Stock Screening and Analysis

Techniques Your Guru

Never Taught You
Marc H. Gerstein
mgerstein@yahoo.com
Portfolio123.com
AAII DC Metro Chapter - 9/21/2013

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Marc H. Gerstein spent his career analyzing stocks, educating investors, and
helping to develop stock screening platforms at Value Line and various web
sites. He is presently Director of Research at Portfolio123 and Editor of Forbes
Low-Priced Stock Report. His commentary can be found on SeekingAlpha.com
and Forbes.com. He has authored three books, Screening the Market (Wiley,
2002), The Value Connection (Wiley 2003), Atlas Upgrades: Objectivism 2.0
(Create Space, 2013) and is presently working on a novel with a Wall Street
setting, and a book with Stanford’s Dr. Chalres Lee based on the latter’s
course in “Alphanomics.”

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 Seminar Topics
• What Your Guru Taught You
• Cheating on Your Guru
– What’s happening here?
• Building a New Framework
• Guerilla Approaches to Company Analysis
• Guerilla Approaches to Stock Hunting (Screening)

NOTE: Basics of stock screening covered in previous appearance before DC Metro AAII;
slides available at:
http://www.aaiidcmetro.com/slides/Finding Investment Ideas(6-14-08).pdf

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What Your Guru Taught You

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Dividend Discount Model (DDM)
• Stock price is equal to present value of all
future dividends
• P = D / (k – g)
– Where
• P = Stock Price
• D = Dividend
• k = required rate of return
• g = expected dividend growth rate

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 Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
• Stock price is equal to present value of all cash
flows

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 Economic Moats
• “In business, I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable moats. . . . A
truly great business must have an enduring ‘moat’ that protects excellent returns
on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will
repeatedly assault any business ‘castle’ that is earning high returns.” (Warren
Buffett)

• Morningstar
– Huge Market Share
– Low-cost Producer
– Patents, Copyrights, etc.
– Unique Corporate Culture
– High Switching Costs
– The Network Effect

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 A Good-Ideas Stock Screen
• Universe: exclude OTC stocks
• PE below 12
• Long-term Debt to Capital less than 20%
• Trailing 12 month Return on Investment above
25%

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 A ten-year Portfolio123 backtest
• 8/1/2003 – 8/1/2013
• 4-week rebalancing
• 0.25% slippage

• Decent performance, but . . .

• About 100 passing stocks – too many

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 Refinement
• Choose best 15 stocks based on lowest PEG ratios

• Yikes! Knock, knock. No answer. My guru isn’t home. %&^@#

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Cheating on Your Guru

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 Good Ideas screen: an anti-guru refinement
• Choose 15 stocks based on Highest PEGs; yes “highest” (no typo)

• I think I’m starting to figure out why my guru ran off

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 Another anti-guru refinement
• Choose top 15 stock as per a Momentum-based ranking system

• It’s got some potentially uncomfortable choppiness, but is still way better than what my
guru suggested could be achieved using such nonsense as momentum

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 Let’s try a Growth-based ranking system
• Again, top 15 stocks . . .

• Meh . . . We’ve seen better

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 Stay with Growth, but first, eliminate stocks ranked 90 or better
• Best 15 stocks

• I think I’m getting a headache.

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What’s Happening Here?

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 Theory: Limited

Nonsense: Unlimited

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 The role of theory
• Theory teaches us basic principles we can use
to look for good ideas
– It helps us identify and work with relationships
between stock price and some measure(s) of
company fundamentals
• But we cannot expect theory to provide
specific formulas into which we can simply
plug numbers
– How nice it would be if investing were that easy!
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 The role of nonsense
• Multitudinous and varied

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 Moats – the world’s worst metaphor
• Q: How many of these castles actually survived as political
power centers?

• A: None!
– While Kings and nobles sat around contented and complacent,
changes in technologies and tactics strengthened enemies

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 Moats don’t protect anyone
• Morningstar wide-moat examples
– Coca Cola and Pepsi
– Procter & Gamble
– McDonalds
– Microsoft
– Railroads
• Are any of these companies truly secure in their
economic castles?
• And by the way, it can actually help a company when
management comes to grips with the absence of a
moat and truly competes
– See, e.g. McDonald’s

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 The Truth About Buffett’s Returns
• Start with preference toward high-quality safe cheap stocks
– These tend to be inherently good due to a phenomenon known as
“betting against beta” (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lpederse/papers/BettingAgainstBeta.pdf)
• Many market participants can’t use leverage and can boost returns only by pursuing
higher-risk assets
• This demand increases prices of and for depresses returns on high-beta stocks
• Conversely, returns on low-beta stocks rise relative to those of high beta stocks
• Add in a leverage factor of 1.6 combined with unusually low
financing costs (due to BRK’s overall credit rating and use of
insurance float) and complete comfort in the availability of funds
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~af227/pdf/Buffett%27s%20Alpha%20-%20Frazzini,%20Kabiller%20and%20Pedersen.pdf)

– Below-average financing costs are an obvious advantage

– Also, because Buffett need not worry about margin calls, he can choose to
hold on through bear markets; most who leverage up that far do not enjoy
that luxury
• Buffett deserves credit for figuring out what to do, but understand
it’s not about moats, etc.
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 Good (guru-good) Idea = Crowded Trade

• This is the age of information and investor education

• Too many investors have the same set of good ideas
• Many such ideas that worked a decade or so ago no
longer work

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 Data: A Science but also more Art than many realize

• This impacted use of the growth-based ranking system to sort the “Good
Ideas” screen
– It’s very likely that companies at the top of growth-based sorts are benefitting from
unusually high percent changes that are clearly not sustainable
• Non-recurring items
– These are typically included in EPS and can paly havoc with ratios and comparisons
computed inside of screeners and in data you see on web sites
• BEWARE of Operating Profit, EBIT or EBITDA and any ratio based on these
– Companies report these items above the operating line
– Database firms should adjust for this but not all of them do it
• Be sensitive to the letter of the law vs. the spirit of the law
– EPS Latest Yr > 0
• Watch for companies with losses in all quarters except for one that was boosted by a non-
recurring gain

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 The Advice Crisis
• In the 1990s and early-2000s,we were worried about ethics
• Now, the main problem is competence
– A purchase at Barnes & Noble does not turn one into an expert
– Writers, etc. used to be held to journalistic standards and were required to
have credible sources
• Today, many writers serve as their own sources
– Many today who speak via the net, blogs, CNBC, etc. are unqualified to be
doing so
• Recent Examples
– “Apple is undervalued”: No it wasn’t, it’s P/S was sky high indicating
expectations of growth, P/E was low indicating expectations of margin
pressure
– “Amazon can’t make money”: Yes it can; there’s a huge difference between a
company that can’t get a profit vs. one that chooses to bypass black ink for
investments of the sort that must be expensed
– “Rite Aid will go bankrupt because there’s no way it can pay off its debt”: The
debt isn’t expected to be repaid; it’s permanent capital that’s expected to be
refinanced and whether or not that happens depends on positive cash flow,
which the company has

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Building a New Framework

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 Beat the Gun
• Traditional notion
– Investors buy stocks they believe will deliver good returns
• John Maynard Keynes
– [T]he professional investor is forced to concern himself
with the anticipation of impending changes, in the news or
in the atmosphere, of the kind by which experience shows
that the mass psychology of the market is most influenced
. . . . The social object of skilled investment should be to
defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which
envelop our future. The actual, private object of the most
skilled investment to-day is “to beat the gun”, as the
Americans so well express it, to outwit the crowd, and to
pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other
fellow.
• John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money (Signalman Publishing, 2010 Kindle Ed.) p. 101

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 Implications of Beat-The-Gun
• We recognize that some will trade on the basis
of reasons that aren’t “right” and . . .
• That many who do so are knowledgeable
investors who really know what’s right and
what isn’t, and . . .
• That what they’re doing is perfectly rational
– It’s perfectly rational to pay $50 for a stock you
know is worth $40 if you expect it to go to $60

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 Fisher Black
• He not only acknowledges the existence of such
“noise” trading but goes further to state that it’s
essential to the functioning of the market
– If all traders did only what’s “right,” no trading could ever
take place since one party would have to be willing to
make a mistake. But . . .
– “Noise trading provides the essential missing ingredient . .
. . With a lot of noise traders in the market, it now pays for
those with information to trade. It even pays for people to
seek out costly information which they will then trade on.”
• Fisher Black, Noise Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the America
Finance Association, New York, New York, December 20-30, 1985, Journal of Finance, Vol. 41, Issue 3
(July 1986), p. 529-543 at 531 )

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 Implications of Black
• Noise trading is not only understandable, but
the market can’t function without it

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 The Next Step: Robert Shiller
• The market consists of two types of traders
– Smart-money investors
• Make decisions based on information relevant to valuation
subject only to wealth constraints
– Ordinary Investors
• Everyone else; i.e., those who do “not respond to expected
returns as optimally forecasted”
– They often over-react to news and follow fads since they “have
no model or at best a very incomplete model of the behavior of
stock prices . . . .”

– Robert J. Shiller, Stock Prices and Social Dynamics Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Vol. 2 (1984) p. 477

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 A new theory courtesy of Shiller
• Note: This is a bona fide theory. We’re only
seeing how concepts interact. We’re not
supposed to try to plug in any numbers.
• Pt = Qt + Yt
– Where
• Pt = Demand for all shares in the market at time t
• Qt = Demand for shares by Smart Money at time t
• Yt = Demand for shares by Ordinary Investors at time t

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To refine it, we’ll add two kinds of discount rates

• ρ (rho) = the expected real return

• φ (phi) = the risk premium that compensates
for “arbitrage costs,” which are influenced by
– Trading costs (brokerage costs, slippage, etc.)
– Holding costs (the cost of maintaining a position)
– Information costs (the cost of getting the
information needed to acquire and monitor a
position)
• This is the main item!

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 The Refined Theory
• Pt = Σ (Et (Dt+k) + φEt(Yt+k)) / (1 + ρ + φ)
• Gag, gag, retch . . .
• RELAX: This is just a theoretical framework. We’re
not going to try to plug in any numbers.
• Generally, this can be translated to English as
stock prices are equal to the present value of
– all expected future dividends (we’ve seen this
before!), plus
– The sum of all future ordinary-trader demand
multiplied by arbitrage costs (this is new)

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 A change in Nomenclature
• Smart Money Trading = Value Trading
– Value Trading need not be strictly DDM
– It can be based on other fundamentals that influence
the factors that go into DDM and can include
commonly used valuation ratios
• Ordinary Investor Trading = Noise Trading
• So now, stocks price = value + noise
– Or, P = V + N

– Courtesy of Prof. Charles Lee, Stanford

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 The Role of Arbitrage Costs
• As they climb higher and higher, noise trading
becomes more prominent and the role of value
diminishes
– i.e., as information becomes harder and more
expensive to get, the role of value diminishes;
something we see in some global markets and in some
segments of the domestic market
• As they approach zero, noise trading diminishes
and value becomes more prominent
– i.e., as it becomes more feasible to value stocks, value
traders become more prominent and noise trading
diminishes

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 Value as a % or Market Cap
• Quantified using a technique to be explained in a few moments – sector
medians

• Value is important, but it doesn’t stand alone

• Value tends to be more stable
– Many near- and intermediate-term stock price are likely to be noise driven
• Can you see a link between value % and ability to calculate value?

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 What it Means
• Unless we expect arbitrage costs to be zero
(which is not the case), we cannot expect stock
prices to strictly be equal to value
• Noise is a normal part of the market’s equilibrium
condition
– It cannot be dismissed as an unfortunate circumstance
– We cannot sit back and sneer or hope it will be
conquered by investor education
– We CAN factor it into our approaches to stock finding
and analysis

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Quantifying the Impacts of Noise and Value

• Deconstruct a stock’s market cap (MC) into

two components
– Value based strictly on present business operation
(VPO)
– Value based on future growth prospects
– (FGV)
• Therefore . . .
– MC = VPO + FGV

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 VPO is easy to calculate
• VPO = NOPAT / CC
– Where
• NOPAT = Net Operating Profit After Tax
• CC = Cost of Capital
• NOPAT = Operating profit * (1 – tax rate)
– We see many abnormal tax rates in the real world
• You can simply eliminate such stocks, or just assume all tax rates
are normal; i.e. NOPAT = Oper Prof * .65
• CC can be incredibly difficult to calculate
– For our purposes, it’s OK to just pick a simple assumption,
like 0.10
• Therefore, VPO = (OpProf *.65) / .10

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After getting VPO, FGV falls into place
• FGV = Market Cap – VPO, or
• FGV = Market Cap – ((OperProf *.65) / .1)

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 Let’s jump to Value and Noise
• V% = VPO / MktCap
• N% = FGV / MktCap
– Where
• V% is the percent of a stock’s market cap attributable to
Value
• N% is the percent of a stock’s market cap attributable
to Noise

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 We Cheated A Bit
• We assumed that FGV = Noise
• In truth, FGV = RG + NG + PN
– Where
• RG = realistic growth expectations
• NG = noise-based growth expectations
• PN = pure noise
• To go forward, we’ll have to assume that RG is always zero
– We’ll live with that
– Unlike with DDM, DCF, etc. etc. etc., we’re not going to pretend
to be more precise than we can actually be
– Our estimate of Noise is likely to be a bit overstated, but as long
as we understand that and refrain from getting carried away
with specifics, we can live with this, and even use it for
screening and analysis

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Some Well Known Stocks

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 A Simple Noise-Value Screen
• Use Russell 2000 as universe (smaller caps
likely to be noisier on average)
• Eliminate Companies for which I don’t have
data to compute NOPAT
• N% < 25 (stocks tending to be more value and
less noise)

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 A 10-Year Backtest

• Z-z-z-z-z
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 Let’s look at the other extreme
• N% > .75 (the noisier group)

• This isn’t the silver bullet, but it looks like we may have an idea worth
pursuing; performance is a bit worse than for the low-noise group
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 Voila!
• Go back to low noise (N%<25) and select the top 15 stocks based on
magnitude of 1-week estimate revision

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 What We Did Here
• We started with a universe of potentially
higher-noise stocks
• We focused on those with the least amount of
noise (N%<25)
• We then picked 15 stocks where the level of
bullish noise, although low at present, seemed
likely to increase going forward

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 What You Can Do
• Be sensitive to the distinction between value and noise
• Get comfortable quantifying the distinction
• Recognize that the relative contributions of noise and value
can fluctuate
• Think about how you can identify situations where bullish
noise is likely to increase
– Estimate revision
– Earnings Surprise
– Analyst upgrades
– Declining short interest
– Noteworthy insider buying
– Momentum / Technical analysis
– Rising Valuation metrics (remember our High PEG sort!)

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Guerilla Approaches to Company Analysis

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 Our Goal
• Apply sensible analytic approaches, but try to
be a little out of the box relative to what most
others do
• What’s wrong with conventional wisdom?
– Too limiting
• They downplay the impact of noise
– Too judgmental
– Too many others are doing it

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 Wait a minute!
• Hey Gerstein, you’re a screening guy. Why are you
covering analysis before screening? That’s not what
you did here in the past or in your books!
– I assume people in this audience who want to screen know
how to use whatever platform they’re using or are willing
to study up, and seek help if necessary if they are still
learning
– Once you know where to click, etc., the real challenge is
coming up with ideas
– As per what we’ve covered up till now, I’m most interested
in showing you how to think about stocks in ways that will
help you uncover new ideas
– In this regard, once you’ve heard the analytic pep talk, the
rest should fall right into place

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 Guerilla Analysis Topics
• Respect Mr. Market
• Think like a business person
• Forget great – good enough can be fantastic
– The difference between a great company, a great
stock and a great investment idea
• Be aware of data oddities
• Study up on earnings quality
• Learn to love the SEC and Investor Relations web
sites
• Engage in ad hominem analysis

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 Respect Mr. Market
• But Ben Graham and Warren Buffett said . . .
– I know, I know. I don’t care.
• This is the information age
– Everyone – EVERYONE! – has access to vital facts
• General web sites such as Yahoo! Finance
• SEC web site (low, low cost of – zero!)
• FRED (Federal Reserve – low, low cost of zero!)
– So assume, unless or until proven otherwise, that Mr.
Market knows exactly what’s going on
• Obviously, in real life, we do have some investors who choose to
remain ignorant, but in today’s primarily institutional market, you
can act as if everybody knows
• And now, you understand the substantive and vital role
of noise!

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 This doesn’t mean Mr. Market is always right

• The facts are clear and apparent to all

• Interpretations and priorities can vary
• The key: If you find yourself thinking Mr. Market
doesn’t get it, stop right there.
• Mr. Market gets it at least in terms of what’s going on
• If you want to disagree, you have to
– Understand why Mr. Market thinks as he does, and
– Articulate the points on which you disagree

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 Example – Amazon.com
• How dumb can Mr. Market be: Doesn’t he see
how AMZN’s margins have contracted?
• Yes, he knows exactly where AMZN’s margins are.
And he has made a judgment to the effect that
this is due to deliberate choices made by the
company, rather than an inescapable
characteristic of the business
– If you want to worry about AMZN’s margins, you need
to address the issue of what they can be once AMZN
chooses to again go full out – and you need to also
address turnover/volume (low margins are fine if
turnover is high)

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 Think like a business person
• No, this doesn’t mean you have to hold forever, even when your
lying in a hospice hoping to raise money for your funeral (“Think
long term, these aren’t just pieces of paper”) .
• It does mean you should be aware of things that happen to real-
world businesses and how they typically don’t match spreadsheet
models
– No matter what management does or doesn’t do, there are good
times and bad times
– If you love growth, you also have to love spending
– Don’t wait for LT debt to get repaid; it’ll never happen; it’s permanent
capital that gets refinanced
– Deploying cash sounds great – but only if you’re truly confident about
making payroll, something investment analysts and gurus need not
worry about but a matter that continually obsesses micro-cap CFOs
– Smaller companies are often less profitable because they find it harder
to cover fixed costs

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 Forget Great – Good Enough is Often Fantastic
• Screening and instant data spoiled us. Now, we all act like Michelin
Review restaurant critics
• Very few, if any, companies are truly magnificent across the board
and if you actually find any, chances are the stocks may be
overpriced (Amazon?) or the company may prove unable to sustain
it (Apple?)
• Companies with visible warts (Microsoft?) may, ultimately, turn out
far better than companies with invisible warts
• Everyone is likely looking at the right things, but many may be too
demanding
– In this economy, tolerable consistent mid- to high-single digit growth
rates can be quite good
• We love good or great fundamentals, but don’t underestimate the
power of bad fundamentals and a catalyst for improvement
– This is what I live on in picking stocks for the Forbes Low Priced Stock
Report

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 Be aware of Data Oddities
• Database vendor methodologies
– Example: How do they handle unusual costs/income
items?
• Abrupt breaks in a trend – look for reasons
• Extremes – usually they signal oddities
– Learn to sneer at computer-generated “research” reports
and commentary that say things like “XYZ’s earnings
deteriorated in the last quarter, having declined 3,784%
versus a 4.8% gain tallied by industry peers.”
• This sort of thing signals that the developers didn’t know or care
about what they were doing.
• Believe it or not, I actually saw within the past few weeks a
premium research service that had reports applying DCF and
projecting negative stock prices!

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 Study Up on Earnings Quality
• Buy this book!
– And it’s not even one of mine, so you have to know I really love it.
• What’s Behind the Numbers by John Del Veccio and Tom
Jacobs

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 Learn to Love the SEC and Investor
Relations web sites
• SEC: http://www.sec.gov/search/search.htm
– It’s ugly, but you can’t live without it
– The Business Descriptions and Financial discussions in 10-
Ks and 10-Qs are the premier sources of information
• and they are usually more readable than many realize
• Investor Relations web sites (in this day and age, not
having one can in and of itself be grounds for your
choosing to refrain from buying a company stock)
– Look especially for sections called Events & Presentations
• Not all have them, but when they are available, they generally
consist of what analysts used to get pre-Reg. FD at management
interviews, and now, they’re vetted by the lawyers

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 The SEC and Investor Relations sites are
especially great at helping to decipher the past
• Sadly, most internet finance sites were developed under the
assumption that all users were day traders who sit all day staring at
their screens and only care about the latest news items
• The internet is horrifyingly bad at helping you uncover past
developments that had strong and visibly obvious impacts on past
(even relatively recent past) financial and/or stock price trends
• Yet such information is vital – product lines, business managers,
strategies, etc. have histories
– They didn’t spring, fully formed, from the head of Zeus as did
Aphrodite
• But you can track this information down on SEC sites (sometimes,
investor relations, too, but for the hard stuff, the SEC is better)

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Become Proficient at Ad Hominem Analysis
• Before reading or listening to any advice or guidance, look
into the credentials of the speaker
– AAII helps you in this regard with speaker profiles
– SeekingAlpha.com gives useful author profiles
• I always check these before starting to read an article and am quick to
leave the page without reading if I don’t like what I see
– As I did, for instance, with an author who stated he was a stand-up comedian
who invests as a hobby
– I also tend to skip authors who look barely into puberty and wax poetic about
how they follow the principles of Ben Graham and Warren Buffett
• Those proficient in on-line community disparage ad
hominem “attacks”
– This isn’t Entertainment Tonight or ESPN.com. It’s YOUR money.
Regardless of what such moderators say, qualifications matter
and you have an obligation to protect yourself against
incompetent commentary, which is flourishing given the
democratization of information
• Especially since regulators don’t care; they’re still fighting the decade-
old war against ethical lapses
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 Guerilla Approaches to
Stock Hunting (Screening)

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 Respect Value
• Guerilla? What the heck. Everybody knows
about value
• Yes, everybody knows about value, but it’s
easy for many to forget how important it can
be
• Let’s really convince ourselves

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 The role of value – another look
• Value as % of market cap over time

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 Basic Screen
• Criteria
– Universe = Russell 3000
– Five-year rate of annual EPS growth in upper half compared to
industry peers
– Five-year average Return on Equity in upper half compared to industry
peers
– Five-year Debt to Capital ratio in lower half compared to industry
peers
• Nice 10-year backtest

• But we can’t stop; screen typically produces 500-550 stocks

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 Narrow to 15-stocks
• Use a Portfolio123 pre-defined style-based multi-
factor ranking system and pick the best 15 from
among the 500-550 that pass the screen

• Value isn’t the only game, but you really handicap

yourself if you ignore it

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 Value Metrics: The Big Three
• Price to Earnings
– Be careful about historic EPS
– Be careful about unusuals included in EPS
– Try to use a consensus EPS estimate
• Price to Book
– More useful than many practitioners realize
– Has a lot of academic research support
• Enterprise Value to Sales
– Because Sales cover the entire company, the part
capitalized by debt as well as by equity, it makes sense to
use EV, which reflects the entire enterprise
– That said, it’s OK to use Price/Sales if it’s more convenient

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 Screen for Good Enough
• Goal
– Create a screen that aims at stocks priced below $10
• Many investors have noted the generally strong performance of
smaller stocks
• So, too, have academicians
• Small is right up there with Value as an important factor
• The Challenge
– Many companies in this end of the market (sub-micro) do
not have the sort of fundamentals that would allow them
to pass a conventional screen
• It’s hard to cover fixed costs when very small so net losses are
typical
• Yet there is still fundamental merit
– Narrowing losses
– Good balance sheets
– Bad ROEs that are getting better
– Etc.
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 Rule #1: Mr. Market
• I want stocks for which Mr. Market is pointing thumbs
up
– Work with Simple Moving Average (SMA) over last 50 days
relative to SMA for last 200 days
• Seek stocks that rank in top half in terms of
SMA(50)/SMA(200) relative to
– Industry, or
– Sector
• Note:
– Top half is not that stringent a requirement
• I’m looking for respectability, not excellence
– Relative to industry OR sector . . . as opposed to AND
• Again, the quest is for respectability, not excellence

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 Rule #2: Growth track record
• Use pre-defined Portfolio123 rankling system
– Consider Sales and EPS growth over Q, TTM and 5 Yrs
as well as acceleration
– The variety of factors gives companies several
different ways to shine; it doesn’t impose a single
requirement
• Rank (Growth) >= 50
– Again, 50 is not an ambitious threshold, but
• It suggests respectability, and
• It doesn’t emphasize fastest growers for which trends are
most likely to be impacted by unusuals or least likely to be
sustainable

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 Rule #3: Avoid Dumpster Fires
• Company must pass one – just one – of the following:
– Trailing 12 Month (TTM) EPS > 0
– A triple header:
• TTM EPS > prior 12 month EPS, and
• Sales % Change TTM >0, and
• TTM FCF >0
– Rank (Quality) >= 50
• Rank considers Op Mar (TTM and 5 Yr), Asset Turnover, ROI and
ROE (TTm and 5 Yr) and Finances (Tot Dbt 2 Cap, Int Cov, Curr
Ratio)
• NOTE: Lots of different ways a company can pass.
Again, excellence is not the goal. We’re looking to
avoid disasters

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Small Group in General

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Respectable Stocks within Small Group

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 Create an Investable Portfolio
• Narrow to best 15 stocks as per Portfolio123 Value Ranking system

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 We Engaged in Stealth Value
• Interestingly, this “good enough” model
incorporated a lot of value behind the scenes
– Excellence in the stock market is expensive
– Good enough (or mediocrity for cynics) is a lot
cheaper

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 Earnings Quality
• Look at the metrics in the book I
recommended (What’s Behind the Numbers
by Del Vecchio and Jacobs)
• It’s a big topic and would really warrant a
seminar all on its own
• But here’s a sample
• Major item: Accruals
– Simple Definition
• Net Income minus Cash from Operations

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 Accruals model
• Start with Russell 3000 as universe
• Eliminate firms for which TTM Net Income or
TTM Cash from Operations is negative
– First, focus on stocks for which accruals, as % of
net income, are greater than 50

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 Backtest: Accruals > 50% Net Income

• Z-z-z-z-z
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 Now, limit Accruals to 10% of Net Income

• Interesting . . .
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 This isn’t a full-fledged investable model

• We only went from 2,150 stocks (Russell 3000

constituents with positive Net Income and
Cash from operations) to 1,960 stocks
• But by eliminating the worst rather than
zeroing in on the best, we gave ourselves a
much more appealing universe against which
we can build other screens
• This is a good example of what earnings
quality can do for you – eliminate the worst

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 Other General Considerations
• Try to work with %N and %V and look for
evidence that %N is increasing in a bullish way
• Be sensible about quality; it’s valid but it can
be expensive
• Be especially attuned to extremes in Growth –
moderation is likely to win the day

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 Be Careful About the Gurus
• Their ideas are generally terrific
– That’s the problem
– Everyone is chasing after those same ideas
– That gets expensive in the stock market
• Try to come in underneath their ideas
– Areas that the guru-obsessed crowd is ignoring
• Odd isn’t it: Gurus used to be the antidote to the herd
mentality – now they inspire the herd
– What a difference the information age makes!

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Thank You!

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