The case of respondent is nothing novel.
This issue had already been resolved by this
Office in Administrative Order No. 20 dated October 25, 2001 wherein former
Immigration Commissioner Edgardo L. Mendoza, who was found guilty of misconduct,
was meted the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, etc., despite
having resigned from the government service to run for public office. We held:
“Although as a rule, the retirement or acceptance of resignation of a public official
leaves nothing in the way of the dismissal of the administrative case filed against him,
because an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or
position in the government (Diamalon vs. Quintillan, Adm. Case No. 116, Aug. 29, 1969,
29 SCRA 347), the better and more recent principle is that enunciated in the case
of People vs. Valenzuela. (L-63950-60, April 15, 1985, 135 SCRA 712, citing Perez vs.
Abiera, Adm. Case No. 223-J, June 11, 1975, 64 SCRA 302) herein below pertinently
quoted:
‘It was not intent of the Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a hard and fast rule
that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge as the case may be renders
moot and academic the administrative case pending against him; nor did the Court
mean to divest itself of jurisdiction to impose certain penalties short of dismissal from
the government service should there be a finding of guilt on the basis of evidence. In
other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to
be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof .
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any
other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct and unscrupulous
magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that
he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative
penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its
jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and
control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to
the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent. Respondent official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well
and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and penalty
proper and imposable under the situation.’
In the case at bar, respondent’s resignation was accepted in the thick of the
administrative investigation of the case against him, which certainly did not divest the
PCAGC of jurisdiction to decide the case on the merit, as in fact it found respondent
guilty of the charge and recommended his dismissal from the service. Concededly,
however, respondent’s connection with the government having been cut off by virtue of
his resignation, the imposition upon him of the penalty of dismissal from the service
would be plain supererogation or vain superfluity.
Be that as it may, the government is not left without recourse against respondent who
should be made to account for his transgression. And the remedy therefor is, as
succinctly and trenchantly stated by the Secretary of Justice in his Opinion No. 30 dated
February 17, 1978, to impose upon respondent, who was found guilty of the charge and
recommended dismissed from the service, the penalties incident to dismissal for cause,
whenever applicable, to wit: (1) cancellation of Civil Service eligibility; (2) forfeiture of
leave credits; (3) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (4) disqualification for
reinstatement or re-employment.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the retirement of respondent from the government
service is not a hindrance to impose the penalties recommended by the PAGC.
However, the penalty imposed should be modified in that, instead of dismissal,
respondent should suffer the accessory penalties to dismissal from the service. Under
Section 58 of CSC Resolution No. 991936 dated August 31, 1999, the penalty of
dismissal from the service shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service. In addition thereto, the penalty of forfeiture of leave credits shall be
imposed upon respondent following the Department of Justice Opinion No. 30 dated
February 17, 1978. Since respondent had already received her retirement benefits, the
same should be returned to the government, including, but not limited, to those received
from the Government Service Insurance System and the Home Mutual Development
Fund or PAGIBIG, if any.
G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
seeks the reversal of the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 28, 2004, in "Uldarico P.
Andutan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman and Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), etc.,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68893. The assailed decision annulled and set aside the decision of
the Ombudsman dated July 30, 2001, 3 finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of
Duty.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions
to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. 4 On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum,
Andutan resigned from the DOF.5
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF;
Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer,
Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia;
Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes,
General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.6 As government employees, Andutan, Belicena
and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification
of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. 7
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit
Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.8
During the investigation, the FFIB found that Steel Asia fraudulently obtained TCCs worth Two
Hundred Forty-Two Million, Four Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos
(₱242,433,534.00).9 The FFIB concluded that Belicena, Malonzo and Andutan – in their respective
capacities – irregularly approved the "issuance of the TCCs to several garment/textile companies
and allowing their subsequent illegal transfer" to Steel Asia. 10
On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to submit
their counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a
Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
Upon the respondents’ failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman deemed
the case submitted for resolution.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. 11 Having
been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves,
retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and
controlled agencies or corporations.12
After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, 13 Andutan filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the CA.
On July 28, 2004,14 the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the
latter "should not have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A.
6770 provides that the Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after
one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of"; 15 and second, the administrative
case was filed after Andutan’s forced resignation. 16
THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn the decision of the
CA. It submits, first, that contrary to the CA’s findings, administrative offenses do not prescribe after
one year from their commission, 17 and second, that in cases of "capital" administrative offenses,
resignation or optional retirement cannot render administrative proceedings moot and academic,
since accessory penalties such as perpetual disqualification and the forfeiture of retirement benefits
may still be imposed.18
The Ombudsman argues that Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is not mandatory. Consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the use of the word "may" indicates that Section 20 is merely directory or
permissive.19 Thus, it is not ministerial upon it to dismiss the administrative complaint, as long as any
of the circumstances under Section 20 is present.20 In any case, the Ombudsman urges the Court to
examine its mandate under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and hold that an
imposition of a one (1) year prescriptive period on the filing of cases unconstitutionally restricts its
mandate.21
Further, the Ombudsman submits that Andutan’s resignation from office does not render moot the
administrative proceedings lodged against him, even after his resignation. Relying on Section VI(1)
of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 38, 22 the Ombudsman argues that
"[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in
the service x x x a public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation,
prosecution and adjudication." 23 It is irrelevant that Andutan had already resigned from office when
the administrative case was filed since he was charged for "acts performed in office which are
inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general
public."24 Furthermore, even if Andutan had already resigned, there is a need to "determine whether
or not there remains penalties capable of imposition, like bar from reentering the (sic) public service
and forfeiture of benefits."25 Finally, the Ombudsman reiterates that its findings against Andutan are
supported by substantial evidence.
THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
Andutan raises three (3) counterarguments to the Ombudsman’s petition.
First, Andutan submits that the CA did not consider Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 as a prescriptive
period; rather, the CA merely held that the Ombudsman should not have considered the
administrative complaint. According to Andutan, Section 20(5) "does not purport to impose a
prescriptive period x x x but simply prohibits the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an
investigation where the complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the act
or omission complained of."26 Andutan believes that the Ombudsman should have referred the
complaint to another government agency.27 Further, Andutan disagrees with the Ombudsman’s
interpretation of Section 20(5). Andutan suggests that the phrase "may not conduct the necessary
investigation" means that the Ombudsman is prohibited to act on cases that fall under those
enumerated in Section 20(5).28
Second, Andutan reiterates that the administrative case against him was moot because he was no
longer in the public service at the time the case was commenced. 29 According to Andutan, Atty.
Perez v. Judge Abiera30 and similar cases cited by the Ombudsman do not apply since the
administrative investigations against the respondents in those cases were commenced prior to their
resignation. Here, Andutan urges the Court to rule otherwise since unlike the cases cited, he had
already resigned before the administrative case was initiated. He further notes that his resignation
from office cannot be characterized as "preemptive, i.e. made under an atmosphere of fear for the
imminence of formal charges"31 because it was done pursuant to the Memorandum issued by then
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora.
Having established the propriety of his resignation, Andutan asks the Court to uphold the mootness
of the administrative case against him since the cardinal issue in administrative cases is the "officer’s
fitness to remain in office, the principal penalty imposable being either suspension or removal." 32 The
Ombudsman’s opinion - that accessory penalties may still be imposed - is untenable since it is a
fundamental legal principle that "accessory follows the principal, and the former cannot exist
independently of the latter."33
Third, the Ombudsman’s findings were void because procedural and substantive due process were
not observed. Likewise, Andutan submits that the Ombudsman’s findings lacked legal and factual
bases.
ISSUES
Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our resolution:
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutan’s resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman’s findings
supported by substantial evidence?
THE COURT’S RULING
We rule to deny the petition.
The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from
conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled by
jurisprudence.34 In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, 35 the Court, speaking through Justice
Austria-Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe [Concerned Taxpayer v.
Doblada, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 218; Melchor v. Gironella, G.R.
No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476; Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 824
(2004); Floria v. Sunga, 420 Phil. 637, 648-649 (2001)]. Administrative offenses by their very nature
pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and
employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement
of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our government
[Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil
Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:
SEC. 20. Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation
of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
xxxx
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
(Emphasis supplied)
proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after one
year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
In Melchor v. Gironella [G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476], the Court held that
the period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense
but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular
administrative offense. The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA
476, 481; Jaramilla v. Comelec, 460 Phil. 507, 514 (2003)]. Where the words of a statute are clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476,
481; National Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918
(2000)].
In Filipino v. Macabuhay [G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50], the Court
interpreted Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 in this manner:
Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section 20(5) of RA 6770)],
respondent's complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year
after the alleged commission of the acts complained of.
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner
contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the
word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying Section
20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an
investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act
or omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis
supplied)
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is
directory, the negative phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified
by the word "not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not
plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on statutory construction. [emphases and
underscoring supplied]
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was
committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period
stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative
investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the issue of
the Ombudsman’s authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government employee
who had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutan’s favor.
Andutan’s resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint
against him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan
because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
The Ombudsman argued – in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with the CA – that
Andutan’s retirement from office does not render moot any administrative case, as long as he is
charged with an offense he committed while in office. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman,
that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative
fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service.
The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 38
for this proposition, viz.:
Section VI.
1. x x x
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision
of his case but it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall
also be without prejudice to the filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act
committed while still in the service. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision "refers to cases where
the officers or employees were already charged before they were allowed to resign or were
separated from service."36 In this case, the CA noted that "the administrative cases were filed only
after Andutan was retired, hence the Ombudsman was already divested of jurisdiction and could no
longer prosecute the cases."37
Challenging the CA’s interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA "limited the scope of the
cited Civil Service Memorandum Circular to the first sentence." 38 Further, according to the
Ombudsman, "the court a quo ignored the second statement in the said circular that contemplates a
situation where previous to the institution of the administrative investigation or charge, the public
official or employee subject of the investigation has resigned." 39
To recall, we have held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., 40 we
held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654,
658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee
charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of
any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M.
No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez,41 we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April
2004, 427 SCRA 8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged
Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27
September 2004; Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, 13 September 2004] neither warrants the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service [Tuliao v.
Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11
June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA
301] nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic [Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil.
524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during
the pendency of his case [Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondent’s resignation
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable [OCA
v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004]. [emphases and underscoring supplied)
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited
cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned,
either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed 42 or to pre-empt the imminent filing of
one.43 Here, neither situation obtains.
The Ombudsman’s general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by
resigning, since he "knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would
eventually reach him"44 is unfounded. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his
own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998,
while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2)
months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman’s sweeping
assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the
Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the
Ombudsman’s position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation
negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the
provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the Ombudsman’s
interpretation that "[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public official or
employee was still in the service x x x a public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his administrative
investigation, prosecution and adjudication."45 If we agree with this interpretation, any official – even
if he has been separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary
authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the
principal motivation of the law – which is to improve public service and to preserve the public’s faith
and confidence in the government, and not the punishment of the public official
concerned.46 Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of
the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.
The possibility of imposing
accessory penalties does not
negate the Ombudsman’s lack
of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutan’s removal from the service is moot,
there is an "irresistible justification" to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of
imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and forfeiture of benefits." 47 Otherwise stated,
since accessory penalties may still be imposed against Andutan, the administrative case itself is not
moot and may proceed despite the inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an administrative case
moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed, this holding must be read in
its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,48 indeed, we held:
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v.
Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9 May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and
academic, despite the petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the most severe of
administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of
administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Reading the quoted passage in a vacuum, one could be led to the conclusion that the mere
availability of accessory penalties justifies the continuation of an administrative case. This is a
misplaced reading of the case and its ruling.
Esther S. Pagano – who was serving as Cashier IV at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Benguet – filed her certificate of candidacy for councilor four days after the Provincial Treasurer
directed her to explain why no administrative case should be filed against her. The directive arose
from allegations that her accountabilities included a cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99. She filed her
certificate of candidacy under the pretext that since she was deemed ipso facto resigned from office,
she was no longer under the administrative jurisdiction of her superiors. Thus, according to Pagano,
the administrative complaint had become moot.
We rejected Pagano’s position on the principal ground "that the precipitate resignation of a
government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not
render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when facing administrative sanction." 49 Our position that accessory penalties
are still imposable – thereby negating the mootness of the administrative complaint – merely flows
from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case against her. It was neither
intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have justified the continuation of the
administrative complaint if Pagano’s filing of candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our
factual findings in Pagano confirm this, viz.:
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the
Provincial Treasurer that she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be filed against
her, after it discovered the cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she
had already filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative proceedings had
already been commenced at the time she was considered separated from service through her
precipitate filing of her certificate of candidacy. Petitioner’s bad faith was manifest when she filed it,
fully knowing that administrative proceedings were being instituted against her as part of the
procedural due process in laying the foundation for an administrative case.50 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied) 1avvphil
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case – notwithstanding Pagano’s
resignation – was her "bad faith" in filing the certificate of candidacy, and not the availability of
accessory penalties.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that "fitness to serve in public office x x x is a question of
transcendental [importance]51" and that "preserving the inviolability of public office" compels the state
to prevent the "re-entry [to] public service of persons who have x x x demonstrated their absolute
lack of fitness to hold public office."52 However, the State must perform this task within the limits set
by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier stated, under the Ombudsman’s theory, the
administrative authorities may exercise administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum;
thus, a public official who has validly severed his ties with the civil service may still be the subject of
an administrative complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy
behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed
violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the "threefold liability
rule," the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability.53 Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a
public official who has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil
cases to vindicate Andutan’s alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman – through the
FFIB – filed a criminal case for Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty
of imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or
forfeiture of any prohibited interest.54
Conclusion
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of
what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of
our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsman’s resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly
committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent
with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find
no reason to delve on the Ombudsman’s factual findings.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman’s petition for review on certiorari, and
AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28,
2004, which annulled and set aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman,
finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
