G.R. No. 178512. November 26, 2014.
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ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Frustrated Homicide; Elements of.—The elements of
frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Inasmuch as
the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in
murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to
ascertain the presence of the two other elements.
Same; Same; Intent to Kill; The essential element in frustrated or
attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.—The
essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the
offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must
allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial
evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed
from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of
mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e.,
the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, 480 SCRA 188 (2006), we
considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill,
namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim;
and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors
the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting
the injuries on the victim.
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* FIRST DIVISION.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guzman, Jr. vs. People
Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. The maximum
term is the penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the
minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the RPC for the offense committed.—Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. The
maximum term is the penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the
minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed.
Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, frustrated
homicide is punished by prisión mayor, which is next lower to reclusion
temporal, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present,
however, prisión mayor in its medium period — from eight years and one
day to 10 years — is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and
one day of prisión mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was
not within the medium period of prisión mayor. Accordingly, the correct
indeterminate sentence is four years of prisión correccional, as the
minimum, to eight years and one day of prisión mayor, as the maximum.
Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission.—Alexander as the
victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the offender
committed violence that nearly took away the victim’s life. “Moral damages
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act for omission.” Indeed, Article 2219(1), of the Civil
Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in
physical injuries. Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the
records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages. In
addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 26, 2014 503
De Guzman, Jr. vs. People
P30,000.00. Both of these awards did not require allegation and proof.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the
offender. Without proof of such intent, the felony may only be
serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through
the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before,
during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and number of
the wounds inflicted on the victim.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision
promulgated on September 27, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide committed
against Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered on September
10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in
Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-MD.
