REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

PRACTICE COURT II
CITY OF MANILA

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Complainant, CRIM. CASE NO. 8080
- versus - FOR: PARRICIDE under Article
ION PEREZ y XIU, 246 of the Revised Penal Code,
Accused. as amended
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ACCUSED’S TRIAL MEMORANDUM

Accused, assisted by the undersigned counsel, most
respectfully alleges:
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
In order that this Honorable Court may be enlightened and
guided in the judicious disposition of the above-entitled case, cited
hereunder are the material, relevant and pertinent facts of the case to
wit:
1. That the accused is Ion X. Perez, of legal age, married, and
residing at El Pueblo Condominum I, Sta. Mesa Manila (hereinafter
referred to as “ACCUSED”);
2. That the offended party is Viceral Alawit-Perez, the wife of
the accused (hereinafter referred to as “VICTIM”);
3. That on 10th day of September 2019 the accused and the
victim got married and on the same day following the ceremony of
their marriage, the accused and the victim went to Manila Hotel to
celebrate their honeymoon and to consummate their marriage;
4. Thereafter, a heated argument ensued between the accused
and the victim when the former discovered that the latter was in fact,
biologically, a male;
5. That the victim, wanting to consummate their marriage,
insisted and threatened the accused with a gun;
6. That as the victim was about to approach the accused, the
former tripped and dropped the gun;
 7. That the victim saw a knife, about 10 inches long, grabbed it
and immediately attacked the accused;
8. That the accused in order to defend himself from the
aggression, reached for the same gun previously dropped by the
victim and pointed it to the latter;
9. That the accused, due to the unlawful aggression of the
approaching victim, aimlessly fired the gun;
10. That after the unfortunate accident, the accused, who has
still in shock, went to his parents and confessed about the matter;
11. That upon the advice of his parents, the accused
immediately surrendered himself that day, September 11, 2019 at
about 5 o’clock in the morning, to the police officer in the nearby Sta.
Mesa Police Station or MPD Station 8.
12. That PCPL Ate Girl Jackie Chan was the duty officer when
the accused surrendered himself; and
13. That after his voluntary surrender, the aforesaid duty officer
made a report and sent an investigating team to the scene of the
crime.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Is the accused is guilty of crime of parricide beyond
reasonable doubt?
2. Is the accused is civilly liable?

ARGUMENTS
1. Accused is not guilty of the crime of parricide beyond
reasonable doubt.
The accused is in fact innocent of the crime charged as he only
acted in defense of his own life against the actual threat posed upon
him by the victim.
Under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, no criminal
liability is incurred by:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it.
 Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
In view of this justifying circumstance of self-defense, it is
respectfully submitted that the accused’s act of killing the victim is
justified and necessary for the preservation of his own life.

A. There is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least
threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind. 1 There is
unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is either
actual or imminent.2 In case of threat, the same must be offensive
and positively strong, showing the wrongful intent to cause an injury. 3
Jurisprudence shows that unlawful aggression is imminent
when the danger is on the point of happening. It is not required that
the attack already began, for it may be too late. 4
In December Supreme Court of Spain, October 24, 1895, the
act of opening a knife and making a motion as if to make an attack is
an example of a threat to inflict real injury. In such case, the
threatening attitude of the aggressor is offensive and positively
strong, showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor to cause an
injury.5
In the instant case, as shown by the records, the victim grabbed
the kitchen knife and immediately attacked the accused. Although the
victim was not able to stabbed the accused, it is at least a threatened
assault of an immediate and imminent kind. The aforementioned
jurisprudential doctrines recognize that the unlawful aggression need
not be an actual physical assault, but also threatened assault so long
as the same must be offensive and positively strong.
Moreover, the act of the victim in grabbing the knife and making
a motion to stabbed the accused is considered a threatening attitude
that is offensive and positively strong, showing the wrongful intent of
the aggressor pursuant to the above-cited jurisprudences.
Therefore, there is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
justifying the action of the accused in repelling such imminent threat
against the latter’s life.

1
People v. Alonga, 78 Phil. 366.
2
People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-38180, October 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 288, 298.
3
U.S. v. Guysayco, 13 Phil. 292, 295.
4
Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law, Book One: Arts. 1-113, at p.163.
5
Id., at pp. 181-182.
 B. The accused employed the means to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression that is reasonably necessary.
In U.S. v. Molina, 19 Phil. 227, it was held that the person
attacked is not duty-bound to expose himself to be wounded or killed,
and while the danger to his person or life subsists, he has a perfect
and indisputable right to repel such danger by wounding his
adversary and, if necessary, to disable him completely so that he may
not continue the assault.
The second requisite of defense means that (1) there be a
necessity of the course of action taken by the person making a
defense, and (2) there be a necessity of the means used. Both must
be reasonable.6
In emergencies where the person or life of another is imperiled,
human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. The reasonableness of
the necessity to take a course of action and the reasonableness of
the necessity of the means employed depend upon the
circumstances of the case.7 In determining the existence of unlawful
aggression that induced a person to take a course of action, the place
and occasion of the assault and the other circumstances must be
considered.8
In the instant case, the act occurred in the Manila Hotel to
celebrate and consummate their marriage. The accused was in bed
while the victim stood before him separating him from the door. The
accused could not have escaped the room without evading the victim.
The only way to preserve his life is picking up the gun to repel the
unlawful attack of the latter. Therefore, there was necessity of the
course of action taken by the accused.
Jurisprudence shows that whether the means employed is
reasonable, will depend upon the nature and quality of the weapon
used by the aggressor, his physical condition, character, size and
other circumstances, and those of the person defending himself, and
also the place and occasion of the assault.9
Furthermore, perfect equality between the weapon used by the
defending party and that of the aggressor is not required. The reason
is that the person assaulted does not have sufficient tranquility of
mind to think, to calculate and to choose which weapon to use. 10
Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply
material commensurability between the means of attack and defense.
6
Id., at p. 183.
7
Id., at p. 184.
8
Id., supra.
9
Id., at p. 189.
10
People v. Padua, C.A., 40 O.G. 998
What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of
which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct,
more than reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but
rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. 11
To use a firearm against a dagger or a knife, in the regular
order of things, does not imply any difference between such
weapons.12 This ruling is subject to limitations mentioned in People v.
Padua, supra, namely: (1) there was no other available means; or (2)
if there was other means, the one making a defense could not coolly
choose the less deadly weapon to repel the aggression.
In the instant case, the accused has no other means to protect
himself. He could not have escaped the room since the victim stood
between him and the door of the room. Even if there was other
means to prevent the incident, he could not have availed him, since
he could not have chosen a less deadly weapon to repel the act of
stabbing of the victim because of the spontaneity of the situation. The
victim is about to stab him. The accused just grabbed the nearest
thing which he could get to protect himself. It just so happen that it
was the gun which he used for self-preservation.
Hence, there was reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel the attack.

C. There was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of

the accused.
It is well settled that the third requisite of self-defense is present
when provocation was given but it was not sufficient. The provocation
to be sufficient, which means that it should be proportionate to act of
aggression and adequate to stir the aggressor to its commission.
(People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366). Thus, to engage in a verbal
argument cannot be considered sufficient provocation. 13

Under paragraph 4 of Statement of Facts, the accused and the

deceased had a heated argument after the accused discovered that
the deceased is not what he expected her to be as the latter is,
biologically, a male. Such cannot be considered a sufficient
provocation to urge the deceased to threat him with a gun initially,
then to attack him with a knife. The accused has no other choice but
to protect himself from the imminent danger to his life.

11
People v. Encomienda, G.R. No. L-26750, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 522, 534, quoting People v. Lara, 48
Phil. 153; People v. Paras, 9 Phil. 367.
12
Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, October 27, 1887.
13
Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, October 5, 1877.
2. Accused is not civilly liable.

It is well-settled that Justifying Circumstances under Article 11

of the Revised Penal Code are those where the act of a person is
said to be in accordance with law, so that such person is deemed not
to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil
liability.

Considering that the accused was justified in killing the victim

under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, he should be exonerated of
the crime charged. For the same reason, there is no act or omission
from which a civil liability may arise (People v. Cristina Samson, GR.
No. 214883, September 02, 2015)

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable

Court that judgment be rendered finding for the innocence of the
accused for the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, by reason of justifying circumstance of
self-defense as provided under Section 11(1) thereof.
Accused likewise prays for such other reliefs as the Court may
deem just and equitable in the premises.
Respectfully Submitted.
Manila, Philippines, February 7, 2020.

LANCE CHRISTOPHER D. PADILLA

Counsel for the Accused

14 Duhat Drive, Valley View Executive Village

Cainta Rizal
Tel. Nos. 88650-2660

COPY FURNISHED:

Unit 6C 20 Lansbergh Place,

170 Morato St., Quezon City

EXPLANATION
(Under Sec. 11, Rule 13, and New Rules on Civil Procedure)
 The foregoing Memorandum was served by registered mail due to lack of
personnel to effect personal service and distance between offices.

LANCE CHRISTOPHER D. PADILLA