PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW

By

I sagani A. C ruz
Associate Justice
(1986-1994)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

C a r l o L. C r u z
Professorial Lecturer
College of Law, Lyceum of the Philippines University
College of Law, University of the Philippines

Bar Review Lecturer

Jurists Bar Review Center
College of Law, Lyceum of the Philippines University
UP Law Center

2014 E d itio n
Philippine Copyright, 1989, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2014

by

I s a g a n i A . Cr u z

and

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ISBN 978-971-011-761-1

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 FOREWORD

ON FEBRUARY 22, 1986, after almost thirteen years of

oppression and repression, the light at the end of the
tunnel glowed fitfully but hopefully to signal the advent
of a new liberation for the Filipino people. That was the
day Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
General Fidel V. Ramos, burrowed themselves at Camp
Crame and proclaimed their defiance of President M ar­
cos, whom they accused of rigging the election held on
February 7, 1986. The real winner, they said, was Cora-
zon C. Aquino, the unassuming widow who had
launched a charismatic campaign against the Marcos
regime and received throughout the land a response
that can only be described as phenomenal. Marcos was
asked to respect the mandate of the electorate and step
down in favor of the legitimate choice of the people.

The announcement stunned, then electrified, the

nation. Before long, a crowd of civilians from all walks of
life— the rich mingling with the slum-dwellers, children
in the care of grandparents, nuns and housewives hold­
ing vigil with doctors and jeepney drivers, students
pitching makeshift tents with their professors, every
single one of them sharing a common obsession for free­
dom— gathered in front of the military camp to give
support and protection to the men inside. The military
was no less affected and inspired. Generals began de­
fecting with their men to the endangered citadel. The
onlookers were at first alarmed, then thrilled, when
several helicopters landed, not to fight, as it turned out,
but to pledge their support for the outnumbered rebels.
Soon millions had massed at the gates of Camp Crame
and the nearby Camp Aguinaldo, to form a human
shield and buffer against the expected onslaughts of the
Marcos loyalists. They came soon enough, their mighty
tanks rumbling along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue,
trucks and trucks of combatants in battle gear and
ready for the kill. But the tanks were stopped on their
tracks and the soldiers themselves were disarmed, ren­
dered hors de combat even before the first shot could be
fired. How? With the opposite of everything the would-
be attackers threatened: peace, not war; love for hate;
flowers instead of bloodshed; rosaries draped on the
barrel of a gun; an old woman in a wheelchair on the
path of the advancing tank— liberty for the long, long
night of enslavement and loss of human dignity.

The choice was obvious. As the whole world

watched in admiration and wonder, the Revolution was
won in the jubilant wash of what came proudly to be
called “people power.”

On February 25, 1986, Corazon C. Aquino and Sal­

vador H. Laurel were sworn in at the Club Filipino as
President and Vice-President of the Philippines respec­
tively. Their induction was held under the auspices of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines in a festive air
of victory and hope. Meanwhile, Ferdinand Marcos, who
had been proclaimed winner by the Batasang Pam-
bansa, took his own oath in Malacanang before a jittery
group of loyalists which, significantly, did not include
his vice-presidential running-mate, Arturo Tolentino.
There was a show of bravado, but the mood was gener­
ally despondent because the angry mob was at that time
practically at the gates of the palace. It was almost anti-
climatic only when the happy news spread that the
Marcoses had fled in a U.S. helicopter that took them to
Hawaii. There was, literally, dancing in the streets.

One of President Aquino’s first official acts was the

proclamation of a Freedom Constitution to bocomc ope­
rative until the adoption of a new Constitution.

iv
 Toward this end, she created a Constitutional Com­
mission which undertook the framing of a new charter
“truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Fili­
pino people.” The draft charter, hammered out for more
than four months, was submitted to the electorate in a
plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, and was ratified
with a comfortable margin, due largely to a desire for
stability and normal government rather than to the
intrinsic merits of the document.

It is this Constitution of 1987 that will serve as the

basis of the eighth revision of this book on the political
structure of the Republic of the Philippines. If there
were these many revisions before, it was because the old
Constitution changed with the fickle whims and designs
of the deposed dictator. It is hoped that this time, there
will be more permanence in the new Constitution, and it
will remain, as it ought to be, “firm and immovable, like
a mountain amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the
ocean amidst the ranging of the waves.”

In a way then, this book is beginning again, not

with a mere revision but with a first edition.

I s a g a n i A . Cr u z

May 3 ,1 9 8 7

V
 F o r M y Children

with the hope that

they will help burnish
the nation’s future with
their inviolate ideals,
their unflappable faith,
and their not im possible
dream s.
 for SALLY
beautiful a nd beloved

.from, the blessed a n d bountiful beyond.

 PREFACE TO THE 2014 EDITION

THIS edition comes after the demise of the author, Jus­

tice Isagani A. Cruz, who, prior to his passing, instructed
the undersigned to undertake the changes required to
make this text both current and comprehensive.
He hesitated for many years to make this revision
himself because of his well-founded apprehension that
our Constitution would be changed, considering the
stubborn and selfish efforts of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
to perpetuate herself in power with the conversion of
our political structure from presidential to parliamen­
tary, thereby enabling her to slide into the premiership
of a new government. By the time it became certain that
she would not succeed, the author, although possessing
still both wisdom and wit, had become weak and thus
physically unable to write.
Had he written this edition himself, he would have,
without doubt, discussed the most recent developments
in the realm of Philippine Political Law with his charac­
teristic incisive commentaries presented in his inimita­
ble and unparalleled writing flair which earned for him
the richly deserved and uncontested title of Lyricist of
the Court.
Nonetheless, this edition is based largely on the
discussions of the undersigned with the author on the
significant cases and laws which merit discussion, and
therefore inclusion, in this book. As ever, it is intended
to aid, more than anyone else, the student of law in his
better understanding, and appreciation, of this subject.
Featured prominently in this edition would be the
most recent, and often conflicting, if not confusing, pro­
nouncements of the Supreme Court on the three
branches of government, with particular emphasis on
the Judiciary, which, in recent years, has grown to be
more assertive of its independence and role as “not only
the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the con­
science of the government.”
Important new decisions on executive privilege, as
invoked against the legislative prerogative of investiga­
tion, the President’s appointment, control, diplomatic and
military powers, and the Legislature’s exercise of its law­
making and non-legislative powers, including its power of
impeachment, are also discussed in this edition.
Principles pertinent to the Constitutional Commis­
sions, as either promulgated or clarified by the Supreme
Court, are likewise presented along with segments on
the greater participation of the people in our democratic
government, as intended in our Constitution.
The undersigned has written these changes in this
book with every intention of remaining consistent with,
if not absolutely faithful to, the views of the author, his
teacher and idol, as expressed and discussed by him
during his final years. It is hoped that the reader would
consider this new edition as a continuation of the au­
thor’s legacy of masterful mentorship in the field of Phil­
ippine Political Law, which he started in his first edition
of this book almost forty years ago.
That first edition was dedicated by the author to
his children. He there, and then, expressed his hope that
they will help burnish the nation’s future with their in­
violate ideals, their unflappable faith, and their not im­
possible dreams. That dedication is retained in this edi­
tion as his continuing prayer for his offspring, and, in
turn, as their affirmation, made with profound grati­
tude, that, as to the hopes their father held for them
when they were young, all is well.

Ca r l o L . Cr u z
October 11, 2013
 PREFACE TO THE 2002 EDITION

M AN Y significant events have happened during the last

two years that have affected the politics of our nation
and will certainly influence our future. The impeach­
ment of President Joseph Estrada, his replacement by
Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the validity of
the constitutional succession, and the current prosecu­
tion of the former President, the first in the history of
our country, are among the important recent develop­
ments that have been the subject of deliberation and
decision by the Supreme Court. The corresponding cases
are discussed in this latest edition of this book, now on
its 27th year, to update the reader on the evolving end­
less narrative of Philippine political law.

I express my warm greetings and appreciation to

those who, through my books on the Constitution as
interpreted (or misinterpreted) by the Supreme Court,
have joined me as kindred spirits in the study of the
republican government under the aegis of the Rule of
Law.

I s a g a n i A . Cr u z
May 3, 2002
 PRAYER
delivered on July 23, 1986
at the Constitutional Commission

by
J.B. LAUREL, Jr.
Commissioner

Almighty God, even as the eagle flies at will in the in­

finite reaches of the skies, let our vision soar untrammeled as
we seek that radiant future we hope to ensure for our people
in the Constitution we are writing.
Let it be a future where all persons are born free, rel­
ishing their rights but always with deference to the rights of
others and recognizing authority as long as its highest com­
mitment is to the strengthening and defense of liberty.
Grant that the spirit of freedom shall always reign in
our land, touching one and all like a benediction and igniting
that divine spark in every human being that can make him,
indeed, slightly “lower than angels” in this imperfect world.
Grant us courage, that we may face up to the powerful
and defend those who are weak and oppressed.
Grant us wisdom, that we may distinguish between
what is right and what is just, for they are not always the
same.
Grant us candor, that we may be true to ourselves and
so not be false to others.
Grant us strength when we are assailed by despair, or
self-doubt, or temptation.
And finally, Lord, grant the new Constitution grace and
beauty of language, so that generations from now, when all of
us here are gone, our people will still be moving reverently to
the cadence of its thoughts.
Bless us all, Eternal Spirit, and keep us free, forever and
ever.
Amen.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Chapter 1

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Scope of the Study............................................................................... 1

Necessity for the Study....................................................................... 1
Basis of the Study.............................................................................. 2
Background of the Study...................................................................... 3

Chapter 2

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Outstanding Features........................................................................... 13
The Supremacy of the Constitution.....................................................16
Prospects of the Constitution...............................................................16

Chapter 3

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Definition................................................................................................17
Elements.................................................................................................18
(1) People.................................................................................. 21
(2) Territory.............................................................................. 22
(3) Government........................................................................ 33
A. Functions...................................................................33
B. Doctrine of Parens Patriae....................................... 37
C. De Jure and De Facto Governments........................40
D. Government of the Philippines................................42
E. Administration......................................................... 42
(4) Sovereignty......................................................................... 43
Act of State............................................................................................ 47
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Page

Chapter 4

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Basis......................................................................................................48
Application ...........................................................................................54
Waiver of Immunity............................................................................. 59
Forms of Consent................................................................................. 59
Suits Against Government Agencies...................................................70
Exemption from Legal Requirements................................................. 75
Suability vs. Liability.......................................................................... 77

Chapter 5

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Preamble...............................................................................................83
Republicanism.......................................................................................87
The Defense of the State...................................................................... 92
Peace and Order....................................................................................95
The Incorporation Clause.................................................................... 95
Rearing of the Youth...........................................................................102
Women................................................................................................. 109
Social Justice....................................................................................... 110
Separation of Church and State........................................................ 115
Supremacy of Civilian Authority...................................................... 118
Local Autonomy.................................................................................. 119
Economy.............................................................................................. 120
Miscellaneous...................................................................................... 126

Chapter 6

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Purposes...............................................................................................133
Blending of Powers......................................................................... 134
Checks and Balances.......................................................................... 135
The Role of the Judiciary....................................................................136
Justiciable and Political Questions................................................... 139
Application of the Doctrine.................................................................144
Political Questions Under Llie New Constitution ............................ 152

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Chapter 7

DELEGATION OF POWERS

Permissible Delegation........................................................................162
(1) Tariff Powers................................................................. 162
(2) Emergency Powers........................................................ 163
(3) Delegation to the People...................................................171
(4) Delegation to Local Governments.................................. 172
(5) Delegation to Administrative Bodies............................ 173
Tests of Delegation...............................................................................175
(1) The Completeness T est.................................................... 176
(2) The Sufficient Standard T est...........................................178
The Pelaez Case................................................................................... 182

Chapter 8

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

The Senate............................................................................................186
(1) Composition.......................................................................186
(2) Qualifications.....................................................................187
Term............................................................................................ 196
The House of Representatives ............................................................200
(1) Composition.......................................................................200
(A) The District Representatives.................................201
(B) The Party-list Representatives.............................. 205
(2) Qualifications.................................................................... 215
(3) Term...................................................................................222
Election.................................................................................................225
Salaries.................................................................................................226
Parliamentary Immunities................................................................. 227
(1) Privilege from Arrest........................................................228
(2) Privilege of Speech and Debate.......................................229
Conflict of Interest...............................................................................233
Incompatible and Forbidden Offices..................................................233
Inhibitions and Disqualifications ......................................................236
Sessions................................................................................................239
Officers ................................................................................................ 241
Quorum.................................................................................................241
Discipline of Members.........................................................................243
Journals................................................................................................245

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Adjournment...................................................................................... 249
The Electoral Tribunals.................................................................. 250
The Commission on Appointments...................................................264
Organization.......................................................................................267

Chapter 9

POWERS OF THE CONGRESS

Legislative Power in General............................................................ 269

Procedure............................................................................................ 274
Origin of Bills................................................................................... 275
Prohibited Measures...........................................................................277
Title of Bills......................................................................................... 278
Formalities.......................................................................................... 283
Approval of Bills.................................................................................. 287
Legislative Inquiries ..........................................................................296
Appearance of Department Heads.................................................... 302
The Power of Appropriation.............................................................. 304
(1) Appropriation Defined.................................................... 305
(2) Implied Limitations ....................................................... 306
(3) Constitutional Limitations............................................. 307
(4) Appropriations for Sectarian Purposes.......................... 315
(5) Automatic Re-appropriation.......................................... 317
(6) Special Funds...................................................................318
The Power of Taxation........................................................................ 319
The Power of Concurrence..................................................................325
The War Powers ................................................................................. 325
Referendum and Initiative.................................................................327

Chapter 10

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Executive Power.................................................................................. 335

Qualifications............................................ ..........................................336
Election and Proclamation.................................................................338
Term .................................................................................................... 345
The Vice-President.............................................................................. 349
Presidential Succession ................................................................... 350
Oath of Office...................................................................................... 355
Perquisites and Inhibitions............................................................. 356

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Executive Privilege .......................................................................... 366

Presidential Immunity ................................................................... 376

Chapter 11

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

The Appointing Power........................................................................389

(1) The Removal Power..........................................................407
The Control Power .............................................................................409
The “Take-Care” Clause.....................................................................419
The Military Power............................................................................. 421
(1) Command of the Armed Forces .......................................424
(2) Habeas Corpus.................................................................. 434
(3) Martial Law ..................................................................... 438
(4) Limitations on the Military Powers ............................... 439
The Pardoning Power.........................................................................443
(1) Definitions......................................................................... 444
(2) Limitations........................................................................ 444
(3) Kinds of Pardon................................................................ 445
(4) Effects of Pardon............................................................... 448
(5) Distinctions....................................................................... 453
(6) Amnesty............................................................................. 453
The Borrowing Power.........................................................................455
The Diplomatic Power .......................................................................457
The Budgetary Power......................................................................... 462
The Informing Power.......................................................................... 463
Other Powers......................................................................................464
Resume................................................................................................464

C hapter 12

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Independence of the Judiciary...........................................................467

Judicial Power..................................................................................... 468
Jurisdiction ........................................................................................ 474
Appointments...................................................................................... 474
(1) Qualifications................................................................... 475
(2) The Judicial and Bar Council................................ 476
Fiscal Autonomy................................................................................. 481
Composition of the Supreme Court................................................... 485

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(1) En Banc cases.....................................................................487

(2) Division Cases....................................................................489
Requisites of a Judicial Inquiry.........................................................490
(1) Actual Case........................................................................491
(2) Proper Party.......................................................................506
(3) Earliest Opportunity......................................................... 520
(4) Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Question ..............521
Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality.................................526
(1) Partial Unconstitutionality...............................................533
Powers of the Supreme Court............................................................. 534
(1) Original Jurisdiction..........................................................535
(2) Appellate Jurisdiction....................................................... 540
(3) Temporary Assignment of Judges.................................... 548
(4) Change of Venue or Place of Trial.................................... 549
(5) Rule-making Pow er.......................................................... 550
(6) Appointment of Court Personnel...................................... 559
(7) Administrative Supervision or Courts ............................ 559
Tenure of Judges.................................................................................564
Consultations of the Court................................................................. 568
Decisions of the Court......................................................................... 570
Salaries of Judges................................................................................585
Periods for Decision............................................................................ 586
Annual Report..................................................................................... 591

Chapter 13

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Salaries................................................................................................. 594
Disqualifications.................................................................................. 594
Staggering of Terms.............................................................................595
Reappointment..................................................................................... 596
Other Perquisites ................................................................................602
Proceedings ......................................................................................... 603

Chapter 14

THE CTVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Composition and Qualifications ........................................................ 607

Scope of the Civil Service.................................................................... 609
Appointments....................................................................................... 620

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(1) Exceptions..........................................................................621
Security of Tenure...............................................................................624
Partisan Political Activity.................................................................. 629
Self-organization..................................................................................634
Temporary Employees.........................................................................636
Objectives of the Civil Service............................................................ 638
Oath.....................................................................................................641
Disqualifications..................................................................................641
Standardization of Compensation......................................................646
Double Compensation......................................................................... 647

Chapter 15

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Composition and Qualifications ........................................................652

Powers and Functions......................................................................... 654
(1) Enforcement of Election Laws..........................................654
(2) Decision of Election Contests...........................................681
(3) Decision of Administrative Questions..............................689
(4) Deputization of Law-Enforcement Agencies....................690
(5) Registration of Political Parties.......................................691
(6) Improvement of Elections.................................................700
Election Period.................................................................................... 701
Party System....................................................................................... 702
Funds............................. ......................................................................704
Judicial Review................................................................................... 705

Chapter 16

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Composition and Qualifications ........................................................709

Powers and Functions......................................................................... 710
Prohibited Exemptions....................................................................... 725
Report...................................................................................................727

C hapter 17

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Impeachment.......................................................................................730

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(1) Impeachable Officers ......................................................736

(2) Grounds for Impeachment...............................................738
(3) Procedure......................................................................... 740
(4) Judgment..........................................................................746
The Sandiganbayan........................................................................... 750
The Ombudsman................................................................................ 756
(1) Composition.................................................................... 758
(2) Qualifications and Appointment ................................... 758
(3) Term................................................................................. 759
(4) Powers and Functions......................................................759
(5) Salary............................................................................... 782
(6) Deputy Ombudsman and Personnel of the Office
of the Ombudsman.........................................................782
The Special Prosecutor...................................................................... 788
Ill-gotten Wealth ............................................................................... 790
Loans...................................................................................................793
Assets and Liabilities......................................................................... 793
Change of Citizenship........................................................................ 798

Chapter 18

AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Kinds of Constitutions....................................................................... 805

Permanence of the Constitution........................................................806
Amendment and Revision.................................................................. 807
Procedure............................................................................................ 807
(1) Proposal........................................................................... 808
(A) Position of the Constitutional Convention.......... 819
(2) Ratification...................................................................... 820
Judicial Review of Amendments....................................................... 824

Chapter 19

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Elections.............................................................................................. 827
Existing Laws and Treaties.............................................................. 829
Reserved Executive Powers............................................................... 830
Court and Judges ...............................................................................832
Constitutional Commissions.............................................................. 832
Career Civil Service ...........................................................................833

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Priority Measures............................................................................... 833

Sequestration...................................................................................... 834
Salaries................................................................................................ 835

APPENDICES

A. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.................837

B. The 1973 Constitution................................................................ 917
C. Ordinance Appended to the Constitution Apportioning
the Members of the Batasang Pambansa to the Differ­
ent Provinces with their Component Cities, Highly
Urbanized Cities, and the Districts of Metropolitan
Manila........................................................................................ 956
D. The 1935 Constitution................................................................ 959

------ oOo------

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 TABLE OF CASES

Page

Abainza v. Arellano, G.R. No. 181644, December 8, 2008,

573 SCRA 332 ...........................................................................662
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056,
September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1 .................... 160, 177, 178, 179
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251............................ 275, 290, 729
Abanilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 142347, Au­
gust 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 87..................................................... 721
Abayon v. COMELEC and Raul Daza, G.R. No. 181295,
April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 473................................................... 663
Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010,
612 SCRA 375............................................................................214
Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 164 SCRA 651.........................252
ABC Party List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193256, March
22, 2011, 646 SCRA 93..............................................................698
Abella v. Larrazabal, G.R. Nos. 87721-30 & 88004,
December 21,1989,180 SCRA 509..........................................658
Abella vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100710, September 3,
1991, 201 SCRA 253..................................................................664
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, October 15, 2008,
569 SCRA 59................................................... •........................ 765
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Phil. Multi-Media
Inc., G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009, 576
SCRA 262................................................................. 129, 520, 524
Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil. 612............................................................. 144
Abundo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013,
688 SCRA 149............................................................................ 223
ACCFA v. Federation o f Labor Unions, 30 SCRA 649.......................35
Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991,
195 SCRA 235............................................................................ 621
Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 4 31........................................................234
Adolfo v. CFI of Zambales, G.R. No. L-30650, July 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 166.................................................................... 460
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Anillo v. Commission on the Settlement o f Land Problems,

G.R. No. 157856, September 27, 2007, 534 SCRA 228.......... 537
Antolin v. Domondon, G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010,
623 SCRA 163........................................................................... 505
Antonino v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 144492, December 18,
2008, 574 SCRA 403................................................................. 765
Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231.............................. 389, 408
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corporation, G.R. Nos. 152613 &
152628, November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 100.......................... 520
Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164195, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 200............................. 583
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 467 (1995) ............. 668
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265,
September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 4 0 0 ............................... 658, 664
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793,
April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 623.................................................... 203
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 .................................................... 7, 438
Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546...................... 529
Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, G.R. No.
L-37364, May 9, 1975, 63 SCRA 5 46 ..................................... 427
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 ...................................165, 241, 509
Aranetav. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328.......................................... 75, 415
Arasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252 ....................................................... 77
Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229,
October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105....................................... 659, 661
Aratuc v. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 ........................................ 603, 706
Arcega v. Court of Appeals, 66 SCRA 229 .........................................71
Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358.....................................................148
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29.............................. 138,198, 300, 371
Arquero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168053,
September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 7 0 ........................................ 390
Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268...............................................245
Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199082,
September 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 1 81 ...... 502, 539, 653, 676, 679
Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No.
162525, September 23, 2008, 566 SCRA 219........................ 510
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)......................................... 525
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
343...............................................................................115, 270, 831
Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 ................................................... 248

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Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16,

2010,612 SCRA 761................................................................. 699
Atienza v. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005,
458 SCRA 385.......................................................................... 503
Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633
SCRA 105.................................................................................. 273
Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633
SCRA 105...................................................................................108
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA
477.................................................... 158, 206, 209, 215, 473, 696
Atty. De Vera v. Judge Layague, 395 Phil. 253 (2000)....................780
Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780........................................................ 390
Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17..................................................150, 242
Aytona v. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1....................................................146, 405
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033,
February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747........................................... 752
Aznar v. HRET, G.R. No. 65000, January 9, 1990...........................254

Bacolod City Water District v. Bayona, G.R. No. 168780,

November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 518......................................... 610
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8,
2008, 573 SCRA 290........................................................204, 538
Balaba v. People, G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009, 593
SCRA 210...... ............................................................................ 754
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December
13, 2011, 662 SCRA 312......................................................... 434
Balbastro v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 171481,
June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 729...................................................778
Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana,
G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 196........................ 75
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7,
2009, 595 SCRA 477........................................ 263, 281, 677, 678
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009,
586 SCRA 210............................................................................214
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009,
592 SCRA 294......................................................... 208, 212, 697
Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620. April 20, 2010,
618 SCRA 488............................................................................384

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Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank,

G.R. Nos. 154470-71, September 24, 2012,
681 SCRA 521......................................................................... 555
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, G.R. No.
137147, January 29, 2002, 375 SCRA 8 1 ................................574
Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271,
May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1................................................128, 209
Barbo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 157542,
October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 302............................................. 723
Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 .................................................. 150, 436
Barrameda v. Moir, 25 Phil. 44 ........................................................ 534
Bases Conversion and Development Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. i78160,
February 26, 2009, 580 SCRA 295..................................... 37, 82
Bautista v. Commission on Elections,
460 Phil. 459, 478 (2003).......................................................... 685
Bautista v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 133840,
November 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 480....................... 655, 656, 660
Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169.................................................. 396
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1,
2011, 641 SCRA 17.......................................... 100, 458, 460, 488
Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., G.R. No. 95136, October 3, 1991,
202 SCRA 405........................................................................... 766
Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-61776 to No. L-61861,
March 23, 1984,128 SCRA 383............................................... 754
Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009,
606 SCRA 554............................................................................689
Bejarasco, Jr. v. Buenconsejo, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417,
May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 212................................................... 768
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013....................................................................156
Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010,
637 SCRA 59.............................................................................. 214
Belongilot v. Cua, G.R. No. 160933, November 24, 2010,
636 SCRA 34.............................................................................. 767
Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992,
208 SCRA 133.......................................................... 133, 482, 483
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 229 U.S. 410.................................. 275
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767......... 299
Benito vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 106053, August 17,1994,
235 SCRA 436............................................................................664
Bermoy v. Philippine Normal College, 99 Phil. 1031 ........................71
Bernabe v. Geraldez, 51 SCRA 369....................................................571

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Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330...............................................................622

Betoy v. Board o f Directors, National Power Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA
420............................................................................ 363, 393, 628
Bibas v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 172580, July 23, 2008,
559 SCRA 591...................... .................................................... 730
Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154...............................................392
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78................. 420
Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008,
554 SCRA 755................................................................. 605, 680
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4,
1994, 235 SCRA 103..................................................................754
Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486....................... 288
Boncalon v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 171812, December 24,
2008, 575 SCRA 449.............................................................778
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 ...................................................... 255
Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan, G.R.
No. 196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 555..............................473
Borja v. People, G.R. No. 164298, April 30, 2008,
553 SCRA 250............................................................................ 610
Borlongan v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 167234, February
27, 2006, 483 SCRA 405.......................................................... 780
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 1.......................................575
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 146....................... 723
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 80767, April 22, 1991, 196
SCRA 176................................................................................... 615
Brillante v. Puyat-Reyes, House Electoral Tribunal
Case No. 31 (1988)............................................................ 188, 216
Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358.................................................... 600
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583,
August 20, 562 SCRA 511................................................. 320, 546
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583,
April 15, 2009, 585 SCRA 36..................................................... 320
Buac v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 800, 810 (2004)..................................341
Buehs v. Bacatan, A.C. No. 6674, June 30, 2009,
591 SCRA 217............................................................................ 563
Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175895,12
April 2007, 520 SCRA 797......................................................... 779
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-
802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718............................................385

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Bulilis v. Nuez, G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011,

655 SCRA 241........................................................................... 685
Burdick v. United States, 235 U.S. 476 ........................................... 455
Bureau of Customs Employees Association v.
Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011,
661 SCRA 589................................................. 133, 160, 179, 183
Bureau of Fisheries v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
169815, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134...........................37, 82
Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees
Association, 1 SCRA 340............................................................ 73
Buscayno v. Enrile, 102 SCRA 7 ....................................................... 579

Cabalit v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 180236,

January 17, 2012, 663 SCRA 133.............................................769
Caballero v. Philippine Coast Guard, G.R. No. 174312,
September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 186.........................................396
Caballero v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 137355-58, Sep­
tember 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 3 0 .................................................752
Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94.................................................38, 105
Cadiente v. Santos, 142 SCRA 280 ....................................................622
Cagas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 194139,
January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA 644...................604, 605, 686, 687
Caguioa v. Aucena, A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012,
673 SCRA 352............................................................................ 473
Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil. 328........................................................633
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726........................... 114, 174, 176, 179
Calano v. Cruz, 94 Phil. 230.............................................................541
Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254....................................................397
Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 92585, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 726.......................... 717
Camacho v. Gloria, 456 Phil. 399 (2003)............................................ 627
Campomanes v. Violon, A.M. No. P-ll-2983, July 25,
2012, 677 SCRA 433.................................................................. 563
Caoibes v. Ombudsman, 413 Phil. 717 (2001)................................... 560
Capalla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012,
673 SCRA 1.................................................................................519
Carandang v. Desierto, G.R. No. 148076, January 11,
2011, 639 SCRA 293.................................................................. 752
Cardona v. Binangonan, 30 Phil. 547 ............................................... 182
Cariaga v. People, G.R. No. 180010, July 30, 2010,
626 SCRA 231............................................................................ 754

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Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7SCRA 3 7 4 ...........................246

Casibang v. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642 .................................................... 140
Casing v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192334, June 13, 2012,
672 SCRA 500........................................................................... 766
Casino Labor Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
141020, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 323................................... 610
Castillo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187231, June 22, 2010,
621 SCRA 499................................................................. 553, 684
Castriciones v. Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 65731, September 28, 1989
(Minute Resolution)................................................................... 437
Castro v. Deloria, G.R. No. 163586, January 27, 2009,
577 SCRA 20.............................................................................. 530
Castro, Jr., et al. v. Castaneda and Liceralde, 111 Phil.
765 (1961).................................................................................. 766
Cavite Crusade for Good Government v. Cajigal,
422 Phil. 1,9(2001)................................................................... 795
Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163776,
April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23............................................666, 668
Cayetano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193846,
April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 561............ 604, 686, 687, 707
Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359...................................... 179
Cesa v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166658, April 30, 2008,
553 SCRA 357............................................................................ 778
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008,
545 SCRA 441............................................................................ 517
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579..................................477, 519, 532
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Govern­
ment, G.R. No. 130716, December 9,1998, 299
SCRA 744....................................................................................370
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250,
July 9, 2002, 433 Phil. 506, 534 (2002), 384
SCRA 152............................................................................299, 371
Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs, G.R. No. 178759, August 11, 2008, 561
SCRA 710....................................................................................548
China National Machinery & Equipment Corporation
v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7,
2012, 665 SCRA 189...,....................... 50, 51, 52, 58, 66, 458
Chua-Qua v. Clave, G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990,
189 SCRA 117...............................................................................87

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Chung v. Mondragon, G.R. No. 179754, November 21,

2012, 686 SCRA 112..................................................................573
Cipriano v. COMELEC, 479 Phil. 677 (2004)...................................692
City Government of Makati v. Civil Service Commission,
426 Phil. 631, 644 (2002)........................................................... 640
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommuni­
cations, Inc., 484 SCRA 169...................................................... 323
City Government of Tuguegarao v. Ting, G.R. Nos.
192435-36, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 760............. 756, 766
City of Cebu v. Dedamo, G.R. No. 172852, January 30,
2013, 689 SCRA 547.................................................................. 581
City of Iriga v. Camarines Sur III Electric Cooperative,
G.R. No. 192945, September 5, 2012 ....................................... 173
City of Pasig v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
185023, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 271.................................323
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
194 SCRA 317.................................................................... 358, 642
Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452,
June 11, 2009, 589 SCRA 88............................................. 627, 774
Civil Service Commission v. Andal, G.R. No. 185749,
December 16, 2009, 608 SCRA 370................................... 562, 628
Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
176162, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 353 .................................. 627
Civil Service Commission v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264,
February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA 485..........................622, 623, 624
Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521,
September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589......................................... 571
Civil Service Commission v. Pillila Water District, G.R.
No. 190147, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 406........... 619, 622, 624
Civil Service Commission v. Pobre, 438 SCRA 334...........................723
Civil Service Commission v. Salas, 274 SCRA 4 1 4 ...........................622
Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, G.R. No. 168766, May
22, 2008, 554 SCRA 160............................................................ 627
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113......................40, 44, 98
Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.....................................................................229
Cojuangco v. Republic, G.R. No. 180705, November 27,
2012, 686 SCRA 472.................................................................. 755
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Gov­
ernment, G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, 190
SCRA 226.................................................................................... 770
Commission on Appointments v. Paler, G.R. No. 172623,
March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 127.................................................. 640

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Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616,

November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 167....................... 152, 282, 472
Commission on Elections v. Espanol, G.R. Nos. 149164-
73, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 554,565.............................. 679
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
240 SCRA 368 (1995)................................................................. 639
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 107135, February 23,1999, 303SCRA 508............... 312
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eastern Telecom­
munications Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 163835, 7 July
2010, 624 SCRA 340.................................................................. 323
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. General Foods
(Phils.), Inc., 401 SCRA 545...................................................... 547
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine
American Accident Insurance Company, Inc.,
453 SCRA 668.............................................................................548
Connally v. Scudder, 160 N.E. 655.................................................... 134
Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 140656, September 13,
2007, 533 SCRA 205........................................................501, 506
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 603
SCRA 621....................................................................................104
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit,
181 SCRA 495.............................................................................522
Cornejo v. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188, 193-194 (1920)................................729
Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242,
July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 563..........................................730, 749
Corpus v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965,
13 SCRA 591...............................................................................629
Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance
Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012, 670
SCRA 343....................................................................................521
CREBA v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295.............................537, 538
Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30,1987, 151
SCRA 462....................................................................................767
Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234................................................. 175, 176
Cua v. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582..................................................... 605
Cuenco v. Fernan, A.C. No. 3135, February 17,
1988,158 SCRA 29................. ...................................................738
Culanag v. Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123 .................................446
Cunanan v. Tan, 5 SCRA 1................ .................................................265
Custodio v. Senate President, 42 O.G. 1243..............................147, 509
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Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, 108 Phil. 1147 .................................................. 508

D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168 (1996)................... 765

Dabalos v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 193960,
January 7, 2013, 688 SCRA 64 ................................................110
Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, 223 SCRA 747 .....................579
Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 83 ........................................................... 628
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA
270.............................................120, 242, 270, 284, 396, 403, 674
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philip­
pines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012,
677 SCRA 200..........................................................489, 828, 829
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3,
2006, 489 SCRA 161 ...................... 169, 270, 379, 383, 387, 430,
439, 501, 510, 511, 517, 519, 831
Dayao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193643,
January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 412.............................................698
Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496......................................... 144, 265, 471
De Castro v. Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 71688,
Sept. 3, 1985 ................................................................... 149, 743
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002,
March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666........................................406, 486
De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180048, June 19,
2009, 590 SCRA 149 ................................................................. 800
De Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337................................................ 555
De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.B. 171 ......................................49
De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 451 Phil. 812 (2003)................. 725
De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 466 Phil. 912 (2004)................. 725
De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 471 SCRA 624........ ................... 721
De Jesus v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140240,
October 18, 2007, 536 SCRA 547.............................................. 778
De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760.............................................678, 788
De la Cruz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
192221, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 347 .. 656, 660, 661, 668
De la Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009,
594 SCRA 648...................................................................................•.............. 39
De la Liana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 2 9 4 ................................ 136,180, 567
De la Liana v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30 ........................................... 147
De la Liana v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
180989, February 7, 2012, 665SCRA 176...................... 511, 719

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De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009,

579 SCRA 521....................................................................298, 300
De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457..................................................... 418
De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
223 SCRA 1............................................................. 51, 61, 62, 63
De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 ..................................... 622, 624
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001,
February 13,1996, 253 SCRA 559........................................... 344
Delector v. Ogayan, 123 SCRA 774................................................... 636
Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903,
May 15, 1989,173 SCRA 409, 419........................................... 753
Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 ............................................. 311, 525
Dept, of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533............................. 107
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v. Franciso, G.R. No.
172553, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 439............................ 776
Deputy Ombudsman v. Abugan, G.R. No. 168892,
March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 3 4 ................................................. 778
Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152318,
April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 150............................................ 52, 58
Dimagiba v. Espartero, G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012,
676 SCRA 420.................................................................... 650, 777
Dimaporo v. COMELEC, 544 SCRA 3 81 .......................................... 259
Dimayuga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174763,
April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 220...................................................687
Dino v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009, 607
SCRA 251................................................................................... 679
Dinsay v. Cioco, 264 SCRA 703 (1996).............................................. 780
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US 203................... 85
Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213............... 170, 383
Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003,
397 SCRA 56.............................................................................. 385
Domino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015,
July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546............................................189, 664
Dra. Baylon v. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau,
442 Phil. 217 (2002)................................................................... 584
Drillon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 ........................................................... 410
Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 49 (1915)...............................................272
Duenas v. HRET, G.R. No, 185401, July 21, 2009,
593 SCRA 316............................................................................ 254
Duenas v. HRET, G.R. No. 191550, May 4, 2010,
620 SCRA 78.............................................................................. 254

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Dumarpa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192249,

April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 403................................................... 675
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392............................................... 491
Dungog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-77850-51,
March 25,1988, 159 SCRA 145, 148...................................... 767
Duque v. Veloso, G.R. No. 196201, June 19, 2012,
673 SCRA 676.......................................................................... 113
Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica, G.R. No. 166365,
September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 776 .......................................610

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. v. Surio, G.R.

No. 154213, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 21........................... 416
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, No. L-76633,
October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 533.............................................178
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 76 (1999),
301 SCRA 96 ............................................................................ 554
Edu vs. Ericta, No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35
SCRA 481, 497...........................................................................178
Emnace v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 10.........................................555
Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 ............................................. 152, 585
Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign
Affairs G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006,
502 SCRA 295............................................................................546
Eriguel v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190526, February 26,
2010 (January 26, 2010), 613 SCRA 809................................ 686
Espinav. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010,
631 SCRA 17..............................................................................121
Espinosa v. Aquino, El. Case No. 9, Senate Electoral
Tribunal ....................................................................................188
Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, 397 Phil. 829,
831 (2000)..................................................................................764
Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 135775,
October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 744.............................................766
Espiritu v. Fugoso, 81 Phil. 637.........................................................545
Espuelas v. Provincial Warden o f Bohol, 108 Phil. 353 ................. 447
Estandarte v. People, G.R. Nos. 156851-55, February 18,
2008, 546 SCRA 130..................................................................783
Estarija v. Ranada, G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006,
492 SCRA 652............................................................................ 782
Esteves v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 182374, November 11,
2008, 570 SCRA 656..................................................................686

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Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, Mar. 2, 2001,

353 SCRA 452............................................................................ 352
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001,
353 SCRA 452....................................................................376, 767
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, April 3, 2001,
406 Phil. 1 (2001), 356 SCRA 108.................................... 152, 472
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006,
492 SCRA 1 .................................................................................86
Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004,
429 SCRA 789....................................................................606, 653
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
247 Phil. 387, 394 (1988)........................................................... 538
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1 ........................................... 85
Executive Judge Basilia v. Judge Becamon, 487
Phil. 490 (2004)..........................................................................780
Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,
G.R. No. 164171, March 1, 2006, 482 SCRA 673.................... 175
Ex-Parte Levitt, 303 U.S. 633 ...................................................506, 508
Ex-Parte Milligan, 4 Wall, 127, L.Ed., 297............................... 428, 435

Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940 (1997)............................ 771

Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16,
1998, 295 SCRA 470.......................................................... 278, 776
Facura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166495,
February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427..........................778, 779, 780
Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals,
477 SCRA 49.............................................................................. 547
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503 ............................... 282
Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals, 217 SCRA 298 ......................72, 75
Federation of Free Farmers v. CA, G.R. No. L-41222,
November 13,1985 ................................................................... 587
Federico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 199612,
January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 134.............................................661
Feliciano v. Aranez, G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010,
629 SCRA 103............................................................................ 723
Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 464 Phil. 439............................. 236
Feria v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122954,
February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 525............................................437
Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179695
and 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782 .......... 660, 676

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Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, 28 March 2008,

550 SCRA 132..............................................................................582
Fernandez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176296, June 30,
2008, 556 SCRA 765................................................................... 684
Festejo v. Fernando, 50 O.G. 1556........................................................57
Fetalino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890,
December 4, 2012, 686 SCRA 813.....................................234, 401
Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer,
135 SCRA 25............................................................................... 707
Filipino v. Macabuhay, G.R. No. 158960, November 24,
2006, 508 SCRA 50......................................................................768
Flauta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184586, July 22, 2009,
593 SCRA 504..............................................................................662
Flora v. Pajarillaga, G.R. No. L-24806, January 22, 1980,
95 SCRA 100................................................................................588
Flores v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 4 8 4 ......................................... 534, 684
Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004,
436 SCRA 337.............................................................................. 753
Flores v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010,
629 SCRA 178.............................................................................. 795
Fonacier v. Court o f Appeals, 96 Phil. 417 (1955)............................. 117
Fontanilla v. Maliaman, G.R. No. L-55963 December 1,
1989, 179 SCRA 685....................................................................610
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 5 3 4 .................................................. 146
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commis­
sioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 173425,
September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 566............................................133
Fortich v. Corona, 312 SCRA 751........................................................ 490
Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012,
668 SCRA 504.............................................................................. 441
Francia v. Municipality of Meycauayan, G.R. No. 170432,
March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 5 3 ................................................... 173
Francisco v. Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16,
2006, 507 SCRA 173.................................................................... 518
Francisco v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261 November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 4 4 ............ 517, 742, 747
Frantz v. Autry, 91 Pac. 193................................................................ 820
Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Metropolitan Water­
works and Sewerage System, G.R. No. 173044,
December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 621............................................537
Frias, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 171437, October 4, 2007,
534 SCRA 654.............................................................................. 724

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Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 120295

& 123755, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727, G.R. No.
87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245 ....................................... 658
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., G.R. No. L-6060,
September 30, 1950......................................................................63
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No.
124295, October 23, 2001, 368 SCRA 3 6 .................................. 561
Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013,
691 SCRA 196............................................................................. 363
Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010,
612 SCRA 308..................................................................... 362, 505
Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579......................501, 598

Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, June 20, 1997,

274 SCRA 540..............................................................................587
Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22,
2011, 643 SCRA 631................................................................... 685
Galero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151121, July 21,
2008, 559 SCRA 11..................................................................... 778
Galicto v. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012,
667 SCRA 150................................................... 158, 386, 498, 520
Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30,
2001, 350 SCRA 568................................................................... 583
Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579,
June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690.................................................... 123
Gamogamo v. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corpora­
tion, G.R. No. 141707, May 7, 2002, 431 Phil. 510,
381 SCRA 742..............................................................................617
Ganaden v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 169359-61, June 1,
2011, 650 SCRA 76 ..................................................................... 765
Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510....................................................... 316
Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
75025, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 3 5 6 .............................450
Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120...................................................54
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.......................85, 110
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584,
April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 119..............................................491, 522
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554,
July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 750.......... 119, 237, 425, 429, 543, 544
Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 520.............................................................. 309

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Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009,

582 SCRA 127.............................................................537, 561, 562
Garcia v. Molina, G.R. Nos. 157383 & 174137,
August 10, 2010, 627 SCRA 540 ............................................. 626
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 .................................151, 437
Garcillano v. House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008,
575 SCRA 170................................... 197, 198, 297, 495, 503, 516
Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 338 Phil. 484 (1997).........................................685
Gascon v. Arroyo, 178 SCRA 582 ...................................................... 415
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 242 Phil. 377 (1988)....... 722, 726
Gayo v. Verceles, G.R. No. 150477, February 28, 2005,
452 SCRA 504.............................................................................504
General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011, 646
SCRA 567.................................................................... 390, 524, 621
German Agency for Technical Cooperation v. Court
o f Appeals, G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009,
585 SCRA 150....................................................................... 52, 58
Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796,
July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 696.......................................... 174, 176
Geronimo v. Ramos, G.R. Nos. L-60504, L-60591,
60732-39, May 14, 1985,136 SCRA 435.................................. 664
Giron v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188179,
January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 9 7 .........................................282
Go v. Sunbanun, G.R. No. 168240, February 9, 2011,
642 SCRA 367....................................................................... 554
Gobenciong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159883, March
31, 2008, 550 SCRA 502.......................................................776
Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006,
498 SCRA 445....................................................................... 433
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774......................................... 821
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 644 SCRA 761........................... 257, 660, 666
Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230........................................... 99, 270
Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, 392 Phil.
518 (2000)..............................................................................511
Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R.
No. 196231, September 4, 2012, 679
SCRA 614................................................. 141, 408, 488, 737, 740,
757, 764, 775, 783, 784,790
Gonzales v. Prov. Auditor o f Iloilo, 12 SCRA 711....................... 712
Gov’t, of the Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728....37, 77
Governor Sahali v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 201796, January 15, 2013, 688 SCRA 552...... 682, 686, 688

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Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June

19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481...........................................602, 639, 665
Grino v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 91602,
194 SCRA 458.......................................................................... 622
GSIS v. Group Management Corporation, G.R. No.
167000, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 279....................................... 80
GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R.
No. 170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622....................... 635
GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010,
625 SCRA 669.............................................................................635
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 ................................................... 515
Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006,
498 SCRA 671.............................................................119, 299, 433
Guerrero v. COMELEC, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000).......................... 257
Guevara v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269................................................ 689
Guevara v. Gimenez, 6 SCRA 813...................................................... 715
Guevara v. Inocentes, G.R. No. L-25577, March 15, 1966,
18 SCRA 379..................................................................... 268, 400
Guiao v. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018 (1954)............................................. 766
Guingona v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846,
May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 448.......................................................519
Gumaru v. Quirino State College, G.R. No. 164196, June
22, 2007, 525 SCRA 412.............................................................583
Gunsi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168792, February 23,
2009, 580 SCRA 70..................................................... 495, 501, 658
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198.... 653, 743, 744, 747
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 8 0 4 ....................................744

Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Luisita Industrial

Park Corporation, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011,
653 SCRA 154................................................... 148, 496, 520, 522
Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, November 22,
2011, 660 SCRA 525.......................................................... 530, 734
Hagad v. Gozo Dadole, 321 Phil. 604 (1995).................... 626, 775, 776
Hailey v. Printwell, Inc., G.R. No. 157549, May 30, 2011,
649 SCRA 116............................................................................574
Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 542 (2003)..........................765

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Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao, G.R. No. 136466,

November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 294..........................................270
Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court o f Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 150768 and 160176, August 20, 2008,
562 SCRA 422............................................................................... 61
Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082, January
28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406.............................................................583
Heirs of Wilson Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R.
No. 176579, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 397................ .........126
Herrera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131499, November 17,
1989,318 SCRA 336................................................................... 203
Hidalgo v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179793,
July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 391 ..................................................... 615
Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 573............................................................. 556
Hilado v. Judge Amor A. Reyes, 496 Phil. 55 (2005)........................ 796
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 9 9 ........................................ 179
Holy See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524 ............................................ 51, 58
Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13,
2004, 427 SCRA 4 6 .............................................................. 770
Houston v. Hormes, 252 U.S. 5 69.........................................................56

Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

No. 192289, January 8, 2013, 688
SCRA 129..................................................604, 663, 681, 685, 707
Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185960, January
25, 2012, 664 SCRA 253........................................................... 756
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 .................................................. 99
Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28 .................................................812
In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562.............................................................. 556
In re Appointment of Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Placido B. Vallarte, 298 SCRA 408........................................... 486
In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 ............................................289, 534, 556
In Re Dick, 38 Phil. 41............................. :.................. ..............139, 145
In Re Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 ..................................................... 551, 556
In Re Garcia, 2 SCRA 9 84.............................................................99, 556
In Re Mateo A. Valenzuela and Placido B. Vallarte,
298 SCRA 408............................................................................. 485
In Re Patterson, 1 Phil. 9 3 .................................................................. 145
In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180, October
24, 1986, 145 SCRA 160...........................................................828

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In Re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595...................................................................... 139

In Re Torres, G.R. No. 122338, Dec. 29, 1996 .................................. 447
In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, A.M. No.
05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 1 ....................... 76, 555
In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 771................................................................... 738
In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Pay­
ment of All Court and Sheriffs Fees, A.M. No.
12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012, 688 SCRA 1.......................... 483, 555
In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess
Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November
17, 2005, 475 SCRA 290, 303.....................................................189
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ o f Amparo
and the Writ o f Habeas Data in Favor of Francis
Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533,
September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 6 78 .................................377, 433
Infante v. Prov. Warden, 92 Phil. 310................................................ 446
Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177 (1968)................................................ 624
Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171.............................................................409
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No.
175241, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 523............................. 505
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
338 SCRA 81............................................................... 430, 471, 515
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil.
618, 634 (2000)............................................................................ 539
Inting v. Tanodbayan, 97 SCRA 494.................................................. 789

Jacob v. Puno, 131 SCRA 144..............................................................418

Jacct v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008, 572
SCRA 295.............................................................................218, 802
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474,
June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 530....................................................257
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474,
October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1 .................................... 257, 659, 668
Jamero v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140929, May 26, 2005,
459 SCRA 113..............................................................................554
Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088,
January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331......................................189, 218
Jardiel v. COMELEC, 124 SCRA 650........................................ 678, 788

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Jarque v. Desierto, A.C. No. 4509, 5 December 1995,

250 SCRA xi, xiv......................................................................... 738
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33 ..................6, 146, 823
Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1048 ........................................................242
Javier v. Commission on Elections, 144 SCRA 194...................499, 683
Javier v. Fly Ace Corporation, G.R. No. 192558,
February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 382............................................ 112
Javier v. Reyes, 170 SCRA 360........................................................... 402
Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 714...............................................229
Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173,
March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 8 0 3 .................................................764
Jumamil v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 167989-
93, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 553.............................................687
JUSMAG v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 108813, 15 December 1994, 239 SCRA 224.........................50
Justimbaste v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179413, November
28, 2008, 572 SCRA 736..................................................... 655, 660

Kalaw v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 80218,

Minute Resolution dated November 5, 1987............................ 699
Kapunan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 148213-17,
March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 4 2 ................................................... 455
Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349 ............................................ 48
Kho v. Commission on Elections; G.R. No. 124033,
September 25, 1997, 279 SCRA 4 63 ..................................605, 687
Kilosbayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007,
526 SCRA 353......................................................................379, 514
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 235 SCRA 630............................................. 513
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 240 SCRA 540................................................. 513
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General, National
Economic Development Authority, G.R. No.
167798, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 623......................................270
Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012,
675 SCRA 482.................................... .............. 119, 419, 432, 442
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G. 4282................................................96, 426

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. Commission

on Elections, 468 Phil. 70 (2004)................................................ 699
Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 257 Phil. 1 (1989).................668

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Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 105111

& 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297..........................658, 665
Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989,
176 SCRA.................................................................................... 664
Lacson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-16261, Dec. 28, 1951 ................. 655
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 165399 and
165475, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 142...................................... 770
Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740 ..........................................................402
Lacson v. Roque, 91 Phil. 456.............................................................. 381
Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001),
357 SCRA 756............................................................................. 441
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 ........................ 416
Lahm v. Mayor, A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012, 666
SCRA 1.........................................................................................563
Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 473............................................................... 712
Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160............................ 328, 809, 813
Land Bank o f the Philippines v. Arceo, G.R. No. 158270,
July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 85.......................................................583
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182431,
November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 285............................................ 76
Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006,
507 SCRA 114..............................................................................680
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 ............................................. 150, 436
Lantaco, Sr. v. Llamas, 195 Phil. 325, 334 (1981).............................796
Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236 (2000)................................ 770
Lastimosa v. Vasquez, 313 Phil. 358 (1995)...................................... 776
Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 ................................................382, 522
Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372, 378 (1946)............ ................................554
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 ......................................................... 43, 45
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670
SCRA 373.............................................................................155, 493
Lawyers League v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986............... 41
Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc., G.R. No.
150470, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 7 5 ..................................... 581
Layug v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192984,
February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 135..................264, 682, 687, 698
Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, 5 June 2009,
588 SCRA 285.............................................................................. 582
Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391........................254
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 176951, November 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263..............197, 249

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League o f Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R.

No. 176951, August 24, 2010, 628 SCRA 819.......................... 529
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 176951, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 150...................... 271
Leave Division v. Heusdens, A.M. No. P-ll-2927,
December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 126........................................... 563
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161629, July 29,
2005, 465 SCRA 437.................................................................. 768
Legarda v. de Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, January 18,
2008, 542 SCRA 125.................................................................. 345
Legaspi Towers 300 v. Muer, G.R. No. 170783, June 18,
2012, 673 SCRA 4 52............................................................. 473
Leongson v. CA, 49 SCRA 212.............................................................542
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011,
639 SCRA 709............................................................................. 236
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009,
593 SCRA 6 8 ..................................................................... 235, 612
Liberal Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191771, 6
May 2010, 620 SCRA 393...........................................................695
Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496 ............................................... 279
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila,
465 Phil. 529 (2004).................................................................... 158
Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345..............................................................64
Lim v. Pelaez, House Electoral Tribunal Case No. 36 (1947)........ 188
Lim v. Zosa, 146 SCRA 366 ................................................................ 553
Limbona v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008,
555 SCRA 391.................................................................. 191, 659
Limbona v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186006, October 16,
2009, 604 SCRA 240................................................................... 191
Limkaichong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 164978, October 13,
2005, 472 SCRA 587................................................................... 192
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32,
April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1............................... 192, 257, 263, 505
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32,
July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 434.............................................219, 569
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292...........321
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v.
University o f the Philippines, G.R. No.
185918, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 206...............60, 68, 614, 720
Lokin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180443, June

Lokin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193808, June

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Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602...........................................348

Loomis v. Jackson, 6W, Va. 613 .........................................................819
Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986,
December 22, 1992, 216 SCRA 760............................................658
Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 269........................... 402
Lopez v. De los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170.....................................................301
Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756..............................................................428
Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396,
August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 6 2 ..................................................764
Lorenzo v. Lopez, A.M. No. 2006-02-SC, October 15,
2007, 536 SCRA 11................................................................ 563
Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012,
670 SCRA 545..............................................................................376
Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337.................................................515
Luciano v. Mariano, 148-B Phil. 178 (1971).......................................753
Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327.......................... 402
Luison v. Garcia, 101 Phil. 1218 ........................................................705
Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 433
SCRA 119.................................. .................................................. 322
Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 192
SCRA 51 (1990)............................................................................534
Lyons v. United States o f America, 104 Phil. 593............................... 64

Mabanagv. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 ................................... 246, 820, 824

Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. 157013, July 10, 2003,
453 Phil. 586 (2003), 405 SCRA 614................................221, 290
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 239.... 132, 256, 343, 479, 580
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010,
635 SCRA 783................................... 132, 256, 340, 343, 344, 479
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77....................................................46
Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)..........................................560
Macias v. Commission on Elections, 3 SCRA 1 ................................. 203
Madarangv. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112314,
March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 525................................................. 752
Madriaga v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560 .......... 495, 501
Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011,
655 SCRA 476........................................................... 24, 37, 81, 99
Magarang v. Jardin, Sr., 386 Phil. 273, 284 (2000)........................... 795

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Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012,
673 SCRA 651...................................................455, 505, 692, 695
Maglakas v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
138823, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 3 79 ...........................113
Magno v. People, G.R. No. 171542, April 6, 2011,
647 SCRA 362............................................................................755
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18,
2008, 574 SCRA 737...................................................................578
Malacorav. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51042,
September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 435.........................................588
Maliksi v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203302,
April 11, 2013, 693 SCRA 214...................................................684
Mamba v. Lara, G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009,
608 SCRA 149............................................................................. 510
Manalang-Demigillo v. Trade and Investment Develop­
ment Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No.
168613, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 3 5 9 ........................... 412, 611
Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007,
536 SCRA 290............................................................................. 437
Mangca v. COMELEC, 112 SCRA 270............................................... 579
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans. Co., 57 Phil. 825 ..................... 151
Manila Electric Company v. Atilano, G.R. No. 166758,
June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 112................................................... 579
Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay,
G.R. No. 163072, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 234...............323, 614
Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495
SCRA 591...........................................................................612, 614
Manila Motors Co. v. Flores, 99 Phil. 738 ......................................... 527
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200
SCRA 323..................................................................................... 634
Manubay v. Garilao G.R. No. 140717, April 16, 2009,
585 SCRA 134..............................................................................411
Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994,
231 SCRA 783................................... ................................2 72, 387
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649,
April 16, 2 0 1 3 ................................................... 193, 663, 669, 799
Marcelino v. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51.........................................................587
Marcoleta v. Borra, A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009,
582 SCRA 474.................................................................. 653, 738
Marcoleta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181377, April 24,
2009, 586 SCRA 765......................................................... 606, 653

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Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, No. L-77210,

September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 464..........................................473
Marcos v. Chief of Staff, 89 Phil, 246 (1951)............................ 237, 544
Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995)............................... 257
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668.................................................382
Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011,
657 SCRA 414.............................................................................539
Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995,
242 SCRA 211.............................................................................. 203
Maribago Bluewater Beach Resort v. Dual, G.R. No.
180660, July 20, 2010, 625 SCRA 147....................................... 112
Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No. 169918, February 27,
2008, 547 SCRA 9 8 ........... .................................................... 778
Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 189034, January 12, 2010,
610 SCRA 53................................................................................ 656
Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002,
429 SCRA 554....................................................................401, 520
Matute v. Hernandez, 66 Phil. 68 ......................................................714
Medina v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 176478,
February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 684...............................................770
Melchorv. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 4 76 ....................................................................769
Mendoza v. Court of First Instance, 65 SCRA 96.............................. 574
Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 ...........................................628
Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999,
367 Phil. 132 (1999).......................................................... 801, 803
Mercury Drug Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 75662, September 15, 1989,
177 SCRA 580............................................................................. 112
Merritt v. Gov’t, of the Phil. Islands, 34 Phil. 3 1 1 ........................ 61, 78
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado,
G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 8 8 ...................... 766
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tobias, G.R.
No. 177780, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 165......................... 154
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390........................................................ 104
Miguel v. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035,
July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 560....................................................... 753
Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005,
455 SCRA 397.................................................................................96
Mlnlsterlo v. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464.............................................. 61
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999,
311 SCRA 617.................................................................... 661, 666

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Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010,

622 SCRA 744.................................................................. 191,216
Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010,
633 SCRA 580................................................................... 191,216
Mizuaki Takenouchi v. Cristi, G.R. No. 82232, July 25,
1988 (Minute Resolution)...........................................................437
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171S47-48, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 90................. 127, 473
Mobil Phil. Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service,
18 SCRA 1120................................................................................74
Mocorro v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008,
560 SCRA 362..............................................................................583
Molen, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,493 Phil. 874 (2005).................. 724
Mondana v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 ............................................ 381, 410
Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190 ...............................................448
Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335, July 1,
2003, 405 SCRA 264.............................................................. 779
Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 .................................. 150, 436
Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429............................................................. 254
Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199............................................................ 90
Mun. of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184.......................................... 79
Munder v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 194076,
October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 256.................................... 658, 676
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. L-28113,
March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533................................................... 529
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme,
195 SCRA 692................................................................................78
Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 130 Phil. 663,
672 (1968).................................................................................... 257
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 .................................................. 381

Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101...................................... 601

Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 35 Phil. 126....................................... 596
Nadeco v. Tobias, 7 SCRA 692 ............................................................. 42
NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-69870, November 29,
1988, 250 Phil. 129 (1988), 168 SCRA 122................................616
National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 2 03.................................72
National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit,
481 Phil. 279, 204 (2004)............................................................ 393
National Electrification Administration v. Commission
on Audit, 427 Phil. 464, 481 (2002)............................................ 717

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National Electrification Administration v. Morales, G.R.

No. 154200, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 7 9 .......... 60, 68, 610, 720
National Housing Authority v. City of Iloilo, G.R. No.
172267, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 237..................................324
National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172..................... 609
National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 ...............................609
Nava v. National Bureau of Investigation, Regional
Office No. XI, Davao City, G.R. No. 134509,
April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 377.................................................... 767
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011,
648 SCRA 400............................................................................. 202
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010,
612 SCRA 131.............................................................................. 202
Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012,
673 SCRA 618............................................................................... 98
Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29,
2013, 689 SCRA 385........................................... 304, 311, 312
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, March
25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77............................ 154, 198, 298, 369, 375
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, September
4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152............................ 197, 298, 304, 372, 457
New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502....................................587
NHMFC v. Abayari, G.R. No. 166508, October 2,
2009, 602 SCRA 242.............................................................. 720
Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11,
2009, 578 SCRA 438............................................................458, 557
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759,
August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649.................................................. 221
Nicos Industrial Corp. v. Court o f Appeals,
206 SCRA 127 ..................................................................... 571, 572
Nieves v. Blanco, G.R. No. 190422, June 19, 2012,
673 SCRA 638............................................................................. 640
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
152 SCRA 284...............................................................................585
Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 47 ........................................................... 417
Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 4 0 5 ................................................. 151
Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26,
2010. 625 SCRA 472.................................................................... 581
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 .............................................526

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Ocampo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-13158, Dec. 6, 1957.................... 672

Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 158466, June 15, 2004,
432 SCRA 144.............................................................................. 664
Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, L-7918, Jan. 18, 1955,
51 O.G. 147............................................................... 136, 523, 565
Occena v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 755................................................... 823
Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio, G.R. No.
186652, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 4 57 ...................................579
Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana,
481 Phil. 315 (2004).....................................................................588
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fuentes,
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342, March 6, 2013, 692
SCRA 429......................................................................................588
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Indar,
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012, 669
SCRA 24.............................................................................568, 730
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Usman,
A.M. No. SCC-08-12, October 19, 2011, 659
SCRA 411......................................................................................795
Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No.
164679, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 539.......................................768
Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No.
165132, March 7, 2012, SCRA 583............................................768
Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commis­
sion, 451 SCRA 5 7 0 .....................................................................782
Office of the Ombudsman v. Cordova, G.R. No.
188650, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 4 65 ...................................775
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 159395, May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 7 5 ........................... 730, 778
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court o f Appeals, G.R.
No. 167844, November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 593...................... 769
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court o f Appeals, G.R.
No. 168079, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 798................................769
Office of the Ombudsman v. de Sahagun, G.R. No.
167982, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 122......................... 730, 769
Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr., G.R. No.
172635, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 135............. 768, 771, 775
Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista, G.R. No.
177211, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 350 .................................. 776

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Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No.

167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 3 27 ................................771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero, G.R. No.
168718, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 106 .......................... 769
Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, G.R. No.
165416, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 253.................... 768, 771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, G.R. No.
177580, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 747..............................771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez,
G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010, 625
SCRA 299.................................................. 753, 762, 768, 769, 774
Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No.
175573, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 140....................... 777, 779
Office o f the Ombudsman v. Santiago, G.R. No.
161098, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 3 05 ................ 768, 769
Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, G.R. No.
168309, January 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 4 6 ...............................730
Office of the President v. Cataquiz, G.R. No.
183445, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 6 8 1 .........................572
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 ....... 427, 528
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172224,
January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 544............................................. 777
Ombudsman v. Pelino, G.R. No. 179261, April 18,
2008, 552 SCRA 203............................................................ 776
Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January
31, 2011, 641 SCRA 148.....................................................760, 794
Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 252......................................................... I l l
Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 354
Phil. 948 (1998), 293 SCRA 141........................................271, 383
Oposav. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993,
224 SCRA 792..............................................................36, 83, 127
Orap v. Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 252 .......................... 754, 769, 790
Orosa v. Roa, 527 Phil. 347, 353-354 (2006) .................................... 418
Osmena v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 188818,
May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 654.................................................... 724
Osmena v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993,
220 SCRA 703..................................................................... 722, 727
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863................................... 147, 230, 244
Oxales v. United Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No.
152991, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 2 6 ........................................ 112

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P.E. Domingo & Co. v. Zari, 159 SCRA 171....................................... 552

Pacete v. Commission on Audit, 185 SCRA 1 ............................622, 719
Pacificador v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
178259, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 372 ..........................686, 704
Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28,
2007, 534 SCRA 338....................................................................539
PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil.806 ................................ 494
Pagano v. Nazarro, G.R. No. 149072, September 21,
2007, 533 SCRA 622...............................................................506
PAGCOR v. Aumentado, G.R. No. 173634, July 22,
2010, 625 SCRA 241.............................................................. 604
PAGCOR v. BIR, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011,
645 SCRA 338..............................................................................323
Paguia v. Office of the President G.R. No. 176278,
June 25, 2010, 621 SCRA 600.............................................. . 508
Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte, 102 Phil. 1186............................. 79
Palmares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
86177-78, Minute Resolution dated August
31, 1989........................................................................................ 699
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. IAC, 140
SCRA 22.......................................................................................401
Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. Public Service
Commission, No. 47065, June 26, 1940, 70
Phil. 221.................................................................... 133, 134, 175
Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works & Communications,
110 Phil. 331............................................................................. 306
PCGG Chairman v. Jacobi, G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012,
675 SCRA 20................................................................................421
Pelaez vs. Auditor General, No. L-23825, December
24, 1965, 122 Phil. 965, 15 SCRA 569.............................. 176, 182
Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441.......................................................448
Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November
25, 2009, 605 SCRA 574 ............................................................. 702
People v. Albano, G.R. Nos. L-45376-77, July 26,
1988, 163 SCRA 511....................................................................753
People v. Bello, G.R. Nos. 166948-59, August 29,
2012,679 SCRA 298....................................................................752
People v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 154473, April 24,
2009,586 BORA 420....................................................................738
People v. Bosi, G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012,
674 SCRA 411...................................................................... 85, 105

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People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997)................................................455

People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715.......................................................709
People v. Fernandez, CA-G.R. No. L-1128 (1945).............................316
People v. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173....................................................... 549
People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011,
645 SCRA 590..............................................................................108
People v. Lagman, 38 O.G. 1676 .......................................................... 93
People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,
2011, 654 SCRA 188.......................................................... 108, 273
People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30,
2013, 689 SCRA 715.......................................................... 108, 273
People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 678 .......................................................... 521
People v. Pacificador, 406 Phil. 774, 782 (2001)................................791
People v. Patriarca, 395 Phil.690 (2000)............................................ 455
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887 ........................................................ 1, 46
People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 .......................................................... 550
People v. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440.............................................................. 805
People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690........................................................... 105
People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328........................................................ 179
People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581 ........................................................... 445
People v. Sandiganbayan, 451 SCRA 413.......................................... 751
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394,
January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 2 05 ..............................................756
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164185, July 23,
2008, 559 SCRA 449....................................................................645
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, Sep­
tember 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 4 8 9 ................................................751
People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10,
2009, 599 SCRA 20............................................................. 108, 273
People v. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984,
130 SCRA 465.............................................................................. 563
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56......................... 171, 173, 176, 180, 507, 521
People v. Zosa, 38 O.G. 1676..................................................................93
PEPSICO, Inc. v. Lacanilao, 524 Phil. 147 (2006)............................. 583
Peralta v. Auditor General, 148 Phil. 261 (1971).............................. 648
Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30 ................................................... 702
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285 .................................. 44, 45
Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106,
1115-1116(1999)......................................................................... 257
Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil. 552............................................................... 585
Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 6 7 2 ............................................ 585
PERT/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. v. Vinuya, G.R.
No. 197528, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 284.......................273

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Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin

M. Dacanay, B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007,
540 SCRA 424........................................................................... 556
Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012, 669
SCRA 49......................................................88, 157, 473, 539, 725
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v.
Health Secretary, G.R.-No. 173034, October 9,
2007,535 SCRA 265................................................................. ..96
Phil. Bar Association v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 72915,
Dec. 20, 1985......................................................................... 7, 148
Phil. National Bank v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595................................ ..67
Phil. National Railways v. LAC, 217 SCRA 401............................... ..71
Phil. Press Institute v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272 ...................... 674
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R.
No. 180308, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 6 1 1 ........................... 300
PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479..................227, 280, 356, 512
PHILCONSA v. Villareal, 52 SCRA 477.......................................... 494
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Angara, 475 SCRA 41............................................................... 622
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93396, September
30, 1991, 202 SCRA 191........................................................... 610
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
vs. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001,
359 SCRA 525............................................................................ 622
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 170574, January
30, 2009, 577 SCRA 366........................................................... 324
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Board of
Directors v. Lapid, G.R. No. 191940, April 12,
2011, 648 SCRA 546.................................................................. 637
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012, 663
SCRA 514..........................................'........ 532, 546, 721, 725, 755
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v.
Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17,
2009, 600 SCRA 102..........................................................132, 148
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v.
Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, February 11,
2010, 612 SCRA 255.................................................................. 382

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Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R.

No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506........ 155, 311, 312
Philippine Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 189767, July
3, 2012, 675 SCRA 513............................................................... 364
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Central
Board o f Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. 178030,
December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 644............................................323
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529,
29 April 2010, 619 SCRA 585..................................................... 582
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. v.
Takenaka Corporation, G.R. No. 180245, July
4, 2012, 675 SCRA 674................................................................503
Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
Commission on Audit, 461 Phil. 737 (2003).............................724
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No.
105371 November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 2 0 3 .................... 247, 286
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,
247 Phil. 641(1988].....................................................................113
Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No.
157279, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 3 07 ...........................520, 522
Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators,
259 Phil. 650, 655-656 (1989)....................................................... 72
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement v. Virgilio
E. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010, 623
SCRA 244..................................................................................... 112
Philippine Society for the Prevention, of Cruelty to
Animals v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
169752, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 112...........................273
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 132561, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 3 3 6 .............................. 520
Phillips Seafood [Philippines] Corporation v. Board
of Investments, G.R. No. 175787, February 4,
2009, 578 SCRA 113....................................................................412
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudica­
tion Division, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012,
677 SCRA 408...........................................313, 385, 421, 462
Pierce v. Society o f Sisters, 262 U.S. 390........................................... 104
Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19,
2000, 336 SCRA 201....................................................................493

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Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13,

2005, 472 SCRA 587........................................... 272, 393, 504
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088,
July 16, 2008, 462 SCRA 622.....................................................460
Pinero v. Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417.................................................... 622
PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129754, Sept. 23, 1997................. 826
Planas v. Commission on Elections, 519 Phil. 506,
512 (2006)....................................................................................258
Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 .................................................................... 380
Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,
G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548
SCRA 485.......................................................... 319, 516, 528, 546
Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, G.R. No.
169982, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 5 3 4 ............................776
Plint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107................................................276
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August
25, 2009, 597 SCRA 1............................................................... 230
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 ................................................33
Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31,
2010, 629 SCRA 530...................................................... 347, 496
Presbiterio v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178884, June
30, 2008, 556 SCRA 815............................................................. 673
Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 451 ...................................................... 552
Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co., G.R. No.
168654, March 25, 2009, 582 SCRA 4 17.................................. 578
Prudente v. Genuino, G.R. No. L-5222, Nov. 6, 1951........................655
Prudential Bank v. Castro, 158 SCRA 646........................................ 577
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No.
138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53....................................... 643
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No.
138965, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 3 36 ............................ 504, 644
Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179313,
September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 1 78 ......................................... 191
Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 33.................................................... 238
PVTA v. CIR, 65 SCRA 416 .................... ;........................................... 35

Quarto v. The Honorable Ombudsman Simeon

Mai'celo, G.R. No. 109042, October 5, 2011,
658 SCRA 580.......................................................... 271, 387, 766

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Querubin v. Regional Cluster Director, Legal and

Adjudication Office, COA Regional Office VI,
Pavia, Iloilo City, G.R. No. 159299, July 7,
2004, 433 SCRA 769.................................................................... 724
Quezon City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA
496................................................................................................ 323
Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012,
675 SCRA 642............................................................................103
Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 98 Phil. 705...............................................644, 651
Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189698, February 22, 2010, 613SCRA 385............................... 632
Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments,
177 SCRA 259.........................................................................398
Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February
15, 2008, 545 SCRA 635............................................................. 659

Radaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177135,

October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 223...................................... 495, 501
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 172476-99,
September 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 5 05 ..........................................766
Ramos v. Ramos, 447 Phil. 114 (2003)................................................ 583
Rapsingv. Abies, G.R. No. 171855, October 15,
2012, 684 SCRA 195.....................................................................544
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 390 Phil. 917 (2000).....................................765
Rayo v. CFI o f Bulacan, 110 SCRA 4 60................................................ 71
Rayo v. Metropolitan Bank, G.R. No. 165142,
December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 571............................................ 522
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3,
2009, 606 SCRA 598....................................................................... 98
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation o f the Ap­
praised Value o f the Properties Purchased by
the retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Su­
preme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31,
2012, 678 SCRA 1.............................................................. 158, 483
Re: Complaint against the Honorable Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona dated September 14, 2011
filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation,
A.M. No. 12-6-10-SC, June 13, 2012, 672
SCRA 62........................................................................................732
Re: Request o f Jose M. Alejandrino, 672 SCRA 27............................ 796

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Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the

Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) for Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No.
08-2-01-0, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 193.......... 76, 483, 555
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Networth (SALN) and Per­
sonal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers
and Employees o f the Judiciary, A.M. No. 09-
8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 27.............................. 796, 798
Re: Request of Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism for the 2008 SALNs and Personal
Data Sheets of Court of Appeals Justices,
A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA, June 13, 2012, 672
SCRA 27.................................................................... 560, 798, 799
Re: Vehicular Accident involving SC Shuttle Bus No.
3 with Plate No. SEG-357 driven by Gerry B.
Moral, Driver II-Casual, A.M. No. 2008-13-SC,
November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 352........................................ 637
Re: Verified Complaint o f Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco,
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31,
2012, 664 SCRA 465......................................................... 571, 578
Repol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161418,
April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 321......................................... 605, 687
Republic of the Philippines v. Badjao, G.R. No.
160596, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 53 ..................768, 769, 778
Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 168584, October 15,
2007, 536 SCRA 193...................................................................325
Republic v. City of Paranaque, G.R. No. 191109,
July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 246 ........................................... 612, 615
Republic v. Cojuangco, G.R. No. 139930, June 26,
2012, 674 SCRA 492...........................................................791, 792
Republic v. De la Cruz, 118 SCRA 18 ............................................... 553
Republic v. De la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 104654, 105715 &
105735, June 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 785....................................... 658
Republic v. Desierto, 416 Phil. 59, 77-78 (2001)................................791
Republic v. Desierto, 438 Phil. 201, 212 (2002).................................791
Republic v. Domingo, G.R. No. 175299, September
14, 2011, 657 SCRA 621..............................................61, 72
Republic v. Francisco, G.R. No. 163089, December
6, 2006, 510 SCRA 377...............................................................778
Republic v. Garcia, 76 SCRA 4 7 ............................................................77
Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil. 770...............................................596, 597

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Republic v. Investa Corporation, G.R. No. 135466,

May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 29.........................................................755
Republic v. National Labor Relations Commission,
263 SCRA 290............................................................................... 79
Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470......................................................61
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 525 Phil.
804 (2006)....................................................................................538
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 182 SCRA 911 ....................................... 64
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478,
November 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 212...............................................63
Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462...................................................553
Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 .................................................66, 78
Resolution dated May 2, 1989, cited in Re: Request
for Copy o f 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabili­
ties and Net Worth (SALN) and Personal
Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Jus­
tices of the Supreme Court and Officers of the
Judiciary, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012,
672 SCRA 27............................................................................... 798
Review Center Association o f the Philippines v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180046, April
2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428..................................................... 270, 383
Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129,
March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 512, 516 ........................................ 604
Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013............................. 193, 257, 260, 682, 800
Reyes v. Lim, G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003,
408 SCRA 560............................................................................. 554
Reyna v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219,
February 8, 2011, 642 SCRA 210.............................................. 724
Riel v. Wright, 49 Phil. 195 ...................................................... 153, 713
Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780......................................................... 254
Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603................................................. 165, 167
Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 8 4 .......................... 377, 378, 433
Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009,
583 SCRA 396..................................................................... 299, 581
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 294 (2004)................791
Romulo v. Yniguez, 141 SCRA 2 63............................................ 149, 743
Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September
10, 2009, 599 SCRA 0 9 .............................................................. 705
Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18,
2010,613 SCRA 233................................................................... 378

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Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875.................................... 44, 425, 542

Ruivivar v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165012, September
16, 2008, 565 SCRA 324.....................................................278, 778
Ruiz v. Cabahug, 54 O.G. 3 51............................................................... 55
Ruiz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105324, March 11, 1993 ....................579

Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17,

2006, 504 SCRA 704...........................................................297, 299
Salalima v. Guingona, G.R. No. 117589-92, May 22, 1996,
257 SCRA 55................................................................................408
Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 4 47 ................................. 655
Salengav. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 174941,
February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 635...............................................616
Sales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174668, September
12, 2007, 533 SCRA 173 ............................................................ 495
Salva v. Valle, G.R. No. 193773, April 2, 2013, 694
SCRA 422..................................................................................... 626
Salvador v. Serrano, A.M. No. P-06-2104 (Formerly
OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1484-P), January 31, 2006,
481 SCRA 55................................................................................ 473
Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182,
November 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 654...........................................312
Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, March 28,
2011, 646 SCRA 4 81................................................................... 768
San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, 394
Phil. 608, 636-637 (2000)............................................................ 766
San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
104637-38, September 14, 2000, 340 SCRA 2 8 9 ......................755
Sana v. Career Executive Service Board, G.R. No.
192926, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 130............................ 497
Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 ..............................................673
Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545,
April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471....... ..........................311, 717, 721
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665, 674 (2003)................... 584
Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November
9, 1993, 227 SCRA 627............................................................... 770
Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88......................................................54
Sangcopan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 17021G, March
12, 2008, 548 SCRA 148............................................................. 673

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Sangguniang Barangay o f Don Mariano Marcos v.

Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008,
547 SCRA 416..............................................................................408
Sanidadv. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333.............................. 143, 512, 824
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085,
February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656...............................................387
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February
19, 2008, 546 SCRA 303............................................................. 765
Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March
19,1997, 270 SCRA 106.......................................... 328, 813, 825
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 2 9 4 ......................................................63
Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
155618, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 6 1 1 ...................................688
Santos v. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749, February 8,
2007,515 SCRA 9 7 ..................................................................... 768
Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281 .............................................................. 64
Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549.................................................. 396
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 SCRA 495.....................................175
Scott v. Inciong, 68 SCRA 473........................................................... 542
Scoty^ Dep’t. Store v. Micaller, 99 Phil. 762 ...................................428
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
357 SCRA 441.............................................................................. 547
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No.
180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1 ...................................... 551
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808,
October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 354............................................... 521
Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, March
27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328........................................................... 753
Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16,
2008, 558 SCRA 700................................................................... 205
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d 725, 162 U. S. App.
D.C. 183 ....................................................................................... 371
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006,
488 SCRA 1............................................... 299, 303, 367, 371, 372
491, 493, 512, 514
Seneres v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178678, April 16,
2009, 585 SCRA 557........................................................... 210, 631
Serrano v. Ambassador Hotel, G.R, No, 197003,
February 11, 2013, 690 SCRA 226.............................................583
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R.
No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254......................37, 273

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Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161390,

April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 524................................................... 588
Severino v. Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366 ..................................... 144
Shell Philippines Exploration BV v. Jalos, G.R. No.
179918, September 8, 2010, 630 SCRA 3 9 9 ............................... 75
Shepard v. Barren, 194 U.S. 553........................................................ 527
Shimizu Philippine Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R.
No. 170026, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 6 5 .............................. 572
Singson v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159355,
August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 36..................................................724
Smart Communications, Inc. v. City of Davao, G.R.
No. 155491, September 16, 2008, 565 SCRA 237...................324
Smith Bell & Co. (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
274 Phil. 472, 479 (1991), 197 SCRA 201................................. 576
Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 198742, August 10, 2012, 678 SCRA 267........ 218, 688, 800
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052,
February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92...............................................173
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570
SCRA 410............................................................................ 193, 676
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051,
April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 613............................................. 579, 580
Sombong v. Court o f Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
111876, January 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 663 ...............................437
Soriano III v. Lista, 399 S.CRA 437.................................................... 395
Soriano v. Cabais, G.R. No. 157175, June 21, 2007,
525 SCRA 261..............................................................................778
Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29,
2009, 587 SCRA 79........................................................................38
Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special
Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, G.R. No.
174350, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 184.........................579, 781
Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
188056, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 109................................. 419
Spouses Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288,
August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 469............................................... 554
Spouses Francisco and Merced Rabat v. Philippine
National Bank, G.R. No. 158755, June 18,
2012, 673 SCRA 383................................................................... 473
Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760 (2001)...............522

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Spouses Serfino v. Far East Bank and Trust Company,

Inc., G.R. No. 171845, October 10, 2012, 683
SCRA 380......... ■........................................................................558
Springer v. Gov’t, pf the Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189.............. 134, 527
SSS Employees Assn. v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686...............634
Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. v. Municipality of
Cainta, G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 44...........473
Sta. Maria v. Ubay, A.M. No. 595-CFI, December
11, 1978, 87 SCRA 179............................................................... 473
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, G.R.
No. 167173, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456........... 299, 300
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 ....................................................56
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,
G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 473 .....................507
Suanes v. Disbursing Officer of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 ................254
Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co. v. CA, 110 SCRA 241 ............. 521
Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (1941).....................676
Sumulong v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272............................................... 447
Sunga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125629, March 25,
1998, 288 SCRA 76......................................................................664
Suplico v. National Economic Development Authority,
G.R. No. 178830, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 329.......................496
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312.......................................... 49, 56

Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., 511 Phil. 56 (2005).................................. 563

Taganas v. Emulsan, G.R. No. 146980, September
2, 2003, 410 SCRA 2 37 ............................................................... 581
Tagolino v. HRET and Lucy Torres, G.R. No.
202202, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574 ................................. 661
Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Apsay, G.R. No.
81188, August SCRA 471, 489...................................................717
Talabon v. Warden, 44 O.G. 4326 ...................................................... 571
Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
196804, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197............... 659, 661, 664
Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888,
November 11, 2008, 570 SCRA 622, 632.................................. 753
Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, October 18,
1990, 190 SCRA 080......................................................... 528, 529
Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997),
272 SCRA 18...............................................81, 144, 471, 493, 539

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Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101....................................142, 251, 824

Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division),
512 Phil. 590 (2005).................................................................... 271
Taruc v. Bishop De la Cruz, 493 Phil. 293 (2005).............................. 117
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad
Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22,
2011, 646 SCRA 21..................................................................... 272
Taxpayers’ League of Cargon County v. McPherson,
54 P. 2d. 897, 901: 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767..........................357
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
161434, 161634, and 161824, March 3, 2004,
424 SCRA 277..............................................................................341
Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154 ................................................................ 556
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337......................... 675
The Heirs of Jolly R. Bugarin v. Republic, G.R. No.
174431, August 6, 2012, 678 SCRA 209................................... 756
The Heritage Hotel Manila v. NUWHRAIN, G.R.
No. 178296, January 12, 2011-08-26, 639
SCRA 420..................................................................................... 416
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130140,
October 25, 1999, 317 SCRA 272...............................................791
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 138142,
September 19, 2007, 533 SCRA 5 71...............................763, 791
The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145184,
March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 2 9 5 ...................................... 782, 791
The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136225,
April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 513.................................................... 791
The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra, G.R. No.
133756, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 3 1 ...........................................791
The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of
the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14,
2008, 568 SCRA 402.............. 18, 19,37, 83, 102, 128, 387, 432
494, 502,510, 511, 512, 515, 517, 519
Tichangoo v, Enriquoa, G.R. No. 150629, Juno 30,
2004, 433 SCRA 325....................................................................578
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 33 SCRA 29 ........................................ 521, 545

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Tilendo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165975, Septem­

ber 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 331..................................... .......760, 762
Tileston v. Ullmann, 318 U.S. 446....................................................507
Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106..................................................204, 280
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702...................................... 511, 822
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 ... 247, 276, 285, 286, 320
Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946)........................ 234
Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18,
2008, 574 SCRA 817................................................................... 508
Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 (1912)..............................................663
Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 5 9 9 ......................................................... 79
Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011,
656 SCRA 486..............................................................................754
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 5 ................................................................ 428
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013, 681 SCRA 27 ..................... 639
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigilio, G.R. No.
176343, September 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 2 7 .............................611
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigilio, G.R.
No. 185571, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 359..............................412
Tria v. Sto. Tomas, 276 Phil. 923 (1991)............................................ 624
Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
166038, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 415...............................781
Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 NJ 31.................................................85
Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,
511 Phil. 510 (2005).....................................................................582

Ugdoracion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851,

April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231.................................................... 658
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 ......................................................... 177
U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332........................................................................ 42
U.S. v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644....................................................... 57, 66
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)............................................ 367, 464
U.S. v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566................................................................ 275
U S v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729 .................................................................. 245
U.S. v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487...................................................................64
Ugdoracion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851,
April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231.................................................... 658

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United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v.

Bradford United Church o f Christ, Inc., G.R.
No. 171905, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 9 2 ............................... 117
United Claimants Association o f NEA v. National
Electrification Administration, G.R. No.
187107, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 483 ...............................628
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v.
Laguesma, 351 Phil. 244, 260 (1998)........................................780
United States vs. Barrias, No. 4349, September 24,
1908, 11 Phil. 327....................................................................... 160
University of the Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No.
171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 5 4 ....... 55, 69, 77, 79, 554,
572, 584, 614, 720, 722
Ursal v. Court of Tax Appeals, 101 Phil. 2 0 9 ....................................547
Ututalum v. COMELEC, 122 Phil. 880 ............................................. 672
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154 (2001)....................................... 770
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R .No. 105965-70, March
20, 2001, 354 SCRA 651............................................................. 762
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111544, July 6,
2004, 433 SCRA 424................................................................... 511

Valdez v. Ocumen, 106 Phil. 929, 933 (1960)................................... 588

Valdez v. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13,
2012, 672 SCRA 8 9 .....................................................................588
Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692........................................................ 393
Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil. 297........................................................ 469
Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio, G.R. Nos. 118813-14,
April 8, 1997, 271 SCRA 67....................................................... 768
Veloso v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677,
September 6, 2011, 656 SCRA 7 67......... 120, 649, 722, 723, 724
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 191 ............................................ 147, 271, 701
Vera v. People, 7 Phil. 152........................ .......................................... 453
Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March
12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693............................................................. 765
Versoza v. Carague, G.R. No. 157838, March 8,
2011, 644 SCRA 679................................. 604, 682, 718, 720, 724
Versoza v. Carague, G.R. No. 157838, February 7,
2012, 665 SCRA 124................................................................... 718

lxviii
 T ab le of Ca s e s

Page

Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on

Elections, 396 Phil. 419, 424-425 (2000)................................... 676
Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149,
August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17....................................... 192, 505
Vilas v. City o f Manila, 229 U.S. 345 ................................................... 46
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 188630, February
23, 2011, 644 SCRA 358............................................................. 753
Villasenor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700,
March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658................................................... 753
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778.................................................... 91
Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 ......................379, 411
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, 520 SCRA 166............ 258
Vios v. Pantangco, G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009,
578 SCRA 129..............................................................................582
Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191........................................108

Western Mindanao Power Corporation v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 181136, June 13,
2012, 672 SCRA 350........................................................... 324, 548
Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South, 640,
641; 126 Ala., 268....................................................................... 584
Wood’s Appeal, 79 Pa 59...................................................................... 819

Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation,

474 SCRA 258............................................................................. 548
Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563.........................................................427
Yap v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562,
April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 154....................................................718
Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369...................................... 273
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356......................................................... 92
Ynchausti v. Wright, 47 Phil. 886....................................................... 712
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 .............................................. 175, 181, 545
Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 ............. 381

box
 T able of C a se s

Page

Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 843 .................................................789

Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat, G.R. No.
104389, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 587..................................... 610
Zandueta v. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 115 ...................................... 523, 565

——oOo------

lxx
 Chapter 1

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Scope of the Study

POLITICAL LA W is that branch of public law which

deals with the organization and operations of the gov­
ernmental organs o f the State and defines the relations
of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.1
In the present law curriculum prescribed by the Su­
preme Court, Political Law embraces Constitutional
Law I and II, Administrative Law, the Law of Public
Officers, Election Law and the Law on Municipal Corpo­
rations.
Constitutional Law I, which is the particular sub­
ject of this work, is a study of the structure and powers
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It
also deals with certain basic concepts of Political Law,
such as the nature of the State, the supremacy of the
Constitution, the separation of powers, and the rule of
the majority.

Necessity for the Study

The inclusion o f Political Law as a required subject

in the law course is only one of the reasons for its study.

1People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887.

1
2 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Every citizen, regardless of calling, should under­

stand the mechanics and motivations of his government.
This must be so because “sovereignty resides in the peo­
ple and all government authority emanates from them. ”2
It is upon the active involvement in public affairs of
every Filipino that the success of the Republic of the
Philippines will depend.
The fundamental law provides that “all educational
institutions shall include the study of the Constitution
as part of the curricula.”3

Basis of the Study

The principal basis of the study of Constitutional

Law I is the present Constitution of the Philippines as
adopted on February 2, 1987. In addition, the student
should consider pertinent statutes, executive orders and
decrees, and judicial decisions, as well as current politi­
cal events in which the purposes of the law are applied
(or misapplied).
Particularly with regard to those of their provisions
that have been retained in toto or with modifications in
the new Constitution, the Constitutions of 1935 and
1973, which served as its working drafts, are an integral
part of this study.
So too is the Constitution of the United States,
along with relevant rulings of its Supreme Court, in
connection with the parts of that document, like the Bill
of Rights, that have been incorporated in the present
Constitution of the Philippines. The reason is that im­
ported provisions of law are, as a general rule, inter­

2 Constitution o f 1987, Art. II, Sec. 1.

3Ibid., Art. XIV, Sec. 3(1).
 G e n e r a l C o n s id e r a t io n s 3

preted in the light of their understanding in the country

of origin.

Background of the Study

The inhabitants of the Philippines originally con­

sisted of disparate tribes scattered throughout its more
than seven thousand islands. These tribes were gener­
ally free and were each governed by a system of laws
promulgated by the daiu or a council of elders. Except
when they fell under the sway of a foreign power, like
the Madjapahit and Sri-Vishayan empires, these tribes
were bound mainly, if not only, by commercial ties.
The discovery of the Philippines by Magellan in
1521 brought the people of the territory under the com­
mon rule of Spain. This rule lasted for more than three
hundred years, during which the abuses of the govern­
ment and the friars gradually developed a sense of unity
among the natives. Rizal and the other propagandists
were later to ignite the spirit of nationalism that was to
fuel the Philippine Revolution.
Started by the fiery Bonifacio and won under the
able generalship of Emilio Aguinaldo, the Philippine
Revolution finally ended Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippines. On June 12, 1898, Philippine independence
was proclaimed; and on January 21, 1899, the First
Philippine Republic was established with Aguinaldo as
its President. The Malolos Constitution, under which
the new government was established, was the first de­
mocratic constitution ever to be promulgated in the
whole of Asia. Significantly, it established a parliamen­
tary system, but with the President and not the Prime
Minister as head of the government.
4 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

The first Republic of the Philippines was to be

short-lived for even as the Philippine State was being
erected, the United States was already planting the
seeds of another sovereignty in our country. The Filipi­
nos were deluded into believing that the Americans,
who were then at war with Spain, were their allies. But
it was soon revealed that the United States had its own
imperialistic designs on the Philippines.
Disregarding the declaration of independence by
the Filipinos, the erstwhile belligerents concluded the
Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898, which provided
for the cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the
United States. To the credit of the Filipinos, they re­
sisted the new threat to their freedom with undimin­
ished valor. However, the superior forces of the invader
easily put an end to the Philippine-American W ar, pav­
ing the way for the new colonization of our country.
The Americans first organized a military govern­
ment, but consolidation of executive, legislative and
judicial authority in the military governor provoked
protests from American libertarians concerned over the
non-observance of the doctrine of separation of powers.
As a result, steps were taken for the transition from
military to civilian rule.
The first of these steps was the creation of the
Schurman Commission, otherwise known as the First
Philippine Commission, to make a fact-finding survey of
the Philippine Islands and submit appropriate recom­
mendations to the U .S. Congress. This was substituted
later by the Taft Commission, also known as the Second
Philippine Commission, which took over all the legisla­
tive powers and some of the executive and judicial pow­
ers of the military governor. Thereafter, on July 4, 1901,
pursuant to the Spooner Amendment, civil government
 G e n e r a l C o n s id e r a t io n s 5

was established in the Philippine Islands, with W illiam

Howard Taft as the first governor.
By virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Philip­
pine Assembly was created in 1907 to sit with the Phil­
ippine Commission in a bicameral legislature. Sergio
Osmena was initially and successively elected Speaker
of the Philippine Assembly until its dissolution in 1916.
In that year was promulgated the Philippine Autonomy
Act, popularly known as the Jones Law, which estab­
lished inter alia a Philippine Legislature consisting of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. Manuel L. Que­
zon and Sergio Osmena were elected President and
Speaker, respectively.
The Jones Law continued until 1935, when it was
supplanted by the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which author­
ized the establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Toward this end, a Constitutional Conven­
tion framed the Constitution of 1935, which was ratified
on May 14 of that year and led to the inauguration of
the Commonwealth Government on November 15, 1935.
Quezon was the first President, with Osmena as Vice-
President.
The Tydings-McDuffie Act promised independence
to the Filipinos if they could prove their capacity for
democratic government during a ten-year transition
period. As it turned out, they were to demonstrate this
competence not only in the councils of peace but also in
the barricades of World W ar II, and no less gallantly in
the Second Republic of the Philippines headed by Presi­
dent Jose P. Laurel during the Japanese occupation of
our country.
Accordingly, on July 4, 1946, the United States for­
mally withdrew it sovereignty over the Philippines.
President Manuel A . Roxas thereupon asserted the
 6 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

freedom of the Filipino people and proclaimed the Re­

public of the Philippines.
The Republic of the Philippines was to pursue an
erratic course that was ultimately to transform it into a
near-anarchic system corrupted on the one hand by the
decadent “haves” and subverted on the other by the dis­
contented “have-nots.” Conditions continued to deterio­
rate until the pent-up resentments of the people erupted
in a number of mass demonstrations, some of them vio­
lent, and the so-called “parliament of the streets” organ­
ized particularly by the student groups.
It was at the height of this unrest that the Consti­
tutional Convention of 1971 was convoked and started
deliberations on the revision of the 1935 Constitution
and the fashioning of the Constitution of 1973.
On September 21, 1972, following an intensification
of the subversive movement by Communist-oriented
groups, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Procla­
mation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under
martial law. Shortly thereafter, on November 30, 1972,
the draft of the 1973 Constitution was formally ap­
proved by the Constitutional Convention and, during a
series of meetings held on January 10-15, 1973, was
submitted to the Citizens Assemblies for ratification. On
January 17, 1973, President Marcos issued Proclama­
tion No. 1102, in which he announced that the Constitu­
tion of 1973 had been ratified by an overwhelming m a­
jority of the people and had thus become effective.
The issue of the validity of the 1973 Constitution
was later raised in what are known as the Ratification
Cases,4 which were dismissed by the Supreme Court.

4Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33 (1973).

 G e n e r a l C o n s id e r a t io n s 7

Subsequently, in the Habeas Corpus Cases,5 the Su­

preme Court unanimously upheld the proclamation of
martial law by the President of the Philippines.
On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law. However, he
retained what he called his ‘‘standby legislative powers”
under several decrees he had promulgated earlier, prin­
cipally the National Security Code and the Public Order
Act.
In 1985, to seek a “fresh mandate” from the people,
President Marcos submitted a questionable resignation
that was to be effective on the tenth day following the
proclamation of the winners in the “snap” election to be
called by the legislature on the strength of such resigna­
tion. The election was challenged in the case o f Philip­
pine Bar Association u. Commission on Elections15 on the
ground inter alia that the vacancy contemplated in Arti­
cle VII, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution which would
justify the call of a special presidential election before
the expiration of President Marcos’s term in 1987 was
supposed to occur before and not after the said election.
Predictably, the then Supreme Court denied the petition
and sustained the resignation and the call.
The election was held on February 7, 1986, as
scheduled, and resulted, amid charges of wholesale ir­
regularities committed by the ruling party, in the proc­
lamation of Marcos and his running-mate, Arturo Tolen­
tino, as President-elect and Vice-President-elect of the
Philippines, respectively. This was followed by a m as­
sive outcry from the people who felt that the real win­
ners were the Opposition candidates.

5Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).

6 G.R. No. 72915, Dec. 20, 1985, 140 SCRA 453.
8 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

On February 22, 1986, Defense Minister Juan

Ponce Enrile and General Fidel V. Ramos began, per­
haps unwittingly, what later came to be known as the
“people power” revolution that led to the ouster of
President Marcos and his replacement by President
Corazon C. Aquino, who, with Vice-President Salvador
H. Laurel, her running-mate, were inducted on Febru­
ary 25, 1986.
One of the first acts of the new President was the
promulgation of a provisional or “Freedom Constitution”
which was to be in force pending the adoption of a new
Constitution to be drafted by a Constitutional Commis­
sion, which she also created. This body approved the
draft of the new charter which was submitted to the
people at a plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, and was
ratified by a vote of 16,605,425 in favor and 4,949,901
against.
Pursuant to this Constitution, elections for the re­
vived Congress of the Philippines were held on May 11,
1988, and those for the local offices were scheduled later
that year. The rest of the government underwent reor­
ganization conformably to the changes prescribed in the
new fundamental law.
On May 11, 1992, general elections were held for
the President and Vice-President of the Philippines, 24
senators, all elective members of the House of Represen­
tatives and local officials. Fidel V . Ramos and Joseph
Estrada were elected President and Vice-President,
respectively.
In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of
the Philippines but was impeached two years later and
forced out of office by a massive people power demon­
stration at EDSA on January 20, 2001. Vice-President
 G e n e r a l C o n s id e r a t io n s 9

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took the oath the same day as

his constitutional successor.
Estrada lost no time in challenging before the Su­
preme Court Arroyo’s right to succeed him, claiming
that he had neither resigned nor abandoned his office,
and that he left Malacanang only to appease the demon­
strators who clamored for his resignation. The Court
dismissed his petition, ruling that his public statements
made upon and the circumstances leading to his depar­
ture from Malacanang clearly showed that he had re­
signed. Accordingly, it considered his presidency as
“now in the past tense” and Arroyo’s ascendancy to the
Presidency as lawful.
Within months after Arroyo’s assumption into of­
fice, Estrada was arrested for plunder amidst the noisy
objections of thousands of his sympathizers who waged
still another people power protest. The attempt of said
protesters to storm Malacanang and the violence which
erupted in the process prompted Arroyo to declare a
state of rebellion. Notwithstanding said protests,
Estrada was eventually tried and convicted by the
Sandiganbayan, only to be later pardoned by Arroyo.
During her first term, Arroyo also faced but quickly
quelled the Oakwood Mutiny mounted by disgruntled
military officers on corruption issues.
She sought another term in 2004, reneging on an
earlier promise that she would not do so. She was pro­
claimed the winner of said election, notwithstanding
allegations of widespread cheating or electoral fraud.
These charges hounded her for most of her second term.
Street protests particularly escalated after the release of
the infamous Garci Tapes, which included her alleged
telephone conversations with a former COMELEC Com­
missioner, to whom she had purportedly given explicit
10 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

instructions to rig or fix the results of the 2004 presi­

dential elections in her favor. These tapes, as well as
charges of corruption, were invoked in at least three
impeachment complaints against her, all of which were
however quickly dismissed by the House of Representa­
tives, which was then composed largely of her political
allies.
In 2006, Arroyo was besieged by yet another
challenge from the military which she invoked as justi­
fication for declaring, this time, a state of emergency
under her Proclamation No. 1017, on the basis of which
several persons were arrested without warrants and
at least one newspaper establishment was raided. These
acts, as well as several substantial portions of said Proc­
lamation, were later nullified by the Supreme Court.
Prior to the expiration of her second term, which
was marred by constant and persistent charges of graft
and corruption as against her claims of economic pro­
gress, she ran for and won a seat in the House of Repre­
sentatives in 2010 and has since been re-elected to a
second term by her constituents in her home district in
Pampanga, despite the pendency of formal criminal
charges against her for, among other offenses, electoral
sabotage and plunder.
These cases were instituted shortly after the as­
sumption into office of her successor, Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino, Jr., only son of former President Corazon C.
Aquino, who was elected President in 2010 despite criti­
cisms as to his perceived lack of executive experience
and abilities and notwithstanding what many consid­
ered as his lackluster performance, first, as a Member of
the House of Representatives and, later, as a Senator of
the Republic. Indeed, it is widely believed that he was
elected to office not in acknowledgement of his qualities
 G e n e r a l C o n s id e r a t io n s 11

as a public functionary but more as a rejection of the

Arroyo regime or, at least, as an affirmation of the con­
tinuing popularity of his mother, who passed away only
months before the 2010 elections.
 Chapter 2

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1987 is the fourth funda­

mental law to govern the Philippines since it became
independent on July 4, 1946.' The first was the Com­
monwealth Constitution, adopted in 1935, which con­
tinued by its provisions to be operative after the proc­
lamation of the Republic of the Philippines. The second
was the Constitution of 1973, which was enforced dur­
ing the Marcos regime following its dubious approval
and ratification at a time when the country was already
under martial law. On February 25, 1986, as a result of
the people power upheaval that deposed President Mar­
cos, the new President proclaimed a Freedom Constitu­
tion, to be effective pending the adoption of a permanent
Constitution aimed at correcting the shortcomings of the
previous constitutions and specifically eliminating all
the iniquitous vestiges of the past regime.
Toward this end, President Corazon C. Aquino, in
Proclamation No. 9, created a Constitutional Commis­
sion composed of fifty members appointed by her and
charged it to frame a new charter not later than Sep­
tember 2, 1986. All but one of those appointed accepted
and immediately undertook their mission under the
presidency of Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma, formerly of
the Supreme Court. The members came from various

* The Constitution promulgated during the Japanese occupa­

tion is not included.

12
 T h e C o n s t it u t io n of the P h il ip p in e s 13

sectors and represented diverse persuasions, which is

probably one reason why they could not meet their
deadline and were able to approve the final draft of
their handiwork only on October 15, 1986. By resolution
of the Commission, it was recommended to the Presi­
dent that the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution be
scheduled, not within sixty days as originally provided,
but within three months, to give the people more oppor­
tunity to study it. Accordingly, the plebiscite was sched­
uled and held on February 2, 1987.
The campaign for the ratification of the proposed
Constitution was led by President Aquino herself, whose
main argument was that it would restrict the powers of
the Presidency as provided for in the Freedom Constitu­
tion. Opposition to the draft, while spirited, was largely
disorganized and consequently ineffective. Many people,
while doubtful about some of its provisions and espe­
cially of its length, which made it seem like a codifica­
tion, nevertheless approved the proposed Constitution
in the end because they felt it would provide the stabil­
ity the country sorely needed at the time. W hen the
votes were tallied, it appeared that 76.29% of the elec­
torate had voted to ratify, with only 22.74% against.

Outstanding Features

The new Constitution consists of eighteen articles

and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based. M any of
the original provisions of the 1935, particularly those
pertaining to the legislative and the executive depart­
ments, have been restored because of the revival of the
bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly
presidential system. The independence of the judiciary
has been strengthened, with new provisions for ap­
14 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

pointment thereto and an increase in its authority,

which now covers even political questions formerly be­
yond its jurisdiction. Additionally, many provisions of
the 1973 Constitution have been retained, like those on
the Constitutional Commissions and local governments.
The bill of rights of the Commonwealth and Marcos
Constitutions has been considerably improved in the
Constitution of 1987 and even bolstered with the crea­
tion elsewhere in the document of a Commission on
Human Rights.
What has made the present Constitution exces­
sively long is the inclusion therein of provisions that
should have been embodied only in implementing stat­
utes to be enacted by the legislature pursuant to the
basic constitutional principles. The most notable flaw of
the new charter is its verbosity and consequent prolixity
that have dampened popular interest in what should be
the common concern of the whole nation. The sheer
length of the document has deterred people from reading
it, much less trying to understand its contents and moti­
vations. It would seem that every one of the members of
the Constitutional Commission wanted to put in his two
centavos worth and unfortunately succeeded, thereby
ballooning the Constitution to unseemly dimensions.
Thus, in some portions thereof, the new Constitu­
tion sounds like a political speech rather than a formal
document stating only basic precepts. It is full of plati­
tudes. This is true of the policies on social justice and
the national economy, which could have been worded
with less loquacity to give the legislature more leeway
in their implementation. It is believed that such policies
could have been expressed briefly without loss of sub­
stance if the framers had more expertise in the art of
 T h e C o n s t it u t io n of the P h il ip p in e s 15

constitution-making and less personal vainglory, let

alone distrust of the legislature.
What is worse is the inclusion of certain topics that
certainly, by any criterion, have no place in a Constitu­
tion. Among these are sports, love, drugs, and even ad­
vertising; and there is also mention of “the rhythm and
harmony of nature.”1 But what is even worse than all
this is the tortuous language of some of its provisions,
like the following masterpiece of circumlocution in Arti­
cle XVI, Section 10:

“The State shall provide the policy environment for the

full development of Filipino capability and the emergence of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspira­
tions of the nation and the balanced flow of information into,
out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that
respects the freedom of speech and of the press.”

Excuse me?
One wonders, given the long-windedness of the pre­
sent Constitution, if the people had really read and un­
derstood it when they voted to ratify it.
Even so, it should be remembered that, as its pro­
ponents repeatedly argued during the campaign for its
ratification, its real and main function was to replace
the Freedom Constitution, which was a revolutionary
constitution, and so pave the way for stability and nor­
mality under a regular Constitution duly approved by
the people. Now that that function has been more or less
achieved, we may take a second more critical look at the
Constitution of 1987, this time with a view to its
amendment or revision under its Article XV II, in a less
tense and more amiable atmosphere.

1Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 16.

16 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

The Supremacy of the Constitution

The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform and to which all per­
sons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its inten­
tions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitu­
tion must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the
mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to
sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.
Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long
as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest
its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of
law by the pretenders to illegitimate power.

Prospects of the Constitution

“The Constitution must be quintessential rather

than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base
and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is
but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly ‘in
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,’ where it will
in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its
strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the
Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-
grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention,
nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must
grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march
apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the
vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will
keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing,
living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.”2

2 “A Quintessential Constitution,” by Isagani A. Cruz, San

Beda Law Journal, April 1972.
 Chapter 3

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Definition

“THE STATE is a community of persons, more or less

numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory, and
possessed of an independent government organized for
political ends to which the great body of inhabitants
render habitual obedience.”1
The term natiqn^ is used interchangeably with
State, e.g., the U nited Nations or the family of nations,
which actually consists of states and not nations. This is
a mistake as the two concepts have different connota­
tions. Hackworth observes that “the term nation,
strictly speaking, as evidenced by its etymology (nasci,
to be born), indicates a relation of birth or origin and
implies a common race, usually characterized by com­
munity of language and customs.” The State is a legal
concept, while the nation is only a racial or ethnic con­
cept.2
Thus understood, a nation may comprise several
states; for example, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
Jordan, Algeria and Libya, among others, while each a
separate state, all belong to the Arab nation. On the
other hand, it is also possible for a single state to be
made up of more than one nation, as in the case of the

1Gamer, Introduction to Political Science, 41.

2 Digest of International Law (1943), p. 47; Cruz, International
Law, 20.

17
18 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

United States, which was a “melting pot” of many na­

tions that were eventually amalgamated into the
“American nation,” or of Malaysia, whose population
consists of Malays and Chinese, or of the United King­
dom, which is composed of England, Scotland, Wales,
and Northern Ireland. Indeed, a nation need not be a
state at all, as demonstrated by the Poles after the dis­
memberment of their country in 1795 and then again in
World War II or by the Jews before the creation of the
State of Israel in 1948.3
The State must also be distinguished from the gov­
ernment. The government is only an element of the
State. The State is the principal, the government its
agent. The State itself is an abstraction; it is the gov­
ernment that externalizes the State and articulates its
will.

Elements

The essential elements of a State are people, terri­

tory, government and sovereignty.

The so-called Montevideo Convention, cited by the

Supreme Court in The Province o f North Cotabato v. The
Government o f the Republic o f the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain ,4 specifies the accepted crite­
ria for the establishment of a State, namely, a perma­
nent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.

These elements were among the factors considered

by the Supreme Court in declaring unconstitutional the
proposed Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral

3Ibid., 21.
4 G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
 T he C oncept o f the State 19

Domain between the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,
which would have paved the way for the conversion of
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), sought to be
established under said proposed Agreement purportedly
as an “expanded version” of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao, into a state.5

Thus, said proposed Agreement was to acknowl­

edge the “birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be ac­
cepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’ It defined ‘Bangsamoro people’
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and
its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time o f conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, includ­
ing their spouses.”

It further specified the “territory of the Bang­

samoro homeland,” described therein “as the land mass
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, including the aerial domain and the atmos­
pheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-
Palawan geographic region.” Significantly, it indicated
that “the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its ‘internal waters,’ defined as extend­
ing fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE
area; that the BJE shall also have ‘territorial waters,’
which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up
to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP)
south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and
that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
‘Central Government’ (used interchangeably with RP)

5 See The Province o f North Cotabato v. The Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, Ibid.
20 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and manage­

ment over all natural resources. Notably, the jurisdic­
tion over the internal waters is not similarly described as
‘joint. ’” It further provided for the sharing of minerals on
the territorial waters between the Central Government
and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production
sharing and economic cooperation agreement.

Under the proposed Agreement, the “Bangsamoro

people are acknowledged as having the right to self-
governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral
territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain
authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong
ku Ranaw.”

Moreover, the proposed Agreement stated that “the

BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and
trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries.”

These considerations led the Supreme Court to de­

scribe the relationship of the “Central Government” or
the Republic of the Philippines and the BJE under the
proposed Agreement as “associative, characterized by
shared authority and responsibility,” stressing that in
“international practice, the ‘associated state’ arrange­
ment has usually been used as a transitional device of
former colonies on their way to full independence.”
Thus—

“Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which

are consistent with the international legal concept of associa­
tion, specifically the following: the BJE’s capacity to enter into
economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the com­
mitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE’s par­
ticipation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the spe­
cialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the
Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the
 T he C oncept of the State 21

BJE’s right to participate in Philippine official missions bear­

ing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protec­
tion, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ances­
tral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM
and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. govern­
ment on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.”

The Supreme Court went on to state that the BJE

“is not merely an expanded version of the A R M M , the
status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the A RM M .
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Conven­
tion, namely, a permanent population, a defined terri­
tory, a government, and a capacity to enter into rela­
tions with other states.” The Court further stressed that
the proposed Agreement “cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific pro­
visions but the very concept underlying them, namely,
the associative relationship envisioned between the
GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.”
There are some writers who suggest two additional
elements, to wit, recognition and possession of a suffi­
cient degree of civilization. As these have not been gen­
erally accepted, we shall confine this study to the four
elements first mentioned.

(1) People

People refers simply to the inhabitants of the State.

While there is no legal requirement as to their
number, it is generally agreed that they must be nu­
merous enough to be self-sufficing and to defend them­
22 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

selves and small enough to be easily administered and

sustained. The populations of States range from the
over one billion of China to a few hundred thousand in
the case of the so-called mini-States like Qatar. Obvi­
ously, the people must come from both sexes to be able
to perpetuate themselves.
The people are more comprehensive and less cohe­
sive than the nation. Starting as an amorphous group of
individuals inhabiting the same territory, the people
may develop and share certain characteristics and in­
terests, such as a common language, a common religion,
and a common set of customs and traditions that will
unite them into the more closely-knit entity known as
the nation.
Malcolm defines a nation as “a people bound to­
gether by common attractions and repulsions into a
living organism possessed of a common pulse, a common
intelligence and inspiration, and destined apparently to
have a common history and a common fate.”6

(2) Territory

Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the

earth inhabited by the people of the State.
As a practical requirement only, it must be neither
too big as to be difficult to administer and defend nor too
small as to be unable to provide for the needs of the
population. Legally, the territory can extend over a vast
expanse, such as those of Russia and China, or cover
only a small area, such as that of Abu Dhabi.
The components of territory are the land mass, oth­
erwise known as the terrestrial domain, the inland and

6 Government of the Philippine Islands, 11.

 T he C oncept of the S tate 23

external waters, which make up the maritime and flu­

vial domain, and the air space above the land and wa­
ters, which is called the aerial domain.
Article I of the Constitution provides as follows:

“NATIONAL TERRITORY

“The national territory comprises the Philippine archi­

pelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipel­
ago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters o f the Philippines.”

The above provision is a substantial reproduction of

Article I of the 1973 Constitution with only a few minor
changes.
Departing from the method employed in the 1935
Constitution, which described the national territory by
reference to the pertinent treaties concluded by the
United States during its regime in this country, the
present rule now physically lists the components of our
territory and so de-emphasizes recollections of our colo­
nial past. The article has deleted reference to the terri­
tories we claim “by historic right or legal title,” but this
does not mean an outright or formal abandonment of
such claim, which was best left to a judicial body capa­
ble of passing judgment over the issue.”7
A t any rate, it has been pointed out that “the defi­
nition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Phil­
ippine Archipelago” as provided for in Section 2 of Re­
public Act No. 5446 “is without prejudice to the delinea­

7Res. of the Constitutional Commission, July 10, 1986.

24 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

tion of the baselines of the territorial sea around the

territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which
the Republic o f the Philippines has acquired dominion
and sovereignty.” It is to be noted that Sabah is main­
tained to be among the territories claimed bjj the Phil­
ippines “by historic right or legal title.”8
The second sentence is an affirmation of the archi­
pelago doctrine, under which we connect the outermost
points o f our archipelago with straight baselines and
consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal
waters. The entire archipelago is regarded as one inte­
grated unit instead of being fragmented into so many
thousand islands. A s for our territorial seas, these are
now defined according to the Jamaica Convention on the
Law of the Sea, ratified in 1994, of which the Philip­
pines is a signatory.9
In addition, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in
Magallona v. Erm ita,10 the Philippines is a signatory to
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu­
ous Zone (otherwise referred to as U N C L O S I), which
codified, am on g^ th ers, “the sovereign right of States
parties over their ‘territorial sea,’ the breadth of which,
however, was left undetermined,” and which served as
basis for the passage in 1961 by Congress of Republic
Act No. 3046 “demarcating the maritime baselines of
the Philippines as an archipelagic State.” Said law “re­
mained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for leg­
islation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA
5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.”

“ See Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011,

655 SCRA 476.
9 Ratified on November 16, 1994.
G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476.
 T he C oncept of the State 25

In 1984, the Philippines ratified the United N a­

tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
which, among others, “prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
like the Philippines.” Consistent with the Philippines’
obligations under said agreement, Congress amended
R A 3046 by enacting Republic Act No. 9522, which, it
was believed, would make RA 3046 “compliant” with the
provisions of U N CLO S III insofar as the determination
of the “water-land ratio, length, and contour of base­
lines” of our archipelago is concerned. Accordingly, “RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as ‘re­
gimes of islands’ whose islands generate their own ap­
plicable maritime zones.”

The petitioners in Magallona challenged “the con­

stitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds,
namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime terri­
tory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the
country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Phil­
ippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation o f relevant constitutional provi­
sions."

The petitioners further contended that “RA 95 22’s

treatment of the K IG as ‘regime of islands’ not only re­
sults in the loss of a large maritime area but also preju­
dices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To but­
26 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

tress their argument of territorial diminution, petition­

ers facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and
included — its failure to reference either the Treaty of
Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS I ll’s framework
of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.”

The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ claim

that RA 9522 had resulted in a reduction of the Philip ­
pines’ maritime territory and “the reach of the Philip­
pine state’s sovereign power,” explaining as follows —

“UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or

loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones {i.e., the territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the cul­
mination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in
the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal
and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
“xxx.
“UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no
role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution o f territory. Under traditional international law ty­
pology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by execut­
ing multilateral treaties on the regulations o f sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to
land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead gov­
erned by the rules on general international law.”

As to the petitioners’ claims that “RA 9522 opens

the country’s waters landward of the baselines to mari­
time passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
 T he C oncept of the State 27

Philippine sovereignty and national security, contraven­

ing the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging m a­
rine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions,” and that said law “unconstitutionally ‘con­
verts’ internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea
lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight,”
the Supreme Court had this to say —

“As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522,

petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally ‘converts’
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting
these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage un­
der UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate
that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine inter­
nal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in viola­
tion of the Constitution.
“Whether referred to as Philippine ‘internal waters’ un­
der Article I of the Constitution or as ‘archipelagic waters’ un­
der UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sov­
ereignty over the body of water lying landward o f the base­
lines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. [UNCLOS III, Article 49]

“Article 49
“Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space
over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil
“1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State ex­
tends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archi­
pelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast.
“2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over
the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and sub­
soil, and the resources contained therein.
“3. x x x x
“4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect
 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea

lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sov­
ereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

“The fact o f sovereignty, however, does not preclude the

operation o f municipal and international law norms subjecting
the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not
marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the in­
ternational law principle of freedom o f navigation. Thus, do­
mestically, the political branches of the Philippine government,
in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may
pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic wa­
ters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills
drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.
“In the absence of municipal legislation, international
law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant inno­
cent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic wa­
ters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a cus­
tomary international law, thus automatically incorporated in
the corpus o f Philippine law. No modern State can validly in­
voke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that
is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
“The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic
waters are subject to both the right o f innocent passage and
sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-a-vis
continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial
sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit
passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their
right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, re­
gardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archi­
pelagic watoro oubjcct to their territorial sovereignty. More Im­
portantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago
and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive en­
tity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands
 T he C on cept of the S tate 29

under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own mari­

time zones, placing the waters between islands separated by
more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sov­
ereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights o f other States
under UNCLOS III.”V

The Supreme Court likewise rejected the petition­

ers’ arguments on “territorial diminution,” i.e., the loss
of our claims to territories under the Treaty of Paris or
Sabah as a result of RA 9522’s adherence to the U N ­
CLOS I ll’s framework on the so-called "regime o f is­
lands” with its inclusion of the Scarborough Shoal and
the KIG as parts of our “regime of islands.” Thus —

“Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the

Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, ad­
verse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would
have committed a breach of two provisions o f UNCLOS III.
First, Article 47 (3) o f UNCLOS III requires that ‘ [t]he drawing
of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago.’ Second, Ar­
ticle 47 (2) o f UNCLOS III requires that ‘the length of the base­
lines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,’ save for three per
cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up
to 125 nautical miles.
“Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sov­
ereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable dis­
tance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,
such that any straight baseline loped around them from the
nearest basepoint will inevitably ‘depart to an appreciable ex­
tent from the general configuration of the archipelago.’ xxx.
“Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to clas­
sify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime [s] of Is­
lands’ under the Republic nf the Philippines consistent, with
Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s res­
ponsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any ‘naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above wa­
30 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

ter at high tide,’ such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under

the category o f ‘regime of islands,’ whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.”

The Supreme Court clarified that —

“Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies

outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522
draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Sec­
tion 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued
claim o f sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal:

“SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over

which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime o f Islands”
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Ar­
ticle 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS):
“a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted
under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
“b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough
Shoal.”

The Court, refuting the petitioners’ claims that RA

9522 not only “results in the loss of a large maritime
area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen,” went on to say that —

“In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the

Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non­
living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation
binds the international community since the delineation is in
strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
“UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the
Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space
— the exclusive economic zone — in waters previously part of
 T he C oncept of th e State 31

the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States
to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up
to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached
to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.”

Finally, the Supreme Court explained in Magallona

that “baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by
UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific base-
points along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geo­
graphic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of U N ­
CLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be
any clearer:

‘“Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territo­

rial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf.—The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continen­
tal shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn
in accordance with article 47.’

“Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory

mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest
of the international community of the scope of the mari­
time space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exer­
cise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in
the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental
shelf (Article 77).
32 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

“Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine

territory embraces the islands and all the waters within
the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris,
the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be
drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the
only way to draw the baselines in conformity with U N ­
CLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the ‘outer­
most islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.’”
The Philippines, like most States now, includes in
its territory the insular shelves which, strictly speaking,
are under the jurisdiction only, and not the sovereignty,
of the coastal state.
The definition in Article I now covers the following
territories:
1. Those ceded to the United States by virtue of
the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898.
2. Those defined in the treaty concluded between
the United States and Spain on November 7, 1900,
which were not defined in the Treaty of Paris, specifi­
cally the islands of Cagayan, Sulu and Sibuto.
3. Those defined in the treaty concluded on Janu­
ary 2, 1930, between the United States and Great Brit­
ain, specifically the Turtle and Mangsee islands.
4. The island of Batanes, which was covered un­
der a general statement in the 1935 Constitution.
5. Those contemplated in the phrase “belonging to
the Philippines by historic right or legal title” in the
1973 Constitution.11

" Res. of the Constitutional Commission No. 21, July 1, 1986.

 T h e C oncept of t h e State 33

(3) Government

Government is the agency or instrumentality

through which the will of the State is formulated, ex­
pressed and realized.12

From the viewpoint of international law, no par­

ticular form of government is prescribed, provided only
that the government is able to represent the State in its
dealings with other States. Our Constitution, however,
requires our government to be democratic and republi­
can.

It has been said that “the State is an ideal person,

invisible, intangible, immutable and existing only in
contemplation of law; the government is an agent and,
within the sphere of its agency, it is a perfect represen­
tative, but outside of that it is a lawless usurpation.”13

The mandate of the government from the State is to

promote the welfare of the people. Accordingly, what­
ever good is done by the government is attributed to the
State but every harm inflicted on the people is imputed
not to the State but to the government alone. Such in­
jury may justify the replacement of the government by
revolution, theoretically at the behest o f the State, in a
development known as direct State action.14

A. Functions

The government performs two kinds of functions, to

wit, the constituent and the ministrant.

12Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270.

'nIbid.
,1 Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 3rd ed., 6-7, op. cit.
34 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Constituent functions constitute the very bonds of

society and are therefore compulsory. Among the con­
stituent functions are the following:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the
protection of persons and property from violence
and robbery;
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between
husband and wife and between parents and chil­
dren;
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmis­
sion and interchange of property, and the determi­
nation o f its liabilities for debt or for crime;
(4) The determination of contractual rights
between individuals;
(5) The definition and punishment of crimes;
(6) The administration of justice in civil
cases;
(7) The administration of political duties,
privileges and relations of citizens; and
(8) The dealings of the State with foreign
powers; the preservation of the State from external
danger or encroachment and the advancement of
its international interests.16

M inistrant functions are those undertaken to ad­

vance the general interests of society, such as public
works, public charity, and regulation of trade and indus­
try. These functions are merely optional. Significantly,
though, it is the performance of ministrant functions
that distinguishes tho paternalistic government from
the merely individualistic government, which is con­

15Malcolm, Gov’t, of the Phil. Is., p. 19.

 The C oncept of the S tate 35

cerned only with the basic function of maintaining peace

and order.

To our Supreme Court, however, the distinction be­

tween constituent and ministrant functions is not rele­
vant in our jurisdiction. In PVTA v. CIR16 it reiterated
the ruling in A C C F A v. Federation o f Labor Unions17
that such distinction has been blurred because of the
repudiation o f the laissez faire policy in the Constitu­
tion.

“The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the

heeds of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief
Justice, who took note, speaking of the reconstituted Agricul­
tural Credit Administration, that functions of that sort ‘may
not be strictly what President Wilson described as ‘constituent’
(as distinguished from ‘ministrant’), such as those relating to
the maintenance of peace and the prevention o f crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political du­
ties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and for­
eign relations. Under this traditional classification, such con­
stituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress
and prosperity of the people—these latter functions being min-
istrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the gov­
ernment.’ Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: The
growing complexities of modern society, however, have ren­
dered this traditional classification of the functions o f gov­
ernment quite unrealistic not to say obsolete. The areas which
used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which
the government was called upon to enter optionally and only
because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be ab­
sorbed within activities that the government must undertake
in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else, llie

1665 SCRA 416.

1730 SCRA 649.
36 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of eco­

nomic forces. Here, of course, this development was envisioned,
indeed adopted as a national policy by the Constitution itself in
its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social
justice.”

Thus, it is now obligatory on the State itself to pro­

mote social justice,18 to provide adequate social services
to promote a rising standard of living,19 to afford protec­
tion to labor,20 to formulate and implement urban and
agrarian reform programs,21 and to adopt other meas­
ures intended to ensure the dignity, welfare and secu­
rity of its citizens. It is also required to establish and
maintain a complete, adequate and fully integrated
system of education,22 to offer free elementary and sec­
ondary public education,23 to promote scientific research
and invention,24 and to patronize arts and letters and
develop Filipino culture for national identity.25 These
functions, while traditionally regarded as merely minis-
trant and optional, have been made compulsory by the
Constitution.

This notwithstanding, the general provisions of Ar­

ticles II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
particularly its provisions on social justice), except Sec­
tions 15 (on the people’s right to health), 16 {on the peo­
ple’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology)™ and 28

18 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 10.

19Ibid., Art. II, Sec. 9.
20Id., Art. XIII, Sec. 3.
21Id., Art. XIII, Secs. 4-9.
22Id., Art. XIV, Sec. 2(1).
2:1Id., Art. XIV, Sec. 2(2).
id., Art. XiV,Sec. 10.
25Id., Art. XTV, Sec. 15.
2I’ Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA
792.
 T he C oncept o f the S tate 37

(on the policy o f full public disclosure),21 and X III (on

Social Justice and Human Rights)28 of the Constitution,
are not self-executing provisions of the Constitution.29
They have been invariably considered as “not sources of
enforceable rights”50 and serve merely as “guides in for­
mulating and interpreting implementing legislation.”31

B. Doctrine of Parens Patriae

One of the important tasks of the government is to

act for the State as parens patriae, or guardian of the
rights of the people. In the case of Government o f the
Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad,32 contributions
were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief
of the victims of an earthquake but part of the money
was never distributed and instead deposited with the
defendant bank. In an action for its recovery filed later
by the government, the defendant questioned the com­
petence of the plaintiff, contending that the suit could
be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries them­
selves or by their heirs. The Supreme Court rejected
this view and upheld the right of the government to file
the case for the State as parens patriae in representa­
tion of the legitimate claimants.

27 The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, GR
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
28 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614,
March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254.
2!i Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. COA, G.R.
No. 178160, February 26, 2009, 580 SCRA 295.
30 Bureau of Fisheries v. Commission on Audit, G.R. Mo.
169815, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134.
11 Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011, 655
SCRA 476.
32 35 Phil. 728.
38 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

In Cabanas v. Pilapil,33 the government acting for

the State as parens patriae chose the mother of an ille­
gitimate child as against his uncle to be the trustee of
the insurance proceeds left him by his father, who had
expressly designated the uncle. The Supreme Court
said:

“The appealed decision is supported by another cogent

consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept
that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens
patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit or litigation af­
fects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest.
It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may
press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance
not only with the natural order o f things but the tradition of
the country for a parent to be preferred. It could have been dif­
ferent if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is
not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly
the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of
parens patriae cannot remain insensible to the validity of her
plea. In a recent case, there is this quotation from an opinion of
the United States Supreme Court: ‘This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legis­
lature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great det­
riment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.’
What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing
this concept. It reads: ‘The State shall strengthen the family as
a basic social institution.’ If, as the Constitution so wisely dic­
tates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it
does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were pre­
sented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate
would have led the lower court to decide as it did.”

In Soriano v. Laguardia,34 the petitioner questioned

the lawfulness of the suspension of his religious televi­

" 58 SCRA 94.

11G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 79.
 T he C oncept of the S tate 39

sion program by the Movie and Television Review and

Classification Board. He invoked, among other grounds,
his freedoms of speech and religion, claiming that said
suspension constitute*^ censorship. The Supreme Court,
after finding that the petitioner had uttered expletives
in the course of said program, which was regularly aired
during prime time, or at a time when children could
actually view the same, rejected his contentions, stat­
ing—

“As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions

to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case
constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unpro­
tected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the wel­
fare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioner’s utter­
ances can be subjected to restraint or regulation, x x x.
“Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a
television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to
the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the
welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect and care
for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and com­
pelling government interest in regulating petitioner’s utter­
ances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986."

In De la Cruz v. Gracia,35 the Supreme Court al­

lowed the registration of an illegitimate child using the
surname of his deceased father, declaring that it is “the
policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children x x x. The State as
parens patriae affords special protection to children
from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development.”

35G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648.

40 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

C. De Jure and De Facto Governments

Regardless of their form, governments are either de

jure or de facto.
A de jure government has rightful title but no
power or control, either because this has been with­
drawn from it or because it has not yet actually entered
into the exercise thereof. A de facto government, on the
other hand, is a government of fact, that is, it actually
exercises power or control but without legal title.
The three kinds of de facto government are as fol­
lows:

(1) The government that gets possession and con­

trol of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority,
the rightful legal government and maintains itself
against the will of the latter, such as the government of
England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament
and later by Cromwell as Protector.
(2) That established as an independent govern­
ment by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insur­
rection against the parent state, such as the government
of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union
during the war of secession in the United States.
(3) That which is established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated
as a government of paramount force, such as the cases
of Castine in Maine, which was reduced to a British
possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico,
occupied during the war with Mexico by the troops of
the United States.)b

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan. Keh, 75 Phil. 113.

 T h e C oncept of th e State 41

It has been held in a number of cases that the Sec­

ond Republic of the Philippines was a de facto govern­
ment of paramount force, having been established by
the Japanese belligerent during the occupation of the
Philippines in World W ar II. The characteristics of this
kind of de facto government are:
“(1) Its existence is maintained by active military
power within the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government.
“(2) During its existence, it must necessarily be
obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts
of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do
not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful gov­
ernment. Actual governments of this sort are estab­
lished over districts differing greatly in extent and con­
ditions. They are usually administered by military au­
thority, supported more or less directly by military
force.”37
By contrast, the Supreme Court unanimously held
in Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Corazon C.
Aquino38 that “the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.”

37Ibid.
38 G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.
42 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

D. Government of the Philippines

The Government of the Philippines is defined as

“the corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears
from the context, the various arms through which politi­
cal authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the pro­
vincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or
other form of local government.”39
Under this definition, a government-owned or con­
trolled corporation engaged in proprietary functions
cannot be considered part o f the Government for pur­
poses of exemption from the application of the statute of
limitations.40 But even such private instrumentalities of
the Government may be considered embraced in the
Civil Service as provided for under Article IX-B, Section
2(1) of the Constitution.
A Government Agency refers to any of the various
units o f the Government of the Republic of the Philip­
pines, including a department, bureau, office, instru­
mentality or GOCC, or a local government or a distinct
unit therein.41

E. Administration

Finally, government must be distinguished from

administration, which is the group o f persons in whose
hands the reins of government are for the time being.42

13Adm. Code of 1987, Sec. 2(1).

4,1Nadeco v. Tobias, 7 SCRA 692.
11 Republic Act No. 10149, Section 3(k).
U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332.
 T he C oncept of the S tate 43

The administration runs the government, as a machin­

ist operates his machine. Thus, we speak of the Aquino
administration as directing the affairs of the Govern­
ment of the Philippines for a given time, after which
another administration may be called upon by the peo­
ple to take over. Administration is transitional whereas
the government is permanent.

(4) Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable

power inherent in a State by which that State is gov­
erned.43
There are two kinds of sovereignty, to wit, legal and
political. Legal sovereignty is the authority which has
the power to issue final commands whereas political
sovereignty is the power behind the legal sovereign, or
the sum of the influences that operate upon it. In our
country, the Congress is the legal sovereign, while the
different sectors that mold public opinion make up the
political sovereign.
Sovereignty may also be internal or external. Inter­
nal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to con­
trol its domestic affairs. External sovereignty, which is
the power of the State to direct its relations with other
States, is also known as independence.
Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive, comprehen­
sive, absolute, indivisible, inalienable and imprescripti­
ble.44
By virtue of these characteristics, sovereignty is not
deemed suspended although acts of sovereignty cannot

43 Garner, Political Science and Government, 238, 170.

" Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856.
 44 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

be exercised by the legitimate authority. Thus, sover­

eignty over the Philippines remained with the United
States during the Japanese occupation of our country
although the Americans could not exercise any control
over the occupied territory at the time.45 W hat the bel­
ligerent occupant took over was only the exercise of acts
of sovereignty.
There being no change of sovereignty during a bel­
ligerent occupation, the political laws of the occupied
territory are merely suspended, subject to revival under
the ju s postliminium upon the end of the occupation.
But the non-political laws are deemed continued unless
changed by the belligerent occupant since they are in­
tended to govern the relations of individuals as among
themselves and are not generally affected by changes in
regimes or rulers.46
It has been held that the Constitution of the Com­
monwealth, being a political law, was not effective in
the Philippines during the Japanese occupation.41 But
non-political laws like the Civil Code and the Insurance
Act remained in force during that period except only
where they were amended or superseded by affirmative
act of the belligerent occupant.
However, the rule suspending political laws affects
only the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory
and is not intended to bind the enemies in arms. Thus,
in Ruffy v. Chief o f S t a f f members of the armed forces
continued to be covered by the National Defense Act, the
Articles of W ar and other laws relating to the armed
forces even during the Japanese occupation.

,r' Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, supra.

Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285.
17 Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 749.
"* 75 Phil. 875.
 T he C oncept of the State 45

Furthermore, the rule does not apply to the law on

treason although decidedly political in character. As
Justice Felicisimo Feria put it in Laurel v. Misa :49
i.
“Since the preservation o f the allegiance o f the obligation
of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his govern­
ment or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action
but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to re­
peal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential
for the preservation o f the allegiance owed by the inhabitants
to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and
give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such ac­
tion is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service
or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the
safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount
to practically transferring temporarily to the occupant their al­
legiance to the titular government or sovereignty.”

As for judicial decisions, the same are valid during

the occupation and even beyond except those of a politi­
cal complexion, which are automatically annulled upon
the restoration of the legitimate authority. Thus, a per­
son convicted of treason against the Japanese Imperial
Forces was, after the occupation, entitled to be released
on the ground that the sentence imposed on him for his
political offense had ceased to be valid.60 But if the con­
viction was for a non-political offense like, say, defama­
tion, the sentence would not be affected by the termina­
tion of the occupation.
Where there is a change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign are not merely suspended
but abrogated. As they regulate the relations between
the ruler and the ruled, these laws fall to the ground

4!>Supra.
5,1Peralta v. Director of Prisons, supra.
46 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

ipso facto unless they are retained or re-enacted by posi­

tive act of the new sovereign. Non-political laws, by con­
trast, continue in operation, for the reason also that
they regulate private relations only, unless they are
changed by the new sovereign or are contrary to its in­
stitutions.
In People v. Perfecto,m the accused had written an
editorial against the Philippine Senate and was prose­
cuted under a provision o f the Spanish Penal Code pun­
ishing insults to Ministers of the Crown. The Supreme
Court acquitted him, holding that that particular article
of the said Code had been automatically abrogated, be­
ing political in nature, upon the advent of American
sovereignty.
In Macariola v. Asuncion,m it was held that Article
14 of the Code of Commerce prohibiting judges from
engaging in commerce was political in nature and so
was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish
rule in the country.
Conversely, it was held in Vilas v. City o f Manila,™
that a debt contracted by the defendant during the
Spanish regime was enforceable against it even after
the change to American sovereignty inasmuch as the
obligation was assumed by the city in its private or pro­
prietary character. As the U .S. Supreme Court put it:

“That there is a total abrogation of the former political

relations of the inhabitants o f the ceded region is obvious. That
all laws therefore in force which are in conflict with the politi­
cal character, constitution or institutions o f the substituted
sovereign lose force, is also plain. But it is equally settled in
the same public law that the great body of municipal law

r,i Supra.
52 114 SCRA 77 (1982).
“ 229 U.S. 345.
 The C oncept of t h e State 47

which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force

until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.”

Act of State
I

A n act of State is an act done by the sovereign

power of a country, or by its delegate, within the limits
of the power vested in him. An act of State cannot be
questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in a
court of law.54
W ith particular reference to Political Law, an act of
State is an act done by the political departments of the
government and not subject to judicial review. An illus­
tration is the decision of the President, in the exercise of
his diplomatic power, to extend recognition to a newly-
established foreign State or government.

84 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 44.

 Chapter 4

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

TH E CONSTITUTION declares, rather superfluously,

that “the State may not be sued without its consent.”1
This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the
courts of justice.

Basis

It is obvious that indiscriminate suits against the

State will result in the impairment of its dignity, be­
sides being a challenge to its supposed infallibility. To
Justice Holmes, however, the doctrine of non-suability is
based not on “any formal conception or obsolete theory
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right against the authority which makes the
law on which the right depends.”2 Another justification
is the practical consideration that the demands and
inconveniences of litigation will divert the time and
resources of the State from the more pressing matters
demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public
welfare.

1Art. XVI, Sec. 3.

2 Kawanakoav. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349.

48
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a te Im m u n it y 49

The doctrine is also available to foreign States inso­

far as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the
local State.3 The added basis in this case is the principle
of the sovereign equality of States, under which one
State cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation
of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do
so would “unduly vex the peace of nations.”4
This does not mean though that the foreign state
would at all times be immune from all suits filed
against it before courts of a host or local state. Accord­
ingly, it has been ruled that such foreign states may be
sued in the host state if engaged regularly therein in a
business or trade or, even if not so engaged, on the basis
of its contracts in the host state which may be consid­
ered as purely commercial, private and proprietary acts,
but not with respect to its contracts entered into by it as
governmental or sovereign acts. Thus —

“The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone

further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of
a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at
all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relation­
ships between sovereign states, brought about by their increas­
ing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive applica­
tion of the doctrine, xxx As it stands now, the application of the
doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign
or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state
immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and pro­
prietary acts (jure gestionis).
“Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it
is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved —
whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental,
as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States
of America v. Ruiz [221 Phil. 179 (1985)] —

1Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312.

4 De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.B. 171.
50 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

“’The restrictive application of State immunity is

proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial ac­
tivities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an individ­
ual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its con­
sent to be sued only when it enters into business con­
tracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions.’ ”5

In other words, the fact that a foreign state enters

into a contract with a private party in the host state
would not necessarily result in the waiver of its sover­
eign immunity. The character of said contract would
still need to be determined, such that said foreign state
m ay be sued if its contract were commercial in nature.
Thus—

“Moreover, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign

state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an
act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transac­
tion must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of
a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act
jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or
profit.
“There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immu­
nity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sover­
eign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immu­
nity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to pri­

5 JUSMAG v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.

108813, 15 December 1994, 239 SCRA 224, cited in China National
Machinery & Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No.
185572, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 189.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 51

vate acts or acts jure gestionis, xxx The restrictive theory came
about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of
governmental functions.”6

A s will be discussed later, in the context of the ap­

plicability of the principle of state immunity to a State
in relation to claims filed against it by its citizens or
inhabitants or in connection with the actions of its gov­
ernment within its territory, not all acts jure imperii
may exempt a State from suit, as in the case of its exer­
cise of its power of eminent domain, when done without
payment of just compensation.7

Moreover, it has likewise been ruled that not any

agency of a foreign state may properly invoke the lat-
ter’s sovereign immunity to ward off suits against it. In
German Agency for Technical Cooperation v. Court o f
Appeals, the petitioner moved to dismiss a complaint for
illegal dismissal filed against it before the National
Labor Relations Commission, contending that the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it, as it was “the im­
plementing agency of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany” and “its acts were undertaken in
the discharge of the governmental functions and sover­
eign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany.” The Supreme Court rejected these conten­
tions stating that the petitioner did not present ade­
quate evidence to establish that it enjoys the immunity
from suit generally accorded to its parent country, the

8 Holy See v. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, 1 December 1994, 238

SCRA 524, 535, cited in China National Machinery & Equipment
Corporation v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665
SCRA 189.
7 See De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA
1, cited in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 185685,
February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36.
52 P h il ip p in e P o l it i c a l L a w

Federal Republic of Germany, adding that, “assuming

that characterization is correct, it does not automati­
cally invest GTZ with the ability to invoke State immu­
nity from suit.”8

In China National Machinery & Equipment Corpo­

ration v. Sta. Maria,9 the petitioner, designated by the
Republic of China as its prime contractor for the North-
rail Project of the Republic of the Philippines, as certi­
fied by its Chinese Ambassador, claimed sovereign im­
munity in connection with a suit against it based on its
Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon
Railways Corporation. The Supreme Court rejected its
claim stating as follows —

“Applying the foregoing ruling [Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur

Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) v. CA, G.R. No. 152318, 16
April 2009, 585 SCRA 150] to the case at bar, it is readily ap­
parent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if
it contends that it performs governmental functions. Its desig­
nation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant
it immunity, just as the term ‘implementing agency’ has no
precise definition for purposes o f ascertaining whether GTZ
was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a gov­
ernment-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it
has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, follow­
ing this Court’s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence
o f evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a
government-owned and -controlled corporation without an
original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be
sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.”

” Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit

(GTZ) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009, 585
SCRA 150.
9 G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 189.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 53

The Court, addressing the factual circumstances

invoked by the petitioner in support of its xjlaim of sov­
ereign immunity, added —
i
“Clearly, it was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking,
and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility Study was
conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exer­
cise of sovereign functions by the Chinese government, but was
plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view
to securing this commercial enterprise, xxx. The use of the
term ‘state corporation’ to refer to CNMEG was only descrip­
tive of its nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled
corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did
not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the perform­
ance of the latter’s sovereign functions, xxx. Thus, despite peti­
tioner’s claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance
to Northrail because the bank was mandated by the Chinese
government, and not because of any motivation to do business in
the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the
Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction. Admit­
tedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM
Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract
Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the
Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal na­
ture of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part o f the entire undertak­
ing, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the North­
rail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or pro­
prietary in character. Thus, piecing together the content and
tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Under­
standing dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1
October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire
o f CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a
purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of
its business. Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs
governmental functions, such claim does not automatically vest
it with immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philip­
pine National Railways, in which this Court held that
‘(i)mmunity from suit is determined by the character of the ob­
jects for which the entity was organized.’ [222 Phil 381, 384
(1985)]”
54 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Application

Actions are rarely instituted directly against the

Republic of the Philippines, presumably because such a
step will provoke resort to the doctrine of State immu­
nity and possible dismissal of the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The usual practice is to file such claims not
against the State itself but, so as to avoid the appear­
ance of its involvement, against the officer of the gov­
ernment who is supposed to discharge the responsibility
or grant the redress demanded. It is important then to
determine i f the State is the real party in interest, that
is, that the claim if proved will be a direct liability of the
State and not merely of the officer impleaded. If this is
shown, the action can be dismissed as a suit against the
State unless its immunity had been previously waived.
To illustrate, it was held in one case10 that a claim
for damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while
undergoing military training as required by law was
actually a suit against the State since it would need the
appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment if
the claim were allowed. Although filed against the chief
of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in his
official capacity, it was dismissed because the State had
not waived its immunity.
In Sanders v. Veridiano, 11 where two American em­
ployees of the Subic Naval Base sued its commanding
general and the director of special services for damages
for allegedly defamatory remarks made by the defen­
dants, the Supreme Court held:

lu Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120.

" 162 SCRA 88.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 55

“Petitioners were being sued as officers o f the United

States Government. As they have acted on behalf o f that gov­
ernment, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that is respon­
sible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it
is proved that claimants have a right to the payment o f dam­
ages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petition­
ers in their personal capacity but by the United States Gov­
ernment as their principal. This will require that government
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that govern­
ment without its consent.”

In University o f the Philippines v. D izon,12 the Su­

preme Court stated that an award against the peti­
tioner for moral and actual damages (including attor­
ney’s fees) would require an appropriation by Congress
considering that “such monetary liabilities were not
covered by the ‘appropriations earmarked for said pro­
ject,”’ which was the subject of the suit and the conse­
quent award.
By contrast, the Supreme Court held as not against
the State an action instituted against the Secretary of
National Defense, also in his official capacity, for pay­
ment of an architect’s professional fees for which an
appropriation had already been made by the govern­
ment.13 The reason was that as far as the State itself
was concerned, it had already discharged its obligation;
clearly, what the complainant wanted only was the
actual payment o f the amount already set aside, which
payment was now the sole responsibility of the defen­
dant. The action was therefore properly filed against

12G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.

1,1Ruiz v. Cabahug, 54 O.G. 351.
56 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

him only and not against the State and no waiver of its
immunity was necessary.
There are many instances, in fact, when a public
officer m ay be sued in his official capacity without the
necessity o f first obtaining the consent of the State to be
sued. Thus, a public officer may be impleaded to require
him to do a duty required by law, or to restrain him
from doing an act alleged to be unconstitutional or ille­
gal, or to recover from him taxes unlawfully assessed or
collected.14 It has also been held that where an action is
filed against a public officer for recovery only of title or
possession of property claimed to be held by him in his
official capacity, the said action is not a suit against the
State for which prior waiver of immunity is required.
But it is different where there is in addition a claim for
recovery o f damages, such as accrued rentals, inasmuch
as its allowance would require the government to ap­
propriate the necessary amount for the satisfaction of
the judgm ent.15
In sum, the test is whether, assuming the decision
is rendered against the public officer impleaded, en­
forcement thereof will require an affirmative act from
the State, such as the appropriation of the needed
amount to satisfy the judgment. I f it does, the suit is
one against the State and its inclusion as party defen­
dant is necessary. If, on the other hand, the officer im­
pleaded m ay by himself alone comply with the decision
of the court without the necessity of involving the State,
then the suit can prosper against him and will not be
considered a claim against the State.

HHouston v. Hormes, 252 U.S. 569; Sterling v. Constantin, 287

U.S. 378.
15Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, supra.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 57

It is understood, of course, that where a public offi­

cer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury
caused by him is his own personal liability and cannot
be imputed to the State. Thus, in Festejo v. Fernando,16
the Director of Public Works took over without authority
property belonging to the plaintiff and constructed
thereon a public irrigation canal. The Supreme Court
held that the action for the recovery of the land or its
value was properly filed against the defendant in his
personal capacity and was therefore not covered by the
doctrine of State immunity.
In U.S.A. v. Guinto,17 the Supreme Court declared:

“The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they

have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers
or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of
evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily
dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable
to the United States of America, which has not given its con­
sent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held
answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself
is not involved. I f found liable, they and they alone must sat­
isfy the judgment.
x x x
“But even as we are certain that the individual petition­
ers in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their offi­
cial functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R.
No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case
deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened
to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the de­
fendants were really discharging their official duties or had ac­
tually exceeded their authority when the incident in question
occurred. Lacking this information, the Court cannot directly
decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the
lower court oo it may q o s o b d and roaolvc tho conflicting claimE

1650 O.G. 1556.

17182 SCRA 644.
58 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be

presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in
what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the in­
cident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary,
if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.”

In the case o f The Holy See v. Rosario,18 the Su­

preme Court dismissed a civil complaint against the
petitioner after the Department of Foreign Affairs had
“officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of
the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and enti­
tled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in this country.” It was
further affirmed that “the determination of the execu­
tive arm of the government that a state or instrumental­
ity is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a
political question that is conclusive upon the courts.
Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to
accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive
arm of the government in conducting the country’s for­
eign relations.”
Thus, in German Agency for Technical Cooperation
v. Court o f Appeals,19 the Supreme Court explained that
an endorsement by the Office of the Solicitor General on
the petitioner’s claim of state immunity, manifested in
its Comment filed in connection with said proceedings,
“does not inspire the same degree of confidence as a
certification from the DFA would have elicited.”
The Supreme Court, in further affirmation of this
principle, rejected in China National Machinery &

238 SCRA 524.

19 Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
v. Court o f Appeals, G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 150.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 59

Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria,20 the “executive

endorsements” (of the Certification executed by the Eco­
nomic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the Peo­
ple’s Republic of China on the purported sovereign im­
munity of the petitioner) made by the Office of the So­
licitor General and of the Office of the Government Cor­
porate Counsel, clarifying that it is only the Department
of Foreign Affairs which has the authority to make a
determination of immunity from suit, although, in said
case, the Court declared that it would not be “precluded
from making an inquiry into the intrinsic correctness of
such certification.”

Waiver of Immunity

Although the doctrine of State immunity is some­

times called “the royal prerogative of dishonesty,” it
must be observed in fairness that the State does not
often avail itself of this rule to take undue advantage of
parties that may have legitimate claims against it. The
principle fortunately has a built-in qualification: the
State may, if it so desires, divest itself of its sovereign
immunity and thereby voluntarily open itself to suit. In
fine, the State may be sued if it gives its consent.
It is gratifying that the exception appears now to
be the general policy, with the result that the filing of
suits against the State has become less difficult than
before.

Forms of Consent

The consent of the State to be sued may be given

expressly or impliedly. Express consent maji be mani­

20 G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 189.

60 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

fested either through a general law or a special law.

Implied consent is given when the State itself com­
mences litigation or when it enters into a contract.
The general law providing for the standing consent
of the State to be sued is Act No. 3083, declaring that
“the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby con­
sents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or im­
plied, which could serve as a basis of civil action be­
tween private parties.”
Under C.A. No. 327 as amended by P.D. No. 1445,
a claim against the government must first be filed with
the Commission on Audit, which must act upon it
within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize
the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court on certiorari and in effect sue the State with its
consent.21
Indeed, it has been ruled that writs of execution is­
sued by regular courts of justice in connection with
money claims filed against the government may not be
implemented without the same first being referred to
the Commission on Audit.22
An example of the second kind of express consent is
the special law enacted by the Philippine Legislature
authorizing an individual to sue the Philippine Govern-

21P.D. No. 1445, Secs. 49-50.

'a Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. Univer­
sity of the Philippines, G.R. No. 185918, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA
206, citing National Electrification Administration v. Morales, G.R.
No. 154200, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 79, 90-91; see also Agra v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011, 661
SCRA 563.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 61

ment for injuries he had sustained when his motorcycle

collided with a government ambulance.23
The express consent of the State to be sued must be
embodied in a duly enacted statute and may not be
given by a mere counsel of the government, as held in
Republic v. Purisima.24 In this case, the waiver made by
the lawyer for the Rice and Corn Administration, an
agency of the government, was held by the Supreme
Court as not binding upon the State. Incidentally, under
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure,
where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines,
service of summons m ust be made on the Solicitor Gen­
eral.26
Worthy of note in this connection is the case of
Amigable v. Cuenca,26 where the question raised was the
right of the plaintiff to sue the government for recovery
of the value of her property which had been converted
into public streets without payment to her of just com­
pensation. Although it was shown that she had not pre­
viously filed her claim with the Auditor General as
normally required, the Supreme Court decided in her
favor, reiterating the following pronouncement in the
earlier case of Ministerio v. City o f Cebu:27

23 Merritt v. Government of the Phil. Is., 34 Phil. 311.

24 78 SCRA 470.
25 Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
150768 and 160176, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 422, cited in Repub­
lic of the Philippines v. Domingo, G.R. No. 175299, September 14,
2011, 057 SCRA 621.
25 43 SCRA 360, See also De los Santos v. Intermediate Appel­
late Court, G.R. 71998-99, June 2, 1993, 223 SCRA 1.
27 40 SCRA 464, see also Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA
212, De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 1.
62 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

If the constitutional mandate that the owner be com­

pensated for property taken for public use were to be re­
spected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be
summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an in­
justice on a citizen. Had the government followed the pro­
cedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the
party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it
‘have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judg­
ment.’ If there were an observance of procedural regularity, pe­
titioners would not be in the said plaint they are now. It is un­
thinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to
abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to
benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fi­
delity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law
were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public use, which is condi­
tioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the ju ­
risdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine
o f immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.”

Similarly, in De los Santos v. Intermediate Appel­

late Court,28 the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court’s dismissal on the ground of state immunity of a
complaint for damages filed by the plaintiff on whose
property was constructed by the Government, through
the provincial engineer of Rizal, an artificial creek with­
out his knowledge or consent, declaring that “the doc­
trine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for
perpetrating any injustice on a citizen.”
In exercising the right of eminent domain, the
State exercises its ju s imperii, as distinguished from its
proprietary rights, or ju s gestionis-, yet, even in that

28 223 SCRA 1.
 T he D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 63

area, where private property is to be taken in expropria­

tion without just compensation being paid, the defense
of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owners.29
As stressed by the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,30 “the doctrine of sovereign immunity
cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim
for compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ prop­
erty.”
In Santiago v. Republic,31 the plaintiff sued the gov­
ernment for revocation of a donation on the ground of
failure of the defendant to comply with the stipulated
conditions. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of
its consent to be sued. The Supreme Court denied the
motion, holding that the suit could prosper because it
did not involve a money claim against the State. As
what the plaintiff was seeking was the return only of
the properties donated, he did not even need to file his
claim first with the Commission on Audit under the
provisions of C.A. No. 327.
Manifestly based on equitable grounds is the rule
that when the State itself files a complaint, the defen­
dant is entitled to file a counterclaim against it. A case
in point is Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,32 where
it was held that the government impliedly allowed itself
to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for

29 See Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 185685,

February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36, citing De los Santos v. Intermedi­
ate Appellate Court, supra.
30 G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 212, 231.
31 87 SCRA 294.
32 G.R. No. L-6060, Sept. 30, 1950.
64 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L aw

the purpose of asserting a claim for affirmative relief

against the plaintiff, to wit, recovery of a vessel.
But a similar conclusion was not reached in Lim v.
Brownell/ 3 where the Philippine Government, as suc­
cessor in interest of the United States to the properties
being claimed from the latter, filed a complaint in inter­
vention to join the defendant in invoking the doctrine of
State immunity to secure the dismissal of the action. As
the Philippine Government was not asking for any af­
firmative relief from the plaintiff but had intervened
only for the purpose of resisting his claim, the Supreme
Court held that no implied waiver of immunity could be
assumed.
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.34
Such an assumption is justified, however, when the
government enters into a contract, for the State is then
deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign
immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary
individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial
action and processes.
While the suggestion in Santos v. Santos,35 and L y ­
ons v. United States o f America36 was that immunity
would be lost regardless of the nature of the contract, it
was held in the case o f United States o f America v.
Ruiz37 that suability would follow only if the contract is
entered into by the government in its proprietary capac­

33107 SCRA 345.

:M182 SCRA 911.
35 92 Phil. 281.
3,<104 Phil. 593.
37 136 SCRA 487.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 65

ity. Governmental contracts do not result in implied

waiver of the immunity of the State from suit.
The private respondent in this case had claimed
that the United State's, through its Engineering Com­
mand in the U.S. Navy, had entered into a contract with
it for the repair of wharves in Subic Bay and should
therefore be required to comply with the agreement or
pay damages. The United States moved to dismiss, in­
voking its non-suability, but the claim was denied by
the lower court on the basis of the Lyons Case. In this
petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court sustained the
immunity of the petitioner from suit, declaring through
Justice Vicente Abad Santos:

“The traditional rule o f State immunity exempts a State

from being sued in the courts o f another State without its con­
sent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they Eire con­
stantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of
States have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now
the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
States in Western Europe.

“The restrictive application of State immunity is proper

only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have de­
scended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part o f the naval base which is de­
voted to the defense of both the United States and the Philip­
 66 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

pines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest

order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.”

On the other hand, it was held in the Guinto Case38

that the operation by the United States government of
restaurants in Camp John Hay in Baguio City and of
barbershops in Clark A ir Base, these establishments
being open to the public for a fee, were proprietary in
nature and so not covered by the doctrine of state im ­
munity.
A n agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration
may be construed as an implicit waiver of immunity
from suit.39

Finally, it should also be observed that when the

State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby
also consent to the execution of the judgment against it.
The rule, as reiterated in the case of Republic o f the
Philippines v. Villasor,40 is that such execution will re­
quire another waiver, lacking which the decision cannot
be enforced against the State. The judge in this case had
issued a writ of execution against the funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a judgment
rendered against the Philippine Government. The Su­
preme Court declared the writ unlawful and made the
following remarks:

“This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Con­

stitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is
therein expressly provided: The State may not be sued without
its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense

d" Supra.
13 China National Machinery & Equipment Corporation v. Sta.
Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 189.
” 54 SCRA 84.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 67

from such a basic concept, is that public funds cannot be the

object o f garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability ad­
judged. Thus, in the recent case of Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was re­
stated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: The universal rule
that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s
action ‘only up to the completion o f proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution’ and that the power of courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs o f execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropri­
ated by law.”

But the foregoing doctrine was not applied in Phil­

ippine National Bank v. Pabalan,41 where a writ of exe­
cution was issued against the Philippine Virginia To­
bacco Administration, pursuant to which its funds on
deposit with the petitioner were garnished. On the con­
tention that such funds were public in character and
therefore could not be garnished, the Supreme Court
declared:

“This is not the first time petitioner raised that issue. It

did so before in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Indus­
trial Relations, decided only last January. It did not meet with
success, this Court ruling in accordance with the two previous
cases o f National Shipyard and Steel Corporation and Manila
Hotel Company, that funds of public corporations which can
sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. As res­
pondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is like-

83 SCRA 595.
 68 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

wise a public corporation possessed of the same attributes, a

similar outcome is indicated. The petition must be dismissed.
“Petitioner Philippine National Bank would invoke the
doctrine of non-suability. It is to be admitted that under the
present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a funda­
mental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in ex­
press terms. If the funds appertained to one of the regular de­
partments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a
provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case
here. Garnishment would lie.”

The issue in National Electrification Administra­

tion v. Morales42 was the propriety of the order of gar­
nishment issued by a court against the funds of the
petitioner in connection with a money claim awarded in
favor of the plaintiff, in the light of the constitutional
authority of the Commission on Audit to review money
claims against the government. The Supreme Court
declared that the “the COA had exclusive jurisdiction
to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money
claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act
No. 6758” and found the trial court to have “acted pru­
dently in halting implementation of the writ of execu­
tion to allow the parties recourse to the processes of the
C O A ,” stating that “it is not for this Court to preempt
the action of the COA on the post-audit to be conducted
by it.”

A similar ruling was made in Lockheed Detective

and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. University of the Philip­
pines,4'1where the Supreme Court declared —

G.R. No. 154200, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 79, 81, cited in
Agra v. Commission on Audit, G. R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011,
661 SCRA 563.
13G.R. No. 185918, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 206.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S ta te I m m u n it y 69

“Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and

distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and
be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and
its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, be­
fore execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judg­
ment award must first be filed with the COA. Under Com­
monwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No.
1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine,
audit and settle ‘all debts and claims of any sort’ due from or
owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money
claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No.
6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, sub­
ject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to
this Court.”

In University o f the Philippines v. Dizon,u the Su­

preme Court, in emphasizing the fundamental rule that
government properties are not subject to levy and exe­
cution, made the following clarifications —

“However, notwithstanding the rule that government

properties are not subject to levy and execution unless other­
wise provided for by statute (Republic v. Palacio, 23 SCRA 899
1968; Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, supra)
or municipal ordinance (Municipality of Makati v. Court of Ap­
peals, 190 SCRA 206 1990), the Court has, in various in­
stances, distinguished between government funds and proper­
ties for public use and those not held for public use. Thus, in
Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo (49 Phil 52
1926), the Court ruled that ‘where property of a municipal or
other public corporation is sought to be subjected to execution
to satisfy judgments recovered against such corporation, the
question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be
determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held.’ The
following can be culled from Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal
Council o f Iloilo'.

" G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
 70 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

“1. Properties held for public uses —and generally

everything held for governmental purposes - are not sub­
ject to levy and sale under execution against such corpo­
ration. The same rule applies to funds in the hands of a
public officer and taxes due to a municipal corporation.
“2. Where a municipal corporation owns in its
proprietary capacity, as distinguished from its public or
government capacity, property not used or used for a
public purpose but for quasi-private purposes, it is the
general rule that such property may be seized and sold
under execution against the corporation.
“3. Property held for public purposes is not subject
to execution merely because it is temporarily used for
private purposes. If the public use is wholly abandoned,
such property becomes subject to execution.”

Suits Against Government Agencies

Where suit is filed not against the government it­

self or its officials but against one of its entities, it must
be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal
that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent
to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first
instance on whether the government agency impleaded
is incorporated or unincorporated.
An incorporated agency has a charter of its own
that invests it with a separate juridical personality, like
the Social Security System, the University of the Philip­
pines, and the City of Manila. By contrast, the unincor­
porated agency is so called because it has no separate
juridical personality but is merged in the general m a­
chinery of the government, like the Department of Jus­
tice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government Printing
Office.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 71

If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suabil­

ity is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is
suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless
of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations,
for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of
the State when they are engaged in governmental func­
tions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in
the performance of such functions because their charter
provides that they can sue and be sued.
In Bermoy v. Philippine Normal College,45 suit was
filed by the personnel of the defendant corporation for
recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The
defendant moved to dismiss, contending that the action
was against the State inasmuch as the college was a
public agency engaged in a governmental function, to
wit, the education of the youth. The Supreme Court did
not consider this argument decisive. The important
thing was that the charter of the college provided that it
could sue and be sued, which meant that, even assum­
ing that the function involved was public, the State had
thereby waived its immunity. A similar ruling was made
in Arcega u. Court o f Appeals,46 involving the Central
Bank, Rayo v. C FI o f Bulacan1 involving the National
Power Corporation, and Philippine National Railways v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.48
This test is obviously not available in the case of
the unincorporated agency as there would be no charter
to consult. Since it has no separate juridical personality,
any suit filed against it is necessarily an action against

G.R. No. L-8670, May 18, 1956.

4666 SCRA 229.
47110 SCRA 460.
“ 217 SCRA 401.
 72 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

the Philippine Government of which it is a part.49 This

being so, it is necessary to determine the nature of the
functions in which the agency is engaged, so as to hold it
suable if they are proprietary and not suable if they are
governmental. The test in every case is the nature of the
primary functions being discharged.
In National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro,™ the
issue was whether the Civil Aeronautics Administra­
tion, an unincorporated agency of the government un­
dertaking the operation of airports and authorized to
charge fees for the use of its facilities, should be re­
garded as engaged in private functions and therefore
subject to suit. The Supreme Court said that it was,
describing its business as “an enterprise which, far from
being the exclusive prerogative of the State, may, more
often than the construction of public roads, be under­
taken by private concerns.”
This ruling was affirmed in Air Transportation Of­
fice v. Ram os,61 where the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner was “an agency of the Government not per­
forming a purely governmental or sovereign function, but
was instead involved in the management and mainte­
nance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not
the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity.”
The non-suability of the State is available to the
agency even if it is shown that it is engaged not only in

43Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators, 259

Phil. 650, 655-656 (1989); see also Farolan, Jr. v. Court o f Tax Ap­
peals, G.R. No. 42204, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 298, 306 and
Republic of tho Philippinoo v. Domingo, G.R. No. 175299, September
14, 2011, 657 SCRA 621.
5091 Phil. 203.
51 G.R. No. 185685, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 73

governmental functions but also, as a sideline, or inci­

dentally, in proprietary enterprises. This doctrine was
first announced in Bureau o f Printing v. Bureau o f
Printing Employees Association,52 where the Supreme
Court stated as follows:

“The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government

created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the
direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is ‘charged with the execution o f all printing
and binding, including work incidental to those processes, re­
quired by the National Government and such other work o f the
same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order o f the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake. . .’ (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the Gen­
eral Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs
of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obvi­
ously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniaiy
profit.
H* %

“. . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to

undertake private binding jobs, it cannot be pretended that it
is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary
in character, there is no showing that the employees perform­
ing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from
those employed in its general governmental functions. * * *
“Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any cor­
porate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot
be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or
proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would ac­
tually be a suit, action or proceeding against the government
itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be
sued without its consent, much leas over its objcotion. (Soo
Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation

52 1 SCRA 340.
74 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

System, et al. v. Angat River Workers Union, et al«, G.R. No.

L-10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957.)”

In Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs

Arrastre Service, 53 it was argued by the plaintiff that by
authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage in arrastre
service, the law had thereby allowed it to be sued inas­
much as the nature of this particular function was pro­
prietary. The Supreme Court rejected this contention
and held as follows:

“The Bureau o f Customs, to repeat, is part o f the De­

partment of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no per­
sonality of its own apart from that of the national government.
Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and col­
lecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other
tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties
(Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a
necessary incident. For practical reasons, said revenues and
customs duties cannot be assessed and collected by simply re­
ceiving the importer’s or ship agent’s or consignee’s declaration
of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided
in the Tariff Law. Customs authorities and officers must see to
it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually
landed. And this checking up requires that the landed mer­
chandise be hauled from the ship’s side to a suitable place in
the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make
it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
“Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may
be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the pri­
mary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so
that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bu­
reau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its gov­
ernmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit.
Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be de­
nied as to the necessary means to that end.”

5:118 SCRA 1120.

 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 75

The non-suability of the Bureau of Customs was af­

firmed in the case of Farolan v. Court o f Tax Appeals.54
In Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. u. Jalos,m the
petitioner invoked the doctrine of state immunity in
asking for the dismissal o f a complaint against it, claim­
ing that it should be considered an agent of the Republic
of the Philippines by reason of its appointment by the
latter as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum op­
erations in a certain area, and that said operations were
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that
these facts do not mean that it had become the State’s
“‘agent’ within the meaning of the law.” The Court con­
sidered the petitioner to be but “a service contractor for
the exploration and development of one of the country’s
natural gas reserves.”

Exemption from Legal Requirements

When the State litigates, either directly or through

its authorized officers, it is not required to put up a
bond for damages, or an appeal bond, since it can be
assumed that it is always solvent.56
In Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana,57
the Supreme Court clarified that this exemption does
not, as a general rule, apply to government-owned or
controlled corporations because they have legal person­
alities distinct from their shareholders. Thus, “while a
GOCC’s majority stockholder, the State, will always be
presumed solvent, the presumption does not necessarily

54 217 SCRA 298.

55 G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010, 630 SCRA 399.
5bAraneta v. Catmaitan, 101 Phil. 323.
57 G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 196.
76 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L aw

extend to the GOCC itself. However, when a GOCC be­

comes a ‘government machinery to carry out a declared
government policy,’ it becomes similarly situated as its
majority stockholder as there is the assurance that the
government will necessarily fund its primary functions.
Thus, a GOCC that is sued in relation to its governmen­
tal functions may be, under appropriate circumstances,
exempted from the payment o f appeal fees. In the case at
bar, BBC was organized as a private corporation, se­
questered in the 1980’s and the ownership of which was
subsequently transferred to the government in a com­
promise agreement. It is therefore crystal clear that
BBC’s function is purely commercial or proprietary and
not governmental. As such, BBC cannot be deemed enti­
tled to an exemption from the posting of an appeal
bond.”
Neither can the State generally be asked to pay the
legal fees prescribed in the Rules of Court or the costs of
the suit.58 It has been ruled, however, that the National
Power Corporation59 and the Government Service In­
surance System60 are not exempt from paying filing fees.
On the other hand, the Land Bank of the Philippines, in
the performance of its governmental functions in agra­
rian reform proceedings, has been considered exempt
from the payment of costs of the suit, as provided for in
Section 1 of Rule 142 of the Rules of Court.61 Interest is

58Rules 141 and 142.

59 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, A.M. NO. 05-10-20-SC, March 10,
2010, 615 SCRA 1.
Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Servicc Insurance System (GSIS) fur Payment of Legal
Fees, AM . No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 193.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182431,
November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 285.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e I m m u n it y 77

also not chargeable against it except when it has ex­

pressly stipulated to pay it or when interest is allowed
by an act of the legislature or in eminent domain cases
where damages sustained by the owner take the form of
interest at the legal rate.62 It has also been held that
statutes of limitation do not run against the State
unless the contrary is expressly provided by law, al­
though this rule is not observed where the State is en­
gaged in private business.63
In Republic v. Garcia,64 it was held that the govern­
ment could not be assessed one-half of the fees paid to
the commissioner who determined the just compensa­
tion for the property under expropriation.

Suability vs. Liability

The mere fact that the State is suable does not mean
that it is liable; or to put it another way, waiver of immu­
nity by the State does not mean concession of its liability.
As already explained, suability is the result of the express
or implied consent of the State to be sued. Liability, on the
other hand, is determined after hearing on the basis of the
relevant laws and the established facts. When, therefore,
the State allows itself to be sued, all it does in effect is to
give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that
the State is liable. The State, in many cases, may be su­
able but not liable.
Indeed, in University o f the Philippines v. Dizon,w
the Supreme Court, citing Municipality o f San Fer-

62Arasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252.

63Gov’t, o f the Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad, supra.
64 76 SCRA 47.
65 G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
78 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

nando, La Union v. Firm e,66 stressed that a “marked

distinction exists between suability of the State and its
liability.” Thus —

“A distinction should first be made between suability and

liability. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts.
The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not con­
ceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be
sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is
only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable.”

Thus, in Merritt v. Government o f the Philippine Is ­

lands,67 the plaintiff was allowed to sue by virtue of a
special law but was unable to hold the defendant liable
when it was shown at the trial that the injuries sus­
tained by him were caused by a regular driver of the
government. The law applied was what is now Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which provides that the State
shall be responsible for torts only when it acts through a
special agent and not when the damage has been caused
by the official or employee to whom the task done prop­
erly pertains.
It has already been remarked that municipal corpo­
rations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting
in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to

m 195 SCRA 692; see also Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA

83.
1,7Supra.
 T h e D o c t r in e of S t a t e Im m u n it y 79

be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to

show that the defendant was not acting in its govern­
mental capacity when the injury was committed or that
the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In one case,68 for example, a claim for recovery of
damages against a provincial government failed when it
was shown that the injury complained of occurred in con­
nection with the repair of streets then being undertaken
by the defendant through its regular agents. This was
clearly a governmental function. By contrast, a municipal­
ity was held liable in another case for forcibly and illegally
ejecting a lessee from certain fishponds belonging to the
former in its proprietaiy capacity.69 In the case of Torio v.
Fontanilla,10 the Supreme Court held a municipality liable
for a tort committed in connection with the celebration of
a town fiesta, which was considered a proprietary func­
tion.
In University o f the Philippines v. Dizon ,71 the Su­
preme Court, citing the earlier case of Republic v. N a ­
tional Labor Relations Commission ,72 explained that the
“funds of the UP are government funds that are public
in character. They include the income accruing from the
use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent
only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be
validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution
or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against
the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was

68 Palafox v. Province o f Ilocos Norte, G.R. No. L-10659, Jan.

31, 1958.
69 Mun. of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184.
7085 SCRA 599.
71 G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
72 263 SCRA 290.
80 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

not immediately enforceable by execution against the

UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily
mean its liability.”
In contrast, the Supreme Court ruled in G SIS v.
Group Management Corporation,1S that the “GSIS
should not be allowed to hide behind such immunity
especially since its obligation arose from its own wrong­
ful action in a business transaction. In this case, the
monetary judgments against GSIS arose from its failure
to comply with its private and contractual obligation to
GMC. A s such, GSIS cannot claim immunity from the
enforcement of the final and executory judgment against
it.”

7:1 G.R. No. 167000, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 279.

 Chapter 5

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE

POLICIES

ARTICLE II of the Constitution is entitled “Declaration

of Principles and State Policies.” This article is intended
to lay down the rules underlying our system of govern­
ment and m ust therefore be adhered to in the conduct of
public affairs and the resolution of public issues. The
present article is an enlargement and, in some sections,
a modification of the original provisions found also in
Article II of the 1973 Constitution. The purpose is to
emphasize and articulate more unequivocally the objec­
tives and limitations of governmental action in pursuit
of the general goals announced in the Preamble. There
may have been some “overkill” though, as the number of
sections has increased from only ten in the 1973 Consti­
tution to twenty eight in the present charter, many of
which appear to be but meaningless platitudes on sub­
jects considered significant, perhaps, only by those who
insisted on their inclusion.
The foregoing notwithstanding, or despite the per­
ceived or seeming importance of many of the principles
and policies announced in Article II, and as previously
observed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
most of its provisions are to be considered as “mere leg­
islative guides, which absent enabling legislation, do not
embody enforceable constitutional rights.”1 Thus, to

1 Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 1871G7, July 16, 2011, 655

SCRA 476; see also Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18.

81
82 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

reiterate, Sections 5 (on the maintenance o f peace and

order) and 18 (labor as a primary social economic force)
have been declared by the Court as not self-executing
provisions.2 “The social justice provisions of the Consti­
tution are not self-executing principles ready for en­
forcement through the courts. They are merely state­
ments of principles and policies. To give them effect,
legislative enactment is required.”3
Independently of the aforecited pronouncements of
the Supreme Court, Section 4 of Article II expressly
provides that citizens may be required to render per­
sonal military or civil service “under conditions provided
by law.” While there appears to be a clear policy against
political dynasties in Section 26, which guarantees
equal access to opportunities for public service, the defi­
nition of “political dynasties” has been left to Congress,
which, to date, or more than two decades after the pre­
sent Constitution became effective, has been unable, or
unwilling, to implement this clear constitutional policy.
On the other hand, the Court has acknowledged
that the people’s right to a balanced and healthful ecol­
ogy, rather dramatically expressed in Section 16, and
their concomitant right to health, provided for in Section
15, “need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of human­
kind.” The Supreme Court explained that if “they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it
is because o f the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are mandated as state policies by the Con­

2 Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. COA, G.R.

No. 178160, February 26, 2009, 580 SCRA 295.
3 Bureau of Fisheries v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
169815, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134.
 F u n d a m e n ta l P r in c ip le s a n d S t a t e P o li c ie s 83

stitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing

importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obli­
gation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.”4
Section 28 {on the policy of public disclosure) has
likewise been similarly treated by the Supreme Court,
which has stated that its effectivity “need not await the
passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for ‘reasonable
safeguards.”’ According to the Court, the government
cannot “point to the absence of an implementing legisla­
tion as an excuse in not effecting such policy.”5

Preamble

The Preamble to the Constitution reads as follows:

“We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of

Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspi­
rations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the bless­
ings of independence and democracy under the rule o f law and
a regime o f truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do
ordain and promulgate this Constitution.”

Unlike in the 1935 Constitution, the above Pream­

ble is couched not in the third person but in the first. It

4 Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA

792.
5 The Province o f North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
84 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

was felt that the use of the more intimate first person
would deepen the sense of involvement and participa­
tion of the individual citizens in the ordaining and
promulgation o f the Constitution, which is supposed to
be their common handiwork. This impression was not
adequately conveyed by the 1935 Constitution, where
“the Filipino people” were viewed by many as a remote,
impersonal and abstract legal entity to which they did
not belong.
The Preamble is not considered a source of substan­
tive right since its purpose is only to introduce, i.e., “to
walk before,” the Constitution. However, its function is
not merely rhetorical as, in the first place, the Preamble
serves to indicate the authors of the Constitution, to wit,
“we, the sovereign Filipino people.” In addition, it also
enumerates the primary aims and expresses the aspira­
tions of the framers in drafting the Constitution and is
also useful as an aid in the construction and interpreta­
tion of the text o f the Constitution. This can better be
understood when studied in the light of the purposes
enunciated in the Preamble.
It is significant that the present Preamble now
makes reference to an “Almighty God” as opposed to the
phrase “Divine Providence” found in the 1935 and 1973
Charters. In this connection, it must be stressed that
the existence of a “Divine Being” or, much less, an “A l­
mighty God,” is not necessarily inherent in a religion.6
This important change is believed to be indicative
of the Filipino people’s ever-increasing adherence to, if
not obsession with, the notion of a Creator as an inte­
gral component o f their respective religions, to the con­
ceivable dismay of non-believers. Indeed, the Supreme

11Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003 edition, page 177.

 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 85

Court has described our nation as “Christian,”7 perhaps,

in affirmation of the reality that the vast majority of the
Filipino people believe in an “Almighty God.” It has
even “hailed” the Philippines as “the bastion of Christi­
anity in Asia,” which “boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos or
93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million — adher­
ing to the teachings of Jesus Christ.”8
Certain sectors find this change to be inconsistent
with the policy of separation of church and state, which
is characterized as inviolable in Article II,9 and the es­
tablishment clause,10 found in the Bill of Rights, which
has been interpreted to restrain the government from
composing prayers for public school children,11 or from
requiring them to read verses from the Bible,12 or even
from allowing public school teachers to distribute copies
of Bibles during class hours.13 In addition, there are
those who maintain that the presence of the phrase
“Almighty God” in the Preamble somehow lessens the
significance of the provisions of Article VI, Section 29 (2)
of the Constitution, which prohibits appropriations for
sectarian purposes.14
On the other hand, the Constitution grants tax ex­
emptions to religious institutions,15 and allows optional
religious instruction in our public schools16 and even full

7 People v. Bosi, G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012, 674 SCRA
411.
* Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.
3Constitution, Article II, Section 6.
10Ibid., Article III, Section 5.
" Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1.
12District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US 203,
1,1Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 NJ 31.
14See Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
15Constitution, Articles VI, Section 28 (3).
16Ibid., Article XIV, Section 3 (3).
86 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

foreign ownership of religious schools.17 Moreover, Arti­

cle XV, Section 3 [1] of the Constitution provides that the
“State shall defend the right of spouses to found a fam­
ily in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood.” In our country, it
is commonplace to witness prayers preceding or mark­
ing government activities, including cabinet meetings,
legislative sessions and even court proceedings, al­
though there are those who consider these to be offen­
sive to religious freedom, which includes the freedom
not to believe.
It is significant that, in Estrada v. Escritor,18 the
Supreme Court, in providing for the dismissal of charges
of immorality against the respondent based on her hav­
ing cohabited with a person other than her husband
upon finding that said arrangement was sanctioned
under her religion, invoked, among other principles, the
so-called benevolent neutrality approach, which “gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as re­
quired by the Free Exercise Clause” and “for accommo­
dation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests,” declaring that her
“conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has
made out a case for exemption from the law based on
her fundamental right to freedom of religion.”
Finally, it must be mentioned that this Preamble
now features the word “love” which many believe may
be appropriate for romantic novels, but should have no
place in a Constitution, which is a formal embodiment of
rules for the exercise of sovereignty. A t any rate, “love”
has, among other grounds, been invoked by our Su­
preme Court in dispensing justice, Thus —

17Ibid., Article XIV, Section 4 (2).

A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 1.
 F u n d a m e n ta l P r in c ip le s a n d S t a t e P o lic ie s 87

“With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of

the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation
of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no
basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner
took advantage of her, position to court her student. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and
academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that
the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know.
But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is
not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of
the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal
pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary so­
cial mores.”19

The new Preamble is rather wordy and suggests at

the outset what one might expect in the text of the Con­
stitution in terms of style and content. Even now we
must prepare against a very “talkative” Constitution.

Republicanism

Section 1 of Article II provides: “The Philippines is

a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.”
It is to be noted that the Constitution now describes
the Philippines as not only a republican but also a de­
mocratic State. Democracy is essentially government by
the people.
In this connection, the Supreme Court has re­
marked that “the 1987 Constitution accords to the citi­
zens a greater participation in the affairs of govern­
ment. Indeed, it provides for people’s initiative, the right
to information on matters of public concern (including
the right to know the state of health of their President),

19 Chua-Qua v. Clave, G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990, 189

SCRA 117.
88 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual

bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of ha­
beas corpus or declaration of martial law. These provi­
sions enlarge the people’s right in the political as well as
the judicial field. It grants them the right to interfere in
the affairs of government and challenge any act tending
to prejudice their interest.”20
Accordingly, the people can now directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative
body,21 and even directly propose amendments to the
Constitution on initiative.22
The Constitution further encourages non-govern­
mental, community based, or sectoral organizations
that promote the welfare of the nation,23 and provides
that no law shall be passed abridging the right of the
people, including those employed in the public and pri­
vate sectors, to form unions, associations and societies
for purposes not contrary to law.24 The role of independ­
ent people’s organizations shall be respected,25 and the
right o f the people and their organizations to effective
and reasonable participation at all levels of social, po­
litical and economic decision-making shall not be
abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the estab­
lishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.26 Re­
gional development councils or other similar bodies
composed of local government officials, regional heads of

20 Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos.

147036-37, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49.
21 Constitution, Article VI, Section 32.
22Ibid., Article XVII, Section 2.
2:1Id., Artiolo II, Scction 23.
21Id., Article III, Section 8.
2r’ Id., Article XIII, Section 15.
“ Id., Article XIII, Section 16.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 89

departments and other government offices, and repre­

sentatives from non-governmental organizations within
the regions for purposes of administrative decentraliza­
tion to strengthen the*, autonomy of the units therein
and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region shall be provided
for by the President.27 The organic act for each autono­
mous region shall be enacted with the assistance and
participation of a regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.28 The
independent economic and planning agency headed by
the President shall consult with the appropriate public
agencies, various private sectors, and local government
units, for purposes of recommending to Congress, and
implementing continuing integrated and coordinated
programs and policies for national development.29 The
Congress may create a consultative body to advise the
President on policies affecting indigenous cultural com­
munities, the majority of the members of which shall
come from the communities.30 Moreover, sectoral repre­
sentation is provided for in the House of Representa­
tives and in local legislative bodies, under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of Section 5 of Article V I and Section 9 of
Article X , respectively, of the Constitution.
This reproduction of the original principle in the
1935 Constitution establishes the democratic and repre­
sentative nature of our government and proclaims our
hostility to autocratic or totalitarian regimes. Thus, the
people are declared supreme. It is affirmed that every

27Id., Article X, Section 14.

28Id., Article X, Section 18.
29Id., Article XII, Section 9.
:,° Id., Article XVI, Section 12.
90 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

citizen is an individual repository of sovereignty. As

Justice Laurel put it, “an enfranchised citizen is a parti­
cle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of
established authority.”31 The citizenry and not official­
dom is recognized as the origin, and therefore also the
restriction, of all government authority.
A republic is a representative government, a gov­
ernment run by and for the people. It is not a pure de­
mocracy where the people govern themselves directly.
The essence of republicanism is representation and
renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of
public functionaries who derive their mandate from the
people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited pe­
riod only, after which they are replaced or retained at
the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials
hold and discharge their position as a public trust and
shall, according to the Constitution, “at all times be ac­
countable to the people”32 they are sworn to serve. The
purpose of a republican government, it is almost need­
less to state, is the promotion of the common welfare
according to the will of the people themselves.
This will is usually determined by the rule of the
majority, that is, the greater number of the people. U n­
der the Constitution, for example, the Senate President
and the Speaker are elected by majority vote of all the
members of their respective Houses,3'1 meaning more
than one-half of the total membership.
On the other hand, in the election of the members
themselves, the winners are those who receive the high­
est number of votes in their respective constituencies, or

31 Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199.

“ Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1.
13Ibid., Art. VI, Sec. 16(1).
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 91

a mere plurality, which may not necessarily be a major­

ity of the total votes cast. It is thus possible at times for
the smaller number to prevail over the majority, as in a
three-cornered election where the winner gets 40,000
votes as against 60,000 votes cast more or less equally
for the other two candidates. This may also occur in,
say, the suspension or expulsion of a member of the
Congress, which requires the concurrence of two-thirds
of the members of the House to which he belongs.34 In
the Sandiganbayan, the dissent of one member will pre­
vent a decision of the other two members of the division
as a unanimous vote is required for such decision. The
lone individual is in fact “a majority of one” when pro­
tected by the bill o f rights.35
All this is justified because the law so provides and
ours is “a government of laws and not of men.” The as­
cendancy of the law is axiomatic in a republic and must
be recognized by every public official no matter how
exalted. No person is above the law; all must bow to its
majesty. Every official act must be based upon and con­
form to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the
act must be rejected.
Indeed, nobility of intention is insufficient to vali­
date an unauthorized act, as illustrated in the cele­
brated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, 36 where it was
conceded that the mayor of Manila had been motivated
by his desire to protect the morals and health of the
people when he “deported” one hundred seventy prosti­
tutes from Manila to Davao. The Supreme Court had
nevertheless no choice except to condemn his act, there
being no showing that it had been authorized by any

34Id., Art. VI, Sec. 16(2).

35 P.D. No. 1606.
36 39 Phil. 778.
92 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

law or even an ordinance. The decision cited the land­

mark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,31 where the rationale
of this principle was explained in the following eloquent
language:

“When we consider the nature and the theory of our ins­

titutions o f government, the principles upon which they are
supposed to rest, and review the history of their development,
we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave
room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it
is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sov­
ereign powers are delegated to the agencies o f government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for
whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the defi­
nition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true that
there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person
or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of
mere administration, the responsibility is purely political, no
appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal o f the public
judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by
means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights of life, lib­
erty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law
which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of
the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under
the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous lan­
guage of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of
the commonwealth ‘may be a government of laws and not of
men.’ For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold
his life, or the means of living, or any material rights essential
to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to
be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence o f slavery itself.”

The Defense of the State

Section 4 provides: “The prime duty o f the Govern­

ment is to serve and protect the people. The Government

:n 118 U.S. 356.

 F u n d a m e n ta l P r in c ip le s a n d S t a t e P o li c ie s 93

may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal military
or civil service.” <.
This provision is based upon the inherent right of
every State to existence and self-preservation. By virtue
of this right, a State may take up all necessary action,
including the use of armed force, to repel any threat to
its security.
To this end, it is provided in Article X V I, Section 4,
of the Constitution that the armed forces of the Philip­
pines shall “be composed o f a citizen armed force which
shall undergo military training and serve, as may be
provided by law.” The pertinent law is C.A. No. 1, oth­
erwise known as the National Defense Act.
In People v. Lagman and People v. Zosa,3S the ac­
cused were charged with and convicted of refusal to
register for military training as required by the above-
mentioned statute. On appeal, Zosa argued that he was
fatherless and had a mother and eight brothers to sup­
port, while Lagman alleged that he had a father to sup­
port, had no military leanings, and did not wish to kill
or be killed; and both claimed that the statute was un­
constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed their con­
viction, holding that the law in question was based on
the aforecited constitutional principle.

“The National Defense Law, in so far as it established

compulsory military service, does not go against this constitu­
tional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the or­
ganization o f an army to the will of the citizens would be to

m38 O.G. 1676.

94 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

make this duty of the Government excusable should there be

no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
“In the United States, the courts have held in a series of
decisions that the compulsory military service adopted by rea­
son o f the civil war and the world war does not violate the
Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from
that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and
maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Govern­
ment to require compulsory military service is a consequence
of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to
defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case
of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S. 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep.
385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a
person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will,
against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious
or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the
army o f his country and risk the chance o f being shot down in
its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed.,
233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property
without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is
no right o f property to an office or employment. The circum­
stance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of
the actual existence of war does not make our case any differ­
ent, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compul­
sory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual
or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of
need.”

It is noteworthy that the duty to defend the State

is imposed upon all citizens, including women, and that
the military or civil service that m ay be required of
them by law must be personal. This precludes the hiring
by the rich of “mercenaries” or professional soldiers
to take their place in the defense of the State. As for
those who may have sincere conscientious or religious
scruples about the taking of human life, or have no mili­
tary inclinations or aptitudes, accommodation can
probably be made by assigning them to non-combat or
civil duties.
 F u n d a m e n ta l P r in c ip le s a n d S t a t e P o li c ie s 95

Peace and Order

Section 5 provides rather pompously:

“Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the pro­

tection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the peo­
ple of the blessings of democracy."

This was probably inspired by the American Decla­

ration of Independence or some high school commence­
ment address. In any case, it speaks for itself —
needlessly, it would seem — as these are implicit in a
welfare state, which is what we are repeatedly told the
Constitution is establishing.

The Incorporation Clause

Section 2 provides: “The Philippines renounces war

as an instrument o f national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles o f international law as part o f the
law o f the land, and adheres to the policy o f peace, equal­
ity, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all na­
tions.”
Every State is, by reason of its membership in the
family of nations, bound by the generally accepted prin­
ciples of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of its own laws. This is known as the
doctrine of incorporation. By virtue thereof, and par­
ticularly since it is expressly affirmed in our Constitu­
tion, our Supreme Court has applied the rules of inter­
national law in the decision of a number of cases not­
withstanding that such rules had not been previously
converted to statutory enactments.
96 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association u.

Health Secretary,39 the Supreme Court clarified that
“under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be trans­
formed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declara­
tion, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the
land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that ‘ [n]o
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Senate/ Thus, treaties or conven­
tional international law must go through a process pre­
scribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.”
In the same case, the Court, citing the earlier case
of Mijares v. Ranada,40 explained that “generally ac­
cepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of
the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations,” specifying as examples “renuncia­
tion of war as an instrument of national policy, the prin­
ciple of sovereign immunity, a person’s right to life, lib­
erty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among
others.”
An example is Kuroda v. Jalandoni,41 where the pe­
titioner challenged the jurisdiction of the military com-

19G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 265.

G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 397.
" 42 O.G. 4282.
 F u n d a m e n ta l P r in c ip le s a n d S t a t e P o li c ie s 97

mission trying him, contending that the Philippines was

not covered by the Hague Convention under which he
was being prosecuted, since the Philippines was not a
signatory to this agreement. The Supreme Court re­
jected this argument, holding that we were bound by
that convention because it embodied generally accepted
principles of international law binding upon all States.
Among the grounds invoked by the Supreme Court
in Agustin v. E d u *2 which was a challenge against the
constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction requiring
early warning devices for all motor vehicles, was our
adherence to general accepted principles of interna­
tional law. Thus —

“The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition

must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The peti­
tion itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed
Letter o f Instruction: ‘ [Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Conven­
tion on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Or­
ganization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for
the installation o f road safety signs and devices; * * *’ It cannot
be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: ‘The Philippines * * * adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law o f the land * * The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not
for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. The concept of pacta sunt servanda stands in
the way o f such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with
the principle of international morality.”

Indeed, generally accepted principles of interna­

tional law can be relied upon even for purposes of inter­

42Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979).

 98 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

preting municipal legislation or issuances, as when the

Supreme Court applied and adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of A ll Persons from En­
forced Disappearance for purposes of defining the con­
cept o f enforced disappearances,43 as used in the Amparo
1 44
rule.
Where there appears to be a conflict between inter­
national law and municipal law, efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both.
For this purpose, it should be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted rules of international law. Thus, in Co Kim
Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 45 it was argued that the Mac-
Arthur Proclamation of October 23, 1944, invalidating
“all laws, regulations and processes” of the Occupation
government, applied also to judicial decisions. The Su­
preme Court did not agree and declared as follows:

Taking into consideration the fact that, according to a

well-known principle of international law, all judgments and
judicial proceedings which are not o f a political complexion of
the de facto government during the Japanese military occupa­
tion remained so after the occupied territory had come again
into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed
that it was not and could not have been the intention of Gen­
eral MacArthur, in using the phrase ‘processes of any other
government’ in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes,
in violation of said principle of international law.”

Suppose, however, that the conflict is irreconcilable

and a choice must be made between these two compo-

" Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009, 606
SCRA 598, citod in Navia v. Pai'dico, G.R. No. 184407, June 19,
2012, 673 SCRA 618.
MA.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (October 24, 2007) or The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.
',s Supra.
 F u n d a m e n ta l P r in c ip le s a n d S t a t e P o li c ie s 99

nents of the law of the land, how is the problem re­

solved?
This question was raised in Ichong v. Hernandez, 46
where the petitioner asked for the invalidation of the
Retail Trade Nationalization Act on the ground, among
others, that it contravened several treaties concluded by
us which, under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a gen­
erally accepted principle of international law should be
observed by us in good faith. The Supreme Court said it
saw no conflict. However, even assuming that there was,
it was the statute that should be upheld because it rep­
resented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent, could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty.
Municipal law was also upheld as against interna­
tional law in Gonzales v. Hechanova,47 on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers, and in In re Gar­
ciaj48 under the rule-making powers of the Supreme
Court.
It will be recalled that among the issues raised by
the petitioners in Magallona v. Ermita49 was the neces­
sity for the passage of RA 9522, which provided for new
baselines for our archipelago, considering the permis­
sive text of UNCLOS III, on which said law was based.
The Supreme Court found this contention of the peti­
tioners as “plausible” but just the same ruled in favor of
the law, stressing that it would actually be more benefi­
cial for the Philippines to have “internationally accepted
baselines” or baselines compliant with the provisions of
U NCLOS III. Thus —

4S101 Phil. 1155.

17 9 SCRA 230 (1963).
48 2 SCRA 984 (1961).
19 G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476.
100 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

“Nevertheless, the prerogative o f choosing this option be­

longs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of
choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an
UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State
like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally ac­
ceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is a recipe for a
two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in
the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and
second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dis­
pute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences
Congress wisely avoided. The enactment of UNCLOS III com­
pliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adja­
cent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth o f the Philippines’ mari­
time zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most
vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our na­
tional interest.”

In Bayan Muna v. Rom ulo,60 the Supreme Court

clarified that a stipulation in a treaty or executive
agreement providing for a State with the option to waive
its criminal jurisdiction over foreigners who commit
crimes within its territory is not to be considered as an
abdication of its sovereignty.

“Almost every time a state enters into an international

agreement, it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty, xxx.
On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the gener­
ally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an
unconstitutional diminution or deprivation o f jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.”

50 G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011, 641 SCRA 17.

 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 101

It is interesting to note that, in the same case, the

Supreme Court, in distinguishing between treaties and
executive agreements, stated that “a treaty has greater
‘dignity’ than an executive agreement, because its con­
stitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having
behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and
the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agree­
ment, takes precedence over any prior statutory enact­
ment.”51
The renunciation of war as an instrument of na­
tional policy is itself a generally accepted principle now
categorically expressed in the United Nations Charter.
The view that the war here eschewed is an offensive and
not a defensive war finds support in the reworded provi­
sion of Article VI, Section 23(1), which empowers the
Congress to declare not war but “the existence o f a state
o f war” presumably commenced or provoked by the en­
emy State.
The last clause of Section 2 is an addition to the
original provision in the 1935 Constitution and is a
mere stylistic embellishment of our commitment to the
law of nations.
Section 2 must be read with another section in this
Article, which provides as follows:

“Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign

policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount con­
sideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-determination.”

and with Section 8, declaring that:

51Ibid.
102 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

“Sec. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national

interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in its territory.”

The authors believe that the inclusion of these pro­

visions only serves to underline our fear of foreign
domination and achieves not much more, considering
that the first provision goes without saying, and the
second is so ambiguously worded that it could be inter­
preted any which way.
A t any rate, in The Province o f North Cotabato v.
The Government o f the Republic o f the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain ,62 the Supreme Court, citing
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, remarked that the “right to self-
determination” pertains to the right of States to “freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.” It there­
after stressed that “internal self-determination” refers
to “a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social
and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state,” while “external self-determination” pro­
vides for “the establishment of a sovereign and inde­
pendent State, the free association or integration with
an independent State or the emergence into any other
political status freely determined by a people.”53

Rearing of the Youth

There are two sections in Article II dealing with the

proper rearing of the youth.

52 G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.

r,:>Ibid., citing Reference Re Secession o f Quebec.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 103

The first is Section 12, which reads: “The State rec­

ognizes the sanctity o f family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social insti­
tution. It shall equally protect the life o f the mother, and
the life o f the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty o f parents in the rearing o f the
youth for civic efficiency and the development o f moral
character shall receive the aid and support o f the Gov­
ernment.”
Kindred ties are especially close in the Philippines,
making the family a fundamental and important factor
in the enhancement of the nation. The theory is that the
better the home, the better the nation; and also that the
strength of the family lies in the correct upbringing of
its children. Proper recognition is therefore given to the
complementary roles of the parents and the government
in the rearing of the youth for the principal purposes
mentioned, to wit, civic efficiency and the development
of moral character.
Accordingly, it has been observed that the “family
is the basic and the most important institution of soci­
ety. It is in the family where children are born and
molded either to become useful citizens of the country or
troublemakers in the community.”54
Significantly, the new provision declares that the
State “shall equally protect the life o f the mother and the
life o f the unborn from conception,” which seems to sug­
gest a policy against abortion. This, however, must be
equated with the equal protection due the mother. It
should also be observed that in recognizing the sanctity
of the family life, the provision is not closing the door on

64 Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 642.

104 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

divorce, which is left for the legislature to allow in its

discretion.55
In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Montano™ the Supreme Court declared that “an unborn
child can be considered a dependent. The term child can
be understood to include the unborn fetus in the
mother’s womb.”
The State cannot unreasonably interfere with the
exercise by parents of their natural right and duty to
rear their children, but it may regulate the same under
the police power.
This power is exercised most effectively, at least
during the child’s formative years, through the school.
As schools are under its supervision and regulation, the
State is in a position to assist the parent in the proper
upbringing of the child through the enforcement of edu­
cational policies looking to the attainment of the above­
stated objectives.
A s announced in M eyer v. Nebraska , m it is incom­
petent for the government to prohibit the teaching of the
German language to students between certain age levels
since there is nothing inherently harmful in the lan­
guage that will impair the upbringing of the child; and
in fact such a subject could improve his academic back­
ground. In Pierce v. Society o f Sisters,511a law prohibiting
the establishment of private schools and in effect confin ­
ing the education of the youth to public institutions of
learning was likewise annulled because it would stan­

r" .Res. of the Constitutional Commission, Sept. 18, 1986.

5,i G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 621.
57Supra.
“ 262 U.S. 390.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 105

dardize the thinking of the children, who, according to

the court, were not “mere creatures of the State.”
On the other hand, there is nothing that inhibits
the government from prescribing or prohibiting certain
courses in the various school curricula intended to im­
prove the education of the students. The legislature now
requires the teaching of the novels of Rizal for the pur­
pose of inculcating in the pupils the virtues and ideals of
our national hero, and may prohibit certain subjects
that are pernicious per se, such as, say, the techniques
of picking pockets.
In People v. Ritter,59 an alien who had enticed Fili­
pino children with money and then sexually abused
them was expelled from the country, conformably to the
commitment of the State “to defend the right o f children
to assistance and special protection from all forms o f
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.”
Accordingly, our Supreme Court has consistently
deplored the commission of incestuous rape, declaring
that “our moral fiber must have truly deteriorated with
fathers raping their own children. For a Christian na­
tion like ours, such bestial act should never be tolerated.
Some would argue that for the sake of the family the
child must forgive her father-tormentor. But in the eyes
of the law, a crime is a crime and justice dictates that
fathers who rape their children deserve no place in our
society.”60
It will be recalled that in the Cabanas Case,61 the
conflicting claims of a mother and an uncle of a child to

59 194 SCRA 690 (1991).

80 People v. Bosi, G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012, 674 SCRA
411.
61 268 U.S. 510.
106 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

be his trustee were resolved in favor of the former on

the strength inter alia of the above constitutional provi­
sion.

The second principle is Section 13, providing that

“the State recognizes the vital role o f the youth in nation-
building, and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism
and encourage their involvement in public and civic af­
fairs.”

This provision was a reaction to the upsurge of

youth activism that marked the days prior to the adop­
tion of the 1973 Constitution and evidently influenced
the thinking of its framers. After a long period of conde­
scension toward them, their elders finally realized the
responsibility, maturity and competence of the youth in
the discussion and solution of public issues and conse­
quently began to accord greater recognition to them as a
vital force in nation-building.

Accordingly, it is now sought to promote not only

the civic efficiency and moral character of our young
citizens but also their physical, moral, spiritual, intel­
lectual and social well-being so that they will be fully
prepared when they assume their responsibility of lead­
ership in the direction of our country’s destiny.

Toward this end, Article XIV, Section 1, requires

the State “to protect and promote the right of all citizens
to quality education at all levels” and to “take all appro­
priate steps to make such education accessible to all,”
besides providing free public elementary and also sec­
ondary education. The out-of-school youth must be given
citizenship and vocational training, and scholarships
shall be created and maintained for deserving students.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 107

Even optional religious instruction has been expanded

under the new Constitution as an added measure for the
improvement of the morals of the youth.

In Department o f Education u. San Diego,62 the is­

sue was the validity of a rule laid down by the petitioner
prohibiting any student from taking the National Medi­
cal Admission Test (NMAT) if he had earlier failed it
three successive times. In sustaining the rule, the Su­
preme Court observed in part:

“The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke

the right to quality education as a guaranty of the Constitu­
tion: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed
the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to
say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
“No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in
the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or
occupation. The only inference is that he is probably better, not
for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest.
“In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster;
in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be out­
standing. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to
quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and
the sharpening of his latent talents towards what may even be
a brilliant future.
“We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes,
of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers
who should have studied banking and teachers who could be
better as merchants.
“It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to
regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the
student to the course for which he is best suited as determined
by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be

62 180 SCRA 533 (1989).

 108 P h il ip p in e P o l it i c a l L a w

‘swamped with incompetence,’ in the words of Justice Holmes,

not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a
nation o f misfits.”

It is significant that, under Section 5(2) of Article

X IV of the Constitution, “every citizen has a right to
select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic re­
quirements.”
In Virtuoso u. Municipal Judge, 63 a 17-year old ac­
cused of robbery was required to post bail in the amount
of P 16,000.00. Holding that he was a minor entitled to
the benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which
was an implementation of Article II, Section 12, the
Supreme Court released him on the recognizance of his
parents and counsel.
In Atizado v. P e o p l e the Supreme Court affirmed
the retroactive application of a law, Republic Act No.
9344, in favor of minors or “children in conflict with the
law,” declaring that said law “aims to promote the wel­
fare of minor offenders through programs and services,
such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion,
rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their
development.” In People v. Jacinto,65 the Court further
ruled that “the promotion of the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law should extend even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long

“ 82 SCRA 191 (1978).

04 G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 105; see also
People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA
20 .
"5 G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 590; see also
People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 188;
People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA
715.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 109

as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a

child,” declaring that the “appellant may be confined in
an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.”

Moreover, Republic Act No. 9262 has been enacted

to protect women and children from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.

It is not amiss to remark in this connection that

most of our more prominent leaders in the past were
young men whose youth belied their competence and
responsibility in the discharge of the significant tasks
that history assigned to them during the more crucial
periods of our national existence. Among them were
Rizal, who died at thirty-five; Bonifacio, who was thirty-
three when the Revolution broke out; Aguinaldo, who
became the first President of the Philippines when he
was only thirty; Sergio Osmena, who was twenty-nine
when he was chosen Speaker of the Philippine Assem­
bly; and Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, whose brilliant if brief
public career began when he was elected to the Consti­
tutional Convention of 1934 at the age of twenty-five.

Women

Article II, Section 14, provides that “the State shall

recognize the role of women in nation-building and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.” The reverse order follows the polite
phraseology of “ladies and gentlemen” and “ladies first”
and does not suggest a social upheaval, much less an
overturning of the tradition conferring upon the man
the position of head of the family, administrator of the
conjugal funds and other similar capacities. This provi­
sion will need implementation by the legislature, which,
110 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

in all certainty, will continue to be dominated by male

members.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9262 has been en­
acted to protect women and their children from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.66 This
law has been upheld by the Supreme Court as against a
challenge as to its constitutionality on the ground of its
purported violation of the equal protection clause, as it
applies only to women, and not to men. The Court cited
“the unequal power relationship between women and
men” and “the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence,” not to mention “the wide­
spread gender bias and prejudice against women” as
basic distinctions between women and men which jus­
tify the “classification under the law.”67 It is significant
though there does not appear to be a specific law which
provides for similar protection to men, who, under Sec­
tion 14, should likewise be entitled to “fundamental
equality before the law.”
Article XIII contains another provision on women,
in case the male chauvinist reader is interested.

Social Justice

One of the most serious problems of the nation is

the acute imbalance between the rich and the poor and
the resultant divisiveness and hostility between them.
This polarization has created an explosive situation
that, unless corrected in time, may lead to a violent
social upheaval.

See Ang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010,
618 SCRA 592 and Dabalos v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No.
193960, January 7, 2013, 688 SCRA 64.
1,7Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s m

The plight of the millions of our impoverished

masses is best told in the story of the ditch-digger, who
was asked why he was digging ditches. His reply: “I dig
the ditch to earn the money to buy the food to give me
strength to dig the ditch.”

To him and countless other Filipinos, life is but an

unending cycle of drudgery and toil, a ceaseless struggle
for survival for the elemental right to just exist instead
of truly living. W ant is a constant companion. Oppres­
sion is always close by. As for those interests intended
to enhance the joy of living, these are total strangers.
One cannot enjoy the sunset when he must worry about
the oil to light the lamp when the darkness closes in.

To alleviate the plight of these forgotten men, to

give those with less privileges in life more privileges in
law, in the words of President Ramon Magsaysay, our
government has assiduously, if not always successfully,
pursued the policy of social justice enshrined in both the
old and the new Constitutions.

Accordingly, it was held in one case68 that:

“As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and

the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice,
the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compli­
ance (with the Workmen’s Compensation Act). Social justice in
this case is not equality but protection.”

The foregoing observations notwithstanding, the

Supreme Court has made it clear that “laws which have
for their object the preservation and maintenance of
social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and
the underprivileged. They apply with equal force to
those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable po­

68 Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611 (1980).

 112 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

sition in life, are equally deserving of protection from

the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on
the rights of the rich in the guise of defending the poor,
where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed
against them.”69

Accordingly, it has been ruled that “the law, in pro­

tecting the rights of the laborers, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.”70 In­
deed, the Supreme Court has declared, rather emphati­
cally, that “while the Constitution is committed to the
policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute
will be automatically decided in favor of labor. M an­
agement also has its rights which are entitled to respect
and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out
of its concern for the less privileged in life, the Court
has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker
and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer.
Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to
the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to
be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the
applicable law and doctrine.”71

“ Adriano v. Tanco, G.R. No. 168164, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA

218.
711Mercury Drug Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 75662, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 580,
587; Maribago Bluewater Beach Resort v. Dual, G.R. No. 180660,
July 20, 2010, 625 SCRA 147; Oxales v. United Laboratories, Inc.,
G.R. No. 152991, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 26.
71 Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) v. Vir-
gilio E. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 244, 257,
cited in Javier v. Fly Ace Corporation, G.R. No. 192558, February 15,
2012, 666 SCRA 382.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 113

In one case, the petitioner invoked social justice as

a ground for rejecting the respondent’s efforts to relo­
cate her. The Supreme Court said —
<.
“For sure, the NHA’s order of relocating petitioner to her
assigned lot and demolishing her property on account of her re­
fusal to vacate was consistent with the law’s fundamental ob­
jective of promoting social justice in the manner that will inure
to the common good, xxx It is also worth noting that peti­
tioner’s continued refusal to leave the subject property has
hindered the development of the entire area. Indeed, petitioner
cannot invoke the social justice clause at the expense of the
common welfare.”72

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. N LR C ,73

the Supreme Court likewise emphasized that —

“The policy of social justice is not intended to counte­

nance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the un­
derprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it cer­
tainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is
an imperative of every humane society but only when the re­
cipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social
justice cannot be permitted to be [the] refuge o f scoundrels any
more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of
the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if
their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not sim­
ply because they happen to be poor. This great policy o f our
Constitution is not meant for the protection o f those who have
proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have
tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own
character.”

72 Maglakas v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 138823,

September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 379.
73 247 Phil. 641 (1988], cited in Duque v. Veloso, G.R. No.
196201, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 676.
114 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

The classic definition of social justice is found in

Calalang v. Williams,14 where Justice Laurel declared as
follows:

“Social justice is ‘neither communism, nor despotism, nor

atomism, nor anarchy,’ but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
component elements of society, through the maintenance o f a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitu-
tionally, through the exercise o f powers underlying the exis­
tence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.”

The new provisions on social justice in Article II are

the following:

“Sec. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic so­

cial order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote full employ­
ment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of
life for all.”
“Sec. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development.”
“Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.”
“Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and pro­
mote their welfare.”
“Sec. 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform.”

74 70 Phil. 726.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s H 5

Apparently not satisfied with the above provisions,

the framers have also provided for a new and separate
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, with
subtopics on Labor, Agrarian and Natural Resources Re­
form, Urban Land Reform and Housing, Health,
Women, People’s Organizations, and Human Rights.
In sustaining the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, the Supreme Court concluded its opinion in A sso­
ciation o f Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary o f Agrarian Reform75 in the following words:

“By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles

to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to
clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now
glimpse the day when he will be released not only from want
but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from
his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last, his
servitude will be ended forever. At last, the farm on which he
toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of Mother Earth
that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of
living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now
can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling fu­
ture. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his
insecurities and dark resentments and ‘rebuild in it the music
and the dream.’”

Separation of Church and State

Section 6 reiterates that “the separation o f Church

and State shall be inviolable.” This is a reproduction of
Article XV , Section 15, of the 1973 Constitution.
The separation of Church and State was originally,
and quite adequately, expressed in the bill of rights pro­
viding that “no law shall be made respecting an estab­
lishment o f religion or prohibiting the free exercise

75 175 SCRA 343 (1989).

116 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

thereof.” It is now rendered more emphatic by the said

Section 6, which says that the separation shall be “in­
violable.”
The rationale of the rule is summed up in the fa­
miliar saying, “strong fences make good neighbors.” The
idea is to delineate the boundaries between the two
institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one
against the other because of a misunderstanding of the
limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The
demarcation line calls on the entities to “render there­
fore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto
God the things that are God’s.”
The doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State
that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiasti­
cal affairs; the Church is likewise barred from meddling
in purely secular matters. And the reason is plain. A
union of Church and State, as aptly remarked, “tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion.” It is also
likely to result in a conspiracy, well nigh irresistible
because of its composite strength, against the individ­
ual’s right to worship.
Accordingly, it has been ruled that “the amend­
ments of the constitution, restatement of articles of re­
ligion and abandonment of faith or abjuration, having to
do with faith, practice, doctrine, form o f worship, eccle­
siastical law, custom and rule of a church and having
reference to the power of excluding from the church
those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unques­
tionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts.” Indeed, it has been held
that the courts “must respect and cannot review” m at­
ters that “may have religious color and are therefore
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 117

ecclesiastical affairs,” including a church’s disconnection

of its ties with another entity.76

The wall of separation between Church and State is

not a wall of hostility. The State in fact recognizes the
beneficent influence of religion in the enrichment of the
nation’s life. “In so far as it instills into the mind the
purest principles of morality,” so said Justice Laurel,
“the influence of religion is deeply felt and highly appre­
ciated” by the State. Thus —

“When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Con­

stitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to es­
tablish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general
welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the bless­
ings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and de­
mocracy,’ they thereby manifested their intense religious na­
ture and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies o f men and nations. The elevating influence o f relig­
ion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to re­
ligious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to reli­
gious purposes. Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest,
preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed. Thursday
and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day,
and Sundays are made legal holidays because of the secular
idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral re­
sults. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and big­
amy; and certain crimes against religious worship are consid­
ered crimes against the fundamental laws o f the state.”77

7BUnited Church of Christ In the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford

United Church o f Christ, Inc., G.R. No. 171905, June 20, 2012, 674
SCRA 92, citing Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417 (1955);
Taruc v. Bishop De la Cruz, 493 Phil. 293 (2005).
77Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
118 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Supremacy of Civilian Authority

Section 3 provides: “Civilian authority is, at all

times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces o f
the Philippines is the protector o f the people and the
State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty o f the State
and the integrity o f the national territory.”
Although this is implicit in a republican system of
government, it was felt advisable to expressly affirm
this principle in order to allay all fears of a military
take-over of our civilian government. The military es­
tablishment is the physically strongest single institution
in our country and has the capacity and might to wrest
power from the constituted authorities. To avoid this, it
is also fittingly declared in Article VII. Section 18, of our
Constitution that the President, who is a civilian offi­
cial, shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed
forces of the Philippines.
Thus, “while the President is still a civilian, Article
II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military,
making the civilian president the nation’s supreme mili­
tary leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when
read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian
President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative
head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military
training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he
has the power to direct military operations and to de­
termine military strategy. Normally, he would be ex­
pected to delegate the actual command of the armed
forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.
A s Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the
movements of the naval and military forces placed by
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 119

law at his command, and to employ them in the manner

he m ay deem most effectual.”78
This military power of the President has been in­
terpreted to include the power to prevent, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, military personnel from testifying in
legislative inquiries,79 and to confirm, mitigate and re­
mit sentences of erring military personnel.80

Local Autonomy

The policy of local autonomy, which was not specifi­

cally mentioned in the 1935 Constitution but was digni­
fied into a constitutional principle by the 1973 charter is
affirmed in Section 25, which provides: “The State shall
ensure the autonomy o f local governments.”
This principle is fleshed out in Article X , entitled
“Local Government” and the Local Government Code.
The strengthening of local governments is based
upon the Jeffersonian view that “municipal corporations
are the small republics from which the great one derives
its strength.” The belief is shared in this country that
vitalization of the local 'government unit will enable its
inhabitants to develop their resources and thereby con­
tribute to the progress of the whole nation. More impor­
tantly, they will acquire a deepened sense of involve­
ment that will encourage them to participate more ac­
tively in the direction of public affairs as members of the
body politic.

78 Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA
482.
79 Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498
SCRA 671.
80 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30,
2012, 677 SCRA 750.
 120 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

It should be emphasized though that the autonomy

granted to local governments is not to be understood as
independence.81

Economy

The various policies on the economy, which is also

the subject of Article X II, are the following:

“Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and in­

dependent national economy effectively controlled by Filipi­
nos.”
“Sec. 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of
the private sector encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investments.”
“Sec. 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform.”

The above provisions only serve to demonstrate the

strange desire of the framers to clutter the Constitution,
which should be limited only to general statements
couched in concise and clear language, with detailed
rules better embodied in implementing statutes instead
of being petrified into constitutional policies.
A t any rate, included as state policies in Article II
are Section 19, which provides that the State shall de­
velop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos, and Section 20, where
the State recognizes the indispensable role of the pri­
vate sector, encourages private investments, and pro­
vides incentives for needed investments. These provi­
sions are to be read in consonance with specific provi-
i

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No.

196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270; see also Veloso v. Commis­
sion on Audit, G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011, 656 SCRA 767.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 121

sions of Article X II of the Constitution, namely, Section

10, which basically gives to Congress the discretion to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments; Sec­
tion 11, which reserves^ franchises for public utilities to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associa­
tions organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens; Section 12, which calls upon the State to pro­
mote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt meas­
ures that help them make competitive; and Section 13,
under which the State shall pursue a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity. All of these provisions are founded on the
need to “conserve and develop our patrimony,” as speci­
fied in the Preamble.
In Espina v. Zamora,82 the petitioners challenged
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8762, otherwise
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000,
which allowed foreigners to engage in retail trade in our
country. The petitioners contended that its basic provi­
sions violated the aforecited constitutional policies. The
Supreme Court rejected the challenge, declaring, as
follows —

“But, as the Court explained in Tahada v. Angara, the

provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declara­
tions of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a
cause of action in the courts.
“The Court further explained in Tahada that Article XII
of Llie 1987 Constitution lays down Llie ideals of economic na­
tionalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified

82 G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010, 631 SCRA 17.

 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions cov­

ering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods;
(2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make
them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively con­
trolled by Filipinos.
“In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987
Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and in­
dependent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino
entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly
of the economic environment. The objective is simply to pro­
hibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our eco­
nomic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference
in all areas of development.
“Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the re­
alities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit o f a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms
and arrangements o f exchange on the basis of equality and re­
ciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection
of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias
in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it
also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases o f equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competi­
tion and trade practices that are unfair.”

The Court added —

“More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipi­
nos certain areas o f investments upon the recommendation of
the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass
it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws al­
lowing the entry o f foreigners into certain industries not re­
served by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case,
Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade
business to foreign investments instead of reserving them ex-
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 123

clusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such

policy.
“Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Lib­
eralization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it can­
not be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’
right to property and to due process o f law. Filipinos continue
to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign
investors.
“Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to
inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no
showing that the law has contravened any constitutional man­
date. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of
R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail
trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete
and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has
provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
business. Thus —
“First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business
subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only na­
tionals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in
countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be al­
lowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified
foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain re­
tailing activities outside their accredited stores through the
use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales repre­
sentatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari
stores and such other similar retailing activities.
“In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade
liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation about a dec­
ade ago.”

In seeming contrast, the Supreme Court, in Gam­

boa v. Finance Secretary,83 in interpreting Section 11 of
Article X ll, which reserves franchises for public utilities

G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690.

1 24 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or asso­

ciations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, clarified that the term “capital,” as used in said
provision, refers to shares of stock “entitled to vote.”
Thus —

“The term ‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the Con­

stitution refers only to shares o f stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus in the present case only to com­
mon shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which
translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usu­
ally have no voting rights, the term ‘capital’ in Section 11, Ar­
ticle XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares.
However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in
the election of directors, then the term ‘capital’ shall include
such preferred shares because the right to participate in the
control or management of the corporation is exercised through
the right to vote in the election o f directors. In short, the term
‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-
owned ‘capital’ required in the Constitution. Full beneficial
ownership of 60 percent o f the outstanding capital stock, cou­
pled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal
and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capi­
tal stock must rest in the hands o f Filipino nationals in accor­
dance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corpo­
ration is ‘considered as non-Philippine national[s].’ To construe
broadly the term ‘capital’ as the total outstanding capital stock,
including both common and non-voting preferred shares,
grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution
that the ‘State shall develop a self-reliant and independent na­
tional economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.’ A broad defi­
nition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important vot­
ing stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public
utility."
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 125

This patriotic stance of the Supreme Court was fur­

ther emphasized when it later declared —

“Since the constitutional requirement of at least 60 per­

cent Filipino ownership applies not only to voting control of the
corporation but also to the beneficial ownership of the corpora­
tion, it is therefore imperative that such requirement apply
uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares, regard­
less of nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a
corporation. Under the Corporation Code, capital stock consists
of all classes of shares issued to stockholders, that is, common
shares as well as preferred shares, which may have different
rights, privileges or restrictions as stated in the articles of in­
corporation.
“The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the
development of an economy ‘effectively controlled’ by Filipinos.
Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly
reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Phil­
ippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments
Act o f 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs
to Filipinos. The FIA’s implementing rules explain that ‘[f]or
stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or
Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the
required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the
stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential.’ In
effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpreta­
tion that the term ‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with
full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to
vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corpora­
tion.
“Any other construction of the term ‘capital’ in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution contravenes the letter and
intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term
‘capital’ openly invites alien domination o f economic activities
reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals. Therefore, re­
spondents’ interpretation will ultimately result in handing
over effective control of our national economy to foreigners in
 126 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

patent violation of the Constitution, making Filipinos second-

class citizens in their own country.
“Filipinos have only to remind themselves of how this
country was exploited under the Parity Amendment, which
gave Americans the same rights as Filipinos in the exploitation
of natural resources, and in the ownership and control of public
utilities, in the Philippines. To do this, the 1935 Constitution,
which contained the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and
control requirement as the present 1987 Constitution, had to
be amended to give Americans parity rights with Filipinos.
There was bitter opposition to the Parity Amendment and
many Filipinos eagerly awaited its expiration. In late 1968,
PLDT was one of the American-controlled public utilities that
became Filipino-controlled when the controlling American
stockholders divested in anticipation of the expiration of the
Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974. No economic suicide hap­
pened when control o f public utilities and mining corporations
passed to Filipinos’ hands upon expiration of the Parity
Amendment.
“The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have the same
60 percent Filipino ownership and control requirement for pub­
lic utilities like PLDT. Any deviation from this requirement
necessitates an amendment to the Constitution as exemplified
by the Parity Amendment. This Court has no power to amend
the Constitution for its power and duty is only to faithfully ap­
ply and interpret the Constitution.”84

Miscellaneous

In addition to the above-discussed provisions, Arti­

cle II contains the following rules on miscellaneous sub­
jects, presumably incorporated in the fundamental law
only to accommodate their particular authors and grat­
ify their desire for expression and perpetuation of their
ideas, even if anonymously, at the expense of the quality
and nature of the Constitution:

“ Heirs of Wilson Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No.

176579, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 397.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 127

“Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.”
“Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
“Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, sci­
ence and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patri­
otism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development.”
“Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development.”
“Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the
welfare o f the nation.”
“Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of commu­
nication and information in nation-building.”
“Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to op­
portunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law.”
“Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integ­
rity in the public service and take positive and effective meas­
ures against graft and corruption.”
“Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure o f all its transactions involving public interest.”

Sections 15 (on the people’s right to health) and 16

{on their right to a balanced and healthful ecology) have,
as earlier noted, been acknowledged by the Supreme
Court as special provisions which “need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind.”85

85Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224

SCRA 792; see also MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 90.
128 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Section 28 has likewise been affirmed by the Su­

preme Court as a self-executing provision, noting that
“the policy of full public disclosure xxx complements the
right of access to information on matters of public con­
cern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand informa­
tion, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom
to give information even if nobody demands.” Indeed,
the policy of public disclosure under Section 28 is “in­
tended as a ‘splendid symmetry’ to the right to informa­
tion under the Bill of Rights.” In this connection, it is
significant that Section 21 of Article X II provides,
among others, that “information on foreign loans ob­
tained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made
available to the public ”m
Section 22, on the promotion of rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development, was among the subjects of The.
Province o f North Cotabato v. The Government o f the
Republic o f the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain .87 In said case, the Supreme Court, in annulling
the Agreement which would have established and
vested in the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity the status of
an “associated state” (or “at any rate, a status closely
approximating it”) by reason of, among others, the pro­
visions thereof conferring upon it the authority or “ca­
pacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries,” stressed that an “associative ar­
rangement does not uphold national unity. While there
may be a semblance of unity because of the associative

The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the

Republic uf llie Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402; see also Bantav Re­
public Act v. COMELEC G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1.
87Ibid.
 F u n d a m e n t a l P r in c ip l e s and S t a t e P o l ic ie s 129

ties between the BJE and the national government, the

act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status
which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive
to national unity.” The Court clarified that “indigenous
peoples situated within states do not have a general
right to independence or secession from those states
under international law, but they do have rights
amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination.”
It is to be noted that Section 12 of Article X V I of the
Constitution provides that Congress may create a consul­
tative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the
members of which shall come from such communities.
As previously noted, Section 23 appears to be an af­
firmation of the ever-growing importance of non­
governmental organizations in our democracy.
In A B S -C B N Broadcasting Corporation v. Phil.
Multi-Media Inc.,™ the Supreme Court remarked that
the “must-carry rule” imposed by the National Tele­
communications Commission and the legislative fran­
chises granted in favor of the parties in said case “are in
consonance with state policies enshrined in the Consti­
tution,” including Sections 17 {on the promotion o f sci­
ence and technology) and 24 {on the vital role o f commu­
nication in nation-building). It would therefore appear
that our Supreme Court has somehow found some use
for these provisions.
Section 17 speaks of promoting “total human lib­
eration and development,” whatever lliia may mean.

™G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 262.

130 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Finally, Sections 26 (on equal access to public ser­

vice and political dynasties) and 27 (on honesty and in­
tegrity in the public service and on measures against
graft and corruption) are to be read in relation to Article
XI, on Accountability of Public Officers, which provides,
as an opening declaration, that “public office is a public
trust” and that “public officers and employees must at oil
times be accountable to the people, serve them with ut­
most responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
 Chapter 6

SEPARATION OF POWERS

THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION of powers was

modified under the 1973 Constitution with the estab­
lishment of a semi-parliamentary government that
made the legislature subordinate in many respects to
the President, who was even vested with the ultimate
power of dissolving it. Under the new Constitution, the
traditional concept of the doctrine has been restored,
but with several significant modifications.
The three major departments of the government
have been maintained, and so have the three constitu­
tional commissions established earlier under the past
charters. Other independent bodies have been created.
By and large, the separation of the principal powers has
been preserved. The judiciary, regarded as the weakest
of the three branches, has been considerably strength­
ened with the conferment on it of additional and impor­
tant powers. In the case of the political departments,
one will observe a lessening of the powers of the execu­
tive and a corresponding increase in the authority of the
legislature, inspired presumably by our experiences
under the Marcos authoritarianism.
Worthy of special interest is the revival of the Com­
mission on Appointments as a check upon the appoint­
ing power in general and the creation of the Judicial
and Bar Council to ensure better selection of the m em ­
bers of the judiciary. The Electoral Tribunals have also
been restored (but with a modified membership) to act

131
 132 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

once again as “sole judge” of all contests relating to the

election, returns and qualifications of the members of
their respective Houses. This function was taken from
them (even as they were abolished) and transferred to
the Commission on Elections by the 1973 Constitution.
“The cardinal postulate explains that the three
branches must discharge their respective functions
within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitu­
tion. Under the principle of separation of powers, nei­
ther Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of
government.”1
It is significant that the Supreme Court has charac­
terized the resolution of by the Electoral Tribunals of
electoral contests as “essentially an exercise of judicial
power,” although “subject to judicial review — via a
petition for certiorari filed by the proper party — if
there is a showing that the decision was rendered with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.”2
The doctrine is observed in our country not only be­
cause it is regarded as a characteristic of republicanism
but also for the reason that the major powers of govern­
ment are actually distributed by the Constitution among
the several departments and the Constitutional Com­
missions. Additionally, Article VI, Section 13, provides
that no member of the Congress may hold any other
office or employment in the government during his term
without forfeiting his seat.

1 Philippine Coconut Producers federation, Inc. v. Republic,

G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 102.
JMacalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618,
November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783, and June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 239.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 133

Purposes

The doctrine of separation of powers is intended to

prevent a concentration of authority in one person or
group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error
or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republi­
can institutions. More specifically, according to Justice
Laurel, the doctrine is intended to secure action, to fore­
stall over-action, to prevent despotism and to obtain
efficiency.3
The principle of separation of powers ordains that
each of the three great branches of government has ex­
clusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.4
To achieve these purposes, the legislature is gener­
ally limited to the enactment o f laws and may not en­
force or apply them; the executive to the enforcement of
laws and may not enact or apply them; and the judiciary
to the application of laws and may not enact or enforce
them.5
Indeed, it has been ruled that “courts cannot limit
the application or coverage of a law, nor can it impose
conditions not provided therein.” “To do so,” according to
the Supreme Court, “constitutes judicial legislation.”6

J Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 67.

4 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936),
cited in Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves, G.R. No.
181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.
5 See Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208
SCRA 133.
h Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 173425, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA
566.
 134 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

However, the need for the above-mentioned objec­

tives does not call for the “doctrinaire application” of
this theory or its observance “with pedantic rigor,” in
the words of Justice Frankfurter.7 While it is desirable
that there be a certain degree of independence among
the several constitutional agencies, it is not in the public
interest for them to deal with each other at arms’ length
or with a hostile jealousy of their respective rights as
this might result in frustration of the common objectives
of the government. To cite Justice Laurel again, the
keynote of conduct of the various agencies of the gov­
ernment under the doctrine of separation of powers, as
properly understood, is not independence but interde­
pendence. 8 The letter of the Constitution wisely declared
a separation,” so observed President Franklin D. Roose­
velt, “but the impulse of common purpose declares a
union.”

Blending of Powers

There are instances under the Constitution when

powers are not confined exclusively within one depart­
ment but are in fact assigned to or shared by several
departments. As a result of this “blending of powers,” as
it is called, there is some difficulty in classifying some of
them as definitely legislative, executive or judicial. Jus­
tice Holmes put it vividly when he remarked that “the
great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish
and divide fields of black and white. Even the more spe­
cific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to another.”9 The

7Connally v. Scudder, 160 N.E. 655.

“ Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. PSC, supra.
9Springer v. P.I., 277 U.S. 189.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 135

powers of government m ay not at all times be contained

with mathematical precision in water-tight compart­
ments because of their ambiguous nature, e.g., the
power of appointment, which can rightfully be exercised
by each department over its own administrative person­
nel. But more importantly, it is often necessary for cer­
tain powers to be reposed in more than one department,
so that they may better collaborate with and, in the
process, check each other for the public good.

An illustration of such coordination is the enact­

ment of the general appropriations law, which begins
with the preparation by the President of the budget,
which becomes the basis of the bill adopted by the Con­
gress and subsequently submitted by it to the President,
who may then approve it.10 Another is the grant of am­
nesty by the President which requires the concurrence
of a majority of all the members of the Congress.11 To
take a third example, the Commission on Elections does
not alone deputize law-enforcement agencies and in­
strumentalities of the government for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections but does so with the consent of the President.12

Checks and Balances

What makes the doctrine of separation of powers

especially workable is the corollary system of checks
and balances, by means of which one department is
allowed to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives
or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the
other departments. The exercise of this authority is not

10Constitution, Art. VI, Secs. 25, 27.

" Ibid., Art. VI, Sec. 19.
KId., Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(4).
 136 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is the Constitution

itself that provides for this system of counteraction. The
theory is that the ends of the government are better
achieved through the exercise by its agencies of only the
powers assigned to them, subject to reversal in proper
cases by those constitutionally authorized.
There are abundant illustrations of this system in
the Constitution. Thus, the lawmaking power of the
Congress is checked by the President through his veto
power, which in turn may be overridden by the legisla­
ture.13 The Congress m ay refuse to give its concurrence
to an amnesty proclaimed by the President14 and the
Senate to a treaty he has concluded.15 The President
may nullify a conviction in a criminal case by pardoning
the offender.16 The Congress may limit the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and that of inferior courts17 and
even abolish the latter tribunals.18 As for the judiciary in
general, it has the power to declare invalid an act done
by the Congress, the President and his subordinates, or
the Constitutional Commissions.19

The Role of the Judiciary

While it is the judiciary which sees to it that the

constitutional distribution of powers among the several
departments of the government is respected and ob­
served, this does not mean that it is superior to the

13Id.., Art. VI, Sec. 27.

MId., Art. VII, Sec. 19.
,nId., Art. VII, Sec. 21.
16Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 19.
17Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
18 Id., Art. VIII, Secs. 1, 2; Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, L-7918,
prom. Jan. 18, 1955, 51 O.G. 147; De la Liana v. Alba, infra.
Id., Art, VIII, Sec. 4.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 137

other departments. The correct view is that when the

Supreme Court mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body,
what it is upholding is mot its own supremacy but the
supremacy of the Constitution.20

In the determination of whether a given power has

been validly exercised by a particular department, the
test applied is not necessarily or always the nature of
the power. The first criterion— and the safest— is
whether or not the power in question, regardless of its
nature, has been constitutionally conferred upon the
department claiming its exercise. The grant being as­
certained, the exercise o f the power is sustained.

The conferment of power is usually done expressly,

as in the vesture of the legislative power in the Con­
gress,21 the executive power in the President22 and the
judicial power in the Supreme Court and such lower
courts as may be established by law.23 As may be readily
noticed, there is no problem as to the validity of the
discharge of these powers because they naturally per­
tain to the agencies in which they have been reposed.

But this is not always the case. To illustrate, the

power to impeach, which is essentially executive, and
the power to try and decide impeachment cases, which
is essentially judicial, are expressly lodged in the Con­
gress,24 as so too is the power of investigation,25 which is
more executive or judicial than legislative. These powers

20Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.

2' Constitution, Art. VI, See. 1.
22Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 1.
2;‘ Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
21Id., Art. XI, Sec. 3.
25Id., Art. VI, Sec. 21.
138 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

are nevertheless validly exercised by the legislature

because the Constitution so provides. By the same token,
the Supreme Court can exercise the executive power of
removal over judges of inferior courts26 although they
have been appointed by the President.27 The President
may be authorized by the Congress to exercise tariff
powers28 and emergency powers,29 both of them legislative
in nature, because the Constitution permits it.
Even in the absence of an express conferment, the
exercise of a given power m ay be justified under the
doctrine of implication, which is based on the theory
that the grant of an express power carries with it all
other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,30 for example, cer­
tain rules of procedure promulgated by the respondent
were challenged on the ground that they had not been
expressly authorized by the 1935 Constitution. The
Supreme Court nevertheless upheld them, declaring
that they were necessary to the proper exercise of the
express power granted to the body to hear and decide
election contests involving members of the legislature.
Another illustration is the power to punish con­
tempt which, although essentially judicial, can unques­
tionably be exercised by the legislature,31 more so now
under the present Constitution, which vests upon it the
express power to conduct investigations in aid of legis­
lation.32 Such investigations, needless to say, could

Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 11.

27Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 9.
28Id., Art. VI, Sec. 28(2).
23Id., Art. VI, Sec. 23(2).
Supra.
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29.
:KConstitution, Art. VI, Sec. 21.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 139

hardly be effective if the Congress did not possess the

implied authority to punish witnesses for contumacy.
Mention must also be made of those powers which
although not specifically granted by the Constitution
either expressly or by implication may be justified as
inherent or incidental. Thus, the President, as head of
the government, may independently of constitutional or
statutory authority deport undesirable aliens as an “act
of State,”33 even as the Congress can punish any person
who impugns its integrity without proof.34 The courts,
for their part, may claim the contempt power inherent
in the judiciary.35

Justiciable and Political Questions

Assuming then that the proper repository of the

power in question has been ascertained on the basis of a
valid constitutional grant, is the power of the judiciary to
review official action terminated? Not necessarily, because
it could be that the act in question had not been per­
formed in accordance with the rules laid down by the Con­
stitution.
If, say, there is no compliance with a voting re­
quirement prescribed by the fundamental law, as where
a statute granting a tax exemption is enacted by less
than a majority of all the members of the Congress,36 or
when an appointee of the President does not possess the
prescribed qualifications, the courts will have jurisdic­
tion to intervene. The questions involved here are justi­
ciable. The judiciary in such cases would not be en-

1:1In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41.

34 In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595.
35Ibid.
:mConstitution, Art. VI, Sec. 28(1).
140 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

croaching upon the exclusive functions of another de­

partment as it is the particular role of the courts to en­
sure proper observance of the norms of action prescribed
by the Constitution.

According to Justice Makasiar in Casibang v.

Aquino: 37

“A purely justiciable question implies a given right, le­

gally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative
of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for
said breach of right.”

But where the matter falls under the discretion of

another department or especially the people themselves,
the decision reached is in the category of a political
question and consequently m ay not be the subject of
judicial review. Accordingly, considerations affecting the
wisdom, efficacy or practicability of a law should come
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress. So too
is the interpretation of certain provisions of the Consti­
tution, such as the phrase “other high crimes” as a
ground for impeachment. Even if the Supreme Court
itself might have a contrary persuasion, it would not be
competent for it to insist on its own thinking and substi­
tute it for the decision of the legislature.
It would appear that this would not be the case
though with respect to the definition of “betrayal of
public trust,” which is among the grounds for impeach­
ment, when invoked by the President in removing a
non-impeachable officer, a Deputy Ombudsman, pursu­
ant to a statute conferring upon him such power, and
listing said ground as among the reasons for his exer­

:,? 92 SCRA 642 (1979).

 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 141

cise of the same. In Gonzales v. Office o f the President,38

the Supreme Court, in nullifying the removal by the
President of a Deputy Ombudsman, relied on the delib­
erations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
constitutional grounds for impeachment in defining
“betrayal of public trust” and explained —

“The Constitutional Commission eventually found it rea­

sonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal o f public trust to re­
fer to ‘acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute
gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of
power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross
exercise o f discretionary powers.’ In other words, acts that
should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant re­
moval from office may be less than criminal but must be at­
tended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the
other grounds for impeachment.
“A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not
impeachable officers. However, by providing for their removal
from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment,
the legislature could not have intended to redefine constitu­
tional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, trea­
son, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as
betrayal of public trust, and apply them less stringently.
Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of im­
peachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official
wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain
true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds
for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the
removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness o f their nature nor
the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not
suddenly ‘overreach’ to cover acts that are not vicious or ma­
levolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeach­
ment.”

3S G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614.

142 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

A t any rate, the distinction between justiciable and

political questions can perhaps best be illustrated by
the suspension or expulsion of a member of the Con­
gress, which must be based upon the ground of “disor­
derly behavior” and concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all his colleagues.39 The determination of what consti­
tutes disorderly behavior is a political question and
therefore not cognizable by the courts; but the discipli­
nary measure may nonetheless be disauthorized if it
was supported by less than the required vote. The latter
issue, dealing as it does with a procedural rule the in­
terpretation of which calls only for a mathematical com­
putation, is a justiciable question.

The case of Tanada v. Cuenco40 involved the provi­

sion in the 1935 Constitution that the Electoral Tribu­
nal should be composed, together with three members of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Jus­
tice, o f six other members to be chosen by each House,
“three upon the nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three upon the nomination
of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein.” Inasmuch as the Senate included at the time
only one minority member, who nominated only himself,
the majority party named two other members from its
ranks to complete the nine-man composition. The lone
oppositionist questioned this procedure, but the respon­
dents moved to dismiss on the ground that the question
raised was political. The Court assumed jurisdiction,
however, and, in holding that the question was justicia­
ble, made the following illuminating remarks:

19Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 16(3).

100 Phil. 1101.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 143

“The term ‘political question’ connotes what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
‘those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be de­
cided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.’ It is con­
cerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure.”

In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,41 it was

held:

“Political questions are neatly associated with the wis­

dom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of
the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the con­
tested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of
the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Con­
stitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act
or to assume the power o f a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to pro­
pose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.
Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President
would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides
how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter o f that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or
the authority assumed was valid or not.
“We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in
pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of
the President’s authority to propose amendments and the regu­
larity of the procedure adopted for submission o f proposals to
the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear
Descartes fallacy or vicious circle. Is it not that the people
themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority
and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that consti­
tutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of
course—who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the

41 73 SCRA 333 (1976).

144 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that

power, a power which includes the competence to determine
whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a
posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the
people.”

The above views were affirmed in Daza v. Sing­

so n g involving the composition of the Commission on
Appointments.
An elaboration on the distinction between the justi-
ficiable and political questions was further made in
Tanada v. Angara,43 where the Supreme Court declared:

“We should stress that in deciding to take jurisdiction

over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the
President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the
WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by the said international body. Neither will it rule on
the propriety of the government’s economic policy o f reduc­
ing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions
and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
constitutional duty ‘to determine whether or not there had
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction’ on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.”

Application of the Doctrine

In accordance with the foregoing principles, it was

held that a writ of mandamus could not be issued
against the chief executive to compel him, in Abueva v.
Wood,44 to produce certain vouchers relative to the ex­
penses of an official mission, and, in Severino v. Gover-

42 180 SCRA 496 (1989).

4:1G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18.
44 45 Phil. 612.
 S e p a r a t io n of Pow ers 145

nor-General,45 to call a special election though this duty

was imposed on him by law in mandatory language. The
Court held in both cases that the powers involved were
discretionary in the executive and therefore not subject
to judicial compulsion. A similar conclusion was reached
in In re Dick,46 where the Supreme Court interpreted
also as discretionary the power of the Governor-General
to ascertain the necessity for the expulsion of an alien
for the protection of the national interest.
Indeed, in the earlier case of In Re Patterson,47 the
Court announced that the Governor-General could act
“without interference on the part of the judicial power”
according to the doctrine of separation of powers, stating
that “the greater part of modern laws, notwithstanding
these objections, have sanctioned the maxim that the
expulsion of foreigners is a political measure and that
the executive power m ay expel without appeal any per­
son whose presence tends to disturb the public peace.
The privilege of the foreigners to enter the territory of a
State for the purpose of traveling through or remaining
therein being recognized on principle, we must also rec­
ognize the right of the State under exceptional circum­
stances to limit this privilege upon the ground of public
policy, and in all cases preserve the obligations o f the
foreigner to subject him self to the provisions of the local
law concerning his entry into and his presence in the
territory of each State.”

“Under these circumstances, the Government exercising

in a sovereign and efficacious manner this attribute of execu­
tive power, has authorized an administrative officer to prevent
the entrance into the country o f persons from abroad whom he

“ 16 Phil. 366.
48Supra.
171 Phil. 93.
146 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

has reasonable grounds to believe guilty of having aided, abet­

ted, or instigated insurrection, or whom he suspects of coming
to the Philippines with that purpose. The power conferred in
these terms upon this executive officer is discretional. Hence,
his act is presumed to be based upon reasonable grounds for
believing certain persons guilty of the acts or of an intention to
commit the acts defined by the law.”

This ruling was affirmed In Forbes v. Chuoco

Tiaco,48 where the Court likewise dismissed an action
for damages against the Governor General for deporting
certain undesirable aliens. Thus —

“No one can be held legally responsible in damages for

doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law,
to do. Therefore, if the Governor General had authority, under
the law to deport or expel the defendants, and the circum­
stances justifying the deportation and the method o f carrying it
out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages
for the exercise o f his power. Moreover, if the courts are with­
out authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of
controlling or interfering with the exercise o f the political pow­
ers vested in the chief executive authority of the government,
then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the
purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exer­
cise of this authority.”

In the famous case of Aytona v. Castillo, 49 where

the conflict between the outgoing and incoming Presi­
dents of the Philippines involved the exercise of the
appointing power, the Supreme Court refused to as­
sume jurisdiction, again upon the ground of separation
of powers. And in the Ratification Cases,50 several ju s­
tices of the Supreme Court expressed the view that they
were concluded by the ascertainment made by the

4816 Phil. 534.

194 SCRA 1 (1962).
snJavellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33 (1973).
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 147

President of the Philippines, in the exercise of his politi­

cal prerogatives, that the people had acquiesced in or
accepted the 1973 Constitution. In De la Liana v. Com ­
mission on Elections,51 the Supreme Court refused to
restrain the holding of a referendum, ruling that the
calling thereof lay in the exclusive discretion of Presi­
dent Marcos.
In Custodio v. Senate President,52 where a taxpayer
challenged the validity of a provision in the general
appropriations law that compensated the members of
the Congress for services supposedly rendered by them
during the Japanese Occupation, it was held that the
question submitted was political, affecting as it did the
wisdom or propriety of the law. Hence, the only remedy
available to the petitioner was a resort not to the courts
but to the bar of public opinion. When the Senate in
Alejandrino v. Quezon53 and the House of Representa­
tives in Osmena v. Pendatun54 suspended a member for
disorderly behavior, the Supreme Court refused to inter­
fere even if in the former case it declared that the sus­
pension was illegal “because the seat remains filled but
the occupant is silenced.”
In Vera v. Avelino ,65 three senators-elect who had
been prevented from taking their oaths of office by reso­
lution of the Senate went to the Supreme Court and
alleged that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction
over contests relating to their election, returns and
qualifications. Again, the Supreme Court refused to
intervene, holding that the case was not a “contest,” and

r” 82 SCRA 30 (1978).
1,242 O.G. 1243.
“ 46 Phil. 83.
54 109 Phil. 863.
55 77 Phil. 192.
148 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to deter­

mine who shall be admitted to its membership. In A r ­
nault v. Balagtas,56 the question raised by the petitioner
was the legality of his detention by order of the Senate
for his refusal to answer questions put to him by one of
its investigating committees. The Supreme Court re­
fused to order his release and deferred to the discretion­
ary authority of the legislative body to punish contuma­
cious witnesses for contempt.

It has further been ruled that the “wisdom of Con­

gress in allowing an SDP [Stock Distribution Plan]
through a corporation as an alternative mode of imple­
menting agrarian reform is not for judicial determina­
tion.”57

In Philippine Coconut Producers Federation v. R e­

public?8 the Supreme Court explained that “the decision
on whether to proceed with the conversion or defer ac­
tion thereon until final adjudication of the issue of own­
ership over the sequestered shares properly pertains to
the executive branch, represented by the PCGG.” The
Court added that “corollary to the principle of separa­
tion of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
that the courts will defer to the decisions of the adminis­
trative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise
and experience in the matters assigned to them.”

In the case of Philippine Bar Association v. Com ­

mission on Elections™ the calling of the “snap” presiden­
tial elections on February 7, 1986, by the Batasang

97 Phil. 358.
'7Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011, 653 SCRA 154.
58G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 102.
53 G.R. No. 72915, Dec. 20, 1985, 140 SCRA 453.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 149

Pambansa was held by the Supreme Court to be a poli­

tical question resoluble only by the sovereign electorate.
In De Castro v. Committee on Justice,60 the Su­
preme Court was asked'-to reverse a decision of the res­
pondent dismissing impeachment charges against
President Marcos after deliberating thereon for only six
hours and to compel the said committee to give due
course to such charges. The petition for certiorari and
mandamus was dismissed, on the ground inter alia that
the issues raised were political in nature and could be
resolved only by the legislators themselves in the exer­
cise of their discretion. The Court ruled that the dis­
missal of the charges was “within the ambit of the pow­
ers vested exclusively in the Batasan by express provi­
sion of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and it is
not within the competence of this Court to inquire
whether in the exercise of said powers the Batasan
acted wisely.” Later, when in Romulo v. Yniguez,61 the
petitioners asked for the recall of the impeachment reso­
lution so it could be considered directly by the Batasang
Pambansa, the Court, citing its ruling in the antecedent
case, dismissed the petition on the ground of separation
of powers, in addition to other reasons to be discussed in
detail in Chapter 17.
It must be noted that the Constitution now re­
quires the proper Committee of the House of Represen­
tatives to submit its report on an impeachment com­
plaint, together with its corresponding resolution, to the
House within sixty days from its referral to the same,
and said resolution shall be calendared for considera­
tion by the House within ten session days from its re­

“ G.R. No. 71688, Sept. 10, 1985.

61Infra.
150 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

ceipt thereof.62 A vote of at least one-third of all the

Members of the House shall be necessary either to af­
firm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Im­
peachment, or override its contrary resolution.63
O f particular interest is Avelino v. Cuenco,64 where
the incumbent Senate President was deposed and re­
placed; whereupon he questioned his successor’s title,
arguing that the latter had been elected without a quo­
rum. The petition was at first dismissed on the ground
that the selection of the presiding officer of the Senate
was an internal matter that could not be reviewed by
the judiciary. On the motion for reconsideration, how­
ever, the Supreme Court decided that it could assume
jurisdiction “in the light of subsequent events which
justified its intervention” and, among other reasons,
because there was a quorum.
A more telling illustration of the vacillation of the
Supreme Court on the nature of the political question is
found in its erratic rulings on the nature of the Presi­
dent’s power to determine the existence of the grounds
specified in the Constitution for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. First, in the early
cases of Barcelon v. Baker*5 and Montenegro v.
Castaneda66 it was held that this power was discretion­
ary and therefore not justiciable, on the justification of
the superior competence of the commander-in-chief to
assess the peace and order condition of the country.
Subsequently, this doctrine was reversed in Lansang v.

02 Article XI, Section 3 (2).

“ Ibid., Section 3 (3).
84 83 Phil. 17.
m5 Phil. 87.
“ 91 Phil. 882.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 151

Garcia,61 where the Supreme Court asserted the right to

inquire into the factual basis of the suspension and to
annul the same if it appeared from its own investiga­
tions that the grounds jnvoked by the President were
not actually existing. In a complete about-face, however,
this decision was itself later abandoned in Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile,m where the original rule announced in
the Barcelon and Montenegro Cases was reinstated to
make the questioned power once again discretionary in
the President. It is no longer so, however, under Article
VII, Section 18, of the present Constitution, to be dis­
cussed in Chapter 11.
It was also held in Noblejas u. Teehankee69 that the
administrative investigation of an executive official
should be undertaken by the President of the Philip­
pines and not the Supreme Court even if it was provided
by law that such official had the rank and privileges of a
judge of the court of first instance. Neither may the
Supreme Court be compelled by law to act as a mere
board of arbitrators, an essentially executive body, par­
ticularly because whatever decisions it might make in
the discharge of its administrative functions would ul­
timately have to be reviewed by the same members in
the exercise o f their judicial powers.70 Section 12 of Arti­
cle VIII of the Constitution provides that the “Members
of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.”
Conversely, powers that belong to the judiciary
may not be assumed by other departments, as when, in

6742 SCRA 448 (1971).

68121 SCRA 472 (1983).
69 23 SCRA 405 (1968).
70 Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans. Co., 57 Phil. 825.
152 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

the case of Endencia v. David,11 the legislature provided

by law that the imposition of income taxes upon the
salaries of judges should not be interpreted as an un­
constitutional diminution of their salary. The Supreme
Court ruled that the interpretation of the provision in
question was the exclusive function of the judiciary.

Political Questions Under the New Constitution

It is noteworthy that under the new Constitution

the scope of the political question appears to have been
considerably constricted because of the new definition of
judicial power, which now “includes the duty... to deter­
mine whether or not there has been a- grave abuse of dis­
cretion amounting to lack or excess o f jurisdiction on the
part o f any branch or instrumentality o f the Govern­
ment.”12 The language suggests quite clearly that this
duty (and power) is available even against the executive
and legislative departments, including the President
and the Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary
powers.
Accordingly, in Estrada v. Desierto,™ the Supreme
Court stressed —

“To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed

the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle ac­
tual controversies involving rights which are legally demand-
able and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-

71 G.R. No. L-6455, August 31, 1953.

71 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
7:1 G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 406 Phil. 1 (2001), 356
SCRA 108, cited in Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R. No.
186616, November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 167.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 153

mentality o f government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused

on the ‘thou shalt not's’ of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can
do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumen­
tality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry
with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket.”

In Article VII, Section 18, it is expressly provided

that “the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or the extension thereof.” There is no doubt of the au­
thority of the Supreme Court in this specific case. The
question is, in the absence of similar specific authoriza­
tion in other cases, to what extent may the exercise of
discretion by the political departments be reviewed and
if warranted reversed by the courts?
If, say, a notorious criminal is extended an absolute
pardon, or the Congress of the Philippines enacts a law
which is obviously impractical or unwise, m ay these acts
of the political departments be annulled by the Supreme
Court on the ground that they were committed with
grave abuse of discretion? For example, may the Su­
preme Court now reverse the doctrine in the case of Riel
v. Wright™ where it inhibited itself from ruling on the
claimed excessive number of employees hired by the
Philippine Legislature after the adjournment of the
session, holding that this was an internal matter under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislators?

49 Phil. 194.
 154 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

In the session of the Constitutional Commission on

July 19, 1986, it was agreed that the above provision
would not do away entirely with the political question
doctrine. It is not clear, however, what discretionary
acts are subject to judicial review, outside of those spe­
cifically mentioned in the Constitution, and what acts
remain prerogatives of the political departments that,
even with the said enlargement of judicial power, cannot
be examined by the courts of justice.
In any event, it has been ruled that —

“Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts

have no right to directly decide matters over which full discre­
tionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch
of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for
that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the
Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will
not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion o f a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exer­
cised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason o f passion
or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals,
Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, the Court ruled that
the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he re­
quired ‘hard facts and solid evidence’ in order to hold the de­
fendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement
should have been left to the court after the conduct o f a trial.”75

In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of

Public Officers,™ the Supreme Court found the Senate to
have gravely abused its discretion in citing the peti­
tioner for contempt for his refusal to answer questions

7n Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tobias, G.R. No.

177780, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 165.
76 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 155

propounded to him in the course of a legislative inquiry.

The Court declared that “there being a legitimate claim
of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt or­
der suffers from constitutional infirmity.”
On the other hand, in Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty v. Secretary o f Budget and Management,77
the Supreme Court rejected a challenge against the
constitutionality of the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act 9206 or
the General Appropriations Act for 2004. Finding that
the proper procedure appeared to have been followed in
the promulgation of said law and noting that the peti­
tioners had not adequately established that said law
constituted an “encroachment on executive power” by
enabling legislators to propose and choose the projects
for which said fund is to be used, the Court held —

“To justify the nullification of the law or its implementa­

tion, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful,
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because ‘to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legisla­
ture that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.’
This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by
the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by
the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the dis­
charge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act
must be struck down.
“The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP
would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality o f the
PDAF’s enforcement based on the absence of express provision
in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress

77 G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373; see also
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113888, August 19, 1994, 235
SCRA 506.
156 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

and the latter’s encroachment on executive power in proposing

and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. Regrettably,
these allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was
presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of
funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them
according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of
the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor o f the Members
of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the
Court to probe into the truth of their claims. Devoid of any per­
tinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the
form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupu­
lous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the peti­
tioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal
and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like this, the
Court’s hands are tied in deference to the presumption o f con­
stitutionality lest the Court commits unpardonable judicial leg­
islation. The Court is not endowed with the power of clairvoy­
ance to divine from scanty allegations in pleadings where jus­
tice and truth lie. Again, newspaper or electronic reports show­
ing the appalling effects o f PDAF cannot be appreciated by the
Court, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or
impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be es­
tablished in accordance with the rules of evidence.
“Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the
principle of separation of powers was committed, much less
tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is
constrained to hold that a lawful and regular government
budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enact­
ment and all throughout the implementation! of the GAA of
2004.”

This ruling has been abandoned by the Supreme

Court in Belgica v. Executive Secretary, where it nulli­
fied a similar PDAF Article in the 2013 General Appro­
priations Act, stating, among other reasons, that “the
2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or en­
forcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers prin­
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 157

ciple and thus unconstitutional.” The Court also de­

clared that said PDAF Article, “insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individu­
ally exercise the power of appropriation which — as
settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress.”78
Among the issues raised by the private respondent
in Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary79 was
the assumption by the Supreme Court of jurisdiction
over the petitions questioning the constitutionality of
certain Executive Orders issued by the President con­
sidering that there were no “ongoing proceedings” before
any board or tribunal which would have warranted its
exercise its power of judicial review under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The Court upheld its jurisdiction, ex­
plaining as follows —

“UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions

for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that
there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or
before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions. UCPB insists that the Court exercises
appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of constitutionality
or validity of laws and presidential orders.
“But, as the Court previously held, where there are seri­
ous allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it be­
comes not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into
such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy
of the Constitution. Moreover, where the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court
has the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.”

78 Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November

19, 2013.
™G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49.
158 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

Incidentally, in Galicto v. Aquino ,80 the Court de­

clared that the issuance of an Executive Order is “not a
judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act.” Accordingly,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may not be availed of by
any party to question its constitutionality. The proper
recourse, according to the Court, would be a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,
which should be filed with the Regional Trial Court.

It is significant that in Atong' Paglaum, Inc. v.

Commission on Elections,81 the Supreme Court, in the
course of its review of a resolution of the Commission on
Elections providing for the disqualification of certain
parties, made the following similar pronouncement —

“This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution,

apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in
socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what
the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include
the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present peti­
tions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualify­
ing petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qual­
ify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elec­
tions under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.”

In Re: COA Opinion on the Computation o f the A p ­

praised Value o f the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief IAssociate Justices o f the Supreme Court, the Su­
preme Court defended or “confirmed” its authority to
determine or fix the appraised value of the properties
purchased by the retired members of said Court, as
against the findings of the Commission on Audit on the

80 G.R. No. 103078, February 28, 2012, 067 SCRA 150, citing
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, 465 Phil.
529 (2004).
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 477.
 S e p a r a t io n of P ow ers 159

same, on the strength of the principle of separation of

powers, stressing its judicial independence and fiscal
autonomy, and citing its “unique circumstances,” declar­
ing that the “judicial branch, as a whole, should work in
the discharge of its constitutional functions free of re­
straints and influence from the other branches, save
only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.”82

"2A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1.

 Chapter 7

DELEGATION OF POWERS

COR O LLAR Y TO THE DOCTRINE of separation of

powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. The
rule is potestas delegata non delegari potest — what has
been delegated cannot be delegated. It is based upon the
ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the dele­
gate through the instrumentality of his own judgment
and not through the intervening mind of another.1 A
further delegation of such power, unless permitted by
the sovereign power, would constitute a negation of this
duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate
mandated to discharge it directly.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is appli­
cable to all the three major powers of the government
but is especially important in the case of the legislative
power because of the many instances when its delega­
tion is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive
or judicial powers are exercised outside the departments
to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legisla­
tive power, however, such instances, have become more
and more frequent, if not necessary. This has led to the

1 United States vs. Barrias, No. 4349, September 24, 1908, 11

Phil. 327, 330, cited in Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos.
168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005, 469
SCRA 1, 115-116 and Bureau of Customs Employees Association v.
Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.

160
 D e l e g a t io n of P o w er s 161

observation that the delegation of legislative power has

become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task
of government and the "growing inability of the legisla­
ture to cope directly with the many problems demanding
its attention. The growth of society has ramified its ac­
tivities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has be­
come necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence, let alone the interest and the
time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not
to say specific, solutions.
One such problem, to take an example, is the regu­
lation of common carriers. This task requires the deter­
mination of such intricate matters as the routes to be
serviced by such carriers, the number of them to be al­
lowed in each route, the conveniences they should offer
the passengers, the fare they may charge, the type of
vehicles they should use, and other myriad details that
the legislature may not have the time, expertise and
interest to prescribe.
Given these shortcomings, the Congress may then
create an administrative body like the Land Transpor­
tation Franchising and Regulatory Board and empower
it to promulgate the needed rules and regulations, sub­
ject only to certain statutory limitations or broad poli­
cies pre-determined by the legislature itself.
Such a device as applied to a hundred other similar
cases can relieve the Congress of many problems that
are better left to be solved by more capable entities and
at the same time enable it to tackle the more serious
162 P h il ip p in e P o l it ic a l L a w

difficulties of the country requiring its direct and imme­

diate attention.

Permissible Delegation

Delegation of legislative powers is permitted in the

following cases:
(1) Delegation of tariff,-powers to the President.
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the Presi­
dent.
(3) Delegation to the people at large.
(4) Delegation to local governments.
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

(1) Tariff Powers

“Sec. 28(2). The Congress may by law authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, im­
port and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts, within the framework of the national devel­
opment program of the Government.”2

The President is granted stand-by or flexible tariff

powers in the Tariff and Customs Code conformably to
the above provision. The reason for this delegation is the
necessity, not to say expediency, of giving the chief ex­
ecutive the authority to act immediately on certain mat­
ters affecting the national economy lest delay result in
hardship to the people. It is recognized that the legisla­
tive process is much too cumbersome for the speedy
solution of some economic problems, especially those
relating to foreign trade.

' Constitution, Art. VI.

 Delegation of P owers 1 63

In A K B A Y A N u. Aquino,3 the Supreme Court clari­

fied that the subject of this constitutional provision “is
not the power to negotiate treaties and international
agreements, but the powder to fix tariff rates, import and
export quotas, and other taxes,” and, accordingly, should
not be considered as a source of the power of the Presi­
dent to negotiate international trade agreements.

(2) Emergency Powers

“Sec. 23(2). In times of war or other national emer­

gency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may pre­
scribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolu­
tion of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon its next ad­
journment.”4

In times of war or other national emergency, it is

not likely that a quorum can be convened in the Con­
gress to enable it to do business. Assuming such quo­
rum, there is still the divisiveness and delay inherent in
the lawmaking process that may hamper effective solu­
tion of the problems caused by the emergency. Such
problems, needless to say, must be solved within the
shortest possible time to prevent them from aggravating
the difficulties of the nation.
To this end, the Congress may authorize the Presi­
dent to exercise emergency powers. This authority may
then be discharged by him with more dispatch and deci­
siveness than can be expected from the Congress itself
dealing with the crisis.

•
’ G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 468.
4 Constitution, Article VI.
164 Philippine Political Law

W hen emergency powers are delegated to the Presi­

dent, he becomes in effect a constitutional dictator. But
in strict legal theory, there is no total abdication of leg­
islative authority in his favor. The conferment itself is
supposed to be subject to certain restrictions and re­
quirements intended to make him only an agent rather
than a replacement of the legislature.
The conditions for the vesture of emergency powers
in the President are the following:
(1) There must be war or other national emer­
gency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restric­

tions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by the Congress.
There cannot be any delegation of emergency pow­
ers in the absence of an emergency. Furthermore, the
emergency powers are self-liquidating unless sooner
withdrawn, in the sense that they will automatically
cease upon the end of the emergency that justified their
delegation. Thus, C.A. No. 671, which conferred emer­
gency powers on the President following the outbreak of
the Pacific W ar in 1941, authorized their exercise only
“during the existence of the emergency.”
“Other national emergency” may include rebellion,
economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood,
or other similar catastrophe of nation-wide proportions
or effect.
Conferment of emergency powers on the President
is not mandatory on the Congress. In the face of the
 Delegation of Powers 165

worst crisis, the Congress may choose to hold on to its

legislative powers and validly refuse to delegate it; or,
should it decide to do so, limit its duration and termi­
nate it even before the end of the emergency. The emer­
gency does not automatically confer emergency powers
on the President. According to Chief Justice Paras,
“emergency itself cannot and should not create power.”5
By the same token, the mere continuance of the emer­
gency does not necessarily continue the President’s
emergency powers if they have been granted to him for
a shorter period.
In every case, to prevent the delegation from being
a total surrender of legislative authority, it must be
subject to the restrictions to be prescribed by the Con­
gress. The specific requirement of the Constitution is
that the President may be authorized to exercise powers
“necessary and proper” only for the purpose of carrying
out a national policy declared not by him but by the
Congress. Any act of the President that is not in keeping
with this national policy can be challenged as beyond
the scope of his delegated authority.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases,6 the petition­
ers questioned the exercise by President Quirino of
emergency powers previously vested in President Que­
zon and successively exercised by Presidents Osmena
and Roxas. At stake was the validity of certain executive
orders promulgated by President Quirino providing
specifically for the appropriation of public funds in the
operation of the national government and the conduct of
the 1949 elections, the control of exports, and the regu­
lation of the rentals of residential lots and buildings. In

5 Second Emergency Powers Cases, Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil.

603.
6Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.
1 6 6 Philippine Political Law

declaring such executive orders invalid, the Supreme

Court, through Justice Tuason, declared inter alia:

“Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in terms fix the

duration o f its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be
sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the pur­
pose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The
consequences of the various constructions offered will also be
resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule
by its results.
“Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law
passed by virtue thereof should be for a ‘limited period.’ ‘Lim­
ited’ has been defined to mean ‘restricted in duration, extent or
scope.’ (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black’s Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120). The words ‘limited period’ as used in
the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restric­
tive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation
of emergency powers, ‘must be temporary or it cannot be said
to be an emergency.’ (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of
Chicago v. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A.L.R., 937, 938.)
“It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671
was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory
would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is con­
trary to the principle that the Legislature is deemed to have
full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The as­
sertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would
not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and
different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the
period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out,
would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; ‘that
which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may be­
come permanent law.’ (Peck v. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Con­
gress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the re­
peal might not meet with the approval o f the President, and
the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Further­
more, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress
might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be
able to rocall them OKcept by a two-thirds vote. In other woida,
it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to
be, the law.
 Delegation of Powers 167

“It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Com­

monwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1948, and that Executive
Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without author­
ity of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress in­
stead o f the first special session which preceded it as the point
of expiration of the Act, we think we are giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special
session, the Congress may ‘consider general legislation or only
such subjects as he (President) may designate.’ (Section 9, A r­
ticle VI of the Constitution) In a regular session, the power of
the Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the
limitations imposed by the organic law.”

Despite this decision, President Quirino continued

exercising emergency powers, promulgating two execu­
tive orders appropriating public funds for public works
and the relief of typhoon victims. These acts were chal­
lenged in the second Emergency Powers Cases,1 where
the additional circumstance appeared that the Congress
had passed House Bill No. 727 repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts except that this measure had been vetoed
by the President. On this point, the Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Paras, made the following pro­
nouncement:

“As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitu­

tional provision, it has to be assumed that the National As­
sembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be con­
tended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such
step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers dele­
gated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitu­
tionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if
the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his
veto. This eventuality had in fact taken place when the Presi­
dent disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the
President or either the principal authority to determine the in­

7Supra.
1 6 8 Philippine P olitical Law

definite duration of the delegation of legislative powers-in pal­

pable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any
grant thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be
fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or
elastic will of either the Congress or the President.
“Although House Bill No. 727 had been vetoed by the
President and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may
at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Con­
gress formally declaring the termination o f the emergency
powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquies­
cence to produce effect would lead to the anomalous, if not ab­
surd, situation that, ‘while Congress might delegate its powers
by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except
by two-thirds vote. In other words, it would be easier for Con­
gress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not
right and is not, and ought not, to be the law.’ ”

Apparently taking its cue from this ruling, the 1973

Constitution provided that the delegation of emergency
powers to the President could be withdrawn by resolu­
tion. That part of the rule is understandable. But what
is rather mystifying is why it was also provided that
unless such emergency powers were sooner withdrawn
by resolution, they would continue until the next ad­
journment of the legislature. W hat is more perplexing is
why the Constitutional Commission perpetuated the
error in the new charter.
The next adjournment obviously refers to the ses­
sion called after the adjournment of the first session
when the emergency powers were delegated. Hence,
unless the delegation is sooner withdrawn, legislative
power can be exercised concurrently by the President
and the Congress during the second session and until its
adjournment. This would run counter to the ruling in
the first Emergency Powers Casco that tho emergency
powers were terminated automatically the moment the
Congress was able to reconvene in regular session and
 Delegation of P owers 169

resume its legislative powers. It would also permit

rather than prevent the anomalous situation envisioned
by Justice Tuason thus:

“More anomalous than the exercise of legislative func­

tions by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed
exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two leg­
islative bodies operating over the same field, legislating con­
currently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other’s
actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as
suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be
renewed after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
eliminated. Congress by a two-thirds vote could repeal execu­
tive orders promulgated by the President during congressional
recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same man­
ner, between sessions o f Congress, laws enacted by the latter.
This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances, it mate­
rialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best in­
terests of the country as they saw them, a former President
promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after
he bad vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on ex­
port control after Congress had refused to approve the meas­
ure.”

Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution pro­

vides —

“In times of national emergency, when the public interest

so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or di­
rect the operation of any privately owned public utility or busi­
ness affected with public interest.”

In David v. Arroyo,8 the Supreme Court declared

that, while the President alone can declare a state of
nalional emergency, he may not invoke this provision Lo
authorize him during the emergency “to temporarily

" G.R. No. 171396, M ay 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.

170 Philippine P olitical Law

take over or direct the operation of any privately owned

public utility or business affected with public interest
without authority from Congress.” It stressed that
“without legislation, he has no power to take over pri-
vately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article XII in the absence of an emergency
powers act passed by Congress.”

However, in the later case of Divinagracia v. Con­

solidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,9 the Court, citing
several laws, acknowledged that the President lias been
authorized “to exercise considerable infringements on
the right of the franchisees to operate their enterprises,”
citing as a “corollary constitutional justification” there­
for the provisions of Section 17, Article XII of the Con­
stitution. Among the laws referred to by the Court in
said case is Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7477, which
provides “(a) special right is hereby reserved to the
President of the Philippines, in times of rebellion, public
peril, calamity, emergency, disaster or disturbance of
peace and order, to temporarily take over and operate
the stations of the grantee, temporarily suspend the
operation of any stations in the interest of public safety,
security and public welfare, or authorize the temporary
use and operation thereof by any agency of the Govern­
ment, upon due compensation to the grantee, for the use
of said stations during the period when they shall be so
operated.”

0 G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213.

 Delegation of Powers 171

(3) Delegation to the People

According to Cooley, “the prevailing doctrine in the

courts appears to be, that, except in those cases where,
by the Constitution, the people have expressly reserved
to themselves a power of decision, the function of legis­
lation cannot be exercised by them, even to the extent of
accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for
their consideration. The people have voluntarily surren­
dered that power when they adopted the Constitution.
The government of the state is democratic, but it is a
representative democracy, and in passing general laws
the people act only through their representatives in the
legislature. Such reference of the law to the people at
large for acceptance or rejection is plain surrender of the
law-making power.”10
But in People v. Vera,11 our Supreme Court ob­
served that “courts have also sustained the delegation of
legislative power to the people at large,” although it was
quick to add that “some authorities maintain that this
may not be done.”
A referendum is traditionally defined as a method
of submitting an important legislative measure to a
direct vote of the whole people.12 It differs from the
plebiscite in that the questions submitted in the latter
are intended to work more permanent changes in the
political structure, like a proposal to amend the Consti­
tution. According to Strong, “the term plebiscite means
literally decree of the people. The plebiscite is a device
to obtain a direct popular vote on a matter of political

10Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. 238-242.

“ 65 Phil. 56.
12Black, 1146.
172 Philippine Political Law

importance, but chiefly in order to create some more or

less permanent political condition.”13
In our jurisdiction, these terms are defined in Re­
public Act 6735, which implements Section 32 of Article
VI, on initiatives on national and local legislation, and
Section 2 of Article XVII, on initiatives on the Constitu­
tion. Under said law, a referendum is “the power of the
electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an
election called for the purpose,”14 while a plebiscite is
“the electoral process by which an initiative on the Con­
stitution is approved or rejected by the people.”16

(4) Delegation to Local Governments

Another accepted exception to the rule against

delegation of legislative powers is delegation to local
governments. This traditional exception is based on the
recognition that local legislatures are more knowledge­
able than the national lawmaking body on matters of
purely local concern and are therefore in a better posi­
tion to enact the necessary and appropriate legislation
thereon.

“It is a cardinal principle of our system of govern­

ment that local affairs shall be managed by local au­
thorities, and general affairs by the central authority;
and hence, while the rule is also fundamental that the
power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of
municipalities exercising local self-government has
never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legisla­
tion is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative
power, but rather as the grant of the authority to pre-

,J Strong, Modern Political Constitutions, 276.

HSection 3 (c).
15Section 3 (e).
 Delegation of Powers 173

scribe local regulations, according to immemorial prac­

tice, subject, of course, to the interposition of the supe­
rior in cases of necessity.”16

Accordingly, the power of eminent domain and, un­

der the general welfare clause, the police power have
been expressly delegated by the legislature to the local
lawmaking bodies.17 The power of taxation is, however,
derived by them directly from the Constitution, subject
only to limitations that may be imposed by the Con­
gress.18

(5) Delegation to Administrative Bodies

The reasons given earlier for the delegation of legis­

lative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of special­
ized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
“power of subordinate legislation,” as it is called. Thus —

“In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena, G.R.

Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in
Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commis­
sion, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court
had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of pow­
ers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
of the principle of ‘subordinate legislation,’ not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modem gov­
ernments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern

16 People v. Vera, supra.

11 See Francia v. Municipality of Meycauayan, G.R. No. 170432,
March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 53; Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R.
No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92.
18 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 5; City of Iriga v. Camarines Sur
III Electric Cooperative, G.R. No. 192945, September 5, 2012.
 1 74 Philippine Political Law

life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regula­

tions, and the increased difficulty o f administering the laws,
the rigidity o f the theory of separation o f governmental powers
has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting, the delega­
tion of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger
amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials,
not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulga­
tion o f certain rules and regulations calculated to promote pub­
lic interest.”13

Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, “given the

volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it
is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that
will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the
minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked
to execute laws in their specialized fields — the author­
ity to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its policies.”20
W ith this power, administrative bodies may imple­
ment the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling
in” the details which the Congress m ay not have the op­
portunity or competence to provide. This is effected by
their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
Administrative agencies may also issue contingent
regulations pursuant to a delegation o f authority to de­
termine some fact or state of things upon which the en­
forcement of a law depends. In other words, they are al­
lowed to ascertain the existence of particular contingen­
cies and on the basis thereof enforce or suspend the

'9 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726.

40 Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17,
2007, 527 SCRA 696.
 Delegation of Powers 175

operation of a law. Such contingent regulations also

have the force and effect of law.
A case in point is Cruz v. Youngberg.21 The law in­
volved here prohibited the entry into the country of for­
eign cattle, which had been determined by the Philip­
pine Legislature as the cause of a rinderpest epidemic
that had killed many of the local livestock. The same
law, however, authorized the Governor-General to lift
the prohibition, with the consent of the presiding offi­
cers of the lawmaking body, if he should ascertain after
a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any
threat of contagion from imported cattle.
For an administrative regulation to be valid, its
promulgation must be authorized by the legislature, it
must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature, it must be promulgated in accordance with
the prescribed procedure, and it m ust be reasonable.22

Tests of Delegation

Assuming that the delegation of legislative power

comes under any of the permissible exceptions, there is
still the question of whether or not the delegation has
been validly made. To be valid, the delegation itself
must be circumscribed by legislative restrictions, not a
“roving commission” that will give the delegate unlim­
ited legislative authority. It must not be a delegation
“running riot” and “not canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.”23 Otherwise, the delegation is

21 56 Phil. 234.
22 See Executive Secretary v, South wing Heavy Industries, G.R.
No. 164171, March 1, 2006, 482 SCRA 673, and Cruz, Philippine
Administrative Law, 2007 edition, pages 50-81.
23 Schecter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 US 495, Concurring Opin­
ion of Mr. Justice Cardozo; Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 669.
 Philippine Political Law
176

in legal effect an abdication of legislative authority, a

total surrender by the legislature of its prerogatives in
favor of the delegate.
According to our Supreme Court, “the true distin c­
tion is between the delegation of power to make the law ,
which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance o f the
law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid ob­
jection can be made.”24
Thus the Supreme Court has declared that all
that is required for the valid exercise of this power of
subordinate legislation is that the regulation be ger­
mane to the objects and purposes of the law and that
the regulation be not in contradiction to, but m confor­
mity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These
requirements are denominated as the completeness test
1 A- 4-
and the sufficient standard test.

(1) The C om p leten ess Test

Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essen­

tial terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do
when it reaches him except enforce it. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, car­
ried out or implemented by the delegate.

25 G e ro c h l v ^ d e p a r tm e n t o f E n ergy, G .R. N o. 159796, July l 7;

20 ° 7 ’ - P e f a e f t 6 A u d itor G en era l, N o. L-23825 D ecem ber 24, 1965,

122 Phil. 965, 974 citin g C a la la n g v s. W illia m s N o. 47800 Decem ber
2 1940 70 Phil. 726- P a n g a s in a n Tran sp. Co. vs. Public Service
C om m ission , N o. 4 7 0 6 5 , J u n e 26, 1940, 70 Phil. 221; Craz vs.
Y ou n gb erg, N o. 34674, O cto b e r 2 6 , 1931, 56 Phil. 234, Alegre vs.
 Delegation of Powers 177

If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its en­
forcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will
then have been given the opportunity to step into the
shoes of the legislature and to exercise a discretion es­
sentially legislative in order to repair the omissions.
This is invalid delegation.
Thus, in United States v. Ang Tang H o,21 a law au­
thorized the Governor-General “whenever, for any
cause, conditions arise resulting in extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate,
with the consent of the Council of State, temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the pur­
poses of this Act.” Pursuant to this authorization, he
issued regulations fixing ceiling prices for the said cere­
als. The appellant, who was being prosecuted for selling
above the said ceiling prices, challenged the law on the
ground that it constituted an invalid delegation of legis­
lative power for failure to conform to the completeness
test. The Supreme Court sustained his.contention, de­
claring as follows:

“By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules

and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Gover­
nor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or
define under what conditions or for what reasons the Gover­
nor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may
be issued for any cause and leaves the question of what is any
cause to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legisla­
ture does not also define what is an extraordinary increase in
the price of palay, rice, or other cereal. That is also left to the
discretion o f the Governor-General. The law does not specify or
define what such temporary and emergency measures shall

Collector of Customs, No. 30763, August 27, 1929, 53 Phil. 394 et

seq., cited in Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056,
168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1,
115-116.
27 43 Phil. 1.
178 Philippine Political Law

remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. All of
these are left to the sole judgment and discretion of the Gover­
nor-General. The law is thus incomplete as a legislation."

(2) The Sufficient Standard Test

A delegation of legislative power should likewise be

made subject to a sufficient standard. A sufficient stan­
dard is intended to map out the boundaries of the dele­
gate’s authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient
standard is to prevent a total transference of legislative
power from the lawmaking body to the delegate, “who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.”28
According to the Supreme Court, a sufficient stan­
dard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected.29 More­
over, a law “lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries o f the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be suffi­
cient, the standard must specify the limits of the dele­
gate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be imple­
mented.”30

“ Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, No. L-76633, October

18, 1988, 166 SCRA 533, 543-544.
2,1Edu vs. Ericta, No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481,
497.
10Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056,
168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1,
 Delegation of Powers 179

The sufficient standard is usually indicated in the

law delegating legislative power. To illustrate, the Blue
Sky Law required the National Treasurer to cancel cer­
tificates for the sale ,of speculative securities whenever
necessary in the “public interest.”31 The Supreme Court
has considered the “optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs” as being
“infused with public interest.”32 Under R.A. No. 51, the
President of the Philippines was authorized to reorgan­
ize government-owned or controlled corporations for the
purpose of promoting “simplicity, economy and effi­
ciency” in their operations.33 C.A. No. 548 empowered
the Director of Public Works to promulgate traffic rules
in the light of the “public welfare.”34 Other accepted
standards are “justice and equity,” “the sense and ex­
perience of men,” and “national security.”

But even if the law itself does not expressly pin­

point the standard, the courts will bend over backward
to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the stat­
ute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity. Thus, in
Hirabayashi v. United States,35 the petitioner challenged
a regulation establishing curfew hours for Niseis, or
American citizens of Japanese ancestry, during World
W ar II. One of his claims was that the rule was based on
invalidly delegated legislative power, there being no
sufficient standard mentioned in the pertinent law to
limit the delegate’s discretion. The U .S. Supreme Court

115-116, cited in Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves,

G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.
31 People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328.
32Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, Ibid.
33 Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359.
34 Calalang v. Williams, supra.
35 320 U.S. 99.
1 8 0 Philippine Political Law

held that there was a sufficient standard, to wit, the

national security, and declared as follows:

“It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a par­
ticular standard to which orders of the military commander are
to conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to
any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and the
statute are not to be read in isolation from each other. They
were parts of a single program and must be judged as such.
The Act of March 21, 1942 was an adoption by Congress of the
Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The Proclamations
themselves followed a standard authorized by the Executive
Order-the necessity of protecting military resources in the des­
ignated areas against espionage and sabotage.”

In De la Liana v. Alba,se Chief Justice Fernando

said:

“Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of

legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix
the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and
judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading o f the
challenged Batas Pambansa Big. 129 ought to have cautioned
them against raising such an issue. The language of the stat­
ute is quite clear. The questioned provision reads as follows:
Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Met­
ropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation and al­
lowances as may be authorized by the President along the
guidelines set forth in Letter o f Implementation No. 93 pursu­
ant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1597. (Chapter IV, Sec. 41 o f BP Big. 129). The ex­
istence of a standard is thus clear.”

But it was different in People v. Vera,m where our

Supreme Court found the old Probation Act unconstitu­
tional. Besides being violative of the equal protection

38 112 SCRA 294.

Supra.
 Delegation of Powers 18 1

clause, the law was held to be an invalid delegation of

legislative power for lack of a sufficient standard.

“The Probation Act was not to be effective immediately.

Its effectivity was made to depend upon an act to be done by
the provincial boards of the provinces, that of appropriating
funds for the salary of a probation officer. If the provincial
board makes the appropriation, the Probation Act is applicable
in that province; if it does not make the appropriation, the law
is not applicable therein. For purposes of the Probation Act,
the provincial boards may thus be regarded as administrative
bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act shall
take effect in their respective provinces. However, the law does
not lay down any rule or standard to guide the provincial
boards in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted to them is a roving commission which enables the pro­
vincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. The applicability
and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the provincial boards with no standard or rule to
guide them. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to
them.”

In Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,38 the Court

noted:

“We also mark, on top o f all this, the questionable man­

ner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed
in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that
the seized property shall ‘be distributed to charitable institu­
tions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the Na­
tional Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of cara­
baos.’ The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reason­
able guidelines, 01 belter still, Llie limitations llial the said offi­
cers must observe when they make their distribution. There is

38 148 SCRA 659.

1 82 Philippine P olitical Law

none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the

fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria
shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they
see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there
is here a ‘roving commission,’ a wide and sweeping authority
that is not ‘canalized within banks that keep it from overflow­
ing,’ in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delega­
tion of legislative powers.”

The Pelaez Case

The case of Emmanuel Pelaez v. Auditor General39

is worthy of special attention because of its discussion of
the tests of a valid delegation of legislative power. A t
issue here was the validity of Sec. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code empowering the President of the
Philippines to create, merge, divide, abolish or other­
wise alter the boundaries of municipal corporations.
Pelaez contended inter alia that it was an invalid dele­
gation of legislative power. The Government argued
that it was not, invoking the earlier case of Cardona v.
Binangonan,i0 where the power of the Governor-General
to transfer territory from one municipality to another
was sustained. The Supreme Court upheld Pelaez. Sig­
nificantly, it ruled that the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test, which had theretofore been
applied alternatively, must be applied together or con­
currently. Justice Roberto Conception, speaking for the
Court, declared:

“Although Congress may delegate to another branch of

the Government the power to fill details in the execution, en­
forcement or administration o f a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle o f separation of powers, that oaid

15 SCRA 569.
40 36 Phil. 547.
 Delegation of Powers 183

law: (a) be complete in itself—it must set forth therein the pol­
icy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the dele­
gate—and (b) to fix a standard—the limits o f which are suffi­
ciently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate
must conform in thp performance of his functions. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence
of every law, and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also—and this is
worse—to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nul­
lifying the principle o f separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
“Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of
the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does
not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently pre­
cise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.”

Accordingly, in Bureau o f Customs Employees A sso­

ciation v. Teves,41 the Supreme Court similarly ruled
that “two tests determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test,” in finding that both tests “were
fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the
aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover,
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the incen­
tives due to District Collection Offices. While it is ap­
parent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides
that ‘[tjhe allocation, distribution and release o f the dis­
trict reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and
regulations o f the Revenue Performance and Evaluation
Board,’ Section 7 (a) of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates

41 G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.

184 Philippine Political Law

and sets the parameters for the Board by providing that

such rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution
and release of the fund shall be in accordance with Sec­
tions 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds
that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety,
is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
that it contains sufficient standards as to negate
BO CEA’s supposition of undue delegation of legislative
power to the Board.”
 Chapter 8

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

K:

THE N E W CONSTITUTION has revived the Congress

of the Philippines, which was replaced during the Mar­
cos regime with the Batasang Pambansa. The name of
that legislature is tainted and disgraced, which is
probably one reason why it was not retained to desig­
nate the new legislature. The old Congress under the
Commonwealth Constitution, for all its rather question­
able record, was never a rubber-stamp of the President,
at least not in the servile way the Batasang Pambansa
was to Marcos. The adoption of the former name of the
lawmaking body will resurrect memories of freer days
when the Congress was a peer of the other two depart­
ments and in some respects even more powerful than
either of them.
The new Congress represents a return to bica­
meralism after our recent experiment with unicameral­
ism, which was established by the 1973 Constitution
and, in fact, also initially provided for in the 1935 Con­
stitution before it was amended in 1940. The Malolos
Congress was also unicameral, and so too was the Taft
Commission during the early years of the American
regime. The Philippine Bill of 1902, however, provided
for a legislature consisting of a Philippine Assembly and
the Philippine Commission, which under the Jones Law
were replaced by the House of Representatives and the
Senate, respectively. The Philippine Legislature, as it
was called, was the pattern of the Congress of the Phil-

185
1 8 6 P hilippine Political Law

ippines that was organized under the 1940 constitu­

tional amendments.
Under the present rules, the Congress of the Philip­
pines also consists of a Senate and a House of Represen­
tatives although many important modifications have
been introduced. One of these, as Section 1 of Article V I
readily indicates, is that the legislative power is now not
exclusively vested in the Congress, in view of the reser­
vation made regarding initiative and referendum.
The said Section 1 provides:

“The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of

the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum.”

The Congress also discharges powers of a non­

legislative nature, among them the canvass of the presi­
dential elections,1 the declaration of the existence of a
state of war,2 the confirmation of amnesties,3 and
(through the Commission on Appointments) presidential
appointments,4the amendment or revision of the Consti­
tution,5 and impeachment.6

The Senate
(1) Composition

Section 2 states that “the Senate shall be composed

o f twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by

' Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4.

2Ibid., Art. VI, Sec. 23(2).
' Id., Art. VI, Sec. 19.
’ Id., Art. VII, Sec. 16.
5Id., Art. XVII.
6 Id., Art. XI.
 The Legislative Department 187

the qualified voters o f the Philippines, as may be pro­

vided by law.”
By providing for a membership elected at large by
the entire electorate, (this rule intends to make the Se­
nate a training ground for national leaders and possibly
a springboard to the Presidency. The feeling is that the
senator, having a national rather than only a district
constituency, will have a broader outlook of the prob­
lems of the country instead of being restricted by paro­
chial viewpoints and narrow interests. With such a per­
spective, the Senate is likely to be more circumspect and
broad-minded than the House of Representatives.

(2) Qualifications

The qualifications for membership in the Senate

are laid down in Section 3 as follows:

“No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born

citizen o f the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a regis­
tered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election.”

According to Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitu­

tion, “natural-born citizens are those who are citizens o f
the Philippines from birtfi without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.”
The age qualification is fixed at 35 and must be
possessed on the day of the elections, that is, when the
polls are opened and the votes are cast, and not on the
day of the proclamation of the winners by the board of
canvassers. This nullifies the ruling in the case of
 188 Philippine P olitical Law

Espinosa v. Aquino,1 which upheld the late Senator Be-

nigno Aquino, Jr., who was less than the required age
on the day of the election but celebrated his thirty-fifth
birth anniversary before his proclamation as one of the
winners.
The literacy requirement is now specifically pre­
scribed because it is not deemed embraced in the suf­
frage qualification under the present Constitution.
Residence is defined as the place where one habitu­
ally resides and to which, when he is absent, he has the
intention of returning.8 A person cannot have two resi­
dences at the same time; acquisition of a new residence
results in forfeiture of the old. However, an intention to
abandon his old residence cannot legally be inferred
from his act in establishing a home elsewhere or other­
wise conducting his activities therein, in the absence of
a clear showing that he has decided to adopt a new resi­
dence. Thus, a legislator who built a house and estab­
lished a law practice in Manila but occasionally visited
his relatives and his properties in his home province
was deemed not to have forfeited his legal residence in
the latter place.9
It has accordingly been held that “the term ‘resi­
dence’ is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to ‘dwelling’ or ‘habitation,’ but rather to
‘domicile’ or legal residence, that is, ‘the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and re­

' Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal.

8 Lim v. Pelaez, Electoral Case No. 36 House Electoral Tribu­
nal. See also Brillante v. Reyes, infra.
9 Ibid.
 The Legislative Department 189

main (animus manendi)’”10 Domicile, according to the

Supreme Court, denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some
other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of
intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind,
namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domi­
cile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains
until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but
one residence or domicile at a time. If one wishes to
successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demon­
strate an actual removal or an actual change of domi­
cile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and defi­
nite acts which correspond with the purpose.11 Without
clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three
requirements, the domicile of origin continues.12

Applying the foregoing criteria, the Supreme Court

disqualified, on the ground of failure to comply with the
residence requirement, a candidate who sought to es­
tablish his residence with his voter registration records,
a marriage certificate, water bills and a deed of sale
covering property in the place where he sought to be
elected. In rejecting his evidence on his alleged resi­
dence, the Supreme Court noted —

“The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail

to convince us that Noble successfully effected a change of

10 Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, Janu­

ary 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
" Domino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015, July
19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546, 369 Phil. 798, 818 (1999).
12 In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess
Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November 17, 2005, 475
SCRA 290, 303.
 Philippine P olitical Law

domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second Division,

private respondent’s claim that he is a registered voter and has
actually voted in the past 3 elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually
elected residency in the said municipality. Indeed, while we
have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong pre­
sumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof.
Thus, in Perez v. Commission on Elections, we held that a per­
son’s registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is
not domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in
a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to
consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
“To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence
in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that in­
tention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place
but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed
and permanent place of abode.
“In this case, Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go does not
establish his actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his
permanent place of residence. We are also not persuaded by his
alleged payment of water bills in the absence of evidence show­
ing to which specific properties they pertain. And while Noble
presented a Deed of Sale for real property, the veracity of this
document is belied by his own admission that he does not own
property in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
“On the contrary, we find that Noble has not abandoned
his original domicile as shown by the following: a) Certification
dated April 12, 2007 of the Barangay Kagawad of Barangay
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City stating that Noble is a resident
o f the barangay; b) Affidavit of the Barangay Kagawad of
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental dated April 14, 2007,
attesting that Noble has not resided in Barangay Esperanza in
Kinoguitan; c) photos and official receipts showing that Noble
and his wife maintain their residence and businesses in La­
pasan; d) tax declarations of real properties in Cagayan de Oro
City under the name of Noble; and e) the ‘Household Record of
Barangay Inhabitants’ of Mayor Narciso Go, which did not in­
clude Noble or his wife, Bernadith Go, which disproves Noble’s
claim that he resides with his father-in-law.
 The Legislative Department 191

“From the foregoing, we find that Noble’s alleged change

of domicile was effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a
candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In To-
rayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, we held that the one-
year residency requ4rement is aimed at excluding outsiders
‘from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain.’ Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats
the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the
community. Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as
municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007
elections.”13

In Limbona v. CO M ELEC ,14 the Court likewise de­

clared that a candidate is presumed to have changed her
domicile upon her marriage, or by operation of law, con­
sistent with the provisions of Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code to the effect that spouses shall have a sin­
gle family domicile, unless one of them maintains a
separate residence.
Residence is in any part o f the Philippines, like in
the case o f the party-list representative member of the
House of Representatives, and unlike in the case of the
district representative member of the House of Repre­
sentatives, who must reside in the district where he is
running.
In M itra v. C O M ELEC,15 the Supreme Court ex­
plained the underlying reasons behind the residence
qualification in this manner —

’J Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179313, September 17,

2009, 600 SCRA 178.
M G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 391; ooo also
Limbona v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009, 604
SCRA 240.
10 G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744; October
19, 2010, 633 SCRA 580.
 192 Philippine P olitical Law

“The minimum requirement under our Constitution and

election laws for the candidates’ residency in the political unit
they seek to represent has xxx a very specific purpose: to pre­
vent ‘strangerfs] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the condi­
tions and needs of a community’ from seeking elective offices in
that community, xxx (Officials of districts or localities should
not only be acquainted with the metes and bounds of their con­
stituencies; more importantly, they should know their con­
stituencies and the unique circumstances of their constituents
— their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth
and development, and all matters vital to their common wel­
fare. Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar, with these
circumstances can only ccme with residency in the constitu­
ency to be represented. The purpose of the residency require­
ment is ‘best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.’ At the
same time, the constituents themselves can best know and
evaluate the candidates’ qualifications and fitness for office if
these candidates have lived among them.”

The qualifications prescribed in this section are

continuing requirements, that is, they must be pos­
sessed for the entire duration of the member’s incum­
bency.
Thus, Senators and Members of the House of Rep­
resentatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the
time of their election but during their entire tenure.16
Accordingly, if a legislator should, say, be naturalized in
a foreign country during his term, he shall cease to be
entitled to his seat.

16 See Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April

1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1; see also Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
164978, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587; Vilando
v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA
17.
 The Legislative Department 193

In Maquiling v. Commission on Elections ,17 the Su­

preme Court declared that a candidate who takes his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executes an Affi­
davit of Renunciation of his American citizenship under
the provisions of the Republic Act No. 9225, but thereaf­
ter continues using his American passport, is to be con­
sidered as having recanted his oath of renunciation of
his foreign citizenship and shall therefore be ineligible
to run for elective office as he thereby reverts to his
status as a dual citizen.
They are also exclusive under the principle of ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, with the result that it
is not competent for Congress to provide by mere legis­
lation for additional qualifications no matter how rele­
vant they may be. For example, a statutory requirement
of a college degree as an added qualification for mem­
bership in the Congress would be unconstitutional.
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, which required
all candidates for public office, whether appointed or
elected, both in the national or local government, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, was, upon petition of a
Senator, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board,™ as follows —

“Accordingly, Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is

hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm o f the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitu­
tion is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the dis­
charge o f their defined functions, the three departments of

17 G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013; see also Reyes v. Commis­
sion on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013.
18 G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410.
194 Philippine P olitical Law

government have no choice but to yield obedience to the com­

mands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
“Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they
may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in
Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract,
the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
‘“Someone has said that the powers of the legisla­
tive department of the Government, like the boundaries
of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional govern­
ments, however, as well as governments acting under
delegated authority, the powers of each of the depart­
ments x x x are limited and confined within the four
walls of the constitution or the charter, and each de­
partment can only exercise such powers as are necessar­
ily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is
the shore of legislative authority against which the
waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which
it cannot leap.’
“Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense
that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations
which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and
the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitu­
tional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and
other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
“In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate
for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COME­
LEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citi­
zen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated
by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
“Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by
the aseailod COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in Sec. 3, Art. VI cf the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably re­
quires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
 The Legislative Department 195

obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of

candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua
non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-
elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the
proviso that ‘ [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory
drug test.’ Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add an­
other qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is
to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as
getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume of­
fice for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
“It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly
state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones
shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering
to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse
consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around
the election and the assumption o f public office of the candi­
dates. Any other construed would reduce the mandatory nature
of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning
and effect whatsoever.
“While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture,
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by
its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 syn­
chronized elections and the candidates running in that elec­
toral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems
it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its va­
lidity as an implementing issuance.
“It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that tho
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator.”
 196 Philippine P olitical Law

O f course, this ruling would be applicable even to

Members of the House of Representatives and other
elective and appointive constitutional officers.

(3) Term

The term of the members of the Senate is governed

by the following provisions in Articles V I and XVIII,
respectively:

“Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six

years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day o f June next following their elec­
tion.”
“Sec. 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Repre­
sentatives, and the local officials first elected under this Con­
stitution shall serve until noon o f June 30, 1992.
“Of the senators elected in the election in 1992, the first
twelve obtaining the highest number o f votes shall serve for six
years and the remaining twelve for three years.”

The twenty-four senators first elected under this

Constitution on the second Monday of May 1987 served
a term o f only five years ending on June 30, 1992. O f the
twenty-four senators elected in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes served the full
term of six years expiring in 1998, and the last twelve
served a term of only three years ending in 1995. The
twelve senators elected in 1995 served the full term of
six years. Those elected in 1998 also served the full term
of six years as so too those elected in 2001. In other
words, beginning 1995, twelve senators were elected
every three years, to serve the full term of six years, so
that unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate
shall not at any time be completely dissolved. One-half
of the membership is retained as the other half is re­
placed or reelected every three years.
 The Legislative Department 197

It is for this reason that the Senate has been de­

scribed as a “continuing” institution, “as it is not dis­
solved as an entity with each national election or change
in the composition of its members. However, in the con­
duct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Con­
gress acts separately and independently of the Senate of
the Congress before it. Accordingly, all pending matters
and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress
are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished mat­
ters, not in the same status, but as i f presented for the
first time.”19
This is consistent with the general characterization
of Congress as “not a continuing body,” particularly with
respect to the passage of bills. Accordingly, in League o f
Cities o f the Philippines v. CO M ELEC ™ it was ruled
that the “unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th
Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the ad­
journment of the 11th Congress. A ll the hearings and
deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on
unapproved bills also became worthless upon the ad­
journment of the 11th Congress.” Said deliberations on
unapproved bills do not even “qualify as extrinsic aids in
construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.”
It should be noted though that it has been ruled
that the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in the
exercise of its power to conduct inquiries in aid of legis­

10 Garnillano v. House of Representatives. G.R. No. 170338, De­

cember 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170; Neri v. Senate Committee on Ac­
countability of Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008,
564 SCRA 152.
20 G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263.
198 Philippine P olitical Law -

lation does not cease to exist upon the periodical disso­

lution of the Congress or of the House of Representa­
tives, because the Senate is, for said purpose or in con­
nection with said power, to be considered a “continuing
body.” According to the Supreme Court in Arnault v.
Nazareno,21 that “power subsists as long as the Senate,
which is a continuing body, persists in performing the
particular legislative function involved. To hold that it
may punish the witness for contempt only during the
session in which investigation was begun, would be to
recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function
but at the same time to deny to it an essential and ap­
propriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if
we should hold that the power to punish for contempt
terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the
Senate would have to resume the investigation at the
next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt
proceedings against the witness until the investigation
is completed — an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious
procedure, which should be avoided.”
It is significant that in Garcillano v. House o f Rep­
resentatives,22 the Supreme Court, citing the separate
opinion of Mr. Justice Carpio in Neri v. Senate Commit­
tee on Accountability o f Public Officers and Investiga­
tions,23 stressed that “the present Senate under the 1987
Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body.
The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of
whom are elected every three years for a term of six
years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires
every three years, leaving less than a majority of Sena­
tors to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Con­

21 87 Phil. 29.
22 575 SCRA 170 (2008).
“ 549 SCRA 77 (2008).
 The L egislative Department 199

stitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority

of Senators to ‘constitute a quorum to do business.’ Ap­
plying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the
Senate under the 198*7 Constitution is not a continuing
body because less than majority of the Senators con­
tinue into the next Congress. The consequence is that
the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Sen­
ate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.”
The continuity of the life of the Senate is intended
to encourage the maintenance of Senate policies as well
as guarantee that there will be experienced members
who can help and train newcomers in the discharge of
their duties.
It should be noted, however, that as desirable as
experience m ay be, the Constitution specifically pro­
vides in Article VI, Section 4, that:

“No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continu­
ity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

The Constitution seems to be wary of elective offi­

cials who stay too long in office, probably because they
may entrench themselves in power to the exclusion of
other aspirants for their office and perhaps also create
or maintain the political dynasties discouraged and
eschewed in Article II as a matter of state policy. The
senator can serve no more than twelve consecutive
years, after which he must seek greener pastures (per­
haps in the Presidency) or just lie down to pasture.

The term of the members of the Congress of the

Philippines under the old Constitution began on the
thirtieth day of December next following their election
in November. Inasmuch as the election date has been
200 Philippine Political Law

moved to May, it has become necessary also to change

the date for the commencement of the term of the mem­
bers of the Congress.
It is curious, though, that it has been set on the
thirtieth day of June, considering that this is the end of
the month and, unlike Rizal Day, does not have any
historical significance. Furthermore, there does not
seem to be any reason for making the term start at ex­
actly noon, as in the case of the President of the Philip­
pines. His term commences at noon because of the
ceremonies held in connection with his formal inaugura­
tion, but the legislators do not have to wait that long to
begin their own term.
Perhaps it might have been better to provide that
the term of office of the members of the Congress shall
commence on the first day of July, and without waiting
for high noon. This may yet be done now by ordinary
legislation.

The House of Representatives

(1) Composition

A new composition is prescribed for the House of

Representatives consisting of two kinds of members, to
wit, the district representative and the party-list repre­
sentative. The former is elected directly and personally,
from the territorial unit he is seeking to represent. The
latter, on the other hand, is chosen indirectly, through
the party he represents, which is the one voted for by
the electorate. The party-list system is an innovation of
the 1987 Constitution and its wisdom and efficacy are
Gtill both doubted and challenged to this day.
The pertinent provisions are the following:
 T he Legislative Department 201

“SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legis­
lative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, re­
gional and sectoral parties or organizations.
“(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total membership of the House of
Representatives. For three consecutive terms after the ratifica­
tion o f this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, in­
digenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
“(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
“(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment o f legisla­
tive districts based on the standards provided in this section.”

(A) The District Representatives

Two hundred members were originally provided for

in the House of Representatives to be directly elected
from the various legislative districts created by the Or­
dinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The terri­
tory was divided into thirteen regions, in turn compris­
ing two hundred districts apportioned among the prov­
inces, cities and Metropolitan Manila in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
This initial apportionment shall be subject to ad­
justment by the Congress within three years after the
return of every enumeration to make the representation
202 Philippine Political Law

of the entire nation as equitable as possible. When mak­

ing such reapportionment, the legislature shall see to it
that each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, and every province, shall have at least
one representative.
The new Constitution reiterates the guaranty
against gerrymandering, which is the arrangement of
districts in such a way as to favor the election of pre­
ferred candidates (usually re-electionists) through the
inclusion therein only of those areas where they expect
to win, regardless of the resultant shape of such dis­
tricts. It has been described as “an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair
advantage to the party in power.”24 Compact means
solid; contiguous, in physical contact; and adjacent, close
by or near.
In Aldaba v. CO M ELEC,25 the Supreme Court nul­
lified a law which created a legislative district for
Malolos City, “carving the city from the former First
Legislative, (leaving) the town of Bulacan isolated from
the rest of the geographic mass of that district.” This,
according to the Supreme Court, “contravenes the re­
quirement in Section 5(3), Article V I that each legisla­
tive district shall ‘comprise, as far as practicable, con­
tiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
In Navarro u. Ermita,26 the Supreme Court, in up­
holding the constitutionality of an exception specified in
the provisions of Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regula­
tions Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,
ruled that a proposed province composed of one or more

MNavarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010, 612

SCRA 131.
25G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010, 611 SCRA 137.
26G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 400.
 T he Legislative Department 203

islands need not comply with the 2,000 square meter

contiguous territory requirement under the Local Gov­
ernment Code.
Macias v. Commission on Elections27 is the author­
ity for the view that the validity of a legislative appor­
tionment measure is a justiciable question, involving as
it does certain requirements the interpretation of which
does not call for the exercise of legislative discretion.
The Supreme Court in fact annulled the challenged law
in that case when it was shown that the apportionment
was not based on the number of the inhabitants in the
various representative districts. The Supreme Court
noted that some big provinces were given less represen­
tatives than certain relatively smaller ones, e.g., Cebu
got seven while Rizal with a bigger population then got
only four.
In Hererra v. COM ELEC™ the Supreme Court
clarified that the basis for “districting is the number of
inhabitants” of a province or a city, and not the number
of its registered voters.
It should be noted that the 250,000 minimum popu­
lation requirement for the establishment of legislative
districts under Section 5 (3) applies only to cities,29 and
not to provinces,30 although the Local Government Code
provides for a minimum population of 250,000 as an
alternative requirement for the establishment of a prov-

27 3 SCRA 1.
28G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 336.
28 Mariano v. COMET.F.O, G.R. No 118577 March 1, 1995, 242
SCRA 211.
30 Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010, 617
SCRA 623.
31 Section 461.
204 Philippine P olitical Law

Indeed, it has been ruled that this population re­

quirement does not apply even to the creation of addi­
tional legislative districts for cities32 or for provinces.33 In
other words, it is not necessary for either a city or a
province to have an additional population of 250,000 to
establish an additional legislative district. As cited by
the Supreme Court in Mariano u. COM ELEC,34 Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution pro­
vides that “any province that may hereafter be created,
or any city whose population may hereafter increase to
more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled
in the immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of Members as it may be enti­
tled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3),
section 5 of Article V I of the Constitution.”
In Tobias u. Abalos,35 the Supreme Court declared
that the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urban­
ized city automatically resulted in its establishment as a
legislative district. It should be noted that a plebiscite
was necessary for the validity of said conversion, consis­
tent with the provisions of Section 10 of Article X of the
Constitution. However, there would be no need for such
a plebiscite where no new territory or no change in an
existing territory is made under a law, and only a reap­
portionment or the creation of an additional legislative
district is done.36

Mariano v. COMELEC, Ibid.

Aquino v. COMELEC, Ibid.
34Id.
35 239 SCRA 106.
36 Tobias v. Abalos, Ibid.; Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
176970, December 8, 2008, 573 SCRA 290.
 The L egislative Department 205

In Aldaba v. C O M E LEC ,31 a law creating a legisla­

tive district was annulled after a finding that it was
based on mere demographic projections.
It must be pointed out as well that a law, the M us­
lim Mindanao Autonomy Act, authorizing the govern­
ment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao to
create provinces and cities has been considered as un­
constitutional because the power to create them inher­
ently involves the power to create legislative districts,
which only Congress possesses. It may, however, be
authorized by law to create municipalities and baran-
38
gays.

(B) The Party-list Representatives

The House of Representatives is composed not only

of the regular district representatives but also of the
party-list representatives as provided for in the 1987
Constitution. The party-list representatives shall consti­
tute 20% of the total membership of the body, including
such representatives.
The rules for the selection of the party-list repre­
sentatives are embodied in R.A. No. 7941, which was
enforced for the first time in the elections held in 1998.
Section 2 of this law provides, among others, for the
promotion of “proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, re­
gional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organi-

37 G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010, 611 SCRA 137.

38 Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, 558
SCRA 700.
2 0 6 Philippine P olitical Law

zations and parties, and who lack well-defined political

constituencies but who could contribute to the formula­
tion and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members o f the
House of Representatives.”
In Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elec­
tions,39 the Supreme Court, in setting the parameters for
participation in party-list elections, clarified that, con­
sistent with the provisions of Section 5 (1), the party-list
system provides for three different groups, namely, the
national parties or organizations, the regional parties or
organizations, and the sectoral parties or organizations.
Thus —

“1. Three different groups may participate in the party-

list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organiza­
tions.
“2. National parties or organizations and regional par­
ties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any ‘marginalized and un­
derrepresented’ sector.
“3. Political parties can participate in party-list elec­
tions provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legisla­
tive district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral -wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an inde­
pendent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
“4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be ‘mar­
ginalized and underrepresented’ or lacking in ‘well-defined po­
litical constituencies.’ It is enough that their principal advo­
cacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sec­
tor. The sectors that are ‘marginalized and underrepresented’

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 477.

 The Legislative Department 2 07

include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cul­

tural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas work­
ers. The sectors that lack ‘well-defined political constituencies’
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
“5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or or­
ganizations that represent the ‘marginalized and underrepre­
sented’ must belong to the ‘marginalized and underrepre­
sented’ sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack ‘well-
defined political constituencies’ must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the ‘marginalized and underrepresented,’ or
that represent those who lack ‘well-defined political constitu­
encies,’ either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
“6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organiza­
tions shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.”

In said case, the Court stressed that “the party-list

system is intended to democratize political power by
giving political parties that cannot win in legislative
district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.” It explained that it is “not synony­
mous with that of the sectoral representation.”
The law provides that not later than 90 days before
election day, any political party, organization or coali­
tion m ay file a verified petition through its president or
secretary for its participation in the party-list system,
attaching a copy of its constitution, by laws, platform,
and list of officers, and such other relevant information
as may be required by the Commission on Elections.
The petition shall be published in at least 2 news­
papers of general circulation and, after due notice and
hearing, be resolved within 15 days and in no case later
 208 Philippine P olitical Law

than 60 days before the election. Among those disquali­

fied are religious sects; those which advocate violence or
unlawful means to seek their goal; foreign parties; par­
ties which receive support from any foreign government
or foreign political party; those which violate or fail to
comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elec­
tion laws; those which declare untruthful statements in
their petitions; those which have ceased to exist for at
least one year; and those who failed to participate in the
last two preceding elections. The other ground specified
in Section 6, to wit, “failure to obtain at least two per-
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list sys­
tem in the two (2) preceding elections for the constitu­
ency in which it has registered,” has been declared un­
constitutional by the Supreme Court.40
The sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisher-folk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas work­
ers, and professionals. According to the Supreme Court,
this enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors in Section 5 is not exclusive. “The crucial ele­
ment is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.”41 As
previously noted, “sectoral parties or organizations may
either be ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ or lack­
ing in ‘well-defined political constituencies.’ It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ include labor,

BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009, 592

SCRA 294.
Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582,
April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32.
 T he Legislative Department 209

peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack ‘well-defined political
constituencies’ include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.”42
Upon registration, the political group shall submit
to the COMELEC not later than 45 days before the elec­
tion at least 5 names from which its representatives
may be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes. Under the law, the names of the party-list nomi­
nees shall not be shown on the certified list of partici­
pants in the party-list system to be distributed by the
COMELEC among all the precincts. It has been ruled
though that it is the COMELEC’s constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups.43
Only persons who have given their consent in writ­
ing may be named as party-list candidates, and in one
list only. Persons who lost in the immediately preceding
election are ineligible. It should be stressed in this re­
gard that, as previously noted, “a party-list nominee
must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sec­
toral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee, one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a
track record of advocacy for such sector.”44 Section 9 of
RA 7941 provides that a nominee of the youth sector

42Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, Id.

1:1Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, May 4,
2007, 523 SCRA 1.
44Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, supra.
210 P hilippine P olitical Law

must at least be twenty-five but not more than thirty

years of age on the day of the election.45
In Alauya v. Limbona,46 the Supreme Court de­
clared as ineligible, and punished, a judge who filed his
certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative
without first resigning, stating that he “violated not
only the law, but the constitutional mandate that ‘no
officer or employee in the civil service shall engage di­
rectly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.’”
In Seneres v. COMELEC,*1 the Court clarified that
the “submission of a nomination list by the President of
a party, who is concurrently LRTA Administrator, with­
out doing more, is not electioneering or partisan politi­
cal activity. Any authorized person may submit a nomi­
nation list. Even a President, whose term had expired,
may validly do so, i f previously authorized, on the basis
of the hold-over doctrine.”
Under Section 8 of the law, no change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed af­
ter the same shall have been submitted to the COME­
LEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or with­
draws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapaci­
tated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral re­
presentatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be consid­
ered resigned.

45 See Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010, 622
SCRA 593.
48A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011, 646 SCRA 1.
17 G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 557.
 The Legislative Department 2 11

In Lokin v. C O M E L E C ,48 the Supreme Court an­

nulled an additional ground allowed by the COMELEC
for the substitution by a registered party of its nomi­
nees, per Section 13 p f its Resolution No. 7804, to wit,
when the “nomination is withdrawn by the party.” It
stressed that Section 8 of RA 7941 “enumerates only
three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose
name has been submitted to the COM ELEC.” The Court
considered said additional ground as ultra vires stating
that the implementing rules and regulations of the
COMELEC “should not override, supplant, or modify
the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consis­
tent with the law they intend to carry out.”
At any rate, it is established that the COM ELEC
has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leader­
ship and the nomination of party-list representatives.49
Every voter shall be entitled to 2 votes: the first for
the candidate for member of the House of Representa­
tives in his legislative district and the second for the
party, organization or coalition he wants represented in
the House of Representatives.
The participants in the party-list system shall be
ranked according to the number of votes they received,
with those getting at least 2% of the total votes cast for
the system being entitled to one seat each. None o f them
shall have more than 3 seats each.
The COM ELEC shall tally all the votes for the par­
ticipants, rank them according to the number of votes
received, and allocate party list representatives propor-

48 G.R. No. 180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385.

“ Lokin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193808, June 26,
2012, 674 SCRA 538.
2 12 Philippine Political Law

tionately according to the percentage of votes obtained

by each of them as against the total nation-wide votes
cast for the party-list system.
The party-list representatives shall be proclaimed
by the COM ELEC according to their ranking in the list
of names submitted to it by the party, organization or
coalition that has been determined, on the basis of the
votes it has garnered, to be entitled to representation in
the Lower House.
In B A N A T v. C O M E LEC ,50 the Supreme Court
clarified that “for every four district representatives, the
1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one
party-list representative. There is no need for legislation
to create an additional party-list seat whenever four
additional legislative districts are created by
law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
automatically creates such additional party-list seat.” It
added that the “filling-up of all available party-list seats
is not mandatory,” and that the four parameters in a
Philippine-style party-list election system are as follows

“1. Twenty percent of the total number o f the member­

ship o f the House of Representatives is the maximum number
of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legisla­
tive districts.
“2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one
seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round
of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the
total party-list votes.

50 BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009, 592

SCRA 294.
 The Legislative Department 2 13

“3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats af­
ter allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to
the party-list organizations including those that received less
than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the
available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distrib­
uted to the parties in a second round of seat allocation accord­
ing to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21
April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
“4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat
cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the
Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require
absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-
settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the
Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.”

As explained by the Supreme Court in its first

B A N A T ruling, the so-called two step procedure for the
determination of the entitlement of the parties to addi­
tional seats initially entails the computation of the per­
centage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party
by the total number of votes cast for party-list candi­
dates. There are thereafter two steps in the second
round of seat allocation — First, the percentage is mul­
tiplied by the remaining available seats, which is the
difference between the maximum seats reserved under
the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the
two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corre­
sponds to a party’s share in the remaining available
seats. Second, one party-list seat is assigned to each of
214 Philippine Political Law

the parties next in rank until all available seats are

completely distributed.51
The party-list representatives shall have the same
rights and be subject to the same inhibitions and dis­
qualifications as the district representatives. The sole
exception is that, unlike the latter, under Section 15 of
the law, “any elected party-list representative who
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during
his term of office shall forfeit his seat: provided, that if
he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be
eligible for nomination as party-list representative un­
der his new party or organization.” The Supreme Court
has interpreted this provision to cover “changes in both
political party and sectoral affiliation,” stressing that
“the latter m ay occur within the same party since multi­
sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to partici­
pate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nomi­
nee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same
party will only be eligible for nomination under the new
sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at
least six months before the elections.”52
In Abayon v. H R E T ,53 the Supreme Court ex­
plained —

“There are two kinds of congressmen — those elected

from legislative districts and those elected through the party-
list system. Once elected, the party-list representative has the

51 BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009, 586

SCRA 210.
52Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA
593.
51 G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 375, citing
Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA
59.
 The Legislative Department 2 15

same rights, privileges and duties as the district representa­

tive. It is the party-list representatives who are ‘elected’ into
office, not their parties or organizations. Once elected, both the
district representatives and the party-list representatives are
treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative
rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the
making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative dis­
tricts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limita­
tion of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdic­
tion to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after
their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all
intents and purposes, ‘elected members’ of the House of Repre­
sentatives although the entity directly voted upon was their
party.”

(2) Qualifications

Where applicable, the same observations earlier

made regarding the qualifications of the Senators are
repeated for the following qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives:

“SEC. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Phil­
ippines and, on the day o f the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election.”

In addition, the party-list representative must be a

bona fide member of the party he seeks to represent at
least ninety days before election day. As previously
noted, to be a bona fide nominee of a sectoral party, one
must either “belong to the sector represented, or have a
track record of advocacy for such sector.”64 The youth

54Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, supra.

216 Philippine Political Law

representative must not be more than thirty years old

but may continue beyond that age until the end of his
term.55
The age qualification is lower, which might explain
the relative impulsiveness of the House of Representa­
tives. Residence, as a qualification for the district repre­
sentatives, must be in the district, not in the province
comprising the district, and is only for one year immedi­
ately before the election, unlike in the case of the Sen­
ate, where it must be for two years before the election,
and anywhere in the Philippines. As previously ob­
served, the purpose of the residence requirement is to
ensure familiarity with the conditions and problems of
the constituency sought to be represented and the con­
sequent efficiency and concern in the discharge of legis­
lative duties on its behalf.56
Section 9 of RA 7941 requires a part-list represen­
tative to be a resident of the Philippines, and not any
particular district, for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.57
In Brillante u. Reyes”8 where the protestee’s resi­
dence was challenged, the House Electoral Tribunal
dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared:

“It has been sufficiently shown that Protestee has estab­

lished her residence in Makati for several years before the elec­
tions of May 11, 1987. The fact that she registered as a voter in
Manila for the purpose of the plebiscite of February 2, 1987
could not be taken as indicating an abandonment of her

55See Amores v. HRET, supra.

x See Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622
SCRA 744; and October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 580.
’’ See Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010, 622
SCRA 593.
58House Electoral Tribunal Case No. 31 (1988).
 The Legislative Department 217

Makati residence and a transfer to a new residence in Manila,

with intention to reside in the latter place permanently, par­
ticularly in the light of the fact that she continued to maintain
her house, conduct her business, and perform her religious and
civil obligations in Makati. Granting that she may have moved
to Manila to vote in the plebiscite, such move, at best, was only
temporary, she having retained the animus revertendi, the de­
sire to return to her Makati residence.”

Under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, oth­

erwise known as the Citizenship Retention and R e­
acquisition Act o f 2003, natural-born Filipino citizens
who have been, or intend to be, naturalized in a foreign
country, shall, upon taking the oath of allegiance pre­
scribed in Section 3 thereof, be deemed to have re­
acquired, or shall retain, their Philippine citizenship.59
They shall thereafter be “deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this A ct.”60
The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen years of age, of those who re­
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this
Act shall likewise be deemed citizens of the Philip-
_ • 61
pines.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizen­
ship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippine
and subject to certain conditions. Accordingly, those
intending to exercise their right of suffrage m ust meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Con­
stitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other
existing laws. On the other hand, those seeking elective

mSection 3.
“ Section 2.
61 Section 4.
2 1 8 Philippine P olitical Law

public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifica­

tions for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation o f any and all foreign citizen­
ship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath. It must be noted that, upon taking said second
oath, the citizen ceases to be a dual citizen.62 Among
such qualifications would be compliance with the resi­
dence requirement for said elective office.63 Similarly,
those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic o f the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office, provided, that they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath. The right to vote or be elected or appointed to
any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who are candidates for or are
occupying any public office in the country o f which they
are naturalized citizens, and/or those who are in active
service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in
the armed forces of the country of which they are natu­
ralized citizens. Those intending to practice their pro­
fession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such prac­
tice.64
Accordingly, a natural-born citizen who either re­
tains or re-acquires his aforesaid citizenship upon tak­
ing the second oath of allegiance where he, this time,

MSee Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008, 572
SCRA 295; see Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 198742, August 10, 2012, 678 SCRA 267.
w Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009,
576 SCRA 331.
MSection 5.
 The Legislative Department 219

makes a personal and sworn renunciation o f any and all

foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath shall be qualified for election, or
appointment, to any constitutional office.
It bears both reiteration and emphasis that M em ­
bers of the House of Representatives must be natural-
born citizens not only at the time of their election but
during their entire tenure. Being a continuing require­
ment, one who assails a member’s citizenship or lack of
it may still question the same at any time, notwith­
standing the prescriptive period set by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal for the filing of elec­
toral protests, which would not “apply to disqualification
based on citizenship, because qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be pos­
sessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer’s entire ten­
ure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his
title m ay be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the
1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House
of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not
only at the time of their election but during their entire
tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails
a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question
the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period
notwithstanding.”65 The Supreme Court clarified though
that, in assailing one’s citizenship, or the source thereof,
proper proceedings should be filed in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. “Clearly, un­
der law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may ques­
tion the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of

6r' Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30,

2009, 594 SCRA 434.
220 Philippine Political L aw

naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization pro­

ceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised
by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizen’s descendant.”66
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have re­
sided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.67 Under Section 118
of the Omnibus Election Code, the following shall be
disqualified from voting — any person who has been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for
not less than one year, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: pro­
vided, however, that any person disqualified to vote
under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the
right to vote upon expiration of five years after service
of sentence; any person who has been adjudged by final
judgment by competent court or tribunal of having
committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly
constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, vio­
lation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any
crime against national security, unless restored to his
full civil and political rights in accordance with law:
provided, that he shall regain his right to vote auto­
matically upon expiration of five years after service of
sentence; and insane or incompetent persons as de­
clared by competent authority. Significantly, Section 2
of said Article V states, among others, that the Congress

“ Ibid.
"1 Constitution, Article 5, Section 1.
 The Legislative Department 2 21

shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and

sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.68
In Nicolas-Lewis1-v. CO M ELEC, 69 where the afore­
cited constitutional provisions were interpreted, the
Supreme Court, in a 13-0 vote, upheld the right to be
registered as a voter of a dual citizen who was then con-
cededly a non-resident of the Philippines. Citing its
earlier ruling in Macalintal v. C O M E L E C ,10 where it
upheld the right of non-resident Filipinos to vote under
the provisions of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act o f
2003, the Court declared that “there is no provision in
the dual citizenship law — R.A. 9225 — requiring
‘duals’ to actually establish residence and physically
stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in im­
plicit acknowledgment that ‘duals’ are most likely non­
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A.
9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims,
in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all over­
seas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions,
are qualified to vote.” In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court relied on its earlier statement in Macalintal
where it pronounced that “Section 2 o f Article V of the
Constitution is an exception to the residency require­
ment found in Section 1 of the same Article.”
It must be noted, however, that said Section 2 pro­
vides for a system of absentee voting only for qualified
Filipinos abroad. It appears clear that only those Filipi-

6" Ibid., Section 5 (2).

*’ G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649.
70 G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 453 Phil. 586, 405 SCRA 614.
2 22 Philippine Political Law

nos who meet the requirements under Section 1, which

include the residence qualification, can be considered as
among those qualified.

(3) Term

The term of the members of the House of Represen­

tatives under the Commonwealth Constitution was four
years and that of the member of the Batasang Pam-
bansa under the 1973 charter was six years. In the new
House of Representatives, the term of the members is
fixed as follows:

“Sec. 7. The Members of the House o f Representatives

shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following their election.
“No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity o f his service for the full term for
which he was elected.”

One purpose in reducing the term to three years is

to synchronize elections, which in the case of the Senate
are held at three-year intervals (to elect one-half of the
body) and in the case of the President and Vice-
President every six years. The term of the local officials
is also three years. It must be recalled, however, that
the first officials elected under the 1987 Constitution
served until noon of the thirtieth day of June 1992.71
Like the senator, the member o f the House of Rep­
resentatives may not be re-elected any number of times.
Whereas the former can serve for no more than twelve
consecutive years, the latter is limited to three terms

'' Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 2.

 T he Legislative Department 223

only, or a total of nine consecutive years. The reason for

the difference is not explained. Considering that the
members of the House of Representatives are generally
younger than the members of the Senate, one would
imagine that the former should be allowed to stay
longer in office or at least as long as the latter.
The Supreme Court has summarized in Abundo v.
COMELEC72 the rules in connection with the consecu­
tiveness of terms and involuntary interruptions thereof
in connection with the application of the rules on term
limits for elective officers both under the Constitution
and pertinent laws. Thus —

“1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective po­

sition and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to
the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be
treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject con­
stitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr. [G.R. No.
133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157 (1998)]). If the offi­
cial runs again for the same position he held prior to his as­
sumption of the higher office, then his succession to said posi­
tion is by operation o f law and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption (Montebon v. Commission on Elec­
tions [G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA 50 (2008)).
“2. An elective official, who has served for three con­
secutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for
what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall elec­
tion, had an interruption in the continuity of the official's ser­
vice. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the
3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo v.
Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002,
376 SCRA 90 (2002)] and Socrates v. Commission on Elections
[G.R, No 154512, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457]).

72 G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 149.

 Philippine P olitical Law

“3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the

conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work
to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service
(Latasa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154829, Decem­
ber 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601 [2003]).
“4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting
event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to
the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office
during this period (Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
184836, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234).
“5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an
elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted
when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office,
thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be
the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602 (1999) and Dizon v.
Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009,
577 SCRA 589 [2009]). The break or interruption need not be
for a full term o f three years or for the major part of the 3-year
term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the
cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 154512,
November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457], citing Lonzanida v. Com­
mission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311
SCRA 602 [1999]).
“6. When an official is defeated in an election protest
and said decision becomes final after said official had served
the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest
does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to
serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits be­
cause the nullification of his proclamation came after the expi­
ration of the term (Ong u. Alegre, G.R. Nos. 163295 & 163354,
January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473 (2006) and Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections [G.R. Nos. 167591 & 170577, May 9,
2007, 523 SCRA 41 [2007]).”
 The Legislative Department 225

Election

As previously remarked, elections for the Congress

of the Philippines were held on the second Monday of
May, 1987. The next elections, conformably to the Tran­
sitory Provisions, were held in 1992, for all the members
of the Congress, followed by another election three years
later in 1995, for the entire membership of the House of
Representatives and twelve members of the Senate.
Every three years thereafter, all the members of the
House of Representatives and one-half of the Senate
were up for election, or re-election if still allowed.
Under the 1973 Constitution, vacancies in the Ba-
tasang Pambansa were supposed to be filled by special
election called by the Commission on Elections. That
rule has been replaced by the following provision, which
is reproduced from the Commonwealth Constitution:

“Sec. 9. In case o f vacancy in the Senate or in the

House of Representatives, a special election may be called to
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.”

Such special election shall however not be neces­

sary if the vacancy pertained to a seat occupied by a
party-list representative, in which case, the same would
be filled by the next representative from the list of
nominees in the order submitted to the Commission on
Elections by the same party, organization, or coalition,
who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is
exhausted, the party, organization or coalition shall
submit additional nominees.73

7i Republic Act No. 7941, Section 16.

2 2 6 Philippine Political Law

Salaries

Following are the pertinent provisions in Article VI

on the salaries of the members of the Congress:

“Sec. 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the

House o f Representatives shall be determined by law. No in­
crease in said compensation shall take effect until after the ex­
piration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase.”
“Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts o f the Con­
gress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accor­
dance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Com­
mission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list
of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.”

It will be noted from the above provisions that

there is no prohibition against the receipt of allowances
by the members of the Congress, unlike the correspond­
ing provision in the Commonwealth Constitution to the
effect that the salary of the members of Congress should
include “per diems and other emoluments and allow­
ances.” The deletion of this rule in the present provision
is an implied permission for the Congress to vote allow­
ances in favor of its members.
Nevertheless, the second section seeks to avoid the
recurrence of the abuses committed by the members of
the old Congress in allotting themselves fabulous allow­
ances the amounts of which they refused to divulge to
the people. Conformably to the constitutional right to
information on matters o f public concern,74 the books of
accounts of the Congress shall be open to public inspec­
tion and must also be audited by the Commission on
Audit. Furthermore, each legislator’s itemized expendi­

71 Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 7.

 The Legislative Department 227

tures, including allowances, shall be published annually

for the information of the people.
Reduction of the salaries of the members of the
Congress is not prohibited by the Constitution. I f any
increase is to be made, the same cannot be effective
during the term of the members of the Congress, includ­
ing the Senators, who have approved such increase.
In Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez,75
the petitioner questioned the constitutionality of Repub­
lic Act No. 3836 “insofar as the same allows retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective offi­
cials of both houses (of Congress).” It is significant that
the law provided that the retirement benefits would be
immediately available upon its approval. It claimed that
its provision on retirement gratuity was “an attempt to
circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of sala­
ries of the members of Congress during their term of
office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14
of the (1935) Constitution.” The Court sustained the
petition and declared the law unconstitutional. It noted
that the retirement benefits were “immediately avail­
able thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Arti­
cle VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.”

Parliamentary Immunities

“Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House o f Repre­

sentatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the

75 G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965, 15 SCRA 479.

228 Philippine P olitical Law

Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor he

held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.”

The rule provides for two kinds of immunities, to

wit: immunity from arrest and the privilege of speech
and debate. The first is intended to ensure representa­
tion of the constituents of the member of the Congress
by preventing attempts to keep him from attending its
sessions. The second enables the legislator to express
views bearing upon the public interest without fear of
accountability outside the halls of the legislature for his
inability to support his statements with the usual evi­
dence required in the court of justice. In other words, he
is given more leeway than the ordinary citizen in the
ventilation of matters that ought to be divulged for the
public good.

(1) Privilege from Arrest

The provision of the Commonwealth Constitution

on the parliamentary immunity from arrest excepted all
criminal offenses regardless of degree, with the result
that the legislator could claim the same only against
civil arrests. For any criminal offense, he was subject to
arrest at any time, even during the sessions. Under the
1987 Constitution, the scope of this immunity has been
expanded to cover not only civil arrests but also arrests
for criminal offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment. Accordingly, the immunity may
not be invoked if the crime is murder but is available in
case of, say, slight physical injuries.
The immunity now applies only while the Congress
is in session. “Session” as here used does not refer to the
day-to-day meetings of the legislature but to the entire
 The Legislative Department 229

period from its initial convening until its final adjourn­

ment.

(2) Privilege pf Speech and Debate

There are two requirements that must concur in or­

der that the privilege of speech and debate can be
availed of by the member of the Congress. The first is
that the remarks must be made while the legislature or
the legislative committee is functioning, that is, in ses­
sion; and the second is that they must be made in con­
nection with the discharge of official duties. These con­
ditions were first laid down in the leading case of Coffin
v. Coffin, 76 where the privilege was denied a legislator
who uttered slanderous remarks in the course of a pri­
vate conversation with a constituent during a lull in the
session,
Applying the rule announced in that case, our own
Supreme Court declared in Jimenez v. Cabangbang11
that the privilege could not be invoked by a legislator
who had allegedly maligned the plaintiff in an open
letter to the President of the Philippines coursed
through and published in the newspapers. The finding
was that he had written the letter at a time when the
Congress was in recess and in his private capacity only.
It is important to note that this privilege is not ab­
solute although it is usually so called. The rule provides
that the legislator may not be questioned “in any other
place,” which means that he m ay be called to account
for his remarks by his own colleagues in the Congress
itself and, when warranted, punished for “disorderly
behavior.”

n 4 Mass. 1.
7717 SCRA 876.
230 Philippine Political Law

Thus, in the case of Osmena v. Pendatun,78 the

President of the Philippines him self who had been vili­
fied by the petitioner could not file any civil or criminal
action against him because of this immunity. Nonethe­
less, the majority of the members of the House of Repre­
sentatives in which the questioned speech was delivered
were not precluded from demonstrating their loyalty to
the chief executive by declaring Osmena guilty of disor­
derly behavior and suspending him in the exercise of
their disciplinary power under what is now Article VI,
Section 16(3), of the Constitution.
In Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, 79 contempt and dis­
barment proceedings were instituted before the Su­
preme Court against a senator who, among other unflat­
tering, if not insulting, remarks, referred to both the
Chief Justice and the Supreme Court in the course of a
privilege speech as “idiots.” The senator justified her
remarks, claiming they were “covered by the constitu­
tional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part
of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of
her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the
open controversial anomalies in governance with a view
to future remedial legislation. She averred that she
wanted to expose what she believed ‘to be an unjust act
of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],’ which, after sending
out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be
vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually in­
form applicants that only incumbent justices of the Su­
preme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that
the JBC should have at least given an advanced [sic]
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like

78L-17144, Oct. 28, 1960.

79A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 1.
 The Legislative D epartment 231

her, would not be considered for the position of Chief

Justice.” The Court boldly chided but nevertheless
meekly exonerated her. It declared that “basic constitu­
tional consideration ^dictates this kind of disposition.”
Thus —

“The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the

language Senator Santiago, a member o f the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent
that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating
that she wanted ‘to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,’ and calling
the Court a ‘Supreme Court of idiots.’ xxx.
“A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily
show that her statements were expressions of personal anger
and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale o f her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamen­
tary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and
its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a
privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them.
“To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to
her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive
personalities, xxx.
“The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disci­
plinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise
would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal cir­
cumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing
so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitu­
tional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
 Philippine P olitical Law

“We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the

Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely
tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on
our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to res­
pect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her
anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted
to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecu­
tions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without
fear of being made responsible before the courts or other fo­
rums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect
members of Congress against government pressure and in­
timidation aimed at influencing the decision-making preroga­
tives of Congress and its members.
“The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on
Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator
from using, under any circumstance, ‘offensive or improper
language against another Senator or against any public insti­
tution.’ But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks,
the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let
alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for
appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under
such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules
of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
“Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in
filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must
be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree
with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of
intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest
court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect law­
yers owe to the courts.
“Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Fobre has
failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in ques­
tion. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not
categorically denied making such statements, she has un­
equivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech.
Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.”
 The Legislative Department 233

Conflict of Interest

The following is a new provision intended to ensure

the probity and objectivity of the members of Congress:

“Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of

Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest
that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which
they are authors.”

There are some persons who may be tempted to run

for Congress not because of a desire to serve the people
but precisely for the protection or even enhancement of
their own interests. By requiring them to make known
at the outset their financial and business connections or
investments, it is hoped that their potential for self-
aggrandizement will be reduced and they will be pre­
vented from using their official positions for ulterior
purposes. In some countries, businessmen are required
to unload their stockholdings as these might affect their
official acts or at least lead to suspicion of chicanery or
impropriety in the discharge of their duties in the gov­
ernment.

Incompatible and Forbidden Offices

“Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Repre­
sentatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corpora­
tions or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been crealed or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected.”
234 Philippine Political Law

The first part o f this section refers to what are

known as incompatible offices, which may not be held by
the legislator during his tenure in the Congress. The
purpose is to prevent him from owing loyalty to another
branch of the government, to the detriment of the inde­
pendence of the legislature and the doctrine of separa­
tion of powers.
The prohibition against the holding of an incom­
patible office is not absolute; what is not allowed is the
simultaneous holding of that office and the seat in the
Congress. Any legislator may hold another office or em­
ployment in the government provided he forfeits, as a
result, his position in the Congress.
Forfeiture of the legislator’s seat, or cessation of his
tenure, shall be automatic upon the holding of the in­
compatible office. Thus, a congressman who was elected
provincial governor was deemed to have automatically
forfeited his seat in the House of Representatives when
he took his oath for the provincial office.80 No resolution
was necessary to declare his legislative post vacant.
Incidentally, term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another, while tenure represents the period
during which the incumbent actually holds the office.81
In Adaza v. Pacana, 82 the petitioner and the respon­
dent were elected governor and vice-governor, respec­
tively, of Misamis Oriental. Both subsequently ran for
the Batasang Pambansa, but only the petitioner won.

” Case of Rep. Antonio V. Raquiza.

Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946); Fetalino
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890, December 4, 2012, 686
SCRA 813.
“ 135 SCRA 431.
 The Legislative Department 235

Adaza then qualified as member of the lawmaking body,

whereupon Pacana assumed the governorship as statu­
tory successor. Adaza challenged Pacana’s takeover,
contending that undep the parliamentary system a legis­
lator could concurrently serve as governor; hence, there
was no vacancy in the governorship that Pacana could
fill. Through Justice Escolin, the Court unanimously
rejected this argument and held that Adaza automati­
cally forfeited the governorship the moment he took his
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
But not every other office or employment is to be
regarded as incompatible with the legislative position.
For example, membership in the Electoral Tribunals is
permitted by the Constitution itself. Moreover, if it can
be shown that the second office is an extension of the
legislative position or is in aid of legislative duties, the
holding thereof will not result in the loss of the legisla­
tor’s seat in the Congress.
Accordingly, the chairmen of the Senate and House
committees on education retain their seats in Congress
while sitting concurrently as ex officio members in the
U.P. Board of Regents. Legislators who serve as treaty
negotiators under the President of the Philippines con­
tinue to sit in the Congress, where they can better work
for the approval of the treaty and the passage of the
needed implementing legislation.
In Liban v. Gordon,M the Supreme Court declared
that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine N a­
tional Red Cross [PNRC], despite its having been cre­
ated by a special law, is not to be considered a govern­
ment office or an office in a government-owned or con­
trolled corporation for purposes of the prohibition under

83 G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 68.

236 Philippine Political Law

Section 13. The Court added though that the PNRC

ought not to have been established as a private corpora­
tion by a special law, and should actually register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to
become a private corporation.84
But even if the member of the Congress is willing
to forfeit his seat therein, he may not be appointed to
any office in the government that has been created or
the emoluments thereof have been increased during his
term. Such a position is a forbidden office.
The purpose is to prevent trafficking in public of­
fice. Were the rule otherwise, certain legislators, espe­
cially those not sure of re-election, might be able to work
for the creation or improvement of lucrative positions
and, in combination with the President, arrange for
their appointment thereto in order to provide for their
future security at the expense of the public service.
Notably, this provision does not apply to elective of­
fices, which are filled by the voters themselves.
The appointment of the member of the Congress to
the forbidden office is not allowed only during the term
for which he was elected, when such office was created
or its emoluments were increased. After such term, and
even if the legislator is re-elected, the disqualification
no longer applies and he may therefore be appointed to
the office.

Inhibitions and Disqualifications

The rules embodied in the Commonwealth and

1973 Constitutions on parliamentary inhibitions and

*■' Ibid.; see also Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18,
2011, 639 SCRA 709, citing Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 464
Phil. 439, in relation to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution.
 The Legislative D epartment 237

disqualifications have been much simplified with the

following rewritten provision in the new charter.

“Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Repre­

sentatives may personally appear as counsel before any court
of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, in­
cluding any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuni­
ary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of
his office.”

Appearance of the legislator is now barred before

all courts of justice, regardless o f rank, composition, or
jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the re­
vived Electoral Tribunals and to all administrative bod­
ies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts m ar­
tial and military tribunals, being administrative agen­
cies, are included.
It must be noted though that the General Court
Martial has been characterized by the Supreme Court
as “a court within the strictest sense of the word and
acts as a criminal court.”85 Accordingly, “a court-martial
case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is
a ‘court’ akin to any other courts.”86
The purpose of the disqualification is to prevent the
legislator from exerting undue influence, deliberately or

85 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30,

2012, 677 SCRA 750.
8,1 Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 89
Phil, 246 (1951).
238 Philippine P olitical Law

not, upon the body where he is appearing. The pressure

may not be intended; normally, the appearance is
enough, considering the powers available to the legisla­
tor which he can exercise to reward or punish a judge
deciding his case or, in the case of the Electoral Tribu­
nals, his close association with its members. This is the
reason why the prohibited appearance must be personal.
The lawyer-legislator m ay still engage in the practice of
his profession except that when it comes to trials and
hearings before the bodies above-mentioned, appearance
may be made not by him but by some other member of
his law office.
In Puyat u. De Guzman, 87 a legislator entered his
appearance as counsel for one of the parties to an intra­
corporate dispute before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. He desisted when his representation was
challenged under the above-mentioned section. Thereaf­
ter, he purchased two hundred pesos worth of stocks in
the corporation from the faction he was representing
and sought to intervene in the said dispute, this time as
a stockholder. The Supreme Court did not allow him to
do so as his evident purpose was to circumvent the con­
stitutional prohibition. Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera
declared:

“Under those facts and circumstances, we are con­

strained to hold that there has been an indirect ‘appearance as
counsel before x x x an administrative body’ and, in our opin­
ion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.
The ‘intervention’ was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceeding in some other capacity. To believe
the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote
and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable
outcome of the SEC Caoo, would bo pure naivete. He would
still appear as counsel indirectly.”

87 113 SCRA 33.

 The Legislative Department 239

Legislators are prohibited from being financially

interested in any contract with the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includ­
ing government-own,ed or controlled corporations, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by any of
these during their term of office, because of the influ­
ence they can easily exercise in obtaining these conces­
sions. The idea is to prevent abuses from being commit­
ted by the members of the Congress to the prejudice of
the public welfare and particularly of legitimate con­
tractors with the government who otherwise might be
placed at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the legis­
lator.
It should be noted, though, that not every transac­
tion with the government is barred by this provision.
The contracts referred to here are those involving “fi­
nancial interest,” that is, contracts from which the legis­
lator expects to derive some profit at the expense of the
government. An illustration is a contract for public
works or the sale of office equipment or supplies to the
government. By contrast, it cannot be said that the leg­
islator will profit financially from a contract of carriage
with a government airline since it is the carrier that will
benefit from the passenger’s fare.
The last sentence restores an inhibition originally
imposed by the 1935 Constitution. Although this provi­
sion has never been judicially interpreted, it may be
surmised that the rule shall apply to the case, say, of a
congressman expediting the collection of a civil servant’s
retirement check for a stipulated fee.

Sessions

The new rule on the legislative sessions is as fol­

lows:
240 Philippine P olitical Law

“Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year

on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in ses­
sion for such number of days as it may determine until thirty
days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may
call a special session at any time.”

The above provision is not really new, being a re­

vival with slight modifications of the original rule
adopted by the 1973 Constitution but never actually
applied. It was later amended to enable the legislators
to meet for such number o f days as they might deter­
mine. Earlier, the Commonwealth Constitution provided
for a maximum duration of one hundred days for the
regular session and thirty days for the special session,
exclusive of Sundays.
W hile the emphasis now is on legislative industry
rather than indolence, a mandatory recess is prescribed
for the thirty-day period before the opening of the next
regular session, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays. This is the minimum period of recess and may
be lengthened by the Congress in its discretion. It may,
however, be called in special session at any time by the
President.
The President’s call is not necessary in some in­
stances, as when the Congress meets to canvass the
presidential elections,88 or to call a special election when
both the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency are va­
cated,89 or when it decides to exercise the power of im ­
peachment,90 particularly where the respondent is the
President himself.

Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4.

““ Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 10.
90Id., Art. XI.
 The Legislative Department 241

It is to be recalled that, in Araneta v. Dinglasan,

the Supreme Court distinguished between the regular
and special sessions of Congress. Thus, in a special ses­
sion, the Congress rr\ay consider “general legislation or
only such subjects as the President may designate.” In a
regular session, “the power of the Congress is not cir­
cumscribed except by limitations imposed by organic
law.”91

Officers
“Sec. 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and
the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.
“Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.”

The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the

House of Representatives do not have a fixed term and
may be replaced at any time at the pleasure of a major­
ity of all the members of their respective chambers. The
legislative heads in the presidential system are highly
political officers whose continued incumbency will de­
pend upon the partisan alignments of their colleagues.
Other officers usually chosen are the Senate Presi­
dent pro tempore, the Speaker pro tempore, the majority
and minority floor leaders, the chairmen of the various
standing and special committees, and the secretary and
the sergeant-at-arms, the last two being non-members
of the legislature.

Quorum

“A majority o f each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day

91 84 Phil. 368.
242 Philippine P olitical Law

and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such

manner, and under such penalties, as such House may pro­
vide.”32

A quorum is defined as any number sufficient to

transact business,93 which may be less than the majority
of the membership. In our Constitution, it is required
that the quorum be a majority of each House.
In Avelino v. Cuenco,9i the petitioner, who was then
Senate President, motu proprio adjourned a session of
the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving
twelve other members who continued meeting and re­
placed him with the respondent as Acting President.
Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings
against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been
validly elected because twelve members did not consti­
tute a majority and, hence, a quorum of the 24-member-
Senate. The Supreme Court at first dismissed the peti­
tion on the ground that it involved a political question.
On the motion for reconsideration, however, it assumed
jurisdiction and ruled inter alia that the twelve m em ­
bers were sufficient to constitute a quorum, being a
majority of twenty-three, not twenty-four. The reason
was that one senator was then in the United States and
therefore outside the coercive jurisdiction of the smaller
number of members who could “adjourn from day to day
and compel the attendance o f absent members in such
manner and under such penalties” as the Senate might
provide.
In Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate o f the Philip­
pines ,9S
the Supreme Court nullified a law requiring

MId., Art. VI, Sec. 16(2).

9,1Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1048.
MSupra.
“ G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270.
 T he Legislative Department 243

what it referred to as a “supermajority vote” of two-

thirds of all the Members of Congress for purposes of
amending or repealing the same, stating that said pro­
vision gave said law “the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution de­
mands.” Thus —

“Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did

in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting re­
quirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.
9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the charac­
ter o f an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the
Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Consti­
tution provides that a ‘majority o f each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business.’ In other words, as long as majority of
the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct busi­
ness and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is
generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. Thus, while
a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limi­
tation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the pas­
sage o f bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it sig­
nificantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action and
flexibility.”

Discipline of Members

Article VI, Section 16(3) states:

“(3) Each House may determine the rules of its pro­

ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and with
the concurrence of two-thirds o f all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days.”

Rules of proceedings are needed for the orderly con­

duct of the sessions of the Congress. Unless such rules
violate fundamental or individual rights, they are
within the exclusive discretion of each House to formu­
late and interpret and may not be judicially reversed.
244 Philippine Political Law

Without the above provision, the authority to disci­

pline its members can still be exercised by each House
as an inherent power, with the concurrence of only a
majority vote, conformably to the general rule on the
will of the majority. W ith this provision, the disciplinary
power is not so much expressly conferred as limited
because of the specific conditions laid down for its
proper exercise.
Thus, the courts may annul any expulsion or sus­
pension of a member that is not concurred in by at least
two-thirds of the entire body or any suspension meted
out by the legislature, even with the required two-thirds
vote, as to any period in excess of the sixty-day maxi­
mum duration. These are procedural matters and there­
fore justiciable.
But the interpretation of the phrase “disorderly be­
havior” is the prerogative of the Congress and cannot as
a rule be judicially reviewed. The matter comes in the
category of a political question. Accordingly, the Su­
preme Court did not interfere when the legislature de­
clared that the physical assault by one member against
another,96 or the delivery of a derogatory speech which
the member was unable to substantiate,97 constituted
“disorderly behavior” and justified the adoption of disci­
plinary measures.
Other disciplinary measures besides expulsion and
suspension are deletion of unparliamentary remarks
from the record, fine, imprisonment and censure, some­
times called “soft impeachment.”

96Alejandrino v. Quezon, supra.

97 Osmena v. Pendatun, supra.
 The legislative Department 245

Journals

“(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,

and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts
as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas
and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
“Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.”

Journals are a record of what is done and past in a

legislative assembly. They are useful not only for au­
thenticating the proceedings but also for the interpreta­
tion of laws through a study of the debates held thereon
and for informing the people of the official conduct of
their respective legislators.
It is for these purposes that the Constitution re­
quires that the journals be published from time to time
excepting such parts as may affect the national security,
which ought not to be divulged to the public in general.
The publication of the journals is in line with the right
to information on matters of public concern as guaran­
teed in Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution.
In U.S. v. Pons,98 the Supreme Court refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative journals, which it
held to be conclusive on the courts. “To inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature,” it
ruled, “when they are, as we have said, clear and ex­
plicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature.”

98 34 Phil. 729; Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268.

246 Philippine P olitical Law

But except only where the matters are required to

be entered in the journals, like the yeas and nays on the
final reading of a bill or on any question at the request
of one-fifth of the members present, the contents of the
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journal in
case of conflict. This rule was first laid down in the case
of Mabanag u. Lopez Vito,99 where the Supreme Court
held that it was bound under the doctrine of separation
of powers by the contents of a duly authenticated resolu­
tion of the legislature.
An enrolled bill has been defined as one “which has
been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the
governor (or president) and filed by the secretary of
state.”100
In the case of Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gi-
menez,101 petitioners claimed that the phrase “urea for­
maldehyde” as used in a statute should be read as “urea
and formaldehyde,” to rectify an alleged error in the
printing of the enrolled bill. The Supreme Court, in
dismissing this claim, declared:

“Hence, ‘urea formaldehyde’ is clearly a finished product

which is patently distinct and different from ‘urea’ and ‘for­
maldehyde’ as separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin known as ‘urea formaldehyde.’ Petitioner con­
tends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction ‘and’ between the term ‘urea’ and
‘formaldehyde,’ and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt ‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde’ separately as essential ele­
ments in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
‘urea formaldehyde,’ not the latter as a finished product, citing
in support of this view the statements made on the floor o f the

83 78 Phil. 1.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th rev. ed. 624.
101 7 SCRA 374.
 T he Legislative Department 247

Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,

by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz. 615;
Mayor Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Reve­
nue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, I960}).
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill—which
uses the term ‘urea formaldehyde’ instead of ‘urea and formal­
dehyde’—is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the Presi­
dent (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm, on Elections, L-
18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Con­
gress and approved by the Executive— on which we cannot
speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one o f the cornerstones of our demo­
cratic system—the remedy is by amendment or curative legis­
lation, not by judicial decree.”

In the VAT Case, 102 the Supreme Court emphasized

that “our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that
an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also its due enactment. Not even claims
that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been
‘smuggled’ in the printing of the bill have moved or per­
suaded us to look behind the proceedings of a co-equal
branch of the government.”
Earlier, in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,103
the Supreme Court had—

102 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630.

m 227 SCRA 703.
248 Philippine P olitical Law

. . decline(d) to look into the petitioners’ charges that

an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of each
House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals cer­
tify that the measure was duly enacted, i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the gov­
ernment, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming cour­
tesy.”

O f particular interest is the case of Astorga v.

Villegas, 104 where an enrolled bill was discovered to have
included, in lieu of the changes approved in the Senate,
certain other proposals that had in fact been rejected.
When this anomaly was discovered, the Senate Presi­
dent withdrew his signature from the enrolled bill and
the President of the Philippines did likewise. In this
action to enforce the measure as originally approved,
the petitioner argued that, assuming there was a con­
flict between the recitals in the journals and the version
of the measure as embodied in the enrolled bill, the con­
flict should be resolved in favor of the enrolled bill.
However, the Supreme Court did not sustain this con­
tention, holding that it had the authority in this case to
verify the real content of the approved bill as reported in
the journal. The reason was that there was actually no
enrolled bill to speak of in view of the withdrawal of the
signatures of the President of the Philippines and the
Senate President.
The journal is only a resume or the minutes of what
transpired during a legislative session. The record is the
word-for-word transcript of the proceedings taken dur­
ing the session.

"M56 SCRA 714.

 The Legislative Department 249

It is to be noted that, in League o f Cities of the Phil­

ippines v. COMELEC, 105 the Supreme Court observed
that the hearings and deliberations during a previous
Congress cannot be i^sed to interpret bills enacted into
law in the next or subsequent Congresses.
A t any rate, at the request of one-fifth of the Mem­
bers present, the yeas and nays on any question shall be
entered in the Journal.106 The Constitution likewise re­
quires the recording in the Journal of the votes with
respect to the consideration of bills on third reading,107
the recording of the objections of the President when he
vetoes a bill as well as the votes cast by the Members of
each House in their reconsideration of a bill vetoed by
the President,108 and the vote of each Member of the
House of Representatives regarding the Articles of Im­
peachment proposed by its Committee which hears an
impeachment complaint.109

Adjournment
“(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress
shall, without the consent o f the other, adjourn for more than
three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.”

The above rule appeared in the Commonwealth

Constitution but was deleted from the 1973 charter
because the legislature established thereunder was uni­
cameral. It is now revived with the restoration of bicam­
eralism, which envisions collaboration and coordination
between the two chambers of the Congress.

105 G.R. No. 176951, Novcmbor 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263.
Constitution, Article VI, Section 16(4).
107Ibid., Article VI, Section 26 (2).
10SId., Article VI, Section 27 (1).
109Id., Article XI, Section 3 (3).
250 Philippine Political Law

As there is need for constant contact and consulta­

tion between the two bodies, it is necessary that there
be prior agreement before either of them decides to ad­
journ for more than three days. For the same reason,
one House should not adjourn to a place other than
where both chambers are sitting, without the consent of
the other. In this connection, “place” as here used refers
not to the building but to the political unit where the
two Houses may be sitting.110 Hence, if both Houses are
sitting in the same building in the City of Manila, either
of them may sit in another building in the same city
without getting the consent of the other.

The Electoral Tribunals

The 1973 Constitution made the Commission on

Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the
election, returns and qualifications of all members of the
legislature, but now decision of such cases is entrusted
once again to the Electoral Tribunals, which have been
restored by the following provision.

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives

shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali­
fications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

"" Jefferson’s Manual.

 The Legislative Department 251

The original provision in the Commonwealth Con­

stitution entitled only the parties having the largest and
second largest number of votes in the chamber to nomi­
nate three members pach to the legislative seats. Now
such seats are apportioned among all the parties repre­
sented in each chamber, including the party-list mem­
bers. Thus, if there are three parties represented in the
Senate with thirteen, seven and four members, respec­
tively, the first shall have three of the legislative seats,
the second two and the third one.
The change introduced by the 1987 Constitution fa­
vors the multi-party system as against the two-party
system which the original rule sought to institutional­
ize.
The case of Tanada v. Cuenco111 held that the right
to nominate to the legislative seats in the Electoral Tri­
bunals belonged to the majority and minority parties in
the chamber, not to the chamber itself or to the majority
party therein if the minority did not make its own
nomination. Presumably, the parties entitled to repre­
sentation in the Electoral Tribunals now are also enti­
tled to nominate their own representatives although the
above provision does not expressly say so. At any rate,
in the event that they should fail or refuse to do so,
would the body itself have the right to fill the vacancies
with representatives from such party? And in case the
representative chosen fails or refuses to assume his
seat, may the chamber then choose a member from an­
other party to fill the vacancy? The records of the Con­
stitutional Commission do not suggest any answer to
these questions.

S u p ra .
252 Philippine P olitical Law

In Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 112 the peti­

tioners, who were protestants in a contest before the
respondent body, sought the disqualification of all the
legislative members thereof on the ground that they
were among the protestees in the said contest, along
with the other majority members of the Senate. (The
original opposition member, Senator Estrada, later
joined the majority and was replaced by Senator Enrile,
who voluntarily inhibited himself.) In dismissing the
petition, the Supreme Court said through Justice Gan-
cayco:

“It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a

Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court
and member of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both
those ‘judicial’ and legislative’ components commonly share
the duty and authority o f deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The re­
spondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition
when it held that said provision ‘is a clear expression of an in­
tent that all (such) contests *** shall be resolved by a panel or
body in which their (the Senators’) peers in that Chamber are
represented.’ The other part, o f course, is that the constitu­
tional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in
the same process of decision of a representative or representa­
tives of the Supreme Court.
“Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that
the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed mem­
bership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmis­
takable indication that the ‘legislative component’ cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senato­
rial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution.
“Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes
the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any
of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objectives to the substitute’s competence, the proposed mass

12 166 SCRA 651.

 The Legislative Department 253

disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the

Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully dis­
charge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators.
“To our mind, this is the overriding consideration-that
the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in
the highest interest as evidenced by its being expressly im­
posed by no less than the fundamental law.
“It is aptly noted in the first o f the questioned Resolu­
tions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would in­
volve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have
to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility would sur­
face again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more,
but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake.
Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators des­
ignated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal, Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.”

Although the Electoral Tribunals are predomi­

nantly legislative in membership and the provision cre­
ating them is found in Article VI on the Legislative De­
partment, it is not correct to say that they are mere
adjuncts of the Congress of the Philippines. In fact, in
the discharge of their constitutional duties, they are
independent of the legislature, and also of the other
departments for that matter.
Thus, in the early case of Angara v. Electoral Com­
mission,113 it was held that the respondent body (prede­
cessor of the Electoral Tribunals) had the exclusive right
to prescribe its own rules of procedure, as against those

1IJ S u p ra .
 2 54 Philippine P olitical Law

earlier adopted by the legislature itself, in connection

with the election contests under its jurisdiction. This
ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lazatin u.
House Electoral Tribunal.114
In Suanes vs. Disbursing Officer o f the Senate,115 the
Supreme Court further bolstered the independence of
these bodies by holding that “the employees of the Elec­
toral Tribunals are its own, and not of the Senate nor
the House of Representatives nor of any other entity,
and it stands to reason that the appointment, the su­
pervision, and the control over the said employees are
wholly within the Tribunal itself.”
The decisions rendered by the Electoral Tribunals
in the contests mentioned in this section, of which they
are the sole judge, are not appealable to the Supreme
Court except in cases where there is a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion.116
Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the HRET must be established by a clear show­
ing of arbitrariness and improvidence.117 The circum­
stance that none of the three Supreme Court Justices
took part in its Decision cannot be taken as proof of
grave abuse of discretion.118
The independence of the Electoral Tribunals as the
sole judge of all election contests involving the members

" 1 168 SCRA 391.

1,5 L-2480, Oct. 26, 1948.
Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429; Aznar v. HRET, G.R. No.
65000, Jan. 9, 1990.
"7 Duenas v. HRET, G.R. No. 185401, July 21, 2009, 593 SCRA
316, citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780.
118 Duenas v. HRET, G.R. No. 191550, May 4, 2010, 620 SCRA
78.
 The L egislative Department 255

of Congress was affirmed in Robles v. House o f Repre­

sentatives Electoral Tribunal,119
A different question was raised in Bondoc v.
Pineda, 120to wit, whether the House of Representatives
could, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change its representative in the House of Rep­
resentatives Electoral Tribunal, presumably “to thwart
the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the
Tribunal.”
While acknowledging the independence of the Tri­
bunal as the “sole judge” of election contests involving
the members of the House of Representatives, the Su­
preme Court assumed jurisdiction, precisely to protect
that independence. The decision penned by Justice
Carolina Grino-Aquino declared:

“The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so

zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle
and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judi­
cial) component of the Electoral Tribunal, to serve the interests
of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party’s candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment
of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribu­
nal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
“To sanction such interference by the House of Repre­
sentatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of
the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Su­
preme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to

113181 SCRA 780.

120201 SCRA 792.
256 Philippine Political Law

stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope

at the threshold of the Tribunal.
“As judges, the members of the Tribunal must be non­
partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence—even independ­
ence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, ‘dis­
loyalty to party’ and ‘breach of party discipline’ are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the Tribunal. In ex­
pelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
cast a ‘conscience vote’ in favor o f Bondoc, based strictly on the
result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and
the recount of the votes by the Tribunal, the House of Repre­
sentatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice,
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion
against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.”

It is significant that the Supreme Court has charac­

terized the resolution of electoral contests as “essen­
tially an exercise of judicial power” and that, although
“not courts of law,” both the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
and the Commission on Elections, are all, “nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in
essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the
explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section
2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17,
Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribu­
nals) of the Constitution.” The Court stressed, however,
that “when the COM ELEC, the HRET, and the SET
decide election contests, their decisions are still subject
to judicial review — via a petition for certiorari filed by
the proper party — if there is a showing that the deci­
sion was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tanta­
mount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”121

,2j Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783, and June 7, 2011, 651
SCRA 239.
 The Legislative Department 257

Apparently consistent with the provisions of Sec­

tion 17 which states that the Electoral Tribunals shall
be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective “M em­
bers,” the Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that
the jurisdiction of an Electoral Tribunal begins once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office, for it is only after the occurrence of
these events that a candidate can be considered as ei­
ther a Member of the House of Representatives or a
Senator.122 The practical application of these rulings, at
least insofar as the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) is concerned, has been that it com­
mences to exercise such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of
the Commission on Elections, which has initial jurisdic­
tion over said matters (pursuant to its general authority
to enforce and administer all election laws and decide
all questions affecting elections),123 upon the proclama­
tion of the winning candidate.124

122 Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1,

2009, 583 SCRA 1; Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106,
1115-1116 (1999); Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995);
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, 520 SCRA 166, 179;
Aggabao v. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405; Guerrero v.
COMELEC, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 644
SCRA 761, 798-799; Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25,
2013.
123 Constitution, Article IX-B, Sections 2(1) and 2(3); Jalosjos v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA
530.
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra, see also Jalosjos
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474, October 9, 2012, 683
SCRA 1; see also Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 130 Phil. 663,
672 (1968), where the Supreme Court made a general statement to
the effect that “after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party
aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest.”
258 Philippine Political Law

For instance, in Jalosjos v. C O M E LEC ,125 the Su­

preme Court annulled a Resolution issued by the Com­
mission on Elections En Banc on June 3, 2010 providing
for the petitioner’s disqualification on the ground that
he had already been proclaimed on M ay 13, 2012. Citing
the earlier cases of Planas v. Commission on Elections,126
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections ,m
and Perez
v. Commission on Elections,128 the Court stressed in this
case that “the proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests COM ELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and quali­
fications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of
the H RET.” The Court did not specify in its Decision in
this case when the petitioner was supposed to have
taken his oath of office and actually assumed office.
In Planas, the Court declared that “the general rule
is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate
divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET.”
However, it must be noted that, in said case, the Su­
preme Court nullified a Resolution (dated March 11,
2005) of the Commission on Elections En Banc issued
almost a year after the winning candidate’s proclama­
tion on M ay 17, 2004. By then, it was clear that the
latter had already assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives. The CO M ELEC had therefore
evidently lost its jurisdiction over the petition to declare
the private respondent’s substitution as invalid when it
issued its subject Resolution on March 11, 2005.
In Vinzons-Chato, the Court likewise pronounced
that “where the candidate has already been proclaimed

ur' Ibid.
126 519 Phil. 506, 512 (2006).
,27 520 SCRA 166, 178.
128 375 Phil. 1106, 1115-1116 (1999).
 The Legislative D epartment 259

winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the

petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.”
In said case, the winning candidate was proclaimed on
M ay 14, 2004. While,the COM ELEC ordered on July 2,
2004 the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of
the private respondent, it, however, lifted the same on
July 23, 2004 “on the ground that respondent Unico’s
proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only
divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass
upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral
tribunal.” It is significant that Congress convened that
year on July 26, 2004, or three days after the COME­
LEC declared it had lost jurisdiction over the case in
favor of the HRET, although the term of the proclaimed
winning candidate, or the private respondent, com­
menced at noon of June 30, 2004.
In Perez, the private respondent was proclaimed on
M ay 16, 1998, and took his oath of office the next day.
The Supreme Court dismissed this petition filed before
it on June 16, 1998, stating that, at the time of the filing
of the same, the private respondent was already a
Member of the House of Representatives. Accordingly,
the Court ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over
this particular electoral contest. It is significant that the
term of Members of the House of Representatives com­
mences at “noon on the thirtieth day of June next fol­
lowing their election.”129 Thus, the oath taken by the
private respondent in this case on M ay 17, 1998 could
not have served to install him into office, considering
that, at that point, his predecessor’s term had not yet

123 Constitution, Article VI, Section 7; see Dimaporo v. COME­

LEC, 544 SCRA 381.
260 Philippine Political Law

expired. Accordingly, the private respondent could not

have validly assumed office then, or on May 17,1998.
Perhaps, in an effort to address the confusion gen­
erated by, or to reconcile, its apparently conflicting rul­
ings in the aforecited cases, the Supreme Court, in the
controversial, if not disturbing, case of Reyes v. Commis­
sion on Elections130 clarified, or reiterated, that “the ju­
risdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives.”
O f course, it cannot acquire jurisdiction over said candi­
date “unless a petition is duly filed with said Tribunal.”
According to the Court, to be considered a “Member” of
the House of Representatives, “there must be a concur­
rence of the following requisites: (a) a valid proclama­
tion, (b) a proper oath, and (c) assumption of office.” It
stressed that a “proper oath” would be one taken before
the Speaker of the House of Representatives “in open
session,” consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of
Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Rep­
resentatives.
In other words, it would seem that a “proper oath”
can only be taken by a new Member of the House of
Representatives only once it convenes, which would be
on the fourth Monday of July,131 as only then may Con­
gress meet in “open session,” unless a special session is
held in the meantime. Curiously, this Reyes decision did
not address the matters of when the “proper oath” can
be taken by a proclaimed candidate, and when he is to
be considered as having “assumed office.” Considering
that, as previously observed, the term of office of Mem­
bers of the House of Representatives commences only at

1311G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013 (see also Resolution on Mo­
tion for Reconsideration, October 23, 2013).
' " Constitution, Article VI, Section 15.
 The Legislative Department 261

noon of the thirtieth day of June next following their

election, it would seem that said oath and assumption of
office clearly cannot be done prior to said date, as the
terms of the their predecessors would, before said time
and date, have not yet expired. Moreover, another ques­
tion arises — how can the House of Representatives
properly convene and validly hold an “open session”
when it would be only during said “open session” that
they all can validly take their “proper oaths?” Needless
to state, the presence of a quorum would be required for
a valid “open session” to be convened or held.132 Stated
otherwise, how can the newly-elected “Members” of the
House of Representatives constitute themselves into a
quorum when, upon the convening of Congress, they
would yet need to take their oaths of office, and it would
be only after they shall have properly established a quo­
rum can a valid “open session” be called for purposes of
enabling them to properly take their oaths as new
“Members” of the House of Representatives?
Moreover, as stressed by Justice Brion in his Dis­
senting Opinion in said case, the “majority’s jurispru­
dential ruling is contrary to the HRET’s rules, effec­
tively allows the filing of any election protest or a peti­
tion for quo warranto only after the assumption to office
by the candidate on June 30 at the earliest” and “would
affect all future proclamations since they cannot be ear­
lier than 15 days counted from the June 30 constitu­
tional cut-off for the assumption to office of newly-
elected officials.” He added —

“I submit on this point that the proclamation o f the

winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the ju­
risdiction o f the HRET over election contests relating to the
winning candidate’s election, returns, and qualifications. In

132I b i d ., Article VI, Section 16 (2).

26 2 P hilippine Political Law

other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate divests

the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before
it at the time of the proclamation and the party questioning
the qualifications o f the winning candidate should now present
his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo warranto) before
the HRET who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole juris­
diction to hear and decide cases involving the election, returns
and qualifications of members o f the House of Representa­
tives.”

Indeed, it would seem that to strictly adhere to the

rules specified in the Reyes case would necessarily entail
the revision by the HRET of its rules prescribing the
deadlines for the filing of election protests and petitions
for quo warranto before it. This may be viewed as an
unnecessary consequence which would undermine its
independence. A t present, said rules require the filing of
such election protests133 and petitions for quo warranto134
within fifteen days from the proclamation of the win­
ning candidates. Said fifteen days would well expire
before “noon of the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.” Perhaps, this issue can be resolved with
a reconsideration of the interpretation assigned to the
word “Member” as used in Section 17. It may be neces­
sary to understand the same as referring simply to the
nature of the officer over whom the HRET may exercise
its jurisdiction, and not to the status o f the proclaimed
candidate. On this basis, the HRET can be said to pos­
sess jurisdiction over candidates for the House of Repre­
sentatives who have been proclaimed as winners upon
their proclamation, without need for them to first take
their oaths and actually assume office.

IU The 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal, Section 16.
“ I b id ., Section 17.
 The Legislative Department 263

It is worth noting that, in B AN A T v. C O M E L E C ,135

the Court declared that the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals can be invoked only after the winning candi­
dates have been proclaimed.
A t any rate, as previously observed, in Lim -
kaichong v. C O M E LEC ,1?8 the Supreme Court ruled that
the HRET would have jurisdiction over a petition for
disqualification based on citizenship filed against a
Member of the House of Representatives, as said quali­
fication is a continuing requirement and may be taken
cognizance of by the H RET even if filed beyond the pre­
scribed prescriptive period for the institution of the
same. However, according to the Supreme Court, “it is
the State, through its representatives designated by
statute that may question the illegally or invalidly pro­
cured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter
that may be raised by private persons in an election
case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.” In
Vilando v. H R E T ,137 the Supreme Court remarked that
“such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve
into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise
would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
the father which, as already stated, is not permissible.”
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
would obviously not have jurisdiction over the qualifica­
tions of candidates who have not been proclaimed as
winners, including nominees of winning parties in
party-list elections who have not qualified to represent

G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.

as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1.
m 656 SCRA 17 (2011).
264 Philippine P olitical Law

the same in view of the maximum number of represen­

tatives assigned for each of the parties. Neither would it
have jurisdiction over the parties themselves. It would
only be the Commission on Elections which may enter­
tain petitions for the disqualification of said national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
or for the cancellation of their registration.138

The Commission on Appointments

Also revived in the 1987 Constitution, to limit once

again the President’s appointing power, is the Commis­
sion on Appointments under the following provision:

“Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appoint­

ments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis o f pro­
portional representation from the political parties and parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system repre­
sented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by
a majority vote of all the Members.”

This is a substantial reproduction of the corres­

ponding section in the Commonwealth Constitution and
reiterates the system o f proportional representation of
the parties sitting in the Senate and the House of Rep­
resentatives. The additional rule is the requirement
that all appointments submitted to the Commission
must be acted upon within thirty session days from
their submission. A d interim appointments not acted
upon at the time o f the adjournment of the Congress,

l,H Layug v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192984, Febru­

ary 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 135.
 T he Legislative Department 265

even if the thirty-day period has not yet expired, are

deemed by-passed under Article VII, Section 16.
In Daza v. Singson,139 the petitioner questioned his
replacement in the (.Commission on Appointments, in­
sisting that his designation thereto as a representative
of the Liberal Party was permanent and could not be
withdrawn. For his part, the respondent contended that
he could be validly named in the petitioner’s place in
view of the political realignment in the House of Repre­
sentatives following the organization of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), to which he belonged.
Both invoked the earlier case of Cunanan v. Tan, 140
where the Supreme Court had held that the political
affiliations in the two Houses of Congress should be
reflected in their respective representations in the Com­
mission on Appointments. The petitioner claimed that
the formation of the LDP was a merely temporary de­
velopment whereas the respondent maintained that it
had permanently altered the political composition of the
House of Representatives.
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the Supreme
Court declared inter alia:

“The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on

the non-registration o f the LDP which, he claims, has not pro­
vided the permanent political realignment to justify the ques­
tioned reorganization. As he insists:
“(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced
majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed re­
organization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because
the LDP, not being a duly registered political party, is
not entitled to the ‘rights and privileges granted by law
to political parties’ (Sec. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore
cannot legally claim the right to be considered in deter-

139S u p r a .
u° 5 SCRA 1.
266 Philippine P olitical Law

mining the required proportional representation of politi­

cal parties in the House of Representatives.
x x x
“xxx the clear constitutional intent behind Section
18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right
of representation in the Commission on Appointments
only to political parties who are duly registered with the
Comelec.
“On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boo-
meranged against the petitioner. On that date, the Commis­
sion on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolu­
tion of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the
petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. This
has taken the wind out o f the sails of the petitioner, so to
speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.
“The petitioner’s contention that, even if registered, the
party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is
not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining
the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or
the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the
Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only
recently and has not yet ‘aged.’ The Liberal Party itself would
fall in such a category. That party was created in December
1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded there­
from to support Manuel A. Roxas’s bid for the Presidency of the
Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. The Liberal
Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no
question was raised as to its right to be represented in the
Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals
by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of
the Congress.
“The LDP has been in existence for more than one year
now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives
and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than
the President o f the Philippines and its president is Senator
Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ra­
mon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still
are, some internal disagreements among its members, but
these are to be expected in any political organization, espe­
cially if it is democratic in structure. In fact, even the mono­
lithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has un-
 The Legislative Department 267

dergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely

cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.
“If the petitioner’s argument were to be pursued, the 157
members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would
have to be denied Representation in the Commission on Ap­
pointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal.
By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now
‘history only,’ should also be written off. The independents also
cannot be represented because they belong to no political
party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only—with
all of its seventeen members—to claim all the twelve seats of
the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appoint­
ments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tri­
bunal.”

Organization

The following provision is also reproduced from the

Commonwealth Constitution:

“Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission

on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call o f its Chairman or a majority
o f all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as
are herein conferred upon it.”

This provision is based on the need to enable the

President to exercise his appointing power with dispatch
in coordination with the Commission on Appointments.
The rule that the Commission on Appointments can
meet only during the sessions of the Congress is the rea­
son why ad interim appointments are permitted under
the Constitution. These appointments are made during
the recess, subject to consideration later by the Com­
mission, for confirmation or rejection. A d interim ap­
pointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
268 Philippine P olitical Law

the Commission on Appointments or until the next ad­

journment of the Congress, referring to the adjournment
of the regular or special session141 immediately following
the recess when said appointments were made.142
But where the Congress is in session, the President
must first clear his nominations with the Commission
on Appointments, which is why it must be constituted
as soon as possible. Unless it is organized, no appoint­
ment can be made by the President in the meantime. In
the case of the Electoral Tribunals, the need for their
early organization is obvious, considering the rash of
election contests already waiting to be filed after, and
even before, the proclamation of the winners. This is
also the reason why, unlike the Commission on Ap­
pointments, the Electoral Tribunals are supposed to
continue functioning even during the recess.

Ml Guevara v. Inocentes, G.R. No. L-25577, March 15, 1966, 18

SCRA 379.
142Constitution, Article VII, Section 16.
 Chapter 9

POWERS OF THE CONGRESS

THE POWERS of the Congress may be classified gener­

ally into legislative and non-legislative. The legislative
power includes the specific powers of appropriation,
taxation, and expropriation. The non-legislative powers,
as previously mentioned, include the power to canvass
the presidential elections, to declare the existence of a
state of war, to give concurrence to treaties and amnes­
ties, to propose constitutional amendments, and to im­
peach.
These powers are expressly conferred by the Con­
stitution. From such express powers may be derived
some implied powers, such as the power to punish con­
tempt in legislative investigations. The Congress also
possesses inherent powers, such as the determination of
its rules of proceedings and the discipline of its mem­
bers.

Legislative Power in General

Legislative power is the power of lawmaking, the

framing and enactment of laws. This is effected through
the adoption of a bill, or a proposed or projected law,
which, once approved, becomes a statute. A statute is
“the written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed
according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law
of the state.”1

1Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 1581.

269
 270 Philippine P olitical Law

The Supreme Court observed in Association of

Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
o f Agrarian Reform2 that “during the past dictatorship,
every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was
called, had the force and effect of law.” It has since been
clarified that legislative power is “peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a
state of emergency” can justify the President’s “exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees.”3
The power to make laws includes the power to alter
and repeal them.4 In Gonzales v. Hechanova/ President
Macapagal entered into two executive agreements for
the importation of rice without complying with a statu­
tory requirement for the prior obtention from the Na­
tional Economic Council of a certification of a shortage
of the cereal. On the question of which should prevail as
between the executive agreements and the statutes, the
Supreme Court decided in favor of the latter, holding
inter alia as follows:

“Under the Constitution, the main function of the Execu­

tive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may
not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter except in the exercise of the veto power. He may not de­
feat legislative enactments by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance
o f the very act prohibited by such laws."

2 175 SCRA 343, cited in Heirs o f Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao, G.R.

No. 136466, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 294.
■' David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA
161.
* Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 180046, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428, 450. citing Kilusang Mayo
Uno v. Director-General, National Economic Development Authority,
G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 623.
r’ 9 SCRA 230.
 Powers of the C ongress 271

In Datu Michael Abas Kida u. Senate o f the Philip­

pines ,8 the Supreme Court clarified that subsequent
laws that do not change or revise any provision in an
earlier law, and whjch merely fill in gaps or supplement
said earlier law, cannot be considered as amendments of
the latter.
In League o f Cities o f the Philippines v. COMELEC,7
the Supreme Court stressed that “the legislative body
possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil gov­
ernment. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine,
except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly
or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects,
and extends to matters of general concern or common
interest.”
Accordingly, it has been ruled that the power to
grant immunity from prosecution has been acknowl­
edged as essentially a legislative prerogative. “The ex­
clusive power of Congress to define crimes and their
nature and to provide for their punishment concomi­
tantly carries the power to immunize certain persons
from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state
interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of
crimes with high political, social and economic impact.
In the exercise of this power, Congress possesses broad
discretion and can lay down the conditions and the ex­
tent of the immunity to be granted.”8

6 G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270.

7 G.R. No. 176951, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 150; see also
Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998); Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192,
212 (1946).
8 Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 512 Phil. 590
(2005), cited in Quarto v. The Honorable Ombudsman Simeon
Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA. 580, citing
272 Philippine Political Law

O f course, Congress is limited in its exercise of its

legislative power by the Constitution. For instance, it
cannot provide for the holdover of elective officers if the
same would go beyond their terms, as fixed in the Con­
stitution.9 Neither can it “also create a new term and
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the
new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President.”10 It
likewise cannot grant legislative franchises for the op­
eration of public utilities which shall be exclusive in
character and which shall not be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal when the common good so requires.11
In Datu Michael Abas Kida, Congress provided that
a law it had passed may be re-amended or revised by
the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-
thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representa­
tives and of the Senate voting separately. The Supreme
Court nullified this provision stating that Congress
cannot pass irrepealable laws. It stressed that “where
the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its
power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty
to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary
powers of Congress.”12

Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, 231
SCRA 783.
9 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, supra.
10 Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472
SCRA 587, cited in Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philip­
pines, supra.
" Constitution, Article XII, Section 11; see Tawang Multi-
Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471,
March 22, 2011, 646 SCRA 21.
12 Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 49 (1915), cited in Datu Michael
Abas Kida v. Senate o f the Philippines, supra.
 Powers of the Congress 273

Laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless

the contrary is provided. Statutes can be given retroac­
tive effect when the law itself so expressly provides; in
case of remedial statutes; in case of curative statutes; in
case of laws interpreting others; and in case of laws
creating new rights.13 In PERT/CPM Manpower Exponent
Co., Inc. v. Vinuya,14 the Supreme Court explained —

“Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the con­

trary is provided. By its very nature, the amendment intro­
duced by R.A. 10022 — restoring a provision of R A . 8042 de­
clared unconstitutional — cannot be given retroactive effect,
not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity
in the law, but because retroactive application will result in an
impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by
virtue of the Serrano ruling — entitlement to their salaries for
the unexpired portion o f their employment contracts. All sta­
tutes are to be construed as having only a prospective applica­
tion, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
them a retrospective effect are expressly declared or are neces­
sarily implied from the language used. We thus see no reason
to nullify the application of the Serrano ruling in the present
case.”

As previously noted, the Supreme Court affirmed in

Atizado v. People15 the retroactive application of Repub-

13 Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.

Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007, 534
SCRA 112.
MG.R. No. 197528, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 284, citing
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March
24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254 and Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management,
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369.
G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 105; see People
v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009, 599 SCRA 20; see
also People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA
188; People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013, 689
SCRA 715.
 274 Philippine Political Law

lie Act No. 9344, which favors “children in conflict with

the law.”

Procedure

The procedure in the approval of bills is briefly as

follows:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of
Representatives or the Senate except for some measures
that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the-
number and title of the measure and its referral by the
Senate President or the Speaker to the proper commit­
tee for study.
The bill may be “killed” in the committee or it may
be recommended for approval, with or without amend­
ments, sometimes after public hearings are first held
thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or
purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under
common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for
second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in
its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended
when desired. The second reading is the most important
stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in
its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least
three days before the third reading. On third reading,
the members merely register their votes and explain
them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate
is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the
other chamber, where it will also undergo the three
readings. If there are differences between the versions
 Powers of the Congress 275

approved by the two chambers, a conference committee

representing both Houses will draft a compromise
measure that, if ratified by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, will then be submitted to the President
for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally ap­
proved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with
the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker,
and the Secretaries of their respective chambers, and
approved by the President.16

Origin of Bills

The restoration of bicameralism has also revived

the following provision appearing in the 1935 Constitu­
tion:

“Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills

authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local applica­
tion, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.”

An appropriation bill is one the primary and spe­

cific purpose of which is to authorize the release of funds
from the public treasury.17
A revenue bill is one that levies taxes and raises
funds for the government,18 while a tariff bill specifies
the rates or duties to be imposed on imported articles.19

lfi Cited in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No.

166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
17Bengzon v. Secretary o f Justice, 299 U.S. 410.
U.S. v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566.
Black 4th rev. ed. 1628.
276 Philippine P olitical Law

A bill increasing the public debt is illustrated by

one floating bonds for public subscription redeemable
after a certain period.
A bill of local application is one involving purely lo­
cal or municipal matters, like a charter of a city.
Private bills are illustrated by a bill granting hon­
orary citizenship to a distinguished foreigner.
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be ini­
tiated by the House of Representatives because it is
more numerous in membership and therefore also more
representative of the people. Moreover, its members are
presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the
country in regard to the enactment of the legislation
involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in
the exercise of its power to propose or concur with
amendments to the bills initiated by the House of Rep­
resentatives. Thus, in one case, a bill introduced in the
U .S. House of Representatives was changed by the Sen­
ate to make a proposed inheritance tax a corporation
tax.20 It is also accepted practice for the Senate to intro­
duce what is known as an amendment by substitution,
which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the
House of Representatives.
This was what happened in Tolentino u. Secretary
o f Finance,21 where the Expanded VAT Law was ques­
tioned on the ground, among others, that the revenue
measure did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as it was the result of the consolidation
of two versions introduced separately in the two cham­
bers of Congress. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court re­

2“ Plint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107.

21 235 SCRA 630.
 Powers of the Congress 277

jected the challenge, holding that such consolidation

was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose
or concur with amendments to the version originated in
the House of Representatives. What the Constitution
simply means, according to the majority, is that the
initiative must come from the House of Representatives.

Prohibited Measures

There are certain measures that may not be passed

by the Congress owing to the nature of our government,
such as those impairing the doctrine of separation of
powers or providing for the appointment of elective offi­
cers. There are also specific prohibitions in the Bill of
Rights against the enactment of ex post facto laws, bills
of attainder, or laws impairing the obligation of con­
tracts. O f this nature is the following provision, also in
Article VI, which was contained in the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution:

“Sec. 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility

shall be enacted.”

The purpose of this provision is to preserve the re­

publican and democratic nature of our society by prohib­
iting the creation of privileged classes with special per­
quisites not available to the rest of the citizenry. The
stratification of our society will result in the violation of
Article II, Section 1, proclaiming that sovereignty re­
sides in the people as a whole without distinction as to
birth or lineage, unlike in monarchial regimes.
Another prohibition, this time more appropriate for
inclusion under the Judicial Department, is the follow­
ing section, also in Article VI:
278 Philippine Political Law

“Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appel­

late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Con­
stitution without its advice and concurrence.”

The purpose is to prevent further additions to the

present tremendous case load of the Supreme Court
which includes the backlog of the past two decades. In
meritorious cases, however, such legislation may be
enacted provided the Supreme Court itself is consulted
and gives its concurrence.
Accordingly, in Fabian v. Desierto,22 the Supreme
Court nullified “Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7,
Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and any other provision of law
implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they pro­
vide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases
from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme
Court.” According to the Court, “such provision was
violative of Section 30, Article V I of the Constitution as
it expanded our appellate jurisdiction without our ad­
vice and concurrence; and that it was also inconsistent
with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which pro­
vides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply
only to a review of judgments or final orders of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts au­
thorized by law.”

Title of Bills

“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only

one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”2,1

22 G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 470; see
also Ruivivar v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165012, September 16, 2008,
565 SCRA 324.
2J Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 26(1).
 Powers of the Congress 279

The purposes of this rule are:

(1) To prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legisla­

tion. This is defined as “any act containing several sub­
jects dealing with 'unrelated matters representing di­
verse interests, the main object of such combination
being to unite the members of the legislature who favor
any one of the subjects in support of the whole act.”

(2) To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legisla­

ture.

(3) To fairly apprise the people, through such pub­

lications of its proceedings as are usually made, o f the
subjects of legislation that are being considered in order
that they may have the opportunity of being heard there­
on, by petition or otherwise, if they should so desire.24

Thus, in Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, 25 the

challenged law was entitled “An Act Creating the M u­
nicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”
when in fact the said municipality comprised not only
barrios in Lanao del Sur but also two municipalities to
be dismembered in the adjacent province of Cotabato.
Interestingly, even the congressman from Cotabato
voted in favor, only to discover later the prejudice to his
own province. In holding the law unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court, observed:

“The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is

not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the mem­
bers o f Congress as to the full impact o f the law; it did not ap­
prise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cota­
bato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory was being taken away from their towns and province
and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept

24 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 172.

25 21 SCRA 496.
 280 P hilippine Political Law

the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were ac­
tually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heav­
ily weigh against the constitutionality o f Republic Act 4790.”

In PH ILCO N SA v. Gimenez,26 the Supreme Court

also annulled a law innocently entitled “An Act Amend­
ing Subsection (c), Section Twelve, of Commonwealth
Act Numbered Thirty Hundred Ninety Six,” which was
revealed upon closer examination to be a clandestine at­
tempt of the Congress to grant special retirement privi­
leges to its members.
But the title need not be a complete catalogue of a
bill. It is permitted, for example, to entitle a law “An Act
to Ordain and Institute the Civil Code of the Philip­
pines,” since the word “code” is sufficient to place the
legislature and the people on their guard as to the num­
ber of varied if related subjects the measure embraces.
In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a law entitled “An Act Con­
verting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City of Mandaluyong” was challenged on the
ground inter alia that it also provided for its conversion
into a separate legislative district. The Supreme Court
said this was a consequence of Article V I, Sec. 5(3) re­
quiring each city with a population of 250,000 or more to
have at least one representative. The Court reiterated its
earlier pronouncement that the rule should be given “a
practical rather than a technical construction” and said
it should suffice if “the title expresses the general sub­
ject and all the provisions are germane to that general
subject.”

2“ 15 SCRA 479 (1965).

27 G.R. No. 114783, Dec. 8,1994.
 Powers of the Congress 281

In B A N A T v. COMELEC,™ the Supreme Court re­

marked that the “requirement is satisfied i f the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The
title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents
and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an
act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the pre­
cise nature of the amendatory act need not be further
stated.” Accordingly, the provisions of the subject law
assailed in said case, RA 9369, which spoke of “poll
automation” but contained “substantial provisions deal­
ing with the manual canvassing of election returns,”
particularly, Sections 34 (on official watchers), 37 (on
Congress and the Commission on Elections acting as
National Boards of Canvassers), 38 (on pre-proclamation
cases) and 43 (on election offenses) thereof, were all con­
sidered by the Court as “germane to the subject matter
of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881,
among others.”
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9164 enti­
tled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending Republic
Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Lo­
cal Government Code of 1991” was challenged on the
ground that, while its title announced that it pertained
to the synchronization of the elections for barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan officials, it likewise provided for
term limits for said officers. The Supreme Court, in re­
jecting the challenge, stated —

28 G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.

2 8 2 Philippine P olitical Law

“First, the title of RA No. 9164, ‘An Act Providing for

Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elec­
tions, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code o f 1991,’ states the law’s
general subject matter — the amendment of the LGC to syn­
chronize the barangay and SK elections and for other pur­
poses. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elec­
tions, the reconciliation of the varying lengths o f the terms of
office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Sec­
ond, the congressional debates show that the legislators and
the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes,
nature and scope of the law’s provisions. Finally, to require the
inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to
make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by
law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contem­
plates.”29

In Giron v. Commission on Elections,30 the Supreme

Court likewise dismissed a petition assailing the consti­
tutionality of Section 12 (on the treatment of votes cast
for substituted candidates after the printing of the offi­
cial ballots) and Section 14 (which repeals Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code on the ipso facto resignation
of incumbents upon their filing of their certificates of
candidacy for offices other than that which they are
currently holding in a permanent capacity) of Republic
Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.
In rejecting the challenge on the ground that said provi­
sions violated the constitutional requirement that
“every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof,” the Supreme Court, cit­
ing the earlier case of Farinas v. Executive Secretary,31
ruled that “the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include subjects other than

29 COMELEC v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009,

605 SCRA 167.
30 G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 97.
31 417 SCRA 503 (2005).
 Powers of the Congress 283

the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election

propaganda.” Accordingly, the Court held that “the as­
sailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Sec­
tion 14 (Repealing. Clause) are indeed germane to the
subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
The title was worded broadly enough to include the
measures embodied in the assailed sections.”
In any case, a title must not be “so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose o f the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”32

Formalities

Another limitation in Article VI is found in Section

26(2), which provides:

“(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law

unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal.”

As it was not required in the 1935 Constitution

that the bill should undergo the three readings on sepa­
rate days, the Congress did not consider it unlawful to

32 82 CJS 365.
284 Philippine P olitical Law

approve a notable number of bills on first, second and

third readings during one session day only. The result
in many cases was half-baked legislation, besides occa­
sional deception of the legislators themselves and the
public in general, who were unable to devote the needed
time and study to the railroaded measures.
The old Constitution also did not specify any reason
for the issuance of the certificate of urgency that dis­
pensed with the requirement for the distribution of final
copies of a bill at least three days before its third read­
ing. In consequence, many bills which were neither im­
portant nor urgent were nonetheless passed by the Con­
gress without compliance with this requirement because
of the facility with which their authors could secure
certificates of urgency from the Office of the President.
This practice is sought to be avoided now by the
specific rule that the certificate of urgency can be issued
only for the purpose of meeting a public calamity or
emergency. In the absence of such justification, bills
must comply with the said requirements prior to their
final reading. The determination by the President as to
the existence of a “public calamity” or “emergency” con­
stitutes essentially a political question.33
The Constitution, however, additionally provides
that the bill calling for a special election “after the va­
cancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President”
shall be deemed certified.3,1

33 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R.

No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270.
MArticle VII, Section 10.
 Powers of the Congress 285

According to the V A T Case,35 the exception applies

to both the requirements of three readings on separate
days and the distribution of final copies of the bill before
its passage. As for the sufficiency of the ground for the
presidential certification, to wit, the “growing budget
deficit,” which the petitioners claimed did not partake of
a “public calamity or emergency,” the Court made the
following feeble justification:

“The sufficiency o f the factual basis of the suspension of

the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Sec. 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying
the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under
Art. VI, Sec. 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of
presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away
with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should
elicit a different standard of review.”

The third reading itself is limited to the casting of

the members’ votes, usually after a brief explanation
thereof, if allowed by the rules, without further debate
on the measure. The yeas and nays are entered in the
journals as a permanent record of how each member
voted on particular issues, for the information especially
of their constituents.
Although not provided for in the Constitution, Con­
gress has established the so-called Conference Commit­
tee, composed of representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives, which is a “mechanism
for compromising differences” between their respective
versions of a bill or joint resolution. It has been ruled

35 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 235

SCRA 630; Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,
supra.
 286 Philippine P olitical Law

that “it is within the power of a conference committee to

include in its report an entirely new provision that is
not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill.”36
Moreover —

“If the committee can propose an amendment consisting

of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot pro­
pose several provisions, collectively considered as an ‘amend­
ment in the nature o f a substitute,’ so long as such amendment
is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. Af­
ter all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both
houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department. The charge that in this case the Conference
Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without
any basis.”d7

It bears emphasis that whatever changes may be

agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not
undergo another “three readings” in the Senate and the
House of Representatives.

“Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as refer­

ring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of
Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the
purpose of requiring three readings is to give members o f Con­
gress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No.
11197 was passed in the House after three readings; that in
the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred
to a committee of that body; that although the Senate commit­
tee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S.
No. 1630) which it had prepared by ‘taking into consideration’
the House bill; that for its p-irt the Conference Committee con­
solidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version;
that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter ap­
proved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appro­
priate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a mat­
ter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of

Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, No­

vember 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 203.
17Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
 Powers of the Congress 287

the provisions o f the bill. The allegation that the Conference

Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our
view, without warrant in fact and in law.”38

Approval of Bills <,•

The rules on the approval of bills are found in Arti­

cle VI, Section 27, providing as follows:

“SEC. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,

before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsidera­
tion, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names o f the Members voting for or against shall be entered in
its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as
if he had signed it.”
“(2) The President shall have the power to veto any par­
ticular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items which he does
not object.”

The above section provides for three methods by

which a bill may become a law, to wit:
(1) When the President signs it;
(2) When the President vetoes it but the veto is
overridden by two-thirds vote of all the members of each
House; and /

____________ ^ ^

* * * U U ,
288 Philippine Political Law

(3) When the President does not act upon the

measure within thirty days after it shall have been pre­
sented to him.
By actually signing a bill presented to him, the
President identifies himself with it and indicates his
approval of its purposes and provisions.
The President may disapprove or veto a measure
upon any ground sufficient for him, as where he consi­
ders it unconstitutional or merely inefficacious or un­
wise. In every case, he should, in returning the measure
to the House of origin, indicate his objections thereto in
what is known as a “veto message” so that the same can
be studied by the members for possible overriding of his
veto. Two-thirds of each House will be sufficient to in­
validate the veto and convert the bill into law over the
President’s objections. On the other hand, the Congress
m ay agree with the President’s objections and decide to
revise the measure as he suggests.
Is partial veto allowed under the Constitution? The
general rule is that the President must approve entirely
or disapprove in toto. The exception applies to appro­
priation, revenue and tariff bills, any particular item or
items of which may be disapproved without affecting the
item or items to which he does not object.
In Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 39 a
public works bill contained an item appropriating a
certain sum for assistance to television stations, subject
to the condition that the amount would not be available
in places where there were commercial television sta­
tions in operation. President Macapagal approved the
appropriation but vetoed the condition. When his act
was subsequently challenged in the Supreme Court, it

“ 11 SCRA 486.
 Powers of the Congress 28£

was held that the veto was ineffectual and that the ap­
proval of the item carried with it the approval of the
condition attached to it.
The last method is commonly mistaken to be some
kind of sanction for the indolence of the chief executive
but the fact is that it has a more practical purpose. This
method is employed whenever the President, while not
convinced of the necessity or validity of the measure
under consideration, is nonetheless unwilling to disap­
prove it. His reason may be fear of antagonizing certain
elements interested in its passage or his belief that the
final judgment on its constitutionality rests not with
him but with the judiciary.
An illustration of a bill approved through executive
inaction is the Bar Flunkers Bill, which President Quir-
ino refused to sign although he allowed it to lapse into
law. The Supreme Court subsequently declared it partly
unconstitutional.40
It should be noted that the thirty-day period during
which the bill is supposed to be considered by the Presi­
dent is now counted from the date of its receipt by him.
This is a definite improvement upon the old rule, which
counted the period from the date of adjournment of the
Congress regardless of the date of the actual submission
of the measure to the President of the Philippines.
It has been ruled that “the requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the
cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and
the so-called rule on presentment.” Thus, “every bill
passed by Congress must be presented to the President
for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to

1(1In re Cunanan, in fr a .
290 Philippine Political Law

the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a

law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is
a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. As­
suming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act
with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such
presentment even if approved by both chambers of Con­
gress.” Accordingly, “from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implemen­
tation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. U n­
der this principle, a provision that requires Congress or
its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitu­
tional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by
the members of the executive branch charged with the
implementation of the law.”41
Such authority would be considered a legislative
veto which would be violative of the principle of separa­
tion of powers, not to mention the aforecited rule on
presentment. Thus, in Abakada Guro Party List v. Puri-
sim a , 42 the Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of
Macalintal v. CO M E LEC ,43 made the following pro­
nouncements —

“The scholarly discourse o f Mr. Justice (now Chief Jus­

tice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in Mac­
alintal v. Commission on Elections is illuminating:

■" Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, Au­
gust 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
“ Ibid.
*' Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. 157013, July 10, 2003, 453
Phil. 586 (2003), 405 SCRA 614.
 Powers of the Congress

“‘Concept and bases of congressional oversight

‘“Broadly defined, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Con­
gress to enhance its understanding of and in­
fluence ovefr the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Con­
gress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered,
(c) to eliminate executive waste and dishon­
esty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (e) to assess execu­
tive conformity with the congressional per­
ception of public interest.
“‘The power of oversight has been held to be
intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government, x x x x x x
xxx
“‘Over the years, Congress has invoked its
oversight power with increased frequency to check
the perceived ‘exponential accumulation of power’
by the executive branch. By the beginning of the
20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous
amount of legislative authority to the executive
branch and the administrative agencies. Congress,
thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that
the administrative agencies perform their functions
within the authority delegated to them, x x x x x x
xxx

‘“Categories of congressional oversight functions

“‘The acts done by Congress purportedly in

the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investiga­
tion and supervision.
“‘a. Scrutiny
‘“Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser in­
tensity and continuity of attention to administra­
292 Philippine Political Law

tive operations. Its primary purpose is to determine

economy and efficiency of the operation of govern­
ment activities. In the exercise of legislative scru­
tiny, Congress may request information and report
from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for considera­
tion of the agency involved.
“xxx xxx xxx
‘“b. Congressional investigation
'“While congressional scrutiny is regarded as
a passive process of looking at the facts that are
readily available, congressional investigation in­
volves a more intense digging o f facts. The power of
Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by
the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI,
xxx xxx xxx.
‘“c. Legislative supervision
‘“The third and most encompassing form by
which Congress exercises its oversight power is
thru legislative supervision. ‘Supervision’ connotes
a continuing and informed awareness on the part of
a congressional committee regarding executive op­
erations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve
inquiry into past executive branch actions in order
to influence future executive branch performance,
congressional supervision allows Congress to scru­
tinize the exercise of delegated law-making author­
ity, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.
‘“Congress exercises supervision over the ex­
ecutive agencies through its veto power. It typically
utilizes veto provisions when granting the President
or an executive agency the power to promulgate
regulations with the force of law. These provisions
require the President or an agency to present the
proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a
‘right’ to approve or disapprove any regulation be­
fore it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions
usually provide that a proposed regulation will be-
 Powers of the Congress 293

come a law after the expiration of a certain period

o f time, only if Congress does not affirmatively dis­
approve of the regulation in. the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation vwill become law if Congress affirma­
tively approves it. ___________ |
‘“Supporters o f legislative veto stress that it is u,
necessary to maintain the balance of power be- .
tween the legislative and the executive branches of
government as it offers lawmakers a way to dele- fb'm
gate vast power to the executive branch or to inde-
pendent agencies while retaining the option to can- V
cel particular exercise of such power without hav­
ing to pass new legislation or to repeal existing Jaw.
They contend that this arrangement promotes de­
mocratic accountability as it provides legislative
check on the activities of unelected administrative
agencies. One proponent thus explains:
‘“It is too late to debate the merits o f this
delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded
in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led
Congress—whether by actual or perceived neces­
sity—to legislate by declaring broad policy goals
and general statutory standards, leaving the choice
of policy options to the discretion of an executive of­
ficer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but
leaves their implementation to the judgment of
parties who may or may not have participated in or
agreed with the development of those aims. Conse­
quently, absent safeguards, in many instances the
reverse of our constitutional scheme could be ef­
fected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes.
One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to
enact new legislation or to change existing law. But
without some means of overseeing post enactment
activities of the executive branch, Congress would
be unable to determine whether its policies have
been implemented in accordance with legislative
intent and thus whether legislative intervention is
appropriate.
 Philippine Political Law

“‘Its opponents, however, criticize the legisla­

tive veto as undue encroachment upon the ex­
ecutive prerogatives. They urge that any post­
enactment measures undertaken by the legis­
lative branch should be limited to scrutiny
and investigation; any measure beyond that
would undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend
that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible
evasion of the President’s veto authority and intru­
sion into the powers vested in the executive or judi­
cial branches of government. Proponents counter
that legislative veto enhances separation o f powers
as it prevents the executive branch and independ­
ent agencies from accumulating too much power.
They submit that reporting requirements and con­
gressional committee investigations allow Congress
to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law­
making authority. They do not allow Congress to
review executive proposals before they take effect
and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing
and binding expressions of congressional intent. In
contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to par­
ticipate prospectively in the approval or disap­
proval o f ‘subordinate law’ or those enacted by the
executive branch pursuant to a delegation of au­
thority by Congress. They further argue that legis­
lative veto ‘is a necessary response by Congress to
the accretion o f policy control by forces outside its
chambers.’ In an era of delegated authority, they
point out that legislative veto ‘is the most efficient
means Congress has yet devised to retain control
over the evolution and implementation of its policy
as declared by statute.’ xxx xxx xxx.’
“In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of
the power of congressional oversight and considering the na­
ture and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission
on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189
(The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint
Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only
to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but
also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promul­
 Powers of the Congress 295

gated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that

these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of
the Commission on Elections.
“With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional over­
sight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither neces­
sarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances in­
herent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over­
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
“However, to forestall the danger of congressional en­
croachment ‘beyond the legislative sphere,’ the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may
not vest itself, any o f its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legisla­
tive power, it must follow the ‘single, finely wrought and ex­
haustively considered, procedures’ specified under the Consti­
tution, including the procedure for enactment o f laws and pre­
sentment.
“Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as
this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particu­
lar, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
“(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power
of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either o f its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power o f confirmation and
“(2) investigation and monitoring of the imple­
mentation of laws pursuant to the power o f Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
“Any action or step beyond that will undermine the sepa­
ration of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.
“Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the
President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
‘right’ or ‘power’ to approve or disapprove such regulations be-
296 Philippine P olitical Law

fore they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a

congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash
(other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to
which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s
diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in en­
forcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
“Congress has two options when enacting legislation to
define national policy within the broad horizons of its legisla­
tive competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can as­
sign to the executive branch the responsibility for making nec­
essary managerial decisions in conformity with those stan­
dards. In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its es­
sential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the
concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and
regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supple­
mentary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).
“Administrative regulations enacted by administrative
agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force o f law and are entitled to
respect. Such rules and regulations partake o f the nature of a
statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in
the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law
and enjoy the presumption o f constitutionality and legality un­
til they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a
competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of
an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting
them to its stamp o f approval without disturbing the calculated
balance o f powers established by the Constitution. In exercis­
ing discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a de­
termination of whether or not they conformed with the provi­
sions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself,
a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.”

Legislative Inquiries
“Sec. 21. The Senate or the House o f Representatives
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
 ~ - ji 4 y ~ Q f
@ w ^ 1|^ s t • / • f cw&i N' i
P ow ers of thI ? C o n ! ^ 297
“ l^rJwV#1^

procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by

such inquiries shall be respected:”

This “power of inquiry” is granted not only to the

Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to
any of their respective committees.44
It has already been remarked that the power of leg­
islative investigation may be implied from the express
power of legislation and does not itself have to be ex­
pressly granted. If the above rule has been incorporated
in the Constitution, it was not so much to authorize as
in fact to limit the conduct of legislative inquiries.
The reason is that in the past this power was much
abused by some legislators who used it for illegitimate
ends or to browbeat or intimidate witnesses, usually for
grandstanding purposes only. There were also times
when the subject of the inquiry was purely private in
nature and therefore outside the scope of the powers of
the Congress.
To correct these excesses, it is now provided that
the legislative inquiry m ust be in aid of legislation,
whether it be under consideration already or still to be
drafted. Moreover, the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries are likewise required to be
respected. Furthermore, the conduct of the investigation
must be strictly in conformity with the rules of proce­
dure that must have been published in advance for the
information and protection of the witnesses.
In Garcillano u. House o f Representatives46 the Su­
preme Court stressed that the “Senate cannot be al­
lowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned

44 Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504

SCRA 704.
15 G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170.
298 Philippine P olitical Law

legislative inquiry without duly published rules of pro­

cedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional re­
quirement.” In said case, the petitioners claimed that
there was no need to publish anew the Senate’s Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation,
considering that they had been published in newspapers
of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006, although
it was conceded that said Rules had not been published
for purposes of the 14th Congress, which commenced on
June 30, 2007. Citing Neri v. Senate Committee on A c ­
countability o f Public Officers and Investigations,46 the
Court clarified that it is “incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.” The Court likewise
explained that publication of said Rules through the
internet cannot be considered as compliance with this
constitutional requirement. In any event, the legislature
has been acknowledged to possess “virtually unre­
stricted authority to determine its own rules” and would
be “at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time
it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum,
voting and publication.”47
In addition to these limitations, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that other prerogatives, principles
and rights may validly be invoked against this power of
Congress. These would include the President’s executive
privilege, but “only in relation to certain types of infor­

46 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77; see also Neri
v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, G.R. No.
180643, September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152.
47De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009, 579
SCRA 521.
 Powers of the C ongress 299

mation of a sensitive character” and which would not

serve to automatically exempt executive officials from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of their
being executive officials,48 the “fiscal autonomy and con­
stitutional independence of the Judiciary,”49 the sub
judice rule, “which restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the ad­
ministration of justice,”50 the right to privacy,51 which,
however, may not be properly invoked if the subject of
the legislative inquiry pertains to the witness’ discharge
of his official functions, and the right to self­
incrimination.52 In Gudani v. S e n g a the Court de­
clared that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may
validly prohibit a general from appearing in a legislative
inquiry, although the legislature would not be “pre­
cluded from seeking judicial relief to compel his atten­
dance.”
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,54 the
petitioners sought to restrain the respondent from in­
vestigating their participation in the alleged misuse of

48Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA
1; AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA
468; Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152; Chavez v. Pub­
lic Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 534 (2002), 384 SCRA 152.
49 Senate v. Ermita, supra.
50 Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583
SCRA 396.
51 Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA 704.
12 Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions and Currencies, G.R. No. 167173, December
27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456.
53G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 671.
54 203 SCRA 767.
300 Philippine Political Law

government funds and the illicit acquisition of proper­

ties being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the
Philippines. The Supreme Court granted the petition,
holding inter alia that “the petitioners are presently
impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandigan-
bayan, which involves issues intimately related to the
subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondent
Committee,” and that no legislation was apparently
being contemplated in connection with the said investi­
gation.
The decision failed to consider that the proceeding
before the Sandiganbayan was not criminal in nature
and that the purpose of the legislative investigation was
to ascertain the disposition of funds and properties
claimed to be public in nature. Its findings on this m at­
ter could be the subject of legislation although it m ay
not have been expressly stated that such was the pur­
pose of the inquiry. A s observed by the Court in the
earlier (and more logical) case of Arnault v. Nazareno,55
“we are bound to presume that the action of the legisla­
tive body was with a legitimate object if it was capable
of being so construed, and we have no right to assume
that the contrary was intended.”
At any rate, it has since been clarified that the sub­
ject of a legislative inquiry is a political question56 and
the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative com­
plaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investiga­
tion.s?

55 87 Phil. 29.
r* De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009, 579
SCRA 521; Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R. No.
180308, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 611.
57 Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions and Currencies, supra.
 Powers of the Congress 301

Failure or refusal to attend a legitimate legislative

investigation or contumacy of the witness may be pun­
ished as legislative contempt. The punishment that may
be meted out includes imprisonment. Thus, in the fa­
mous case of Arnault v. Nazareno,™ the petitioner was
ordered incarcerated by the Senate until such time as he
decided to answer certain relevant questions put to him
in connection with the investigation of a government
transaction.
It was also held in this case that the questions that
may be raised in a legislative investigation do not neces­
sarily have to be relevant to any pending legislation,
provided only that they are relevant to the subject mat­
ter of the investigation being conducted. Such investiga­
tion may result in the submission of proposed legislation
based upon the findings of the investigating committee.
How long may a private individual be imprisoned
by the legislature for contempt? The old rule announced
in Lopez v. De los Reyes69 was that the punishment could
last only for the duration of the session when the con­
tempt was committed. In the Arnault Case, however, the
Supreme Court held that the offender could be impris­
oned indefinitely by the Senate, it being a continuing
body, provided that the punishment did not become so
long as to violate due process. As for the House of Rep­
resentatives, the same decision declared that the im ­
prisonment could last not only during the session when
the offense was committed but until the final adjourn­
ment of the body. This rule is presumably still valid and
may be applied, unless changed, to the present Con­
gress.

58Ibid.
59 55 Phil. 170.
304 P hilippine Political Law

other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct

a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain in­
formation in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any
of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are
different.”61

The Power of Appropriation

Article VI, Section 29(1), of the Constitution provides

that “no money shall be paid out o f the Treasury except in
pursuance o f an appropriation made by law.”
In Nazareth v. Villar,62 funds were released by the
Department of Science and Technology to cover the
benefits for its personnel provided for under a law des­
pite the absence of a specific appropriation for the same
in the existing General Appropriations Act (GAA), and
notwithstanding an express provision in said law requir­
ing said funds to be covered by the GAA. Upon its re­
ceipt from the Commission on Audit of a Notice of Disal­
lowance covering said released funds, the petitioner
obtained authority from the Office of the President to
use said agency’s savings to cover said benefits, and,
upon the granting of said authority, invoked the same
for purposes of requesting the Commission on Audit to
lift the notice of disallowance. In resolving the issues
pertinent to said disallowance, the Supreme Court de­
clared —

“As we see it, the COA correctly ruled on the matter at

hand. Article VI Section 29 (1) o f the 1987 Constitution firmly

(’1Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability o f Public Offi­

cers, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 564 SCRA 152.
62 Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689
SCRA 385.
 Powers of the Congress 305

declares that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury ex­
cept in pursuance o f an appropriation made by law.’ This cons­
titutional edict requires that the GAA be purposeful, deliber­
ate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. As'such, the
requirement un<|er Section 20 of R.A. No. 8439 that the
amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be
appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must
be purposefully, deliberately, and precisely included in the
GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not ma­
terialize as a matter o f course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439,
but must initially be proposed by the officials o f the DOST as
the concerned agency for submission to and consideration by
Congress. That process is what complies with the constitu­
tional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of
the benefits because the GAA did not mirror every provision of
law that referred to it as the source of funding. It is worthy to
note that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for
the appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte,
Jr. would not have needed to request the OP for the express
authority to use the savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.”

While “law” as here used may refer to constitu­

tional appropriations like the grant of a P 300,000.00
salary to the President, it is more often supposed to
denote statutes enacted by the lawmaking body. Funds
are always needed for the support of public projects;
money is the motive force and lubricant of the machin­
ery of government. Hence, the power of the purse is one
of the most important prerogatives of the Congress.

(1) Appropriation Defined

An appropriation measure may be defined as a

statute the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury,
e.g., the public works act and the general appropriations
act. A law creating an office and providing funds there­
for is not an appropriation law since the main purpose is
not to appropriate funds but to create the office.
306 P hilippine Political Law

Appropriation measures may be classified into gen­

eral and special. The general appropriations law passed
annually is intended to provide for the financial opera­
tions of the entire government during one fiscal period
whereas a special appropriation is designed for a spe­
cific purpose, such as the creation of a fund for the relief
of typhoon victims.

(2) Implied Limitations

It is essential to the validity of an appropriation

that it be devoted to a public purpose. Thus, in Pascual
v. Secretary o f Public Works and Communications,63 an
appropriation measure contained an item for the con­
struction of roads in a private subdivision which subse­
quently were turned over to the Philippine government.
The Supreme Court annulled this item, observing that
the property sought to be improved with public funds
was private in nature at the time the appropriation was
made. The circumstance that the roads were later do­
nated to the government did not cure the basic defect of
the appropriation as it was null and void ab initio.
Another requirement of a valid appropriation is
that the sum authorized to be released must be deter­
minate or at least determinable. Otherwise, the national
treasurer will have no guide or, worse, will have unlim­
ited discretion in the release of public funds. Ideally, the
law must appropriate a fixed amount, but it is sufficient
if only the maximum is indicated. But where the mini­
mum rather than the maximum is specified, as where
there is an appropriation of “not less than one million
pesos,” the measure is invalid for lack of certainty. Here
the national treasurer is in effect authorized to release

,a 110 Phil. 331.

 P owers of the Congress 30'

from the treasury any amount in excess of one millior

pesos.

(3) Constitutional Limitations

In addition to these extra-constitutional require­

ments, the Constitution lists down several specific limi­
tations on the power of appropriation of the Congress.
The first is that all appropriation bills should origi­
nate in the House o f Representatives, for reasons al­
ready discussed.
The second is the following provision, which was
thought necessary in view of the many abuses commit­
ted in the past in the use of discretionary funds. In
many cases, these funds were spent for personal pur­
poses, or at least unnecessary or excessive public pur­
poses, to the prejudice and often without even the
knowledge of the public.

“(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular of­

ficials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be sup­
ported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines
as may be prescribed by law.”64

The Congress is called upon to pass the necessary

legislation providing for the proper guidelines to make
this new and salutary limitation effective.
In the case of special appropriations, it is provided
in Article VI, Section 25(4), that:

“A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose

for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actu­
ally available as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein.”

64 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

308 Philippine Political Law

The purpose is to discontinue the practice of ficti­

tious appropriations that were frequently enacted by the
Congress even if it knew that no funds were available.
Constituents were often deluded into believing that
their representative had done his duty by them al­
though the truth was that no money was really forth­
coming since funds were inexistent or inadequate.
With regard to the general appropriations act, the
following are the constitutional rules in Section 25.

“(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations

recommended by the President for the operation of the Gov­
ernment as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by
law.”

The reason for the above rule is the theory that the
President knows more about the needed appropriations
than the legislature. Under the Constitution of 1935, it
was only the appropriations for the executive depart­
ment that could not be increased, one other reason being
to prevent the Congress from unduly influencing him.
But while the Congress may not increase the Presi­
dent’s budgetary recommendations, there is no prohibi­
tion against its reducing such recommendations, which
is in fact what it usually does, particularly those relat­
ing to the executive department. However, reduction is
not permitted when it comes to the appropriations for
the judiciary,65 as will be discussed later.
The budget is only a proposal, a set of recommenda­
tions on the appropriations to be made for the opera­
tions of the government. It is used as a basis for the
enactment of the general appropriations law, which is

65I b i d . , Art. VIII, Sec. 3.

 Powers of the Congress 309

the measure that authorizes the release of public funds

in accordance with Article VI, Section 29(1).

“(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the

general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enact­
ment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.”

This is a verbatim reproduction of Article V I, Sec­

tion 19(2), of the 1935 Constitution. The purpose is to
prevent “riders” or irrelevant provisions that are in­
cluded in the general appropriations bill to ensure their
approval.
In Garcia v. M ata,ee certain provisions dealing with
the activation and retirement of reserve officers of the
Armed Forces were incorporated in the General Appro­
priations Act for 1956. The Supreme Court, in annulling
these provisions, declared:

“A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails

to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item
therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very
first clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads:
‘After the approval of this Act, and when there is no
emergency, no reserve officer o f the Armed Forces o f the
Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for
more than two years during any period of the consecutive
years.’
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While
R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Gov­
ernment for the fiscal year 1956-1967, the said paragraph 11
refers to the fundamental government policy matters of the
calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of re­
serve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy con­
tinue throughout the entire paragraph.

60 65 SCRA 520.
310 P hilippine Political Law

“In the language o f the respondents-appellees, it was a

non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure
in violation of the constitutional inhibition against ‘riders’ to
the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and com­
pletely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.”

It will be noted that the above prohibition applies

only where the rider is incorporated in the general ap­
propriations bill. Suppose, however, that the rider is
included in an ordinary bill only? The anomaly may still
be attacked but not on the basis of Article VI, Section
25(2). The applicable rule will be Section 26(1), which
requires every bill to embrace only one subject, to be
expressed in the title.

“(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the

Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving ap­
propriations for other departments and agencies.”

The reason for this new rule is to prevent the adop­

tion of appropriations sub rosa by the Congress. In the
past, the public was unable to ascertain the purposes
and exact amounts of the outlay for the operations of the
Congress and the allowances of its members because
these were agreed upon among themselves only. By
contrast, other offices of the government were subjected
to public budget hearings conducted by the legislature
in which their recommended outlays were scrutinized.

“(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
 P owers of the Congress 311

Taken from the 1973 Constitution, this provision

was inspired by an expose made by Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, who charged that several millions of pesos had
been transferred from the executive department to the
House of Representatives, presumably to augment the
allowances of some of its members during an election
campaign.
This provision prohibits one department from
transferring some of its funds to another departmenl
and thereby make it beholden to the former to the det­
riment of the doctrine of separation of powers. Such
transfers are also unsystematic, besides in effect disre­
garding the will of the legislature that enacted the ap­
propriation measure.
Applying the above provision, the Supreme Court,
declared in Demetria v. Alba67 through Justice Fernan:

“Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over­

extends the privilege granted under said Section 16(5). It em­
powers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds froir
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive De­
partment to any program, project or activity of any depart­
ment, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as tc
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings
in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether oi
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item tc
which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completelj
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, therebj
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, bui
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitu
tional infirmities render the provision in question null anc
void.”

67 148 SCRA 208; Philippine Constitution Association v

Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994; Sanchez v. COA, G.R
No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471; Nazareth v. Villar, G.R
No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385.
312 Philippine Political Law

However, transfers of savings in one department

from one item to another in the general appropriations
act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency
and efficiency. In this case, there is no danger to the
doctrine of separation of powers because the transfer is
made within a department and not from one department
to another.
“It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of
the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article V I of
the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer sav­
ings only to augment another item in the G AA is strictly
but reasonably construed as exclusive.”68 Accordingly,
“the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philip­
pines may not be given authority to transfer funds un­
der this article because the realignment of savings to
augment items in the general appropriations law for the
executive branch must and can be exercised only by the
President pursuant to a specific law.”69 However, in
Nazareth v. Villar,70 the Supreme Court clarified that
“such power could well be extended to his Cabinet Sec­
retaries as alter egos under the ‘doctrine of qualified
political agency’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in
the case of Binamira v. Garrucho, where it was pro­
nounced that the official acts of a Department Secretary
are deemed acts of the President unless disapproved or

“ Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179431-32

and 180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385, 409-410; see also Samson
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, November 25, 1986, 145
SCRA 654, 659; and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107135, February 23, 1999, 303 SCRA 508, 515
cited in Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689
SCRA 385.
“ Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
711Supra.
 Powers of the C ongress 313

reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the

authority granted to the DOST by the Executive Secre­
tary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was
legal and valid but^in so far as the use of agency’s sav­
ings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was
reenacted in 2001, the authority granted on the use of
savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding
year.”
Insofar as Congress is concerned, “the individual
members of Congress may only determine the necessity
of the realignment of savings in the allotments for their
operating expenses because they are in the best position
to know whether there are savings available in some
items and whether there are deficiencies in other items
of their operating expenses that need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives who shall approve the
realignment.”71
The issue in Pichay v. Office o f the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudica­
tion Division 2 was the legality of the President’s trans­
fer of the funds appropriated by Congress for the Presi­
dential Anti-Graft Commission [PAGC] in favor of the
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal A f­
fairs — Investigative and Adjudication Division (IAD-
ODESLA), to which was transferred the functions of the
PAGC after its abolition. The Supreme Court considered
said allocation of funds as lawful. Thus —

“Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is

(sic) shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appro­
priated P22 Million for the PAGC’s operation in the 2010 an­
nual budget, no separate or added funding of such a consider-

71 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra.

72G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 408.
314 Philippine Political Law

able amount was ever required after the transfer of the PAGC
functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
“Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-
ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and maintain its
personnel would be sourced from the following year’s appro­
priation for the President's Offices under the General Appro­
priations Act of 2011. Petitioner asseverates, however, that
since Congress did not indicate the manner by which the ap­
propriation for the Office of the President was to be distrib­
uted, taking therefrom the operational funds of the IAD-
ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the
President. The contention is without legal basis. There is no
usurpation o f the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
“In the chief executive dwell the powers to run govern­
ment. Placed upon him is the power to recommend the budget
necessary for the operation of the Government, which implies
that he has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine
the structure that each government agency in the executive
department would need to operate in the most economical and
efficient manner. Hence, the express recognition under Section
78 o f R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of
the President’s authority to ‘direct changes in the organiza­
tional units or key positions in any department or agency.’ The
aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the
general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the
President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and agen­
cies under him, which is, ‘even to the extent of modifying and
realigning appropriations for that purpose.’
“And to further enable the President to run the affairs of
the executive department, he is likewise given constitutional
authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations
Law using the savings in other items of the appropriation for
his office. In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any
fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, of­
fices and agencies of the Executive Department which is in­
cluded in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, pro­
ject or activity o f any department, bureau or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enact­
ment.
“Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked
for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by
 Powers of the Congress 315

Congress in the annual budget for the Office o f the President,

the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly
sourced from the President’s own office budget without com­
mitting any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no' usurpa­
tion of the legislature’s power to appropriate funds when the
President simply allocates the existing funds previously appro­
priated by Congress for his office.”

(4) Appropriations for Sectarian Purposes

Whether the appropriation be general or specific, it

must conform to the prohibition against the use of pub­
lic funds or property for sectarian purposes. This is pro­
vided for in Article VI, Section 29(2), which runs in full
as follows:

“No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,

applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, bene­
fit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian in­
stitution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or sup­
port of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minis­
ter, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any pe­
nal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.”

This provision must be read with Article III, Sec­

tion 5, on religious freedom, and Article II, Section 6, on
the separation of Church and State. Its purpose is to
further bolster this principle and emphasize the neu­
trality of the State in ecclesiastical matters.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the above
prohibition is applicable only where the appropriation is
intended purposely to benefit a religious institution. In
Aglipay v. R uiz,13 the Philippine government authorized
a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance
in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Con­

7" 64 Phil. 201.

316 Philippine P olitical Law

gress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The

petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent
Church, assailed the measure and contended that it
violated the Constitution inasmuch as it benefited a
particular religion. The Supreme Court, on examining
the facts, discovered that the original design of the
stamp featured a picture of a Catholic chalice, but this
was later rejected in favor of a map of the Philippines
under which appeared the caption, “Seat, 33rd Interna­
tional Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” As the
purpose of the stamp issue was evidently to focus atten­
tion not on the Eucharistic Congress but on its site, the
idea being to attract tourists to our country and not
primarily to publicize the religious event, it was held
that the stamp issue was not invalid.
In Garces v. Estenzo74 the Supreme Court ruled that
the purchase of a religious image by the barangay coun­
cil with private funds raised from voluntary contribu­
tions did not violate the Constitution.
It has also been held that the above provision “does
not inhibit the use o f public property for religious pur­
poses when the religious character of such use is merely
incidental to a temporary use which is available indis­
criminately to the public in general.”75 Hence, a public
street may be used for a religious procession even as it
is available for a civic parade, in the same way that a
public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may
also be used for a political assemblage.
Subject to the four exceptions specifically men­
tioned, payment of public funds is prohibited to ecclesi­
astics only “as such,” which means that they may be

74 105 SCRA 510.

75 People vs. Fernandez, CA, G.R. No. L-1128 (1945).
 P owers of the Congress 317

paid from public funds if they serve the government in a

non-ecclesiastical capacity. Thus, some priests who
served as members of the Constitutional Commission
were paid per diems from public funds for services ren­
dered by them not as ecclesiastics but as public officers.
Finally, it should be stressed that by specific per­
mission in the Constitution, and as an exception to the
above-stated rule, it is provided in Article X IV , Section
3(3), that:

“At the option expressed in writing by the parents or

guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their chil­
dren or wards in public elementary and high schools within the
regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by
the religious authorities o f the religion to which the children or
wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.”

(5) Automatic Re-appropriation

“If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed
by the Congress.”78

Under the 1935 Constitution, the general appro­

priations act had a duration of only one fiscal year.
Hence, if the Congress failed to enact a new general
appropriations act for the incoming fiscal year, the en­
tire government was theoretically paralyzed since no
money could be paid out of the Treasury “except in pur­
suance o f an appropriation made by law.” The President
of the Philippines therefore had to call back the Con­
gress in special session and keep it in session until it

7I’ Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 25(7).

318 Philippine Political Law

was able to approve a new general appropriations act.

The old procedure entailed a great deal of inconven­
ience, not to mention circumvention of the Constitution
through unauthorized releases of funds that were made
in advance of the expected new general appropriations
law.
To correct this, the above rule reverts to the old
system observed under the Jones Law. Under this rule,
the old general appropriations act is deemed continued
in operation notwithstanding the lapse of the fiscal year
for which it was originally intended until the Congress
enacts a new general appropriations law.

(6) Special Funds

Restored from the Commonwealth Constitution is

the following section:

“(5) All money collected on any tax levied for a special

purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was cre­
ated has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall
be transferred to the general funds o f the Government.”77

If, for example, a special tax is levied upon sugar

millers for the rehabilitation of the sugar industry, the
revenue collected shall be used only for the purpose
indicated and should not be channeled to the improve­
ment of the coconut industry. The limitation continues
to apply even if the original purpose of the tax has al­
ready been fulfilled or abandoned. W hatever of the spe­
cial tax collections may remain shall then be transferred
to the general funds of the government, for general ap­
propriation in the discretion of the legislature.

77I b i d ., Art. VI, Sec. 29(3).

 Powers of the Congress 319

The Power of Taxation

The power of taxation is inherent in the State and
is generally vested in the legislature. Its exercise is,
however, restricted by the following rules:

“(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.

The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.”78

In addition to the limitations set forth in this provi­

sion, tax laws must be for a public purpose. Accordingly,
a tax may not be levied for the purpose of paying the
corporate debts of a private corporation on the pretext
that it is intended to ensure the stability of the fertilizer
industry in the country.79
Uniformity in taxation means that persons or
things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. It is distinguished from equality in taxation
in that the latter requires the tax imposed to be deter­
mined on the basis of the value of the property. The
present Constitution adds that the rule of taxation shall
also be equitable, which means that the tax burden
must be imposed according to the taxpayer’s capacity to
pay.
According to Delegate Artemio M . Lobrin of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, “progressive taxation is
one which tends to accelerate instead of arrest economic
growth. Furthermore, to be progressive, the tax system
should be suited to the social conditions of the people.”80

mIbid., Art. VI, Sec. 28(1).

78Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No.
166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.
“ Montejo, The New Constitution, 128.
320 Philippine P olitical Law

The Supreme Court, citing Tolentino v. Secretary of

Finance,81 declared in British American Tobacco v.
Camacho82 that “regressivity is not a negative standard
for courts to enforce. W hat Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to ‘evolve a progressive system of
taxation.’ This is a directive to Congress, just like the
directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws
for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduc­
tion of social, economic and political inequalities [Art.
XIII, Section 1] or for the promotion of the right to ‘qual­
ity education’ [Art. XIV, Section 1]. These provisions are
put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legisla­
tion, not as judicially enforceable rights.”

“(2) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or

convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.”83

The most important change introduced in this pro­

vision is the restoration of the tax exemption in favor of
educational institutions which was withdrawn by the
1973 Constitution. Educational, charitable and religious
institutions are now exempted, but only if they or their
lands, improvements and buildings are actually, directly
and exclusively devoted to their basic purposes.
Whereas all cemeteries were benefited by the original
provision, the new rule extends only to “non-profit ceme­
teries,” obviously because of the proliferation and suc­
cess of the commercial “memorial parks.” The rule also
expressly includes “mosques” although they were al-

81 G.R. No. 115455, 235 SCRA 630.

82 G.R. No. 163583, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA o i l , and April
15, 2009, 585 SCRA 36.
“ Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 28(3).
 Powers of the Congress 321

ready embraced in the generic term “churches” under

the 1935 Charter. The addition is a token of the recogni­
tion by the Constitution of the Muslim elements in our
nation.
In Angeles University Foundation v. City o f Ange­
les, 84 the petitioner, invoking the tax exemption in favor
of educational institutions granted under Republic Act
No. 6055, claimed that it should not be made to pay
building permit fees. Said law provided that non-stock,
non-profit educational foundations shall be “exempt
from the payment of all taxes, import duties, assess­
ments, and other charges imposed by the Government
on all income derived from or property, real or personal,
used exclusively for the educational activities of the
Foundation.” The Supreme Court rejected said conten­
tion, stressing that “since building permit fees are not
charges on property, they are not impositions from
which petitioner is exempt.”
In Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ,86 a
donation of P 10,000.00 was accepted by a parish priest
for the construction of a church. The BIR sought to im­
pose a donee’s tax upon his successor, who protested,
invoking the constitutional exemption from taxation of
religious institutions. The Supreme Court sustained the
BIR, holding that the tax imposed was an excise tax, a
tax levied not upon the church itself but upon the parish
priest for the exercise by him of the privilege of receiv­
ing the donation. The taxes covered by the constitu­
tional exemption are real estate taxes or ad valorem
taxes imposed on the property itself.

" G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 359.
8514 SCRA 292.
322 Philippine Political Law

It bears stressing that, to be entitled to this consti­

tutional exemption, there must be “clear and unequivo­
cal proof’ that the entity claiming the same is a reli­
gious, charitable or education institution and that its
real properties are actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
Thus —

“Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act

No. 7160, in order to be entitled to the exemption, the peti­
tioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof,
that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties
are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for
charitable purposes. ‘Exclusive’ is defined as possessed and en­
joyed to the exclusion of others-, debarred from participation or
enjoyment; and ‘exclusively’ is defined, ‘in a manner to exclude;
as enjoying a privilege exclusively.’ If real property is used for
one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for
the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The words
‘dominant use’ or ‘principal use’ cannot be substituted for the
words ‘used exclusively’ without doing violence to the Constitu­
tions and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.
“What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the
property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate
and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for
which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use
o f the income from the real property that is determinative of
whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.”86
“(3) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress.”"7

Bills are ordinarily passed with the support of only

a simple majority, or a majority o f those present and

Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 433 SCRA

119, 138, cited in Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles,
supra.
1,7Art. VI, Sec. 29(4), Constitution.
 Powers of the C ongress 323

voting. The above provision requires an absolute major­

ity of the entire membership of the Congress' because a
tax exemption represents a withholding of the pqwer to
tax and consequent loss of revenue to the government.
An example of a law providing for a tax exemption
is Section 234(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code, which states that properties owned
by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real
property tax.88 It should be noted that Congress has the
power to grant tax exemptions over and above the power
of the local government’s delegated power to tax.89 A
claim for a tax refund under a statute partakes of the
nature of a tax exemption.90 Likewise, under Presiden­
tial Decree No. 1922, P.D. No. 2013 and Republic Act
No. 7279, the National Housing Authority is exempt
from the payment of any and all fees and taxes of any
kind, whether local or general. Accordingly, it is not
subject to the deposit requirement under Section 267 of
R.A. No. 7160 with respect to court actions assailing the
validity of any delinquency sale at public auction of real
property (for non-payment of realty taxes). “N H A cannot
be declared delinquent in the payment of real property

88 See City of Pasig v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.

185023, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 271; Manila International Air­
port Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 163072, April 2, 2009, 583
SCRA 234; Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. CBAA,
G.R. No. 178030, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 644; PAGCOR v.
BIR, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011, 645 SCRA 338.
89 City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunica­
tions, Inc., G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 169; Quezon
City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 166408, Octo­
ber 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 496.
80 CIR v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
163835, 7 July 2010, 624 SCRA 340.
324 Philippine Political Law

tax obligations which, by reason of its tax-exempt

status, cannot even accrue in the first place.”91
It should be understood that “being a derogation of
the sovereign authority, a statute granting tax exemp­
tion is strictly construed against the person or entity
claiming the exemption.”92 It has similarly been ruled
that “tax exemptions are never presumed and are
strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor o f the taxing authority. They can only be given
force when the grant is clear and categorical. The sur­
render of the power to tax, when claimed, must be
clearly shown by a language that will admit of no rea­
sonable construction consistent with the reservation of
the power. I f the intention of the legislature is open to
doubt, then the intention of the legislature must be re­
solved in favor of the State.”93 Moreover, a “tax amnesty
is a general pardon or the intentional overlooking by the
State o f its authority to impose penalties on persons
otherwise guilty of violation of a tax law. It partakes of
an absolute waiver by the government of its right to
collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish
to relent a chance to start with a clean slate. A tax am­
nesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor
presumed in law. The grant of a tax amnesty, similar to
a tax exemption, must be construed strictly against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.”94

01 National Housing Authority v. City of Iloilo, G.R. No. 172267,

August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 629.
Western Mindanao Power Corporation v. CIR, G.R. No.
181136, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 350.
s* Smart Communications, Inc. v. City of Davao, G.R. No.
155491, September 16, 2008, 565 SCRA 237.
91 Philippine Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 170574, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 366.
 Powers of the Congress 325

Finally, it is established that “there is no vested

right in a tax exemption, more so when the latest ex­
pression of legislative intent renders its continuance
doubtful. Being a mere statutory privilege, a tax exemp­
tion may be modified or withdrawn at will by the grant­
ing authority A tax exemption cannot be grounded upon
the continued existence of a statute which precludes its
change or repeal. No law is irrepealable. Congress, in
the legitimate exercise of its lawmaking powers, can
enact a law withdrawing a tax exemption just as effica­
ciously as it may grant the same under Section 28(4) of
Article VI of the Constitution.”95

The Power of Concurrence

The Constitution requires the concurrence of the

Congress to an amnesty and to a treaty.
Article VII, Section 19, authorizes the President to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of the Congress. The basis of the majority
is not the membership of each House, it would appear,
but the membership of the legislature as a whole.
It is also specifically provided in Article VII, Sec­
tion 21, that “no treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds o f all the members o f the Senate.”

The War Powers

“Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of

both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.”

Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 168584, October 15, 2007, 536

SCRA 193.
326 Philippine P olitical Law

As previously observed, the rewording of this provi­

sion so as to authorize a declaration not o f war but only
of the existence of a state of war is in line with our re­
nunciation o f war as an instrument of national policy
under Article II, Section 2. The above provision suggests
a war already begun or provoked by the enemy and the
existence of which we are only affirming. In other
words, we are not the aggressor but merely reacting to
an aggression.
The acknowledgment of a state of war is the sole
act of the Congress and may be effected only by two-
thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately. A s commander-in-chief and diplomatic head,
however, the President m ay so precipitate or actually
begin hostilities that the legislature will have no choice
except, in the words of Corwin, “to baptize the hostilities
with the name of war.”
It will not be correct, of course, to say that the Con­
gress becomes functus officio once it declares the exis­
tence of a state of war and that thereafter the war effort
becomes the sole responsibility of the President as com­
mander-in-chief of the armed forces.
The armed forces must, to begin with, be raised by
the Congress. Thereafter, the troops must be regulated,
fed, clothed, armed, billeted, paid and otherwise main­
tained, all of which will need the passage of laws and
the enactment of appropriations. This means that the
President must depend heavily on the Congress for the
effective exercise of his military powers. The power of
the sword and the power of the purse must be exercised
together.
 Powers of the Congress 327

Referendum and Initiative

In line with the conferment of legislative power di­

rectly on the people, Section 32 provides as follows:
V

“Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, pro­

vide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the excep­
tions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the regis­
tration o f a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legisla­
tive district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters thereof.”

Initiative is generally defined as the power of the

people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at the polls, independent of the legislative assem­
bly.96 It is the right of a group of citizens to introduce a
matter for legislation either to the legislature or directly
to the voters.97
Referendum is understood to be the right reserved
to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which
has been passed by a legislative body and which in most
cases would without action on the part of the electors
become a law.98 It is defined as a method of submitting
an important legislative measure to a direct vote of the
whole people, the submission of a law passed by the
legislature for their approval or rejection.99
Independently of the foregoing general definitions
of said concepts, Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6735
now defines initiative as “the power of the people to

86Black, p. 923.
07Webster, Col. Ed., 752.
1,8Black, 1446.
33 Sibal, Phil. Legal Encyclopedia, p. 845.
328 Philippine Political Law

propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose

and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose”100 and, as noted earlier, referendum as “the
power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for the purpose.”101
Said law provides for “three systems of initiative,”
namely, Initiative on the Constitution, which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
initiative on statutes, which refers to a petition propos­
ing to enact a national legislation; and initiative on local
legislation, which refers to a petition proposing to enact
a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance.102 It is significant that, in
Santiago v. CO M ELEC, R.A. No. 6735 was found by the
Supreme Court to be “incomplete, inadequate, or want­
ing in essential terms and conditions insofar as initia­
tive on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.”103
R A 6735 also provides for a process known as indi­
rect initiative, defined as the “exercise of initiative by
the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the
local legislative body for action.”104

100 Section 3 (a).

1111Section 3 (c).
Sections 3 (a.l), (a.2) and (a.3).
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106. It should
be noted though that, in its Resolution dated November 21, 2006
providing for the denial of the Motions for Reconsideration in the
later case of Lambino v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, October 25,
2006, 505 SCRA 160), the Supreme Court stated that “ten Members
of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opin­
ions already given when the decision herein was promulgated, that
Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Con­
stitution through a people’s initiative.”
"MSection 3 (b).
 Powers of the Congress 329

The referendum may be of two classes, namely, ref­

erendum on statutes, which refers to a petition to ap­
prove or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and referendum on local law, which refers to a
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordi­
nance enacted by regional assemblies and local legisla­
tive bodies.105
To exercise the power of initiative or referendum,
at least ten per centum of the total number of the regis­
tered voters, of which every legislative district is repre­
sented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and
register the same with the Commission on Elections.
Said petition is defined as the written instrument con­
taining the proposition, which is the measure proposed
by the voters, and the required number of signatories. It
shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to
the Commission.106
A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolu­
tion or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of
an autonomous region, province or city is deemed val­
idly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least
ten per centum of the registered voters in the province
or city, of which every legislative district must be repre­
sented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein; provided, however, that i f the province or
city is composed only of one legislative district, then at
least each municipality in a province or each barangay
in a city should be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein.107 A referendum
of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality

106Sections 3 (c.l) and (c.2).

'"6Section 5 (a), in relation to Sections 3 (f) and (d).
107Section 5 (d).
330 Philippine P olitical Law

shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor

is signed by at least ten per centum of the registered
voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is
represented by at least three per centum of the regis­
tered voters therein.108 A referendum or initiative on a
barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly ini­
tiated i f signed by at least ten per centum of the regis­
tered voters in said barangay.109
W ithin a period of thirty days from receipt of the
petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino
and English at least twice in newspapers o f general and
local circulation and set the date of the initiative or ref­
erendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five days
but not later than ninety days from the determination
by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.110
The decision of the Commission on the findings of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative
or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court
within thirty days from notice thereof.111
The proposition of the enactment, approval,
amendment or rejection of a national law shall be sub­
mitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast
by all the registered voters of the Philippines. If, as cer­
tified by the Commission, the proposition is approved by
a majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed
for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become
effective fifteen days following completion of its publica­
tion in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the

Section 5 (e).
"J3Section 5 (f).
' 10Section 8.
Section 12.
 Powers of the C ongress 331

Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is

approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said na­
tional law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall
become effective fifteen days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by
the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspa­
per of general circulation in the Philippines. However, if
the majority vote is not obtained, the national law
sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full
force and effect.112 A national or local initiative proposi­
tion approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen days
after certification and proclamation by the Commis­
sion.113
Section 10 of the law prohibits petitions embracing
more than one subject from being submitted to the elec­
torate and provides that statutes involving emergency
measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested
in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until ninety days after its effectivity.
Under Section 11, any duly accredited people's or­
ganization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a
summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill
that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by
the legislature. The procedure to be followed on the ini­
tiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of Representatives
except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence
over the pending legislative measures on the commit­
tee.

112Section 9 (a).
" JSection 9 (c).
332 Philippine P olitical Law

Insofar as local initiatives are concerned, not less

than two thousand registered voters in case of autono­
mous regions, one thousand in case of provinces and
cities, one hundred in case of municipalities, and fifty in
case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional
Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, propos­
ing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of
any law, ordinance or resolution.114 If no favorable action
thereon is made by local legislative body within thirty
days from its presentation, the proponents through their
duly authorized and registered representative may in­
voke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to
the local legislative body concerned.116 Two or more
propositions may be submitted in an initiative.116 Propo­
nents shall have one hundred twenty days in case of
autonomous regions, ninety days in case of provinces
and cities, sixty days in case of municipalities, and
thirty days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned
in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of
signatures.117 If the required number of the signatures is
obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the
initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to
the registered voters in the local government unit con­
cerned for their approval within ninety days from the
date of certification by the Commission, in case of
autonomous regions, sixty days in case of the provinces
and cities, forty-five days in case of municipalities, and
thirty days in case of barangays. The initiative shall
then be held on the date set, after which the results

1HSection 13 (a).
"BSection 13 (b).
1UlSection 13 (d).
111Section 13 (e).
 P owers of the Congress 333

thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Com­

mission on Elections.118
I f the proposition is approved by a majority of the
votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen days after certifica­
tion by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon
had been made by the local legislative body and local
executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.119
The power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year. Initiative shall extend only to
subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of
the local legislative bodies to enact. If at any time before
the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative
shall be cancelled. However, those against such action
may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner
provided under the law.120
Any proposition or ordinance or resolution ap­
proved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or
amended, by the local legislative body concerned within
six months from the date therefrom, and may be
amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative
body within three years thereafter by a vote of three-
fourths of all its members: provided, however, that in
case of barangays, the period shall be one year after the
expiration of the first six months.121
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 of the
law, which states that the power of initiative and refer­
endum may be exercised by all registered voters of the

118Section 13 (h).
119Section 14.
120Section 15 (a), (b) and (c).
1'!' Section 16.
334 Philippine Political Law

country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, munici­

palities and barangays, any local legislative body may
submit to the registered voters of autonomous region,
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the
approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly
enacted or approved. Said referendum shall be held
under the control and direction of the Commission
within sixty days in case of provinces and cities, forty-
five days in case of municipalities and thirty days in
case of barangays. The Commission shall certify and
proclaim the results of the said referendum.122

UI Section 17.
 Chapter 10

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT was debased by

Ferdinand E. Marcos who converted it into a seat of un­
limited power and unbelievable corruption. In 1986,
after almost thirteen years of absolute and tyrannical
rule, he was deposed by an outraged and indignant citi­
zenry. He deserves the scorn o f history. Even so, his
oppressive regime has taught us many lessons on liberty
which were useful in the redrafting of the new article on
the Executive Department. Indeed, the main motivation
of the framers in the writing of Article V II was to pre­
vent the recurrence of another despot like the discred­
ited ex-dictator.

Executive Power

Article VII, Section 1, reproduces the original rule

in the 1935 Constitution that:

“The executive power shall be vested in the President of

the Philippines.”1

Executive power is briefly described as the power to

enforce and administer the laws, but it is actually more
than this. In the exercise of this power, the President of
the Philippines assumes a plenitude of authority, and
the corresponding awesome responsibility, that make

1 The 1935 Constitution vested executive power in “a President

of the Philippines.”

3 35
336 P hilippine Political Law

him, indeed, the most influential person in the land.

The potentials of executive power are tremendous for
good or evil. In the hands of a Quezon or a Magsaysav, it
can be an instrument for the uplift of the common man;
by contrast, a Marcos can deprave and pervert it into a
bludgeon of oppression. In any event, there is no ques­
tion of the impact of the Presidency upon the nation.
The President, like him or not, is a ubiquitous and un­
avoidable presence because of the m any capacities in
which he acts as repository and discharger of the execu­
tive power. Whether as expected company or as unwel­
come intrusion, the President is involved in our daily
existence and undeniably affects our lives and even our
destinies no matter how distant we m ay be from Mala-
canang.

Qualifications

Qualifications are prescribed for public office to en­

sure the proper performance o f powers and duties. In
the case of the highest office in the land, Article VII,
Section 2, provides as follows:

“Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he

is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years o f age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election.”

The above qualifications are exclusive and may not

be reduced or increased by the Congress. The applicable
rule o f interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio alte-
rius.
A ll constitutional officers, beginning appropriately
with the President, are required to be natural-born citi­
zens of the Philippines. A natural-born citizen is one
 The Executive D epartment 337

who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without

having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Phil­
ippine citizenship.2 He is distinguished from the- natu­
ralized citizen, whoi, acquires his Philippine citizenship
after birth by any of the modes allowed by law.
As previously observed, under the provisions of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act o f 2003,3
natural-born Filipino citizens who have been, or intend
to be, naturalized in a foreign country, shall, upon tak­
ing the oath of allegiance prescribed in said law be
deemed to have re-acquired, or shall retain their Philip­
pine citizenship, upon taking said oath. Those seeking
elective or appointive public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candi­
dacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation o f any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer au­
thorized to administer an oath. It must be noted that,
upon taking said second oath, the citizen ceases to be a
dual citizen.4
Registration as a voter connotes, of course, posses­
sion of the qualifications for suffrage as enumerated in
Article V , Section 1, of the Constitution.
The literacy qualification is now expressly required
because it is not deemed embraced in the suffrage quali­
fication. The present Constitution not only does not
require ability to read and write but in fact prohibits its
imposition as a qualification for voting.5

2Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2.

■'Republic Act No. 9225.
4 See discussion in Chapter 8.
5Ib id .
338 Philippine Political Law

The age qualification for the President under the

1935 Constitution was forty years but this was in­
creased to fifty years by the 1973 Charter, presumably
on the justification that more maturity was needed for
the highest office in the land. This did not seem to jibe
with the reduction of the voting age from twenty-one to
eighteen, which was based on the supposed increased
sense of responsibility and competence of the younger
citizens. In an interesting somersault, the age require­
ment was brought back to forty years in 1984 and is now
retained in the present Constitution.
It should be noted that this qualification should be
possessed by the candidate on the day of the election for
President regardless of the time the President-elect is
actually proclaimed.
The residence qualification is retained at ten years,
the object obviously being to ensure close touch by the
President with the country of which he is to be the high­
est official and familiarity with its conditions and prob­
lems, the better for him to discharge his duties effec­
tively.

Election and Proclamation

The President and the Vice-President are elected

by direct vote of the people. Unless otherwise provided
by law, the regular presidential election shall be held at
six-year intervals on the second Monday of May.0
The canvass of the election returns and the procla­
mation of the winners shall be conducted under Article
VII, Section 4, as follows:

Constitution, Art. VII Sec. 4.

 The Executive Department 339

The returns of every election for President and Vice-

President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed
to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt o f the certificates
of canvass, the Prqgident of the Senate shall, not later than
thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certifi­
cates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Represen­
tatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon deter­
mination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
“The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
“The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the can­
vassing of the certificates.
“The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali­
fications o f the President or Vice-President, and may promul­
gate its rules for the purpose.”

As the canvass is regarded merely as a ministerial

function, the Congress shall not have the power to in­
quire into or decide questions of alleged irregularities in
the conduct of the elections. These are matters appro­
priate for an election contest. Normally, as long as the
election returns are duly certified and appear to be au­
thentic, the Congress shall have no duty but to canvass
the same and to proclaim as elected the person receiving
the highest number of votes.
When the Congress meets to canvass the presiden­
tial election returns, it does not need the call to a special
session by the President under Article VI, Section 15, as
the canvass is mandated and called by the Constitution
itself.
340 Philippine P olitical Law

In the unlikely, but not impossible, event that the

election results in a tie, the one to be proclaimed “shall
be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the members of
both Houses of Congress, voting separately.” This pro­
cedure may clearly result in the absurd situation where
a majority of all the members of the House of Represen­
tatives would choose one of the candidates involved in
the tie, while a majority of all the Senators would choose
the other, in which case, the tie would clearly not be
broken.
Under this section, the Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
Accordingly, pursuant to this provision, the Su­
preme Court promulgated in 2010 its Rules establishing
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which,
among others, provided for its membership (consisting
of the members of the Supreme Court), the authority of
its Chairman to appoint employees and confidential
employees of every member thereof, for the establish­
ment of a separate “Administrative Staff of the Tribu­
nal,” and the provision for a “seal” separate and distinct
from the Supreme Court.
The legality of the PET was challenged in Macalin-
tal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,1 where the peti­
tioner questioned, among others, “the constitution of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.” The petitioner further claimed that “the
PET exercises quasi-judicial functions,” as specified by

7 G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.

 The Executive Department 341

the Supreme Court in Buac v. CO M ELEC ,8 “in contra­

vention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,”
which provides that the “Members of the Supreme Court
and of other courts established by law shall not be des­
ignated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or ad­
ministrative functions.”
Citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections ,9 the Su­
preme Court explained that this portion of Section 4
designating it as the sole judge of all presidential and
vice-presidential election contests “is an innovation of
the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions to designate any tribunal to be the
sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests,
has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas, as ‘not (being) justiciable’ controversies or dis­
putes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June
1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, ‘A n A ct Constitut­
ing an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to
Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of
the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect o f the
Philippines and Providing for the Manner o f Hearing the
Same.’ Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be
the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent
adoption of the parliamentary form of government un­
der the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonethe­
less, would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.” Ac­
cordingly, “unquestionably, the overarching framework

8465 Phil. 800.

9 424 SCRA 277 (2004).
342 P hilippine Political Law

affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections is that

the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide
presidential and vice-presidential election protests
while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral
Tribunal.” In other words, “the establishment of the
PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory be­
fore the 1987 Constitution.”
The Court added —

“By the same token, the PET is not a separate and dis­
tinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions pe­
culiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was con­
stituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Con­
stitution, and it faithfully complies — not unlawfully defies —
the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as
well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the
Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the
singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a spe­
cial electoral court.”

With respect to the contention that the PET exer­

cises quasi-judicial power and that its establishment
consequently contravenes Section 12 of Article VIII of
the Constitution, the Court clarified that “the set up
embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power.” Thus —

“It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as

PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election con­
test, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case o f Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose
P. Laurel enucleated that ‘it would be inconceivable if the Con­
stitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels.’ In
fact, Angara pointed out that ‘[t]he Constitution is a definition
of the powers o f government.’ And yet, at that time, the 1935
Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial
 The Executive D epartment 343

power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 o f the pre­

sent Constitution.
“With the explicit provision, the present Constitution
has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with lat-
ter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task
of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded
by the PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allo­
cated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless,
distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
“If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of
the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals
would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section
12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first
to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in
Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme
Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tri­
bunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the
same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII,
which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the
PET, from the same prohibition.
“We have previously declared that the PET is not simply
an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers o f the Consti­
tution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State o f Maryland proclaimed that ‘[a] power
without the means to use it is a nullity.’ The vehicle for the ex­
ercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and spe­
cifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners dur­
ing the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the
PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s, should not
constrict an absolute and constitutional grant o f judicial
power.

10 Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783; see also Macalintal v.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, 651
SCRA 239.
344 Philippine Political Law

Significantly, the Court added —

“At the higher levels — city, provincial, and regional, as

well as congressional and senatorial — exclusive and original
jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of
Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are
not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not
courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve elec­
tion contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial
power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment
found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tri­
bunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the
HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions
are still subject to judicial review — via a petition for certiorari
filed by the proper party — if there is a showing that the deci­
sion was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”11

In Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,12 among the

grounds relied upon by the PET in providing for the
dismissal of the election protest filed by the petitioner or
protestant was her having filed a certificate of candi­
dacy for Senator in the M ay 1995 elections. In its Deci­
sion, the Tribunal emphasized that she campaigned for
such office and submitted herself to be voted upon.
Thus —

“She knew that the term of office of the Senators who

would then be elected would be six years, to commence at noon
on the thirtieth day o f June next following their election and to
end at noon o f 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integ­
rity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign,
she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the
outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition,
or reservation.

" Ibid.
12P.E.T. Case No. 001, February 13, 1996, 253 SCRA 559.
 The Executive Department 345

“In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the

electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Sena­
tor, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such
for the term for which she was elected. These are givens which
are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the Constitu­
tion that public office is a public trust, and public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people and
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, x x x .
“The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May
1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides
with the last three years o f the term of the President elected in
the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be
Protestant Santiago’s term if she would succeed in proving in
the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992
elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protes­
tant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at
the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her ‘de­
termination to protect and pursue the public interest involved
in the matter o f who is the real choice of the electorate.’ Such
abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the in­
stant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would
serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura o f uncer­
tainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election,
thereby enhancing the all-too crucial political stability o f the
nation during this period o f national recovery.”

This ruling was affirmed in a vice-presidential elec­

tion contest where the protestant ran for and won a seat
in the Senate during the pendency of her aforesaid ac­
tion before the PET.13

Term

The term of the President (and the Vice-President)

is fixed by Section 4 as follows:

13 Legarda v. de Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, January 18, 2008,

542 SCRA 125.
346 Philippine Political Law

“The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by

direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall be­
gin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day
of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelec­
tion. No person who has succeeded as President and has served
as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election
to the same office at any time.”

It is expected that, because the President is not eli­

gible for re-election, he shall devote his attention during
his lone term to the proper discharge of his office in­
stead of using its perquisites to ensure his remaining
therein for another term. This was the original rule in
the Commonwealth Constitution, but it was amended in
1940 upon the strong advocacy of the incumbent Presi­
dent Manuel L. Quezon, who argued that six years was
“too long for a bad President and too short for a good
President,” presumably meaning himself. The amend­
ment was adopted.
In the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was
strong sentiment to prohibit re-election of the President,
possibly because of the known plans of President Marcos
to run for re-election notwithstanding that he was al­
ready disqualified under the 1935 charter. The issue
was mooted, however, when a parliamentary system
was adopted and the President was reduced to a mere
figurehead.
When the presidential system was restored, there
was no thought of limiting the term of President M ar­
cos, who apparently planned to stay in office for life. But
with his ouster in 1986, the Constitutional Commission
saw fit to put a rein on presidential ambitions and ten­
ure and so provided for this limitation of only one presi­
dential term.
 The Executive Department 347

The term of the President is fixed at only six years,

but it was extended by a few months in the case of
President Aquino. Although her term began on Febru­
ary 25, 1986, it was provided in Article XVIII, Section 5,
that “the six-year term o f the incumbent President and
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes o f synchronization o f elections, hereby ex­
tended to noon of June 30, 1992.” The next regular elec­
tion for the President and Vice-President was held on
the second Monday of that year.
The question of whether or not the President can
run for another term after other persons shall have
served in his former office has yet to be settled by the
Supreme Court. One view is that the President can be
re-elected provided this is not done immediately follow­
ing his first term. Others contend that he is forever dis­
qualified because Section 4 provides that “the President
shall not be eligible for any re-election.”
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who succeeded President
Estrada on January 20, 2001, was therefore eligible for
election in her own right because she had not served
more than four years by the end of her predecessor’s
term, which expired on June 30, 2004. If her unexpired
term exceeded that period, she would not have been
“qualified for election to the same office at any time.”
Estrada, on the other hand, was elected President
in 1998 and served only for, or resigned from office af­
ter, less than three years. This notwithstanding, he ran
for President again in 2010 and almost won.
In Pormento v. Estrada,14 the petitioner sought to
disqualify Estrada from participating in the 2010 presi­
dential election, on the basis of this constitutional provi­

14 G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, 629 SCRA 530.

348 Philippine P olitical Law

sion which states that no President shall be eligible for

any re-election. While the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the “novelty and complexity of the constitutional
issue involved in this case present a temptation that
magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law students
alike would find hard to resist,” it nevertheless dis­
missed the petition, stating that, considering that
Estrada was actually not elected President for the sec­
ond time, “any discussion of his ‘re-election’ will simply
be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful
or practical purpose.” It said, “prudence dictates that
this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue
before it has already been mooted by subsequent events.
More importantly, the constitutional requirement of the
existence of a ‘case’ or an ‘actual controversy’ for the
proper exercise of the power of judicial review con­
strains us to refuse the allure of making a grand pro­
nouncement that, in the end, will amount to nothing but
a non-binding opinion.”
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, 15 the pe­
titioner was elected three times as mayor but lost in an
election protest and was ousted during his third term.
Interpreting the three-term limit rule in the Constitu­
tion and the Local Government Code for local officials,
the Supreme Court held that he was not disqualified
from running for the same position again because his
third election was nullified and he did not fully serve
the third term. However, this ruling is not necessarily
decisive of the question as it applies to the term limits of
the President and the Vice-President.

15 311 SCRA 602.

 The Executive Department 349

The Vice-President
The new Constitution retains the office of the Vice-
President who shall, with the President, be elected di­
rectly by the people, for the same term of six years, and
may be removed also only through the process of im­
peachment. His qualifications are the same as those of
the President. The Vice-President is eligible for the posi­
tion of member of the Cabinet and when appointed as
such does not need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. This is intended to prevent him from
becoming, as mere presidential standby, “a superfluous
Excellency” with nothing more to do than pray for a
vacancy in the Presidency. Nevertheless, he may not
demand such appointment nor m ay he, conversely, be
compelled to accept it.
The new provisions on the office of the Vice-
President are as follows:

“Sec. 4. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have

the same qualifications and term o f office and be elected with
and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed
from office in the same manner as the President.
“The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.”
“Sec. 4(2) No Vice-President shall serve for more than
two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
“Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
the Members of both Houses o f Congress voting separately.”
350 Philippine Political Law

It is to be noted that whereas the President is not

eligible for any re-election, the Vice-President is allowed
to serve as such for two successive terms. The question
is, after an interval during which some other persons
may have served as Vice-President, would he again be
eligible for the same office?
Section 9, which was copied from Amendment 25 of
the U.S. Constitution, was applied when Vice-President
Arroyo replaced President Joseph Estrada and thereby
vacated her former office. To fill the vacancy, she nomi­
nated Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who, with the
concurrence of the Congress, took the oath as the new
Vice-President.
As in Section 4, which provides for settlement of
ties in presidential elections, this provision likewise
requires a separate majority vote of all the Members of
both Houses of Congress in the confirmation of the
nomination by the President of a Vice-President. It
would be clear that such nomination would not be con­
sidered confirmed without the concurrence of the sepa­
rate votes of both Houses.

Presidential Succession

There are two sets of rules on presidential succes­

sion, one found in Section 7 on vacancies occurring be­
fore the President’s term and the other in Section 8 on
vacancies occurring afterwards. The two provisions read
as follows:

“Sec. 7. The President-elect and the Vice-Presidentelect

shall assume office at the beginning o f their terms.
“I f the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-
elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
 The Executive Department 351

“If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-

President-elect shall act as President until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
“If at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become perma­
nently disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become Presi­
dent.
“Where no President and Vice-President shall have been
chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Represen­
tatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice-
President shall have been chosen and qualified.
“The Congress shall by law provide for the manner in
which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials men­
tioned in the next preceding paragraph.”
“Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or res­
ignation of both the President and Vice-President, the Presi­
dent o f the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall then act as President until
the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
“The Congress shall by law provide who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation
of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or
the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions o f powers and disqualifica­
tions as the Acting President.”

The cases contemplated in the first section are: (1)

death or permanent disability of the President-elect; (2)
failure to elect the President, as where the canvass of
the presidential elections has not yet been completed, or
where for one reason or another the presidential elec­
352 P hilippine Political Law

tion has not been held; and (3) failure of the President­
elect to qualify, that is, to assume his office by taking
the oath and entering into the discharge of his duties.
In the first case, the Vice-President-elect shall be­
come President. In the other two cases, the Vice-
President-elect shall merely act as President until such
time as the President shall have been chosen and quali­
fied.
The second section deals with vacancies occurring
in the office of the President during his incumbency and
is limited to four specified situations, to wit: (1) death;
(2) permanent disability; (3) removal; or (4) resignation.
Death, resignation and removal are self-explanatory.
Incurable insanity is an example of permanent disabil­
ity. In any of these situations, the Vice-President shall
become President.
In Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,16 the peti­
tioner questioned the respondent’s right to succeed him
as President, claiming that he had left Malacanang on
January 20, 2001 only to defuse the tension building up
among the demonstrators at Edsa who were demanding
his resignation. He denied he had resigned and said he
had every intention to return after the disturbances
shall have ended but was being prevented from doing so.
In rejecting this pretense, Justice Reynato S. Puno de­
clared in part for the Court:

“In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner

cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Mala­
canang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1)
he acknowledged the oath-taking o f the respondent as President
of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presi­

,GG.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452.

 T he Executive Department 353

dency, for the sake o f peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind o f inability and that he was going to re-flssume
the presidency as soon as the disability appears; (3) he ex­
pressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as their President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office o f the presi­
dent which he has given up, and (5) he called on his supporters
to join him in the promotion of a national spirit o f reconcilia­
tion and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit o f reconcilia­
tion and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up
the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory,
his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.”

Estrada also argued that the respondent could not

have replaced him either in an acting capacity because
the determination of the President’s inability to dis­
charge the powers and functions of his office should be
made by the Congress pursuant to the procedure laid
down in Section 11 of Article VII. The Court held that
he had not been replaced on that ground; and anyway,
the Senate and the House of Representatives had, by
resolution, formally recognized Gloria Macapagal A r­
royo as the constitutional successor of Joseph Estrada
by reason of his resignation as President of the Philip­
pines.
The following additional rules on presidential dis­
ability were originally embodied in a statute17 only but
have now been transferred to the Constitution:

“Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the

President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Rep­
resentatives his written declaration that he is unable to dis­

17B.P. 231.
354 Philippine Political Law

charge the powers and duties of his office, and until he trans­
mits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President.
“Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
“Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Presi­
dent of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Repre­
sentatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he
shall reassume the powers and duties o f his office. Meanwhile,
should a majority o f all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
within five days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House o f Representatives their written declara­
tion that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For
that purpose, the Congress shall convene if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and with­
out need of call.
“If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days af­
ter it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote
of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
“Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the
public shall be informed of the state of his health. The Mem­
bers of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign
relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Phil­
ippines shall not be denied access to the President during such
illness.”

In the event that both the offices of the President

and the Vice-President are vacated, the following rules
shall apply.
 T he Executive Department 355

“Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morn­

ing of the third day after the vacancy in the offices o f the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance
with its rules without need o f a call and within seven days en­
act a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a
Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor
later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling
such special election shall be deemed certified under para­
graph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading by the Con­
gress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged
against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from
the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI o f this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be sus­
pended nor the special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date o f the next presidential election.”

Oath of Office

The taking of the oath of office by the President­

elect marks his formal assumption of his duties. The
prescribed oath is provided for as follows:

“Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their of­

fice, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President
shall take the following oath or affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faith­
fully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President
(or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines,
preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service
of the Nation. So help me God.”
“(In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)”

The oath is not a source of substantive power but is

merely intended to deepen the sense of responsibility of
the President and ensure a more conscientious dis­
charge of his office. Nevertheless, it has been invoked as
a justification for presidential action, as when President
356 Philippine Political Law

Quezon sought to mitigate his outburst against a judi­

cial decision which he later found to be still pending
appeal. He said he had been moved to speak out because
of his sworn duty to “do justice to every man.” President
Lincoln also invoked his oath “to execute the laws” when
he suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
during the American civil war. That oath, he said, was
“registered in heaven.”
According to Corwin, the fact that “the President
takes an oath to preserve and protect the Constitution
does not authorize him to exceed his own powers under
the Constitution on the pretext of preserving and pro­
tecting it.”18

Perquisites and Inhibitions

Article VII, Section 6, provides for the perquisites

of the President and the Vice-President as follows:

“The President shall have an official residence. The sala­

ries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No in­
crease in said compensation shall take effect until after the ex­
piration of the term o f the incumbent during which such in­
crease was approved. They shall not receive during their ten­
ure any other emolument from the government or any other
source.”

The prohibition against the change of their salary

either by reduction or increase during their term is
meant to prevent the legislature from “weakening their
fortitude by appealing to their avarice or corrupting
their integrity by operating on their necessities.”

13The Constitution (1963), p. 99.

 The Executive Department 357

The “emoluments” which they may not receive dur­

ing their tenure from the government or any other
source (that is, private) refers to any compensation re­
ceived for services rendered or from possession o f an
office. “Emolument” has been defined as “the profit aris­
ing from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services, or which is annexed to the
possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites; ad­
vantage, gain, public or private.” “The gain, profit or
advantage which is contemplated in the definition or
significance of the word ‘emolument,’ as applied to pub­
lic officers, clearly comprehends, a gain, profit, or ad­
vantage which is pecuniary in character.”19 This means
that the President cannot accept other employment
elsewhere, whether in the government or in the private
sector, and must confine himself to the duties of his
office, although in the case of the Vice-President, he
may be appointed to the Cabinet. It is submitted,
though, that the Vice-President may not receive addi­
tional compensation in the second capacity because of
the absolute prohibition in the above provision.
The following inhibitions are also provided by Sec­
tion 13:

“The President, Vice-President, the Members o f the

Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless oth­
erwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, par­
ticipate in any business, or be financially interested in any con­
tract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality

19 Taxpayers’ League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d.

897, 901; 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767, cited in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965, 15
SCRA 479.
358 Philippine P olitical Law

thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corpo­

rations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict
o f interest in the conduct o f their office.”
“The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during
his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commission, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretar­
ies, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.”

These inhibitions are in line with the principle that

a public office is a public trust20 and should not be
abused for personal advantage. Significantly, except
only for the Vice-President who may be appointed to the
Cabinet, all the officers mentioned in the above provi­
sion are now inhibited from holding any other office or
employment in the government during their tenure.
This will discontinue the lucrative practice of Cabinet
members occupying seats in the boards of directors of
affluent corporations owned or controlled by the gov­
ernment from which they derived substantial income in
addition to their regular salaries. The second paragraph
of the provision, which is new, is intended as a guaranty
against nepotism, hitherto prohibited only by statute.21
In Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secre­
tary, 22 the petitioner challenged Executive Order No.
284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and other
appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold
other positions in the government albeit subject to the
limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refut­
ing the petitioners’ argument that the measure was

Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1.

21 P.D. 807, Sec. 49.
22 194 SCRA 317 (1991).
 The Executive Department 3 59

violative of Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution,

invoked Article IX-B, Section 7, allowing the holding of
multiple positions by the appointive official if “allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position.”
V

In declaring the executive order unconstitutional,

the Court declared through Chief Justice Fernan:

“In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Arti­

cle VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of posi­
tions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant sec­
retaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than two (2) positions in the government and government
corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Con­
stitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise pro­
vided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
“The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical
consequences that will result from a strict application of the
prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the op­
erations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members
would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity,
by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation.
“As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts or
those required by the primary functions o f the executive offi­
cial concerned do not fall within the definition of ‘any other of­
fice’ within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.
With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of
legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in gov­
ernment-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidi­
aries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences
are more apparent than real. Being head o f an executive de­
partment is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, re­
quiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and exper­
tise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department
head’s ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to
his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded
360 Philippine Political Law

from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too

many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphaz­
ardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived
from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise,
particularly at this stage of our national and economic devel­
opment, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained
from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking
in more than what he can handle.”

Moreover, the Court clarified that the “prohibition

against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied
by the Executive officials specified therein without addi­
tional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do no
comprise ‘any other office’ within the contemplation of
the constitutional prohibition but are properly an impo­
sition o f ‘additional duties and functions on said offi­
cials.’” Thus —

“To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article

VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned
official's office. The term ex-officio means ‘from office; by virtue
o f office.’ It refers to an ‘authority derived from official charac­
ter merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual charac­
ter, but rather annexed to the official position.’ Ex-officio like­
wise denotes an ‘act done in an official character, or as a con­
sequence of office, and without any other appointment or au­
thority than that conferred by the office.’ An ex-officio member
of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a cer­
tain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To il­
lustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Trans­
portation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of
the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail
Transit Authority.
 The Executive Department 361

“The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex­

officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board, thus: ‘An examination of section 2 of the
questioned statute (RA. 3137) reveals that for the chairman
and members of the'.Board to qualify they need only be desig­
nated by the respective department heads. With the exception
of the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio.
In order to be designated they must already be holding posi­
tions in the offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance,
one who does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau o f
Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a representative
from that office. The same is true with respect to the represen­
tatives from the other offices. No new appointments are neces­
sary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so
designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to
those already performed under their original appointments’
“The term ‘primary’ used to describe ‘functions’ refers to
the order of importance and thus means chief or principal
function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may re­
fer to the plural. The additional duties must not only be closely
related to, but must be required by the official's primary func­
tions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's
primary functions are the Secretaries o f Finance and Budget
sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary
of Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of
the Maritime Industry Authority and the Civil Aeronautics
Board.
“I f the functions required to be performed are merely in­
cidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or oth­
erwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such
additional functions would fall under the purview of ‘any other
office’ prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the
Press Undersecretary sitting as a member o f the Board of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same
rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet offi­
cial management functions and/or monetary compensation,
such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their sub­
sidiaries.”
362 Philippine Political Law

In Funa v. E rm ita 23 the petitioner questioned (on

the basis of Section 13) the constitutionality of the des­
ignation of the Undersecretary (for Maritime Transport)
of the Department of Transportation and Communica­
tion as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Au­
thority (MARINA). The respondent undersecretary,
Bautista, justified her concurrent holding of said posts
by invoking the provisions of Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B, which allows the holding by an appointive
official of another office if allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position. The Supreme Court, in sus­
taining the challenge, explained the concept of “holding”
an office, and held —

“Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of

DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the
exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B
where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of
MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception rec­
ognized in Civil Liberties Union.
“The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices
or employment under Section 13, Article VII o f the 1987 Con­
stitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Execu­
tive officials specified therein, without additional compensation
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these
posts do not comprise ‘any other office’ within the contempla­
tion o f the constitutional prohibition but are properly an impo­
sition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart
from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not re­
ceive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, re­
spondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as
such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the pri­
mary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Mari­
time Transport. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or

2a G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308.

 The Executive Department 363

multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the hold­

ing of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or des­
ignation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article
VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold’ an office
means to ‘possess or^occupy’ the same, or ‘to be in possession and
administration,’ which implies nothing less than the actual dis­
charge of the functions and duties of the office.”

For virtually the same reasons, the Supreme Court

also nullified in Funa v. Agra24 the designation of the
respondent as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, stressing
that it “was of no moment that Agra’s designation (as
Acting Secretary of Justice) was in an acting or tempo­
rary capacity.” Thus —

“The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being

held by one official must be construed as to apply to all ap­
pointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary,
for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section
13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants.
“According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma [G.R.
Nos. 83896 and 83815, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317], the
only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section
3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a
member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive of­
ficials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices. In
this regard, the decision in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma
adverted to the resolution issued on August 1, 1991 in Civil
Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, whereby the Court
held that the phrase ‘the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants’ found in Section 13, referred only to the

24 G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, 691 SCRA 196.

 364 Philippine Political Law

heads o f the various executive departments, their undersecre­

taries and assistant secretaries, and did not extend to other
public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary or
Assistant Secretary. Hence, in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma, the Court opined that the prohibition under Section 13
did not cover Elma, a Presidential Assistant with the rank of
Undersecretary.”

The Court emphasized that the subject designation

cannot be justified as necessarily springing from the
respondent’s position as Acting Solicitor General be­
cause “the powers and functions of the O SG are neither
required by the primary functions nor included by the
powers of the DOJ, and vice versa.” It clarified though
that, had the respondent’s designation been in an ex
officio capacity, “he would have been validly authorized
to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding
of one office being the consequence of holding the other.”
On the other hand, in Betoy v. Board o f Directors,
National Power Corporation,26 the Court upheld the
validity of a law providing for the designation (by Con­
gress) of Members of the Cabinet as Members of the
National Power Board of Directors (NPB). Thus —

“The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form

the NPB does not violate the prohibition contained in our Cons­
titution as the privatization and restructuring of the electric
power industry involves the close coordination and policy de­
termination of various government agencies. Section 2 of the
EPIRA clearly shows that the policy toward privatization
would involve financial, budgetary and environmental con­
cerns as well as coordination with local government units,
xxx.

25 G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA 420; see

also Philippine Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 513.
 T he Executive Department 365

“As can be gleaned from the foregoing enumeration, the

restructuring o f the electric power industry inherently involves
the participation o f various government agencies. In Civil Lib­
erties, this Court explained that mandating additional'duties
and functions to Cabinet members which are not inconsistent
with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments
by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their
respective executive offices, is a practice long-recognized in
many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of
efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among
the different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of
its multifarious tasks o f executing and implementing laws af­
fecting national interest and general welfare and delivering
basic services to the people.
“The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one
of national interest and is a basic commodity expected by the
people. This Court, therefore, finds the designation o f the res­
pective members o f the Cabinet, as ex-officio members o f the
NPB, valid.
“This Court is not unmindful, however, that Section 48 of
the EPIRA is not categorical in proclaiming that the concerned
Cabinet secretaries compose the NPB Board only in an ex-
officio capacity. It is only in Section 52 creating the Power Sec­
tor Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM)
that they are so designated in an ex-officio capacity, x x x .
“Nonetheless, this Court agrees with the contention of
the Solicitor General that the constitutional prohibition was
not violated, considering that the concerned Cabinet secretar­
ies were merely imposed additional duties and their posts in
the NPB do not constitute ‘any other office’ within the contem­
plation of the constitutional prohibition.
“The delegation o f the said officials to the respective
Board of Directors were (sic) designation by Congress of addi­
tional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they
were designated as members of the Board of Directors. Desig­
nation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment of
additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to re-
366 P hilippine Political Law

ceive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an em­

ployee’s right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly is­
sued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere
designation.
“Hence, Congress specifically intended that the position
of member of the Board of NPB shall be ex-officio or automati­
cally attached to the respective offices of the members compos­
ing the board. It is clear from the wordings o f the law that it
was the intention of Congress that the subject posts will be ad­
junct to the respective offices of the officials designated to such
posts.”

It is significant that, consistent with its ruling in

the Civil Liberties Union case, the Court stressed that
the concerned officials designated under the law to serve
as Members of the NPB “should not receive any addi­
tional compensation pursuant to their designation.”
The second paragraph of Section 13 prohibits the
President from appointing his spouse and relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree
as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersec­
retaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus of offices, includ­
ing government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries. Obviously, the prohibition applies
only during his tenure, as superfluously provided for in
this section, as he clearly may not exercise his power of
appointment after his tenure. Significantly, this provi­
sion does not preclude him from appointing his afore­
said relatives to the judiciary.

Executive Privilege

This special privilege of the President, although not

expressly conferred upon him under the Constitution,
has been invariably acknowledged as essential to his
 The Executive Department 367

exercise of his powers as the Chief Executive, consistent

with the principle of separation of powers.26
Defined simply as “the power of the Government to
withhold information ^from the public, the courts, and
the Congress”27 or as “the right of the President and
high-level executive branch officers to withhold informa­
tion from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the pub­
lic,”28 executive privilege has been the subject of many
rulings of the Supreme Court covering demands made
upon the executive department for the disclosure of
information, as pressed by both individuals and institu­
tions, like Congress.
Thus, executive privilege has generally been con­
strued to refer to the so-called informer’s privilege, or
the privilege of the Government not to disclose the iden­
tity of a person or persons who furnish information on
violations of law to officers charged with the enforce­
ment of that law; the privilege accorded to presidential
communications, which are presumed privileged with­
out distinguishing between those which involve matters
of national security and those which do not, the ration­
ale for the privilege being that “a frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare
of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essen­
tial to protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power;” the deliberative process privilege, which

26 See Almonte v. Vasquez, 314 Phil. 150 (1995); see also U.S. v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), cited in Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1.
27 B. Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investi­
gatory Power, 47 Cal. L. Rev. 3, cited in Senate v. Ermita, supra.
28 M. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In
Nixon’s Shadow (83 Minn. L. Rev. 1069), also cited in Senate v.
Ermita, supra.
368 Philippine P olitical Law

covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recom­

mendations and deliberations comprising part of a proc­
ess by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated; and the diplomatic negotiations privilege,
which is meant to encourage a frank exchange of ex­
ploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by
shielding such negotiations from public view.29
It has been held that, insofar as the informer’s
privilege is concerned, “the suspect involved need not be
so notorious as to be a threat to national security for
this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise,
the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the most
high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be
contrary to long-standing practice, it would also be
highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in gen­
eral.”30
On the other hand, the presidential communications
privilege applies to the decision-making of the President,
rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of
powers and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The elements of presidential communications privilege
are, first, the protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power,”
such as the power to enter into executive agreements;
second, the communication must be authored or “solicited
and received” by a close advisor of the President, such as
a member of the Cabinet, or the President himself; and,
third, the presidential communications privilege remains
a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing
of adequate need, such that the information sought
‘likely contains important evidence” and by the unavail­

2” AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558

SCRA 468.
:mIbid.
 T he Executive D epartment 369

ability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate

investigating authority.31 Moreover, “the privilege ac­
corded to presidential communications is not absolute,
one significant qualification being that ‘the Executive
cannot, any more than the other branches of govern­
ment, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield
its officials and employees from investigations by the
proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing.’ This qualification applies whether the
privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial
trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of
legislation.”32
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presi­
dential communications privilege applies to documents
in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional
materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a conse­
quence, congressional or judicial negation of the presi­
dential communications privilege is always subject to
greater scrutiny than denial o f the deliberative process
privilege.33
The deliberative process privilege confers such upon
the documents covered by the same, “not on the need to
protect national security but, on the obvious realization
that officials will not communicate candidly among
themselves if each remark is a potential item of discov­
ery and front page news, the objective of the privilege
being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.”34

31 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Offi­

cers, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
32AKBAYAN v. Aquino, supra.
33 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Offi­
cers, supra.
34AKBAYAN v. Aquino, supra.
370 Philippine Political Law

The diplomatic negotiations privilege “bears a close

resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential
communications privilege. It m ay be readily perceived
that the rationale for the confidential character of dip­
lomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presiden­
tial communications is similar, if not identical.” As de­
clared by the Supreme Court —

“Similar to the privilege for presidential communications,

the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same
means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the
President, particularly in its capacity as ‘the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations.’ And, as with the deliberative process privi­
lege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises,
not on account of the content of the information per se, but be­
cause the information is part of a process o f deliberation which,
in pursuit of the public interest, must be presumed confiden­
tial.”35

Executive privilege has been interpreted to include

the President’s conversations and correspondences, to
enable the President and those who assist him to freely
“explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately.”36 It likewise
covers military, diplomatic and other national security
matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.37 It includes as well information
between inter-government agencies prior to the conclu­
sion of treaties and executive agreements,38 discussions

:mIbid.
Almonte v. Vasquez, 314 Phil. 150.
37 Ibid.; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Govern­
ment, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744.
:,eId.
 The Executive Department 371

in closed-door Cabinet meetings,39 and matters affecting

national security and public order.40
As stressed by the Supreme Court, “executive privi­
lege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or
the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types
of information of a sensitive character. While executive
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may
be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to ju s­
tify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably
absent is any recognition that executive officials are
exempt from the duty to disclose information by the
mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the ex­
traordinary character of the exemptions indicates that
the presumption inclines heavily against executive se­
crecy and in favor of disclosure.”41 Accordingly, to reiter­
ate, in A K B A Y A N v. Aquino,42 the Court, citing Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon,43 declared that “the Executive cannot, any more
than the other branches of government, invoke a gen­
eral confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and
employees from investigations by the proper govern­
mental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.”
This qualification applies whether the privilege is being
invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congres­
sional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.44
“When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves there­

40 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9,

2002, 433 Phil. 506, 384 SCRA 152.
Senate v. Ermita, supra.
42 G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 468.
“ 498 F.2d 725, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 183.
44 AKBAYAN v. Aquino, supra., citing Arnault v. Nazareno, 87
Phil. 29, 46 (1950).
 372 P hilippine Political Law

from is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not ex­

empt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official m ay be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and
the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of gov­
ernment which is sanctioned by a long-standing cus­
tom.”45 Significantly, the Supreme Court has likewise
provided that “by the same token, members of the Su­
preme Court are also exempt from this power of in­
quiry.”40
A t any rate, it has further been ruled that execu­
tive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that
adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect
public interest, not to benefit a particular public offi­
cial.47 In any event, in Senate v. Ermita,48 the Supreme
Court, in nullifying specific provisions of Executive Or­
der No. 464 authorizing certain officers specified therein
to make a determination as to the privileged nature of
particular information requested to be disclosed by Con­
gress in the course of its conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation, without any showing of a prior consultation
with, or, much less the concurrence of, the President,
clarified that —

“Upon a determination by the designated head of office or

by the President that an official is ‘covered by the executive
privilege,’ such official is subjected to the requirement that he

45 Senate v. Ermita, supra.

wIbid.
41 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Offi­
cers, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152.
48Supra.
 The Executive Department 373

first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing be­

fore Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appear­
ance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by
the President.
“The proviso Allowing the President to give its [sic] con­
sent means nothing more than that the President may reverse
a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
“Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is
the determination by a head of office, authorized by the Presi­
dent under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such of­
ficial is in possession of information that is covered by execu­
tive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for
the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation.
“In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to
justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be con­
strued as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a
head o f office authorized by the President, has determined that
the requested information is privileged, and that the President
has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, how­
ever, even without mentioning the term ‘executive privilege,’
amounts to an implied claim that the information is being
withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the Presi­
dent, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an im­
plied claim of privilege.
“The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Ex­
ecutive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates
the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O.
464. It reads:
‘ ‘In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the
Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at
10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the Executive
Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to
attend the same without the consent o f the President, pursuant
to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled ‘Ensuring Obser­
vance O f The Principle O f Separation O f Powers, Adherence To
The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights
Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of
Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes.’
Said officials have not secured the required consent from the
President.’
374 Philippine Political Law

“The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege

or that the matter on which these officials are being requested
to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of
the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly
state that in view of the lack o f consent from the President un­
der E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
“Significant premises in this letter, however, are left un­
stated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the invited
officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, how­
ever, to be covered by the order means that a determination
has been made, by the designated head of office or the Presi­
dent, that the invited official possesses information that is cov­
ered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in
the letter that such determination has been made, the same
must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the
invited officials have not secured the consent of the President,
it only means that the President has not reversed the standing
prohibition against their appearance before Congress.
“Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to
the conclusion that the executive branch, either through the
President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464,
has made a determination that the information required by the
Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, there has
been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine,
an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.”

The Court added though that —

“Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides

that, once the head of office determines that a certain informa­
tion is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the offi­
cial from appearing before Congress, subject only to the ex­
press pronouncement o f the President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the
President to authorize claims o f privilege by mere silence.
“Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to
the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as
already discussed, is recognized with respect to information
the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or
 The Executive Department 3 75

in those instances where exemption from disclosure is neces­

sary to the discharge of highly important executive responsi­
bilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on
the fact that certain information must, as a matter of Neces­
sity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation
to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest
in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
“In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege,
the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power
to invoke the privilege. She may o f course authorize the Execu­
tive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
‘By order of the President’, which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the ex­
ecutive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not au­
thorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even
less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case
where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence.
Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this
score.”

Significantly, the Supreme Court made further

clarifications in Neri v. Senate Committee on Account­
ability o f Public Officers,49 as follows —

“Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly

invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by
the head of the department which has control over the matter.
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a
‘precise and certain reason’ for preserving their confidentiality.
“The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secre­
tary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal
claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that ‘this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine o f executive privilege
as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly.’ Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the

19 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77.

376 Philippine Political Law

President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate u.

Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be suffi­
cient.
“With regard to the existence of ‘precise and certain rea­
son,’ we find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary
Ermita specific enough so as not ‘to leave respondent Commit­
tees in the dark on how the requested information could be
classified as privileged.’ The case of Senate v. Ermita only re­
quires that an allegation be made ‘whether the information
demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc.’ The particular ground must only be
specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be compre­
hensive. The following statement of grounds satisfies the re­
quirement:
“‘The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic rela­
tions with the People’s Republic of China. Given the con­
fidential nature in which these information were con­
veyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee
any further details of these conversations, without dis­
closing the very thing the privilege is designed to pro­
tect.’
“At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, the
Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons
for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of
the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is
a matter of respect to a coordinate arid co-equal department.”

Presidential Immunity

W hen several criminal charges were filed against

him with the Sandiganbayan, former President Estrada
sought to dismiss them on the ground of his claimed
presidential immunity. In Estrada v. Desierto,50 the Su-

60 G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 356 SCRA 108; Lozada

v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 545.
 The Executive D epartment 377

preme Court dismissed his petition, holding in part as

follows:

“We now come to the immunity that can be claimed by

petitioner as a non-kitting president. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination cam these crimes, especially plunder which carries
the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immu­
nity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any deci­
sion of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with the post-tenure immunity from li­
ability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity as an in­
oculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The
rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such
but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.”

In fact, present jurisprudence reveals a “judicial

disinclination to expand the privilege, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication
of a right.”51 This modern trend was applied in the case
of U.S. v. Nixon and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, where it was
held that the immunity of the President from civil dam­
ages covered only official acts, a rule reiterated in Clin­
ton v. Jones, where the petitioner was an incumbent
president.
A t any rate, the Supreme Court has ruled that
“pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the
President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can
be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights
to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evi­

51 See Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, No­

vember 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84, citing Estrada v. Desierto, supra.-, In
the Matter o f the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of
Habeas Data in Favor of Francis Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
183533, September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678.
 378 Philippine Political L aw

dence exist to show that he or she had exhibited in­

volvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the
violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and rea­
sonable diligence in conducting the necessary investiga­
tions required under the rules,” and that “former Presi­
dent Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from
suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would
assess whether, within the context of amparo proceed­
ings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduc­
tion of Rodriguez.” It stressed though that “presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the
president’s incumbency.”52
“Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will de­
grade the dignity of the high office of the President, the
Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that
he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the perform­
ance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the leg­
islative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the
executive branch and anything which impairs his use­
fulness in the discharge of the many great and impor­
tant duties imposed upon him by the Constitution nec­
essarily impairs the operation of the Government.”53

MRodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November

15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84, citing Estrada v. Desierto, supra.
5:1 Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010, 613
SCRA 233.
 The Executive D epartment 379

Accordingly, in David v. A rroyo,54 the Court de­

clared that “it is not proper to implead President Arroyo
as respondent.” This, however, “does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other
official, he remains accountable to the people but he
may be removed from office only in the mode provided
by law and that is by impeachment.”

51 G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 433 Phil. 506; see Kilosbayan
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 353.
 Chapter 11

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

M ENTION HAS ALR E AD Y been made of the profound

influence exerted by the President as head of State and
chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines. This
influence derives from the vast powers conferred on him
that enable him to assume the leadership in the conduct
of public and governmental affairs.
This leadership is displayed by him not only in the
enforcement of laws but also in their enactment, as well
as in the conduct of foreign affairs, the command of the
armed forces, the administration of the government and
even the crystallization of public opinion on vital issues.
Does the President enjoy the totality of executive
power? Is he authorized to exercise any power so long as
it is by nature executive? In other words, is every power
relating to the enforcement and administration of laws
to be regarded as belonging to the President by virtue of
his office?
The original view of our Supreme Court on these
questions as they applied to the President of the Philip­
pines under the 1935 Constitution favored his complete
assumption of executive power. The Supreme Court de­
clared in Villena v. Secretary o f the Interior1 that “the
President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Gov­
ernment of the Philippines, and no other” and in Planas

' 67 Phil. 451.

380
 Powers of the President 381

v. Gil2 that “all executive authority is thus vested in

him.” These pronouncements were in keeping with the
rule announced in Myers v. United States,3 where Chief
Justice Taft held that “the words of Sec. 2 following the
general grant of executive power under Sec. 1 were ei­
ther an enumeration and emphasis of specific functions
of the Executive, not all inclusive, or were limitations
upon the general grant of executive power.” The U.S.
Supreme Court cited with approval Alexander Hamil­
ton’s opinion that “the enumeration (of specific execu­
tive powers) ought therefore to be considered as in­
tended merely to specify the principal articles implied in
the definition of power, leaving the rest to flow from the
general grant of that power.”
But these views have been reconsidered in favor of
a stricter interpretation of executive power. In Lacson v.
Roque4 and Mondano v. Silvosa,5 for example, our Su­
preme Court held that the President’s power of general
supervision over local governments could be exercised
by him only “as may be provided by law” in accordance
with the constitutional limitation. In the famous Steel
Seizure Case,5 President Truman’s takeover of the steel
mills to continue their operations while the steel work­
ers were on strike was declared illegal in the absence of
a specific constitutional or statutory authority. The ar­
gument offered was that the clause vesting in the Presi­
dent the executive power “constitutes a grant of all ex­
ecutive power of which the Government is capable.” The
U.S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 6 to 3, did not agree.
“If that be true,” Justice Black wryly commented, “it is

2 67 Phil. 62.
3 272 U.S. 52.
" 92 Phil. 456.
5 92 Phil. 456.
s Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579.
382 Philippine Political Law

difficult to see why our forefathers bothered to add sev­

eral specific items, including some trifling ones ... I can­
not accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of
all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allo­
cation to the presidential office of the generic powers
thereafter stated.”
It must be noted, however, that in Marcos u.
Manglapus,1 the Supreme Court, declared through Jus­
tice Irene R. Cortes:

“x x x we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitu­

tion imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally consid­
ered as within the scope of ‘executive power.’ Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated.”

This cannot be considered the last word on the mat­

ter, though, considering the strong dissents registered
in this 8-7 decision.
In fact, in the subsequent case of Laurel v. Garcia,8
the Supreme Court prohibited the sale of the properties
of the Philippines at Roppongi, Japan, on the ground
inter alia that the President of the Philippines had no
specific statutory authority to sell them. This time the
vote was 9-6.
It is significant though that, in the later case of
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Repub­
lic ,9 the Supreme Court declared that it is the executive
branch, “either pursuant to the residual power of the

1177 SCRA 668.

8187 SCRA 797.
8 G.R. Nos. 177857-58, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 255.
 Powers of the President 383

President” or by force of his enumerated powers under

the laws, that has control over all matters pertaining to
the disposition of government property including se­
questered assets und^r the administration of the Presi­
dential Commission on Good Government. “Surely,” said
the Supreme Court, “such control is neither legislative
nor judicial.”
In Ople v. Torres,10 the Supreme Court declared
“void, as a usurpation of legislative power,” Administra­
tive Order No. 308, which provided for the adoption of a
national identification system “even in the absence of an
enabling legislation.”
It will be recalled that, in David v. Arroyo,“ the
Court pronounced that, although the President m ay call
out the armed forces and declare a state of emergency,
he may not, without a law authorizing him to do so,
exercise emergency powers under Article XII, Section
17, which authorizes the State, during a national emer­
gency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. That authorization was eventually con­
ferred upon the President when Republic Acts Nos.
3902, 7477 and 7582 were passed by Congress.12
It has likewise been ruled that the President may
not amend by Executive Order the functions of the
Commission on Higher Education, as conferred upon it
by law, without prior legislative authority.13 Indeed, the

G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 354 Phil. 948, 293 SCRA 141.
" G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.
12 See Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213.
13 Review Center Association o f the Philippines v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428.
384 Philippine Political Law

provision in the Administrative Code on the so-called

residual powers of the President declares that “unless
Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exer­
cise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and
which are not specifically enumerated above, or which
are not delegated by the President in accordance with
law.”14
In Banda v. Erm ita,16 the Supreme Court acknow­
ledged that the President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive department in
line with his constitutionally granted power of control
over executive offices and by virtue of a previous delega­
tion of the legislative power to reorganize executive
offices under existing statutes. The Administrative Code
of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to re­
organize and redefine the functions of the Office of the
President.16 “Concomitant to such power to abolish,
merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the Presi­
dent Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only
among the offices in the Office of President Proper but
also the rest of the Office of the President and the Ex­
ecutive Branch, the President implicitly has the power
to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the
functional and internal structure of the Office of the
President, including the modification of functions of
such executive agencies as the exigencies of the service
may require.”17

Executive Order No. 292, Book III, Title 1, Section 20.

15G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010, 618 SCRA 488.
16 Executive Order No. 292, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31,
cited in Banda v. Ermita, supra.
17Ibid.
 Powers of the President 385

In Pichay v. Office o f the Deputy Executive Secretary

for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication D ivi­
sion,18 the Court upheld the President’s abolition of the
Presidential Anti-Gr^ft Commission (PAGC) and his
transfer of its functions to the Office of the Deputy Ex­
ecutive Secretary For Legal Affairs (ODESLA) under
the Office of the President, stressing that the President
has continuing authority to reorganize the Executive
Department under Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III of
E.O. 292.19 “Clearly,” said the Court, “the abolition of the
PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division spe­
cially created within the O D ESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing ‘dele­
gated legislative authority to reorganize’ his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292.”20
To stress that the President’s authority to reorgan­
ize his office was subject to the strictures provided for
under the law, the Court even explained the distinctions
between his basic authority to reorganize the Office of
the President Proper, and his general power to reorgan­
ize the Office of the President. Thus —

“However, the President’s power to reorganize the Office

of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should
be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the Presi­
dent can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abo­
lishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring func­
tions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31
(2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s power to reorganize of-

18 G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 408.

18 Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802,
July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718; Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283,
February 6, 2003, 397 SCRA 56.
20 Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, supra.
386 Philippine P olitical Law

fices outside the Office o f the President Proper but still within
the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring
functions or agencies from the Office of the President to De­
partments or Agencies, and vice versa.
“The distinction between the allowable organizational ac­
tions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2)
and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees'
tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the valid­
ity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions
undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O.
292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was com­
posed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the
ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was
placed directly ‘under the Office of the President.’ On the other
hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have
now been transferred, is an office within the Office o f the
President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to the Of­
fice of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abo­
lishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODE­
SLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.”21

In Galicto v. Aquino,22 the Supreme Court, while

providing for the dismissal on technical grounds of the
petition assailing the validity of an Executive Order
fixing the compensation and classification systems for
all government-owned or controlled corporations and
government financial institutions, nevertheless stressed
that the issuance of a new law vesting said power in the
President would mean that “the President can now reis­
sue an EO containing these same provisions without
any legal constraints.”
On the other hand, it must be mentioned that cer­
tain powers have been acknowledged as pertaining to
the President despite the absence of express confer­
ments upon him of the same. Thus, “that the authority

Ibid.
“ G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150.
 Powers of the President 387

of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel

groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
does not mean that she has no such authority. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general responsibility
to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief,
she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress
rebellion and lawless violence.”23 Moreover, it has also
been ruled that “the President's authority to declare a
state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength
from her Commander-in-Chief powers.”24 Likewise, in
Quarto v. The Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, 26
it was pronounced that “while the legislature is the
source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to
implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose
the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a
constituent part of the process and is essentially an
executive function.”
It is clear, however, that the President does not
have the authority to promulgate decrees. According to
the Supreme Court in David v. Arroyo ,26 where it de­
clared as unconstitutional President Arroyo’s Proclama­
tion 1017 which authorized her to issue decrees, “legisla­
tive power is peculiarly within the province of the Legis­
lature” and “neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion

23 The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
24 Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February
3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
25 Quarto v. the Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, G.R.
No. 169042, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 580, citing Mapa, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 783.
26Supra.
388 Philippine Political Law

nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s

exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.”
It clarified, however, that the President is granted
Ordinance Powers under Chapter 2, Book III of Execu­
tive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and
may issue any of the following: Executive Orders, which
are acts of the President providing for rules of a general
or permanent character in implementation or execution
of constitutional or statutory powers; Administrative
Orders, or acts of the President which relate to particu­
lar aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of
his duties as administrative head, Proclamations, which
are acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon
the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, and which shall have the
force of an executive order; Memorandum Orders, de­
fined as acts of the President on matters of administra­
tive detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which
only concern a particular officer or office of the Govern­
ment; Memorandum Circulars, which refer to acts of the
President on matters relating to internal administra­
tion, which the President desires to bring to the atten­
tion of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus
or offices of the Government, for information or compli­
ance; and General or Special Orders, which refer to acts
and commands of the President in his capacity as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Court stressed that “President Arroyo’s ordinance
power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by former Presi­
dent Marcos under PP 1081.”
Following is a discussion of the specific powers
vested in the President by the Constitution.
 Powers of the President 389

The Appointing Power

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by

the authority vested jvith the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. It has
likewise been defined as the “act of designation by the
appointing officer, body or board, to whom that power
has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise
the functions of a given office.”27 Although intrinsically
executive and therefore pertaining mainly to the Presi­
dent, the appointing power m ay be exercised by the
legislature and by the judiciary, as well as the Constitu­
tional Commissions, over their own respective person­
nel.
An appointment may be made verbally but is usu­
ally done in writing through w hat is called the commis­
sion. The commission is the written evidence of an ap­
pointment.
The Constitution vests the appointing power in the
President as follows:

“Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the

consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers o f the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose ap­
pointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers o f the Government whose ap­
pointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
“The President shall have the power to make appoint­
ments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or

27Appari v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231, citing Mechem.

390 Philippine Political Law

compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until

disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.”

This provision has not done away with the distinc­

tion between permanent and temporary or acting ap­
pointments. Permanent appointments are those ex­
tended to persons possessing the requisite eligibility and
are thus protected by the constitutional provision on
security of tenure. Temporary appointments, on the
other hand, which are given to persons without such
eligibility, are revocable at will and without the neces­
sity of just cause or a valid investigation. They are ex­
tended upon the understanding that the appointing
power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee
and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at
any time a final choice shall have been made by the
President.28
In General v. Urro,29 the Supreme Court explained
further the nature of temporary appointments, and de­
clared that acting appointments may be made even to
offices with staggered terms. Thus —

“Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President

includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless
he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by
the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the
nature o f the office involved. The President’s power to issue an
acting appointment is particularly authorized by the Adminis­
trative Code o f 1987 (Executive Order No. 292). x x x.
“The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by au­
thorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the se-

a Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780.

G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011, 646 SCRA 567; see also
Arquero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168053, September 21, 2011,
658 SCRA 70.
 Powers of the P resident 391

lection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting ap­

pointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall sur­
render the office once he is called to do so by the appointing
authority. Therefore, his term o f office is not fixed but endures
at the pleasure of tlje appointing authority. His separation
from the service does not import removal but merely the expi­
ration of his term — a mode of termination of official relations
that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision
on security of tenure since no removal from office is involved, x
x x.
“Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office
is to minimize the appointing authority’s opportunity to ap­
point a majority of the members o f a collegial body. It is also
intended to ensure the continuity o f the body and its policies. A
staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibi­
tion, direct or indirect, against the issuance of an acting or
temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to is­
sue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative
Code grants.
“Ramon P. Binamira v. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr., involving
the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), is an example o f how
this Court has recognized the validity of temporary appoint­
ments in vacancies in offices whose holders are appointed on
staggered basis. Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 189, (the
charter of the PTA, as amended by P.D. No. 564 and P.D. No.
1400), the members of the PTA’s governing body are all presi­
dential appointees whose terms of office are also staggered.
This notwithstanding, the Court sustained the temporary
character of the appointment extended by the President in fa­
vor of the PTA General Manager, even if the law also fixes his
term of office at six years unless sooner removed for cause. In­
terestingly, even a staggered term of office does not ensure
that at no instance will the appointing authority appoint all
the members of a body whose members are appointed on stag­
gered basis, x x x.
“Given the wide latitude of the President’s appointing
authority (and the strict construction against any limitation on
or qualification of this power), the prohibition on the President
from issuing an acting appointment must either be specific, or
there must be a clear repugnancy between the nature of the of­
fice and the temporary appointment. No such limitation on the
President’s appointing power appears to be clearly deducible
392 Philippine P olitical Law

from the text o f R.A. No. 6975 in the manner we ruled in Na-
cionalista Party v. Bautista. In that case, we nullified the act­
ing appointment issued by the President to fill the office of a
Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on
the ground that it would undermine the independence o f the
COMELEC. We ruled that given the specific nature o f the
functions performed by COMELEC Commissioners, only a
permanent appointment to the office of a COMELEC Commis­
sioner can be made, x x x.
“Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment
(and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause
of action to maintain the present petition. The essence o f an
acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent
revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The peti­
tioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement
to an office, on the ground o f usurpation or illegal deprivation,
must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed;
otherwise, his petition must fail.”

Appointments, whether permanent or temporary,

are distinguished from designation in that the latter
means simply the imposition of additional duties, usu­
ally by law, on a person already in the public service.
For example, the chairman of the Board of Investments
is, by designation, a member of the National Economic
and Development Authority.
In Binamira v. Garrucho, 30 the Court observed:

“Designation may also be loosely defined as an appoint­

ment because it likewise involves the naming o f a particular
person to a specified public office. That is the common under­
standing of the term. However, where the person is merely des­
ignated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold
the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at
will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation
is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which
does not confer security of tenure on the person named.”

188 SCRA 154.

 P owers of the P resident 393

A designation connotes an imposition of additional

duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the
public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.31- It
does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant
upon the person so designated the right to claim the
salary attached to the position. Without an appoint­
ment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive
the salary of the position. The legal basis of an em­
ployee’s right to claim the salary attached thereto is a
duly issued and approved appointment to the position,
and not a mere designation.32
Both the temporary appointment and the designa­
tion are not subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given errone­
ously, will not make the incumbent a permanent ap­
pointee.33
The Supreme Court discussed the nature of an act­
ing appointment in Pimentel v. Ermita.34 Thus —

“The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is

its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill
an office for a limited time until the appointment o f a perma­
nent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occu­
pied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a de­
partment secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an
alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
“Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the Presi­
dent the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecre­
tary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether tempo­

" National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit, 481

Phil. 279, 294 (2004).
32 Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA 420.
11Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692.
34 G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587.
394 P hilippine P olitical Law

rary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confi­

dence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an
office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be.
“The office of a department secretary may become vacant
while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is
the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office
must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the
very nature of the office of a department secretary, the Presi­
dent must appoint in an acting capacity a person o f her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not
be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it
expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
“The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292 states that ‘[t]he President may temporarily designate
an officer already in the government service or any other com­
petent person to perform the functions of an office in the execu­
tive branch.’ Thus, the President may even appoint in an act­
ing capacity a person not yet in the government service, as
long as the President deems that person competent.”

The Court went on to say that the President may

not be compelled to submit his acting appointments to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
Thus —

“The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,

and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances when the Constitu­
tion expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the execu­
tive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legisla­
ture. The scope o f the legislature’s interference in the execu­
tive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint
a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to
that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the
duty to appoint any particular person to an office.”
 P owers of the President 395

There are now six categories of officials who are

subject to the appointing power of the President, viz.:
(1) The heads of the executive departments. •
(2) Ambassaddrs, other public ministers and con­
suls.
(3) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain.
(4) Those other officers whose appointments are
vested in him by the Constitution.
(5) All other officers of the government whose ap­
pointments are not provided for by law.
(6) Those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint.
The President of the Philippines under the 1935
Constitution was empowered to appoint “officers of the
army from the rank of colonel and of the navy and air
force from the rank of captain or commander.”35 The
rank was raised to brigadier-general or commodore in
the 1973 charter.36
It must be pointed out though that appointments
and promotions from the rank of captain and higher in
the Philippine Coast Guard no longer require confirma­
tion by the Commission on Appointments in view of its
transfer from the Department of National Defense to,
eventually, the Department of Transportation and
Communication, for which reason, it is now to be con­
sidered a civilian agency,37 although, for purposes of
disciplining its officers and personnel, it remains a com­
ponent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. There­

35Art. VII, Sec. 10(3).

36Art. VII, Sec. 12.
37 Soriano III v. Lista, 399 SCRA 437.
396 Philippine Political Law

fore, said officers and personnel shall still be subject to

the primary disciplinary jurisdiction of its Efficiency
and Separation Board, and not the Civil Service Com­
mission.38
Some officers whom the President is authorized by
law to appoint are the members of the various statutory
administrative agencies. Also included in this class
would be the Officers-in-Charge of the Autonomous Re­
gion of Muslim Mindanao authorized to be appointed by
the President under the provisions of Republic Act No.
10153.39 An example of an officer whose appointment is
not otherwise provided for in the Constitution is the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Accord­
ingly, his appointment would not require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.40 On the other
hand, there is express constitutional authority given to
the President in the appointment of the Ombudsman,41
although such appointment, including the appointment
by the President of his deputies, would require no con­
firmation as well by the Commission on Appointments.
In Sarmiento v. M ison,42 the Commissioner of Cus­
toms was held to be not subject to confirmation, being of
the rank of the bureau director, who was purposely de­
leted from the listing o f those whose appointments had
to be approved by the Commission on Appointments.
As pointed out by Justice Teodoro Padilla:

Caballero v. Philippine Coast Guard, G.R. No. 174312, Sep­

tember 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 186.
19 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270.
“ Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169.
41 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 9.
“ 156 SCRA 549.
 P owers of the President 397

“In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed

out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to ex­
clude presidential appointments from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sen­
tence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word ‘alone’ after the word
‘President’ in providing that Congress may by law vest the ap­
pointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power
to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in
the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
“Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked offi­
cers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the
President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments
of the government. In short, the word ‘alone’ in the third sen­
tence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a lit­
eral import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII
of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light
of the second sentence o f Sec. 16, Article VII. And this redun­
dancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential ap­
pointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
“Coming now to the immediate question before the Court,
it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group o f appointments where the consent of the Commission
on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already
pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes ‘heads of bu­
reaus’ among those officers whose appointments, need the con­
sent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitu­
tion, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
‘heads of bureaus’ from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.”43

See also Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254.

398 Philippine P olitical Law

Chief Justice Teehankee and Justices Herrera and

Sarmiento filed separate concurring opinions. Justices
Gutierrez and Cruz dissented.
The Chairman and members of the National Labor
Relations Commission have likewise been declared as
not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Ap­
pointments, as they are not among the officers included
in the first sentence of Section 16.44
On the other hand, the sectoral representatives ap­
pointed by the President to the House of Representa­
tives pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 (2) of Arti­
cle VI, in relation to Section 7 of Article X V III of the
Constitution, required confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, according to the Supreme Court in
the case of Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appoint­
ments.45
Under the Constitution, confirmation would also be
required with respect to the appointments of the
Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commis­
sions46 and the regular members of the Judicial and Bar
Council.47 The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the Presi­
dent from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council. Such appointments need
no confirmation.48 Neither shall the appointment of the
Vice-President as a member of the Cabinet require con­
firmation by the Commission on Appointments.49

11Ibid.
45 177 SCRA 259.
“ Constitution, Articles IX-B, Section 1 (2), IX-C, Section 1 (2)
and IX-D, Section 1 (2).
47Ibid., Article VTII, Section 8 (2).
“ Id., Article VIII, Section 9.
43Id., Article VIII, Section 3.
 P owers of the President 399

As to officers lower in rank, the Congress m ay al­

low their appointments to be made by the President
alone, the courts, and the heads of departments, agen­
cies, commissions and boards. “Officers lower in rank”
as here used, should not be understood as referring to
petty or unimportant officers but those below the rank
of or subordinate to those in whom the power of ap­
pointment is vested.50
As under the Commonwealth Constitution, the Pre­
sident’s appointing power is once again subject to check
by the Commission on Appointments, which was abol­
ished by the 1973 charter. Consequently, the distinc­
tions between the regular and ad interim appointments,
and the applicable jurisprudence thereon, have also
been revived.
The usual steps in the appointing process are the
nomination, which is made by the President; the con­
firmation, which is the prerogative of the Commission
on Appointments; and the issuance of the commission,
also done by the President. This is where the appoint­
ment is regular. On the other hand, in the case of the ad
interim appointment, the appointment comes before the
confirmation, which is made by the Commission when it
reconvenes following the legislative recess. The nomina­
tion of the regular appointee is made and approved dur­
ing the session, when the Commission on Appointments
is authorized to meet. But the ad interim appointment
is made during the recess and becomes effective then,
subject to confirmation or rejection later, during the
next legislative session.
The distinction between the regular and ad interim
appointments are the following:

50 Black, Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., 128.

400 Philippine Political Law

(1) The regular appointment is made during the

legislative session; the ad interim appointment is made
during the recess.
(2) The regular appointment is made only after
the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Ap­
pointments; the ad interim appointment is made before
such confirmation.
(3) The regular appointment, once confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, continues until the
end of the term of the appointee; the ad interim ap­
pointment shall cease to be valid if disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or upon the next ad­
journment of the Congress. In the latter case, the ap­
pointment is deemed “by-passed” through inaction of,
and so disapproved impliedly by, the Commission on
Appointments.
As clarified by the Supreme Court in Guevara v.
Inocentes,bl the phrase “next adjournment” refers to the
termination of the next regular or special session of
Congress. Thus —

“It is true that the provision of the Constitution we are

now considering in speaking of the mode of termination epito­
mized in the phrase ‘until the next adjournment of the Con­
gress’ does not make any reference to any specific session of
the Congress, — whether regular or special, — but such silence
is of no moment, for it is a well-known maxim in statutory con­
struction that when the law does not distinguish we should not
distinguish. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTIN-
GUERE DEBEMUS (Robles vs. Zambales Chromite Mining
Company, et al., G.R. No. L-12560, September 30, 1958). Con­
sequently, it is safe to conclude that the framers of our Consti­
tution in employing merely the word adjournment as a mode of
terminating an appointment made during the recess of Con-

r” G.R. No. L-25577, M arch 15, 1966, 18 SCRA 379.

 Powers of the President 401

gress had in mind either the regular or special session, and not
simply the regular one as contended by petitioner.”

In Matibag v. Benipayo,52 the Supreme Court clari­

fied that “an ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appoint­
ments does not alter its permanent character. The Con­
stitution itself makes an ad interim appointment per­
manent in character by making it effective until disap­
proved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress.” However, when the ad
interim appointment lapses by inaction of the Commis­
sion on Appointments, as when it fails or refuses to act
on the same until the next adjournment of Congress, it
would not constitute a term of office. The period from
the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time
it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an expired term .53
The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent
a hiatus in the discharge of official duties. Obviously,
the public office would be immobilized to the prejudice
of the people if the President had to wait for the Con­
gress and the Commission on Appointments to recon­
vene before he could fill a vacancy occurring during the
recess.
The President’s power of appointment may also be
limited by the Congress through its power to prescribe
qualifications for public office. The judiciary for its part
may annul an appointment made by the President i f the

82 G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 429 Phil. 554; see also
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. IAC, 140 SCRA 22.
83 Fetalino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890, De­
cember 4, 2012, 686 SCRA 813.
402 P hilippine Political Law

appointee has not been validly confirmed or does not

possess the required qualifications.
In any event, the power of appointment, as ex­
plained by the Supreme Court in Lusgo v. Civil Service
Commission,54 “is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. I f he does, then the appointment can­
not be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred.” Accordingly,
the Civil Service Commission, which approved as “tem­
porary” a permanent appointment otherwise duly made,
was, in this case, declared by the Supreme Court as not
being “empowered to determine the kind or nature of
the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its
authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law.” All that the Civil Service Commission
may do is determine whether or not the appointee pos­
sesses the qualifications and requisite or appropriate
eligibility. “If he does, his appointment is approved; if
not, it is disapproved.”55
As held in Lacson v. Romero, 56 an appointment is
deemed complete only upon its acceptance. Pending
such acceptance, which is optional to the appointee, the
appointment m ay still be validly withdrawn. Appoint­
ment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen
except for purposes of the defense of the State under
Article II.

5J 143 SCRA 327.

65 Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 269.
Bb84 Phil. 740; see also Javier v. Reyes, 170 SCRA 360.
 Powers of the President 403

As earlier noted, the Supreme Court upheld in

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines57
the authority of the President to appoint officers-in-
charge for elective positions for purposes of temporarily
filling the posts left vacant by said elective officials from
the expiration of their terms up to the conduct of the
regular elections. The basis for said authority was Re­
public Act No. 10153, the law which provided for the
synchronization of the elections for the regional gov­
ernment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Min­
danao with the regular elections.
The Court stated that, even if said law had not ex­
pressly provided for the President’s authority to appoint
said officers-in-charge, he would still nevertheless pos­
sess the power to appoint them as Section 16 vests in
him as well the power to appoint officials whose ap­
pointments are not otherwise provided for by law. “In
other words, where there are offices which have to be
filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling
them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the
President to fill the office by appointment. A ny limita­
tion on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s
appointment power should be strictly construed and
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.”
Against the contention that this power of the Presi­
dent to appoint said officers-in-charge, who would be
occupying elective offices, breaches Section 16 of Article
X of the Constitution, which grants the President the
mere power of general supervision over autonomous
regions, the Court explained that it saw “no incompati­
bility between the President’s power of supervision over
local governments and autonomous regions, and the

87 G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, 677 SCRA 200.

404 P hilippine Political Law

power granted to the President, within the specific con­

fines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.”

“The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s

alleged power o f control over the OICs is rooted in their belief
that the President’s appointment power includes the power to
remove these officials at will, xxx The -wording of the law [Sec-
tion 3, RA 10153] is clear. Once the President has appointed
the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same of­
ficials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly
elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this pro­
vision even hints that the President has the power to recall the
appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears
in this regard are more apparent than real.”

The Court further noted that the “grant to the

President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
is neither novel nor innovative. The power granted to
the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the
power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code)
to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the
Regional Legislative Assembly.”
Two special limitations on the appointing power
should be noted in Article VII, thus:

“Sec. 14. Appointments extended by an acting Presi­

dent shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected
President within ninety days from his assumption of office.”

This emphasizes the caretaker capacity of the Act­

ing President but at the same time allows the elected
President to ratify his appointments by mere inaction
during the specified ninety days.
 Powers of the President 405

“Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next

presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a Presi­
dent or Acting President shall not make appointments except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein Will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.”

The obvious purpose of the above is to prevent the

use, or abuse, of the appointing power for the purpose of
enlisting political support in exchange for some appoint­
ive office in the government. This will also prevent the
“midnight appointments” that may otherwise be issued
by an outgoing President, as happened in the case of
Aytona v. Castillo,58 which involved the validity o f Presi­
dent Diosdado Macapagal’s Administrative Order No. 2,
issued on December 31, 1961, recalling, withdrawing,
and cancelling all (350) ad interim appointments made
by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, (the date
when Macapagal was proclaimed elected by the Con­
gress), including several ad interim appointments made
by outgoing President Carlos P. Garcia on December 29,
1961, or one day before the expiration of his term. In
providing for the dismissal of the petition, the Court
declared that “under the circumstances above described,
what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves
that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Ad­
ministrative Order No. 2, cancelling such ‘midnight’ or
“last-minute’ appointments.” It did point out though that

“Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia

ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December 30, 1961.
But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of
the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a
‘care-taker’ administration. He was duty bound to prepare for
the orderly transfer o f authority to the incoming President,

r,R4 SCRA 1.
406 P hilippine Political Law

and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would em­

barrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for
debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for
him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the po­
litical warfare that had ended or to avail himself o f presiden­
tial prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up of
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford
some assurance o f deliberate action and careful consideration
of the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifica­
tions may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and planned induction o f almost all
of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new Presi­
dent may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an
abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being ap­
parently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions, irre­
spective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive
the new administration of an opportunity to make the corre­
sponding appointments.”

In De Castro v. Judicial and Bar C ouncil/9 the Su­

preme Court declared that the prohibited appointments
under Section 15 do not cover appointments to the Su­
preme Court.

“There is no question that one of the reasons underlying

the adoption of Section 15 as part o f Article VII was to elimi­
nate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing
Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt with in
the leading case o f Aytona v. Castillo. Given the background
and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we
have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined
the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive De­
partment. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition
to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment
of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening
of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and delib­
erate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.

r'3 G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666.
 Powers of the President 407

“Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to

submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint
one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of
the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to
the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens
the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President
to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be uncon­
scionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively
and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted
under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the ap­
pointment.”

(1) The Removal Power

From the express power of appointment, the Presi­

dent derives the implied power of removal. However, it
is not correct to say that all officials appointed by him
are also removable by him since the Constitution pre­
scribes certain methods for the separation from the pub­
lic service of some such officers. For example, the m em ­
bers of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Commissions, although appointed by the President, may
be removed only by impeachment in accordance with
Article XI. Judges o f inferior courts, likewise appointed
by the President, are subject to the disciplinary author­
ity of, and may be removed only by, the Supreme
Court.60 Moreover, the Ombudsman, who shall also be
appointed by the President under the Constitution,61
may be removed only by impeachment.62 Insofar as the
Deputy Ombudsmen are concerned though, the Presi­
dent’s authority to appoint them63 includes, by necessary

6(1Constitution, Article VIII, Sections 9 and 11.

61Ibid., Article XI, Section 9.
62Id., Article XI, Section 2.
“ Constitution, Article XI, Section 9.
 408 P hilippine Political Law

implication, the authority to remove them, especially so

since a law has expressly conferred upon him said
power, which he shares with the Ombudsman.64 The
President is without any power to remove elected local
officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the
proper courts as expressly provided for in the last para­
graph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code.65
In all other cases where the power of removal is
lodged in the President, the same may be exercised by
him only for cause as may be provided by law and in
accordance with the prescribed administrative proce­
dure.66 The exception only is with respect to the mem­
bers of the Cabinet or to other executive officials whose
term of office is determined at the pleasure of the Presi­
dent. Legally speaking, their separation is effected not
by the process of removal but by the expiration of their
term.
Thus, in Alajar v. Alba,67 the charter of a city pro­
vided that its vice-mayor shall be appointed by and hold
office at the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
Having been appointed and qualified, Alajar served as
vice-mayor for more than a year until he was required
by the Office of the President to vacate his post in favor
of Alba, a new appointee. Alajar invoked his constitu­
tional security of tenure and claimed that he had been
unlawfully removed, no administrative charge having
been filed or proved against him. The Supreme Court

64 Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sep­

tember 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614.
“ Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 416, citing Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr., 326 Phil. 847, 904-905 (1996).
“ Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(3).
1,7 100 Phil. 683; see also Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA
231.
 Powers of the President 409

denied him relief, holding that there was no removal

here but a mere expiration of the term of office. Justice
Roberto Concepcion explained in his concurring opinion:

“In the case at bar, the term of respondent Alajar as Vice-

Mayor of the City of Roxas is not fixed by law. However, the
latter, in effect, vests in the President the power to fix such
term. When, in November 1955, petitioner Alba was designated
as Acting Vice-Mayor of said City, the term of respondent Alba
was thereby fixed implicitly by the President, in the exercise of
his aforementioned authority. Thus, the term of office of Alajar
expired and his right to hold office was extinguished, with the
same legal effect as if the term had been fixed by Congress it­
self. In other words, Alajar was not removed from office, for ‘to
remove an officer is to oust him from office before the expiration
of his term.’ (Manalang v. Quitoriano, et al., 50 Off. Gaz.,
2515). Alajar merely lost the right to hold the office of Vice-
Mayor of the City of Roxas by expiration of his term as such.”

But it would be different i f the law provided that a

member of the classified civil service could be “removed
at pleasure” as this would contravene the constitutional
rule that “no officer or employee o f the Civil Service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law™
At any rate, a removal presupposes a forcible and
permanent separation of the incumbent from office be­
fore the expiration of his term.69

The Control Power

“The President shall have control of all the executive

departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.”10

1,8Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(3).

88 Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171.
70Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17.
410 Philippine Political Law

Control is defined as “the power of an officer to al­

ter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.”71 It includes the authority to order the doing of
an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume
a power directly vested in him by law. Control is a
stronger power than mere supervision, which means
“overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may
take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make
them perform these duties.”72 In the case of Drilon v.
Lim ,13 the Supreme Court elaborated on the distinction
thus:

“An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of

an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order
the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such author­
ity. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules,
nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re­
done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed.”

Theoretically, the President has full control of all

the members of this Cabinet. He may appoint them as
he sees fit, shuffle them at pleasure, and replace them
in his discretion without any legal inhibition whatever.
It is true that there are practical or political considera-

11 Mondano v. Silvosa, supra.

72Ibid.
73 235 SCRA 135.
 Powers of the President 411

tions that may limit his freedom of control over them.

From the purely legal standpoint, however, the mem­
bers of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the dispo­
sition of the President since they are merely his alter
ego. 1
As the Supreme Court put it in Villena v. Secretary
o f the Interior,14 “without minimizing the importance of
the heads of various departments, their personality is in
reality but the projection of that of the President.” Ac­
cordingly, their acts “performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive.”
This principle, generally known as the doctrine o f
qualified political agency, was acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in Manubay v. Garilao75 where it de­
clared that a further appeal from a decision of a cabinet
secretary may be taken to the Office of the President
before resorting to judicial action, to be consistent with
the doctrine o f exhaustion o f administrative remedies.
Thus —

“Under the doctrine o f qualified political agency, depart­

ment secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President
and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless
disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an ag­
grieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary
need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari
directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said
secretary. Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP
was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of administra­
tive remedies. A party aggrieved by an order o f an administra­
tive official should first appeal to the higher administrative au­
thority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case,

w 67 Phil. 451.
75 G.R. No. 140717, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 134.
412 P hilippine Political Law

the complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for hav­

ing no cause of action.’"

Such appeal to a “higher administrative authority”

pursuant to the doctrine o f exhaustion o f administrative
remedies would however not be necessary or required
when there exists a special law that provides for a dif­
ferent mode of appeal. Indeed, it has been ruled that
“executive control” cannot be considered as “absolute”
and may be “effectively limited by the Constitution, by
law, or by judicial decisions.” It is likewise subject to the
rule-making authority of the Supreme Court.76
It would appear though that the doctrine o f quali­
fied political agency would be not be applicable to acts of
cabinet secretaries done in their capacity as ex officio
board directors of a government-owned or controlled
corporation of which they become members not by ap­
pointment of the President but by authority of law.
Thus, in Trade and Investment Development Corpora­
tion o f the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigilio ,77 the peti­
tioner sought to justify its reorganization, as directed by
its board of directors, by invoking this doctrine, stating
that since the members of its board are cabinet secretar­
ies, their act of providing for the reorganization should
be considered as the act of the President, who, under
existing laws, possesses the continuing authority to
reorganize the executive department, including the peti­
tioner. Although the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the reorganization, it did so on the basis of other

76 Phillips Seafood [Philippines] Corporation v. BOI, G.R. No.

175787, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 113.
77 G.R. No. 185571, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 359. (Manalang-
Demigilio v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 168613, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 359.)
 Powers of the President 413

grounds, and not the doctrine of qualified political

agency. It explained —

“The doctrine o f qualified political agency essentially pos­

tulates that the heads of the various executive departments
are the alter egos o f the President, and, thus, the actions taken
by such heads in the performance of their official duties are
deemed the acts c f the President unless the President himself
should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of
the fact that in our presidential form of government, all execu­
tive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive;
that the heads o f the Executive Departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple execu­
tive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are per­
formed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has
been adopted here out o f practical necessity, considering that
the President cannot be expected to personally perform the
multifarious functions of the executive office.
“But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not
be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
despite some of its members being themselves the appointees
of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 o f Presiden­
tial Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 o f Re­
public Act No. 8494, the five ex officio members were the Secre­
tary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Gov­
ernor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General
of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the
Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board,
while the four other members of the Board were the three from
the private sector (at least one of whom should come from the
export community), who were elected by the ex officio members
of the Board for a term of not more than two consecutive years,
and the President o f TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-
Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on. the
Board o f Directors o f TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason o f their
office or function, not because of their direct appointment to
the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the
President, that sat them in the Board.
“Under the circumstances, when the members o f the
Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002 reorganization,
they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of
414 Philippine Political Law

Directors of TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential

Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as
the alter egos of the President. "We cannot stretch the applica­
tion of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount
of power. Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not
to be lightly inferred.”

In this connection, it has likewise been ruled that

the Constitution’s express grant of the power of control
in the President justifies an executive action to carry
out reorganization measures under a broad authority of
law.78
In Angeles v. GaiteJ9 the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a memorandum circular issued by the Presi­
dent limiting his review of resolutions, orders or adjudi­
cations of the Secretary of Justice to offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death on the basis of the doc­
trine of qualified political agency. Moreover, the Court
said that the “President has not fully abdicated his
power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows
an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose
upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary
investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do
so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the
President by having to scrutinize each and every deci­
sion of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the
latter’s expertise in said matter.”
Section 17 is a self-executing provision. The Presi­
dent derives his power of control directly from the Con­
stitution and not from any implementing legislation.
Such a law would in fact be unnecessary and would even

™ Anak Mindanao Party List-Group v. The Executive Secre­

tary, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, 531 SCRA 583.
79 G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 309.
 Powers of the President 415

be invalid if it limits the exercise of his power or with­

draws it altogether from the President.
In Araneta v. Gatmaitan80 for example, the Con­
gress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and N atu­
ral Resources to promulgate rules and regulations con­
cerning trawl fishing. W hen President Magsaysay di­
rectly exercised this authority, his act was challenged on
the ground that the power in question had been.con­
ferred not on him but on the aforementioned Cabinet
member. The Supreme Court did not agree, holding as
follows:

“If under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natu­

ral Resources has authority to regulate or ban fishing by trawl,
then the President of the Philippines may exercise the same
power and authority because of the following: (a) The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, pursuant to Section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitu­
tion; (b) Executive Orders may be issued by the President un­
der Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code ‘governing
the general performance o f duties by public employees or dis­
posing of issues of general concern’; and (c) Under Section 74 of
the Revised Administrative Code, ‘All executive functions of
the Government of the Republic o f the Philippines shall be di­
rectly under the Executive Department, subject to the supervi­
sion and control of the President of the Philippines in matters
of general policy.”

In Gascon v. Arroyo,81 the Supreme Court held that

the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter into
the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS-CBN Broad­
casting Corporation as he was acting on behalf of the
President of the Philippines who had the power to nego­
tiate such agreement. The agreement was therefore
binding on the Republic of the Philippines.

80101 Phil. 328.

81 178 SCRA 582.
416 Philippine P olitical Law

It has also been ruled that the Secretary of the D e­

partment of Labor and Employment, as the officer exer­
cising the power of supervision and control over the
Bureau of Labor Relations, has the authority to directly
exercise the quasi-judicial functions entrusted by law to
the Director of said Bureau.82 He likewise possesses
appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by the Philip­
pine Overseas Employment Administration, consistent
with his power of supervision and control under Section
38(1), Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised A d­
ministrative Code of 1987.83
In Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. us. Pano,114 a law
provided that decisions rendered by the Director of
Lands on questions of fact shall be conclusive when
affirmed by the Secretary o f Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Nevertheless, one such decision was ap­
pealed to the Office of the President and was subse­
quently reviewed and reversed by the Executive Secre­
tary. On the basic issue of whether or not the adminis­
trative decision could still be appealed to the President
of the Philippines, the Supreme Court held as follows:

“Plaintiffs position is incorrect. The President’s duty to

execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control
of all executive departments. His is the power to appoint them;
his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally,
he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority
to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that
the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary.”

82 The Heritage Hotel Manila v. NUWHRAIN, G.R. No. 178296,

January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 420.
B:<Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. v. Surio, G.R. No.
154213, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 21.
“ 21 SCRA 895.
 Powers of the P resident 417

It should be noted, however, that the power of con­

trol is exercisable by the President over the acts of his
subordinates and not necessarily over the subordinate
himself or, as the Supreme Court put it in Ang-Angco v.
Castillo,85 not “over the actor or agent himself of the
act.” In this case, the President of the Philippines had
assumed direct jurisdiction over a member of the classi­
fied Civil Service against whom administrative charges
had been filed by the Commissioner of Customs. In hold­
ing this act of the President to be unlawful, the Su­
preme Court declared:

“Let us now take up the power o f control given to the

President by the Constitution over all officers and employees in
the executive department which is now invoked by respondents
as justification to override the specific provisions of the Civil
Service Act. This power of control is couched in general terms
for it does not set in specific manner its extent and scope. Yet,
this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, had already
occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean ‘the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter,’ to distinguish it from the power of supervision over
municipal governments, but the decision does not go to the ex­
tent o f including the power to remove an officer or employee in
the executive department. Apparently, the power merely ap­
plies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate
and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only
means that the President may set aside the judgment or action
taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.”

In Noblejas u. Salas, 86 a provincial fiscal directed by

the Secretary of Justice to file informations against five
persons added a sixth accused on his own authority. The
Supreme Court reversed his action, holding that he

85 9 SCRA 619 (1963).

8667 SCRA 47 (1975).
 418 Philippine Political Law

could not contravene the directive. The reason was that

he was under the constitutional power of control of the
President, exercised in this case through the Secretary
of Justice.
This ruling was reiterated in Jacob v. Puno, s7 where
the Minister of Justice was sustained by the Supreme
Court when, pursuant to his authority under P.D. 916,
he ordered a fiscal to withdraw certain informations.
In De Leon v. Carpio,ss the respondent refused to
obey the orders of the Secretary of Justice to reinstate
the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
found by the Civil Service Commission to have been
illegally dismissed. The Supreme Court declared:

“In the case at bar, there is no question that when he di­

rected the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Secretary
Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as
an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have
been respected by the respondent Director of the National Bu­
reau of Investigation, which is in the Department of Justice
under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in
this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the
Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts o f the
President of the Philippines.

In Orosa v. Roa,S9 the Court affirmed that the De­

partment of Justice is under the President’s control.
Accordingly, the decisions of the Secretary of Justice are
subject to his review. Incidentally, it has been repeat­
edly ruled by the Court that the Department of Justice,
as the primary prosecution arm of the Government, is

87 131 SCRA 144 (1984).

88 178 SCRA 457 (1989).
sa 527 Phil. 347, 353-354 (2006), cited in PCGG Chairman v.
Jacobi, G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 20.
 Powers of the President 419

not a quasi-judicial body. Its preliminary investigation

of a case is therefore not a quasi-judicial proceeding.90
In Kulayan v. Tan,91 the Supreme Court affirmed
that, “as a civilian agency of the government, the police,
through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is
subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control.”

The “Take-Care” Clause

The power to take care that the laws be faithfully

executed makes the President a dominant figure in the
administration of the government. The energy or indif­
ference with which he discharges this power will deter­
mine the measure of his success as Law Enforcer.
The law he is supposed to enforce includes the Con­
stitution itself, statutes, judicial decisions, administra­
tive rules and regulations and municipal ordinances, as
well as treaties entered into by our government.
It has been suggested that the President is not un­
der obligation to enforce a law which in his belief is un­
constitutional because it would create no rights and
confer no duties, being totally null and void. The better
view is that it is not for him to determine the validity of
a law since this is a question exclusively addressed to
the judiciary. Hence, until and unless a law is declared
unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it
regardless of his doubts on its validity. A contrary opin­
ion would allow him not only to negate the will of the
legislature but also to encroach upon the prerogatives of
the judiciary.

30 Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 188056,

January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 109.
01 G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 482.
420 Philippine Political Law

In any event, this duty of the President to ensure

that the laws are faithfully executed was cited by the
Supreme Court as justification for the validity of his
creation of an investigative body in Biraogo u. The Phil­
ippine Truth Commission o f 2 0 1 0 .92 Although the Court
declared as unconstitutional the Executive Order issued
by the President for the purpose for being violative of
the equal protection clause, it nevertheless declared
that his “power to conduct investigations to aid him in
ensuring the faithful execution of laws — in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and trans­
parency — is inherent in the President’s powers as the
Chief Executive.” Thus —

“That the authority o f the President to conduct investiga­

tions and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority. Indeed, the Executive is
given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain
facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the authority of
the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating
an investigative committee to look into the administrative
charges filed against the employees of the Department of
Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. It
should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investi­
gating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which
the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly ad­
vised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.”

“2 G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCR A 78.

 P owers of the President 421

The Court added —

“The President’s power to conduct investigations to en­

sure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It
flows from the faithfM-execution clause of the Constitution un­
der Article VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has the authority to directly assume the func­
tions of the executive department. Invoking this authority, the
President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports
of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate ac­
tion.”

This ruling has since been affirmed in Pichay v. Of­

fice o f the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Investigative and Adjudication Division , 93 where the
Court stressed that the “obligation to see to it that laws
are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding
power in the President to conduct investigations into the
conduct of officials and employees in the executive de­
partment.”
In P C G G Chairman v. Jacobi,94 the Court further
stressed that a “necessary component of the Executive’s
power to faithfully execute the laws of the land is the
State’s self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its
penal laws.” This responsibility, according to the Court,
is primarily lodged with the Department of Justice, as
the principal law agency of the government.

The Military Power

Tremendous and extraordinary authority is reposed

in the President by the following provision in Article
VII;

MG.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 408.

94 G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 20.
 Philippine Political Law

“Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-

Chief o f all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it be­
comes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privi­
lege of the writ o f habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privi­
lege of the writ o f habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or sus­
pension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
“The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
“The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate pro­
ceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency o f the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege o f the writ or the extension thereof, and must prom­
ulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
“A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning o f the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment
of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically sus­
pend the privilege o f the writ.
“The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses in­
herent in or directly connected with invasion.
“During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.”
 Powers of the President 423

To begin with, this section bolsters the principle

announced in Article II, Section 3, that “civilian author­
ity is, at all times, supreme over the military.” B y mak­
ing the President the commander-in-chief of all the
armed forces, the Constitution lessens the danger of a
military take-over of the government in violation of its
republican nature.
The military establishment is the strongest single
institution in the country and could easily employ its
physical force to wrest power from the civilian authori­
ties. The threat of such domination would be present in
fact even if the civil and military authorities were made
only equal. It is important that the military be subordi­
nated to the President so he can keep it in check when­
ever it is tempted to impose its will upon the govern­
ment.
There is some hazard, to be sure, in entrusting fi­
nal military decisions to a civilian President without
much background in military matters. The danger be­
comes especially marked in times of war or when the
President happens to be opinionated or is unwilling to
defer to the recommendations of his more knowledge­
able military advisers. The counter-argument is that
such a situation, although not impossible, would be
unlikely, given the sense of responsibility that can be
expected from any person elevated to the position of
President. More importantly, it was felt that the need
for preserving our democratic institutions against a
military coup d ’etat was worth the calculated risk the
Constitution was taking.
It should be noted that although the President is
made the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, he
will be so only if there are armed forces to command.
These forces will be raised by the Congress in the exer­
424 Philippine Political Law

cise of its general legislative power, and particularly

under Article II, Section 4, providing that the Govern­
ment may call upon the people to defend the State and
in the fulfillment thereof all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal
military or civil service.
The military power enables the President to: (1)
command all the armed forces of the Philippines; (2)
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
(3) declare martial law. .

(1) Command of the Armed Forces

The “power of the sword” makes the President the

most important figure in the country in times of war or
other similar emergency. In theory, he plans all cam­
paigns, establishes all sieges and blockades, directs all
marches, fights all battles. His leadership, if bold and
decisive, can galvanize people to gallantry or, if vacillat­
ing and timorous, can enfeeble them to defeatism and
surrender. It is because the sword must be wielded with
courage and resolution that the President is given vast
powers in the making and carrying out of military deci­
sions.
Accordingly, it has been held that he can determine
what degree of force a particular crisis demands, as
when President Lincoln declared a blockade of the Con­
federate ports during the American civil war; organize
courts martial for the discipline of the members o f the
armed forces violating military law; create military
commissions for the punishment of war criminals; and
call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion.
 P owers of the President 425

Courts martial were described in Ruffy u. C hief o f

S ta ff5 as agencies of executive character which m ay be
convened by the President independently of legislation
and by virtue only of his constitutional function as
commander-in-chief. These courts do not pertain to the
judiciary and are utilized by him in properly command­
ing and enforcing discipline in the armed forces. Thus —

“Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and

one of the authorities ‘for the ordering of courts martial has
been held to be attached to the constitutional functions o f the
President as Commander in Chief, independently of legisla­
tion.’ (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p.
49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judici­
ary. The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the
provisions o f the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide
for the government of the army, excepting military offenses
from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Com­
mander in Chief, observes as follows: ‘These provisions show
that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and pun­
ishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and
now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so
is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article
of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely
independent of each other.’
“Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government,
it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive de­
partment; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by Congress for the President as
Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized military representa­
tives.”

However, in Garcia v. Executive Secretary,96 the Su­

preme Court clarified that the “general court martial is

05 75 Phil. 875.
“ G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 750.
426 Philippine Political Law

a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as

a criminal court.” Thus —

“In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philip­

pines [89 Phil, 246 (1951)], this Court ruled that a court-
martial case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial
is a ‘court’ akin to any other courts. In the case of Ramon Ruffy
vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we
did not hold that the word ‘court’ in general used in our Consti­
tution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that
the words ‘inferior courts’ used in connection with the appel­
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to ‘review on appeal cer­
tiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules o f court may provide,
final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment,’ as provided
for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to
Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
“The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal,
rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing
authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not
change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A
judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty
must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be
executed.”

As previously observed, the Court added that “the

power to confirm a sentence of the President, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or dis­
approve the entire or any part of the sentence given by
the court martial.”97
In Kuroda u. Jalandoni,9S a former commanding
general of the Japanese forces in the Philippines
charged with having permitted his troops to commit
atrocities against civilians and prisoners of war, ques­
tioned inter alia Executive Order No. 68, establishing a
national war crimes office, under which he was being

07Ibid.
aK42 O.G. 4282.
 Powers of the President 427

tried. The Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of Ya-

mashita v. S t y e r which upheld the jurisdiction of mili­
tary commissions over war criminals, declared that the
promulgation of the challenged order was “an exercise
by the President of his powers as commander-in-chief of
all our armed forces.”
In Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2,100 the Su­
preme Court upheld the power of the President to create
military tribunals authorized to try not only military
personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil
courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the
“open court” theory observed in the United States. In
the case of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 101
however, the Aquino decision was reversed and it was
held in part, through Justice Gancayco:

“Due process of law demands that in all criminal prose­

cutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his
liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
(In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 [1948]; Sections 1 and 14[2], Article
III, 1987 Constitution.) There appears to be no substantial
change from the corresponding provisions o f the 1973 Consti­
tution. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the
Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process. A mili­
tary commission or tribunal, by whatever name they are called,
are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. As ex­
plained by Justice Teehankee in his separate dissenting opin­
ion —
“‘x x x Civilians like (the petitioner) placed on trial
for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by
judicial process.
‘“Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclu­
sively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts

98 75 Phil. 563 (1977).

63 SCRA 546 (1975).
lnl 150 SCRA 144 (1987).
 428 Philippine P olitical Law

as are duly established by law. Judicial power exists only

in the courts, which have exclusive power to hear and de­
termine those matters which affect the life or liberty or
property of a citizen.102
‘“Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are
we under a military government and even on the premise
that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil
offenses committed by them which are properly cog­
nizable by the civil courts that have remained open and
have been regularly functioning.’103
‘“And in Toth v. Quarks, 104 the, U.S. Supreme Court
further stressed that ‘the assertion of military authority
over civilians cannot rest on the President’s power as
Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.’
‘x x x.
“The U.S. Supreme Court aptly pointed out x x x, in
ruling that discharged army veterans (estimated to num­
ber more than 22.5 million) could not be rendered “help­
less before some latter-day revival o f old military
charges’ and subjected to military trials for offenses
committed while they were in the military service prior
to their discharge, that the presiding officer at a court-
martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independ­
ence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary
and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military
law officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and
procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these dif­
ferences, the suggestion o f the possibility of influence on
the actions of the court-martial by the officer who con­
venes it, selects its members and the counsel on both
sides, and who usually has direct command authority
over its members is a pervasive one in military law, des­
pite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.’

102 Citing Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 (1966) and Scoty’s De

partment Store v. Micaller, 99 Phil. 762 (1956).
"MCiting Ex-parte Milligan, 4 Wallace (U.S.), 127, 18 L.Ed.,
297.
11,4 350 U.S. 5, 14(1955).
 Powers of the President 429

“The late Justice Black x x x added that ‘(A) Court

Martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice
but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of
the over-all mechanism by which military discipline is
preserved and (.that ex-servicemen should be given ‘the
benefits of a civilian court trial when they are actually
civilians x x x . Free countries of the world have tried to
restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction
deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline
among troops in active service.’
“Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply instrumentali­
ties of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the
President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly com­
manding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein,
and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized mili­
tary representatives. (Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875
[1946]) Following the principle of separation of powers under­
lying the existing constitutional organization of the Govern­
ment o f the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting
the laws (as when an individual should be considered to have
violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. (Kop-
pel [PhiL], Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496, 515 [1946]). It is not, and
it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through
the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the
land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so
today and as they did during the period of the martial law in
the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise juris­
diction over civilians for offenses committed by them and
which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. (Ex-parte
Milligan, supra.) To have it otherwise would be a violation of
the constitutional right to due process o f the civilian con­
cerned.”

In the Garcia case, the Court emphasized that the

“courts” referred to in Olaguer were military commis­
sions created during martial law while the General
Court Martial was created under Commonwealth Act
No. 408, “and remains a valid entity.”105

",r’ Garcia v. Executive Secretary, supra.

430 Philippine P olitical Law

In Integrated Bar o f the Philippines v. Zamora106 the

petitioner questioned the command of President
Estrada deploying the Philippine Marines to join the
Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around
Metro Manila for the purpose of crime prevention. The
order was obviously based on the deteriorating peace
and order in the metropolis. The IBP contended that
there was no emergency or a state of “lawless violence”
to warrant the calling of the Armed Forces, which would
have the effect of militarizing the government to the
prejudice of individual liberties and the supremacy of
civilian authority.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding
that inasmuch as the IBP had not shown that the Presi­
dent had committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
his command, it was not inclined to overrule the Presi­
dent’s determination of the factual basis for the calling
of the Marines. Moreover, it ruled that the IBP was not
a proper party to raise the challenge.
According to the Supreme Court, this so-called
“calling-out power” of the President involves “ordinary
police action,” which would ordinarily not entitle him to
“invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a
lesser power.”107 Thus, the Supreme Court nullified in
David v. Arroyoim President Arroyo’s Presidential Proc­
lamation No. 1017, under which she commanded “the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insur­
rection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the

338 SCRA 81.

"" David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA
161.
'"“ I b i d .
 P owers op the President 431

laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promul­

gated by me personally or upon my direction” and “as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution”
declared a “National Emergency.” The Court ruled that,
while the call made by her upon the Armed Forces to
suppress lawful violence, as well as her proclamation of
a state of national emergency, can be considered as
valid, her reliance on the provisions of Section 17 of
Article X II of the Constitution, which allows the State,
during times of national emergency, to temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned pub­
lic utility or business affected with public interest for
purposes of her proclamation of a state of national
emergency was misplaced. The Court declared —

“Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can

declare a state o f national emergency, however, without legis­
lation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. The President
cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist war­
ranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or busi­
ness affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when
such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exer­
cise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in
the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.”

Incidentally, the Court clarified in David that the

President “cannot call the military to enforce or imple­
ment certain laws, such as customs laws, laws govern­
ing family and property relations, laws on obligations
and contracts and the like.” He can only order the mili­
tary to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress
lawless violence.
432 P hilippine Political Law

It has further been ruled that it is only the Presi­

dent who is authorized to exercise the calling-out power.
Accordingly, a provincial governor may not validly issue
a proclamation calling upon the Philippine National
Police and the Civil Emergency Force to “set up check­
points and choke points, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to
ensure public safety,” by reason of a kidnapping incident
in his area, and on the basis merely of a general provi­
sion in the Local Government Code entitling him “to
carry out emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to sup­
press disorder and lawless violence.
The Supreme Court has likewise declared that “the
President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is im­
plicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President
has the general responsibility to promote public peace,
and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific
duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless vio­
lence.”110 Moreover, as previously observed, the Presi­
dent, as Commander-in-Chief, may validly prohibit a
military officer from testifying in a legislative inquiry,
without prejudice though to the right of the legislative
body seeking such testimony to obtain judicial relief to
compel the attendance of said officer. “Such judicial
action should be directed at the heads of the executive
branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield au­
thority and control over the actions of the officers con-

Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA

482.
1IUThe Province o f North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
 Powers of the President 433

cerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as

well as any defenses against the same — whether
grounded on executive privilege, national security or
similar concerns — would be accorded due judicial
evaluation. All the constitutional considerations perti­
nent to either branch of government may be raised, as­
sessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And
once the courts speak with finality, both branches of
government have no option but to comply with the deci­
sion of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to
their liking or disfavor.”111
In Rodriguez v. Macapagal A rroyo,112 the Supreme
Court, citing Gonzales v. Abaya,113 declared that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, can be held respon­
sible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and en­
forced disappearances in the context of amparo proceed­
ings114 on the basis of the doctrine o f command responsi­
bility, the requisites of which are “a. the existence of a
superior-subordinate relationship between the accused
as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his sub­
ordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know
that the crime was about to be or had been committed;
and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and rea­
sonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
the perpetrators thereof.” According to the Court, the
President, being the commander-in-chief of all the
armed forces, is to be considered as necessarily possess-

111 Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498
SCRA 671.
112 G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84; see also
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of
Habeas Data in Favor of Francis Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
183533, September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678.
1,3 G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 445.
" 4 A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC.
434 P hilippine Political Law

ing control over the military that qualifies him as a su­

perior within the purview of the doctrine. Moreover, he
can, according to the Court, be presumed to have knowl­
edge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or of­
fenses pertinent to said extrajudicial killings and en­
forced disappearances. “Meanwhile, as to the issue of
failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president
has the power to effectively command, control and disci­
pline the military.” In Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo,115 the
Court clarified that, in amparo proceedings, “command­
ers may therefore be impleaded— not actually on the
basis of command responsibility— but rather on the
ground of their responsibility, or at least accountabil­
ity.”

(2) Habeas Corpus

To the President is entrusted the power to suspend

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. However, this
power is not without limitations and may be revoked by
the Congress or the Supreme Court in proper cases.
The. aforecited provision must be read with Article
III, Section 15, stating as follows:

“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it.”

The writ of habeas corpus “is a writ directed to the

person detaining another, commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place,
with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to
do, to submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge

1,5 G.R. No. 186050, Decem ber 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 312.
 Powers of the President 435

awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf. It is a

high prerogative common law writ of ancient origin the
great object of which is the liberation of those who may
be in prison without sufficient cause.”116
It should be stressed that what is permitted to be
suspended by the President is not the writ itself but its
privilege.
“Suspension of the privilege of the writ o f habeas
corpus does not suspend the writ itself, but only its
privilege. This means that when the court receives an
application for the writ, and it finds the petition in
proper form, it will issue the writ as a matter of course,
i.e., the court will issue an order commanding the pro­
duction before the court of the person allegedly de­
tained, at a time and place stated in the order, and re­
quiring the true cause of his detention to be shown to
the court. If the return to the writ shows that the person
in custody was apprehended and detained in areas
where the privilege of the writ has been suspended or
for crimes mentioned in the executive proclamation, the
court will suspend further proceedings in the action.”117
The Supreme Court decidedly has the power to an­
nul the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus if the same is not based on either of the two
grounds stated in the Constitution, to wit, “invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it.”
In 1951, President Quirino based his suspension of
the privilege of the writ o f habeas corpus on “sedition”
and “imminent danger of insurrection or rebellion.” If he
had not added the latter ground, which was listed in the

" s Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. II, 499.

117Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 131.
436 Philippine P olitical Law

1935 charter, the Supreme Court would have, in Monte­

negro v. Castaneda,118 invalidated his proclamation.
Supposing, however, that the suspension is based
on the grounds prescribed by the Constitution, will the
Supreme Court have the competence to ascertain the
existence of such grounds for the purpose of determining
the validity of the suspension?
The Montenegro Case affirmed the doctrine an­
nounced in Barcelon v. Baker119 and held that the de­
termination by the President of the Philippines o f the
existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Consti­
tution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The
justification was that the President, with all the intelli­
gence sources available to him as commander-in-chief,
was in a better position than the Supreme Court to as­
certain the real state o f peace and order in the country.
The doctrine in the above case was subsequently
abandoned in Lansang u. Garcia,120 where the Supreme
Court declared that it had the power to inquire into the
factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus by President Marcos in August
1971 and to annul the same i f no legal ground could be
established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to
receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-
door sessions in which relevant classified information
was divulged by the government to the members of the
Court and three selected lawyers of the petitioners. In
the end, a unanimous Court, after satisfying itself that
there was actually a massive and systematic Commu­
nist-oriented campaign to overthrow the Republic of the

91 Phil. 882.
1,3 5 Phil. 87.
123 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
 Powers of the P resident 437

Philippines by force, as claimed by the President, de­

cided to uphold the suspension.
In Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile , 121 however, the Su­
preme Court reversed^ the Lansang decision and revived
the Montenegro doctrine, reiterating that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a politi­
cal question to be resolved solely by the President. For­
tunately, though, this ruling has been abrogated by
Section 18, which has expressly constitutionalized the
Lansang doctrine.
It should also be noted that under Article III, Sec­
tion 13, “the right to bail shall not be impaired even if
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”
“The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose
origin is traced to antiquity, w as devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint and as the best and efficient defense
of personal freedom.”122 It may therefore not be availed
of by police officers under investigation and subjected to
a “restrictive custody order” issued by their superiors,
limiting their physical movements and liberty to leave
their camps. According to the Supreme Court, consider­
ing that they are not, by reason of their restrictive cus­
tody status, actually detained or imprisoned, their
“minimal restraint” is “beyond the ambit of habeas cor-

121121 SCRA 472 (1983).

122 Feria v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122954, February
15, 2000, 325 SCRA 525, 533; Sombong v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 663, 673; Castriciones
v. Chief o f Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines, G.R. No. 65731,
September 28, 1989 (Minute Resolution); Mizuaki Takenouchi v.
Cristi, G.R. No. 82232, July 25, 1988 (Minute Resolution).
>2i Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA 290.
438 Philippine P olitical Law

(3) Martial Law

In the case of Aquino v. Enrile124 the Supreme

Court, by unanimous vote of its members then, sus­
tained the proclamation of martial law by President
Marcos on September 21, 1972, but no clear consensus
was reached on the justification for the common conclu­
sion. For this reason, each o f the justices submitted his
own opinion of the rationale for such proclamation. The
case has now only historic interest, however, because of
the new provisions in the 1987 Constitution, quoted
above, on the scope and effects of martial law.
In light of the re-definition o f martial law and the
delimitation of its duration and consequences, we may
now say again with Willoughby that martial law in its
strict sense refers to that law which has application
when the military arm does not supersede civil author­
ity but is called upon to aid it in the execution of its civil
function.
The declaration of martial law, he continues, has
no further legal effect than to warn the citizens “that
the military powers have been called upon by the execu­
tive to assist him in the maintenance of law and order
and that while the emergency lasts, they must, upon
pain o f arrest and punishment, not commit any act
which will in any way render difficult the restoration of
order and the enforcement of law. When martial law is
declared, no new powers are given to the executive; no
extension of arbitrary authority is recognized; no civil
rights of the individuals are suspended. The relation of
the citizens to their State is unchanged. Whatever inter­
ference there may be with their personal freedom or
property rights must be justified, as in the case o f the

^ 59 SCRA 183 (1974).

 Powers of the President 439

police power, by necessity actually existing or reasona­

bly presumed. During times of disorder as will lead to a
call upon the military for assistance, necessity naturally
demands the commission of acts which in more tranquil
times are not demanded and thus in fact those in au­
thority may control the individual in his property in
ways which they could not legally do at other times. But
the principle still holds good that necessity, and neces­
sity alone, will justify an infringement upon private
rights o f persons and property.”126
It is significant that while the Supreme Court ac­
knowledged in David statements made before the Sen­
ate Committee on Justice to the effect that “(a) arrests
and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies
and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential
Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the
President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a
valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus,” it nevertheless ruled that “to be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exer­
cise of legislative power by issuing decrees.”

(4) Limitations on the Military Powers

To settle once and for all the extent of the Presi­

dent’s military powers, the new Constitution has pro­
vided for the following significant changes in the origi­
nal authority o f the commander-in-chief.

™ Willoughby, 2nd ed., Sec. 1056, pp. 1591-92; see David v. Ar­
royo, supra.
440 Philippine P olitical Law

(1) He may call out the armed forces when it be­

comes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion only.
(2) The grounds for the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and the proclamation of
martial law are now limited only to invasion or rebel­
lion, when the public safely requires it.
(3) The duration of such suspension or proclama­
tion shall not exceed sixty days, following which it shall
be automatically lifted.
(4) Within forty-eight hours after such suspension
or proclamation, the President shall personally or in
writing report his action to the Congress. If not in ses­
sion, Congress must convene within 24 hours without
need of a call.
(5) The Congress may then, by a majority vote o f
all its members voting jointly, revoke his action.
(6) The revocation may not be set aside by the
President.
(7) By the same vote and in the same manner, the
Congress may, upon initiative of the President, extend
his suspension or proclamation for a period to be deter­
mined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion shall
continue and the public safety requires the extension.
(8) The action of the President and the Congress
shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court which
shall have the authority to determine the sufficiency of
the factual basis of such action. This matter is no longer
considered a political question and may be raised in an
appropriate proceeding by any citizen. Moreover, the
Supreme Court must decide the challenge within thirty
days from the time it is filed.
 Powers of the President 441

According to the Supreme Court, "it is evident that

under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Con­
gress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of ha­
beas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequen­
tially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President
has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own
evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that
the President does not have. Consequently, although the
Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proc­
lamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit
that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to de­
fend the Constitution through such review should the
Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The consti­
tutional validity of the President’s proclamation of mar­
tial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
first a political question in the hands of Congress before
it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.”128
Moreover, “while it is true that the Court may inquire
into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of
(these powers),127 it would generally defer to her judg­
ment on the matter. Unless it is shown that such de­
termination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
the Court will accord respect to the President’s judg­
ment.”128

126 Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, 668
SCRA 504.
127Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001), 357 SCRA 756.
1211 Ampatuan v. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, 651
SCRA 228.
442 Philippine P olitical Law

It is significant that, in Kulayan v. Tan, the Su­

preme Court clarified as follows —

“The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to

the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis
thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is
of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is be­
stowed upon the President alone, xxx. Congress may revoke
such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or re­
view of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and the power to sus­
pend the privilege of the writ o f habeas corpus, otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped to­
gether the three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.”129

(9) Martial law does not automatically suspend

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the opera­
tion of the Constitution. The civil courts and the legisla­
tive bodies shall remain open. Military courts and agen­
cies are not conferred jurisdiction over civilians where
the civil courts are functioning.
(10) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall apply only to persons facing charges
of rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.
Any person arrested for such offenses must be judi­
cially charged therewith within three days. Otherwise
he shall be released.

129S u p ra .
 Powers of the P resident 443

The Pardoning Power

The pardoning power is provided for in Article VII
as follows:

“Sec. 19. Except in cases o f impeachment, or as other­

wise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and for­
feitures, after conviction by final judgment.
“He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.”

Executive clemency is granted for the purpose of re­

lieving the harshness of the law or correcting mistakes
in the administration of justice. For example, a person
already serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment
may be extended a pardon i f it is subsequently discov­
ered that he is innocent. Under our Revised Penal Code,
the judge may in his decision make a recommendation
for the pardon of the convict i f warranted by the circum­
stances of the commission of the offense, as where the
accused is found guilty of killing her father for raping
her.
The exercise of the pardoning power is discretion­
ary in the President and m ay not be controlled by the
legislature or reversed by the courts, save only when it
contravenes the limitations discussed below. Thus, it is
incompetent for the Congress to condition the grant of a
pardon by the President upon a previous clearance or
approval by a board of pardons. Neither would it be
justified for the judiciary to order the grant of a pardon
in favor, say, of a reformed criminal.
444 P hilippine Political Law

(1) Definitions

A pardon is an act of grace which exempts the indi­

vidual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment
which the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.
A commutation is a reduction or mitigation of the
penalty, e.g., when the death sentence is reduced to life
imprisonment.
A reprieve is merely a postponement of a sentence
to a date certain, or a stay of execution. It may be or­
dered to enable the government to secure additional
evidence to ascertain the guilt of the convict or, in the
case of the execution of the death sentence upon a preg­
nant woman, to prevent the killing of her unborn child.

(2) Limitations

The following are the constitutional limitations on

the pardoning power of the President:
(1) Pardon cannot be granted in cases of impeach­
ment. Strictly speaking, an impeachment proceeding is
not a judicial, much less a criminal, prosecution and
therefore does not essentially come under the pardoning
power. However, the party convicted in an impeachment
proceeding is subject to prosecution, trial and punish­
ment in an ordinary criminal action and in this case can
be extended a pardon.
(2) No pardon can be granted for the violation of
any election law, rule or regulation without the favor­
able recommendation of the Commission on Elections.130
But it is to be noted in this connection that not every
offense committed on election day is to be considered an

Constitution, Art. IX(C), Sec. 5.

 Powers op the President 445

election offense. Hence, several persons convicted of

having committed on that day the crime of, say, quali­
fied theft as punished under the Revised Penal Code
could be validly pardoned without the necessity of a
favorable recommendation from the Commission on
Elections.
(3) Pardon can be granted only after conviction by
final judgment.
In People v. Salle,131 a conditional pardon extended
to the prisoner while his appeal was still pending before
the Supreme Court was held to be invalid but, in view of
the special circumstances of the case, he was given 30
days to withdraw his appeal to make his conviction final
and the pardon effective.
In addition to the foregoing constitutional limita­
tions, a pardon cannot be extended to a person convicted
of legislative contempt, as this would violate the doc­
trine of separation of powers, or of civil contempt since
this would involve the benefit not of the State itself but
of the private litigant whose rights have been violated
by the contemner.
Pardon cannot also be extended for the purpose of
absolving the pardonee of civil liability, including judi­
cial costs, since, again, the interest that is remitted does
not belong to the State but to the private litigant. Par­
don also will not restore offices forfeited.

(3) Kinds of Pardon

Pardon may be classified into absolute or condi­
tional and plenary or partial. An absolute pardon is one
extended without any strings attached, so to speak,
whereas a conditional pardon is one under which the

m 250 SCRA 581.

446 Philippine Political Law

convict is required to comply with certain requirements.

A plenary pardon extinguishes all the penalties imposed
upon the offender, including accessory disabilities,
whereas a partial pardon does not.
Where the pardon is conditional, the offender has
the right to reject it since he may feel that the condition
imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be
remitted. But in the case of an absolute pardon, the
pardonee has no option at all and must accept it
whether he likes it or not. In this sense, an absolute
pardon is similar to commutation, which is also not sub­
ject to acceptance by the offender.
The condition of the pardon shall be co-extensive
with the penalty remitted unless otherwise indicated.132
Hence, if the condition is violated after the expiration of
the remitted penalty, there can no longer be any viola­
tion of the conditional pardon. But if the violation takes
place before the expiration of the remitted penalty, the
pardon itself is deemed invalidated and the pardonee
may be either recommitted by the President under the
Administrative Code or prosecuted for violation of condi­
tional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the latter case, the penalty of prision correc­
tional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the
convict, except when the penalty remitted is higher than
six years, in which event he shall serve the unexpired
portion of his original sentence.
It was held in Culanag v. Director o f Prisons133 that
the criminal and administrative remedies above-men­
tioned are not mutually exclusive and may be succes­
sively availed of by the President for the punishment of
the violator of the conditional pardon.

IKInfante v. Prov. Warden of Negros Occidental, 92 Phil. 310.

“ 20 SCRA 1123 .
 Powers of the P resident 447

In Espuelas v. Provincial Warden o f Bohol,134, the

petitioner accepted a pardon subject to the condition
that he would not thereafter commit a violation of the
penal laws of the Philippines. He was later convicted by
the municipal court of* the crime of usurpation of public
functions but the case was provisionally dismissed for
lack of witnesses when he appealed it to the court of
first instance. Ordered administratively reincarcerated
by the President of the Philippines for violation of his
conditional pardon, he filed a petition for habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court denied it, holding that “mere com­
mission, not necessarily conviction by the court, of any
other crime, is enough in order that the petitioner may
be deemed to have violated the condition of his parole or
pardon. Determination of violation of such condition
rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief
Executive and the courts will not interfere by way of
review with any of his findings.”
The Supreme Court did not consider in this case
that the ascertainment of whether or not an offense has
been committed is not an executive but a judicial func­
tion and that a person cannot be deemed to have com­
mitted a criminal offense unless he is convicted thereof
by a court of justice. The executive can only allege the
commission of an offense; it is for the judiciary to de­
clare such commission in the form of a conviction.
Espuelas was nevertheless later affirmed in Sumu-
long v. Gonzales,135 with Justices Cruz and Paras dis­
senting.136

,34 108 Phil. 353.

136 152 SCRA 272.
13fi The doctrine was later reiterated in In re the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, G.R. No. 122338, Dec.
29, 1996.
448 Philippine P olitical Law

A convict who has already served his prison term

may still be extended a pardon for the purpose of reliev­
ing him of whatever accessory liabilities have attached
to his offense. For example, under Section 118 of the
Omnibus Election Code, a person who has been sen­
tenced to imprisonment for not less than one year shall
be disqualified from the exercise of the right of suffrage
for a period of five years from service of the sentence
unless this disability is removed earlier by the grant of
pardon.

(4) Effects of Pardon

The legal effect of a pardon is to restore not only

the offender’s liberty but also his civil and political
rights. In Pelobello u. Palatino,131 a municipal mayor’s
election was contested on the ground that he was dis­
qualified from public office because of a prior conviction
and imprisonment. It was shown, however, that before
assuming office following his election he was granted an
absolute pardon by President Quezon. As a result, the
Supreme Court held his former disabilities had been
removed, and he was therefore eligible for the public
office in question.
But the ruling in this case was modified in M on­
santo v. Factoran13S where a woman convicted of estafa
through falsification of public documents was granted
an absolute pardon and thereafter claimed she was enti­
tled as a consequence to reinstatement as assistant city
treasurer. Through Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, the
Supreme Court held:

1:11 72 Phil. 441.

170 SCRA 190 (1989).
 Powers of the President 449

“The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador

cases, and several others, show the unmistakable application
of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, whose sweeping gen­
eralizations to this day continue to hold sway in our jurispru­
dence despite the faot that much o f its relevance has been
downplayed by later American decisions.
* # *

“Such generalities have not been universally accepted,

recognized or approved. The modern trend of authorities now
rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed
to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been
made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more
realistic approach.

* * #

“Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime.

These are ‘historical’ facts which, despite the public manifesta­
tion of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, ‘ordinary,
prudent men will take into account in their subsequent deal­
ings with the actor.’

“Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual

from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to
all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the per­
son’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost repu­
tation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be con­
stantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character
and purpose of the privilege.

“Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive lan­

guage of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the
commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore
a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or for­
feited by reason of the conviction although such pardon un­
doubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that of­
fice.”
450 P hilippine P olitical Law

The subject of Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on

A u d it139 was an executive clemency or pardon granted to
a public officer. He was dismissed from the service for
dishonesty and later charged with qualified theft for the
same act, but was acquitted by the trial court which
found that “petitioner did not commit the offense im ­
puted to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the
charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his
concern and dedication as a public servant.” Armed with
said acquittal, he sought reinstatement but was initially
rejected by his former employer. He appealed to the
President, who eventually granted him executive clem­
ency, on the basis of which he filed with the Commission
on Appointments a claim for back salaries from the date
of his dismissal. The Commission denied his request
stating that “that the executive clemency granted to him
did not provide for the payment of back salaries and
that he has not been reinstated in the service.” He re­
newed his claim after he was eventually reinstated.
Again, the Commission rejected the same, this time,
explaining that “the executive clemency was silent on
the payment of back wages and that he had not ren­
dered service during the period of his claim.” He even­
tually sought relief from the Supreme Court, which or­
dered the payment of his back salaries from the date of
his dismissal. The Court said —

“Time and again this Court has unfolded the effects of a

pardon upon the individual to whom it is granted. In Monsanto
v. Factoran, we have firmly established the general rule that
while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is
as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does
not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission o f guilt and not forgetfulness. It does

G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 356.

 Powers of the President 451

not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the con­
viction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penal­
ties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil
rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it
cannot bring back logt reputation for honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for
appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of
the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not gener­
ally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender
has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back
wages.
“But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the in­
nocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes
him a new man and as innocent, as if he had not been found
guilty o f the offense charged. When a person is given pardon
because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon re­
lieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal
act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation
and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
“In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively
liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the ser­
vice. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the
charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which
he was dismissed. The acquittal o f petitioner by the trial court
was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but
on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed
to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial
court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a
public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary
reason behind the grant o f executive clemency to him, bol­
stered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement
by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and
the Civil Service Commission.
“The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in ef­
fect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the adminis­
trative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and or­
dered his separation from the service. This can be inferred
from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from
the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstate­
ment, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be rein-
452 Philippine Political Law

stated to his former employment; he is restored to his office

ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
“Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government
service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford re­
lief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make
reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust
dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the
very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to
petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to
those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them. There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls
within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back
wages.
“Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of peti­
tioner was not the result of any criminal conviction that car­
ried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is
the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a
branch of the Executive Department over which the President,
as its head, has the power of control. The President's control
has been defined to mean ‘the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance o f his duties and to the judgment of
the former for the latter.’ In pardonihg petitioner and ordering
his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his power of
control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of Transpor­
tation and Communications. The clemency nullified the dis­
missal of petitioner and relieved him from administrative li­
ability. The separation o f the petitioner from the service being
null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.”

While, as earlier stated, a pardon will not relieve

the pardonee of the civil liability or such other claims as
may pertain to private litigants, it will, however, have
the effect of remitting fines and forfeitures which oth­
erwise will inure to the interests of the government
itself.
 Powers of the President 453

(5) Distinctions

Pardon must be distinguished from parole in that

the latter involves or^ly a release of the convict from
imprisonment but not a restoration of his liberty. The
parolee is still in the custody of the law although no
longer under confinement, unlike the pardonee whose
sentence is condoned, subject only to reinstatement in
case o f violation of the condition that may have been
attached to the pardon.
A parole must also be distinguished from probation
in that the former is executive whereas the latter is
judicial. Moreover, parole presupposes the prior service
of part of the sentence whereas probation may be
granted before actual service of sentence.

(6) Amnesty

A s previously observed, the pardoning power may

not be limited by the legislature nor may the President’s
discretion in its exercise be reviewed by the judiciary.
But when it comes to amnesty, the Constitution it­
self provides that it can be granted by the President
only with the concurrence of the Congress. This concur­
rence must be given by a majority of all the members of
the Congress.
It was the rule before that admission of guilt was
not necessary to the enjoyment o f amnesty, upon the
theory that amnesty looks backward and obliterates not
only the penalty but the offense itself. In the case of
Vera v. People o f the Philippines140 however, this doctrine
was reversed. The present rule requires a previous ad­
mission of guilt since a person would not need the bene­

",0 7 SCRA 152 (1963).

454 Philippine P olitical Law

fit of amnesty unless he were, to begin with, guilty of

the offense covered by the proclamation.
The distinctions between amnesty and pardon are
as follows:
(1) Amnesty is usually addressed to crimes against
the sovereignty of the State, to political offenses, for­
giveness being deemed more expedient for the public
welfare than prosecution and punishment; pardon con­
dones infractions of the peace of the State.
(2) Amnesty is usually generally addressed to
classes or even communities of persons; pardon is usu­
ally addressed to an individual.
(3) In amnesty, there may or may not be distinct
acts or acceptance, so that if other rights are dependent
upon it and are asserted, there is affirmative evidence of
acceptance; in pardon, there must be distinct acts of
acceptance.
(4) Pardon does not require the concurrence of the
Congress; amnesty requires such concurrence.
(5) Pardon is a private act of the President which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned be­
cause the courts do not take judicial notice of it; am­
nesty is a public act of which the courts take judicial
notice.
(6) Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted; while amnesty looks backward and abol­
ishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself; it so over­
looks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands
 Powers of the President 455

before the law precisely as though he had committed no

offense.141
Accordingly, it has been ruled that “amnesty com­
monly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their trea­
son or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness
which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another,
who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliter­
ates the offense with which he is charged, that the per­
son released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed.no offense.”142 “Pardon,” on
the other hand, “is granted by the Chief Executive and
as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take
no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial no­
tice.”143
A grant of amnesty shall cover only such offenses
as may be specified in the proclamation providing for
j i 144
the same.

The Borrowing Power

“Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee for­
eign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence o f the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board

141Burdick v. United States, 235 U.S. 476.

142People v. Patriarca, 395 Phil. 690 (2000).
143 People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997), cited in Magdalo Para
sa Pagbabago v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190793, June 19,
2012, 673 SCRA 651.
144 Kapunan v. Court o f Appeals, G.R. Nos. 148213-17, March
13, 2009, 581 SCRA 42.
456 Philippine P olitical Law

shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the
calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaran­
teed by the Government or government-owned and controlled
corporations which would have the effect of increasing the for­
eign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by
law.”

This provision reverses the extraordinary authority

granted by the 1973 charter to the President, who
grossly abused it to the prejudice of the national eco­
nomy. Doubtless, a President concerned only with the
prosperity or success of his own administration may be
tempted to contract or guarantee loans to subsidize his
program of government and leave it to succeeding ad­
ministrations to pay off the obligations he has incurred
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Apart from
being unfair to the future generations of taxpayers who
will inherit the burden but not the benefits of these
debts, such a policy could also enable foreign lending
institutions, like the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, to impose conditions on these loans
that might impair our economic and even political inde­
pendence. It is fitting, therefore, that the power is now
made subject to the limitations provided for in the above
section.

According to the Supreme Court, “the fact that this

power is subject to the concurrence of another entity
does not make such power less executive.”

“‘Quintessential’ is defined as the most perfect embodi­

ment of something, the concentrated essence of substance. On
the other hand, ‘non-delegable’ means that a power or duty
cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the re­
sponsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into
an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
 Powers op the President 457

without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally

been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that
the President has to secure the prior concurrence o f the Mone­
tary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report
of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,
does not diminish the executive nature of the power.”145

The Diplomatic Power

As head of State, the President is supposed to be

the spokesman of the nation on external affairs. In this
capacity, he may deal with foreign states and govern­
ments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplo­
matic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations.
The conduct of external affairs, according to Jeffer­
son, “is executive altogether.” Chief Justice Marshall de­
scribed the President of the United States as “the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole
representative with foreign nations.”
It has already been noted that the President of the
Philippines is empowered to appoint ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls. No less important, he is
also vested with the power to conclude treaties, except
that, conformably to the usual rule:

“Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be

valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.”

Interestingly, the records of the Constitutional

Commission show that the phrase “international
agreement” was not intended to include the executive
agreement, which apparently can still be concluded by

145 Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, 564

SCRA 152.
458 Philippine Political Law

the President alone without the necessity of Senate

concurrence. This is a rather strange decision in the
light of the general intention to limit the President’s
powers as a hedge against the resurgence of another
dictatorship.
An executive agreement, according to the Supreme
Court, is a treaty within the meaning of that word in
international law and constitutes enforceable domestic
law.146 Unlike a treaty though, an executive agreement
does not require legislative concurrence, is usually less
formal and deals with a narrower range of subjects.147
All that would be required for its efficacy would be the
agreement must be between states; it must be written;
and it must be governed by international law.148
A “Contract Agreement” entered into by a Philip­
pine government-owned or controlled corporation and a
“state” corporation “duly organized and created under
the laws of the People’s Republic of China,” which was
executed by them “as entities with personalities distinct
and separate from the Philippine and Chinese govern­
ments, respectively” was considered not as an executive
agreement but as “an ordinary commercial contract that
can be questioned before the local courts.”149
In Bay an M una u. Romulo,16° the Court further
clarified that the “terms ‘exchange of notes’ and ‘execu­
tive agreements’ have been used interchangeably, ex­
change of notes being considered a form of executive

Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009, 578

SCRA 438.
147China National Machinery & Equipment Corporation v. Sta.
Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 189.
'wIbid.
I4BId.
150G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011, 641 SCRA 244.
 Powers of the President 459

agreement that becomes binding through executive ac­

tion. On the other hand, executive agreements con­
cluded by the President ‘sometimes take the form of
exchange of notes and at other times that of more for­
mal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’”
Moreover —

“Under international law, there is no difference between

treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding ef­
fects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the nego­
tiating functionaries have remained within their powers. Nei­
ther, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates
the Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed that one is
distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the con-
currence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US con­
stitutional scholars, a treaty has greater ‘dignity" than an ex­
ecutive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond
doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President,
the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an execu­
tive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory en­
actment.”

It is significant that the Court further declared in

said case that “treaties and international agreements
actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encom­
passing and absolute nature of sovereignty.” Thus —

“To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender

agreement cannot be predicated on the postulate that some of
its provisions constitute a virtual abdication of its sovereignty.
Almost every time a state enters into an international agree­
ment, it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty. The Con­
stitution, as drafted, did not envision a reclusive Philippines
isolated from the rest o f the world. It even adheres, as earlier
stated, to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements actu­
ally have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and
absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations
may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state
power or agree to limit the exercise o f their otherwise exclusive
 460 P hilippine Political Law

and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration

in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived
from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting
party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other.
On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the gener­
ally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an
unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.”151

However, an executive agreement cannot be used to

amend a duly ratified and existing treaty, such as the
RP-US Bases Treaty.152 “An executive agreement that
does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its
ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that,
under the Constitution, is the product of the ratifying
acts of the Executive and the Senate.153

In Pimentel u. Executive Secretary,154 the petitioner

sought to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the
signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its
concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article V II of
the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition, stating —

“In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section

21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power
to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate. It should be emphasized
that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the

m Ibid.
152Adolfo v. CFI o f Zambales, G.R. No. L-30650, July 31, 1970,
34 SCRA 166.
'!i'<Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011,
641 SCRA 244.
164G.R. No. 158088, July 16, 2008, 462 SCRA 622.
 Powers of the President 4 61

President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of

the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is
within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate o k , having secured its consent for its ratifi­
cation, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to rat­
ify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step
that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached
by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no juris­
diction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the per­
formance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot is­
sue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is
beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
Senate.”

Indeed, the treaty-making power is exclusive to the

President. Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotia­
tions. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the
treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of nego­
tiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a whole that has been given the au­
thority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-
making power of the President, but only the Senate.155
Treaties and other international agreements con­
cluded by the President are also subject to check by the
Supreme Court, which has the power to declare them
unconstitutional.156

155 AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558
SCRA 468.
158Constitution, Art. VIII, Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a).
 462 Philippine Political Law

The Budgetary Power

Originally vested in the President by the Common­

wealth Constitution but thereafter transferred to the
Prime Minister by the 1973 Charter, the budgetary
power is once again conferred on the President by the
following provision:

“Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress

within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as
the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of ex­
penditures and sources of financing, including receipts irom
existing and proposed revenue measures.”

This power is properly entrusted to the executive

department as it is the President who, as chief adminis­
trator and enforcer o f the laws, is in the best position to
determine the needs of the government and propose the
corresponding appropriations therefor on the basis of
existing or expected sources of revenue. “In the chief
executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed
upon him is the power to recommend the budget neces­
sary for the operation of the Government, which implies
that he has the necessary authority to evaluate and
determine the structure that each government agency in
the executive department would need to operate in the
most economical and efficient manner.”157
In this connection, it is reminded that “the Congress
may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation o f the Government as speci­
fied in the budget.'™

157 Pichay v. Office o f the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal

Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, G.R. No. 196425,
July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 408.
'“ Art. VI, Sec. 25(1).
 Powers of the President 463

The Informing Power

“Sec. 23. The President shall address the Congress at
the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it
at any other time.” i

Although couched in mandatory language, the first

sentence of this provision does not as a rule impose a
compellable duty on the President. In his discretion, he
may or may not give information to the legislature, al­
though he will usually choose to do so for practical rea­
sons. For one thing, he will want to maintain the good­
will of the Congress and so will not deny its request for
information if its release will not in his belief prejudice
the public interest. For another, the requested informa­
tion may be needed as the basis of the legislation he is
recommending and he knows that lacking such basis the
legislature would be justified in not acting on his pro­
posals.

When President Washington withheld from the U.S.

Congress requested information relating to the negotia­
tion of a treaty, the legislators did not press the issue.
But when President Nixon refused to release information
concerning the Watergate scandal, claiming what he
called “executive privilege,” the U.S. Supreme Court held
his refusal invalid, declaring in part as follows:

“x x x neither the doctrine o f separation of powers, nor

the need for confidentiality of high-level communications,
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presiden­
tial privilege of immunity from judicial process under all cir­
cumstances. The President’s need for complete candor and ob­
jectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts.
However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, un­
differentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of
such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises.
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensi­
464 P hilippine Political Law

tive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the

argument that even the very important interest in confidenti­
ality of Presidential communications is significantly dimin­
ished by production o f such material for in-camera inspection
with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to
provide.”159

The President usually discharges the informing

power through what is known as the state-of-the-nation
address, which is delivered at the opening of the regular
session of the legislature. He may also appear before it
at any other time for the same purpose.

Other Powers

Elsewhere in the Constitution, the President is

vested with the power to call the Congress to special
session,160 to approve or veto bills,161 to consent to the
deputization of government personnel by the Commis­
sion on Elections,162 to discipline its deputies,163 and by
delegation, to exercise emergency164 and tariff powers.165

Resume

The following eloquent observations of Prof. Clin­

ton Rossiter are a fitting resume of the foregoing study
of the powers of the President and their limitations:

'r,!) United States v. Richard M. Nixon, 418 U.S. 863.

“ Art. VI, Sec. 15.
Ibid., Sec. 27.
162Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(4).
Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(8).
,MArt. VI, Sec. 23(2).
"* Art. VI, Sec. 28(2).
 Powers of the President 465

“xxx the President is not a Gulliver immobilized by ten

thousand tiny cords, nor even a Prometheus chained to a rock
of frustration. He is, rather, a kind of magnificent lion who can
roam widely and do great deeds so long as he does not try to
break loose from his hfoad reservation. Our pluralistic system
of restraints is designed to keep him from going out o f bounds,
not to paralyze him in the field that has been reserved for his
use. He will feel few checks upon his power if he uses that
power as he should. This may well be the final definition of the
strong and successful President: the one who knows just far as
he can go in the direction he wants to go. If he cannot judge the
limits of his power, he cannot call upon its strength. If he can­
not sense the possible, he will exhaust himself attempting the
impossible. The power o f the Presidency moves as a mighty
host only with the grain o f morality and liberty.”166

166The American Presidency, Rev. Ed., pp. 68-69.

 Chapter 12

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

ALTH O U G H H O LDIN G “neither purse nor sword,” the

judiciary is an indispensable department of every demo­
cratic government. It is trite to say that courts of justice
are the bastion of the rights and liberties of the people.
Nevertheless, it cannot be repeated too often that the
life-blood of every libertarian regime is found in the
vitality of its judicial system.
Timid and corrupt judges will sap the vigor of popu­
lar government; on the other hand, a free and fearless
judiciary will give it strength, endurance and stability.
There is no doubt that the success of the Republic will
depend, in the last analysis, upon the effectiveness of
the courts in upholding the majesty of justice and the
principle that ours is a government of laws and not of
men.
Lacking this capacity, judges become no more than
lackeys of the political departments cowed to do their
bidding or instruments of their own interests scheming
for self-aggrandizement. Without independence and
integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential
to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of ju s­
tice.
The need is for judges like Lord Coke who, in an­
swer to the intimidations and importunings of his mon­
arch, intoned the ringing words: “I will do what becomes

4 66
 The Judicial Department 467

me as a judge.” There can be no other alternative if our

ideal is, as it should always be, the preservation of a
free society under the aegis of just and humane laws
applied without fear or favor.

Independence of the Judiciary

To maintain the independence of the judiciary, the

following safeguards have been embodied in the Consti­
tution:
(1) The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It
cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the
manner of its meetings be changed by mere legislation.1
(2) The members of the Supreme Court may not
be removed except by impeachment.2
(3) The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its
minimum original and appellate jurisdiction as pre­
scribed in Article V III, Section 5, of the Constitution.3
(4) The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may not be increased by law without its advice
and concurrence.4
(5) Appointees to the judiciary are now nominated
by the Judicial and Bar Council and no longer subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.5
(6) The Supreme Court now has administrative
supervision over all lower courts and their personnel.6

1Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1).

2Ibid., Art. XI, Sec. 2.
3Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
4Id., Art. VI, Sec. 30.
5Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 9.
BId., Art. VIII, Sec. 6.
468 Philippine Political Law

(7) The Supreme Court has exclusive power to dis­

cipline judges of lower courts.7
(8) The members of the Supreme Court and all
lower courts have security of tenure, which cannot be
undermined by a law reorganizing the judiciary.8
(9) They shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.9
(10) The salaries of judges may not be reduced
during their continuance in office.10
(11) The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.11
(12) The Supreme Court alone may initiate rules
of court.12
(13) Only the Supreme Court may order the tem­
porary detail of judges.13
(14) The Supreme Court can appoint all officials
and employees of the judiciary.14

Judicial Power

The vesture and definition of the judicial power are

effected by the following rewriting in Article VIII of the
original provision appearing in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions:

“Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

7Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 11.

8Id.
11Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 12.
Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 10.
” Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 3.
u Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).
" Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(3).
" Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(6).
 The J udicial Department 469

“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice

to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumen­
tality of the Government.”

According to the above provision, the judicial power

shall be vested not only in the Supreme Court but in
such lower courts as may be established by law. “Lower
courts” as here used is to be understood as referring to
all other courts below the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court is the only constitutional court, all the lower
courts being of statutory creation.
The different lower courts under the Judiciary Re­
organization Law are the Court of Appeals, the regional
trial courts, the metropolitan trial courts, the municipal
trial courts, and the municipal circuit trial courts. Not
included in the reorganization were the Court of Tax
Appeals although it is also a court of justice and the
special statutory court known as the Sandiganbayan, as
well as the Sharia courts for the Muslims. Together with
the Supreme Court, the aforementioned tribunals make
up the judicial department of our government.
As the Constitution speaks only of one Supreme
Court, it is not competent for the legislature to create
even a temporary Supreme Court to sit in special cases.
In Vargas u. Rilloraza, 15 Section 20 of the People’s Court
Act provided that whenever the Supreme Court had to
hear collaboration cases, the members thereof who were
disqualified because they had also participated in the
Occupation government would be temporarily replaced
by ad hoc members to be designated by the President of
the Philippines from either the Court of Appeals or the

15 80 Phil. 297.
470 Philippine Political Law

courts of first instance. The result was the creation of

two Supreme Courts: one the regular body and the other
the temporary court to sit only in collaboration cases.
The Supreme Court held that this arrangement was
unconstitutional in view of the provision that “the judi­
cial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as may be established by law. ”

Under the new definition of judicial power, the

courts of justice are authorized not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demand-
able and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse o f discretion amounting
to lack or excess o f jurisdiction on the part o f any branch
or instrumentality o f the government.”

The first part of the authority represents the tradi­

tional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement
of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary,

and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to re­
view even the political decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
“grave abuse of discretion,” which is a rather elastic
phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary.

An assertive and activist Supreme Court is likely to

venture boldly into the realm of political questions and
claim the right to resolve them according to its own
 The J udicial Department 471

lights even at the risk of antagonizing the other de­

partments. On the other hand, a timorous judiciary will
probably cling to the conventions and in the interest of
harmony, or perhaps its own convenience and security,
choose not to rush in where angels fear to tread.
Interpreting the expanded definition of judicial
power, the Supreme Court declared in the IB P Case:1*

“When the grant o f power is qualified, conditioned or sub­

ject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifi­
cations or conditions or limitations have been met or the limi­
tations respected, is justiciable—the problem being one of va­
lidity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit con­
stitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When po­
litical questions are involved, the Constitution limits the de­
termination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the official whose action is being questioned.”

The following observations in Daza v. Singson17 are

relevant:

“The issue presented to the Supreme Court is justiciable

rather than political where it involves the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitu­
tion. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within the Court’s powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article VIII, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instru­
mentality of the government.”

In Tanada u. Angara,’8 which was a petition to an­

nul the Senate concurrence to the World Trade Organi­

16Integrated Bar o f the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81.

17180 SCRA 496.
272 SCRA 18.
 472 Philippine Political Law

zation Agreement, the Supreme Court declared through

Justice Panganiban:

“In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate, on

the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus inter­
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty to adjudicate
remains to assure that the supremacy o f the Constitution is
upheld.
“(Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution) emphasizes the
judicial department’s duty and power to strike down grave
abuse o f discretion on the part of any branch or instrumental­
ity of the government including Congress. It is an innovation
in our political law...
“As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sa­
cred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters
that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in ap­
propriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumen­
tality or department of the government.”

Indeed, “the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the

reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review of (the) court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discre­
tion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government.”19
It must be stressed, however, that, as previously ob­
served, independently of the existence of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1 (2001), cited in COMELEC v.

Cruz, G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 167.
 The J udicial Department 473

the part of any branch or instrumentality of govern­

ment, judicial power may be exercised “where there are
serious allegations that a law has infringed the Consti­
tution,” in which case,, “it becomes not only the right but
the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and,
when warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitu­
tion.”20 Verily, this duty includes the power to set aside
acts of government, even if not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdic­
tion.21
It must further be noted that judicial power in­
cludes the power of the courts “to alter, modify, or set
aside their decisions before they become final and unal­
terable.”22 It covers as well the continuing authority of
the Supreme Court to enforce its final decisions because
the execution of its decisions is but an integral part of
its adjudicative function. Accordingly, it may issue a
writ of continuing mandamus to ensure compliance with
its decision.23

20 Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos.

147036-37, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49.
21 See Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 203766, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 477.
22 Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, No. L-77210, Sep­
tember 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 464, 470, cited in Spouses Francisco and
Merced Rabat v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 158755, June
18, 2012, 673 SCRA 383; see also Sta. Lucia Realty & Development,
Inc. v. Municipality of Pasig, G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011, 652
SCRA 44; Caguioa v. Aucena, A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012,
673 SCRA 352; Salvador v. Serrano, A.M. No. P-06-2104 (Formerly
OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1484-P), January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 55, 69-70;
Sta. Maria v. Ubay, A.M. No. 595-CFI, December 11, 1978, 87 SCRA
179, 187; Legaspi Towers 300 v. Muer, G.R. No. 170783, June 18,
2012, 673 SCRA 453.
2,1 MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171947-48, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 90; see also Boracay Foun-
 474 Philippine Political Law

Jurisdiction

The old rule is reiterated in the first paragraph of

Section 2, which states in full as follows:

“The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,

and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.”

Jurisdiction is defined as the authority by which

courts take cognizance of and decide cases, the legal
right by which judges exercise their authority.24 The
jurisdiction spoken of in this provision is jurisdiction
over cases, to be prescribed by the Congress subject to
the constitutional limitations. Thus, although the appel­
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be increased
by law, this may not be done now except upon advice
and with the concurrence of the Supreme Court itself;26
on the other hand, no law may be passed depriving it of
the power to review a life sentence, for example, as this
comes under its minimum appellate jurisdiction, which
may not be reduced.

Appointments

A new process of appointment is prescribed for the

judiciary in the following provision in Article VIII which
is intended to “de-politicize” our courts of justices, en­
sure the choice of competent judges, and fill existing
vacancies as soon as possible so as not to unduly disrupt
judicial proceedings:

dation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26,
2012, 674 SCRA 555.
21 Black, 991.
“ Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 30.
 The J udicial D epartment 475

“Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges

of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confir­
mation.
“For the lower courts, the President shall issue the ap­
pointments within ninety days from the submission o f the list.”

The reason for requiring at least three nominees for

every vacancy is to give the President enough leeway in
the exercise of his discretion when he makes his ap­
pointment. If the nominee were limited to only one, the
appointment would in effect be made by the Judicial
and Bar Council, with the President performing only the
mechanical act of formalizing the commission.

(1) Qualifications

It is required by the new Constitution that every

member of the judiciary “be a person o f proven compe­
tence, integrity, probity, and independence.”26 This gen­
eral qualification is intended to improve the quality of
the judiciary by admitting thereto only deserving per­
sons who can dispense justice wisely and impartially.
The specific qualifications for the collegiate courts
are laid down by the following provision:

“Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of

the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Su­
preme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or en­
gaged in the practice o f law in the Philippines.”

These qualifications, having been enumerated in an

exclusive manner, may not be reduced or increased by

‘ “' I b i d . , Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3).

476 P hilippine Political Law

the Congress through ordinary legislation. Thus, a stat­

ute requiring that the members shall hold a doctorate
degree in law, while calculated to improve the stature of
the Supreme Court, would still be unconstitutional.
But in the case of the judges of the other lower
courts, it is expressly permitted for the Congress to add
to the constitutional qualifications, the same being only
minimum requirements. Thus, it is competent for the
legislature to provide for age or practice qualifications
for such judges in addition to the citizenship and profes­
sional qualification prescribed in Section 7(2), thus:

“(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of

judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member
of the Philippine Bar.”

It should be noted that natural-born citizenship is

not required for courts lower than collegiate courts.

(2) The Judicial and Bar Council

An innovation in the 1987 Constitution is the Judi­

cial and Bar Council, which takes the place of the Com­
mission on Appointments in the matter of judicial ap­
pointments. It is the Council that will screen such ap­
pointments and not the Commission, which is a highly
political body likely to be influenced by considerations
other than the merits of the candidate for judicial office.
It was not infrequent in the past when persons without
credentials except their political affiliation and loyalty
were able to infiltrate and emasculate the judiciary.
The constitutional provisions on the composition,
term and functions of the Council are the following:
 The J udicial Department 477

“Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby

created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of
law, a retired Member o f the Supreme Court, and a represen­
tative of the private sector.
“(2) The regular members of the Council shall be ap­
pointed by the President for a term of four years with the con­
sent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative o f the Integrated Bar shall serve
for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired
Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sec­
tor for one year.
“(3) The Clerk o f the Supreme Court shall be the Secre­
tary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its pro­
ceedings.
“(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive
such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget
the appropriations for the Council.
“(5) The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise
such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may as­
sign to it.”

The Supreme Court clarified in Chavez v. Judicial

and Bar Council27 that the Congress may have only one
representative in the JBC, and not two representatives,
or one from each House, with each having only one-half
vote.
A rotational scheme similar to that of the Senate
and the Constitutional Commissions is provided for the
Council, with the original regular appointees being
given staggered terms of four, three, two and one year

27 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579.

478 Philippine Political Law

respectively, to be followed with new appointees who

shall each serve for the full term of four years.
Nevertheless, the supposed guaranties to the inde­
pendence of the JBC are not really that effective. The
reasons are these. O f its regular members, the Secretary
of Justice is under the President’s constitutional power
of control, and the representative from the Congress
usually belongs to the party in power, of which the
President is the actual or titular head. As for the ap­
pointive members, there is no limit on the number of
terms they may serve as such, which means that they
will tend to defer to the “suggestions” of the President in
hopes of being rewarded with a re-appointment. With
only the Chief Justice theoretically not under his influ­
ence, the President can simply order the rest of the body
to nominate whomever he wants to appoint, thus mak­
ing judicial appointments his unlimited prerogative.
Once appointed upon nomination of the Council,
the judge does not need confirmation by the Com m ission
on Appointments. This is one instance where appoint­
ments made by the President of the Philippines may not
be checked by the Commission. In this connection, it
should be noted that in appointing the Chief Justice or
the presiding justice of any of the lower collegiate
courts, or any judge for that matter, the President is not
bound by the seniority rule, as is commonly supposed.
In fact, a complete outsider to the judiciary may be cho­
sen as its head provided only that he possesses the nec­
essary qualifications.
It must also be stressed that judges may not be ap­
pointed in an acting or temporary capacity as this would
undermine the independence of the judiciary, temporary
appointments being essentially revocable at will. And to
 The J udicial Department 479

prevent impairment of this same goal and discontinue a

notorious practice before, it is now also provided that:

“Sec. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of

other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.”

It will be recalled that this was the provision in­

voked by the petitioner in Macalintal v. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal/ 8 who maintained that the “respon­
dent exercises quasi-judicial power” and that its mem­
bers consequently violate the proscription in Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution.” The Supreme Court
rejected these contentions. It said —

“The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Sec­

tion 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the
power ‘shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.’ Consistent with our
presidential system of government, the function of ‘dealing
with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts in­
volving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demand-
able and enforceable’ is apportioned to courts of justice. With
the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was ex­
panded to include ‘the duty o f the courts of justice to settle ac­
tual controversies involving rights which are legally demand-
able and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or ex­
cess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumenta­
lity of the Government.’
“The power was expanded, but it remained absolute. The
set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power.
“At the barangay and municipal levels, original and ex­
clusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the mu-

28 G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783, and
June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 239.
480 P hilippine P olitical Law

nicipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial

courts, respectively.
“At the higher levels — city, provincial, and regional, as
well as congressional and senatorial — exclusive and original
jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of
Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which aie
not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not
courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve elec­
tion contests which involve, in essence, an exercise o f judicial
power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment
found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tri­
bunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the
HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions
are still subject to judicial review — via a petition for certiorari
filed by the proper party — if there is a showing that the deci­
sion was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack or excess o f jurisdiction.
“It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as
PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election con­
test, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose
P. Laurel enucleated that ‘it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels.’
In fact, Angara pointed out that ‘[t]he Constitution is a defini­
tion of the powers of government.’ And yet, at that time, the
1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of
judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of
the present Constitution.
“With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has
allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s ex­
ercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of decid­
ing presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with
full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by the
PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the
whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, dis­
tinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
“If the logic o f petitioner is to be followed, all Members of
the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals
 The Judicial D epartment 481

would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section

12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first
to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in
Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme
Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tri­
bunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VTII. In the
same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII,
which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the
PET, from the same prohibition.
“We have previously declared that the PET is not simply
an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Consti­
tution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that ‘ [a] power
without the means to use it, is a nullity.’ The vehicle for the
exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and
specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners
during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is
the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's, should
not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial
power.”

Fiscal Autonomy

As previously discussed, the power of appropriation

is limited by the following new provision, which is in­
tended to strengthen the independence of the judiciary.
To remove the courts from the mercy and caprice, not to
say vindictiveness, of the legislature when it considers
the general appropriations bill, it is provided that:

“Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Ap­

propriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the leg­
islature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly re­
leased.”
482 Philippine P olitical Law

In Bengzon v. Drilon,29 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez

explained fiscal autonomy as follows:

“As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy

enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wis­
dom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the
power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by
law for compensation and pay plans of the government and al­
locate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their func­
tions.
“Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If
the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules
we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by
the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
“The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The im­
position of restrictions and constraints on the manner the in­
dependent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal auton­
omy and violative not only o f the express mandate of the Con­
stitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire
fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of
comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their
objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the peti­
tioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a mean­
ingless provision.” 1

According to the Supreme Court, the judiciary’s fis­

cal autonomy entitles it to levy, assess and collect fees.30

“ 208 SCRA 133.

Bengzon v. Drilon, Ibid.
 The J udicial Department 483

Any law which provides for an exemption from said fees

(as, for instance, in favor of government-owned or con­
trolled corporations and local government units) would
be “constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independ­
ence.”31

In Re: COA Opinion on the Computation o f the A p ­

praised Value o f the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief!Associate Justices o f the Supreme Court,32 the
Court was requested by the Commission on Audit to
“determine the proper formula to be used in computing
the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and
several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to
pay to acquire the government properties they used
during their tenure.” The request was made after a find­
ing by the Commission of “underpayment” with respect
to the three vehicles purchased by a retired Chief Jus­
tice, and the vehicles and other personal properties,
including a television set, acquired by four other Jus­
tices of the Supreme Court, upon their retirement. The
Court, relying on the recommendations of its Office of
Administrative Services, confirmed the in-house compu­
tation of the appraisal value made by its Property
Division, and declared that the authority of the Com­
mission on Audit to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy under
Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution “must be
read not only in the light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy,

Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for Payment of Legal
Pees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 193, at 209,
cited in In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of
All Court and Sheriffs Pees, A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012,
688 SCRA 1.
32A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1.
484 P hilippine P olitical Law

but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on

judicial independence and Court rulings on these mat­
ters.” Thus —

“By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the

intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the re­
tired Justices o f specifically designated properties that they
used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a
privilege and a benefit. This has become an established prac­
tice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously
recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of
the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the
Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its
power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative
authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judici­
ary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle
and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its
personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.
“Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the
Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where,
when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to jus­
tices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the pa­
rameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the
terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
“In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the
formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of
the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine
the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can
be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only
violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judici­
ary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and
privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc
to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.”

The Court further pronounced —

“One of the most important aspects of judicial independ­

ence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the
 T he Judicial Department 485

Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her

judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court
from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not
enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts
may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of
their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While,
as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control
the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of in­
terference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judici­
ary’s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co­
equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to per­
form its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to
command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority
to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over
the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a viola­
tion of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative
autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and
is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant
of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.”

Composition of the Supreme Court

The Commonwealth Constitution fixed the mem­

bership of the Supreme Court at eleven, unless other­
wise provided by law, but the 1973 Constitution in­
creased it to a maximum of fifteen, which could not be
reduced or increased by mere legislation. There was a
plan in the Constitutional Commission to restore the
original composition of only eleven, but in the end the
maximum was retained at fifteen, to enable the Court to
cope more effectively with its mounting backlog of cases.
To this same end, it may now meet not only en banc but
in two, three or five divisions, and any vacancy in the
Court must be filled within ninety days from its occur­
rence.
The number of members of the full Court and of the
divisions, which is fixed by the Constitution and may
not be changed by statute, is provided for as follows:
486 Philippine P olitical Law

“Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a

Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.”

Suppose the 90-day requirement conflicts with Sec­

tion 15 of Article VII of the Constitution, which prohib­
its the President from making appointments within two
months immediately preceding the next presidential
election up to the end of his term?
In In re Appointment o f Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Placido B. Vallarte,33 the Supreme Court held through
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that, during the period
covered by Section 15, “the President is neither required
to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so,
and Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the
President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless prohib­
ited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that
the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only
once every six years.”
A s previously discussed, this ruling has since been
reversed by the Court in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council,34 where it was declared that the President may
provide for appointments in the judiciary even within
“two months immediately before the next presidential
election and up to the end of his term.”

“Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition con­

tained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Mem­
bers of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering o f the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the pro­

93 298 SCRA 408.

MG.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666.
 The Judicial D epartment 487

hibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being

equally applicable to the appointment o f Members of the Su­
preme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or
Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members o f the
Supreme Court.”

It is to be noted that, in said case, the Court like­

wise stressed that Section 15, Article VII of the Consti­
tution “does not apply as well to all other appointments
in the Judiciary.”

(1) En Banc Cases

The new rules in Section 4 on en banc cases are as

follows:

“(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which
under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, in­
cluding those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, in­
structions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actu­
ally took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon.”

Whereas the old rules on the declaration of uncon­

stitutionality covered only the “treaty or law” under the
1935 Constitution and the “treaty, executive agreement
or law” under the 1973 Charter, the new Constitution
includes the treaty, international or executive agree­
ment, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instructions, ordinance, and other regulations.
488 Philippine P olitical Law

In Bayan Muna v. Rom ulo ,35 the Supreme Court

clarified that “Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law o f Treaties defines a treaty as ‘an international
agreement concluded between states in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied
in a single instrument or in two or more related instru­
ments and whatever its particular designation.’ Interna­
tional agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that
require legislative concurrence after executive ratifica­
tion; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to
treaties, except that they do not require legislative con­
currence and are usually less formal and deal with a
narrower range of subject matters than treaties.”
The rule on the needed vote for a declaration of un­
constitutionality is also elaborate and elongated, not to
say ill-advised. While the 1935 Constitution called for a
vote of two-thirds of the Supreme Court and the 1973
Constitution fixed the flat number of ten, the Constitu­
tion of 1987 evidently will have no truck with such sim­
plicity. Instead, it requires for such declaration “the
concurrence o f a majority o f the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon,” in a masterpiece of quibbling and
verbosity .J6
Significantly, whereas under the two previous char­
ters no less than two-thirds of the Court were needed for
a declaration of unconstitutionality, now as few as five
members of the Court can declare any of the measures
mentioned above unconstitutional, this number being a
majority of the quorum of eight of the fifteen-member
Court.

G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011, 641 SCRA 244.

Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sep­
tember 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614.
 T he Judicial Department 489

At any rate, in Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate o f

the Philippines,37 the Supreme Court stressed that the
fact that its previous decision “was based on a slim vote
of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making
our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of
how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of
the majority of the members of the en banc who actually
took part in the deliberations of the case, a decision
garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a deci­
sion of the Supreme Court en banc and must be re­
spected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in
any position to speculate that, based on the voting, ‘the
probability exists that their motion for reconsideration
may be granted.’”

(2) Division Cases

The rules on the decision of cases by division have

been reworded in the same section to read as follows:

“(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be de­

cided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the is­
sues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the
concurrence of at least three o f such Members. When the re­
quired number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.”

Where the necessary vote cannot be had in division,

the case shall be referred to the Court en banc and de­
cided in accordance with its own rules. The same action
shall be taken where a doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court en banc or in division is sought to be

•
” G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, 677 SCRA 200.
490 Philippine P olitical Law

modified or reversed, as a contrary rule would lead to

confusion in our jurisprudence, with the divisions con­
tradicting each other or even changing rulings laid down
by the full Court.
In Fortich v. Corona38 the petitioners filed motions
for reconsideration of a 3-2 decision of the Special Sec­
ond Division that were denied by a 2-2 vote. As the de­
nial was not supported by a majority of the division,
they asked for the elevation of the issue to the banc in
accordance with the above-quoted provision. In a dubi­
ous rationalization, the Court held that following the
rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word “decided”
must refer to “cases,” while the word “resolved” must
refer to “matters.” This rather strained interpretation
militates against another rule of construction, which is
that one m ust not distinguish i f the Constitution does
not.
There are now three divisions of the Supreme
Court with five members each.

Requisites of a Judicial Inquiry

Unlike the political departments, courts are passive

instruments that can act only when their jurisdiction is
invoked. It has already been remarked that, even then,
the question raised will ordinarily not be entertained by
them i f it is political in nature. Furthermore, by virtue
of a judge-made policy, no constitutional question will
be heard and decided by them unless there is compli­
ance with what are known as the requisites of a judicial
inquiry:

” 312 SCRA 751.

 The Judicial Department 491

These requisites are the following:39

(1) There must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) The question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party;
(3) The constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) The decision of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case it­
self.40

(1) Actual Case

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of

legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims sus­
ceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other simi­
lar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence.
“A ‘controversy’ must be one that is appropriate for
judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus
distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypo­
thetical or abstract character or from one that is aca­
demic or moot. The controversy m ust be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substan­
tial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree that is conclusive in character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Where there is such a con-

39 Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392.

10 See Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1; see also Garcia v. Execu­
tive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 119.
492 Philippine Political Law

crete case admitting of an immediate and definitive

determination of the legal rights o f the parties in an
adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the adjudi­
cation o f the rights of the litigants may not require the
award o f process or the payment of damages. And it is
not essential to the exercise of the judicial power that an
injunction be sought; allegations that irreparable injury
is threatened are not required.”41
A request for advisory opinion cannot come under
the category of an actual case or controversy since the
issue raised does not involve any conflict in law that has
assumed the proportions of a full-blown dispute. The
court in this case is being asked only to counsel and not
to decide. Counseling by courts is contrary to the doc­
trine of separation of powers since their advice will not
have the force of law but of a mere suggestion or rec­
ommendation that may be accepted or rejected at will by
the department requesting it.
But where the purpose is to solicit from the court a
declaratory judgment involving the interpretation of the
rights and duties of a person under the provisions of a
deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or a
statute or ordinance,42 the case is deemed an actual con­
troversy over which the courts may validly assume ju ­
risdiction.
The Supreme Court however took cognizance of a
constitutional challenge filed by taxpayers against the
practice of direct allocation and release of funds to
Members of Congress and the authority given to them to
propose and select projects. It considered said petition
as pertaining to what may constitute a “serious consti-

11Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227.

12Rule 64, Sec. 1, Rules o f Court.
 T he Judicial Department 493

tutional transgression involving the expenditure of pub­

lic funds.” It said that a “finding of unconstitutionality
would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of
public funds which, jn turn, [would] cause injury or
hardship to taxpayers.”43
In Senate v. Ermita,44 the Court proceeded to re­
solve the petitions questioning the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 464, which allowed President A r­
royo’s subordinates not to appear before Congress in
connection with its legislative inquiries, despite the
absence of any showing that she had actually invoked it
or prohibited them from participating in said legislative
investigations. The Court found the “assertion that the
President has not withheld her consent or prohibited
the appearance o f the officials concerned immaterial in
determining the existence of an actual case or contro­
versy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned.”
In Pimentel v. Aguirre,45 the Supreme Court, citing
Tanada u. Angara,46 where it held that “when an act of
the legislative department is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy be­
comes the duty of this Court,” went further and declared
that “by the mere enactment of the questioned law or
the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said
to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without
any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.”

43Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of

Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670
SCRA 373.
44Supra.
45 G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 201.
46272 SCRA 18 (1997).
494 P hilippine Political Law

The Court made a similar ruling in The Province o f

North Cotabato v. The Government o f the Republic o f the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain47 where it
stressed that “that the law or act in question is not yet
effective does not negate ripeness. When an act of the
President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal
of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws, settling the dispute becomes
the duty and the responsibility of the courts.”
In P A C U vs. Secretary o f Education,48 the petition­
ers challenged a regulation of the respondent requiring
all private colleges and universities to first obtain a
permit from the Department of Education before they
could open and operate. It appeared, however, that all
the petitioners had previously obtained the required
permit and that they were questioning the regulation
only because of the possibility that such permit might be
denied them in the future. The Supreme Court declared
that the case was premature as there was no showing at
the time of any conflict of legal rights that would justify
assumption of jurisdiction by the judiciary. The Court
said that “mere apprehension that the Secretary of Edu­
cation might, under the law, withdraw the permit of one
of the petitioners does not constitute a justiciable con­
troversy.”
PH ILCON SA v. Villareal49 was a petition to compel
the Speaker of the House of Representatives to produce
the books of accounts of that body in which were re­
corded the amounts appropriated by the legislators for
their allowances. Before the case could be decided, how­
ever, the 1973 Constitution became effective and the

" G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
1897 Phil. 806.
" 5 2 SCRA 477(1973).
 The J udicial Department 495

Congress of the Philippines was abolished. The Supreme

Court thereupon dismissed the petition, holding that it
had already become moot and academic.
Indeed, in Madripga u. China Banking Corpora­
tion ,50 the Court declared that “judicial power presup­
poses actual controversies, the very antithesis of moot­
ness. Where there is no more live subject of controversy,
the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling
or make any pronouncement. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction on the ground o f mootness.”
Accordingly, in Radaza v. Court o f Appeals,51 the
Court ruled that there would no longer be any purpose
in determining the lawfulness of a preventive suspen­
sion if the preventive suspension period had already
prescribed. For the same reason, the expiration of the
term generally renders an election protest moot and
academic.52
In Garcillano v. House o f Representatives,53 the
Court dismissed the petition filed for purposes of prohib­
iting the respondents from playing the “tape recordings
and from including the same in their committee report.”
It noted that “the recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members” and that there is also
“the widely publicized fact that the committee reports
on the ‘Hello Garci’ inquiry were completed and submit­
ted to the House in plenary by the respondent commit­
tees. Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcil-

50 G.R. No. 192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560.

51 G.R. No. 177135, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 223.
62 Sales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174668, September 12, 2007,
533 SCRA 173; see also Gunsi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168792, Feb­
ruary 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 70.
53 G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170.
 496 P hilippine P olitical Law

lano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and

academic.”
The Court made a similar ruling in Suplico v. N a­
tional Economic Development Authority,64 which was a
petition to compel the production of a supply contract
required in a legislative investigation being conducted
by the House of Representatives. It found that during
one o f the Senate hearings on the same subject, copies of
the supply contract were readily made available to peti­
tioners. “Evidently,” said the Supreme Court, “the said
prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.” In
A K B A Y A N v. Aquino,55 the Court also dismissed the
petitioners’ demand to be furnished with a copy of the
full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement, for having become moot and academic, said
document having been already made accessible to the
public.
A s earlier discussed, the Court also dismissed the
petition questioning former President Estrada’s eligibil­
ity to run for President during the 2010 presidential
election, stressing that, since he was not elected for the
second time, “any discussion of his ‘reelection’ will sim­
ply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no
useful or practical purpose.”56
In Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Luisita Indus­
trial Park Corporation,57 the Court refrained from ruling
on the constitutionality of Section 31 of Republic Act No.
6657, which provided for a stock distribution scheme for
purposes of the comprehensive agrarian reform program

5<G.R. No. 178830, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 329.

55 G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 468.
Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, 629
SCRA 530.
57 G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011, 653 SCRA 154.
 The J udicial Department 497

of the Government, noting that said law had by then

already been “all but superseded” by Section 5 of Repub­
lic Act No. 9700. “Thus, for all intents and purposes, the
stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no
longer an available option under existing law. The ques­
tion of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a
moot issue.” It added that it “would be speculative for
this Court to assume that the legislature will enact an­
other law providing for a similar stock option.”
Sana v. Career Executive Service Board58 was a pe­
tition questioning the constitutionality of certain ap­
pointments made by President Arroyo on June 10, 2010,
or shortly before the expiration of her term, on the basis
of her Executive Order No. 883, which granted the rank
of CESO III or higher to officers and employees occupy­
ing legal positions in the government executive service
who have obtained graduate degrees in law and success­
fully passed the bar examinations. Said Executive Order
was supported by the Career Executive Service Board,
per its Resolution No. 870, where it expressed its find­
ing that no legal impediment existed for the President
to vest CESO rank to executive officials during the peri­
ods covered by the constitutional ban on midnight ap­
pointments and the statutory ban on pre-election ap­
pointments. The Court dismissed said petition when it
found that, at the time of the filing of the same, Presi­
dent Benigno Aquino III had already issued Executive
Order No. 3 expressly revoking his predecessor’s Execu­
tive Order No. 883. “EO 883 and CESB Resolution No.
870 having ceased to have any force and effect, the
Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition
and pass upon these issuances’ validity. To do so would
transgress the requirement of case and controversy as

58 G.R. No. 192926, Novem ber 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 130.
 498 Philippine P olitical Law

precondition for the Court’s exercise of judicial review.”

The Court added that “the question whether an ap­
pointment to a CESO rank of an executive official
amounts to an ‘appointment’ for purposes of the consti­
tutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially
recurring, holds no certainty of evading judicial review
as the question can be decided even beyond the ap-
pointments-ban period under Section 15, Article V II of
the Constitution.”
A petition challenging the constitutionality of an­
other Executive Order, this time, issued by President
Aquino, which provided for his power to establish the
compensation systems for government-owned or con­
trolled corporations and government financial institu­
tions, was likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court
after it found that the Congress, through Republic Act
No. 10149, had, in the meantime, expressly conferred
said power upon the President. “For the Court to still
rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will
merely be an academic exercise.”59
However, despite its rulings in the aforecited cases,
the Supreme Court has made it clear that —

“The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of le­

gal questions but also the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him
justice. The two are not always the same. There are times
when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been
settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law.
But there are also times when although the dispute has disap­
peared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication

m Galicto v. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667

SCRA 150.
 The J udicial Department 499

of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of
and as a restraint upon the future.” 60

In Javier v. Commission on Elections,61 the peti­

tioner “was gunned down in cold blood and in broad
daylight.” The respondent therefore asked for the dis­
missal of the case on the ground that it had become
moot and academic. The Court rejected this plea. It
said—

“It is not as simple as that. Several lives have been lost

in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner
himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of
suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through
a confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep
silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.”

The Court, after discussing the merits of the peti­

tion, concluded as follows —

“Since this case began in 1984, many significant devel­

opments have taken place, not the least significant of which
was the February revolution o f ‘people power’ that dislodged
the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for
this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of
bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive
is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared
with the ‘pomp of power’ he had before enjoyed. Even the Bata-
sang Pambansa itself has been abolished, ‘an iniquitous vestige
of the previous regime’ discontinued by the Freedom Constitu­
tion. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without rea­
son, to send the records of this case to the archives and say the
case is finished and the book is closed.
“But not yet.
“Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen
hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he
dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly si-

1,0Javier v. Commission on Elections, 144 SCRA 194.

Ibid.
500 Philippine P olitical Law

lence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned
in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was
not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt
him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all­
exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And
though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound
and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless,
fighting valiantly for the liberties o f his people against the
enemies o f his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would
impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement.
He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a
very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer
because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, ‘swifter than eagles
and stronger than lions.’
“A year ago this Court received a letter which began: ‘I
am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the
mother o f Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel San­
chez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I
lost all four of them in the election eve ambush in Antique last
year.’ She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her
provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the
early resolution of that horrible crime, saying: ‘I am 82 years
old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in church
and my plea to you, ‘Before I die, I would like to see justice to
my son and grandsons.’ May I also add that the people of An­
tique have not stopped praying that the true winner of the last
elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon.’
“That was a year ago and since then a new government
has taken over in the wake o f the February revolution. The
despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the oppres­
sions and repressions of the past have also been banished for­
ever. A new spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the
horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under
the Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly sov­
ereign in his own country, able to express his will through the
pristine ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.
“This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an ap­
proachable goal. It can and will be won if we are able at last,
after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we can
do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and
not until then, can we truly say that the case is finished and
the book is closed.
 The J udicial Department 501

“WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this

case that were it not for the supervening events that have le­
gally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have
been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections
dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.”

Accordingly, it has since been pronounced that the

“moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving
a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Con­
stitution; second, the exceptional character of the situa­
tion and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.62
In Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit,63
the Court proceeded to resolve the challenge against the
constitutionality of the respondent’s appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, notwithstanding
his subsequent resignation and the appointment of his
successor, considering that the petition falls “within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case,
since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness
rule.”

62 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,

171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA
161; see also Madriaga v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560; Constantino v. People, G.R.
No. 140656, September 13, 2007; Radaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 177135, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 223; Gunsi v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 168792, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 70.
63 G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579.
502 Philippine P olitical Law

In Arroyo v. Department o f Justice64 the Court ad­

dressed the issues raised by the petitioner regarding the
lawfulness of the preliminary investigation conducted
by the respondent despite “the occurrence of the super­
vening events of filing an information and dismissal of
the charges,” on the ground that the petition was based
on “constitutional grounds.”
In The Province o f North Cotabato v. The Govern­
ment o f the Republic o f the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain,65 the Supreme Court stressed that
“when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws, settling
the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts.” In the same case, the Court declared that
“the petitions are imbued with paramount public inter­
est, involving a significant part of the country’s territory
and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected
LGUs. The assertion that the M O A-AD is subject to
further legal enactments including possible constitu­
tional amendments more than ever provides impetus for
the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the gov­
ernment and its negotiating entity.” It added that “once
a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the chal­
lenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the
tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and
does not render the case moot especially when the plain­
tiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against
the possible recurrence of the violation.”

64 G.R. No. 199082, September 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 181.

“ Supra.
 The J udicial Department 503

The Court likewise found certain issues raised in

Garcillano v. House o f Representatives66 as of “transcen­
dental and paramount importance not only to the public
but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be re­
solved for the guidance1,of all.”
Cases involving the construction and operation of
the country’s international airports have also been con­
sidered by the Supreme Court as being of “transcenden­
tal importance” and would merit its exercise of its judi­
cial power. It is for this reason that in Philippine Inter­
national A ir Terminals Co., Inc. v. Takenaka Corpora­
tion, 67 the Court saw “it fit to relax the rules in this case
to arrive at a full settlement of the parties’ claims and
avoid further delay in the administration of justice.”
In Atienza v. Villarosa,m the Supreme Court ruled
on the lawfulness of the respondent governor’s purchase
orders and termination of casual employments despite
the expiration of his term, stating that “even in cases
where supervening events had made the cases moot, the
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitu­
tional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and the public. In this case, there
is compelling reason for the Court to resolve the issues
presented in order to clarify the scope of the respective
powers of the Governor and Vice-Governor under the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code of
1991.”
It is the so-called doctrine o f capable o f repetition
yet evading review upon which the Court relied in re­

mSupra.
07 G.R. No. 180245, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 674; see also Agaji,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. Nos.
155001, 155547 & 155661, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 612.
68G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005, 458 SCRA 385.
 504 Philippine Political Law

solving a petition involving the one-year residency re­

quirement for those running for public office, which is
one capable of repetition;69 a case involving the commis­
sion of election offenses, notwithstanding the election
and proclamation of a new set of municipal officers, to
prevent a repetition of the acts complained of;70 and an
action questioning the lawfulness of certain appoint­
ments, despite the approval by the Civil Service Com­
mission of the questioned appointments, “to avoid a
repetition.”71
In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,12 the Court
ruled on the merits of a petition questioning the holding
by the respondent of two offices, despite his having
ceased to do so during the pendency of the case, consid­
ering that the question of whether the PCGG Chairman
could concurrently hold the position of Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel was one capable o f repetition.
Pimentel u. Ermita73 pertained to the validity of the
President’s appointment of acting secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments while
Congress was in session. While the President extended
ad interim appointments to her appointees immediately
after the recess of Congress, the Court still resolved the
petition, noting that the question of the constitutionality
of the President’s appointment of department secretar­
ies in acting capacities while Congress was in session
was one capable of repetition.

69 Gayo v. Verceles, G.R. No. 150477, February 28, 2005, 452

SCRA 504.
7,1 Albana v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23,
2004, 435 SCRA 98.------------------------------------------------------------------------
71 Altres v. Empleo, G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008, 573
SCRA 583.
72 G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 336.
13G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587.
 The J udicial D epartment 505

In Limkaichong v. Comelec,74 Supreme Court em­

phasized that “citizenship, being a continuing require­
ment for Members of the House of Representatives” may
be questioned at anytime. “For this reason, the Court
deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the mer­
its. This position finds support in the rule that courts
will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if
it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. The ques­
tion on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur i f she
would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence,
capable of repetition.”
In Antolin v. Domondon ,75 which was a suit to com­
pel the Board of Accountancy to allow the petitioner to
review her examination papers, the Supreme Court
stated that “any citizen may challenge any attempt to
obstruct the exercise of his or her right to information
and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since
every citizen possesses the inherent right to be informed
by the mere fact of citizenship, we find that petitioner’s
belated passing of the CPA Board Exams does not
automatically mean that her interest in the Examina­
tion Papers has become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly,
the constitutional question presented, in view of the
likelihood that the issues in this case will be repeated,
warrants review.”
A similar ruling was made by the Court in Magdalo
Para sa Pagbabago v. Commission on Elections,76 where
the petitioner challenged the rejection by the respon-

74 G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1, citing Inte-

— grated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February
24, 2010, 613 SCRA 518, 523; Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740,
February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308; see also Vilando v. HRET, G.R.
Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17.
75 G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 163.
78 G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 651.
506 P hilippine Political Law

dent of its application for registration as a political

party on the ground that it was found to have used vio­
lence or unlawful means to attain its goals. The Court
passed upon the merits of the petition despite a finding
that the issue had been rendered moot with the conduct
of the election where the petitioner sought to partici­
pate, saying that “the instant action brings to the fore
matters of public concern, as it challenges the very no­
tion of the use of violence or unlawful means as a
ground for disqualification from party registration.
Moreover, considering the expressed intention of M AG -
DALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occur­
rence of supervening events pertinent to the case at bar,
it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and
resolve the arising legal questions once and for all.”
The Supreme Court has further had occasion to
take cognizance of a case despite the demise o f one of
the accused, to prevent a miscarriage of justice against a
co-accused,77 and a disciplinary action notwithstanding
the separation of the petitioner from government ser­
vice, because “other penalties may be imposed upon
her.”78

(2) Proper Party

A proper party is one who has sustained or is in im ­

mediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the
act complained of.79 Until and unless such actual or po­
tential injury is established, the complainant cannot

'7 Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 140656, September 13, 2007,

533 SCRA 205.
™ Pagano v. Nazarro, G.R. No. 149072, September 21, 2007,
533 SCRA 622.
79Ex Parte Levitt, 303 U.S. 633.
 The Judicial Department 507

have the legal personality to raise the constitutional

question.
In Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,60
the Supreme Court explained that “it is fundamental
that the courts are established in order to afford reliefs
to persons whose rights or property interests have been
invaded or violated, or are threatened with invasion by
others’ conduct or acts, and to give relief only at the
instance of such persons. The jurisdiction of a court of
law or equity may not be invoked by or for an individual
whose rights have not been breached.” Indeed, “locus
standi, which is a mere procedural technicality, has
been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.”81
In Tileston v. Ullmann,82 a physician questioned the
constitutionality of a law prohibiting the use of contra­
ceptives, upon the ground that it might prove dangerous
to the life or health of some of his patients whose physi­
cal condition would not enable them to bear the rigors of
childbirth. The court dismissed the challenge, holding
that the patients of the physician and not the physician
himself were the proper parties.
In People v. Vera,83it was held that the Government
of the Philippines was a proper party to challenge the
constitutionality of the Probation Act because, more

G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 473, citing 59 Am

Jur 2d, Parties, § 30.
81 Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. The Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, 531 SCRA 583.
”2318 U.S. 446.
“ G.R. No. L-16263, July 26, 1960.
508 Philippine P olitical Law

than any other, it was the government itself that should

be concerned over the validity of its own laws.
In Cuyegkeng v. Cruz,8' the petitioner challenged in
a quo warranto proceeding the title of the respondent
who, he claimed, had been appointed to the board of
medical examiners in violation of the provisions of the
Medical Act of 1959. The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition, holding that Cuyegkeng had not made a claim
to the position held by Cruz and therefore could not be
regarded as a proper party who had sustained an injury
as a result of the questioned act.
In Ex Parte Levitt85 the petitioner, an American tax­
payer and member of the bar, filed a motion for leave to
question the qualifications of Justice Black who, he
averred, had been appointed to the U .S. Supreme Court
in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The
Court dismissed the petition, holding that Levitt was
not a proper party since he was not claiming the posi­
tion held by Justice Black.
Accordingly, in Topacio v. Ong,m the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition filed by one who was not seeking
the seat of the respondent as an Associate Justice in the
Sandiganbayan. It said that the petition, which essen­
tially called for the nullification of the respondent’s ap­
pointment to said court, constituted a collateral attack
on a public officer’s title. The Court stressed that such a
challenge may be done only directly by way of quo war­
ranto proceedings, which m ay be filed only by the Solici­
tor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be,
or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exer-

84 65 Phil. 56.
“5 303 U.S. 633.
“s G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 817.
 The Judicial D epartment 509

cised by another. “For a quo warranto petition to be

successful, the private person suing must show a clear
right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere
preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a
modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.”
The issue in Paguia v. Office o f the President7 was
the power of Congress to limit the President’s preroga­
tive to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifi­
cations despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’
role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commis­
sion on Appointments’ confirmation of nominees. The
Court dismissed said petition, which was filed by a citi­
zen and a taxpayer, “for lack of a case or controversy
grounded on petitioner’s lack o f capacity to sue and
mootness.”
The rule before was that an ordinary taxpayer did
not have the proper party personality to question the
legality of an appropriation law since his interest in the
sum appropriated was not substantial enough. Thus, in
Custodio v. Senate President,88 a challenge by an ordi­
nary taxpayer to the validity of a law granting backpay
to members of Congress for the period corresponding to
the Japanese Occupation was dismissed as having been
commenced by one who was not a proper party.
Since the first Emergency Powers C a ses/9 however,
the rule has been changed and it is now permissible for
an ordinary taxpayer, or a group of taxpayers, to raise
the question of the validity of an appropriation law. As
the Supreme Court put it, “The transcendental impor­
tance to the public of these cases demands that they be

87 G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010, 621 SCRA 600.

m42 O.G. 243.
89Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.
 510 Philippine P olitical Law

settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we

must, technicalities of procedure.”
Taxpayers must however make a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that a tax measure is
unconstitutional,90 or deflected to an illegal purpose, or
that there is a wastage of public funds through the en­
forcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.91 They
may likewise sue when loan contracts entered into by
the government are serviced or paid through a dis­
bursement of public funds.92
“A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show
that the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He
must also prove that he has sufficient interest in pre­
venting the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxa­
tion and that he will sustain a direct injury because of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. In
other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requi­
sites m ust be met: (1) public funds derived from taxa­
tion are disbursed by a political subdivision or instru­
mentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some ir­
regularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly
affected by the alleged act.”93
A taxpayer is considered to have the proper per­
sonality or standing to raise a constitutional issue when
it is established that public funds from taxation have
been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or

David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.
81 The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic o f the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
Asean Pacific Planners v City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525,
September 23, 2008, 566 SCRA 219.
9i Mamba v. Lara, G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009. 608
SCRA 149.
 T he Judicial Department 511

the Constitution.84 Thus, a taxpayer who claims that the

issuance by the Commission on Audit of its Circular No.
89-299 “has led to the dissipation of public funds
through numerous irregularities in government finan­
cial transactions” was considered as possessing the
“standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would
be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.”95
It bears stressing though that the Supreme Court
has declared that it “retains discretion whether or not to
allow a taxpayer’s suit.”96 Being a mere procedural tech­
nicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.97
In Tolentino v. Commission on Elections,98 it was
held that a senator had the proper party personality to
seek the prohibition of a plebiscite for the ratification of
a proposed constitutional amendment. Legislators have
invariably been acknowledged as proper parties in suits
involving claims that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as such.99 In The Prov­
ince o f North Cotabato v. The Government o f the Repub­
lic o f the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral D o­
main,100 the Supreme Court pronounced that “any act of
the Executive that injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury
that can be questioned by legislators.” The Court like-

91 Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, 392 Phil. 518 (2000);

Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111544, 6 July 2004, 433 SCRA 424.
95 De la Liana v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
180989, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 176.
98 The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, supra.
97 David v. Arroyo, supra.
9841 SCRA 702.
99 David v. Arroyo, supra.
100Supra.