Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v.
Public Service Commission
447 U.S. 530
Facts. The Petitioner sought to place written materials regarding nuclear power in its
billing envelopes. The NRDC disagreed with this practice and filed a complaint with the
Respondent asking that Petitioner’s envelopes be opened to contrasting views. The
Respondent did not grant this request, but instead barred utility companies from
including any political viewpoints in their bill inserts. The Petitioner filed suit, seeking
review of the bar on its political speech. The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with
Respondent, that the order of the commission did not infringe on Petitioner’s First
Amendment rights because inclusion of the Petitioner’s viewpoints in all envelopes
infringed on the rights of their customers to not accept the speech and therefore the
time, place and manner of the speech was inappropriate. The Petitioner Edison
appealed to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court), which granted
certiorari.
Issue. This case considers whether it is constitutionally acceptable to suppress political
viewpoints when they are shared with a mass audience, through envelope inserts.
Held. Judge Lewis Powell Jr. (J. Powell). Reversed.
The Respondent presented several theories to the court. First, it argued that the subject
matter of the inserts addressed controversial issues of public policy, which was a
permissible subject-matter regulation. The court found, in that instance, that while
nuclear power may be a controversial topic, the expression of Petitioner’s opinion did
not cause public upheaval, and therefore the suppression of the inserts directly infringed
on the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution (Constitution). Respondent also argued that suppression of
the inserts was necessary to avoid forcing one viewpoint on the public. The court
rejected this argument, noting that where speech is communicated to many listeners, it
cannot be prohibited except where the audience cannot avoid the speech. In the case of
envelope inserts, consumers are free to discard the materials without reading them and
are hardly considered to be captive to another’s view.
De Jonge v. Oregon
299 U.S. 353
Facts:
Oregon has a law that prohibits “criminal syndicalism,” defined as “the doctrine which
advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage, or any unlawful acts or methods as a
means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution.”
Violation of the law can result in imprisonment of at least one year and no more than 10
years, and/or a fine.
Appellant De Jonge was charged with criminal syndicalism for speaking at a Communist
Party event in Portland, which was raided by police. No other basis for prosecution
existed except for De Jonge’s participation in the meeting. The facts available did not
indicate that communist literature was distributed at the meeting, or that any unlawful
conduct occurred at the meeting.
At trial, De Jonge moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the criminal syndicalism
statute, as applied to him, violated due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue
Does Oregon’s criminal syndicalism law violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause?
Held:
The decision of the Oregon Supreme Court is reversed. As the Court stated in United
States v. Cruikshank: “The very idea of government, republican in form, implies a right
on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for a redress of grievances.” The First Amendment expressly guarantees
those rights. Denying those rights violates the fundamental principle embodied in the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A law may prohibit abuses in the
exercise of those rights if they lead to violence or crime. However, a law may not
prohibit the rights themselves.In this case, De Jonge did nothing more than exercise his
rights of free speech and assembly. There was no unlawful conduct, no incitement to
violence, nothing beyond an exercise of what the Constitution guarantees as part of a
citizen’s personal liberty.
Dennis v. United States - 341 U.S. 494
FACTS:
Defendants were members of the Communist Party who were convicted of
violating the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 11, by conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the
United States. Defendants were convicted and the appellate court affirmed. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court judgment upholding
defendants' convictions.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court err in interpreting the statute by charging that the statute required an
unlawful intent before the jury could convict?
HELD:
No. Upon review, the Court affirmed the conviction, holding that §§ 2 and 3 of the
Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 10 and 11, as applied to defendants did not violate their First
Amendment rights because their conduct presented a clear and present danger of
attempting to accomplish a crime that was within Congress' power to punish. The
structure and purpose of the statute demand the inclusion of intent as an element of the
crime. Congress was concerned with those who advocate and organize for the
overthrow of the Government. Certainly those who recruit and combine for the purpose
of advocating overthrow intend to bring about that overthrow.
