10.

  Repeal of statutes

        - Only by enactment of subsequent laws

a. Express- declaration in a statute that a particular and specific                 

law identified by its number or title

Stated the specific provisions

            Case: Mecano vs COA, GR No. 103982, Dec 11, 1992

FACTS: Mecano  is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of

which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he
is claiming from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the
RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of
duty. — When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby
to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may
direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full
pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also
authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,
subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated
shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act
in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment
of the necessary hospital fees.

Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding
petitioner’s illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of
the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim to

Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73,
S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter”.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied
petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not
restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation Commission,
considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro
to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court if he so desires”.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:  1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of

the RAC
 

HELD:   The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioner’s claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent
law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by
incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific
law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are
implied repeals

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether
or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code
partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision
is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Not an express, failed to establish facts or specific- implied

Why is it repealed according to COA? No SPECIFIC PROVISION like 699

             b.      Implied- where a statute of later date clearly reveals an                         

intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a                                             
prior act on the subject.

i. The provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter         

are in an irreconcilable conflict
 RA 7160 (1991)SHALL GOVERN...ENACTED LATER THAN 6679(1988)

Where there is incompatibility the later law prevails

In conflict- terms of brgy officials.

It didn’t indicate the special law.

RA 7160- repealable law

SHALL PEVAIL (LATER NUMBER IS THE LATER LAW)

Greater number – the later prevails

2 laws are conflicting- other is 5 yrs the other is 3 years

Sc reasons:

(3 yrs)

                       Case: David vs COMELEC, GR No. 127116, Apr 8, 1997

FACTS

On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with
petitioner and praying that "the election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in
abeyance." Respondent Commission on Elections filed a separate Comment, dated
February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On February 11, 1997, the Court issued a
Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty days from notice.
It also requested former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.1 to act as amicus
curiae and to file a memorandum also within a non-extendible period of twenty days.
It noted but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997 (as
well as his Urgent Ex-Parte Second Motion to the same effect, dated March 6, 1997).
Accordingly, the parties filed their respective memoranda. The Petition for Leave to
Intervene filed on March 17, 1997 by Punong Barangay Rodson F. Mayor was denied
as it would just unduly delay the resolution of the case, his interest like those of all
other barangay officials being already adequately represented by Petitioner David who
filed this petition as "president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas."

ISSUE
Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is
the term of office of barangay officials?

HELD

The petitions are devoid of merit.

Brief Historical Background

of Barangay Elections

For a clear understanding of the issues, it is necessary to delve briefly into the history
of barangay elections.

An a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the

Philippines The word "barangay" is derived from the Malay "balangay," a boat which
transported them (the Malays) to these shores. 11 Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a
Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Benitez 12 wrote that the barangay
was ruled by a dato who exercised absolute powers of government. While the
Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic structure of government, they stripped
the dato or rajah, of his powers. 13 Instead, power was centralized nationally in the
governor general and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and
the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de barangay,
who was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The position degenerated
from a title of honor to that of a "mere government employee. Only the poor who
needed a salary, no matter how low, accepted the post." 14

After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as
"barrios." 15 For some time, the laws governing barrio governments were found in the
Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised Administrative Code of
1917. 16 Barrios were granted autonomy by the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and
formally recognized as quasi-municipal corporations 17 by the Revised Barrio Charter,
RA 3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were "declared" or renamed
"barangays" — a reversion really to their pre-Spanish names — by PD. No. 86 and PD
No. 557. Their basic organization and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly
"adopted as the Barangay Charter, were retained. However, the titles of the officials
were changed to "barangay captain," "barangay councilman," "barangay secretary" and
"barangay treasurer."

Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Big. 222, 18 "a Punong Barangay (Barangay

Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who
shall constitute the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang Barangay
(Barangay Council) respectively" were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term
of six years which began on June 7, 1982.

The Local Government Code of 1983 19 also fixed the term of office of local elective
officials at six years. 20 Under this Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the
punong barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay members, the kabataang
barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer. 21 B.P. Blg. 881,
the Omnibus Election Code, 22 reiterated that barangay officials "shall hold office, for
six years," and stated that their election was to be held "on the second Monday of May
nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six years thereafter." 23

This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May 1988 was reset
to "the second Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter 24 by RA
6653. Under this law, the term of office of the barangay officials was cut to five
years 25 and the punong barangay was to be chosen from among themselves by seven
kagawads, who in turn were to be elected at large by the barangay electorate. 26

But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was
again "postponed and reset to March 28, 1989" by RA 6679, 27 and the term of office of
barangay officials was to begin on May 1, 1989 and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679
further provided that "there shall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5) years thereafter Their
term shall be for five years . . . " 28 Significantly, the manner of election of the punong
barangay was changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained that while the seven kagawads
were to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay, "(t)he candidate who
obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of
a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the supervision of the Commission on
Elections."

ii. The later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one               
and is clearly intended as a substitute

Eo order 205- allocation

Ra 426- quota for the old importers

Both refer to allocation of wheat flour

Irreconcilliable defense between the two

Ruling

                        Cases: Chinese Flour Exporters Assn. vs Price Stabilization           

Board,  GR No. L-4465, July 12, 1951

FACTS

On September 5, 1950, the Chinese Flour Importers Association, Manila Philippines,

filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus to compel the
Philippine Relief and Trade Rehabilitation Administration (PRATRA) and the Philippine
Wheat Flour Board to issue in favor of petitioner's members the import quota
allocations of wheat flour to which they claim to be entitled under sections 12 and 14
of Republic Act No. 426, known as Import Control Law, with a prayer that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to restrain the PRATRA and the Wheat Flour Board from granting flour
allocations and imports licenses therefor to new importers in excess of the latter's
shares in the portion reserved for new importers by the provision of Republic Act No.
246. After hearing, the writ was granted. In the meantime, Manuel S. Rustia, Ernesto
Y. Sibal, and other allowed to intervene. The parties having agreed to submit the case
on the pleadings and on their respective memoranda, because it involves only a
question of law, the trial court rendered judgment as stated in the early part of this
decision. From this judgment respondent and intervenors appealed. On November 16,
1950, petitioner filed motion for a writ of execution pending appeal from the judgment
of the trial court. The motion was granted over the objection of the respondent were
allowed to file a superseades bond. The case is now before us purely on question of
law.

The background of this case is as follows: On March 23, 1949, the Republic of the
Philippines signed the International Wheat Agreement together with the governments
of forty-one (41) other countries, which was entered into for the purpose of assuring
supplies of wheat to importing countries and markets of wheat to exporting countries
at equitable and stable prices (Part 1, article 1). The agreement fixes the quantities of
wheat representing the guaranteed sales of an exporting country to the importing
countries and the guaranteed purchases of an importing country from the exporting
countries, and specifies the prices for such sales and purchases (arts. III and VI). The
guaranteed purchases of the Philippines as an importing country, is 196,000 metric
tons, of wheat every crop year during the period of the agreement which expires on
July 31, 1953, (Annex A to art. III). The Agreement also provides that the exporting
and importing countries shall be free to fulfill their guaranteed quantities through
private channels or otherwise (art. III).

ISSUE

Shall the PRATRA, now PRISCO, make the allocation of import quota on wheat flour in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 426, as claimed by the appellee, or
shall it make such allocation in accordance with sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order
No. 305 in conjunction with section 15 of Republic Act No. 426, as claimed by the
appellants?

HELD

                                      People vs Perfecto, GR No. L-8463, Oct 4, 1922

Libel case

Criminal case
Implied repeal

It covers everthing in the repealed law, coa case, not everything are covered by the new
code

Grounds are discussed to know the intent of the legislators.

Grounds

1. Not all are covered by the new law

2. Sovereighnty- monarchy in nature now we are democratic principles of

governance

3. It is a political law

Later law act

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in
an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code –
provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the
issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and
can be applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of
the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its
representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over
the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC
to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants,
thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot
be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.