LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES VS.
CORAZON AQUINO
(G.R. NO. 73748, MAY 22, 1986)
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 5 of the same year, Proclamation No. 3 was issued providing the basis
of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the “new government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Aquino administration is legitimate.
RULING:
YES. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judges. The court further
held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control
of the entire country. Furthermore, the government of Aquino is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government. Lastly, the community of nations
have recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
RAMON L. LABO, JR. VS. COMELEC, JR.
(G.R. NO. 105111 JULY 3, 1992)
PONENTE: Bidin, J.,
FACTS:
For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr
filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992
elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the same
office on March 25, 1992.
Petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the
COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen. Respondent Comelec
issued the assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.
Respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the
Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying
respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5)
days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate
for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case
in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.
Respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of
Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.
Then petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among
others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992
resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino
citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event
he wins in the contested elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the
fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already become final and executory.
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining
order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s
certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega
further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy —
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory
unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of
procedure, to wit:
Sec. 3. Decisions final after five days. — Decisions in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates
of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a
candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is
qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
2. Whether or not the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the
candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be
proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
RULING:
1. Whether or not petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is
qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
NO. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the
May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate
of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May
14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same
day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order
was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground
that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992
constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks
the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was
elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the
fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law:
"An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."
2. Whether or not the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the
candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be
proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
NO. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle
petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to
proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for
the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for
the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of
Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent
Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.
He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to
deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter the
people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed
by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus
Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION
(G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000)
PONENTE: MELO, J.,
FACTS:
On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of
Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America.
The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of the said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes
correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of
a. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2
counts),
b. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts),
c. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),
d. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and
e. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999 requested
copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional
Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
a. for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the
extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
b. certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition
request and from filing an extradition petition in court;
c. and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from
performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States),
with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of
the, extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right
to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process
RULING:
NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party,
the doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
a situation where there is a conflict between a rule of the international law and the
constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to
give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over the municipal law in the
municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present
danger of loss of property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead
to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable
action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is
easily comprehensible.
It was ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements. The constitutional issue in the
case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent’s
due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by
constitutional guarantees. The court would not be true to the organic law of the land if
we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised.
Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to
file his comment with supporting evidence.
