TITLE 7 – CASE DIGEST

People vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division & Third Division, 712 SCRA 359, G.R. No. 188165, G.R. No.
189063 December 11, 2013

FACTS:

An information was filed against Hernando Perez, the then Secretary of DOJ for violation of section 3(b)
of RA No. 3019. It was alleged in the information that he conspired with the other accused, all private
individuals for requesting and demanding the amount of 2 Million US Dollars from Mark Jimenez. The
accused succeeded in receiving the amount demanded as a consideration of the accused’s desisting
from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the
Plunder Case against Former President Estrada, and in connection with the pending application of Mark
Jimenez for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The accused intervene in all these
transaction in his official capacity to the damage and prejudice of Mark Jimenez.

The accused moved to quash the information. The Sandiganbayan First Division denied such motion for
lack of merit but granted its Motion for Reconsideration and grant their motion to quash the
information against them rationating that sec3b of RA 3019 is specific that it is limited only to contract
or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has authority to intervene
under the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is liable for violation of section 3(b) of RA No. 3019

HELD: NO, the investigation conducted by Perez was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction
because this term must be construed as analogous to the terms which precedes it. A transaction like a
contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element is absent in
the investigation conducted by Perez.

The Court believes and so holds that the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez "from
pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder
case against former President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in connection with the pending application of
Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP of the government", cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered as "contract" or "transaction" as defined within the ambit of the fourth
element of the offense under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because no "monetary consideration" as in credit
transaction is involved.
 Campomanes vs. People, 511 SCRA 285, G.R. No. 161950 December 19, 2006

FACTS:

The accused Hechanova was the Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) and Campomanes
was the President of Federation International Des Echecs (FIDE) were charged with conspiracy in
violating Article 218 of the RPC which defines and penalized the failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts. PSC submitted to FIDE a bid offer to host the 30 th Chess Olympiad of 1992 in Manila. In
connection with the said transaction, PSC passed a resolution appropriating financial amount for the
allowance and other expenses for the said event, and FIDE acknowledge as having received the said
amounts as shown by a letter.

COA conducted an audit of the PSC’s transactions from March 1990 to June 1992. During the audit, the
COA team noticed irregularities in the claims payable to the FIDE which consisted of the lack of
acknowledgement receipts and of accounting liquidation attached to the disbursement vouchers. The
report stated that the FIDE, through Campomanes, received P12,876,008 without acknowledgment and
without liquidation. Hence the filing of the information against the herein accused.

ISSUE: Whether Campomanes is guilty of failure to render accounts as defined in Article 218 in relation
to Article 222 of the RPC

RULING: NO.

There are four elements of the crime under Article 218. First, the offender is a public officer. Second, he
must be an accountable officer for public funds or property. Third, the offender is required by law or
regulation to render accounts to the COA, or to a provincial auditor. Fourth, he fails to render an
account for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.

The COA has the authority to demand an accounting from the FIDE if there is a law which requires the
PSC to ask the FIDE to render an accounting, or if the PSC expressly required the FIDE to render an
accounting as a condition for funding the Chess Olympiad and Congress. Absent such law or contractual
obligation, the COA does not have the authority to audit the accounts of non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity from the government, like the FIDE. In the same manner, nongovernmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity from the government, like the FIDE, are not obliged to render an
accounting to the COA if no law or contract requires them to do so. In the present case, the absence of
the conditions contained in Section 2(1)(d) of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution prevents the creation
of an obligation on the FIDE’s part to render an accounting to the PSC or the COA. Consequently,
Campomanes, as representative of the FIDE which has no legal obligation to render an accounting,
cannot be liable under Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
 TITLE 8 – CASE DIGEST

Dado vs. People, 392 SCRA 46, G.R. No. 131421 November 18, 2002.

FACTS:

Sometime in May 1992, the Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept cattle
rustlers. One of the team is the herein accused Dado. On the evening of operation, the team saw
somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. Thinking that it was one of the cattle rustlers, Eraso
fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man, and Dado fired a single shot from his .45 caliber
pistol. The victim turned out to be Silvestre Butsoy Balinas and not the cattle rustle the team were
ordered to intercept. Silvestre died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.

The accused found guilty of the crime of homicide together with his co-accused. However, the accused
filed a Petition for Review contending that the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in finding him guilty
of homicide on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution

ISSUE: Whether or not Dado is guilty of homicide

RULING: NO, he is not guilty of homicide but he is not completely without liability. He should be held
liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the RPC.

The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person;
and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person.

Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to
life. Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the
other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.

Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime
of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs. Abanilla, 413 SCRA 654, G.R. Nos. 148673-75 October 17, 2003

FACTS:

A consolidated decision was rendered by the RTC finding appellant Florencio Abanilla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of rape committed against his 17-year old daughter, which resulted in
the latter’s pregnancy.
The complainant testified on the three alleged rape incidents. The first was said to have occurred during
the month of June 1999 where accused Abanilla touched her private part and rubbed his penis unto her
until ejaculation. The second and third rape incidents purportedly occurred on October 1999 where the
accused was able to insert his penis into Lorena’s vagina. All three incidents were committed by means
of force, threat and intimidation.

Abanilla denied raping his daughter but the sole evidence he presented was his own testimony.
Considering that his conviction was chiefly due to the complainant’s testimony, the Court is obliged to
examine thoroughly the veracity of such testimony to ensure that it meets the required quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt necessary to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abanilla is guilty attempted rape in the first rape incident

RULING: NO.

Under the doctrine laid down in People v. Dulay, the traditional concept of rape is that carnal knowledge
is gained against or without the consent of the victim. If the rape is made by force, violence or
intimidation, it is self-evident that it was made against or without the victim’s consent. The rule is that
resistance may be proved by any physical overt act in any degree from the offended party. Tenacious
resistance, however, is not required. Neither is a determined and persistent physical struggle on the part
of the victim necessary.

In People v. Campuhan, the Court extensively discussed what should constitute rape: x x x x x x x x x . . . .
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or
grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or
the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof,
for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be “touched”
by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to
touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.

Without the penetration, the crime committed is either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Attempted rape, however, requires that the offender commence the commission of rape directly by
overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.

In the present case, nothing prevented appellant from consummating the act and it would seem that he
was already contended with rubbing his penis against the complainant without actually inserting it into
her private part. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of attempted rape but only of acts of
lasciviousness for the June 1999 incident.