G.R. No.

181492             December 16, 2008

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 

vs.
SAMUEL OBMIRANIS y ORETA, appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is an appeal filed by Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta (appellant) who was charged with
violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.1 He was
allegedly caught in a buy-bust operation by elements of the Manila Western Police District
(MWPD) while offering to sell methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug locally
known as shabu. The criminal information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 22 accused him as follows:

That on or about May 18, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly attempt to sell
or offer for sale one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing TWO POINT EIGHT
ZERO ZERO (2.800) grams of white crystalline substance known as "SHABU"
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.3

At the pre-trial, both the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the qualification of
Forensic Chemist Elisa Reyes and, thus, both parties dispensed with her testimony. The
prosecution further admitted that the forensic chemist who analyzed the seized the
confiscated substance-which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride content-
did not have personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug.4

Appellant was brought to trial after having entered a negative plea.5 The prosecution then
proceeded to prove the charge against him through the lone testimony of police officer Jerry
Velasco (Velasco). Velasco was the alleged leader of the raiding team that apprehended
appellant on 18 May 2004 at the corner of G.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets in Sampaloc,
Manila.6

The narrative woven by Velasco established the following facts: On 17 May 2004, Police
Superintendent Marcelino Pedrozo (Pedrozo) of the MWPD organized a buy-bust team on
the information of a confidential informant that the latter was able to place an order for half a
"bulto" of shabu with appellant. Velasco was designated as the team leader and the poseur-
buyer, with Police Officers Wilfredo Cinco, Edgardo Palabay, Roberto Benitez and
one7confidential informant as members.8 Pedrozo gave the team a marked 500-peso bill to
be used as buy-bust money which was placed on top of a deck of boodle money. The team
informed the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) of the impending
operation,9 entered the same in the blotter10 and proceeded to Bambang in G.Tuazon Street
just before 12 a.m. of 18 May 2004-the appointed time and date that the confidential
informant and appellant had agreed to meet. The informant joined Velasco in his car, and
they awaited the arrival of appellant at the corner of G.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets.11 At
around 12:30 a.m., appellant on board a car arrived at the scene and seeing the informant
he approached the latter. The informant introduced Velasco to appellant and said that
Velasco would like to buy one-half "bulto" of shabu. Velasco negotiated with appellant to
lower the price but the latter refused. Velasco then insisted that he must first see the
merchandise. Appellant went back to his car, took the item and brought it to Velasco.
Velasco readily recognized the item as a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. When appellant asked for payment, he seemed to have recognized Velasco's co-
officer because he uttered the words, "May pulis yata." At that point, he was arrested just as
he was trying to get back to his car.12

According to Velasco, he was the one who effected the arrest but it was Cinco who seized
the plastic sachet from appellant. He further stated that immediately after the arrest, he and
his team brought the seized item to the police headquarters and there, in his presence,
Cinco marked the same with the initials "SOO." At the trial, he identified the plastic sachet as
that seized from appellant as well as the marking made by Cinco on it. Furthermore, he
admitted on cross-examination that there was no evidence custodian designated and that he
could not remember if the seized item had been inventoried and photographed in the
presence of the accused; that Cinco put the item in his pocket after the same was recovered
and did not mark it on the spot and that the markings made on the buy-bust money had not
been entered in the blotter.13

The chemistry report issued at the instance of Pedrozo and signed by Forensic Chemical
Officer Maritess Mariano of the PNP Crime Laboratory revealed that the specimen
supposedly seized from appellant yielded positive of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
content.14

Taking the stand, appellant boldly asserted that he was merely framed up by the buy-bust
team, and strongly denied having transacted the alleged sale of shabu with Velasco and the
confidential informant. He claimed that he was taken by Velasco and his team not on 18 May
2004 but rather on 17 May 2004 at 7:00 p.m. along Santa Teresita Street, Sampaloc,
Manila;15 that he was there to see his girlfriend who was residing in that area; that when he
was arrested by two men in civilian clothes, he was not committing any crime; that he asked
them why they were arresting him but neither of them gave an answer and instead one of
them grabbed him by his shoulder and ushered him inside a police car; that once inside the
car, one of the men pulled out a gun with which he hit his neck, kicked him and uttered,
"Makulit ka ha, yuko!"; that he asked them why they were doing that to him when in fact he
merely told them to park their car properly on the street; that they cuffed his hands at the
back and the driver, Velasco, asked if he could give them P200,000.00; that he answered he
did not have that much money; that they drove the car around and told him that if he could
not give them the money then he must just find for them someone who sells drugs in large-
scale ("Magturo ka ng nagbebenta ng droga, iyong malakihan ha!"); that because he said he
did not know anyone who was into selling drugs, he was taken to the U.N. Avenue police
headquarters; that he was not detained at the headquarters but rather, he was brought to the
second floor where the two arresting officers demanded P50,000.00 from him; that the
demand was then reduced to P30,000.00 in exchange for the mitigation of his case. 16 Olivia
Ismael, another defense witness who introduced herself as a friend of appellant's girlfriend
and who admitted having witnessed appellant's arrest, corroborated the material points of
appellant's testimony.17

In its 23 February 2006 Decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay
a P500,000.00 fine without subsidiary imprisonment as well as the costs.18

Appellant interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals in which he reiterated that the
prosecution was unable to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in view of the failure
to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drugs and that it was likewise unable to
establish the consummation of the alleged sale of drugs. 19 For its part, the People, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), posited that the fact that all the essential elements
of a consummated sale of dangerous drug had not been completely shown was immaterial
because the charge involved a mere attempt or offer to sell which had been duly established
by the prosecution.20 It also maintained that the chain of custody of the seized shabu had
been duly established because the requirements in taking custody of seized narcotics
provided for in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002 21 admit of liberal
interpretation.22

In its 4 September 2007 Decision, 23 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's
decision. Appellant's Notice of Appeal24 was approved, and the records of the case were
elevated to this Court. This Court's 24 March 2008 Resolution25 allowed the parties to file
their supplemental briefs, but only appellant complied; the OSG manifested instead that
there was no need for its part to file a supplemental brief as the merits of the case had
already been extensively discussed in its brief before the appellate court.26

The appeal has to be granted.

In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting
the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a
finding of guilt. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes
the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.27 It is therefore of prime importance that in these cases,
the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. 28 In
other words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug
presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in
the first place. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.29

Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002 defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources
of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction." As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. 30 It would
thus include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to
the time it is offered in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the same
would admit how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 31 It is from the
testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can
be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the
accused.

The prosecution evidence in the case at bar, however, does not suffice to afford such
assurance. Of all the people who came into direct contact with the sachet
of shabu purportedly seized from appellant, only Velasco was able to observe the
uniqueness thereof in court. Cinco, who, according to Velasco, took initial custody of the
plastic sachet at the time of arrest and who allegedly marked the same with the initials
"SOO" at the police station, was not even presented in court to directly observe the
uniqueness of the specimen and, more importantly, to acknowledge the marking as his own.
The same is true with respect to the laboratory personnel who could have but nevertheless
failed to testify on the circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory
for analysis and testing, as well as on the conduct of the examination which was
administered on the specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and
custody. Aside from that, it was not reasonably explained why these same witnesses were
not able to testify in court. While indeed the prosecution and the defense had stipulated on
the qualification of the forensic chemist, dispensed with his testimony and admitted that said
forensic chemist had no personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug submitted for
examination, nevertheless, these stipulations and admission pertain only to a certain Elisa G.
Reyes and not to Forensic Chemical Officer Maritess Mariano who, based on the chemistry
report, was the one who examined the contents of the plastic sachet at the crime laboratory.

In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant, it can be reasonably
concluded that the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug
and in effect failed to obliterate the hypothesis of appellant's guiltlessness.

Be that as it may, although testimony about a perfect chain does not always have to be the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody
indeed becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is a narcotic
substance. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances such asshabu is that they are not
distinctive and are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature.32 And because they cannot be readily and properly
distinguished visually from other substances of the same physical and/or chemical nature,
they are susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, 33 substitution and exchange-
34
 whether the alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and exchange be inadvertent
or otherwise not.35 It is by reason of this distinctive quality that the condition of the exhibit at
the time of testing and trial is critical.36 Hence, in authenticating narcotic specimens, a
standard more stringent than that applied to objects which are readily identifiable must be
applied-a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged
with another or contaminated or tampered with.37

The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution,
alteration or contamination-whether intentional or unintentional-of narcotic substances at any
of the links in the chain of custody thereof especially because practically such possibility is
great where the item of real evidence is small and is similar in form to other substances to
which people are familiar in their daily lives.38 Graham v. State39 in fact acknowledged this
danger. In that case, a substance later shown to be heroin was excluded from the
prosecution evidence because prior to examination, it was handled by two police officers
who, however, did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the
time it was in their possession. The court in that case pointed out that the white powder
seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It thus
declared that the state must be able to show by records or testimony the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition.40

Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity
of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders.
Section 2141 of R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs to, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The
same requirements are also found in Section 242 of its implementing rules43 as well as in
Section 244 of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002.45

These guidelines, however, were not shown to have been complied with by the members of
the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable
efforts to comply with the statutory requirements in handling the evidence. Velasco, the
leader of the raiding team, himself admitted that as soon as appellant was arrested, Cinco
had taken custody of the plastic sachet of shabu, placed it in his pocket and brought the
same together with appellant to the police station. It was at the police station-and not at the
place where the item was seized from appellant-where according to him (Velasco), Cinco
had placed the initials "SOO" on the specimen. Velasco never even mentioned that the
identifying mark on the specimen was placed in appellant's presence; he could not even
remember whether or not the specimen had been properly inventoried and photographed at
least in appellant's presence. Even more telling is the fact that, as elicited from Velasco
himself during his cross-examination, no evidence custodian had been designated by the
raiding team to safeguard the identity and integrity of the evidence supposedly seized from
appellant.46

All these aforementioned flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous
drug allegedly recovered from appellant, taken together with the failure of the key persons
who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in
evidence in court, militates against the prosecution's cause because it not only casts doubt
on the identity of the corpus delicti but also tends to discredit, if not totally negate, the claim
of regularity in the conduct of official police operation.

What we can fairly assume is that the Court of Appeals had overlooked the significance of
these glaring details in the records of the case as it placed blind reliance right away on the
credibility of Velasco's testimony and on the presumption of regularity and thereby it failed to
properly account for the missing substantial links in the chain of custody of the evidence. In
the same vein the liberality, suggested by the OSG relative to post-seizure custody of
narcotics under paragraph 1 Section 2 of Board Regulation No. 1, can hardly be given merit
precisely because the proviso in that section of the regulation requires that the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the evidence be properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team in order that non-compliance with the post-seizure custody requirements be
excused on justifiable grounds.47

It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance
of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in
other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law
enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the
law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse
presumption arises as a matter of course.48 There is indeed merit in the contention that
where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members of the
buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed
their duty, but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the conduct of police
duty was irregular. People v. Dulay49 and People v. Ganenas50 in fact both suggest that the
presumption of regularity is disputed where there is deviation from the regular performance
of duty. Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police
duty is merely just that-a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.51

It must be emphasized at this juncture that what can reasonably be presumed based on the
records of this case is that Velasco is aware of his duties and responsibilities as an agent of
the government in its anti-narcotics campaign. A member of the anti-narcotics division of the
police since 1997,52 Velasco can be reasonably presumed to be adept in and mindful of the
proper procedure in apprehending drug offenders, securing and taking custody of the
evidence obtained in police operations such as this one and preserving the integrity of the
evidence by protecting the chain of custody thereof.53 However, for reasons as obvious as
intimated above, even this presumption is unworthy of credit.

All told, in view of the deviation by the buy-bust team from the mandated conduct of taking
post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case, there is no way to presume that the
members thereof had performed their duties regularly. Even granting that we must blindly
rely on the credibility of Velasco's testimony, still, the prosecution evidence would fall short of
satisfying the quantum of evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly connect appellant with the seized
drug in a way that would establish that the specimen is one and the same as that seized in
the first place and offered in court as evidence. The Court cannot indulge in the presumption
of regularity of official duty if only to obliterate the obvious infirmity of the evidence advanced
to support appellant's conviction. In Mallillin v. People,54 we categorically declared that the
failure of the prosecution to offer in court the testimony of key witnesses for the basic
purpose of establishing a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu and
the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally
offered in court, materially conflict with every proposition as to the culpability of the accused.
For the same plain but consequential reason, we will not hesitate to reverse the judgment of
conviction in the present appeal.

One final word. In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that basic and elementary is the
presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution
which must draw strength from its own evidence and not from the weakness of the defense.
The rule, in a constitutional system like ours, is invariable regardless of the reputation of the
accused because the law presumes his innocence until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro
reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable
doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.55

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.

02158 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is thus accordingly ordered released immediately
from confinement, unless he is lawfully confined for another offense.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report
to this Court his action hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173480               February 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
RUIZ GARCIA y RUIZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Decision the conviction of accused-appellant Ruiz Garcia y Ruiz (Ruiz) by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision of May 10, 2006 1 for violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
assailed CA decision fully affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch
72, Malabon City.

Ruiz was formally charged and pleaded "not guilty" under an Information that reads:

That on or about the 27th day of February 2003, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being a private person, and without authority of law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously sell and deliver for consideration in the amount of P200.00 to
poseur-buyer one (1) piece of printed paper with markings ‘RGR-1’ containing the following:
one (1) small brick of dried suspected Marijuana fruiting tops with a net weight 11.02 gram[s]
and Thirteen (13) small white paper[s] with markings ‘RGR-RPI’ through ‘RGR-RP13,’
respectively, which substance, when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result
for Marijuana, a dangerous drug.3

In the pre-trial conference that followed, his counsel admitted the following: (1) the identity of
Ruiz as the accused in the case; (2) the jurisdiction of the RTC; and (3) Ruiz’ lack of
authority to possess or sell shabu. 4 The defense counsel also manifested that admissions
could be made in the course of the trial concerning the manner and nature of the testimony
of the forensic chemist.5lawphil.net

The prosecution presented a single witness, PO1 Samuel Garcia (PO1 Garcia), who, as
poseur-buyer, testified that Ruiz’ arrest was made pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust
operation where Ruiz sold him marijuana. The parties dispensed with the testimony of the
forensic chemist, Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa, after they entered into stipulations concerning
the manner and nature of his testimony.6

The prosecution also submitted the following evidence:

Exhibit "A" - INFOREP dated February 7, 2003 written by Police Senior

Superintendent Oscar F. Valenzuela;
Exhibit "B" - the Dispatch Order dated February 27, 2003;
Exhibit "C-1" - the photocopy of the recovered marked money;
and "C-2"
Exhibit "D" - the Pre-Operation Report dated February 27, 2003 prepared by PO2
Geoffrey Huertas;
Exhibit "E" - the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1Samuel Sonny Garcia;
Exhibit "F" - the corpus delicti;
Exhibit "H" - the Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 28, 2003
submitted by Ferdinand Lavadia Balgoa, Police Inspector Chief SDEU
and;
Exhibit "G" - the Physical Sciences Report No. D-250-03 prepared by forensic
chemist Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa.
The defense relied solely on the testimony of Ruiz who claimed he was the victim of a police
frame-up and extortion.

The RTC summarized the prosecution’s version of events as follows:

On February 27, 2003, at around 2:45 p.m., PO1 Samuel Garcia was with a confidential
informer and two other policemen at the back of San Roque Church, Navotas, Metro Manila,
waiting for the accused with whom the confidential informer arranged for him (Garcia) to buy
marijuana. There were prior Informations [sic] from Camp Crame and the NPDO about the
selling of marijuana xxx For this reason, Garcia got in touch with the confidential informer
whom [sic] he learned could buy marijuana from the accused.

It did not take long after the arrival of Garcia and the others at the area of operation for the
accused to arrive on board a red scooter. Garcia told the accused that he will buy P200.00
worth of marijuana, as agreed upon between the confidential informer and the accused. The
accused in turn gave Garcia the marijuana wrapped in a yellow page of the PLDT directory.
Garcia verified the contents thereof and thereafter gave the P200.00, consisting of
two P100.00 bills earlier given for him to use as buy-bust money xxx whose serial numbers
were listed in the dispatch order xxx Garcia then gave the signal to his companions for them
to approach. He also arrested the accused whom he told of his rights and brought him to a
lying-in clinic and then to the police headquarters.

According to PO1 Garcia, after the arrest, they brought Ruiz to the DEU 7 office for
investigation. He (PO1 Garcia) turned over the seized items to the investigator, who then
placed markings on the wrapper. 8 The seized items were thereafter sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination; they tested positive for marijuana.9

The version of the defense, as summarized by the RTC, is as follows:

Accused Ruiz Garcia y Ruiz, on the other hand, maintained that he was riding on a hopper
on his way [home] to his wife at Daang Hari, Navotas, Metro Manila, when he saw a jeep
with policemen on board. A policeman named Balais stopped the accused and asked for the
papers of the hopper which he, at the same time, searched with nothing illegal found inside
its compartment [sic].

The accused then heard someone remarked "ito pala si Ruiz," and he was told to go along
with the policemen, who initially brought him to the lying-in clinic, and then to the police
headquarters where he was asked to make "tubos" or to "ransom" the hopper; Garcia [Ruiz]
was not able to do so because he cannot afford what the policemen were demanding. As a
consequence, he was detained and charged in this case which he protested, as nothing was
confiscated from him.

Ruiz claimed that the case was a trumped-up charge made by the police to extort money
from him.10 In making this claim, he admitted that he did not know PO1 Garcia and that he
saw him for the first when he was arrested. 11 He insisted that he knew a certain Balais who
arrested suspected pushers/users in their place.12

The prosecution and the defense thereafter entered into stipulations on the substance of the
rebuttal and sur-rebuttal testimonies of PO1 Garcia and Ruiz, which were mainly reiterations
of their earlier testimonies.13 In its Decision of July 27, 2004, the RTC found Ruiz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and costs.14 The CA, on appeal, fully affirmed the RTC’s
decision.15

In the present appeal before us, Ruiz faults the CA for believing the testimony of the lone
prosecution witness, and for convicting him despite the insufficiency of supporting evidence.
He observes that: (a) PO1 Garcia’s motive was to impress his superiors who had issued a
special order against him; (b) the police officers arrested him to extort money by asking him
to ransom his scooter which the police had confiscated; (c) no prior surveillance was
conducted before he was arrested; (d) the informant was not presented in court; (e) his
arrest was illegal because it was made without a warrant; and (f) there was no compliance
with Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 or the chain of custody rule on seized drugs.16
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintains that the lower courts
correctly found Ruiz guilty of the crime charged. 17 As established through the testimony of
PO1 Garcia, his arrest was effected through a legitimate buy-bust operation that was
regularly conducted, properly documented, and coordinated with the PDEA. 18 The Office of
the Solicitor General also argued that Ruiz failed to present sufficient evidence to
substantiate his claim of frame-up; his (Ruiz’) evidence also failed to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the public officers in the
case.19

THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT Ruiz, as the prosecution’s evidence failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the
police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain
of evidence requirement of this Act.

Every criminal case starts with the constitutionally-protected presumption of innocence in

favor of the accused that can only be defeated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution starts the trial process by presenting evidence showing the presence of all the
elements of the offense charged. If the prosecution proves all the required elements, the
burden of evidence shifts to the accused to disprove the prosecution’s case. Based on these
presentations, the court must then determine if the guilt of the accused has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It may happen though that the prosecution, even before the
presentation by the defense, already has failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged, in which case, the presumption of innocence prevails; the burden of evidence does
not shift to the accused, who no longer needs to present evidence in his defense.

In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these
require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has
actually been committed,20 as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. In the
present case, the object is marijuana which the prosecution must present and prove in court
to be the same item seized from the accused. It is in this respect that the prosecution failed.

The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21

of Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been
proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted
covertly and in secrecy,21 a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not
escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In People v. Tan,22 this Court itself
recognized that "by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment
procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of
marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting
provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of
abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest
an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses."
Accordingly, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid
down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly follow. The prosecution must adduce
evidence that these procedures have been followed in proving the elements of the defined
offense.

The first procedural safeguard that the police failed to observe (and which both the RTC and
the CA failed to take into account) is that provided under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. This provision states:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. [Emphasis
supplied.]

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 further elaborate on the legal
requirement by providing, under its Section 21(a), that:

(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]

The records utterly fail to show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures
despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of the law
and its implementing rules. The procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimony of PO1
Garcia. Testifying on the handling of the seized marijuana, he stated that:

Q: After he handed to you the one pack and then you handed to him the P200.00,
what happened next?

A: After verifying the contents and after convincing myself that the same is
marijuana, I handed to him the money and raised my hand as a pre-arrange[d]
signal.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After you had arrested the person of the accused, what happened next?

A: We brought him for medical examination and [thereafter] brought him to our office.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: So what happened to the pack of marijuana that you were able to buy from the
accused?

A: I turned it over to our investigator and then he placed markings on the wrapper.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: I am handing to you now the improvise [sic] wrapper. Is this the marking that you
placed?

A: Yes, sir, RP-1.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What happened after you have seized the item from the accused or after you
have recovered this and placing [sic] markings?

A: It was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination.23

Thus, other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia and the police investigator (whose
identity was not disclosed), no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the
seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules. We observe that while there was testimony with respect to the marking
of the seized items at the police station, no mention whatsoever was made on whether the
marking had been done in the presence of Ruiz or his representatives. 24 There was likewise
no mention that any representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any
elected official had been present during this inventory, or that any of these people had been
required to sign the copies of the inventory.25

In People v. Orteza,26 the Court, in discussing the implications of the failure to comply with
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, declared:

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to
place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to
observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with
regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory
on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The
Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the
identity of the shabu. [Emphasis supplied.]

We reached the same conclusion in People v. Nazareno 27 and People v. Santos, Jr.,28 and
recently, in the cases of People v. Dela Cruz29 and People v. De la Cruz30 where we again
stressed the importance of complying with the prescribed procedure. We also held that strict
compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the
government, and liberally in favor of the accused.311awphi1.zw+

In addition, we also note that PO1 Garcia testified that he marked the confiscated items
when he returned to the police station after the buy-bust operation. This admission
additionally shows that the marking was not done immediately after seizure of the items, but
only after a significant intervening time had lapsed, i.e., after the buy-bust team had taken
Ruiz to a lying-in clinic for a medical examination,32 and from there, to the police
headquarters. Significantly, Ruiz confirmed in his testimony that the buy-bust team first took
him to the San Jose Lying-in Center, before proceeding to the police headquarters.33

In People v. Sanchez,34 we held that in case of warrantless seizure (such as a buy-bust

operation) under R.A. No. 9165, the physical inventory and photograph of the items shall be
made by the buy-bust team, if practicable, at the place they were seized, considering that
such interpretation is more in keeping with the law’s intent of preserving the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs. 35 The prosecution, in the present case, failed to explain
why the required inventory and photographing of the seized items were not practicable and
could not have been done at the place of seizure.

We further note, on the matter of identifying the seized items, that the lower courts
overlooked the glaring inconsistency between PO1 Garcia’s testimony vis-à-vis the entries in
the Memorandum dated February 28, 2003 (the request for laboratory examination of the
seized items)36 and Physical Science Report No. D-250-03 dated February 28, 2003 issued
by the PNP Crime Laboratory with respect to the marking on the seized items.37

PO1 Garcia testified that he had marked the seized item (on the wrapper) with the initial "RP-
1."38 However, an examination of the two documents showed a different marking: on one
hand, what was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory consisted of a single piece
telephone directory paper containing suspected dried marijuana leaves fruiting tops with the
marking "RGR-1" and thirteen pieces of rolling paper with the markings "RGR-RP1" to "RGR-
RP13"; on the other hand, the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the following items with the
corresponding markings: a printed paper with the marking "RGR-1" together with one small
brick of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops and thirteen pieces of small white paper with
the markings "RGP-RP1" to "RGP-RP13."

PO1 Garcia’s testimony is the only testimonial evidence on record relating to the handling
and marking of the seized items since the testimony of the forensic chemist in the case had
been dispensed with by agreement between the prosecution and the defense. Unfortunately,
PO1 Garcia was not asked to explain the discrepancy in the markings. Neither can the
stipulated testimony of the forensic chemist now shed light on this point, as the records
available to us do not disclose the exact details of the parties’ stipulations.

To our mind, the procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items, as
well as the unexplained discrepancy in their markings, collectively raise doubts on whether
the items presented in court were the exact same items that were taken from Ruiz when he
was arrested. These constitute major lapses that, standing unexplained, are fatal to the
prosecution’s case.39

To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the
express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."
In Sanchez, we clarified that this saving clause applies only where the prosecution
recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.40 We
also stressed in Sanchez, that in such case, the prosecution must show that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been preserved.41

These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution, in the first place, did
not even recognize the procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized items.
Had the prosecution done so, it would not have glossed over the deficiencies and would
have, at the very least, submitted an explanation and proof showing that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.

The chain of custody requirement

In Lopez v. People, 42 we explained the importance of establishing the chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs, as follows:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witnesses'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential
when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to
alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering – without regard to
whether the same is advertent or otherwise not – dictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule. [Emphasis supplied.]

The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of
the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the
seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the
court.43 It is important enough as a concern that Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 200244 (which implements R.A. No. 9165) specifically defines
chain of custody.

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of

seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final
disposition;

In the present case, while PO1 Garcia duly testified on the identity of the buyer and seller, on
the consideration that supported the transaction, and on the manner the sale took
place,45 the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that
the marijuana presented in court was the very item seized from Ruiz at the time of his arrest.

(a) The first crucial link in the chain of custody

The first crucial link was from the time the marijuana was seized by PO1 Garcia to its
delivery to the police investigator at the police headquarters. Only PO1 Garcia
testified to this link. From his own testimony, he did not mark the seized marijuana
after it was handed to him by Ruiz; he only marked it at the police station when he
turned it over to the investigator. In the interim, he and the rest of the buy-bust team
had taken Ruiz to a lying-in clinic for medical examination. The evidence does not
show who was in possession of the marijuana during the ride from the crime scene to
the lying-in center, and from the lying-in center to the police station.

(b) The second link in the chain of custody

The second link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is from PO1 Garcia
to the police investigator. The identity of this police investigator to whom the custody
of the seized marijuana was turned over was not disclosed. Although a reading of the
Memorandum dated February 28, 2003 shows that a certain Ferdinand Lavadia
Balgoa, as Police Inspector Chief SDEU, prepared the request for the laboratory
examination of the seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory, this piece of
evidence does not establish the latter’s identity as the police inspector to whom PO1
Garcia turned over the marijuana, and who subsequently made the corresponding
markings on the seized items.

(c) The subsequent links in the chain of custody

The evidence on record relating to the subsequent links in the chain of custody –
from the police inspector to the PNP Crime Laboratory –did not identify the person
who submitted the seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Whether it was the Police Inspector Chief SDEU is not clear from the evidence that
only shows that he signed the request for the laboratory examination of the seized
marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. At the same time, the identity of the person
who had the custody and safekeeping of the seized marijuana, after it was
chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court, was also not disclosed.

In this regard, Sections 346 and 647 (paragraph 8) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.
2, Series of 200348require laboratory personnel to document the chain of custody each time a
specimen is handled or transferred until the specimen is disposed. The board regulation also
requires the identification of the individuals participating in the chain. The available records in
the case fail to show compliance with this regulation.

Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the
identification of the seized marijuana that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect,
the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable
doubt on the criminal liability of the accused. As we pointed out in the opening statement of
our Ruling, this brings the case to a situation where the defense does not even need to
present evidence as it has no viable case to meet. We need not therefore discuss the
specific defenses raised. Nor do we need to discuss the lower courts’ misplaced reliance on
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, except to state that the
presumption only arises in the absence of contrary details in the case that raise doubt on the
regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in the present case, the police
officers failed to comply with the standard procedures prescribed by law, there is no occasion
to apply the presumption.49
We close with the thought that this Court is not unaware that in the five years that R.A. No.
9165 has been in place, the rate of cases that resulted in acquittals and dismissals was
higher than the rate of conviction. 50 Under PDEA records, the dismissals and acquittals
accounted for 56% because of the failure of the police authorities to observe proper
procedure under the law, among others.51 A recent international study conducted in 2008
showed that out of 13,667 drug cases filed from 2003 to 2007, only 4,790 led to convictions
(most of which were cases of simple possession); the charges against the rest were
dismissed or the accused were acquitted.52

The present case is now an added statistic reflecting our dismal police and prosecution
records. Without casting blame, we call the attention of the authorities to exert greater efforts
in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed
necessary for the greater benefit of our society. We cannot afford to fail either in combating
the drug menace or in protecting the individual rights and liberties we have enshrined in our
Constitution. Either way, the consequences of continued failure are hard to imagine.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 10, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00954 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Ruiz Garcia y Ruiz is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he
is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
report to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
Copies shall also be furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police, and the
Director General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized marijuana to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186529               August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004
finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police
authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local
police force to apprehend the appellant. 4 The agent gave the police appellant’s name,
together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora the following day.

On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was
on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red
and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the
person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the
highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant
was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station
on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he
pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when
opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.5

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated
specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with
his initials and with appellant’s name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the
contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.6

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for
possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:

"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW."7

"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said
accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering
dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the
proper authorities to transport the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his
brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him
were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he
explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in;
forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear;
then brought him to the police station for investigation.9

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant of Violation of

Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11

Hence, the present appeal.

In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise
avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of
the team’s failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief,
appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent
warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground
that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.

The appeal is meritorious.

We have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However,
this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case.13

Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the
sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that
although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of
the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not
squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.

It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.  This 1avvphi1

Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if
we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in
favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate
that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.14

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed
below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet
of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against
him.

The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse,
coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence
which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever
defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over his person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal. 15

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain

whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.16

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with
a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Said proscription, however, admits
of exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a

judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.19

The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was
caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the
presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a
sachet of shabu.20 Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was
deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must
precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 21 Thus, given the factual milieu
of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest
appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.22

The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a

reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police
transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent
reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to
apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with
the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora
anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members posted
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same
day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential
agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was
suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the
suspected drug.23 The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and
the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and
laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the
tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.24 We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.

The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa"
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting
on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in
front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed
to the team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag.
Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the
contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag
was found to contain dried marijuana leaves.28

The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station,
Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel
Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted
surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved
in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had
headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At
around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted themselves to await
Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry
a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the
contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.29

In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person,
more or less 5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand,
and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves.
While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw
the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused
and informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by
the accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In
his bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make
a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as
Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves
as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents
of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves.30

In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there
was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of
the criminal design.

As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an
offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was
waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender
a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing
or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant,
appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and
consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.

We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information"
sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v.
Tudtud, these include People v.

Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v.

Montilla,35 People v. Valdez,36 and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained
the validity of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or
suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually
committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in
Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against
warrantless searches.38

Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away
with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the
arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise
learned from the informant not only the appellant’s physical description but also his name.
Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was
an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had
ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.39

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his
right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in
the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does
not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.40

One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights.
Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and
seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of
the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the
name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system
of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and
security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the
parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.42

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero
Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of
the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174198               January 19, 2010

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review the decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 which
affirmed in toto the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Parañaque
City4 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 finding Zaida5 Kamad y Ambing (accused-appellant)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez y Acosta (Leo) who was charged for illegal possession
of shabu, the accused-appellant was charged under an Information6 that reads:

The above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give away, distribute and sell to a customer for P300.00
pesos one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance
(shabu) weighing 0.20 gram, which when examined were found positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.

The prosecution’s version of events is summarized below.

On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig (Taguig police) received information from an
asset that a certain "Zaida" was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu at Purok IV, Silverio
Compound in Parañaque City. The Taguig police formed a buy-bust team composed of
P/Insp. Antonio Parillas,7 PO3 Christopher Maulit8 (PO3 Maulit), PO1 Manfoste,9 SPO2
Arthur Velasco, and SPO2 Ernesto Sanchez10 (SPO2 Sanchez), as members. SPO2
Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso bills for use as
marked money.

After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around 10:00
p.m. of October 16, 2002 to the target area where they immediately saw the accused-
appellant and Leo. The asset and SPO2 Sanchez approached the two while the rest of the
buy-bust team watched from a distance. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez as a buyer of
shabu and the accused-appellant asked him how much he would buy. SPO2 Sanchez asked
for P300.00 worth of shabu and gave the marked money; the accused-appellant thereafter
handed him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected to be shabu. SPO2 Sanchez
lighted a cigarette to give the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to approach. SPO2
Sanchez arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her the P300.00 marked
money. The buy-bust team arrested Leo who was found in possession of one (1) plastic
sachet also suspected to contain shabu.

The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets to
their office for investigation. The recovered plastic sachets, marked as "ES-1-161009" and
"ES-2-161002," were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination;
the tests yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.11
The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.

The accused-appellant12 denied the charge and claimed that she and Leo were framed-up. At
around 2:30 p.m. of October 16, 2002, the accused-appellant and Leo went to Leo’s cousin’s
house. Since Leo’s cousin was not yet at home, she and Leo waited. After waiting for an
hour, four (4) men wearing civilian clothes and carrying firearms entered the house and
introduced themselves as police officers. The accused-appellant and Leo were frisked, but
nothing was found in their possession. The police officers asked the accused-appellant
where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling shabu. Afterwards, she and
Leo were taken to the police headquarters where they were again frisked and asked the
same question to which they gave the same response. The police detained Leo and the
accused-appellant for about a day and later brought them to the Prosecutor’s Office for
inquest without showing them any shabu.

The RTC Ruling

After consideration of the evidence, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding both accused GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences Zaida Kamad to life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00 for Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 …

xxxx

SO ORDERED.13

The accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA, attacking the RTC’s reliance
on the presumption of regularity that the RTC found to have attended the conduct of the buy-
bust operation by the police. She argued that no presumption of regularity could arise
considering that the police violated NAPOLCOM rules by using an asset; the rules prohibit
the deputation of private persons as PNP civilian agents.14 The accused-appellant also
pointed out the material inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that
cast doubt on their credibility, namely: (a) the uncertainty of SPO2 Sanchez regarding the
time the buy-bust team was dispatched to the target area; (b) the confusion of PO3 Maulit on
the identity of the team leader of the buy-bust team; (c) the admitted mistake of PO3 Maulit
that only the recovered plastic sachet was marked "ES" (standing for the initials of SPO2
Sanchez), while the marked money was marked "MF" (standing for the initials of P/Insp.
Mariano F. Fegarido as commanding officer); and (d) the contradictory statements of PO3
Maulit who testified that it was Leo who sold the shabu and that of SPO2 Sanchez who
testified that it was the accused-appellant who sold him the shabu.

The CA Ruling

The CA rejected the defense arguments and affirmed in toto the RTC findings. The CA ruled
that the prosecution satisfactorily established the accused-appellant’s guilt based on the
positive testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the conduct of the buy-bust operation; his testimony
bore badges of truth. Accordingly, the CA found the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated
denial undeserving of any weight. The CA brushed aside as a minor inconsistency the
uncertainty in the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the time the buy-bust operation took place.
The CA also brushed aside the violation of the NAPOLCOM rules on the ground that the
accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto for illegal sale of shabu committed in the
presence of the prosecution witnesses who were police officers. Moreover, the CA held that
the use of assets to aid police officers in buy-bust operations has been judicially recognized.
The CA found that while the asset brokered the shabu transaction, he had no role in the
apprehension of the accused-appellant and in the search and seizure of the shabu from the
accused-appellant.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu.

The Court’s Ruling

We draw attention at the outset to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case; the
appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to
correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.15 We find the present appeal meritorious on the basis of such review.

As a general rule, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material
bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied.16 After due consideration of the records of this case, the evidence adduced, and
the applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that a deviation from the general rule is
warranted.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.17 Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust
situation requires evidence, not only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as
well that the drugs seized and examined are the same drugs presented in court. This is a
condition sine qua non for conviction as the drugs are the main subject of the illegal sale
constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be proven for the crime to
exist. As we discuss below, the special characteristics of prohibited drugs necessitate their
strict identification by the prosecution.18

Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the
testimony of SPO2 Sanchez that the sale of the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant
took place, we find that both the RTC and the CA failed to consider the following infirmities in
the prosecution’s case: (1) the serious lapses in the RA 9165 procedure committed by the
buy-bust team in handling the seized shabu; and (2) the failure of the police to comply with
the chain of custody rule in handling the seized shabu, resulting in the prosecution’s failure
to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the same shabu seized from the accused-
appellant on October 16, 2002.

Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure 

under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165

In People v. Garcia,19 we emphasized the prosecution’s duty to adduce evidence proving

compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedure laid down under paragraph
1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. This provision reads:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. [emphasis
supplied]

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides
further details on how RA 9165 is to be applied, and provides too for a saving mechanism in
case no strict compliance with the requirements took place. Section 21(a) states:

(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]

Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug’s
unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.20 Hence, the rules on the
measures to be observed during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of the
drugs for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.

In this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of the seized shabu.
The records show that his testimony and the identification he made in court constitute the
totality of the prosecution’s evidence on how the police handled and preserved the integrity
of the seized shabu. Significantly, SPO2 Sanchez merely stated in his testimony that:

Q: What else transpired when Zaida gave something to you and you, being the
poseur buyer, gave the money to Zaida?

A: We brought them to our office.

xxxx

Q: What did you do with those plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance?

A: We brought them to the SPD Crime Lab for examination.21

Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked although the
evidence shows that the shabu was marked as "ES-1-161009" before it was sent to a
forensic laboratory. His testimony also failed to state whether the marking of the shabu was
done immediately after its seizure (as Section 21 of RA 9165 requires) or during the
investigation. His testimony likewise failed to disclose if a physical inventory and
photography of the seized items had taken place, or if they had, whether these were
undertaken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, or a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and of an elective official.

In sum, his testimony failed to show how the integrity and evidentiary value of the
item seized had been preserved; no explanation was ever given by SPO2 Sanchez to
justify the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedures. In
fact, the records clearly reveal that the prosecution did not even acknowledge the
procedural lapses committed by the buy-bust team in the handling of the seized
shabu.

The consequences of the above omissions must necessarily be grave for the prosecution
under the rule that penal laws, such as RA 9165, are strictly construed against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.22 One consequence is to produce doubts on
the origins of the illegal drug presented in court, 23 thus leading to the prosecution’s failure to
establish the corpus delicti.24 Unless excused by the saving mechanism, the acquittal of the
accused must follow.

The non-compliance with the 

chain of custody rule

Separately from Section 21 violations, we also find the prosecution fatally remiss in
establishing an unbroken link in the chain of custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is
simply incomplete in establishing the necessary links in the handling of the seized prohibited
drug from the time of its seizure until its presentation in court.

In Mallillin v. People,25 we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes sufficient
compliance with this rule:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witnesses'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. [emphasis supplied]26

We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia,27 People v. Gum-Oyen,28 People v. Denoman29 and

People v. Coreche30 where we recognized the following links that must be established in the
chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court.

(a) The first link in the chain of custody

We observe that SPO2 Sanchez’ testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was
handled immediately after the accused-appellant’s arrest. Although the records show that
SPO2 Sanchez testified that he actually seized the shabu when he arrested the accused-
appellant, he never disclosed the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of
the shabu after its seizure, nor that he retained possession of the shabu from the place of the
arrest until they reached the police station.

SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the person/s
who made the markings on the two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu
seized from the accused-appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.

(b) The second link in the chain of custody

We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez’ testimony regarding the post-arrest police
investigation failed to provide particulars on whether the shabu was turned over to the
investigator. The records only identify the name of the investigator as one SPO1 Nuestro
before whom SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated
October 17, 2002.31 Thus, a big gap exists on who had custody and possession of the shabu
prior to, during and immediately after the police investigation, and how the shabu was stored,
preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure up to its receipt by the forensic
laboratory.

(c) The third link in the chain of custody

The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence
adduced by the prosecution consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 200232 of
Police Superintendent Mariano F. Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police District Drug
Enforcement Group and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr.
Richard Allan B. Mangalip as the forensic chemist.33

These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings
"ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-161002" were sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1)
small brown envelope bearing unidentified signatures. On the same day, the PNP Crime
Laboratory received this letter-request along with the submitted specimens. The specimens
were then subjected to qualitative examination which yielded positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the
seized shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also fail to clearly identify the person who
received the shabu at the forensic laboratory pursuant to the letter-request dated October
17, 2002, and who exercised custody and possession of the shabu after it was examined
and before it was presented in court. Neither was there any evidence adduced showing how
the seized shabu was handled, stored and safeguarded pending its presentation in court.

(d) The fourth link in the chain of custody

The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecution’s evidence in this
case. Although the forensic chemist was presented in court, we find that his offered
testimony related to a shabu specimen other than that seized in the buy-bust operation of
October 16, 2002. Specifically, his testimony pertained to shabu seized by the police on
October 12, 2002. This is borne by the following exchanges:

FISCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he is the
one who cause [sic] the examination of the physical evidence subject of this case
containing with white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet weighing
0.20 grams and 0.30 grams with markings of EBC and EBC-1 that I reduced findings
after the examination conducted.

xxxx

Q And with the cause of the performance of your duties, were you able to receive a
letter request relevant to this case specifically a drug test request, dated October 12,
2002 from PS/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon. Do you have the letter request with you?

A Yes, sir.

Q The witness presented to this representation the letter request dated October 12,
2002 for purposes of identification, respectfully request that it be marked in evidence
as Exhibit A. In this Exhibit A Mr. Officer, were you able to receive the evidence
submitted specifically a small brown stapled wire envelope with signature containing
with white crystalline substance inside and with markings EBC- 12/10/02 and EBC-1
12/10/02. After you received this specimen what action did you take or do?

A Upon receiving, I read and understand the content of the letter request after which,
I stamped and marked the letter request and then record it on the logbook and after
recording it on the logbook, I performed the test for determination of the presence of
dangerous drug on the specimen.

xxxx

Q Now, after those tests conducted what was the result of the examination?

A It gives positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or otherwise known as

shabu, a dangerous drug.

xxxx

Q At this juncture your Honor, the witness handed with this representation a brown
envelope with markings D-1487-02, and the signature and the date 12 October 02,
now Mr. Witness tell us who placed these markings on this brown envelope?

A I am the one who personally made the markings, sir.

Q And in the face of this brown envelope there is a printed name PO1 Edwin Plopinio
and the signature and the date 12 October 2002. Do you know who placed who
placed those markings?

A I have no idea.

Q At this juncture your Honor, this representation proceeded to open the brown
envelope. May I respectfully request that this brown envelope be marked in evidence
as Exhibit B. And inside this brown envelope are three pieces of plastic sachets
inside which are white crystalline substance with markings EPC 12 October 02 and
EPC-1 12 October 02. May I respectfully request that these plastic sachets with white
substance inside be marked in evidence as Exhibit B-1 and B-2. And in these plastic
sachets with white crystalline inside is a masking tape with the signature and letters
are RAM, do you know who placed those letters?

A I am the one who placed that markings sir.

Q And what RAM stands for?

 A That stands for my name Richard Allan Mangalip sir.

Q You mentioned that you reduced your findings in writing, do you have the official
finding with you?

A Yes, sir.

Q At this juncture the witness handed to this representation the physical science
report no. D-1487-2 for purposes of identification respectfully request that this
specimen be marked in evidence as Exhibit C. And in this Exhibit C, there is a
signature above the typewritten name Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, do you
whose signature is this Mr. Witness? 34 [Emphasis supplied]

A That is my signature sir.

Q Respectfully request that the signature appearing in Exhibit C be marked in

evidence as Exhibit C-1. You stated earlier that you cause the weight of the white
crystalline substance in this plastic sachet, what the weights of this white crystalline
substance?

A For the specimen A, it is .20 grams and the specimen B, it is .30 gram.

Q May I respectfully request that this weight indicated in this physical science report
now mark in evidence as Exhibit C-2. I have no further questions to the witness your
Honor.

xxxx

Aside from the different dates of seizure, we note that the shabu identified and presented in
court as evidence through the testimony of the forensic chemist, showed characteristics
distinct from the shabu from the buy-bust sale of October 16, 2002:

First, there were different markings made on the plastic sachets of the shabu
recovered on October 12, 2002. As testified to, one plastic sachet of shabu was
marked, "EBC 12 October 02," while the other plastic sachet of shabu was marked,
"EBC-1 12 October 02";35

Second, there was a different sealed brown envelope used where a printed name
and signature of one "PO1 Edwin Plopino" and the date "12 October 2002" were
written; 36

Third, the examination of the shabu by the PNP Crime Laboratory was made
pursuant to a different letter-request for examination dated October 12, 2002 written
by one P/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon;37 and

Fourth, the results of the shabu testified to by the forensic chemist in court was
contained in a different forensic laboratory report known as Physical Science Report
No. D-1487-2.38

We highlight these characteristics because they are different from the documentary evidence
the prosecution formally offered39 consisting of the letter-request dated October 17,
200240 and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02.41 The testimonies of SPO2 Sanchez
and PO3 Maulit as well as the submitted documentary evidence referred to the plastic
sachets of shabu through their markings of "ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-161002."42

From all these, we find it obvious that some mistake must have been made in the
presentation of the prosecution’s evidence. The prosecution, however, left the discrepancies
fully unexplained. To reiterate, the forensic chemist testified to a specimen dated October 12,
2002, or one secured way before the buy-bust of October 16, 2002, but marked as evidence
documents relating to the specimen of October 16, 2002. Strangely, even the defense
disregarded the discrepancies. In his comment on the offer of evidence, the defense simply
stated, among others, by way of stipulation, that "the forensic chemical officer only
conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen he examined and not the quantitative
examination."43 Coming immediately after the offer of evidence that mentioned the plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substances with markings "ES-1 16/10/02" and "ES-2
16/10/02," and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02,44 the defense was clearly
sleeping on its feet when it reacted to the prosecution’s offer of evidence.

But the defense was not alone in glossing over the discrepancies between the testimony for
the prosecution and the offered evidence, as both the RTC and CA also failed to notice the
glaring flaws in the prosecution’s evidence. Apparently, because the parties did not point out
these discrepancies while the appellate court did not closely review the records of the
proceedings, the discrepancies were not taken into account in the decision now under
review.

These observations bring us full circle to our opening statement under the Court’s ruling on
the kind and extent of review that an appellate court undertakes in a criminal case; the
appeal opens the whole case for review, with the appellate court charged with the duty to
cite and appreciate the errors it may find in the appealed judgment, whether these errors are
assigned or unassigned. This is one such instance where we are duty bound to rectify errors
that, although unnoticed below and unassigned by the parties, are clearly reflected in the
records of the case.

The Conclusion

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and
the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute
authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance
thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is
irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise.45 In light of the flagrant lapses we noted,
the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty.

We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized
and examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts
regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the
chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused
must be acquitted. 1avvphi1

From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution’s failure to establish with moral
certainty all the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator signify
that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused
enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not
even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal must
forthwith issue.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the March 28,
2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 affirming the decision
of conviction dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Parañaque
City in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-appellant ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING is hereby
declaredACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless she is
confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to

report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179939             September 29, 2008

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

vs.
GERALDINE MAGAT y PADERON, Appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Two separate informations1 for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, were filed
against appellant Geraldine Magat y Paderon. She pleaded not guilty to both charges at the
arraignment.2

The prosecution presented PO1 Philip Santos (PO1 Santos) who was assigned at the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Meycauayan Police Station and had acted as the poseur-buyer in
the buy-bust operation. The testimony of forensic chemist P/Insp. Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria
was dispensed with in view of the defense’s admission that if the chemist were placed on the
witness stand he could identify the Request for Laboratory Examination3 and Chemistry
Report No. D-403-2003,4 with the qualification that the chemist had no personal knowledge
of the facts surrounding the arrest of appellant and the source of the specimen
examined.5 The testimonies of PO1 Manuel Mendoza (Mendoza) and Michael Sarangaya
(Sarangaya), who were PO1 Santos’s backup during the entrapment operation, were
likewise dispensed with as the defense admitted that it would merely corroborate the
testimony of PO1 Santos.6

According to the evidence for the prosecution, the facts are as follows:

On 7 and 8 of June 2003 and in the morning of 9 June 2003, a buy-bust team composed of
policemen conducted surveillance operations on appellant on account of a validated report
from a concerned citizen that she was engaged in selling illegal drugs.7

With PO1 Santos to act as the poseur-buyer and two P100.00 bills as buy-bust money, in the
afternoon of 9 June 2003 at about 4:20 p.m. the policemen proceeded to the target place
and reached appellant’s premises 30 minutes later. They saw appellant standing in front of
her house. PO1 Santos asked appellant "Ate, meron bang dalawang piso?" After looking at
him, appellant said "Okay!" and then went inside her house. When appellant came back, she
asked for money from him and so PO1 Santos handed her the two marked P100.00 bills. In
turn, appellant gave the plastic sachet of shabu to him. Thereafter, PO1 Santos executed the
pre-arranged signal by scratching his head, prompting his companions to approach them.
PO1 Santos, introducing himself as a policeman, arrested appellant. He informed appellant
that she was being arrested for violation of R.A. No. 9165. The policemen requested
appellant to empty her pockets. Appellant complied; her right pocket yielded another sachet
of shabu. They got back the two marked P100.00 bills from appellant’s left hand.8

They brought appellant to the police station where they booked her. PO1 Santos marked the
plastic sachets containing shabu with his initials "PCS" and the letters "A" and "B" for
examination. The plastic sachets were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory Office; the
examination yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.9 PO1 Santos admitted
during cross-examination that although it was confirmed that appellant was selling illegal
drugs he did not secure a search warrant since their chief’s instruction to them was to
conduct a buy-bust operation. 10 He also admitted that he did not coordinate the buy-bust
operation with the barangay officials and did not verify whether appellant was a drug
peddler.11

Appellant denied the charges against her and testified that between 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. on 9
June 2003, while she was taking a bath, policemen PO1 Santos, Sarangaya, and Mendoza
barged into her house. Hearing the noise, she came out of the comfort room and proceeded
upstairs where she saw the policemen already searching the place. After the search, they
brought her to the Meycauayan Police Station and detained her for one day for alleged
violations of the anti-drug law. Appellant further testified that at the time the policemen
arrested her, her children were playing about three meters away from her house and that no
one saw her being brought to the police station.12

To corroborate appellant’s testimony, Teresa Manebo (Manebo), her neighbor, testified that
on 9 June 2003, at about 4:00 p.m., while she was at the artesian well inside appellant’s
compound, a man in civilian clothes arrived and knocked at the door of the comfort room
where appellant was taking a bath. Appellant informed the man to wait as she was dressing
while Manebo was looking at them. Another man arrived as appellant went out of the comfort
room. The men talked to appellant for about 30 minutes. They asked her about the
whereabouts of her husband. Afterwards, four other men arrived. Appellant and the men
went inside the house. When they came out, she saw appellant crying as the men took her
away.13

On cross-examination, Manebo declared that the two persons who arrived came one after
the other within a ten-minute interval. They talked with appellant for about 30 minutes. She
admitted that she did not hear the entire conversation. When the four other men arrived, they
went upstairs, and stayed there for an hour. 14 At the time appellant was talking with the two
men, she was just two meters away from them. The men asked appellant about her
husband’s whereabouts. She watched them for 30 minutes.15

In a Decision16 dated 21 February 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections
517 and 1118 of R.A. No. 9165. Appellant filed a notice of appeal dated 7 March 2006 to the
Court of Appeals.19

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in a decision promulgated on 7 June
2007.20 Appellant filed a notice of appeal dated 20 June 2007 with this Court.21

Appellant raised before this Court and the Court of Appeals the lone issue of whether the
trial court erred in convicting her despite the prosecution’s failure to establish the identity of
the prohibited drugs, which constitute the corpus delicti of the offense.

The appeal is meritorious.

In all prosecutions for violation of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 22 The existence of dangerous drugs
is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.23

In the case at bar, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 916524 were not complied with. PO1
Santos admitted that he marked the two plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance in the police station.25 He did not mark the seized items immediately after he
arrested appellant in the latter’s presence. He also did not make an inventory and take a
photograph of the confiscated materials in the presence of appellant. Other than the three
policemen, there were no other people who participated in the alleged buy-bust
operation.26 There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or
any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign
an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of the statutory safeguards
were observed.

A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of the R.A. No. 9165, shows that this
Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper procedure for
the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the
procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 amending
Board Regulation No. 7, Series of
1974.27http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/mar2006/G.R. No. 162064.htm -
_ftn19

In People v. Laxa,28 http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/mar2006/G.R. No.

162064.htm - _ftn16the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the
confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged apprehension of the appellant. One
policeman even admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first
time in the police headquarters. The Court held that the deviation from the standard
procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana
and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.29

Similarly, in People v. Kimura,30 the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the

alleged seized marijuana on the night the accused were arrested and to observe the
procedure in the seizure and custody of the drug as embodied in the aforementioned
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Consequently, we held that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

In Zaragga v. People,31 involving a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the police failed to place
markings on the alleged seized shabu immediately after the accused were apprehended.
The buy-bust team also failed to prepare an inventory of the seized drugs which accused
had to sign, as required by the same Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of
1979. The Court held thathttp://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/mar2006/G.R.
No. 162064.htm - _ftn19 the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug
which constitutes the corpus delicti.32

In all the foregoing cited cases, the Court acquitted the appellants due to the failure of law
enforcers to observe the procedures prescribed in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.
3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974, which are similar to the
procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Marking of the seized drugs alone by the law
enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

In the present case, although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic sachets
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for examination, it was not indubitably shown
by the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the seized drugs in the presence of
appellant after their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to whether the substances seized
from appellant were the same ones subjected to laboratory examination and presented in
court.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in
fact they have to be subjected to scientific analysis to determine their composition and
nature. Congress deemed it wise to incorporate the jurisprudential safeguards in the present
law in an unequivocal language to prevent any tampering, alteration or substitution, by
accident or otherwise. The Court, in upholding the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent, can do no less than apply the present law which prescribes a more stringent
standard in handling evidence than that applied to criminal cases involving objects which are
readily identifiable.

R.A. No. 9165 had placed upon the law enforcers the duty to establish the chain of custody
of the seized drugs to ensure the integrity of the corpus delicti. Thru proper exhibit handling,
storage, labeling and recording, the identity of the seized drugs is insulated from doubt from
their confiscation up to their presentation in court.

Recently, in People v. Santos, Jr.,33 which involved violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, the Court agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General’s observation that
the identity of the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently established since the confiscated
plastic sachets of shabu have been marked/initialed at the scene of the crime, according to
proper procedure. Citing People v.
Lim,34whichhttp://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/175593.htm -
_ftn37specified that any apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs and/or
paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused if there be any, and/or his
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such requirement raises doubt whether what
was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court is the same drug and/or
paraphernalia as that actually recovered from the accused.

While the seized drugs may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow that the
same should be given evidentiary weight if the procedure in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was
not complied with. The Court stressed that the admissibility of the seized dangerous drugs in
evidence should not be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus delicti. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and

competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade.35

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied upon by the courts a
quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable
doubt.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/november2007/170180.htm -
_ftn4536 Although the evidence for the defense is weak, the prosecution must rely on the
weight of its own evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.37

All told, the corpus delecti in this case is not legally extant.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 21 February 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 78 in Criminal Case Nos. 2158-M-2003 and 2159-M-2003 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant Geraldine Magat y Paderon is ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt and ordered immediately RELEASED from
custody, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision forthwith
and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was
actually released from confinement.

Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the PNP Director and the Director General of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper guidance and implementation. No costs.

SO ORDERED.