Anti-Corruption in Public Service
Anti-Corruption in Public Service
GRAFT
– is the acquisition of gain or advantage through abuse or misuse of one‘s position or influence, whether in politics, business or any other undertaking. It is an
act performed by a civil servant or a group of civil servants, acting alone by himself or by themselves, without involving any person outside the bureaucracy or
jeopardizing the performance of duties by another bureaucrat.
CORRUPTION
– has been defined as the misuse or abuse of public office for private gain both in government and the private sector. It comes in several illicit forms, including
bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, graft, speed money, pilferage, theft, embezzlement, falsification of records, kickbacks, influence peddling and campaign
contributions.
– is the perversion or destruction of integrity or fidelity in discharging public duties and responsibilities by bribery or favor.
It entails the use of public power for private advantage in ways which transgresses some formal rule of law. It involves participants from within and outside of
the bureaucracy. – it ?refers to the use of public office for private gain or the betrayal of public trust for private gain,” (National Anti-Corruption Framework
and Strategy, 2000). – rottenness: putrid matter: impurity: bribery.Source- Chambers Dictionary According to common usage of term ?Corruption? of officials,
we call corrupt a public servant who accepts gifts bestowed by a private person with the object of inducing him to give special consideration to the interests of
the donor. Sometimes also the act of the officials offering such gifts or other tempting favors is implied in
the concept. Extortion, i.e. demanding such gifts or favors in the execution of public duties, too, may be regarded as ?Corruption.? Indeed, the term is
sometimes also applied to officials who use the public funds they administer for their own benefit; who, in other words, are guilty of embezzlement at the
expense of a public body. In most instances, reference to corruption is made in connection with other subjects, such as crime or public administration. Many
works referring to corruption do not attempt a conceptual and actual analysis.
The commonly held perception amongst most people of corruption is that of something that is debased, impure, or acts of criminality. Indeed, corruption as it
relates to human behavior can be all of those things and more.
Innate in the human psyche, irrespective of race or religion, is a sense of morality, of what is right and wrong. As innate as this sense of morality, is the desire to
gain advantage over others. A conflict of good and evil. Thankfully most people display more of the good, and some display extraordinary feats of humility and
selflessness.
Yet others sway to the easy path of seeking advantage, wherever they can get it. Self and self gratification are their main motives. These individuals it could be
said are corrupt or corruptible. Corruption weakens the fabric of societies and leads to the society becoming dysfunctional. The 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines provides the basis of ethical and accountable behavior in the public sector. Section 1 of Article XI states that:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. This provision requires every public official and employee to exhibit and live
certain values while in government service. In addition, the State has been mandated by the Constitution to ?maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption?.
In 1989, the Philippine legislature passed Republic Act No. 6713, a law embodying the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. The Code spells out in fine detail the do‘s and don‘ts for government officials and employees in and out of the workplace. These do‘s and don‘ts
are encapsulated in the eight norms of conduct to be observed by all government officials and employees. These norms or standards are:
Political neutrality
Responsiveness to the public
Nationalism and patriotism
Commitment to democracy
Simple living
The Code, likewise, introduced some reforms in the administrative systems like giving heads of agencies the responsibility of ensuring there is a value
development program for their employees; continuing studies on work systems and procedures with the end in view of improving the delivery if public
services; and, mandating the designation of a resident Ombudsman in every department, office and agency. Incentives and rewards system has also been put in
place.
Another comprehensive law passed to address and curb the commission of malfeasance in government is Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In Section 1 of this law, it states that:
It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officer and private
persons alike which constitute graft and corrupt practices which may lead thereto.
This law specifies eleven (11) instances of corrupt practices in addition to acts or omissions already penalized by existing laws:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation
or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom
the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help
given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency
thereof or within one year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the
purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party. (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government,
into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or
group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the
board, committee, panel or group. Interest
for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts
by the board, panel or group to which they belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license,
permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.
The Constitution of 1987 provides six grounds as basis for initiating impeachment proceedings against high ranking government officials, among which are
graft and corruption. (The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust). (Article XI Sec. 2, Phil. Constitution) These are unethical conduct ubiquitously present in all systems of
government. The problem is not so much the present but rather the extent of its use and the negative effects upon the bureaucracy. Philippine laws rarely
distinguish graft from corruption; these may even be used inter-changeably to refer to dishonest means or questionable activity or taking advantage of one‘s
authority or position. Ivan Hill, formerly the Ethics Center at Washington D.C., believes that honesty increases efficiency and productivity both in business and
in government. The inference is that where there is dishonesty, there is the corresponding decrease of efficiency and productivity. Applied to public
management, there will therefore be inefficient and poor delivery of service, and if the segment of the bureaucracy infested is a revenue collecting entity, like
the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, this could only mean a much depreciated revenue collection.
The identity or similarity of their consequences, notwithstanding, In the Bureau of Internal Revenue, graft takes the form of falsification and manipulation of
financial documents and other records and delay in forwarding remittance collections. Contract graft in public works construction may take the form of sealed
bids which are but a formality because there already is a pre-arranged winner of the bid. The use of substandard construction materials is also another form of
graft.
Colonial roots
The use of public office for private ends by government officials and private businessmen has been evident since the Spanish colonial period.
A summary report by Elizabeth Medina of the conference proceedings of the Asociacion Española de Estudios del Pacifica (November 1997) discusses the
kinds and causes of corruption in 19th-century Philippines.
Medina’s report said: “The most important practices were falsification of accounting documents. The evidence of embezzlement of funds was destroyed and the
cabezas de barangay were obliged to sign blank financial statements. Corrupt governors hid monies from the administration in Manila. They also found ways to
discourage the natives from working so they would be thus liable to fines. Taxes and fees were arbitrarily set and excessively high, and illegal fines were often
collected. Governors could embezzle the salaries of public officials and often demanded gifts from their hosts when they made official visits. Gifts were also
necessary so that false documents would not be issued. The reasons for corruption were many: the governors had executive, legislative and judicial powers. No
checks and balances were built into the system, and when they were, they were unenforceable. There was a vague limit between what were public goods and
what were private ones…
The salaries of public officials were low… There was monetary crisis in the 19th century… The laws were so complex as to easily hide misappropriations and
fraud… Finally, the common people had no idea of the law and submitted meekly to the injustices and abuses…”
Many Filipinos today believe that corruption was negligible during the American colonial era. However, as suggested in Medina’s report, corruption in the
provinces was not altogether eradicated.
According to Alfred McCoy (1994), the Americans even ”used the term cacique to describe the provincial elites who combined local office with landed wealth
to gain extraordinary control over the countryside.”
The US colonial authority similarly tried to restrain rent-seeking by an emerging national elite. And although it was penetrated and manipulated by these elites,
the colonial bureaucracy managed to maintain its influence until the 1930s.
Although American colonial rule tried its best at eradicating corruption, there were incidents that already indicated its prevalence. Paul D. Hutchcroft (1998),
for example, cites the solvency problems faced by the Philippine National Bank less than five years after its establishment in 1917. Loans were given out
without consultation and went to well connected agricultural families, directors or interests controlled by directors. In 1921, an accounting firm reported that the
PNB had squandered the entire capital stock contributed by the government as well as half of all government deposits in the bank.
American legacy
American colonial rule also helped develop another building block for the national spread of corruption. It maintained and expanded a big and interventionist
government within a democratic framework. At the start, the colonial administrators promoted an economy led by private enterprise, and big business in
particular, following the trend in the United States at the time. However, beginning in 1913, the government took an active role in the promotion of economic
growth. Then, in 1916, the colonial administrators increasingly interfered in business. The consequent ”growth of government”, as leader, large-scale
development promoter and employer, laid the ground for massive and systematic corruption later in the country’s history. With this legacy came expanded
opportunities for corruption. These included granting individuals and organizations of special favors, policy changes, licenses, business contracts, and even
employment (which in a patron client system redound to personal gain). Such practices effectively destroyed the development of a merit system in the
Philippines. After political independence in 1946, writers like nationalist Renato Constantino bewailed the pervasiveness of corruption in Philippine society.
“Daily, in the halls of Congress, through the printed word and over the airwaves, our politicians and our civic leaders expose, denounce, or deplore this or that
government’s anomaly.
During election time the principal issue is always graft and corruption. No wonder public concern is almost exclusively centered on malfeasance in government.
But with every change of administration, the problem only becomes aggravated. The panaceas and the grandiose promises fizzle out. The accusers become the
accused; the halo of righteousness changes heads. The list of dishonor is different but corruption remains the same. Graft and corruption persist, like a cancer
gnawing at our entrails, showing no signs of abatement and consigning us to a state of helplessness and hopelessness.” The Marcos government has been often
regarded as the most systematically corrupt of all government administrations in the Philippines. This was not surprising considering the concentration of state
powers in the President at the time. Unlike in previous administrations that more or less observed the independence of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government, Marcos effectively controlled these three branches. Eventually, crony capitalism reached its zenith with the centralization of political
power and the realignment of concentrated economic power from the old elites to favored Marcos associates. Although the Marcos government has been
considered as the most corrupt of all, succeeding political administrations had their own share and have not effectively controlled the problem. In fact, with the
return to democracy after the EDSA Revolution, the perception is that the floodgates of corruption have been opened for more people at various levels of
government and society. The vacuum left by the Marcos regime has been filled and even widened; opportunities have simply become available to a broader
population.
Characteristics of Corruption
(b) Corruption on the whole involves secrecy, except where it has become so rampant and so deeply rooted that some powerful individuals or those under their
protection would not bother to hide their activity. But nevertheless, even here the corrupt motive is kept secret.
(c) Corruption involves an element of mutual obligation and mutual benefit. The obligation or benefit need not always be pecuniary.
(d) Those who practice corrupt methods usually attempt to camouflage their activities by resorting to some form of lawful justification. They avoid any open
clash with the law. Page 7 of 31 pages
(e) Those who are involved in corruption are those who want definite decisions and those who are able to influence those decisions.
(f)Any act of corruption involves deception, usually of the public body or society at large.
(h) Any form of corruption involves a contradictory dual function of those who are committing the act. When an official is bribed to issue a business license by
the party who offers a ?gift?, the act of issuing the license is a function of both his office and his self-interest. He acts in a dual
contradictory function. The same may be said of the party offering the bribe. Applying and receiving of license is a function of his lawful business interest, but
resorting to bribery is not.
(i)A corrupt act violates the norms of duty and responsibility within the civic order. It is based on the deliberate intent of subordinating common interest to
specific interest.
The above list of characteristics of corruption could be extended. For an act to be classified as corrupt it has to contain all the above characteristics. The only
possible exception is where corruption is difficult to distinguish from criminal extortion, where the party who bribes was compelled to do so, grudgingly and
resentfully, and where the bribery was not considered as a necessary outlay for future gain. In such cases the victims kept no secrecy. Opportunities for
corruption abound in the absence or lack of order, transparency and accountability.
Ledivina V. Cariño believes that corruption results from individual, organizational and societal causes.
1.individual — this results from low morality of both bureaucrats and clients
2.organizational — the weaknesses arising from the system may be due to unrealistic compensation, inadequate controls in areas not susceptible to corruption;
lack of explicit standards of performance for individual employees and organizational units; poor recruitment and selection procedures and government red-
tape. The inability of the organization to provide adequate services to cope with the volume of demand breeds black market operations for government
subsidized services. Poor public relations could result to public ignorance of what the organization does. This whets employee appetite for corruption. Poor
working conditions and office facilities, weak organizational leadership and bureaucratic politization are other contributory factors.
3.societal — these are causes which are primarily attributed to the culture of a society. The open tolerance of the public of undesirable and inefficient
employees has bred an employee psychology of recalcitrance and lack of fear of being censured or criticized because of the assurance given to them by their
political ?backers?, all because of the “padrino system” or political patronage. The negative role model played by superiors creates an atmosphere of
incompetence and defiance rather than efficiency and discipline. The “pakikisama” system puts heavy pressure upon the new employee to join his peers in the
workplace as to perpetuate the legacy of administrative ineffectiveness.
The Filipino is further beset by extreme familism and personalism which generate inefficient delivery of services. The expected behavior of the Filipino is
arrayed against cultural norms most of which are anchored on personalism. In the Philippines, people who practice graft and corruption are often put on the
pedestal; they attain respectability while those who do not engage in such practices are branded as “tanga” for not taking advantage of their position and power.
Behavior that is legally unacceptable may be ideal and acceptable depending upon the political culture of a society. The bureaucrat is expected to deal equally
with everyone, whether relatives or strangers. They are not supposed to receive gifts in any form. However, this expected behavior often clashes with the
personal way Filipinos get on terms with one another. The practice of taking care of their kin is a deeply ingrained trait which could result in partiality and
preferment in his official dealings. He gives priority to the transactions of his family however down the file these may be. Such personalism is not limited only
to blood relations but extends to all those sanctified by ritualistic ties like
the compadre system, including neighbors, friends and other persons with whom, one interacts. All these practices explain the persistence of the social evils in
our society.
Social tolerance of these negativistic practices is complemented by passage of legislation without sufficient study of implications; the difficulty of proving graft
and corruption cases; lack of political will to wage a determined anti-corruption campaign; poor educational orientation of the citizenry and clannishness and
parochialism which destroys the merit system. There are three critical focal points of corruption in the bureaucracy.
a. regulatory entities and enforcement agencies like police, regulation, of professions and licensure boards, securities exchange commission, board of
investments and environmental and natural resources conservation, among others;
c. revenue raising and collecting entities like the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Department of Transportation and Communications, and the
treasury offices. Two variants of corruption have been identified as negative bureaucratic behavior in the Philippines:
1.that which involves only civil servants like giving lucrative positions and promotions to the highest bidder and giving and accepting bribes (padulas) to get a
preferred position or receive lenient treatment than what is deserved, especially in cases where the employee is under administrative investigation.
2.that which involves a person or persons outside the bureaucracy either of whom initiates the act.
In the Land Transportation Office, there is corruption when the employee circumvents procedures for checking and resealing taxi meters; receiving ?retainers
fee for expeditious processing of license to operate and for motor vehicle registration. There could be collusion by purchasing agents and suppliers of office
supply, equipment, spare parts which increases the cost of supplies and equipments; in government contracts there ?are high-bribe-paying applicants; out-of-
office settlement of income tax, business tax and sales tax are some of the common corrupt practices.
2.misclassification
3.misdeclaration
4.outright smuggling
There is undervaluation when an importer depreciates his imported goods very much below the actual cost. For instance, a sardine importer brings in a million
cans. He pays P2.00 per can before taxes. Sardines are subject to 20% customs duty, as of January, 1991, or 40 centavos per can. If the importer is dishonest, he
undervalues the importation to P1.00 per can before taxes and therefore pays only 20 centavos instead of 40 centavos as
customs duty. With millions of cans of sardines, and with the number of importers doing this, government is defrauded by the millions of pesos. Customs
appraisers check the value of the imported goods against the official customs published values. When they are bribed, they will not bother to check, and if they
check they deflate the value.
Misdeclaration and misclassification are falsification of quantity and quality of imported goods. There is misdeclaration when the importer declares a lesser
volume or quantity or declares the items different from what is contained in the van. The inspector does not bother to check and just clears the cargo. In the case
of misclassification, the importer declares the importation as belonging to another classification. For example, he declares it as industrial flour but in reality it is
food flour which is taxed less.
Outright smuggling occurs when the cargo is unloaded not in the designated place or port of entry. For example, when the vessel enters Philippine waters, it is
met and the cargo is transferred to “kumpits” and brought to shore somewhere, other than the designated entry port and from there picked up by cargo trucks,
sorted and delivered to contract-outlets, without paying customs duties. The culprits here are the coastguard and the military at the checkpoints who are paid off
to let the cargo pass.
Abuse of bonded warehouse permits occurs when an importer brings in raw materials to be made into finished products. He does not pay taxes for the raw
materials because he holds a permit to import. But in reality, he sells these raw materials to manufacturers at a price slightly lower than when the factories
import by themselves. The culprits involved in this operation are the customs guards of the warehouse, the accountant of the bonded warehouse and the legal
division of the customs office.
If the causes of graft and corruption are individual, organizational and societal, said three sectors are also affected. To the individual there is
loss of self-respect and ultimate dehumanization; to the organization it could result in subversion of authority structure and disillusionment within the
bureaucracy. To society, it could mean increased administrative cost and revenue loss to government. There will be corresponding deterioration of public
service and loss of confidence in government.? There will be goal displacement as employees pursue personal interests, rather than organizational and social
objectives. The intent of policy and the procedures for their implementation become useless since target beneficiaries are substituted for. Unauthorized control
mechanisms take precedence over legal rules and regulations. Authoritative allocation of values envisioned by legislation gives way to shady deals and the
demands of personal expediency. It brings about frustration and cynicism which could undermine faith and confidence in the viability and effectiveness of the
democratic system. Graft and corruption are encouraged by public apathy which results from bad and ill-managed government. But its most important and
potent medium is the individual official or employee. Let us take the Bureau of Customs as a case in point, since it is the number one collecting arm of
government which account for four-fifths of the total governmental revenue generated. This entity administers control and police authority over all harbors,
piers, airports, wharves, ports, bays, rivers and inland waters throughout the Philippines. Its general duties and powers include assessment and collection of
lawful revenues from imported goods and other fees, charges, dues, fines and penalties. It is charged with preventing and suppressing smuggling; supervision
and control over the entrance and clearance of vessels and aircraft engaged in foreign trade; enforcement of customs and tariff laws and other rules and
regulations relating to tariff and customs administration; supervision over the handling of foreign mail to collect duties on articles smuggled through mails;
control import and export cargoes landed and stored in piers, airports, terminal and depot facilities like container yards and flight stations, and exercises
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases in accordance with tariff and customs laws. While the Bureau of Customs exercises extensive powers, these
powers could be abused especially if these entail discretion. Newspaper reports of customs men charged of fraud, smuggling rings bared, and cargoes worth
millions seized, are not uncommon.
2. ?The finance intelligence bureau bared the existence of a smuggling syndicate allegedly headed by a Taiwanese national. The suspected ring leader tried to
bribe a team of operatives during the raid. The merchandise included electronic goods, household wares, toys, and ready-to-wear clothes.?
3. ?Cases of food flour smuggling proliferated when the government imposed a 30% import duty on food flour imports and only 10% for industrial flour.
Unscrupulous traders declared their food flour imports as industrial flour to do away with paying higher taxes. Smuggled food flour posed unfair competition
with the imported ones which were legally paid for.?
4. ?Graft charges were filed with the Tanodbayan against nine customs personnel and four others for allegedly conniving with smugglers in defrauding the
government of millions of pesos in revenue.?
Corrupt Conduct
(b) any conduct of a public official that constitutes or involves the dishonest or partial exercise of any of his or her official functions;
or (c) any conduct of a public official or former public official that constitutes or involves a breach of public trust;
or (d) any conduct of a public official or former public official that involves the misuse of information or material that he or she has acquired in the course of
his or her official functions, whether or not for his or her benefit or for the benefit of any other person.
(2) Corrupt conduct is also any conduct of any person (whether or not a public official) that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly or
indirectly, the exercise of official functions by any public official, any group or body of public officials or any public authority and which could involve any of
the following matters:
(a) official misconduct (including breach of trust, fraud in office, nonfeasance, misfeasance, malfeasance, oppression, extortion or imposition);
(b) bribery;
(c) blackmail;
(d) obtaining or offering secret commissions;
(e) fraud;
(f) theft;
(r) forgery;
There are three types of phenomena contained in the term corruption; bribery, extortion and nepotism. They are not completely identical, but can be classified
under one heading. Essentially there is a common thread running through these three types of phenomena – the subordination of public interests to private aims
involving violation of the norms of duty and welfare, accompanied by secrecy, betrayal, deception and a callous disregard for any consequence suffered by the
public.
Another phenomenon which can be described as corruption is the appointment of relatives, friends or political associates to public offices regardless of their
merits and the consequences on the public wealth. This is called nepotism.
Red Tape
One catalyzing agent of graft and corruption is red tape. This is a bureaucratic procedure characterized by excessive and unnecessary – delay in transacting
business with government which is intentionally committed. It is a practice that slows down or hampers the delivery of much-needed basic services. When there
is undue delay in the processing of transactions, people resort to fixers who collude with corrupt employees and officials to expedite business transactions. This
is a common phenomenon in government offices. Fixers with connections inside the different offices facilitate the issuance of marriage license or certificate of
birth or of death. After all, marriages are not made in heaven but at the city hail with the price set by the fixer.
Certainly, the client of city hall would be willing to shell out a few pesos as “fixer’s fee” rather than queue the long line aggravated by the slow-paced
processing process. This is the price paid for the inefficiency of the bureaucracy however unethical the practice is Nepotism.
Nepotism is a version of graft and corruption exemplified by favors showered on relatives by appointing them to government positions regardless of
qualifications. The practice may be viewed as an aid to responsive management if blood relatives do their share in achieving organizational goals with
minimum time and effort expended. On the other hand, nepotism can be pernicious to society if the relatives in the employ of government use blood
relationship as the key to open themselves to the opportunity of improving their lives at the expense of public good and general welfare. It can foster the growth
of dictatorship and the formation of ?political dynasties? which the 1987 constitution prohibits.
In the Philippines, nepotism is not without historical antecedents. The barangay of early Philippine society was viewed more as a socio-economic unit
composed of members with consanguinial ties and those related by affinity. Cooperation in the community was a function of personal connection than pre-
determined programs and impersonal procedures. These historical antecedents nurtured a tradition and a culture which considered public office more as a
source of private gain than a public trust.
The prohibition against nepotism is articulated best in the statement made by the late Ferdinand Marcos in 1972.
?Let no man who claims to be friend, relative or ally presume to seek license because of the relationship. If he offends the new society, he should be punished
like the rest.? Unfortunately, however, his administration committed the most number of cases of nepotism. Critics maintain that it was during the Marcos era
that nepotism was institutionalized. The Aquino administration also showcased nepotism. If the Marcoses and the Romualdezes had their day, the Aquinos and
the Cojuangcos also have theirs. The Ramos administration and the Estrada administration have their respective shares too. So what else is new? After all
unethical behavior and practices have always been with us. In our Muslim society, this problem is of more acute proportion. But why the insatiable desire of
relatives of presidents to serve in government? Why do public officials appoint relatives to sensitive positions? Should personal loyalty and intimacy outweigh
competence, seniority and the merit system? These are administrative dilemmas which have to be resolved.
In the Philippines, there is a strong belief that corruption is prevalent. In a 1998 Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey, more than 70 percent of the respondents
thought that corruption existed in government. Nearly 40 percent believed that there was ”a great deal” of corruption.
Based on its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 99 countries, Transparency International rated the Philippines as the 54th among the most corrupt countries
in 1999. The Philippines scored 3.6 based on the CPI scale of 1 (high perception) to 10 (negligible perception). Indeed, in a society with a long history of
rapacity and plunder in the ranks of the state and the elite, and powerlessness among the masses, the use of public office has been identified with gaining and
maintaining economic, political and social power. Both private citizens and government employees habitually use this office to further their self-interest at the
expense of the common good. This custom has prevailed in the Philippines under a long and continuing regime of rent capitalism, in contrast to production-
oriented capitalism.
Here is the anatomy of some types of corruption, taken from the website ofthe Transparent Accountable Governance project.
Textbook scams
According to the article of Yvonne T. Chua of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, up to 65 percent of textbook funds are reserved as bribe
money. The range is from 20 percent to 65 percent.
Take the case of the medium-sized book publisher caught in January 1999. Her bulging bag contained several envelopes:
P 1,000,000 (5% of the contract) for the regional director
50,000 for the supply officer
40,000 for the chief accountant
15,000 for the accountant who obligated the money
10,000 for the cashier
5,000 for each of the accounting clerks
Then add 40 percent of the contract to a congressman. The total is about half the size of the contract she won.
Public works
A report by Earl Parreño said that congressmen get 12 percent to 20 percent of the funds allotted for building artesian wells, bridges, and roads. The total lost
money may be bigger. In 1998 a cabinet member told journalists that commissions on public works ran up to an average 30 percent of the project cost.
He cited an engineer who supervised road pavement projects in an Eastern Visayas district. The engineer cut the cement used by 20 to 30 percent “to save on
materials.” To do this he would leave hollow the middle portion of the road. Only gravel now occupies that section, though covered by a thin covering of
cement.
“A foreman of a construction company building a seawall in the same district, meanwhile, admits he is using `small stones’ in the inner portion of the wall,”
wrote Parreño. “That’s not supposed to be done,” says the foreman, “but no one can see it, anyway.” This cuts down the cement used by 20 percent.
A piece by Stella Tirol tells of the corruption that takes place in elections. A common means is the simple dole-out. One congressional candidate in Southern
Luzon gave out as much as P 10,000 a day in the barrios. The rate then was P 100 per voter. Election eve would require some P 4 million.
The more sophisticated way is to get the barangay captain to your side. One barangay captain she interviewed admitted that he and other barangay captains
were offered P 30,000 each. A bidding competition would ensue among the candidates.
“Barangay officials act as the conduit for purchasing votes,” writes Tirol. “They know who among their constituents can be bought and on election day itself,
they ensure that these people actually go to the precinct and cast their vote for the preferred candidate.” THE FIGHT AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION
A. Oversight Institutions
The legal infrastructure and political commitment are supported and complemented by the existence of oversight institutions. The creation of the oversight
institutions that deal with issues of ethics, accountability, graft and corruption are mandated by the Constitution. The common feature of these institutions is
they enjoy a substantive degree of fiscal autonomy in the sense that they are not subject to the fiscal controls of the executive. The budget is directly released to
these institutions and the heads are authorized to realign savings from their budget. They also have quasi-judicial powers in that they can adjudicate and decide
cases and enforce their own decisions, including the imposition of sanctions which may include suspension from office or even dismissal from government
service.
In the Philippines, the three constitutionally mandated oversight institutions are the Civil Service Commission, the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Commission on Audit. The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government. Under Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution, the
CSC is mandated to ?establish career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service.? It is also tasked to ?institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.? CSC‘s effort involves in enforcing ethics and
accountability of line agencies basically involves three approaches. One approach is regulatory, the other, corrective, and the last one, developmental. The first
approach addresses compliance ofagencies with policies and standards on HRD systems set by the CSC. For instance, CSC prescribes qualification standards
for each and every position in the Philippine government. Non-compliance with the QS by agencies in the processing of appointments of their staff results in the
disapproval by the CSC of such appointments. But, apart from the substantive requirements for practically all kinds of personnel actions such as the publication
requirement and the promotion and selection board processes. Non-compliance with the procedural requirements constitutes ground for corrective or even
punitive action.
The second approach deals with disciplinary actions against official or employee for infractions committed in relation to the performance of his/her official
functions. The Administrative Code of 1987 or Executive Order No. 292 outlines the various acts that are subject to administrative disciplinary proceedings.
However, administrative discipline is not a function within the exclusive jurisdiction of CSC. Agency heads as well as the Office of the Ombudsman also have
the authority to proceed against erring government officials and employees. The third approach is developmental and will be discussed later in the succeeding
paragraph. The Office of the Ombudsman acts as a prosecutor against those charged with the violation of RA 3019, RA 6713 and the law against ill-gotten
wealth, among others. It is mandated to investigate and prosecute the criminal liability of public officials and employees involved in graft and corruption.
The Commission on Audit is the fiscal watchdog of the government. COA is responsible for ensuring legal and proper disbursement of public funds and
preventing irregular, unnecessary, or extravagant expenditures or usage of public funds. It also has quasi-judicial powers. All these oversight institutions
enforce accountability ethic in government. B. Traditional approaches since independence, numerous mechanisms have been designed to counteract corruption
in the Philippines. The traditional approaches include setting the legal framework and establishing anti graft and corruption bodies like presidential committees,
commissions, task forces and other units.
Since 1950, various Philippine presidents, from Quirino to Estrada, have created antigraft and corruption investigation units and agencies. With the exception of
the present Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), established in February 1994, these bodies have been short-lived.
The most recent presidential body is the Interagency Anti Graft Coordinating Council, which includes the Commission on Audit, the Civil Service Commission,
the Office of the Ombudsman, the PCAGC, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Justice. The council was established through a
memorandum of agreement among these agencies on June 11, 1997 (the DOJ was admitted in 1998).
The council received presidential recognition only in August 1999 through President Estrada’s Administrative Order Number 79 which allotted P5 million for
antigraft activities. At present, the Ombudsman and the PCAGC are the principal actors in government to act on complaints and cases of graft. Some of the
cases are resolved by the Ombudsman while the others are elevated to the Sandiganbayan. Cases where the accused have been found guilty are sent to the
Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals. Currently, administrative cases are automatically sent to the Court of Appeals while criminal cases like the violation
of the AntiGraft and Corruption Practices Act go directly to the Supreme Court. The issues of ethics and accountability pose a continuing challenge to the
Philippine government. The mechanisms and infrastructure that have been put in place, as outlined in this paper, may not yet be the best or ideal in the sense
that ethical and accountable behavior in the public sector is still much to be desired in the Philippines. But, there is so much hope to hold and believe that there
will be many opportunities to lead and change for the best.
b. CODE OF CONDUCT & ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
(Republic Act No. 6713)
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as
well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent,
and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance
of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents
relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination
and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-
owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. Section 17. A public officer
or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by
law.
TITLE VII
REVISED PENAL CODE
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Who Are Public Officers? – any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part of the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer. (Art. 203)
Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. – The penalty of prison correccional in its medium period to prison mayor in its minimum
period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both shall be imposed upon any public officer who: 1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person
with regard to furnishing supplies, the making of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property or funds, shall enter into an
agreement with any interested party or speculator or make use of any other scheme, to defraud the Government; 2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes,
licenses, fees and other imposts, shall be guilty of any of the following acts or omissions;
(a) Demanding, directly or directly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law.
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially.
(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law. When the
culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs, the provisions of the Administrative Code shall be applied.
Art. 215. Prohibited transactions. – The penalty of prison correctional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any appointive public officer who, during his incumbency, shall directly or indirectly become interested in any transaction of exchange or
speculation within the territory subject to his jurisdiction. Art. 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon a public officer who directly or indirectly, shall become interested in
any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene.
This provision is applicable to experts, arbitrators and private accountants who, in like manner, shall take part in any contract or transaction connected with the
estate or property in appraisal distribution or adjudication of which they shall have acted, and to the guardians and executors with respect tom the property
belonging to their wards or estate.
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable
for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. – Any public officer, whether in the service or separated there from by resignation or any other
cause, who is required by law or regulation to render account to the Insulator Auditor, or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two
months after such accounts should be rendered, shall be punished by prison correctional in its minimum period, or by a fine ranging
from 200 to 1,000 pesos or both. Art. 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country. – Any public officer who
unlawfully leaves or attempts to leave the Philippine Islands without securing a certificate from the Insular Auditor showing that his accounts have been finally
settled, shall be punished by arresto mayor, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos or both.
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. – Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or property under his administration to any public use
other than that for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prison correctional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damage or embarrassment shall have Page 22 of 31 pages
resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5 to 50 per cent of the sum misapplied.
Art. 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property. – Any public officer under obligation to make payment from Government funds in his
possession, who shall fail to make such payment, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine of from 5 to 25 per cent of the sum which he failed to pay.
This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by competent authority to deliver any property in his custody or under his administration,
shall refuse to make such delivery.
The fine shall be graduated in such case by the value of the thing, provided that it shall not be less than 50 pesos.
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense. (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom
the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help
given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency
thereof or within one year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before
him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or
group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the
board, committee, panel or group. Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful,
inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong. (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit,
privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or
dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the
employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this
section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the
discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government. Sec. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any
person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction,
application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word “close personal relation” shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections,
and professional employments all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer. (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. – It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene,
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who,
prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of
business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed
by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law,
or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Sec. 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. – It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected, to
acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or
resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term.
The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or
resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency.
It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution
authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain such interest. Sec. 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. – Every public
officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon
the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department
Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and
the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements
in the following months of January.
Sec. 9. Penalties for violations. – (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6
of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other
lawful income.
Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the
criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the value of
such thing.
(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.
The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no
criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
Sec. 10. Competent court. – Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the proper Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court).
Sec. 11. Prescription of offenses. – All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
Sec. 12. Termination of office. – No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Sec. 14. Exception. – Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according
to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by any public
officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession,
trade or occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations penalized in this Act.
Any public official and employee, whether of the national or local governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to
give, any gift, present or other valuable thins on any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by reason of his
official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future
from the public official and employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or
entertainments in honor of the official and employee or his immediate relatives.
For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment, for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years and perpetual disqualification from public
office shall be imposed. The official and employee concerned shall likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary action and, if found guilty, shall be meted
out the penalty of suspension or removal, depending on the seriousness of the offense.
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities
or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Sec. 3. Competent Court. – Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Sec.
4. Rule of Evidence. – For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Sec. 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. – Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstated and to the salaries and other benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Sec. 6. Prescription of Crime. – The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. However, the right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. Sec. 7.
Separability of Provisions. – If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance are held invalid, the remaining provisions of
this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
A Final Word (Toward New Beginnings, as stated in the SONA of former Pres. Estrada, July 24, 2000) “Graft and corruption is the worst form of rottenness in
our society. It erodes the moral fabric of our people, robs the poor, increases the costs of doing business, erodes tax collection efforts, and drives away
investments. The World Bank estimates that at least 20 percent of government project funds ends up as kickbacks. We can no longer fight corruption piecemeal.
We need a comprehensive approach that would reduce opportunities for corruption; remove needless regulations and simplify procedures; eradicate the end to
recover electoral expenses by corrupt means; increase public vigilance both to deter and to detect commissions of graft; reform budget processes; improve
meritocracy in the civil service; target selected departments and agencies for cleansing; increase the efficiency and speed in catching offenders and their
prosecution; stiffen sanctions against corruption partnerships with the private sector; and support judicial reform to make the courts part of the solution rather
than part of the problem. The courts should not allow themselves to be used as a refuge for scoundrels.”
References:
1. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION