I

NYU Press

Chapter Title: Introduction

PART
Book Title: Busting the Mob
Book Subtitle: The United States v. Cosa Nostra
Book Author(s): James B. Jacobs, Christopher Panarella and Jay Worthington
Published by: NYU Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt9qfvw4.5

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 1
Introduction

For mos t o f the twentiet h century , wha t ha s bee n calle d th e "Mafia, " "Cos a
Nostra," or simply "organized crime " seemed a s inevitable as increased taxes .
Some Mafi a chieftain s eve n attaine d widesprea d publi c notoriet y an d wer e
treated lik e fol k heroe s i n thei r neighborhoods , cities , an d beyond . Peopl e
who understoo d powe r an d "th e wa y things worked " i n Ne w Yor k and othe r
large citie s recognize d organize d crim e a s a key player i n politics , vice , an d
legitimate industr y rangin g fro m shippin g an d truckin g t o garbag e disposa l
and the garment trade.
Despite, o r perhap s becaus e of , it s powe r an d pervasiveness , wit h a fe w
notable exception s Cos a Nostr a face d relativel y littl e oppositio n fro m la w
enforcement. Loca l polic e force s di d no t hav e th e resources , strategies , o r
tools t o engag e i n long-ter m investigation s o f secre t societie s tha t carefull y
covered thei r tracks and insulate d thei r leader s from scrutin y throug h hierar -
chical organizatio n an d a code of silence. Sometime s loca l la w enforcemen t
personnel, a s well as prosecutors and judges , were dissuaded fro m organized -
crime contro l initiative s b y potentially advers e politica l o r eve n professiona l
consequences; sometimes the y wer e jus t bribed. Remarkably , unti l wel l int o
the 1960 s th e FBI , unde r th e leadershi p o f J . Edga r Hoover , dispute d th e
very existence of an American Mafia. 1
Congressional attentio n t o organize d crim e date s bac k t o th e Kefauve r

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4 / Introduction Introduction I 5

Committee hearing s i n 195 1 an d th e McClella n Committe e hearing s i n short o f incredible . Ther e wer e majo r prosecution s i n ever y cit y wher e
1957. Th e Departmen t o f Justice began t o focus o n organize d crim e durin g organized-crime familie s hav e been identified . Th e followin g i s a list of Cosa
Robert Kennedy's tenure as attorney general in the early 1960s . He sponsored Nostra bosse s wh o wer e convicte d betwee n 198 1 an d 1992 . (Th e lis t show s
antiracketeering legislatio n i n th e earl y 1960s . B y th e en d o f th e decad e that severa l Cos a Nostr a familie s hav e ha d mor e tha n on e bos s convicte d
Congress ha d passe d th e Organize d Crim e Contro l Act ; Title II I provide d a during this period.)
comprehensive regime n for electronic surveillance by federal, state , and local
1. Funz i Tieri—Genovese famil y i n Ne w York City
police. Afte r Hoover' s departure fro m th e FB I i n 1972 , that agency began t o
2. Anthon y Salerno—Genoves e famil y
devote significan t resource s t o organized-crim e control . Variou s successe s
3. Anthon y Corallo—Lucchese famil y i n Ne w York City
can b e identifie d throughou t th e 1960 s an d 1970s, 2 bu t ther e ca n b e n o
4. Carmin e Persico—Colomb o famil y i n New York City
mistaking the proliferation o f achievements beginning i n the late 1970s .
5. Phili p Rastelli—Bonanno famil y i n New York City
From approximately 1978 , the federal governmen t mounte d a n extraordi -
6. Carlo s Marcello—New Orlean s famil y
nary effor t t o eradicat e Cos a Nostra . Utilizin g extensiv e electroni c surveil -
7. Eugen e Smaldone—Denve r famil y
lance, undercove r governmen t agents , an d mo b turncoats , th e FBI , th e
8. Josep h Aiuppa—Chicago famil y
federal Organize d Crim e Strik e Forces , an d th e Unite d State s attorneys '
9. Nic k Civella—Kansas Cit y famil y
offices initiate d a stead y strea m o f intensiv e investigation s an d produce d a
10. Car l Civella—Kansas Cit y famil y
regular flow of Cosa Nostr a prosecutions throughout the country. Th e federa l
11. Dominic k Brooklier—Lo s Angeles famil y
effort wa s supplemented b y more limited, bu t not inconsequential, effort s b y
12. Fran k Balistrieri—Boston famil y
state an d loca l investigativ e an d prosecutoria l agencies . Join t tas k force s
13. Gennar o Anguilo—Boston famil y
involving federal, state , an d loca l agencie s became routine . N o othe r perio d
14. Russe l Buffalino—Pittston, Pa. , famil y
in America n histor y come s clos e i n term s o f th e numbe r o f investigation s
15. Nicodem o Scarfo—Philadelphi a famil y
and prosecutions . Ultimately , whethe r thi s effor t wil l prov e sufficien t t o
16. Jame s Licavoli—Cleveland famil y
destroy Cosa Nostr a o r whether, phoenixlike , organize d crim e wil l ris e fro m
17. Michae l Trupiano—St. Loui s famil y
the ashes , remain s t o b e seen . Thi s introductor y chapte r seek s t o plac e th e
18. Sa m Russotti—Buffal o crim e famil y
government's organized-crim e contro l effort s i n perspectiv e b y examinin g
19. Joh n Gotti—Gambin o famil y i n Ne w York City
what wa s accomplished , how , an d why , an d wit h wha t likel y consequence s
20. Raymon d Patriarca—Patriarc a famil y i n Providence , R.I .
for the future .
21. Vittori o Amuso—Lucchese famil y
22. Vicori o Orena—Colombo famil y
The Scop e o f the Government' s Attac k 23. Joh n Riggi—DeCavalcant e famil y i n Ne w Jersey
on Cos a Nostr a
These federa l cases , supplemente d b y som e stat e an d loca l prosecutions ,
There i s no exact figure on ho w many crimina l an d civi l cases were brought systematically decimate d whol e organized-crime families . I n Ne w York City,
by th e federa l governmen t (muc h les s stat e an d loca l prosecutors ) agains t the leadershi p an d man y soldier s o f eac h o f th e five Cos a Nostr a crim e
organized crim e i n th e 1980s . However , i n 1988 , FB I Directo r Willia m families (Bonanno , Colombo , Gambino , Genovese , Lucchese ) wer e prose -
Sessions reporte d t o th e Senat e Subcommitte e o n Investigation s tha t sinc e cuted i n separat e RIC O suit s o n th e theor y tha t th e defendant s conducte d
1981 ninetee n bosses , thirtee n underbosses , an d forty-thre e capo s (cre w the affair s o f a n "enterprise " (thei r respectiv e crim e families ) throug h a
chiefs) ha d bee n convicted. 3 Anothe r witness , Davi d Williams , directo r o f pattern o f racketeering activit y (thei r man y rackets , extortions , an d crime s of
the GAO' s Offic e o f Specia l Investigations , state d tha t betwee n 198 3 an d violence). I n United States v . Salerno, th e heads of four o f the five families,
1986, ther e had bee n twenty-fiv e hundre d indictment s of Cosa Nostr a mem - and severa l othe r ke y figures, wer e prosecute d togethe r fo r constitutin g an d
bers and associates. 4 operating a "commission," i n effec t a regional an d perhap s nationa l boar d of
The magnitud e o f th e government' s attac k o n Cos a Nostr a i s nothin g directors for the mob. 5

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6 / Introduction Introduction I 7

Some o f th e investigation s an d prosecution s ha d internationa l dimen - portion o f thei r garment-industr y truckin g interest s an d pa y a $1 2 millio n
sions, especiall y linkin g th e investigator y agencie s an d effort s o f the Unite d fine; their truckin g companie s (whic h wer e als o defendants ) agree d t o with -
States an d Italy . Th e mos t famou s o f thes e case s wa s United States v . draw from a n industr y they had dominated fo r decades. 9 The Brooklyn Strik e
Badalamenti, i n whic h a cooperativ e effor t o f American , Italian , Swiss , Force's investigatio n o f th e Bonann o family' s 25-yea r dominatio n o f Ne w
Brazilian, an d Spanis h la w enforcemen t agencie s close d dow n a massiv e York City' s movin g an d storag e industr y le d t o conviction s o f th e family' s
international dru g traffickin g an d mone y launderin g conspirac y involvin g boss, Philli p Rastelli , an d fourtee n othe r defendants , includin g th e entir e
American Cos a Nostr a and Sicilia n Mafi a groups . leadership o f Teamste r Loca l 814 , an d a numbe r o f executive s o f movin g
The governmen t no t onl y pu t Cos a Nostr a bosses , capos , soldiers , an d and storag e firms. 10
associates i n prison , bu t i t also attacke d mob-controlle d enterprises , suc h a s There were similar victories over mob-controlled enterprise s outside of the
labor unions , constructio n companies , restaurants , an d mobbed-u p indus - New Yor k Cit y metropolita n area . I n 1981 , Eugen e Boffa , owne r o f a
tries. Perhap s th e moder n er a i n th e government' s anti-organized-crim e nationwide labo r leasin g business , wa s convicte d an d sentence d t o twent y
war date s t o th e FBI' s massiv e UNIRA C investigatio n o f th e Internationa l years' imprisonmen t an d ordere d t o forfei t asset s wort h $250,00 0 a s wel l a s
Longshoremen's Association i n the late 1970s . This labor racketeering inves- his interes t i n th e leasin g corporations. 11 Th e "roofers " cas e i n Philadelphi a
tigation, th e subjec t o f specia l Senat e hearing s i n 1981 , resulte d i n th e resulted i n a notoriously mobbed-u p unio n bein g placed i n trusteeship. 12
conviction o f 13 0 businessmen, unio n officials , an d Cos a Nostr a members , The prosecutorial attac k on Cos a Nostr a was supplemented an d supporte d
including Anthony Scotto. 6 by high-visibilit y governmen t hearing s an d inquirie s tha t kep t th e spotligh t
In 1982 , th e Newar k Strik e Forc e mad e histor y b y filing th e first civi l on organize d crim e throughou t th e decade . Fro m 198 3 t o 1987 , th e Presi -
RICO sui t agains t a labo r union , Loca l 560 , th e larges t Teamster s loca l i n dent's Commissio n o n Organize d Crim e hel d publi c hearing s an d issue d
the stat e an d a unio n tha t ha d bee n dominate d b y organized crim e throug h twelve reports; among other things , i t laid ou t the structure o f the organized -
the Provenzano brothers and th e Genovese crime family sinc e the 1950s ; the crime families , documente d thei r extensiv e involvemen t i n dru g traffickin g
suit resulted i n a court-imposed trusteeship , whic h gav e the trustee extensiv e and labo r racketeering , an d recommende d tha t th e Departmen t o f Justic e
powers to run th e unio n unti l th e racketeerin g element coul d b e purged an d bring a civi l RIC O sui t agains t th e Internationa l Brotherhoo d o f Teamsters.
fair election s held . Si x years later, th e Unite d State s Attorney's Office i n th e The Unite d State s Senate' s Permanen t Subcommitte e o n Investigations ,
Southern Distric t o f Ne w Yor k filed a civi l RIC O sui t agains t th e Interna - under th e leadershi p o f Senato r Sa m Nunn , hel d dramati c hearing s o n th e
tional Brotherhoo d o f Teamsters (IBT) , it s general executiv e board , an d th e role of Cosa Nostra i n legitimate industry and illici t rackets. B The committe e
board's incumbents ; unde r a consen t decre e tha t settle d th e case , th e IB T called hundred s o f witnesses, includin g forme r Sicilia n Mafi a bos s Tomasso
agreed t o a three-perso n trusteeshi p whos e goal s wer e t o purg e corruptio n Buscetta and ex-Cosa Nostr a members Vincent Cafaro and Angelo Lonardo.
and racketeerin g an d t o supervis e a direc t electio n o f th e presiden t an d They provide d testimon y o n th e history , customs , an d operation s o f Cos a
general executiv e board . I n Ne w Yor k City , a s a resul t o f civi l RIC O suits , Nostra.
court-appointed trustee s and monitor s were appointed i n a half-dozen RIC O The unprecedente d la w enforcement attac k and th e intensiv e governmen t
cases involving historically mobbed-u p unions. 7 attention pai d t o Cos a Nostr a generate d seriou s instabilit y withi n th e fami -
The governmen t als o move d agains t mob-dominate d businesses . Ne w lies. B y the end of the decade, th e inconceivable had become commonplace :
York City's largest concrete contractor, jointl y owned and operated by several Cosa Nostr a members , eve n leaders , wer e agreein g t o becom e cooperatin g
organized-crime families, wa s put out of business. As part of a consent decree government witnesse s i n exchang e fo r lenienc y an d admissio n int o th e Wit -
between th e Unite d State s Departmen t o f Justic e an d th e Genoves e crim e ness Securit y Program . A mob defecto r o f the statur e o f Salvator e ("Samm y
family, th e Fulto n Fis h Marke t wa s placed unde r th e supervisio n o f a court - the Bull" ) Gravano , underbos s o f th e Gambin o crim e family , woul d hav e
appointed trustee. 8 Similarly , mo b contro l o f th e garmen t industr y wa s ad - seemed unimaginabl e jus t a decade earlier . Defection s adde d t o problems of
dressed b y a ple a bargai n betwee n th e Manhatta n Distric t Attorney' s Offic e leadership successio n an d le d t o man y intra - an d interfamil y assassinations .
and th e Gambin o brothers , whereb y the y promise d t o sel l of f a substantia l By the earl y 1990s , th e accumulated prosecution s ha d bee n s o extensive an d

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8 I Introduction Introduction I 9

the internal deterioratio n o f the families s o severe that some law enforcemen t Number of Court Authorized
experts began to predict the end of Cosa Nostra . Year Electronic Surveillance Orders
1978 570
How th e Governmen t Succeede d 1979 553
1980 564
The government's success can be attributed t o powerful lega l tools, personne l
1981 589
and structura l change s i n th e Departmen t o f Justice an d th e FBI , th e initia -
tive o f president s an d attorne y general s durin g th e 1980s , an d th e interna l 1982 578
deterioration o f Cosa Nostr a itself. 1983 648
1984 801
Legal Weaponry 1985 784
1986 754
The most important legal weapons deployed i n the government's attack on
1987 673
organized crim e hav e bee n electroni c surveillanc e authority , th e Racketee r
Influenced an d Corrup t Organization s Ac t (RICO) , an d th e Witnes s Secu - 1988 749
rity Program. 1989 763
1990 897
Electronic Surveillance
1991 823
Title II I o f th e Omnibu s Crim e Contro l an d Saf e Street s Ac t o f 196 8 1992 991
provided comprehensiv e authorit y fo r electroni c surveillanc e b y federal ,
state, an d loca l la w enforcement agencies. 14 The tw o mai n justification s fo r Electronic eavesdroppin g figured prominentl y i n almos t ever y organized -
the act, accordin g to its proponents, wer e the necessity for electronic surveil - crime prosecutio n o f th e moder n period ; som e prosecution s wer e base d
lance i n nationa l securit y an d i n organized-crim e investigations. 15 Titl e II I almost entirel y o n intercepte d conversations . Th e FB I an d stat e an d loca l
brought federal , state , an d loca l wir e tappin g withi n th e framewor k o f a agencies utilize d bot h telephon e intercept s an d hidde n microphone s i n cars,
comprehensive statute. I t permits electroni c eavesdroppin g onl y wit h a judi- homes, restaurants , an d socia l clubs. I n some cases, the FBI was able to pick
cial warrant issue d upo n a showing of probable cause and o f necessity due to up conversation s o n th e street s wit h high-powe r surveillanc e microphones .
the absenc e o f alternative means . Th e interceptio n i s limited t o thirty days, By the en d o f th e decade , ther e wa s n o plac e wher e Cos a Nostr a member s
although extension s ca n b e obtained . Th e la w require s "minimization" ; th e could convers e without concern fo r government eavesdroppers .
eavesdropping device must be turned of f if, afte r a brief period o f listening, i t Some o f th e majo r organized-crim e investigation s involve d thousand s o f
is apparent tha t th e intercepte d conversatio n i s not relevan t to the subjec t o f conversations intercepte d ove r months. I n the Pizz a Connectio n case , actor s
the warrant . Amendment s i n 198 6 strengthene d th e la w and , fo r th e first were hire d t o rea d t o th e jur y fro m hundred s o f transcript s o f intercepte d
time, authorize d "rovin g surveillance " t o cove r sophisticate d criminal s wh o conversations. Likewis e i n United States v . Gotti, th e governmen t intro -
use a number o f different phone s or sites to conduct business. 16 duced extremel y inculpator y conversation s betwee n Gott i an d hi s subordi -
The shee r numbe r o f federa l electroni c eavesdroppin g order s increase d nates that ha d take n plac e i n th e Ravenit e Socia l Clu b an d i n a n apartmen t
over th e cours e o f th e 1980s , peakin g i n 198 4 an d the n jumpin g t o a n above the club.
apparently ne w platea u i n th e 1990s. 17 The absolut e numbe r o f authoriza -
RICO
tions, however , i s onl y a roug h indicato r o f surveillanc e activity , becaus e
some of the interception s laste d man y months , covere d multipl e phone s and The Racketee r Influence d an d Corrup t Organization s (RICO ) Act, par t of
locations, an d resulte d i n the seizure of thousands of conversations. the 197 0 Organized Crim e Control Act, create d th e most important substan -

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JO / Introduction Introduction I 11

tive an d procedura l la w too l i n th e histor y o f organized-crim e control . A need only prove that the defendant committe d al l these crimes in furtheranc e
brainchild o f Professo r G . Rober t Blake y (wh o worke d o n Senato r McClel - of the defendant' s participatio n i n conductin g th e affair s o f the sam e enter -
lan's organized-crime hearing s in the late 1950 s and late r with the Organized prise. Critic s complai n tha t thi s put s a defendant a t a n enormou s disadvan -
Crime an d Racketeerin g Sectio n o f the Departmen t o f Justice whe n Rober t tage becaus e th e judg e o r jur y ca n hardl y hel p concludin g tha t h e mus t b e
F. Kenned y wa s attorney general ) brough t int o existenc e a ne w kin d o f law guilty o f at leas t som e o f the divers e offense s bein g alleged , especiall y give n
punishing "enterpris e criminality. " RIC O wa s explicitl y aime d a t organize d his connectio n t o a racketeerin g enterpris e lik e Cos a Nostra . Proponent s o f
crime, especiall y it s infiltratio n o f legitimate business. 18 I t took investigator s RICO argu e tha t i t simpl y allow s th e governmen t t o presen t a complet e
and prosecutors some years to become fully familia r an d comfortable wit h the picture o f what the defendant wa s doing and why—instea d o f the artificiall y
new law; after 1980 , almost every major organized-crim e cas e was brought as fragmented pictur e that traditional crimina l la w demands.
a RIC O prosecution. 19 Moreover , th e concep t o f enterpris e racketeerin g From th e prosecutor's standpoint, anothe r o f RICO's advantageous proce-
changed th e wa y organized-crim e investigation s wer e conceive d an d exe - dural feature s i s its ability to join al l the member s o f a criminal enterpris e i n
cuted. Th e FB I began t o think i n term s of gathering evidenc e an d obtainin g a singl e trial , eve n thoug h the y ar e no t al l charge d wit h th e sam e predicat e
indictments agains t entire "enterprises" like each organize d crim e family an d offenses. Fo r example, i n a single trial some defendants ma y be charged wit h
the Cosa Nostr a commission . participating i n th e affair s o f th e enterpris e (e.g. , a Cos a Nostr a crim e
RICO make s i t a crime t o infiltrate , participat e in , o r conduc t th e affair s family) throug h murder s an d loansharking , whil e other s ar e charge d wit h
of a n enterpris e throug h a patter n o f racketeerin g activity . A n enterpris e i s participating i n th e affair s o f th e sam e enterpris e throug h dru g trafficking .
defined a s an y "associatio n i n fact " comprise d o f tw o o r mor e people . I n Moreover, wher e tw o o r mor e defendant s ar e charge d wit h racketeerin g
United States v . Turkette, 20 th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t hel d tha t a n related to the same enterprise, a RICO conspiracy count can also be brought.
enterprise coul d b e a wholly illegitimat e group . Thi s provide d a green ligh t The consequenc e i s the potential fo r "megatrials " (like the Pizza Connectio n
for prosecutin g individual s fo r participatin g i n crimina l syndicate s lik e Cosa case) i n whic h al l th e member s an d associate s o f a crime syndicat e ar e trie d
Nostra crews, families, an d the commission . together because two predicate offenses ar e alleged agains t each on e of them.
Having t o prov e a n "associatio n i n fact " i n a n organized-crim e cas e The advantage s t o th e governmen t ar e obvious ; i t ca n pou r int o th e tria l
provides prosecutor s wit h a n excellen t opportunit y t o introduc e extensiv e masses of evidence about murders , dru g deals, extortions, labo r racketeering ,
evidence, complet e wit h chart s an d table s o f organization , depictin g th e and s o forth , allegedl y committe d b y eac h defendant . Th e prosecutio n ca n
structure o f a n organized-crim e family . I n th e Commissio n cas e an d othe r present a complete pictur e o f a large-scale , ongoing , organized-crim e grou p
organized-crime prosecutions , th e governmen t ha s bee n abl e t o introduc e engaged i n divers e racket s and episodi c explosion s o f violence. A t the en d o f
testimony abou t th e histor y o f organize d crim e i n orde r t o establis h th e the trial , th e juror s wil l b e admonishe d no t t o allo w evidenc e agains t on e
enterprise's existenc e ove r time . Angel o Lonardo' s (forme r underbos s o f th e defendant t o affect thei r judgmen t abou t the guilt of the others, bu t i t is hard
Cleveland crim e family ) length y accoun t o f th e histor y o f th e Cos a Nostr a to believe that "guilt by association" is not a danger i n such megatrials .
commission provide d some of the most valuable evidence in the Commission RICO also provides for ver y severe sentences: twenty years on eac h RIC O
case.21 I n th e Pizz a Connectio n case , th e prosecutio n use d Tomass o Bus - violation an d twent y year s mor e fo r a RIC O conspiracy . Th e defendan t ca n
cetta, a forme r leade r o f th e Sicilia n Mafia , t o la y ou t th e histor y an d also be sentenced fo r each of the predicate offenses. Thi s sentencing structur e
structure of both the Sicilia n Mafi a an d the American Cos a Nostra . made Cosa Nostr a bosse s in United States v . Salerno, the Commission case ,
RICO require s th e governmen t t o prov e tha t a defendan t conducte d o r liable t o thre e hundre d years ' imprisonmen t fo r takin g kickback s fro m con -
participated i n th e affair s o f an enterpris e throug h " a patter n o f racketeerin g crete contractors , althoug h thei r actua l sentence s wer e a mer e on e hundre d
activity," defined a s at least two racketeering act s committed withi n te n year s years each. I n addition , RIC O provide s fo r sever e fines ($250,000, o r twic e
of one another. A racketeering act (also called a "RICO predicate") is defined the loss/gain ) an d fo r th e forfeitur e o f propert y (broadl y define d t o includ e
as virtuall y an y seriou s federa l felon y an d mos t stat e felonies . Thus , i n a businesses, offices , jobs , persona l property , cars , boats , planes , an d rea l
RICO trial, the defendant ma y find himself charged wit h all sorts of differen t estate) tha t has * been acquire d wit h th e proceed s o f racketeerin g activity .
crimes, allegedl y committe d a t differen t time s an d places . Th e prosecutio n While i t is by no means clear that Cosa Nostr a bosses or families ca n actuall y

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12 I Introduction Introduction I 13

be "bankrupted, " th e combinatio n o f forfeitures , fines an d million-dolla r place fo r month s o r years to purge mo b influence , roo t and branch . Durin g
lawyers' fee s mus t caus e problem s fo r organize d crime' s financial bas e an d the remedia l phase , som e trustee s hav e vigorousl y continue d t o investigat e
cash flow. mob influenc e i n th e union s tha t the y supervis e an d hav e remove d busines s
In additio n t o it s criminal provisions , RIC O contain s powerfu l civi l pro - agents an d othe r official s tainte d b y organized-crim e tie s (eve n thoug h the y
visions. On e o f them allow s RICO victims to sue for treble damages but, fo r haven't been convicte d o f a crime). Othe r trustees have been les s aggressive.
obvious reasons , privat e partie s hav e no t opte d t o su e th e mob . However , The succes s o f court-appointe d o r court-approve d trustee s i n purgin g
another provision ha s proven extremely important: it gives the federal govern - organized crim e from traditionall y mob-dominate d union s i s mixed. I n these
ment the righ t to sue civilly for wide-ranging injunctiv e remedie s i n orde r to cases, th e truste e face s enormou s problem s i n dealin g wit h a deepl y en -
prevent a RICO offense fro m continuing. 22 I n some labor racketeering cases, trenched powe r structur e tha t yield s it s power an d privilege s reluctantly , i f at
like th e Teamster s Loca l 56 0 cas e an d th e Teamster s Internationa l case , all. Typically , an d th e Teamsters Loca l 56 0 case is an excellen t example, th e
government prosecutor s electe d t o us e civi l rathe r tha n crimina l RICO . government an d th e truste e find themselve s repeatedl y bac k in cour t seekin g
Proceeding civilly, the government first has to prove that the defendant unio n further relie f agains t obstructionis t unio n tactic s o r defendin g themselve s
officials an d mo b figures have bee n participatin g i n th e affair s o f the unio n against harassin g litigatio n brough t b y th e racketee r elemen t withi n th e
enterprise. The n i t must show the pattern o f racketeering activity by entering union. Th e result s ar e no t ye t i n o n whethe r th e trusteeship s ca n brea k
into evidenc e th e defendants ' pas t crimina l conviction s (i f relate d t o labo r organized crime' s hol d o n mobbed-u p unions , bu t the y ar e the bes t mecha -
racketeering), o r by proving that th e defendants ha d committe d o r conspire d nism ye t devised.
to commi t variou s labo r racketeerin g offenses , includin g solicitin g bribes ,
extortion, embezzlemen t o f pensio n an d welfar e funds , an d multifariou s The Witness Security Program
frauds. I n som e cases , th e defendants ' liabilit y ha s bee n predicate d o n thei r Historically, th e unwillingnes s o f victim s an d othe r witnesse s t o testif y
aiding and abettin g labor racketeerin g and othe r crimes by failing t o take any posed a majo r impedimen t t o successful organized-crim e prosecutions . Fea r
action agains t officials who m they knew to be victimizing their unions . of retribution wa s well founde d sinc e there wer e many example s of potential
Civil RIC O suit s ar e governe d b y civi l procedure , whic h include s th e witnesses' having bee n murdere d o r beaten. Th e Witnes s Securit y Program ,
opportunity for wide-ranging pretrial discovery. The government has the right authorized i n the Organized Crim e Control Act of 1970 , sought to guarantee
to tak e affidavit s fro m ke y defendant s an d defens e witnesse s an d t o loo k the safety o f witnesses who agreed t o testify fo r the government i n organized -
through masse s o f unio n o r compan y book s an d records . Perhap s t o avoi d crime cases. 23
being exposed i n thi s way, o r simply to minimize thei r exposur e at and afte r Run b y th e Unite d State s Marshall s Service , th e Witnes s Securit y Pro -
trial, unio n leader s hav e settle d a numbe r o f civil RIC O labo r racketeerin g gram applie s t o witnesse s before , during , an d afte r trial . I t protect s the m
cases, lik e th e Teamster s Internationa l case , resultin g i n comple x court - during thei r priso n term s and , i f the y ar e release d provide s the m wit h ne w
approved consen t agreements. identities, jobs , an d home s i n ne w locations . Thi s protectio n make s i t feasi-
Civil RICO' s focu s i s futur e oriente d an d preventative , no t punitive . I n ble to testify agains t Cosa Nostr a an d survive.
effect, th e judg e ca n issu e whateve r injunctio n o r othe r remedia l order s ar e The Witnes s Securit y Progra m ha s encouraged , o r a t leas t facilitated , a
necessary t o preven t furthe r racketeerin g b y th e defendants . I n th e RIC O number o f major defection s fro m organize d crime . Up until th e trials of the
labor racketeerin g cases , th e governmen t ha s sough t t o hav e court s appoin t 1980s, n o membe r o f organize d crime , wit h th e singl e exceptio n o f Josep h
trustees t o purg e mobbed-u p union s o f th e essentia l condition s tha t cause d Valachi i n 1963 , ha d eve r broke n th e cod e o f "omerta" an d gon e public ,
the racketeerin g proble m and , i n furtheranc e o f tha t end , t o hel p affecte d much les s testified a t a criminal tria l against fellow Cosa Nostr a members . I n
unions mak e th e transitio n fro m a mob-dominate d dictatorshi p t o a demo - the 1980s , facin g th e prospect of long prison terms , a number o f mob figures
cratic organization. "flipped," agreein g t o testify fo r th e governmen t i n exchang e fo r concession s
The RIC O unio n trusteeship s represen t a n evolutionar y ste p i n society' s in th e charge s agains t the m an d admissio n int o th e Witnes s Securit y
ability t o cop e with organize d crime . I n contras t t o a successful prosecutio n Program.24
that ends when th e defendant i s sent to prison, th e court can pu t a trustee i n One o f th e first Cos a Nostr a member s t o flip wa s Aladem a ("Jimm y th e

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14 I Introduction Introduction I IS

Weasel") Fratianno , actin g boss of the Lo s Angeles crime family ; h e testifie d tigation o f racketeerin g i n th e Longshoremen' s Association ) starte d a s a
for th e government i n th e first RICO prosecution agains t a Cosa Nostr a boss Miami Strik e Forc e projec t an d sprea d t o Ne w Yor k City an d ultimatel y u p
(United States v . Tieri) and late r i n th e Commission case. 25 Shortl y thereaf - and dow n th e Eas t Coast . Operatio n BRILA B wa s directe d b y th e Ne w
ter, Angel o Lonardo, th e one-time underbos s of the Cleveland crim e family , Orleans Strik e Force and involve d strik e force attorney s in New Orleans, Lo s
became a government witness , an d als o provided importan t testimon y i n th e Angeles, an d Washington , D.C . I t resulted i n the conviction o f Cosa Nostr a
Commission case . The prosecution i n the Pizza Connection cas e was assisted boss Carlos Marcell o and numerou s othe r organized-crime member s and as-
by the testimony of Tomasso Buscetta, a former high-rankin g member o f the sociates.28
Sicilian Mafi a wh o agree d t o testif y fo r th e Italia n an d America n govern - From th e outset , th e strik e force s wer e anathem a t o man y o f the Unite d
ments afte r hi s tw o son s an d son-in-la w wer e murdere d b y a riva l Sicilia n States attorneys in whose jurisdictions they operated. Historically , th e Unite d
Mafia faction . Probabl y th e mos t notoriou s Cos a Nostr a membe r turne d States attorneys decided ho w prosecutorial resource s were deployed an d wh o
government witnes s i s Samm y Gravano , Gambin o crim e famil y underbos s would prosecut e wha t cases . Man y Unite d State s attorneys , therefore , ob -
and Joh n Gottf s long-tim e comrade . A s part o f his plea agreemen t wit h th e jected t o th e strik e forces ' independence . Whe n Richar d Thornburgh , a
government, Gravan o admitte d t o havin g carrie d ou t ninetee n ganglan d former Unite d State s attorne y i n Pittsburg h an d a strik e forc e opponent ,
murders on orders from Gott i and othe r superiors. became attorne y genera l i n 1988 , h e move d immediatel y t o disban d th e
strike force s an d transfe r thei r missio n an d personne l bac k t o th e Unite d
States attorneys . Althoug h ther e wa s som e oppositio n i n Congress , whic h
Structural Changes in the Department of Justice held hearing s on th e issue , th e strike forces wer e disbanded i n 1989. 29 Many
The Organize d Crim e an d Racketeerin g sectio n o f th e Departmen t o f experienced strik e forc e prosecutor s resigne d fro m th e Justic e Department .
Justice wa s formed i n 1954-55 . Rober t Kenned y (wh o ha d bee n counse l t o Whether thi s will mean a diminution o f effort agains t Cosa Nostr a o r a more
the McClella n Committe e i n th e lat e 1950s ) reactivate d thi s uni t whe n h e efficient deploymen t o f resources remains to be seen.
became attorne y genera l i n 1961 , making organize d crim e a top priority. I n
Developments in the FBI
1967, th e Justic e Departmen t forme d th e Organize d Crim e Strik e Forces ,
comprised o f prosecutors and representative s of the federal investigativ e agen- One reaso n fo r th e succes s o f th e FBI' s organized-crim e progra m wa s its
cies in fourteen cities . Over the years they came to be led by seasoned federa l ability t o develop a n intelligenc e bas e o n th e structure , makeup , an d activi -
prosecutors. Th e strik e force s wer e separat e an d distinc t fro m th e Unite d ties o f Cos a Nostr a ove r man y year s an d t o disseminat e intelligenc e fro m
States attorneys ; thei r attorney s i n charg e o f eac h field uni t reporte d t o one field divisio n t o another . Thi s wa s facilitate d b y th e developmen t an d
the hea d o f th e Organize d Crim e an d Racketeerin g Sectio n o f th e Justic e implementation o f th e Organize d Crim e Informatio n Syste m (OCIS) , a
Department. The y concentrate d mor e attentio n an d resource s o n organize d computer networ k (initiated i n 1980 ) designed t o collect, evaluate , store , an d
crime than eve r before. Accordin g to their supporters, th e strike force lawyers disseminate organized-crime intelligenc e information .
stayed i n thei r job s longe r tha n th e typica l Unite d State s attorney s an d Given th e concentratio n o f Cos a Nostr a familie s an d member s i n Ne w
assistant Unite d State s attorneys , develope d mor e specialize d expertis e i n York City , th e Ne w Yor k Cit y FB I offic e was , no t surprisingly , th e Burea u
organized-crime control, an d were more successful i n gaining the confidenc e office mos t involved i n organized-crime investigation s throughout th e 1980s .
of the FBI and othe r law enforcement agencies . In 1979 , tha t office' s coordinato r o f organized-crim e investigations , Jame s
Nevertheless, u p t o the lat e 1970 s and earl y 1980s , th e strik e forces wer e Kossler attended G . Rober t Blakey' s summer institut e o n organize d crim e a t
criticized fo r thei r inabilit y t o defin e organize d crime , fo r pursuin g low - Cornell University . Blake y explaine d ho w RIC O coul d b e use d t o attac k
priority targets , an d fo r lackin g th e authorit y t o contro l th e activitie s o f th e Cosa Nostr a an d argue d fo r th e targetin g o f organize d crimina l enterprises.
investigative agencie s upo n whic h the y depended. 26 Soon , however , th e Kossler, maintainin g clos e touch wit h Blakey , redeploye d resource s o n Ne w
strike force s bega n functionin g mor e effectively , an d th e FB I significantl y York City's five Cosa Nostr a crim e families. Unde r operation GENU S team s
elevated it s commitmen t t o organized-crim e control. 27 Th e payof f soo n be - of FB I agent s wer e assigne d t o develo p intelligenc e o n eac h family . Eac h
came evident as success followed success . Fo r example, UNIRA C (the inves- team's jo b was to develop a table of organization fo r eac h family , identif y al l

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16 I Introduction Introduction I 17

the members and their status in the organization, an d then determin e whic h cover costs of joint investigations , wer e very successful i n involvin g state and
rackets and industrie s the family wa s involved in . Afte r that , th e prosecution s local agencie s i n thei r operations . I n 197 6 th e Nationa l Organize d Crim e
would fal l int o place. 30 By the mid-1980s , th e Ne w York FBI office ha d 16 5 Planning Counci l wa s forme d t o facilitat e plannin g an d coordinatio n be -
agents assigned t o the organized-crime division . tween th e strik e force s an d th e federa l la w enforcemen t agencies . I n 1980 ,
FBI agen t Josep h Pistone' s penetratio n o f th e Bonann o famil y i n Ne w the Executiv e Workin g Grou p fo r Federal-State-Loca l Prosecutoria l Rela -
York Cit y fro m 197 6 t o 198 2 constitute s on e o f th e mos t extraordinar y tions wa s initiated . I t provide d th e first forma l liaiso n betwee n th e Depart -
chapters i n th e moder n histor y o f law enforcement's attac k o n Cos a Nostra . ment o f Justice , th e Nationa l Distric t Attorney s Association , an d th e Na -
No la w enforcement agen t ha d eve r befor e bee n able , throug h disguis e an d tional Associatio n o f Attorney s Genera l fo r th e purpos e o f improvin g
guile, t o ge t s o deepl y insid e a Cos a Nostr a family . Indeed , tha t th e FB I relations between th e federal, state , and loca l prosecutors.
would eve n attemp t t o plac e a secre t agen t i n th e rank s o f organize d crim e These formal institutiona l mechanism s of cooperation wer e supplemented
reveals ho w commited , confident , an d creativ e th e agenc y ha d become. 31 and reinforce d b y man y informa l multiagenc y workin g arrangements . I n
Pistone hun g ou t a t th e bar s an d restaurant s frequente d b y organized-crim e New Yor k City , FB I Agent-in-Charg e Jame s Kossle r worke d ou t a n im -
members an d associates . Eventually , h e wa s notice d b y organized-crim e mensely valuabl e agreemen t wit h Deput y Ne w Yor k Cit y Polic e Commis -
figures, whom h e cu t i n o n a numbe r o f phony schemes . I n th e cours e o f sioner Patrick Murphy whereby the Bureau an d the New York Police Depart-
some o f thes e "crimes, " he wa s able t o brin g othe r agent s int o contac t wit h ment agree d t o shar e resources , intelligence , an d coordinat e thei r
members of Cosa Nostra . Pistone' s undercover operatio n laste d six years; just investigations. Th e agreemen t marrie d th e Bureau' s substantia l budgetar y
before h e had to surface an d break his cover, h e was promised inductio n int o resources an d sophisticate d intelligenc e apparatu s wit h th e NYPD' s street -
the Bonann o family . Piston e provide d a mountai n o f intelligenc e materia l level intelligenc e an d highl y develope d informan t system . NYP D detective s
and serve d a s a witness at a number o f key Cosa Nostr a trials , especiall y th e were abl e t o confir m FB I intelligenc e hypothese s an d provid e lead s fo r
Commission case. 32 N o doubt , thi s infiltratio n wa s a blo w t o Cos a Nostr a identifying crim e family members , thei r roles , and crimina l activities .
morale, raisin g doubts about how many of its secrets had been revealed . The organized-crim e squa d i n th e Ne w Yor k Cit y Polic e Departmen t
began t o cooperat e muc h mor e harmoniousl y an d effectivel y wit h it s FB I
Cooperation among Federal, State, and Local Law
counterparts an d wit h stat e agencie s lik e th e Ne w Yor k Stat e Organize d
Enforcement Agencies
Crime Task Force . Thi s kind o f interagency cooperation wa s instrumental i n
Historically, effectiv e organized-crim e contro l wa s severel y hampere d b y initiatives lik e th e investigatio n o f th e Fulto n Fis h Market , th e massiv e
bitter rivalr y amon g th e federal , state , an d loca l la w enforcemen t agencies . investigation o f the Pizza Connection, an d the preparation o f the Gotti prose-
Each agenc y distruste d th e others , eve n t o th e poin t o f chargin g tha t riva l cution.
agencies wer e neithe r secur e no r trustworthy ; frequently , eac h fel t tha t th e The practic e o f "cross-designating" prosecutors fro m on e agenc y t o prose-
others wer e tryin g t o seiz e credi t unfairl y fo r successes . Th e histor y o f cute o n behal f o f another agenc y als o proved t o be a major breakthroug h i n
American la w enforcement , especiall y i n combattin g organize d crime , i s interagency cooperation . Thi s practice allows state and loca l prosecutors who
replete wit h los t opportunitie s du e t o inabilit y o r unwillingnes s t o reac h have worke d o n a n investigatio n t o follow th e cas e i f it becomes federa l an d
interagency agreements. vice versa . Fo r example , afte r Pau l Castellan o wa s assassinated, Pa t Rya n o f
Beginning i n the 1970s , joint federal, state , an d loca l task forces began t o the Manhatta n Distric t Attorney' s Offic e wa s cross-designated a s an assistan t
make significan t headwa y i n overcomin g agenc y parochialism . I n 1970 , th e United State s attorne y i n th e Souther n Distric t an d Walte r Mac k fro m th e
National Counci l o n Organize d Crim e wa s established t o formulate a strat - Southern Distric t Unite d State s attorney' s offic e wa s cross-designate d a s a n
egy t o eliminat e organize d crime . Whil e th e counci l faile d t o formulat e a assistant distric t attorne y i n th e Manhatta n Distric t Attorney' s Office . Thi s
national strategy , i t mobilize d attentio n t o th e proble m o f interagenc y rela - proved t o be a n enormousl y valuabl e mechanis m fo r investigatin g th e Gott i
tions. Th e federa l strik e forces mad e majo r stride s in coordinatin g the effort s case tha t wa s eventuall y turne d ove r t o th e Unite d State s attorne y fo r th e
of federal prosecutoria l an d investigativ e agencie s an d also , b y promising t o Eastern Distric t of New York.

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18 I Introduction Introduction I 19

Robert F . Kennedy , fo r example , wa s highl y committe d t o a full-scal e

Why the 1980s?
attack o n organize d crime . H e ha d playe d a key rol e durin g th e McClella n
Why di d th e government' s attac k o n Cos a Nostr a reac h it s zenit h i n th e hearings and was extremely well informed abou t the Mafia, especiall y its role
1980s? Perhap s th e 1980s ' successe s wer e simpl y th e culminatio n o f a n in th e Teamster s an d othe r labo r unions . Prosecutin g Jimm y Hoff a wa s a
organized-crime contro l proces s that bega n i n th e 1950 s and steadil y gaine d top priorit y o f hi s administration . Furthermore , Kenned y quadruple d th e
strength an d momentu m thereafter . Perhap s the 195 1 Senate hearing s orga - Organized Crim e Sectio n an d encourage d i t t o mov e aggressivel y agains t
nized b y Senato r Kefauver , th e 195 7 revelatio n o f a secre t meetin g o f orga- organized crime. 33 By contrast his successor, Ramse y Clark, ha d little interest
nized-crime bosse s fro m al l ove r th e countr y a t Apalachin , Ne w York , in organized-crime contro l and opposed electroni c surveillance .
Kennedy's tenur e a s attorne y general , th e Valach i revelations , an d th e pas - The Reaga n administratio n seem s t o hav e bee n th e mos t aggressivel y
sage o f organized-crim e contro l legislatio n provide d th e foundatio n fo r a anti-organized crim e sinc e th e Kenned y administration . I n on e speec h o n
gradual, sometime s halting , proces s tha t le d t o the investigation s an d prose - the subject , Reaga n announce d hi s commitmen t t o attackin g organize d
cutions o f th e 1980s . Thi s "explanation, " however , doe s no t focu s o n ke y crime and described a special cabinet session he called to address the problem
decisions o r decisionmaker s o r majo r shift s i n forma l policy . I t interpret s on Septembe r 30 , 1982 .
organized-crime contro l initiative s as having "evolved" or "matured," perhaps
following thei r ow n interna l logi c o r tim e clock . Thos e wh o favo r suc h a n Attorney General William French Smith . . . talked not only about the steady rise in
interpretation ten d t o speak i n term s lik e the following : "I t took ten year s for street crime over two decades but the growth and increasing sophistication of regional
federal prosecutor s to learn to use RICO." and national networks of professional criminals. He described the alarmingly success-
ful attempts of these networks to corrupt legitimate business, unions, political figures
We believ e tha t th e evidenc e wil l ultimatel y suppor t a different hypothe -
and member s of law enforcement an d governmen t agencies . H e made i t clear that
sis, albei t on e tha t coul d b e reconcile d wit h th e evolutionar y hypothesis . career criminals had not only grown bolder in their activities but were continuing to
While maturation , evolution , an d interna l logi c ar e certainl y par t o f th e extend thei r reac h eve r deepe r int o law-abidin g sector s o f our society , buyin g and
story, ther e wer e als o ke y decision s an d decisionmaker s wh o consciousl y bribing their way to the kind of official protectio n and respectability that would permit
chose t o mak e organized-crim e contro l a n importan t priorit y despit e relent - them to operate their criminal undergrounds with impunity. 34
less pressure to accord preferenc e t o other crime problems.
The attitude , politics , priorities , an d policie s o f presidents an d th e attor - According t o Reagan , thi s specia l cabine t decide d tha t th e Justic e Depart -
neys genera l hav e surel y ha d a n impac t o n federa l organize d crime-contro l ment woul d "mor e vigorousl y prosecut[e ] th e mob , includin g us e o f th e
initiatives. The president can have a positive impact via his choice of attorney RICO statut e t o confiscate mor e o f its financial asset s . . . and [forge ] close r
general an d FB I director , hi s suppor t fo r enhance d crime-contro l budgets , co-operation wit h stat e an d loca l la w enforcemen t agencies , includin g ne w
and hi s "jawboning " o n organized-crim e themes . O n th e othe r hand , a training program s a t a federal facilit y i n Glynco , Georgia , tha t woul d focu s
president ca n hav e a negativ e impac t if , fo r politica l o r othe r reasons , h e on th e mob' s ne w an d mor e sophisticate d tactics. " Moreover , Reaga n ap -
chooses a n attorne y genera l disincline d t o pursue organize d crim e o r make s pointed a presidential commissio n t o determin e wha t els e migh t b e done t o
it clea r t o th e attorne y genera l an d othe r subordinate s eithe r tha t attackin g further th e anti-organized-crime effort .
organized crime is not a priority or that some other goals are higher priorities. Two Genera l Accountin g Offic e (GAO ) reports , i n 197 6 and 1981 , criti-
Likewise, th e attorne y genera l ca n hav e grea t impact o n organized-crim e cized th e For d an d Carte r administrations ' Justic e Departments ' organized -
control b y lobbyin g o r no t lobbyin g fo r legislatio n (e.g. , RICO , electroni c crime contro l effor t fo r failin g t o concentrate o n Cos a Nostr a an d fo r failin g
eavesdropping, Witnes s Security Program) and by allocating or not allocating to engag e i n strategi c plannin g an d cooperativ e venture s wit h othe r agen -
substantial resource s t o th e Organize d Crim e an d Racketeerin g Section . cies.35 There were no similar GAO criticisms thereafter, whic h lend s support
While the Unite d State s attorneys have some independence fro m th e centra l to th e hypothesi s tha t afte r 1981 , the Justic e Departmen t go t it s organized -
Justice Department , ther e i s littl e doub t tha t th e attorne y genera l ha s th e crime-control progra m o n track .
power t o establis h prioritie s throug h persuasio n an d manipulatio n o f re - Policy is also made by each of the ninety-two Unite d State s attorneys, wh o
sources. have historicall y enjoye d a grea t dea l o f independenc e i n runnin g thei r

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20 I Introduction Introduction I 21

offices. I n 1983 , Rudolp h Giulian i lef t a top positio n i n th e Departmen t o f government. Thi s certainl y reflect s som e sor t o f change , eithe r muc h mor e
Justice t o becom e Unite d State s attorne y fo r th e Souther n Distric t o f Ne w powerful an d effective la w enforcement tha n eve r before (including especially
York.36 Ultimately , i t wa s th e Souther n Distric t Unite d State s Attorney' s the draconian RIC O sentences) and the possibility of defecting withou t being
Office, unde r Giuliani , tha t brough t th e Commissio n case , fou r famil y killed (thank s to the Witness Securit y Program ) or a different attitud e amon g
RICO cases , th e Pizz a Connectio n case , an d th e Teamster s Internationa l Cosa Nostr a member s about the importance o f loyalty to their organization .
case a s wel l a s man y others . Whateve r debat e ther e migh t b e abou t th e While plausible , Goldstock' s thesi s i s difficul t t o evaluat e becaus e i t i s
impact o f president s an d attorney s genera l i n makin g organize d crim e a hard t o compar e th e "values " of yesterday's organized-crim e leaders , middl e
higher priority, ther e is no doubt about Giuliani's importance . managers, an d soldier s with today's. There i s a tendency i n man y contexts to
The FBI' s prioritie s wer e als o crucia l t o th e histor y o f organized-crim e romanticize th e value s an d accomplishment s o f pas t generations . Jus t a s
control. Clearly , Hoove r wa s not intereste d i n takin g on Cos a Nostra . How - many o f u s d o no t believ e tha t thi s generation' s politica l leader s o r colleg e
ever, a t least one, perhap s all , o f his successors mus t hav e seen a n attac k o n presidents measur e u p to their counterpart s o f the past, s o it is not surprisin g
organized crime as consistent with and even central to the agency's mission. 37 that Jo e Bonann o believe s tha t today' s mo b leader s ar e les s capabl e an d
The investigation s that took place from th e late 1970 s onward could no t have worthy than he. 40
occurred withou t th e stron g suppor t o f th e FB I directors . Moreover , th e This romanticizin g tendenc y i s compounded b y the methodologica l erro r
priorities an d decision s o f othe r FB I officials , especiall y i n Ne w Yor k City , of comparin g al l (o r th e average ) o f today' s leader s wit h onl y th e bes t o f
are sure to figure prominently whe n th e ful l histor y o f this law enforcemen t yesterday's leaders . No t al l o f yesterday's mo b members an d bosse s were like
effort i s finally written. Marlon Brando' s depiction o f a man o f honor i n The Godfather. The Golds -
tock thesis is intriguing, bu t it needs to be carefully an d critically examined .

Internal Weakening of Cosa Nostra

Organized-Crime Contro l an d Civi l Libertie s
Ronald Goldstock , long-tim e directo r o f th e Ne w Yor k Stat e Organize d
Crime Tas k Force , echoin g th e thesi s o f mob-boss-turned-autho r Jo e Bo - Whatever on e think s o f the event s examine d i n thi s book , United States v .
nanno, 38 ha s argue d tha t Cos a Nostr a ha s bee n weakene d a s muc h b y Cosa Nostra is not a case of law enforcement agencies ' ignoring or taking the
internal force s a s b y externa l forces. 39 I n Goldstock' s opinion , th e moder n law int o thei r ow n hands ; rathe r i t i s a n exampl e o f ho w substantiv e an d
generation o f Cosa Nostr a leader s ha s different value s fro m it s predecessors. procedural crimina l law s have been expansivel y amended an d recas t in orde r
Honor, respect , an d famil y hav e give n wa y t o gree d an d th e fas t buck . to provid e la w enforcemen t agencie s powerfu l mean s fo r defeatin g Cos a
Moreover, Goldstoc k argue s tha t wit h th e demis e o f "Littl e Italies " aroun d Nostra an d othe r organized-crim e groups . Whil e som e observer s ma y ap -
the Unite d States , th e mo b los t it s recruitmen t bas e an d di d not , perhap s plaud th e government' s attac k o n Cos a Nostr a a s a n impressiv e exampl e o f
could not , adequatel y replenis h itsel f wit h youn g members . H e conclude s how a democrati c governmen t ca n defea t a n immensel y powerfu l crim e
that Cosa Nostr a becam e les s competent a t the very time when la w enforce - syndicate whil e respectin g th e rul e o f la w an d du e proces s o f law , othe r
ment was becoming more competent . observers ma y conclud e tha t th e rul e o f la w an d importan t principle s o f
Goldstock's thesis deserves serious consideration becaus e of its plausibility fairness, du e process , an d substantiv e justic e hav e bee n stretche d to o fa r i n
and th e author' s expertise . Al l organization s experienc e chang e resultin g the relentles s effor t t o pu t th e leader s o f Cos a Nostr a behin d bars . Suc h
from leadershi p transitions , alteration s i n environment , an d oscillation s i n critics would poin t t o the expansion o f accessorial an d conspiratoria l liabilit y
the economy . Som e change s ar e merel y deviation s fro m long-ter m pattern s under RICO , electroni c eavesdropping , gran d jur y supoenas , makin g deal s
and other s permanen t change s i n goals , priorities , strategies , an d culture . with dangerous an d reprehensibl e criminals , mas s trials, and draconia n pun -
Goldstock believe s cultura l chang e ha s diminished organize d crime' s capac - ishments as too great a price to pay, even for the dismantling of Cosa Nostra .
ity t o carr y ou t it s goals an d strategie s effectively . Th e stronges t evidenc e i n Politicians hav e show n n o concer n fo r th e privac y o f o r justic e fo r orga -
favor o f Goldstock's thesi s i s the apparen t breakdow n of omerta, th e cod e of nized-crime figures. Senator s an d representative s hav e compete d wit h on e
silence, an d th e willingnes s o f score s o f mobster s t o cooperat e wit h th e another t o b e toughes t o n organize d crime . Th e onl y doubt s raise d i n

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22 I Introduction Introduction I 23

congressional debate s ove r organized-crim e legislatio n hav e involve d th e of civi l RIC O provision s i n dispute s amon g corporation s ha s triggere d re -
possibility tha t organized-crime-contro l tactic s woul d b e use d agains t peopl e peated, albei t unsuccessful , effort s t o reig n i n th e reac h o f th e statute . I f
other than organized-crim e members , especiall y unpopular politica l groups. anything, however , th e tactic s tha t hav e prove n s o successfu l agains t Cos a
Cosa Nostr a member s hav e bee n demonize d i n Congres s an d define d a s Nostra ar e bein g transplante d t o th e wa r agains t drugs , an d eve n t o "wars "
social pariah s agains t who m extraordinar y rule s ough t t o apply . Thus , a against official corruption , violen t crime, an d pornography .
system of substantive and procedura l la w has evolved so that once a person is
identified a s hea d o f a n organized-crim e family , ther e i s usuall y probabl e
The Futur e o f Organized Crim e
cause t o bu g hi s hom e an d ca r an d ta p hi s phones . Unde r RIC O th e
crime bos s can practicall y b e automaticall y charge d wit h participatin g i n a n After eac h o f the majo r organized-crim e case s presented i n thi s book , som e
enterprise (hi s crim e family ) throug h racketeerin g activit y (th e crime s com - law enforcement official s an d academic observers predicted tha t America was
mitted b y hi s underlings) . N o matte r wha t th e underlyin g crime s prove d on th e threshol d o f defeatin g Cos a Nostra. 41 Whil e on e canno t hel p bein g
against him , th e sentencin g la w is structured s o that the bos s can b e impris - impressed b y th e government' s overwhelmin g successe s i n organized-crim e
oned fo r a very long time, probabl y for life . prosecutions across the Unite d State s since 1980 , one must also be impressed
For the most part, th e appellate courts have not rejected th e government' s by Cosa Nostra' s powe r an d expansiv e reac h a s evidenced i n th e testimony ,
aggressive use of RICO and other anti-organized-crime tactics . The appellat e wiretaps, an d physica l evidenc e tha t hav e been adduce d i n thes e same trials.
courts are loathe to reverse a conviction resultin g from man y month s of trial It i s soberin g t o conside r that , a t leas t unti l recently , Cos a Nostr a exerte d
against a defendan t who m "everybod y knows " i s a majo r organized-crim e powerful influenc e ove r th e nation' s larges t unio n (th e Teamsters) , severa l
figure. Eve n whe n the y ar e obviousl y trouble d b y suc h thing s a s megatrial s other importan t nationa l union s (Longshoreman' s Association , Hote l Em -
and statu s crimes, th e appellat e judge s have upheld organized-crim e convic - ployees an d Restauran t Employee s Internationa l Union , an d th e Laborer s
tions, whil e expressing their "doubts" and "concerns. " International Unio n o f Nort h America) , th e Ne w Yor k City/Ne w Jerse y
Civil libertarian s hav e rarel y chose n organized-crim e case s t o challeng e waterfront, th e Fulton Fis h Market, the New York City construction industry ,
government over-reaching and abuse of authority. Indeed , fro m a civil libert- garment industry , an d trash-haulin g industry , an d numerou s other businesse s
ies standpoint, majo r organized-crim e case s provide th e worst set of facts o n throughout th e country . Ove r th e las t severa l decades , Cos a Nostr a leader s
which t o test the propriety and constitutionalit y o f new law enforcement an d have stoo d a t th e sid e o f mayors , governors , an d eve n presidents . Th e su m
crime contro l tactics . Perhap s ther e i s an implici t assumptio n tha t th e rule s total o f this muc h influenc e an d powe r make s organize d crim e a significan t
are differen t i n organized-crim e cases . Perhap s i t i s generally accepte d tha t part of the political econom y of the Unite d States .
Cosa Nostr a bosse s and member s assum e th e ris k of (and hav e n o justifiabl e Unfortunately, ther e is no systematic way to determine ho w successful th e
complaint about ) whateve r la w enforcemen t tactic s th e legislativ e an d th e government's organized-crime-contro l campaig n ha s been , muc h les s will
executive branches come up with. be, i n weakenin g o r eliminatin g Cos a Nostr a o r i n reducin g th e amoun t o f
Rather tha n defen d th e right s o f organized-crim e figures, civi l libertie s racketeering an d har m associate d wit h Cos a Nostra. 42 Ther e ar e n o system -
groups hav e ofte n warne d agains t an d oppose d th e tactic s designe d fo r th e atic an d reliabl e dat a o n th e health , wealth , an d powe r o f Cosa Nostr a a s a
"war on organize d crime " on th e groun d tha t the y woul d inevitabl y b e use d whole or of its individual crim e families. Hundred s o f Cosa Nostr a member s
in othe r contexts , especiall y t o chil l bon a fide politica l expression . I n fact , have bee n sentence d t o lon g priso n terms , bu t w e d o no t kno w whethe r
organized-crime-control devices , fro m conspirac y la w t o RICO , an d fro m replacements hav e o r will mov e int o thei r vacate d roles . Man y la w enforce -
electronic eavesdroppin g t o crimina l an d civi l forfeitures , hav e inexorabl y ment professional s se e th e Cos a Nostr a familie s a s bein g i n disarra y an d i n
seeped int o othe r contexts . On e reaso n fo r thi s i s the plasticit y o f th e ter m permanent decline . Bu t these observations are generally a d ho c and no t par t
"organized crime. " Many kind s o f criminality ca n plausibl y b e labele d orga - of systematic nationwide intelligence gathering and analysis effort. Electroni c
nized crime . Th e RIC O statute , fo r example , ha s frequentl y bee n use d monitoring, compute r systems, and the emergence of well-trained organized -
against non-Cos a Nostr a defendant s who , unde r eve n th e broades t defini - crime-control unit s an d specialist s mak e conceivabl e th e implementatio n o f
tion, coul d no t be linked t o an organized-crime group . Furthermore , th e use an extensiv e intelligence operation . Bu t resources and technolog y hav e to be

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24 I Introduction Introduction I 25

supported b y politica l wil l an d organizationa l commitment . Th e dange r i s most of the members . However , twenty-fiv e hundre d migh t be a plausible numbe r i f
that attentio n wil l b e draw n awa y fro m organized-crim e contro l t o othe r mob "associates" are counted, sinc e the numbe r o f associates far exceed s the numbe r
pressing la w enforcemen t prioritie s an d that , whil e th e la w enforcemen t of "made" members.
machinery sleeps , Cos a Nostr a wil l reconstitut e itself . Finally , eve n i f Cosa 5. Fo r a description o f Cosa Nostr a an d it s crime families , se e President' s Com -
mission o n Organize d Crime , Repor t t o th e Presiden t an d Attorne y General , The
Nostra a s a n organizatio n ha s bee n substantiall y weakened , w e obviousl y
Impact: Organized Crime Today (Washington, D.C. , Apri l 1986) .
cannot b e sur e tha t Cos a Nostra' s racketeerin g activitie s hav e no t bee n (o r
6. Othe r majo r labo r racketeerin g investigation s o f th e lat e 1970 s wer e (1 )
will no t be ) take n ove r b y newl y emergin g crim e groups , thereb y negatin g
"PENDORF," which focuse d o n Cos a Nostr a control o f the Teamster Centra l State s
any reduction i n racketeering or societal harm . Pension Fun d an d whic h resulte d i n th e convictio n o f the Teamsters' president, Ro y
Many o f the economi c an d socia l force s tha t allowe d organize d crim e t o Williams; (2 ) "STRAWMAN, " whic h focuse d o n a conspirac y b y fou r Cos a Nostr a
achieve suc h immens e powe r ar e stil l operative . Th e citizenry' s deman d fo r families t o utiliz e th e Centra l State s Pensio n Fun d t o secur e interest s i n La s Vega s
illicit goods and service s remains strong . Man y union s remai n vulnerabl e t o casinos an d t o ski m profit s fro m thos e businesses ; (3 ) "LILREX," whic h focuse d o n
labor racketeering , an d thos e tha t hav e bee n "liberated " fro m organize d racketeering i n th e Ne w Yor k Cit y constructio n industry ; an d (4 ) "LIUNA, " whic h
crime hav e bee n ver y slo w to repudiat e thei r mo b ties , i f they hav e done s o focused o n Cos a Nostr a racketeerin g i n th e Laborer s Internationa l Unio n o f Nort h
at all. Thus , i t may be premature t o predict that th e investigation s an d trial s America.
of th e 1980 s constitut e th e beginnin g o f th e las t chapte r i n th e histor y o f 7. Se e Rand y Mastro , Steve n C . Bennett , an d Mar y P . Donlevy , Private Plain-
Cosa Nostra . Whateve r th e futur e ma y hold , th e perio d fro m th e lat e 1970 s tiffs Use of Equitable Remedies under the RICO Statute: A Means to Reform
Corrupted Labor Unions, 2 4 Universit y o f Michiga n Journa l o f La w Refor m 57 1
to the earl y 1990 s has been marke d b y the mos t concerted an d sophisticate d
(1991).
attack o n organize d crim e i n th e histor y o f th e Unite d States . Th e goa l o f
The loca l union s place d unde r trusteeship s ar e Loca l 6 A o f th e Cemen t an d
this boo k i s t o begi n th e herculea n tas k o f documenting , explaining , an d
Concrete Worker s o f the Laborer s Internationa l Unio n o f America; Distric t Counci l
critiquing thi s recen t histor y s o tha t i t wil l b e availabl e t o thi s an d futur e of Carpenters ; Teamster s Loca l 814 ; Unite d Seafoo d Worker s Loca l 359 ; (Philadel -
generations o f students, scholars , an d member s o f the publi c wh o ar e inter - phia) Roofer s Unio n Loca l 30-30B , an d Loca l 181 4 of the Internationa l Longshore -
ested i n organized crim e in American society . man's Association . Loca l 10 0 of the Restauran t Worker s Union , charge d wit h bein g
dominated b y th e Gambin o family , wa s spare d a court-appointe d truste e whe n th e
judge permitte d th e unio n voluntaril y t o instal l a unio n internationa l vice-presiden t
Notes as trustee.
1. Hoover' s resistance to investigating or even recognizing the existence of orga- 8. Se e United States v Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 8 7 Civ 735 1 (SDN Y
nized crime has been very well documented. See , e.g., J . R. Nash, Citizen Hoover, filed October 15 , 1987) ; for a discussio n o f the case , se e Brian Carroll , Combatting
chapter 6 , "Th e Organizatio n Tha t Didn' t Exist " (Hall, 1972) ; Arthur M . Schle - Racketeering in the Fulton Fish Market, i n Cyrill e Fijnau t an d James Jacobs, Orga-
singer, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Ballantine, 1978). nized Crime and Its Containment: A Transatlantic Initiative (Kluwer, 1991) .
2. A useful, i f somewhat abbreviated, chronology of milestones and major prose- 9. Fo r a discussion o f the case , se e Robert Maas , Organized Crime Infiltration of
cutions is Department of Justice, Criminal Investigatio n Division , Organize d Crime Legitimate Industry in New York, in Cyrill e Fijnau t an d Jame s Jacobs , Organized
Section, Chronological History of la Cosa Nostra in the United States: January 1920- Crime and Its Containment: A Transatlantic Initiative (Kluwer, 1991) .
August 1987 (Washington, D.C., October 1987). 10. United States v Rastelli, 8 5 CR 34 5 (EDNY filed June 10 , 1985) .
3. Th e fact that these FBI statistics did not include consiglieri, advisors or counsel- 11. United States v Boffa, 68 8 F2d 91 9 (3d Cir 1982) .
ors to the bosses, is indicative of the lack of a systematic and comprehensive officia l 12. United States v Local 30, United States Tile and Slate Roofers, 68 6 F Supp
reporting system for organized-crime prosecutions. 1139 (ED P a 1988) . Se e Rand y Mastro , Steve n C . Bennett , an d Mar y P . Donlevy ,
4. Thi s coul d mea n twenty-fiv e hundre d separat e "counts " charge d agains t a Private Plaintiffs Use of Equitable Remedies under the RICO Statute: A Means to
much smalle r numbe r o f individual s (althoug h som e individual s wer e charge d i n Reform Corrupted Labor Unions," 2 4 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
several different indictments) . It seems implausible that twenty-five hundred differen t 571 (1991).
organized-crime members were charged in criminal cases, since this would constitute 13. Permanen t Subcommitte e o n Investigation s o f th e Committe e o n Govern -

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26 I Introduction Introduction I 27

mental Affairs , Twenty-Five Years after Valachi, 100t h Cong. , 2 d sess. , 11 , 15 , 21, See also General Accounting Office, Report on Organized Crime: Issues Concern-
22, 2 9 April 1988 . ing Strike Forces, repor t prepared fo r the Permanent Subcommitte e o n Investigations ,
14. Unite d State s Code, vol . 18 , sees. 2510-2 0 (1982). Senate Committee o n Government Affairs , 101s t Cong., 1s t Sess., April 1989 .
15. Se e Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law 28. Concernin g Marcello , se e Donal d W . Cox , Kingfish: Carlos Marcello and
of Electronic Surveillance, 7 4 Journal of Criminal La w and Criminology 1 (1983) . the Assassination of]ohn F . Kennedy (McGraw Hill , 1989) . Another majo r investiga -
16. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Publi c La w 99-508 , United States tion o f the late 1970s/earl y 1980 s period wa s operation PENDORF . I t resulted i n th e
Statutes at Large 10 0 (1986) : 1848 . Ne w technologie s brough t withi n Titl e II I conviction o f to p organized-crim e figures i n Chicago , Milwaukee , Cleveland , La s
include electroni c mail , compute r transmissions , vide o teleconferencing , cellula r Vegas, and Kansa s City.
telephones, som e telephoni c pagers , an d certai n type s o f radi o transmissions . Se e 29. Attorne y Genera l Orde r No . 136-89 , 2 6 Decembe r 198 9 ("Orde r Directin g
Michael Goldsmith , Eavesdropping Reform: The Legality of Roving Surveillance, Realignment o f Organized Crim e Progra m Resources") .
University of Illinois Law Review 401 (1987). 30. Fo r a n excellen t exampl e o f ho w tenaciou s attentio n t o Pau l Castellano ,
17. Statistica l Analysi s an d Reports , Administrativ e Offic e o f th e Unite d State s because h e wa s boss o f on e o f th e crim e families , contribute d t o th e Gambin o an d
Courts, Reports on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception Commission RIC O prosecutions , se e Josep h O'Brie n an d Andri s Kurins , Boss of
of Wire, Oral, or Electric Communications. Bosses (Simon an d Schuster , 1991) .
18. Se e Gerald Lynch , RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 8 7 Columbia La w 31. Se e J . R . Nash , Citizen Hoover, chapter 6 , 'Th e Organizatio n Tha t Didn' t
Review 661 (parts 1 , 2) (1987); 87 Columbia La w Review 920 (parts 3 , 4) (1987). Exist" (Hall, 1972) .
19. Th e first RICO convictio n o f a Cosa Nostr a famil y bos s was United States v 32. Se e Pistone' s accoun t o f hi s undercove r experienc e i n Josep h Piston e wit h
Frank (Funzi) Tieri in 1981. Richard Woodley, M y Undercover Life in the Mafia: Donnie Brasco (New American
20. 45 2 Unite d State s 57 6 (1981). Prio r to Turkette, i t was plausible to argue that Library, 1987) .
RICO require d proo f o f racketee r infiltratio n o f a legitimat e business , union , o r 33. Se e Arthu r M . Schlesinger , Robert Kennedy and His Times, a t 28 7 (Ballan -
governmental organization . Afte r Turkette, RIC O coul d b e use d t o prosecut e an y tine, 1979) .
ongoing criminal group . 34. Se e Ronal d Reagan , Declaring War on Organized Crime, Ne w Yor k Time s
21. Thi s history had been previousl y and remarkabl y reveale d i n mob boss Joseph Magazine, sec . 6 , p . 26 , col. 1,1 2 Januar y 1986 .
Bonanno's memoir , A Man of Honor (Simon an d Schuster , 1983) . 35. Comptrolle r Genera l o f the Unite d States , War on Organized Crime Falter-
22. Unite d State s Code, vol . 18 , sec. 1964 . ing: Federal Strike Forces Not Getting the Job Done (Unite d State s Governmen t
23. Se e Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Publi c La w 91-452 , United Accounting Office , 1976) . Comptrolle r Genera l o f the Unite d States , Stronger Fed-
Statutes at Large 84 , sees . 922 , 922-2 3 (1970 ) (Statemen t o f Finding s an d Pur - eral Effort Needed in Fight against Organized Crime (Unite d State s Governmen t
pose). Accounting Office, 1981) .
24. Se e Nicholas Pilegg i and Henr y Hill, Wiseguy (Simon an d Schuster , 1985) . 36. I n 1968 , a strik e forc e ha d bee n create d fo r th e Souther n Distric t o f Ne w
25. Se e Ovid Demaris, The Last Mafioso: The Treacherous World of Jimmy Frati- York, bu t i n 197 6 i t wa s merge d int o th e Unite d State s Attorney' s offic e b y the n
anno (Fitzhenr y and Whiteside, 1981) . Assistant Attorney General Richar d Thornburgh .
26. Comptrolle r Genera l o f the Unite d States , War on Organized Crime Falter- 37. Afte r Hoover , th e successio n a t th e FB I ha s bee n a s follows : Patric k Gra y
ing: Federal Strike Forces Not Getting the Job Done (Unite d State s Governmen t (acting directo r 1972-73) ; Willia m Ruckelshau s (actin g directo r 1973) ; Clarenc e
Accounting Office , 1976) ; Comptroller Genera l o f the Unite d States , Stronger Effort Kelley (directo r 1973-78) ; Willia m Webste r (directo r 1978-87) ; Willia m Session s
Needed in Fight against Organized Crime (Unite d State s Governmen t Accountin g (director 1987-93) ; Louis Freeh (directo r 1993-) .
Office, 1981) . 38. Jo e Bonanno, Man of Honor (Simon an d Schuster , 1983) .
27. Se e Proposed Merger of the Organized Crime Strike Forces into the Various 39. Ronal d Goldstock , Som e Rumination s o n th e Curren t an d Futur e Statu s o f
United States Attorneys Offices: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Organized Crim e i n the Unite d State s and on Effort s t o Control Illici t Syndicates and
of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives 101st Cong. , 1s t Sess. , Enterprises, unpublishe d repor t fo r th e Ne w Yor k Stat e Organize d Crim e Tas k
June 1989 ; Status of the Department of Justice Organized Crime Strike Forces: Joint Force, n.d .
Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on 40. Accordin g to Jimmy Fratianno , Bonann o wa s made persona no n grat a by the
Government Affairs 101s t Cong., 1s t Sess., Septembe r 1989 . commission som e tim e i n th e 1970s . Accordin g t o hi s account , an y Costr a Nostr a

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28 / Introduction

member who had contact with Bonanno was subject to capital punishment. Fratiann o
does not say why Bonanno had this falling out with the commission .
41. See , e.g. , Sellwy n Raab , The Mob in Decline—A Special Report: An Ailing
and Battered Mob Is Losing Its Grip on America, New York Times, 2 2 Octobe r
1990, Al .
42. Se e Michae l D . Maltz , Measuring the Effectiveness of Organized Crime
Control Efforts (Offic e o f Internationa l Crimina l Justice , 1990) ; Herber t Edelhatz ,
Roland J. Cole , an d Bonni e Berle, The Containment of Organized Crime (Lexington
Books, 1984) .

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