Joselito E.

Kakilala 1 - Al-Farabi Criminal Law I

Article 5

A. IN CASES OF EXCESSIVE PENALTIES

1. People vs. Monleon December 10, 1976 (74 SCRA 263)

FACTS:
On June 1, 1970, Cosme Monleon in his inebriated state asked whether the carabao was
already fed. To check the veracity of the statement, he went to see the carabao. He discovered
that the carabao had not been adequately fed. He was about to hit Marciano, his 10 year old
son, when Concordia, his wife, intervened. Monleon choked her, bashed her head against the
post, and kicked her abdomen. Concordia died the following day due to trauma or external
violence.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the accused is criminally liable although he had no intention to kill his wife.

HELD:
Yes. Art 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different than that which he intended
to do. The maltreatment inflicted by the accused on his wife was the proximate cause of her
death. He could have easily killed his wife had he really intended to take her life. He did not kill
her outright. The accused was found guilty of parricide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

2. People vs. Jocelyn Acbangin G.R. No. 117216  August 9, 2000

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:

On April 23, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Danilo Acbangin was worried when
his daughter, four-year old Sweet Grace Acbangin (hereinafter referred to as "Sweet") did not
come home.3
Sweet's father, Danilo, testified that he last saw Sweet on the same day, at six o'clock in the
evening, playing in Jocelyn's house.4 Jocelyn was the common-law wife of his second cousin,
Remy Acbangin.5

Danilo went to Jocelyn's house and looked for Sweet. 6

At around seven fifteen in the evening, Danilo reported to the Barangay and the Bacoor Police
Station that Sweet was missing.7

On the same day at eleven o'clock in the evening, Jocelyn arrived at Danilo's house without
Sweet. When asked where the child was, Jocelyn denied knowing of the child's whereabouts.

On April 24, 1991, Danilo made a second report to the Bacoor Police Station, stating that
Jocelyn returned without the child.8

On April 24, 1991, Jocelyn informed Danilo's mother-in-law that Sweet was in Niu's house in
Tondo, Manila.9 9

On April 25, 1991, the case was reported to the Manila police. 10

Jocelyn accompanied Danilo, Sweet's grandfather and police officers to Niu's house. She went
down with Niu and Sweet.13 Sweet was well-dressed and smiling.14 Niu then voluntarily turned
Sweet over to her father and the policemen.15

Pat. Manuel Lao testified that when he asked Niu how she came to have possession of the child,
she answered that a certain "Helen" brought the child to her. This "Helen" could not be found. 16

However, on the witness stand, Niu told a different story. Niu narrated that it was Jocelyn who
brought Sweet to her house on April 23, 1991.

On April 26, 1991, a complaint for kidnapping a minor18 was filed against accused-appellant
Jocelyn Acbangin, accused Niu, Helen Doe and Juana Doe with the Municipal Trial Court,
Bacoor, Cavite, to wit:19

ISSUE: Whether or Not Sweet’s penalty is too excessive on the charges of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention punishable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and should
suffer the prison term of Reclusion Perpetua.

HELD: Yes,

"This Court finds the above penalty to be too harsh to be imposed against 23-year old and third
year high school student-accused Jocelyn Acbangin. The evidence on record had not clearly
indicated that Danilo Acbangin and minor-victim Sweet Grace Acbangin during the latter's
two-day stay in the house of Juanita Niu has been emotionally or physically injured. The degree
of malicious intent of accused Jocelyn does not warrant the excessive penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Bacoor, Cavite, dated June 22, 1994, finding accused-appellant JOCELYN RADAM
ACBANGIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,33 we recommend to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice, the grant to accused-appellant
JOCELYN RADAM ACBANGIN of either a commutation of sentence to an indeterminate penalty
of prision correctional to prision mayor or executive clemency, considering that she has been in
preventive detention since April 29, 1991. 34 Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice.

3. People vs. Pedro Montano and Wenceslao Cabagsang G.R. No. L36345            
November 25, 1932

BUTTE, J.:

FACTS: The defendants-appellants were convicted of the crime of falsification of public

documents from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite. The defendant Wenceslao
Cabagsang was the chief of police and the defendant Pedro Montano was the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Tanza in the Province of Cavite, in the month of September, 1930,
when the crimes for which they were convicted occurred.

On September 5, 1930, a criminal complaint against one Arturo A. Soriano for the crime of
qualified seduction was filed with the said justice of the peace. The justice, apparently to favor
Soriano, delayed the preliminary investigation.

The offended woman on September 18, 1930, filed with him a motion demanding immediate
action and calling his attention to the fact that his delay was a violation of the circular of
instructions of the judge of the Court of First Instance of said province.

The case was then set for hearing on September 22, 1930. Thereafter administrative charges
against the justice of the peace were filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite, alleging
that the delay in the preliminary investigation was a violation of the circular of the Court of First
Instance, dated November 15, 1928, requiring all justices of the peace to dispose of all
preliminary investigations within ten days from the date on which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.lawphil.net
The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that prior to the hearing of said administrative
case, the defendants, in order to make it appear that there had been no violation of the said
instructions to the justices of the peace, falsified official records in their custody.

The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered and falsified the municipal police blotter and
the book of records of arrests and the return of the warrant of arrest and Soriano's bail bond so
as to make them show that the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and gave bond on the 13th
day of September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in fact, as said records showed before said
falsification, the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and released on bond on the 6th day of
September, 1930.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alterations and falsification of the municipal police blotter were
made in good faith and corresponded to the true facts.

HELD: The court below rejected the defense of the accused that said alterations were made in
good faith and corresponded to the true facts of the case. There is no issue of law raised in the
assignment of errors. We have made a careful review of the evidence and have come to the
conclusion that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.

Separate Opinions

STREET, J., concurring:

I am unable to resist the conclusion that the two accused in this case are guilty having violated
the law, but in view of the apparent lack of malice and total absence of injury resulting from the
offense, I am of the opinion that the case is one that calls for a recommendation of clemency to
the Chief Executive in conformity with the provisions of the second paragraph of article 5 of the
Revised Penal Code. It seems to me that imprisonment for six months would be an adequate
penalty for the offense here committed.

MALCOLM, OSTRAND and IMPERIAL, JJ., dissenting:

We dissent and are of the opinion that the proof does not justify the conviction of either
defendant.

4. People vs. Teopista Canja G.R. No. L-2800             May 30, 1950

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS: Appellant Teopista Canja was convicted of parricide for having killed her husband Pedro
Jongque, the by the court of first instance of Antique, and was sentenced to imprisonment for
life, plus indemnity of P2,000, and costs.
The spouses resided at barrio Badiangan, Potnongon, province of Antique. Squandering the
family funds in gambling and even keeping a paramour, Pedro got the drinking habit that
sometimes led him to lay violent hands on his wife.

The slaying occurred at night, about ten o'clock, May 25, 1948, in the conjugal home, where the
family had gone to bed earlier in the evening, the husband sleeping in one small room, and the
wife with the children in another.

The eldest daughter Exuperia, twenty years old, declared substantially as follows: "That night
my mother woke me up and told me my father was dead. She told me that she had killed him
otherwise he would kill her. At her indication I helped carry the corpse to the creek where we
left it. Before we retired that evening my parents had a discussion.

They often quarreled before. I am aware that my testimony may send mother to jail for life, but
what I say is the truth. I am displeased with her because she killed my father".

Leonardo Reluta, chief of police of the town, testified that at noon of May 26, 1948, he
proceeded to the barrio in company with the sanitary inspector and the justice of the peace;
that they found Pedro's corpse in the creek; that the health officer examined the body; that
after conferring with Exuperia he arrested Teopista Canja; that the confession Exhibit C was
signed by her.

Benjamin Valente, the justice of the peace, declared that on May 27, 1948, the accused
appeared before him accompanied by the chief of police and one policeman; that answering his
questions, she stated that she had signed the Exhibit C freely and voluntarily. that she swore to
the same in the presence of the witnesses Juan Victoriano and Carlos Tandoy. This official
further said that before talking with the accused, as above related, he took the precaution of
excluding the police officers from the room.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant Teopista Canja is guilty of parricide.

HELD: Yes.

Declaring in her defense, Teopista swore that that night she suddenly awoke when a man was
strangulating her; that she grabbed a piece of wood and gave the assailant two blows on the
face; that she thereby was able to free herself; that she then lighted a lamp and found to her
amazement that she had killed her husband.

This self-defense version was correctly rejected. Firstly, because the wounds found on the head
of the dead man could not have been the effect of two strokes with a blunt instrument. There
were eleven incised wounds. Secondly, because she never mentioned the piece of wood to the
chief of police, and there is enough evidence that she signed the confession Exhibit C
voluntarily, with full knowledge of its contents. Thirdly, because she pleaded guilty at the
preliminary investigation on June 2, 1948. Fourthly, if the facts had really happened as she
relates, there is every reason to expect that she had given the same explanation to her children,
who would undoubtedly have absolved her; and yet we have Exuperia declaring against her
mother, and openly resentful to her.

Appellant must be declared to have feloniously extinguished the life of her husband. He may
have been unworthy. He may have been a rascal and a bully; but that is no excuse for
murdering him. His badness is not even a mitigating circumstance.

Wherefore, inasmuch as the penalty imposed on appellant is in accordance with the law
( Article 246, Revised Penal Code), the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Separate Opinions

MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring:

I agree with the majority as to the guilt of the appellant and the correctness of the penalty
imposed according to the provision of law pertinent to the case. But I wish only to add that if a
person properly convicted and sentenced according to law was ever deserving of executive
clemency, then the herein appellant is that one.

Her deceased husband not content with squandering away the family substance, and not
satisfied with keeping a mistress upon whom he must have spent some of the money that
properly belonged to his own family, including his wife, got into the habit of drinking until he
became a habitual drunkard. In other words, he developed and indulged in all the major vices,
and to cap it all, when he came home, drunk, he would even beat up his wife. That the poor
wife, the appellant could put up with all this, still keep house for that kind of husband, thriftless,
faithless, vicious, and brutal and continue to be a wife to him, speaks volumes for her. It implies
patience, forbearance, devotion and sacrifice in the extreme.

On the very day that she killed her husband, according to her own confession on which her
conviction was based, he came home drunk, forthwith laid hands on her, striking her on the
stomach until she fainted, and when she recovered consciousness and asked for the reason for
the unprovoked attack, he threatened to renew the beating. At the supper table instead of
eating the meal set before him, he threw the rice from his plate, thus adding insult to injury.
Then he left the house and when he returned he again boxed his wife, the herein appellant. The
violence with which the appellant killed her husband reveals the pent-up righteous anger and
rebellion against years of abuse, insult, and tyranny seldom heard of. Considering all these
circumstances and provocations, including the fact as already stated, that her conviction was
based on her own confession, I repeat that the appellant is deserving of executive clemency,
not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation of her life
sentence.
 5. People vs. Winston Manlapaz G.R. No. L-41819 February 28, 1979

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Therese Endencia, a thirteen year-old, mentally retarded, daughter of the spouses,
Jerome Endencia and Teresita Encarnacion. Therese, who was born in Chicago, Illinois, is a fair
complexioned girl with mestiza features.

Residing in the same neighborhood in an apartment identified as 1021-M Aurora Boulevard,

near the Marian Bakery, also in Project 4, was a nineteen-year-old, unmarried boy, named
Winston Manlapaz. His apartment was about five hundred meters away from the residence of
Therese.

Winston and Therese met at the basketball court in November, 1972. They became friends.
Therese came to know the residence of Winston. She went there two or three times with her
neighbor, Vicky, and her friend, Robin, a teenager. She got acquainted with Winston's sister.

According to the prosecution, Winston had sexual intercourse with Therese in his apartment in
the afternoon of November 28 and 30, 1972. Winston denied that he had sexual intercourse
with Therese but that denial does not merit any credence.

According to Mrs. Endencia since infancy, Therese has a speech impediment.

As clinical head of the school, he issued a certificate dated January 23, 1973, stating that
Therese had been "as mentally retarded of the educable type" and as a "speech-defective"

Doctor Hofileña ventured the opinion that might not completely understand the nature and
consequences of sexual intercourse (41- 42 ) or has only a vague notion that sexual intercourse
is bad (49-50 tsn).

On New Year's Day, January 1, 1973, while Mrs. Endencia was cleaning her house, she found
two white pills in the locker of Therese. When she queried her daughter as to the function of
the pills, Therese answered that the pills "were for not having a baby or were contraceptive
pills. Mrs. Endencia found out that her daughter got the pills from Winston and that Therese
had sexual intercourse with him two times.

On January 5, Therese was examined by the medico-legal of the Philippine Constabulary crime
laboratory at Camp Crame. He found her to be "feeble-minded but coherent". It was not easy to
elicit the facts from her because she was hesitant and her recollection was poor. She was
assisted by her mother. However, it was Therese herself who narrated the facts without any
leading questions from her mother.
The doctor found that Therese was no longer a virgin. Her hymen had two deep and healed
lacerations at the five and seven o'clock positions. Her vaginal orifice offered slight resistance to
the index finger and the virgin-sized speculum. The lacerations were more than a month old.

On January 12, 1973, at about eleven-forty in the morning, there was a confrontation in the
police headquarters between Therese and Winston. She identified Winston as the rapist (5054
tsn November 26, 1973). Winstons admitted that there was such a confrontation. It should be
stressed that on that occasion Winston did not make any statement.

On June 4, 1973, Therese and her mother filed the following complaint for rape against Winston
Manlapaz in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City.

The trial court regarded that charge as proven, meaning that Manlapaz had forcible sexual
intercourse with a feeble-minded girl, a victim with "mental abnormality or deficiency of
reason". It convicted Manlapaz of simple rape, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and
ordered him to pay Therese Endencia damages amounting to P40,000.

ISSUE: The issue is whether the complaint and the evidence are sufficient to convict appellant
Manlapaz of rape committed when the victim was deprived of reason (private de razon).

HELD: Yes,

As to the merits of the case, we are convinced that Manlapaz had sexual intercourse with
Therese on the two occasions mentioned by her. That fact was ascertained from her by the
police investigator and by the medico-legal officer who examined her. It is noteworthy that
Manlapaz did not deny it at the confrontation in the police precinct. "He who remains silent
when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent". (31 C.J.S. 494. See
Sec. 23, Rule 130, Rules of Court on admission by silence, which was applied in People vs.
Phones, L-32754-5, July 21, 1978.) Although the testimony of Therese at the trial may be
vitiated by contradictions and inadequacies, due to her low intelligence, she, nevertheless,
stuck steadfastly to her story that she, to use her own words, had 4 made baby or had carnal
intercourse with Manlapaz in the afternoon of November 28 and 30, 1972.

The police investigator admitted that he pieced the above account from the fragmented
narration which he extracted with much trouble from Therese and which was punctuated by
remarks not included in her statement.

Sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason or with a girl who is below twelve
years of age is raped because she is incapable of giving rational consent to the carnal
intercourse. "Las mujeres privadas de razon, enjenadas, Idiotas, imbeciles, son incapaces por su
estado mental de apreciar la ofensa que el culpable infiere a su honestidad y, por tanto,
incapaces de consentir. Pero no es condicion precisa que la carenmental que solo la disminuye,
sim embargo, la jurisprudence es discondante" (II Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 14th Ed., 1975,
pp. 538-9).
"An accused is guilty of the crime of rape when it is established that he had sexual intercourse
with a female who was mentally incapable of validly consenting to or opposing the carnal act"
(65 Am Jur 2nd 766 citing State vs. Prokosch, 152 Minn. 86, 187 NW 97 1; Cokeley vs. State, 87
Tex. Crim. 256, 220 SW 1099; 31 ALR 3rd 1227, sec. 3).

In the instant case, the victim has the mentality of a five-year-old child. If sexual intercourse
with a child below twelve years of age is rape, then it should follow that sexual intercourse with
a thirteen-year old girl whose mental capacity is that of a five-year old child would constitute
rape.

The mental deficiency of Therese may be gleaned from her testimony. She testified that she
resided at "P. Go, Project 4, Quezon City". when she was asked to spell "P. Go", she said that
she could not spell it (4 tsn January 30, 1974). She actually resided at 10 Padre Burgos Street.

Asked to explain her testimony that she "was fucking with" Winston, she replied that fucking
means "fighting" and that when she "made baby" with Winston she was "fighting with" him
(Ibid, 19 and 23 tsn). She testified that Winston placed his penis "in the couch" (29 tsn), that she
did not suffer any physical injury because she "had no voice" (43 tsn) and that she did not cry
for help but a moment later she said that she cried for help (44 tsn).

Manlapaz testified that he knew Therese to be a nominal person and that she informed him
that she was studying at the "St. Joseph College". He denied any knowledge that Therese was
mentally retarded (63-65 tsn September 9, 1974).

Appellant Manlapaz, taking advantage of Therese's mental deficiency and immaturity (she had
barely reached the age of puberty) and subordinating his wig to his concupiscence or animal
instincts, was able to have carnal intercourse twice with a ten-year-old girl who was not aware
of the disgrace and dishonorable consequences resulting from that immoral act.

The crime committed by the accused is simple rape. No modifying circumstances can be
appreciated in this case. The trial court properly sentenced him to reclusion perpetua [Arts. 63
and 335(2), Revised Penal Code].

Before article 335 was amended, simple rape was penalized by reclusion temporal or twelve
years and one day to twenty years. Republic Act No. 4111 raised the penalty for simple rape to
reclusion perpetua and made qualified rape a capital offense. Taking notice of the rampancy of
sexual assaults, ensuing from the lawlessness and deterioration of morals occasioned by the
war, the lawmaking body sought to deter rapists by increasing the penalty for rape.

After a judicious consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, we believe that after
appellant Manlapaz had served a term of imprisonment consistent with the ends of retributive
justice, executive clemency may be extended to him in the discretion of the Chief Executive and
Prime Minister. A copy of this decision should be furnished the Minister of Justice.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed subject to the observation an the preceding paragraph as
to the application to this case of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. costs against the appellant.

6. People vs. Alberto Estoista G.R. No. L-5793             August 27, 1953

TUAZON, J.:

FACTS: The defendant-appelant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for
homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under one information.
The appellant was acquitted of the first offense, but found guilty of the second, for which he
was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This appeal is from that sentence raising factual legal
and constitutional questions. The constitutional question, set up after the submission of the
briefs, has to do with the objection that the penalty — from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and
fines — provided by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty — from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines — provided
by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel, excessive and unusual.

HELD: Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of
imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying
firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law
proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the
very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying
and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might
appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in
view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason.
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional
cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound
to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty. (Art. 5,
Revised Penal Code; People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil., 906.)

The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized by Republic Act
No. 4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to imprisonment for
five years. However, considering the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law
to its full extent would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be
furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the
imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months. the appellant will pay the costs of
both instances.
 7. People vs. Tiu Ua G.R. No. L-6793 March 31, 1955

JUGO, J.:

FACTS: Tiu Ua was accused before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay Branch) of the
offense of profiteering in an information of the following tenor:

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1950, in Pasay City, Philippines, the above named
accused, Tiu Ua, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate the provisions of
Republic Act No. 509 by selling a can of powdered Klim milk for P2.20, to Eusebio Perez, when
the ceiling price for that commodity was P1.80 only.

After the trial the accused was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000, or, in case of
insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. In
addition to this penalty the trial court declared that the accused, being an alien, "shall be upon,
upon final conviction, subject to immediate deportation without the necessity of any further
proceedings on the part of the Deportation Board.

ISSUES:

I. The trial court erred in not holding that the present case is one of entrapment the
prosecution of which should not have been sustained on grounds of public policy, and that it
was not established beyond reasonable doubt by credible evidence, and consequently, erred in
not acquitting the accused.

II. The trial court erred in imposing a penalty wholly disproportionate to the offense, and
therefore unconstitutional as cruel and unusual and shocking to the
conscience.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

III. The trial court erred in not declaring Republic Act No. 509 unconstitutional in so far as it
imposes penalties wholly disproportionate to the offenses sought to be punished, and
consequently violative of the due process and equal protection clauses and of the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments in the Constitution.

HELD: Francisco who happened to be an employee of the national Bureau of Investigation, went
to his office and reported the matter to the Price enforcement Unit. Francisco, accompanied by
Efrain Verano and Felipe Guatno, agents of the prisco, came back home. There Eusebio related
the incidents to the agents. Then Francisco gave to the houseboy a five-peso bill telling him to
buy milk in the same store. At about 11:20 in the same morning Eusebio returned to the store
leaving the two prisco agents in the house of the Villa family. After sometime the houseboy
came back with a can of Klim milk and with the amount of P2.80 as change, telling the agents
that the accused had charged him P2.20 for the can of Klim milk. Francisco and the two agents
went to the store of the accused at 320 F. B. Harrison Street, Pasay City, and there asked the
accused if he had sold one can of Klim milk for P2.20 to Eusebio. The accused answered in the
affirmative. The accused then signed the investigation slip, Exhibit "B." The prisco agents
brought the accused to their office where he was photographed and fingerprinted.

1) No, according to the Court, in the present case it would be hard to conclude that there
was even entrapment, because the accused had already charged the sum of P2.20 and
the prisco agents only tried to verify the illegal act of the accused.

2) Yes, the Court ruled, with regard to the fine, it should be considered that Congress
thought it necessary to repress profiteering with a heavy fine so that dealers would not
take advantage of the critical condition of the country to make unusual profits. It is true
that in specific individual cases the profit made is small but when it is remembered that
these individual transactions are numerous and make a great total and affect the poor
people in general, it can be easily seen that the raise in the price above that authorized
by law, causes a great hardship to the country. The courts cannot interfered with the
discretion of the legislative body in enforcing a public policy unless there has been a
clear violation of the Constitution.

3) With reference to the deportation of the accused who is an alien, it should be noted
that the trial court stated that Tiu Ua, being an alien, shall be, upon final conviction,
subject to immediate deportation without the necessity of any further proceedings on
the part of the Deportation Board.

It should be noted that the trial court did not impose deportation but simply stated that
the defendant was subject to it. Actual deportation, therefore, is for the proper
administrative authorities to decide, considering the circumstances of the case.

With the above modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

8. People vs. Ricardo Limaco G.R. No. L-3090             January 9, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICARDO LIMACO, defendant-appellant.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS: This is an appeal to suspend the decision of conviction for the crime of triple murder
sentencing the accused-appellant Ricardo Limaco to "life imprisonment at hard labor, without
hope of any pardon or reprieve whatsoever, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Severa
Envelino, Sofia Envelino and Matrina Amores in the sum of P6,000 each (People vs. Amansec,
G.R. No. L-927, March 11, 1948)*, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs."

On June 30, 1948, Liberato Envelino, his wife and son left their house in Sitio Bunlas,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, to work on their clearing or kaingin several kilometers away. In
the house were left his three daughters — Inacia, Severa, and Sofia, all surnamed Envelino and
a niece Martina Amores, aged 15, 14, 5 and 3 respectively.

According to the eldest daughter, Inacia, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant Ricardo
Limaco came to the house and found the four girls in the kitchen. He asked her sister Severa to
sell him a pig which he wanted to butcher. Severa told him that he better wait for her parents
because she would not dare sell the animal in their absence and without their consent.

Visibly disappointed and resenting her refusal to sell, he addressed Severa thus: "If you do not
want to, it is better that you will be hacked because you are selfish." Almost simultaneously, he
drew his bolo, Exhibit A, locally known as "talibong", from its sheath, Exhibit A-1 and attacked
Severa with it, inflicting on her seven wounds, two of which were mortal; Sofia and Martina
rushed to Severa and embraced her, but Ricardo in his fury also boloed them, inflicting on each
four wounds, two of which were mortal. The three girls died on the spot.

In the meantime, Inacia who witnessed the horrible slaughter jumped down from the kitchen
through an opening in the wall and hid herself in the bushes and escaped alive.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s imposing the accused-appellant Ricardo Limaco to “life
imprisonment at hard labor, without hope whatsoever of any pardon or reprieve whatever, is
just the right punishment for him”.

HELD:

The Court noted the trial judge indulged in unfavorable comments on the case.

We always respect the private opinions of trial judges to be highly debatable and even if they
happen not to harmonize with ours on the subject. But when such private opinions not only
form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving at a conclusion and
determination of a case or he penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error,
then we are constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the guidance
of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else, layman or jurist as to
the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of people who
honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for is imposition in certain cases, it is a duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the
law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within
the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or
vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony
with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of the judiciary we
feel it incumbent upon us to state while they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as
harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department
concerned, its amendment, modification or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must
apply it effect as decreed by the law-making body.

The crime committed in this case is truly shocking. Three innocent girls, two of tender age,
apparently without any provocation, were butchered and hacked to death. While some
members of this Court are for imposing the extreme penalty, others believe that the appellant
is entitled to a mitigating circumstance, either that he, a relatively ignorant man interpreted the
refusal of one of the victims to sell a pig as an affront and thereby became obfuscated and lost
his head, or that he lacks education and instruction for the reason that he did not finish even
the first grade in elementary school. In that case, this mitigating circumstance will compensate
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, thereby resulting in the imposition of the penalty in
its medium degree. For lack of sufficient votes, the penalty will be reclusion perpetua. But this
penalty is for each of three murders, it being understood that the maximum period of
imprisonment will not exceed forty years. With this modification, the decision appealed from, is
hereby affirmed with costs.

9. People vs. Albert Olaes G.R. No. 76547 July 30, 1990

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: The decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXII in Olongapo City, in Criminal Case
No. 3602 involving a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) has been brought to us on appeal 2 by accused-appellant who was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and the costs. The
confiscation and immediate destruction of six (6) lids of marijuana subject matter of the case
was also ordered. 3

In an information dated March 27, 1978, appellant was charged with unlawfully selling six (6)
lids of marijuana.4 On March 16, 1979, appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, was duly
arraigned and, having pleaded not guilty, 5 trial on the merits ensued.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Trial Court committed the following alleged reversible errors (1) the
conviction based on an extrajudicial confession extracted in violation of due process and the bill
of rights of the fundamental law: (2) the conviction under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425 (selling) even if one of the elements of the offense is missing; and (3) the resolution of
doubt on the defense theory by reason of non-corroboration. 8
HELD: We find for appellant and decree his acquittal.

Firstly, the extrajudicial confession 9 executed by appellant on June 15, 1977 is inadmissible in

evidence. An examination thereof shows that he was informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during said investigation. He was also asked if he
was waiving his right to be assisted by counsel and he answered in the affirmative. However,
while the rights of a person under custodial investigation may be waived, nonetheless the
waiver must be made not only voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but in the presence and
with the assistance of counsel. 10

In the case at bar, the waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. 11 This omission
alone is sufficient to invalidate the confession… having been made without the mandatory
assistance of counsel the same is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given. 14

Secondly, this case exemplifies the instance where the non-presentation of the supposed
poseur-buyer is fatal to the prosecution's case. The records show that the alleged sales
transaction took place inside the house of appellant. In other words, the transaction was
supposedly witnessed only by the poseur-buyer, Manuelito Bernardo. Only he has personal
knowledge of such transaction which is the subject matter of this prosecution…In this case, the
police officers did not see the actual sale of marijuana. For the culprit to be convicted, the
element of sale must be unequivocably established. Yet, the alleged poseur-buyer in the "buy-
bust" operation, the only one who allegedly dealt directly with appellant in the purchase of
marijuana, was not presented at all at the trial. Under such circumstances, we have repeatedly
held that the failure of the prosecution to present the alleged buyer was a fatal blow to the
case against the accused. 16

It is further undisputed that the six (6) lids of marijuana supposedly bought by the poseur-buyer
was taken by the police officers not from appellant but from said poseur-buyer. 27 Appellant's
disclaimer of ownership of the prohibited drug should have cautioned and alerted the
prosecution to the fact that the testimony of their alleged poseur-buyer was not merely
corroborative nor cumulative but direct and material to the defense of appellant who claims
innocence of the offense imputed to him. 28 It is also significant that the identity of the informer
and/or poseur-buyer was already known during the trial.29 Despite all these, the prosecution
opted not to present him for reasons which remain unknown. Such unexplained failure to
present this vital witness gives rise to the presumption that, if he had been presented, his
testimony would probably not have supported the case of the prosecution. 30

The foregoing considerations cannot but rule out a verdict of guilty, there being an exiguity of
any other independent incriminating evidence, aside from appellant's uncounselled and
inadmissible extrajudicial confession. While the theory of the defense is not totally convincing,
the Court cannot tip the scales of justice against him in the face of the cardinal and long
entrenched rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of that of the defense.
One final observation. What cannot escape our attention is the penalty imposed by the trial
court, that is, life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00. The court a quo obviously failed to
consider that the alleged crime was committed on June 15, 1977. Under Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425, prior to its amendment on February 17, 1980 by Presidential Decree No. 1675,
the act of selling marijuana was punishable by imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P12,000.00 to P20,000.00. 31 Due
to the urgent necessity of reinforcing the drive against dangerous drugs by making "drug-
pushing" a capital offense, Presidential Decree No. 1675 was subsequently passed providing for
the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Obviously, this amendment having taken effect after the alleged commission of the crime in the
case at bar, it could not have been given retroactive effect.

WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused-appellant not having been proved with the requisite
quantum of evidence, the appealed decision is REVERSED and he is hereby ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt, with costs de officio.

10. People vs. Jaime Santos G.R. No. L-11813 September 17, 1958

FELIX, J.:

FACTS: A total of 10 separate informations were filed before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, charging the defendants therein with the complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, etc. One of those cases is No. 20379 of said Court entitled People of the Philippines
versus Jaime Santos, alias "La Perla", alias "Velasco", alias "Santos"; Irineo
Canlas, alias "Carson", alias "Dizon", alias "Arco", alias "Tuazon"; Jose
Ferrer, alias "Pepe", alias "Ferrer"; Francisco Inocencio, alias "Pangilinan", alias "Lioning";
Onofre Quiambao, alias "Efren Quiambao", alias "Garson", alias "Garrison"; Estrellita
Pangan, alias "Pangan", alias "Melensita"; Pedro
Gamboa, alias "Peter", alias "Martov", alias "Mar"; Anacleto Suba, alias "Letty", alias "Suba";
Epifanio Nucup, alias "Remy"; Paras, alias "Defin", alias "Ordoñez", alias "Isay", alias "Say";
Luciano Figueroa, alias "Luz"; Felicisimo Saggal, alias "Teddy"; Felix
Vicente, alias "Bugnot", alias "Valdez"; Filomena Canlas, alias "Mining", alias "Canlas"; and
Crisostomo Maristela, alias "Villamor" alias "Henry". The amended information filed in this case
followed a common pattern and charged the defendants with the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murders, arson, robberies and physical injuries.

Jaime Santos also offered to plead guilty of simple rebellion but the Fiscal refused to amend the
information with respect to him.

Appellant Santos does not controvert the findings of fact of the trial court so the case is limited
to the single issue whether or not there exists a complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, etc., defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in finding appellant guilty of the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, arson, and robbery.

HELD:

There is no question that appellant Jaime Santos committed the crime of rebellion, but as this
Court has already held in the cases of People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., 52 Off. Gaz. [12]
5506; 99 Phil., 515, and the later case of People vs. Geronimo, supra (by a voting of 7 against 4)
this crime cannot be complexed with other common crimes, because the latter are either
absorbed by the crime of rebellion if committed in pursuance of the aims, purposes and
objectives of the rebels and in furtherance of their intention to overthrow the duly constituted
government by force, or are independent common crimes which had no connection with the
rebellion and must be separately prosecuted in the proper court within the territorial
jurisdiction of which the same had been committed.

The Solicitor General in his brief recognizes and yields to the doctrines We have laid down in
the above-mentioned jurisprudence and recommends that the decision appealed from be
modified holding that the lower Court erred in finding appellant guilty of the complex crime
of rebellion with murders, arson, and robbery and that the appellant should be only found
guilty of simple rebellion. This attitude of the prosecution constitutes a lesson to the trial Judge
on the respect and deference that decisions of this Superiority deserve.

As may be noticed from the decision in the Hernandez and Geronimo cases, which had already
been promulgated when the decision of the trial Judge in the case at bar was rendered on
November 28, 1956, the respective opinions of the individual Justices of this Court were fully
expressed and properly outlined. In the case of People vs. Geronimo, the writer of said Decision
took pains to indicate, for the benefit of the Bench and Bar, how each of the members of the
Court voted on the particular points involved therein, and it was evident from the exposition of
the individual opinions of the Justices of this Court, arrived at after a careful, extensive and
mature deliberation, that the doctrines then laid down as a result thereof, were unalterable
and final as long as the composition of the Court remain the same as it was, or unless, of
course, the law would changed. Yet the lower Court, disagreeing with the principles laid down
by this Tribunal on this matter, preferred to impose his own criterion on the flimsy pretext that
said decisions were not yet final as the Solicitor General had filed motions for clarification and
that the opinion of this Court was divided. Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the
fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by
this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his
opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal
views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court
of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably
cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays, and expenses to the litigants. And if
despite of what is here said a Judge, by delicate or acute qualms of conscience, still believes
that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the
position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case
concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.

The penalty provided for the offense of rebellion is prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000. (Art. 135, par 1, Revised Penal Code). Considering, however, that the appellant offered
to plead guilty if charged only of that offense, the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt
should be appreciated in his favor and there being no aggravating circumstance to offset this
mitigating circumstance, that penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period(Art. 64, par. 2
Revised Penal Code).

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
hereby modified by finding appellant guilty only of rebellion and sentencing him to the penalty
guilty only of rebellion and sentencing him to the penalty of 7 years, of prision mayor, to the
accessories of the law, and to pay a fine of P10,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in view of the nature of the imprisonment penalty imposed upon him. Appellant is
further sentenced to pay the costs. It is so ordered.

11. People vs. Patricio Amigo G.R. No. 116719  January 18, 1996

MELO, J.:

FACTS: Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder, but later was elevated to
murder after the victim died.

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an
accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight
damaged to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4). With Virgilio was
Patricio Amigo alias Bebot.

Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted
Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)

While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a
passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously
approached Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor
accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)

A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him
not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. (ibid. p. 7) Irked by the comment
made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You are Chinese, is it you?" With a ready answer
Benito said; "Yes, I am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait
for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and 19)
Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly took a
five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest.
After being hit, Benito wounded tried to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and run
around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content with the injuries he
had already inflicted, still chased Benito and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the
last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body.

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that
should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without
the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium
period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder
committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances,
should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years
of reclusion temporal.

HELD:

…The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have
arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person
originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium
period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is
the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction.

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are
prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only
interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the
lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium
period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably
to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty
we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed
in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is
affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present
policy.

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People
vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a
penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of
courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA
LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the executive or an amendment of the
law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

12. Lito Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of
the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS: Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry
for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence,
he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit
the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces
of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present
petition stating the following grounds:

ISSUES:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE

ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE;

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B)
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE
REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE
TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD,
OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;

D. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE

INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD

AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

HELD: This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight
when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.4 

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party
on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant
narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he
gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising
to pay them. Thus:

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of
estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary,
the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its
general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the
same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this
Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity
denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case. 15 The assessment by
the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by
the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their
testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered.17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money
and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the
division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they
decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution.

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot
be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without
any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is,
that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by
penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.

Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The
same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being
repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to
legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from
crossing this clear-cut divide.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making
and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is
a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

13. Romarico Mendoza vs. People G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011

BRION, J.:

FACTS: We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Romarico J. Mendoza
seeking the reversal of our Decision dated August 3, 2010. The Decision affirmed the
petitioner’s conviction for his failure to remit the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions of
his employees. The petitioner anchors the present motion on his supposed inclusion within the
coverage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 or the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009, whose
passage the petitioner claims to be a supervening event in his case. He further invokes the equal
protection clause in support of his motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the equal protection clause can be invoked by Petitioner’s motion on his
supposed inclusion within the coverage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 or the Social Security
Condonation Law of 2009.

HELD: The petitioner’s liability for the crime is a settled matter.

The petitioner cannot benefit from the terms of RA No. 9903, which condone only employers
who pay their delinquencies within six months from the law’s effectivity.

True, the petitioner’s case was pending with us when RA No. 9903 was passed. Unfortunately
for him, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007. By paying outside of the availment
period, the petitioner effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA No. 9903.
This is how the law is written: it condones employers — and only those employers — with
unpaid SSS contributions or with pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month period
following the law’s date of effectivity. Dura lex, sed lex.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class.

The petitioner is entitled to a waiver of his accrued penalties

Despite our discussion above, the petitioner’s move to have our Decision reconsidered is not
entirely futile. The one benefit the petitioner can obtain from RA No. 9903 is the waiver of his
accrued penalties, which remain unpaid in the amount of ₱181,394.29. This waiver is derived
from the last proviso of Section 4 of RA No. 9903:

Referral to the Chief Executive for possible exercise of executive clemency

Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,12 the courts are bound to apply the law as it is and
impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision, however,
gives the Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but
are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. Although the
petitioner was convicted under a special penal law, the Court is not precluded from giving the
Revised Penal Code suppletory application in light of Article 10 13 of the same Code and our
ruling in People v. Simon.14

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS petitioner Romarico J. Mendoza’s motion for
reconsideration. The Court AFFIRMS the petitioner’s conviction for violation of Section 22(a)
and (d), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, and the petitioner is thus sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 9903, the petitioner’s liability for accrued penalties is considered WAIVED.
Considering the circumstances of the case, the Court transmits the case to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the
petitioner.

Article 6

ATTEMPTED FELONY

1. People v Tabago et al, CA

G.R. No. 69778, November 08, 1988

Facts:

On or about the 27th day of August, 1982, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines; the
above-named accused with violence against and/or intimidation of person, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one Leni Chavez y Espiritu inside her residence located
at Solomon Street, Duque District, Camp Aguinaldo, this City, by then and there passing through
the window of said house and once inside, accused at gun point robbed and divested said Leni
Chavez y Espiritu of her cash money amounting to Pl20.00, Philippine Currency; that on the
occasion thereof and with the use of same gun, accused by means of force or intimidation,
pointing said gun at the offended party forced her to take a tablet rendering her unconscious,
after which accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the said Leni Chavez y Espiritu, all done against the will and without the consent
of the offended party, to her damage and prejudice.

The accused, Sixto Tabago, upon the other hand, denied having committed the crime imputed
to him and interposed the defense of alibi. After trial, the defendant was charged with the
crime of Robbery with Rape; hence, his appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused committed such crime.

Held:

Yes. the defense of alibi of the defendant is not creditable as he had been positively Identified
by the complainant. It is contended, in this connection, that the complainant could not have
Identified the defendant as her assailant because the person who robbed and attacked her was
wearing a mask. But, while it may be true that the complainant had testified that the person
who robbed and then raped her was wearing a mask, she also said that only the lower portion
of the face was covered—he was covered only up to the eyes. Other parts of the body were
visible and clearly distinguishable in broad daylight.

The crime of rape has been committed in vicinities or places where people congregate such as
parks or by the roadside or even Within school premises where people abound. Besides, it
would appear that the offense was committed inside the house of Sgt. Camerino with nobody
else around except two sleeping children, and the complainant could not scream because she
was threatened with a gun and then gagged with a handkerchief, after which she was forced to
swallow a pill which made her unconscious.

Hence, the judgement of the lower court is affirmed by the Court.

2. US v Simeon
G.R. No. 1603. April 15, 1904

Facts:

Bali Kan was night watchman at the railroad station in Manila; that his dwelling place was very
near that station; that the defendant was seen several occasions walking near that place with a
working bolo in his hand and had been requested by Bali Kan to go away but to refused to do
so, whereupon Bali Kan pushed the defendant.

On the morning in question, was walking from the station toward his house, he encountered
the defendant who, while two yards away, raised his bolo as if about to strike or stab Bali Kan
with it. The latter shouted for help an ran away, and immediately thereafter a detective of the
police department arrested the defendant. No blow was struck; nor is there proof of threats to
kill or to do bodily harm.

Issue:

Whether or not Simeon committed the crime of assassination.

Held:

A crime is frustrated when the guilty person performs all the acts of execution which produce
the crime as their consequence, but nevertheless do not constitute it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)

In order to constitute the crime of assassination, it must be proved that the accused committed
the crime with treachery; for a price or reward; by means of flood, fire, or poison; with
deliberate premeditation, or vindictiveness, by deliberately and inhumanely increasing the
suffering of the person attacked.

The evidence does not show that any of these essential elements of the crime of assassination
existed in this case. There is no proof whatever from which it may be even inferred that the
defendant intended to kill Bali Kan, much less to show that he intended to do so with deliberate
premeditation.

The crime committed by the defendant is that provided in article 589 of the Penal Code for
threatening another weapons, and it is punishable by imprisonment from one to five days or by
a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas.

3. US v Gloria
G.R. No. 1740. March 27, 1905

Facts:
Gloria was an unsuccessful candidate for election as president of the town of Bayambang, at
the municipal elections held on the 1st of December, 1903; that on account of alleged
irregularities he filed a protest with the provincial board of said province against the
confirmation of the election of the successful candidate; that after the filing of said protest and
while the same was being considered by the provincial board, the said Julio Gloria approached
the treasurer of said province, a member of said board, and offered and promised to give him
the sum of 200 pesos if he would "lend his aid and support to the said protest.”
Gloria contended that it was a mere proposal only and that there is nothing in the Penal Code
which penalizes a proposal to commit the crime of bribery.

Issue:

Whether the said offer is an attempt to commit the crime of bribery.

Held:

Yes. In the case in question the proposal was in fact an "attempt" as defined in article 3 of said
code, wherein it is said that "there is an attempt when the guilty person makes a beginning in
the commission of a crime by direct, overt acts and does not perform all of the acts of
execution which constitute the crime, by reason of some cause of action other than his own
voluntary desistance;" the accused, having made an offer of money for the purpose of bribery,
cannot be said to have made a mere proposition, as the offer of money is an overt act in a
crime of this nature, and its refusal on the part of the official whom it was proposed to bribe
alone prevented the consummation of the crime

Thus, defendant is guilty of attempt to commit the crime of bribery.

4. People v Lamahang
G.R. No. L-43530 August 03, 1935

Facts:

Lamahang was caught by a policeman the act of making an opening with an iron bar on
the wall of a store of cheap goods. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and
in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested
him and placed him under custody. The lower court found him guilty of attempted robbery.

Issue: Is he guilty of attempted robbery?

Held: No. He is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling

The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a
logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of
the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code.

There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan
Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on
the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of the police, did not
develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of
imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of
execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural
relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop
into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.

Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or
violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it
must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain,
of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the
record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.

in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action
intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the
nature of the acts executed (accion medio). Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in
favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act,
must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes.

5. People v Lizada
G.R. No. 143468-71. January 24, 2003

FACTS:
 THE CHARGES: Lizada was charged with 4 counts of

qualified rape under 4 separate Information. That

Lizada, on 4 different occasions (August “First Case”, November 5 “Second Case”, October 22
“Third Case”, and September 15 “Fourth Case” of 1998), with lewd designs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with the victim against her will and
consent.

 EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION:

o Rose Orillosa had 3 children, Analia, Jepsy, and

Rossel. Orillosa after being separated to her husband, met Lizada and lived together as husband
and wife.

o Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when Lizada entered, laid on top of her, removed
her T-shirt and underwear. Lizada then inserted his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger
and inserted his penis in her vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from
his penis. She also felt pain in her sex organ. Satiated, accused-appellant dismounted but
threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. Accused-appellant then
returned to his room. The incident lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the threats on her life,
Analia kept to herself what happened to her.

o Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia, placed
himself on top of her and held her legs and arms. He then inserted his finger into her sex organ
("fininger niya ako"). Satiated, accused-appellant left the room. During the period from 1996 to
1998, accused-appellant sexually abused private complainant two times a week.

o On November 5, 1998, Analia was in the sala of their house studying her assignments. Lizada
was also in the sala. Rossel tended the video shop while his mother was away. Analia went into
her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door of the room because her brother
might enter any time. She wanted to sleep but found it difficult to do so. Lizada went to his
room next to the room of Analia. He, however, entered the room of Analia. He was wearing a
pair of short pants and was naked from waist up. Analia did not mind Lizada entering her room
because she knew that her brother, Rossel was around. However, Lizada sat on the side of her
bed, placed himself on top of her, held her hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She
struggled to extricate herself. Lizada removed her panty and touched her sex organ. Lizada
inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it and then inserted his penis into her vagina.
Lizada ejaculated. Analia felt pain in her sex organ. Momentarily, Rossel passed by the room of
Analia after drinking water from the refrigerator, and peeped through the door. He saw Lizada
on top of Analia. Lizada saw Rossel and dismounted. Lizada berated Rossel and ordered him to
go to his room and sleep. Rossel did. Lizada then left the room. Analia likewise left the room,
went out of the house and stayed outside for one hour. Rose arrived home at 6:00 p.m.
However, Analia did not divulge to her mother what Lizada had just done to her.

o On November 9, 1998, Rose left the house. Lizada was in the sala of the house watching
television. Analia tended the video shop. However, Lizada told Analia to go to the sala. She
refused, as nobody would tend the video shop. This infuriated Lizada who threatened to slap
and kick her. Analia ignored the invectives and threats of Lizada and stayed in the video shop.
When Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between Lizada and Analia. Rose sided with
her paramour and hit Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. "Ayoko na, ayoko na." Shortly
thereafter, Rose and Analia left the house on board the motorcycle driven by her mother to
retrieve some tapes which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired from her daughter
what she meant by her statement, "ayoko na, ayoko na," she told her mother that accused-
appellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her body and that he had been on top of her.
Rose was shocked and incensed.

Analia and her mother went to the Police Station where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint.
Analia was also examined by the medico-legal officer. The following is the conclusion made by
the officer: 1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject
at the time of examination. 2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to
preclude complete penetration by an average- sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any genital injury.

 DEFENSES AND EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED: Lizada denied any allegations and claimed that
Rose actually coached her children to testify against him because Rose wanted to manage their
business and take control of all the properties they acquired during their coverture. Also, Rose
was so exasperated because he had no job.

ISSUE:
1. First Criminal Case: W/N the information was

defective because the date of the offense “on or about August 1988” is too indefinite.

2. W/N Lizada is guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as amended in
relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. (I think sir will focus on this
issue)

3. W/N Lizada is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and also W/N Lizada is guilty of qualified rape.

HELD:
1. NO.

2. Attempted Rape.
3. YES. NO, 2 counts of simple rape.

Summary:

First Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape.

Second Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape.

Third and Fourth Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of simple rape.

FIRST CRIMINAL CASE: SIMPLE RAPE

Lizada avers that the Information for this Case is defective because the date of the offense "on
or about August 1998" alleged therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:

"Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient
of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.”
Lizada further asserts that the prosecution failed to proved that he raped Analia in August 1988.
The OSG argued that that the date "on or about August 1998" is sufficiently definite. After all,
the date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure
to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the
victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of
carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the
actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient.

SECOND CRIMINAL CASE: ATTEMPTED RAPE

Lizada avers that he is not liable for rape. His contention is correct. The collective testimony of
Analia and her younger brother Rossel was that on November 5, 1998, Lizada who was wearing
a pair of short pants but naked from waist up, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her
panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However, Lizada saw Rossel peeping
through the door and dismounted. He later left the room of Analia. In light of the evidence of
the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of Lizada into the aperture or within
the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant. Hence, Lizada is not criminally liable for
consummated rape.

In light of the evidence on record, we believe that Lizada is guilty of attempted rape and not of
acts of lasciviousness.

Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads: "Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. — Any person
who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional."

For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is burdened to prove

the confluence of the following essential elements:

"1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.

2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age."

"Lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality
which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

"There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

"1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance."

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

"(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the

crime intended to be committed."

Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory

acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired
object or end. One perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony.
However, if the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under the law, the
malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. It must be borne in mind, however, that the
spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal liability for the intended
crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his desistance.

In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that Lizada intended to have
carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of Lizada proven by the prosecution
were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, Lizada had commenced the
execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape.
Although Lizada desisted from performing all the acts of execution, his desistance was not
spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of
Rossel. Hence, Lizada is guilty only of attempted rape.

THIRD AND FOURTH CRIMINAL CASES: 2 counts of SIMPLE RAPE

Lizada avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
physical evidence belies Analia’s claim of having been deflowered by Lizada on four different
occasions. The contention of Lizada, however, does not persuade the Court. The fact that Analia
remained a virgin from 1996 up to 1998 does not preclude her having been repeatedly sexually
abused by Lizada. Analia being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male
organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private complainant was
still intact has no substantial bearing on Lizada's commission of the crime. Even, the slightest
penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture
constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within
the labia of the pudendum.

SC agree with Lizada, however, that he is guilty only of 2 counts of simple rape, instead of
qualified rape.

The evidence on record shows that Lizada is the common- law husband of Rose, the mother of
private complainant, Analia. As of October 1998, Analia was still 13 years old, and under Article
335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private complainant, concurring with
the fact that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of the victim's mother, is a special
qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty. However, said
circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it
is favorable to the accused. Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying
circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the Lizada being the
common-law husband of her mother, Lizada is guilty only of simple rape.

6. U.S. v Eduave
6 Phil. 209, February 2, 1917

FACTS:

Defendant Protasio Eduave is the querido of the victim’s mother. Eduave attacked the victim
from behind using a bolo creating a gash 8 1/2 inches long and 2 inches deep because the latter
accused defendant of having commiting rape against said victim. Upon thinking that he has
already killed the victim, he threw the body into the bushes and left.

ISSUE/S:

What is the crime committed by Eduave?

HELD:

Accused is guilty of frustrated murder. The fact that Eduave attacked the victim from behind, in
a vital portion of the body, shows treachery qualifying it as murder. The crime was not
consummated because the elements of the crime’s execution and accomplishment were not
complete as the victim did not die. Neither was the crime an attempted one because the
accused’s actions has already passed the subjective phase, that is, there was no external force
preventing defendant from performing all the acts of execution necessary to commit the felony.
Consequently, the victim did not die because an external element has prevented such death
after Eduave has performed all the necessary acts of execution that would have caused the
death of the victim.

7. People v Villacorte (1974)

G.R. No. L-21860 February 28, 1974

Facts:

In the evening of August 27, 1959, Benito Ching, a Chinese merchant, left his sari-sari store in
the public market of Caloocan1 to go home, bringing with him the proceeds of his sales of the
day which were placed in a paper bag. He was accompanied by his two employees, Pedro
Libantino and Modesto Galvez, who acted as his bodyguards. On the way towards his home
located at 133 F. Roxas, Grace Park, Caloocan, Benito Ching and his two companions were
accosted by four persons near the corner of an alley at F. Roxas street. At that time, Libantino
was some three or four meters in front of Ching, while Galvez was walking directly behind the
Chinese merchant.

One of the holduppers pointed a .45 cal. pistol at Ching. Another placed his left arm around the
neck of Galvez, while the third held both his arms. The first who pointed a pistol at Ching
snatched from him the paper bag containing the money. The fourth got that paper bag from
the snatcher.

Ching shouted for help, crying aloud "Pedie, Pedie"; his companion Libantino turned around to
respond to his employer's call; but upon seeing the bag snatcher pointing a pistol at Ching,
Libantino fled. When Ching shouted: "Pedie, Pedie," the pistol-holder fired at him. Galvez,
Ching's other companion, was able to free himself from two of the holduppers holding him, and
he too ran away. Ching fell down sprawled on the street and the four holduppers ran away.
Benito Ching, notwithstanding his wound, was able to walk, staggering towards his home. His
common-law wife immediately called for a taxicab, brought Ching to the North General Hospital
in Manila where he died the following day.

On September 11, 1959, Galvez and Libantino declared that Ching was accosted by three
persons, one of them pointing his pistol at the right ribs of his employer. He identified the
gunman as Violeto Villacorte alias Bonging and even described the shirt and pants the gunman
was then wearing.  On September 12, 1959 admitted that he was the one who snatched the
paper bag from Benito Ching and shot him. He identified his companions as "Roque", "Sante"
and "Fred".

They were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide but Inoferio appealed for the
judgement against him.

Issue:

Whether or not Inoferio committed such crime.

Held:

No. Upon a careful review of the evidence, the Court hold that the accused-appellant Crisanto
Inoferio should be acquitted upon the ground that although his defense, in the nature of an
alibi, is inherently a weak defense, it should be considered sufficient as in this case, to tilt the
scale of justice in favor of the accused because the evidence for the prosecution is itself weak
and unconvincing and, therefore, by and large, insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. By way of background to our findings of facts which justify the
acquittal of appellant Inoferio, we now recapitulate the evidence against the accused Violeto
Villacorte, Marciano Yusay, and Alfredo Handig.

This is good a time as any to emphasize the fact that courts should not at once look with
disfavor at the defense of alibi. Although inherently weak and easily fabricated, the evidence
presented by an accused in support of that defense must be scrutinized with the same care that
evidence supporting other defenses deserves. When an accused puts up the defense of alibi,
the court should not at once have a mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all
the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit him, as in the case of appellant Inoferio.

The decision appealed from convicting the accused-appellant Crisanto Inoferio is hereby
reversed and he is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio

8. People v Pambaya

October 31, 1928 (52 Phil 309)

FACTS:
Pambaya Bayambao was charged with the crime of murder. Because of fear, he shot the head
of his brother in law whom he thought was an outlaw ready to strike him.

ISSUE:

WON the offense made by the defendant which was under uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury is a crime.

HELD:

No. If an offense is acted from the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an injury, at least in same
gravity, in the belief that the deceased was a malefactor who attacked him with a dagger in
handand for the reason he was guilty of no crime and is exempt from criminal liability.

The ignorance of fact of the defendant was not due to negligence or bad faith, and this rebuts
the presumption of malicious intent accompanying the act of killing.

9. Araneta Jr. v CA (1990)

Facts:
At about a little past midnight of March 22, 1972, while the victim Manuel Esteban, Jr. and his
companions Jaime Roque, Eduardo Saguil, Jesus Dizon and Charles Go were having a drinking
spree at the mezzanine floor of the Sands
Kitchenette, Rizal Avenue, Manila, a napkin container was thrown to their table coming from a
group of three or four persons, which included the petitioners.  The victim approached the
group of petitioner Araneta,... Jr. after which a heated argument ensued.  Petitioner Bautista
pushed the left shoulder of the victim causing the latter to spin at which time, petitioner
Araneta, Jr. fired his gun with his left hand (his right hand is atrophied), hitting... the victim, who
was then in a stooping position, at the back.  Having been shot, the victim drew his gun and
fired indiscriminately hitting Manuel de Guzman, a companion of petitioner Araneta, Jr. on his
left thigh.  The bullet... which wounded De Guzman hit the wall and ricocheted, hitting one of
the accused Eden Ng along his umbilical cord.  Petitioner Bautista then held the victim who was
bent forward, on his right wrist and poked a gun at him.  At this... point, petitioner Bautista
suddenly fired his gun hitting the chest of the victim.  Roque and Saguil together with a bouncer
from a nearby Soda Fountain brought the victim to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he
was pronounced... dead on arrival.
Issues:
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have inflicted only a slight
wound be held accountable for the death of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-
accused? And should petitioner Araneta, Jr. be acquitted on the ground of self-defense and/or
defense of strangers.
Ruling:
1. Yes, Finding accused Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute and Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of homicide and there being proved
the... mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to
offset the same, the court sentences each one of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and... one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Manuel Esteban, Jr. the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of the latter; the sum of
P20,000.00 by way of moral damages; the sum of P169,600.00 by way of consequential
damages... and to proportionately pay the costs.
2.     Acquitting accused Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito Boy Santiago of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio. 
Their release is hereby ordered unless there is valid ground for further detaining them.
As We uphold the factual findings of the respondent court, thepetitioner should be held liable
for the death of the victim by inflicting the fatal wound upon him.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 20, 1976 affirming with modification
the decision of the trial court dated August 20, 1973 is afirrmed as to the conviction of
Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza for homicide, and modified Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute, who is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted homicide penalized
under Article 249 in relation with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any other attendant circumstances,
petitioner Araneta, Jr. is imposed the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) months of prision.
correccional.

FRUSTRATED FELONIES

1. People vs. Sy Pio G.R. No. L-5848 April 30, 1954

LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the
defendant-appellant herein Sy Pio, alias Policarpio de la Cruz, guilty of frustrated murder
against the person of Tan Siong Kiap, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence
of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days of prision mayor, to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the offended party Tan Siong Kiap in the sum of P350, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The case was appealed to
the Court of Appeals, but that court certified it to this Court under the provisions of section 17
(4) of Republic Act No. 296, on the ground that the crime charged was committed on the same
occasion that the defendant-appellant had committed crime of murder, with which the
defendant-appellant was also charged.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that early in the morning of September 3, 1949, the
defendant-appellant entered the store at 511 Misericordia, Sta Cruz, Manila. Once inside he
started firing a .45 caliber pistol that he had in his hand. The first one shot was Jose Sy. Tan
Siong Kiap, who was in the store and saw the accused enter and afterwards fire a shot at Jose
Sy, asked the defendant-appellant, "What is the idea?" Thereupon defendant-appellant turned
around and fired at him also. The bullet fired from defendant-appellant's pistol entered the
right shoulder of Tan Siong Kiap immediately ran to a room behind the store to hide. From
there he still heard gunshot fired from defendant-appellant's pistol, but afterwards defendant-
appellant ran away.

Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where his wound was treated. He
stayed there from September 3 to September 12, 1949, when he was released upon his request
and against the physician's advice. He was asked to return to the hospital for further treatment,
and he did so five times for a period of more than ten days. Thereafter his wound was
completely healed. He spent the sum of P300 for hospital and doctor's fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant-appellant performed all the acts of execution necessary
to produce the death of his victim when he shot and wounded Tan Siong Kiap for the crime of
frustrated murder.

HELD: In the cases of U.S. vs. Eduave, 36 Phil., 209, People vs. Dagman, 47 Phil., 768 and People
vs. Borinaga, 55 Phil., 433, this Court has held that it is not necessary that the accused actually
commit all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of his victim, but that it is
sufficient that he believes that he has committed all said acts. In the case of People vs.
Dagman, supra, the victim was first knocked down by a stone thrown at him, then attacked
with a lance, and then wounded by bolos and clubs wielded by the accused, but the victim upon
falling down feigned death, and the accused desisted from further continuing in the assault in
the belief that their victim was dead. And in the case of People vs. Borinaga, supra, the accused
stabbed his intended victim, but the knife with which he committed the aggression instead of
hitting the body of the victim, lodged in the back of the chair in which he was seated, although
the accused believed that he had already harmed him. In both these cases this Court held that
of the crime committed was that of frustrated murder, because the subjective phase of the acts
necessary to commit the offense had already passed; there was full and complete belief on the
part of the assailant that he had committed all the acts of execution necessary to produce the
death of the intended victim.

In the case at bar, however, the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was hit,
but he was able to escape and hide in another room. The fact that he was able to escape, which
appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind of the defendant-appellant that he
was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. In other words, the defendant-appellant
knew that he had not actually all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these
circumstances, it can not be said that the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been
completed. And as it does not appear that the defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit,
and as a matter of fact, he ran away afterwards a reasonable doubt exist in our mind that the
defendant-appellant had actually believed that he has committed all the acts of execution or
passed the subjective phase of the said acts. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the
defendant-appellant.

We are, therefore, not prepared to find the defendant-appellant guilty of frustrated murder, as
charged in the information. We only find him guilty of attempted murder, because he did not
perform all the acts of execution, actual and subjective, in order that the purpose and intention
that he had to kill his victim might be carried out.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, modified and the defendant-
appellant is found guilty of the crime of attempted murder, and the sentence imposed upon
him reduced to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision
correccional to 10 years of prision mayor. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. With
costs against the defendant-appellant.

2. People vs. Anastasio Dagman G.R. No. L-23133 August 20, 1925

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS: On the 2nd of May, 1924, Elias Magbual, en employee of the hacienda "La Esperanza,"
while in the performance of his duties, was treacherous attacked by a crowd of person,
probably about forty in number and was nearly killed. The motive of the crime was that the
persons who harbored enmity against the Magbual had previously been dispossessed of
portions of the land by judicial order. The attack began by the crowd shouting "Avance" and
with Magbual attempting to escape. But a stone thrown by Anastasio Dagman hit Magbual in
the breast, and knocked him down. In this position, he was attacked by Luis Pacunla who
wounded him with a lance. Magbual made another attempt to flee only to fall again and to
receive wounds made by bolos and clubs wielded by the accused. Magbual escaped death from
his tormentors by the use of feigning death.
On these facts, seven persons, Luis Pacunla, Andres Rebollido, Isabelo Rebollido, Juan Olanan,
Anastasio Dagman, Valentin Tabladillo, and Luciano Pacunla, were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija with the crime of frustrated murder. After trial, each of the accused was
found guilty by the Honorable Eduardo Gutierrez David, Judge of First Instance, of the crime of
frustrated homicide and was sentenced accordingly.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not that the trial judge erred in finding that the accused had the
intention to kill Elias Magbual, the offended party, and

(2) Whether or not that the trial judge likewise erred in finding that there was an
agreement to kill Elias Magbual and therefore in sentencing all of the accused to the same
penalty, without taking into account the participation of each of one of them in the commission
of the crime, if any.

HELD: Neither of these points is well taken. The trial judge found each of the accused to have
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a crime included in the information. There is
ample proof to substantiate this finding. The murderous intent of the accused and their joint
purpose are likewise clearly demonstrated.

The trial judge, it will be recalled, found the defendants guilty of the crime of frustrated
homicide. The Attorney-General, however, recommends that the crime be classified as
frustrated murder in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and that
the penalty then be placed in the maximum of that provide by law because of the presence of
the aggravating circumstance that prohibited arms were use by the assailants. A majority of the
court agree with the Attorney-General. We believe the felony should be classified as frustrated
rather than attempted, under the law and the local jurisprudence.

The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the offenders performed all of the acts of
execution which should precede the felony as consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the
playing possum by Magbual. (Penal Code, art. 3, par. 2.) There was an intent upon the part of
the assailants to take the life of the person attacked, which intent may be gathered from the
circumstances surrounding the attack; in this instance, the nature of the wounds, the cry of the
accused, "Vamos a matarle," and their fingering the nose of Magbual to see if respiration
continued. (U.S. vs. Mendoza [1918], 38 Phil., 691; U.S. vs. Sanchez [1911], 20 Phil., 427; U.S. vs.
Domingo and Dolor [1911], 18 Phil., 250; U.S. vs. Marasigan [1908], 11 Phil., 27; U.S. vs. Reyes
[1906], 6 Phil., 38 U.S. vs. Sabio [1903], 2 Phil., 485; U.S. vs. Taguibao [1901], 1 Phil., 16.) Deadly
weapons were used, blows were directed at the vital parts of the body, the aggressors stated
their purpose to kill and thought they had killed. The subjective phase of the crime was entirely
passed, and subjectively speaking, the crime was complete. (U.S. vs. Eduave [1917], 36 Phil.,
209.) The particular parts of the body of the person struck during the assault, the deadly
character of the weapons used, the violence of the attack, and the accomplishment of the
crime with alevosia in such manner as to insure the safety of the assailants while depriving the
victim of the opportunity to make defense, classifies the crime a frustrated murder. (U.S. vs.
Sanchez [1911], 20 Phil., 427, citing decisions of the supreme court of Spain of April 17, 1895,
September 29, 1881, and December 31, 1890.) And finally, that the victim did not die, was
owing to a chance or accident or reason independent of the criminal act performed. (U.S.
Agoncillo and Admana [1916], 33 Phil., 242.) (See also U.S. vs. Bastas and De la Serna [1905], 5
Phil., 251; U.S. vs. Poblete [1908], 10 Phil., 578; U.S. vs. Domingo and Dolor [1911], 18 Phil.,
250; Albert, The Law on Crimes, pp. 31-33; and 30 C.J., 14.)

Agreeable to the recommendation of the Attorney-General, the judgment appealed from is

modified and each of the defendants and appellants is sentenced to fourteen years, eight
months and one day imprisonment cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to pay a one-seventh part of the costs of each instance, and all of the defendants and
appellants jointly and severally are sentenced to reimburse the offended party in the amount of
P65 for medical services. So ordered.

3. United States vs. Lim San G.R. No. L-5335  November 8, 1910

MORELAND, J.:

FACTS: The defendant in this case was convicted of the crime of attempted murder in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila and sentenced to seven years of presidio mayor and to
pay one-third of the costs of the trial.

It is alleged that on or about the 18th day of October, 1908, the defendant Lim San attempted
to kill one Keng Kin by assaulting him with a bolo and inflicting upon him several wounds; that
one of the wounds would have proved fatal had not the injured person received prompt and
efficient medical assistance.

The guilt of the defendant was established beyond reasonable doubt, if the testimony of Keng
Kin, Chua Hung, and Gregorio Mariano is to be believed. All of these witnesses testify that the
accused assaulted Keng Kin without cause or provocation and stabbed him several times with a
bolo. All unite in saying that Keng Kin, at the time, was standing just outside the limits of the
street, his attention upon a dog which he had with him, when the accused leaped upon him
with his bolo and committed the acts complained of. All of these witnesses saw the accused in
the act, fully recognized him, and later identified him as the person who committed the offense.

The defense interposed by the accused was an alibi. He produced several witnesses to support
it. Between the testimony of these witnesses and that of the witnesses of the prosecution there
is irreconcilable contradiction.

The crime in this case was committed about 10 o'clock at night. It was somewhat dark, the only
light being that given by a lamp suspended from the ceiling of a tienda directly across the
street. Keng Kin was not expecting to be attacked. His attention was directed exclusively to his
dog. He was wholly unsuspicious… The accused, without warning of any kind, careful not to
disturb the quiescent attitude in which he found his victim until the very instant of the blow,
attacked him with great rapidity and force, driving his bolo straight into his face. On the first
blow the point of the knife entered the left eye, penetrating to and slightly cutting the brain,
destroying the eye completely and rendering him entirely incapable of protecting himself. This
means simply that the accused committed the crime maliciously and treacherously by methods
which tended, directly and especially, to insure him against risk that might proceed from any
defense which his victim might make. In other words, the combination of the conditions,
darkness, distracted attention, lack of knowledge of the attack, lack of warning, the suddenness
of the assault, the maneuvering of the accused in such way as not to attract attention till the
very moment of the blow, keeping him quiescent until the end was accomplished,
constitutes alevosia under subdivision 2 of article 10 of the Penal Code. This would have made
the crime murder had Keng Kin been killed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Manila Court of First Instance Judge erred in judgment that the
defendant is guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

HELD: The court found the defendant guilty of the crime of attempted murder. We are unable
to agree with that finding. We regard the crime as frustrated murder. The distinction between
frustrated murder and attempted murder is this: In frustrated murder the accused performs all
of the acts which he believes necessary to consummate the crime. Death, however, fails to
follow for causes entirely apart from his will. In attempted murder the accused begins the
commission of the crime by overt acts, but involuntarily desists from performing the other acts
necessary to consummate the crime, he being prevented from so doing by some cause outside
of his own will. In the case at bar it appears clearly that the defendant believed that he had
performed all of the acts necessary to consummate the crime of murder, and, therefore, of his
own will, desisted from striking further blows. He believed that he had killed Keng Kin. Death
did not result for reasons entirely apart from the will of the accused. This surely stamps the
crime as frustrated murder. If, after the first blow, some one had rushed to the assistance of
Keng Kin and by his efforts had prevented the accused from proceeding further in the
commission of the crime, the accused not believing that he had performed all of the acts
necessary to cause death, he would have been guilty of attempted murder.

For these reasons it is competent for this court to find the defendant guilty of the crime
described by the facts stated in the information, these facts being fully and satisfactorily proved
and the accused having in no wise been prejudiced.

Under article 407 of the Penal Code the defendant should be punished with a penalty lower by
one degree than that which would have been applied had he consummated the crime. The
penalty for the consummated crime ranges from cadena temporal in its maximum degree to
death. The penalty lower by one degree is from presidio correccional in its maximum degree
to presidio mayor in its medium degree. There being present the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, the penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.
The judgment of the court below is, therefore, reversed, and the defendant is convicted of the
crime of frustrated murder and sentenced to eight years and one day of presidio mayor and to
pay one-third of the costs. There being no evidence in the case of the damages which Keng Kin
has suffered by reason of the facts complained of, no indemnity can be required paid in this
action..

4. People v. Marcelo Honrada 62 Phil. 112/ GR No. 43495, Sep 14, 1935

VICKERS, J.:
FACTS: It appears from the evidence that while Gregorio Estandarte was walking along the road
in the municipality of General Trias about four o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1934, he was
suddenly and without warning stabbed twice in the back, and when he looked around he saw
the defendant with a long fan knife in his hand. The defendant then renewed the attack, and
Estandarte tried to defend himself with the riding whip he was carrying, but the defendant
succeeded in stabbing him in the abdomen. The offended" party fell on his back in a ditch
beside the road. The defendant continued the attack and stabbed the offended party in the
chest and under the breastbone.

The assault took place near the house of Candido Rosari; and Maxima Ballecer, who was going
to the house of Rosari and saw the defendant attack the offended party, shouted for help.
Miguel Tagle, Pedro Ballecer, and Leonardo Figueroa heard her cries and went to the scene of
the crime. When the defendant saw the three men approaching he ran away. Pedro Ballecer
took the wounded man to the poblacion, where he was given first aid. He was then taken to the
Philippine General Hospital. Upon examination by Dr. E. M. Lesaca he was found to have the
following wounds: A stabbed wound under the breastbone, a stabbed wound penetrating the
liver, an incised wound in the right lumbar region and another in the left lumbar region, and an
incised wound on the nose. He was also suffering from shock and anemia. Because of the
wound in the liver, he was promptly operated upon, and was able to leave the hospital at the
end of three weeks.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from four years, two months, and one day of prision correctional to eight years
and one day of prision mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing the penalty not in accordance with the
law.

HELD: It appears from the evidence that while Gregorio Estandarte was walking along the road
in the municipality of General Trias about four o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1934, he was
suddenly and without warning stabbed twice in the back, and when he looked around he saw
the defendant with a long fan knife in his hand. The defendant then renewed the attack, and
Estandarte tried to defend himself with the riding whip he was carrying, but the defendant
succeeded in stabbing him in the abdomen. The offended" party fell on his back in a ditch
beside the road. The defendant continued the attack and stabbed the offended party in the
chest and under the breastbone.

The assault took place near the house of Candido Rosari; and Maxima Ballecer, who was going
to the house of Rosari and saw the defendant attack the offended party, shouted for help.
Miguel Tagle, Pedro Ballecer, and Leonardo Figueroa heard her cries and went to the scene of
the crime. When the defendant saw the three men approaching he ran away. Pedro Ballecer
took the wounded man to the poblacion, where he was given first aid. He was then taken to the
Philippine General Hospital. Upon examination by Dr. E. M. Lesaca he was found to have the
following wounds: A stabbed wound under the breastbone, a stabbed wound penetrating the
liver, an incised wound in the right lumbar region and another in the left lumbar region, and an
incised wound on the nose. He was also suffering from shock and anemia. Because of the
wound in the liver, he was promptly operated upon, and was able to leave the hospital at the
end of three weeks.

The trial judge rejected the contention of the defense, and we think he was fully justified in
doing so. They were undoubtedly caused by the defendant when he attacked the offended
party from behind, as stated by the latter and Maxima Ballecer. The attack was therefore
treacherous, and the number and seriousness of the wounds, especially the one in the
abdomen that penetrated the liver, show that it was the intention of the defendant to kill the
offended party. It was only the prompt and skillful medical treatment which the offended party
received that saved his life. The offense committed by the defendant was therefore frustrated
murder. He is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The penalty imposed by the lower court is not in accordance with the law. Murder is punished
by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, and in accordance with article 50 the
penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower, or prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in, its medium period. The minimum period of this penalty is from ten
years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor. It is true that article 250 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the courts, in view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the
person guilty of the frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide a penalty lower by one
degree than that which should be imposed under the provisions of article 50, but there exists in
this case no special reason for applying article 250. In accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law the minimum penalty to be served by the defendant was correctly fixed at four
years, two months, and one day. The appellant is therefore sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence ranging from four years, two months, and one day of prision
correctional to ten years and one day of prision mayor. As thus modified, the decision appealed
from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

5. People vs. Marcos Mercado G.R. No. L-27415 November 29, 1927

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
FACTS: On the morning of July 23, 1926, in the municipality of Bustos, Province of Bulacan,
Rufino Lopez was attacked and wounded on the left side of the abdomen with a sharp-edge
weapon by his brother-in-law Marcos Mercado. The wound extended to the peritoneal cavity
and, according to Doctor Estrada, who attended the injured man, it was serious enough to have
produced his death had it not been properly treated in time.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that while Rufino was gathering ears of corn that
morning, he was suddenly attacked by the accused who inflicted upon him the wound herein
before described. According to the injured party, as soon as he felt himself wounded, he turned
around and only then saw the accused behind him. He caught his aggressor's right hand which
bore the weapon, with his left hand, and with his right tried to snatch the weapon. While they
thus grappled, Alejandro Mercado, who was some distance away and saw the attack, left the
bolo with which he was working on the ground and went towards the combatants. Alejandro
succeeded in wresting the weapon from the accused who stepped back from them. The
accused, however, upon seeing the bolo left by Alejandro on the ground, picked it up and came
back to where the injured party was, in order to again assault him, but was prevented from
doing so by Alejandro's intervention. The accused then asked the latter for the weapon taken
from him, offering in exchange the bolo which he had picked up from the ground. After
Alejandro had received his bolo and had delivered the weapon to the accused, the latter
withdrew.

A complaint having been filed against Marcos Mercado charging him with the crime of
frustrated murder, he was convicted and sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one
day reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the injured party in the
sum of P780 and to pay the costs of the action.

The lower court found that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in commission
of the crime. We do not find such circumstance sufficiently proven. We cannot admit that the
attack took place as related by the offended party; we cannot conceive how, upon him from
behind, the accused could have wounded him on the left side of the abdomen, having the
weapon in his right hand. The position of the wound shows that the attack must have been
made with the accused in front of the injured party. Besides, Alejandro Mercado, testifying for
the prosecution, contradicted from the injured party of this point. According to said witness,
the accused came up from behind but suddenly placed himself in front of his victim and it was
them that he wounded the latter in the abdomen.

ISSUE: Whether or not lower court erred in imposing crime of frustrated murder against the
defendant.

HELD: As the versions of the occurrence given by the witnesses for the prosecution are
contradictory to each other, we cannot accept them, finding that the crime was committed in
this or that particular way, and hence, we cannot hold that the circumstance of treachery was
present.
It has been clearly shown that the accused intended to kill the offended party, having executed
to this end all the acts that should have produced this result but for Alejandro's intervention.
This is seen not only from the location and seriousness of the wound inflicted on the injured
party, but also from the accused's conduct in picking up Alejandro's bolo after the latter had
disarmed him and in returning to where the injured party was in order to again attack him with
said bolo. lawphil.net

The facts established by the evidence of the prosecution constitute the crime of frustrated
homicide, aggravated by the circumstance of the accused being a brother-in-law of the injured
party. The penalty one degree lower than that provided by the law for the crime of homicide
should be imposed.

The judgment appealed from is modified and it being understood that the crime committed is
that of frustrated homicide, the appellant is sentenced to ten years and one day reclusion
temporal, said judgment appealed from being confirmed in all other respects, with the costs
against the appellant. So ordered.

6. People v. Leovigildo David 60 Phil. 93 GR Nos. 39708, April 16, 1934

VILLA-REAL, J.:

FACTS: This case comprises two appeals taken by the defendant Leovigildo David from the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bataan in criminal cases Nos. 3310 (G. R.
No. 39708) and 3296 (G. R. No. 39709), guilty for frustrated murder and for discharge of
firearms with less serious physical injuries, respectively.

The herein defendant-appellant Leovigildo David is the son of Teodoro David,

a democrata candidate for municipal president of Dinalupihan, and the offended party Jose V.
Reyes is the brother of Emilio Reyes, nacionalista candidate for member of the provincial board
of Bataan, both during the general elections of 1931.
Emilio Reyes and Teodoro David were engaged in an argument and then fistfight. While Jose V.
Reyes was on top of Teodoro David, herein defendant Leovigildo David shot Jose V. Reyes,
which did not hit its mark. However, the defendant again fired three more shots hitting the
upper left hand side of Reyes' body, stock of the gun carried by the constabulary soldier Cirilo
Dullas and the left axilla of the boy German Pinili.
Jose V. Reyes was immediately brought by his brother Emilio Reyes and others to Dr. Gonzalo
Nuguid's clinic in Orani, Bataan, where he was given first aid, while the constabulary soldiers
seized the revolver of the defendant Leovigildo David and placed him under arrest. In the
chamber of the revolver of the defendant Leovigildo David were found four empty cartridges.
ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision convicting Leovigildo David guilty on
the crime of frustrated murder in criminal case Nos. 3310 (G. R. No. 39708) and for discharge
of firearms with less serious physical injuries in criminal case No. 3296,

HELD: The first question to be decided in this appeal, in connection with the criminal case for
frustrated murder, is one of fact and consists in whether or not Jose V. Reyes had his back
toward Leovigildo David when the latter shot at him.
The witnesses for the prosecution testified in the affirmative, while those for the defense
testified in the negative stating that when the defendant fired the shot which hit Jose V. Reyes,
the latter was on top of Teodoro David, the defendant's father, and in the act of hitting Teodoro
on the forehead for the second time with the butt of his revolver. The testimony of the
constabulary soldier Esteban Aninang, who stated that the violent shove given Jose V. Reyes by
his companion Cirilo Dullas caused the said Jose V. Reyes to stagger and stoop to the right side
and at the same time to turn his back toward the defendant simultaneously with the third shot,
corroborates the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that Jose V. Reyes was facing the
defendant.
The second question of fact to be decided is whether or not Jose V. Reyes had struck Teodoro
David with the butt of his revolver, while the latter was under him, and was in the act of striking
said Teodoro David for the second time when Leovigildo David fired the shot which hit him.
On this point, the testimony of the two constabulary soldiers, who may be regarded as
impartial witnesses, is unanimous in that when Jose V. Reyes received the bullet wound, he was
already standing far from Teodoro David and beside the constabulary soldier Cirilo Dullas who
had dragged him away from said Teodoro David.
From the foregoing, it may be stated as a conclusion of fact that when Leovigildo David fired
the shot that hit Jose V. Reyes, the latter was facing him, and if the bullet hit Reyes on the back,
it was due to the fact that his position was changed upon being shoved by the constabulary
soldier; and that when the said defendant Leovigildo David fired the same shot, said
complainant was already far from Teodoro David.
Now then, do the above facts, which were proven beyond reasonable doubt at the trial,
constitute the crime of frustrated murder for which the defendant Leovigildo David has been
convicted and sentenced?
Inasmuch as the defendant fired the shot facing the victim and in the presence of many people,
he did not employ means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make (article 10, No. 2, of the old Penal Code). The very fact that Jose V.
Reyes had been shoved by the constabulary soldier Cirilo Dullas shows that he could have
evaded the shot and thereby frustrate the defendant's intent. Therefore, the circumstance of
treachery was not present in the commission of the crime.
Did the defendant Leovigildo David have the intention of killing Jose V. Reyes?
The defendant-appellant invokes the defense of a relative to exempt himself from criminal
liability (article 8, No. 5, of the old Penal Code). It has been shown that when the said defendant
fired at Jose V. Reyes, the aggression had already ceased and, therefore, the motive for
defense; and in firing at his victim, the defendant's intention could not have been only to repel
the aggression against his father but also to kill Jose V. Reyes. Therefore, the intention of the
defendant Leovigildo David to kill Jose V. Reyes is obvious.
The third question to be decided is whether or not the defendant Leovigildo David, having
intended to kill Jose V. Reyes, had performed all the acts of execution which should have
produced the latter's death, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will
(article 3 of the old Penal Code).
The doctors, who testified as experts on whether or not the wound received by Jose V. Reyes
was necessarily mortal, are not unanimous.
From all the above expert testimony, it may be inferred that had it not been for the timely and
adequate medical intervention, the offended party Jose V. Reyes would have succumbed from
the wound in his lung. A wound that may, by itself alone, produce a similar consequence, is
mortal.
The defendant-appellant Leovigildo David, in firing his revolver and hitting Jose V. Reyes on the
upper left hand part of his body, piercing it from side to side and perforating the lung, then
performed all the acts of execution which should have produced the latter's death but did not
produce it by reason of the timely and adequate intervention of medical science, which was
completely independent of his will.
The facts proven at the trial as committed by the defendant-appellant Leovigildo David
constitute the crime of frustrated homicide, defined and penalized in article 404 of the old
Penal Code which was in force at the time of the commission of the crime.
As to the offended party German Pinili, the evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that one
of the shots fired by the defendant Leovigildo David hit him on the left axilla, the treatment of
the wound having lasted about twenty-five days.
Although it is true that the shot, which hit the boy German Pinili, was not aimed at him,
however, it cannot be considered accidental because, it having been voluntarily aimed at Jose
V. Reyes, the defendant-appellant Leovigildo David is liable for the consequences of his act, in
accordance with the provisions of article 1, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code, which provides
that "any person voluntarily committing a felony (delito) or misdemeanor (falta) shall incur
criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
Although the crime, which the defendant Leovigildo David had intended to commit against Jose
V. Reyes, was homicide, the crime committed by him against the boy German Pinili is discharge
of firearms with less serious physical injuries.
In both cases, Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is applicable
to the defendant-appellant, and consequently the maximum of the penalty, which he should
suffer in case No. 3310, should be the maximum of that which should be imposed upon him
under the law, that is, eight years of prision mayor; and the minimum, a penalty embraced
within that next lower in degree to that prescribed by law for the crime of frustrated homicide,
which is prision correccional in its full extent, the duration of which is from six months and one
day to six years, that is, one year and one day of prision correccional. Therefore, the total extent
of the penalty to be imposed upon the defendant for the crime of frustrated homicide should
be from one year and one day to eight years.
In criminal case No. 3296, for the complex crime of discharge of firearms with less serious
physical injuries, the maximum of the penalty, which should be imposed upon the defendant, is
the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by the law, that is, three years, nine months and
three days of prision correccional, and the minimum, four months and one day of arresto
mayor, a penalty embraced within that next lower in degree which is arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods, the duration of which is from four months and one day to six
months, and consequently the full extent of the penalty which should be imposed upon him is
from four months and one day to three years, nine months and three days.
The total amount of the expenses incurred by the offended party for medical assistance is
P1,030.79.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and the defendant Leovigildo
David is declared guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide in criminal case No. 3310 of the
Court of First Instance of Bataan (G. R. No. 39709) and sentenced to one (1) year and one (1)
day of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor and to indemnify the offended
Rarty Jose V. Reyes for damages in the sum of P1,030.79; and in criminal case No. 3296 of the
said Court of First Instance of Bataan (G. R. No. 39708), he is declared guilty of the crime of
discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, and sentenced to four months and one
day to three years, nine months and three days, with the costs of both instances in the two
cases against the appellant. So ordered.

7. US v. Luis Bien 20 Phil. 354/ GR No. 6739, Oct 16, 1911

TORRES, J.:
FACTS: Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction by the Hon. Judge P. M. Moir.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock on the morning of the 3d of May, 1910, the  Chinaman, Go Sui Chiang,
a resident of the pueblo of Bacacay, Albay,  heard  that, in the maritime fishing zone comprised
within the concession obtained by him, there were several men engaged in  fishing by means of
a hoop net; he therefore got into a small boat, or baroto, and went to  the point indicated, and
when he reached a place where there was a depth of about 3 varas of water, he  was
approached by  Luis Bien in his baroto.  Chiang then told Bien to cease fishing and leave  the
place, whereupon the  latter  caught hold of the  Chinaman and threw him into the  water.   As
Chiang could not swim, he made efforts to keep himself afloat until finally he succeeded in
seizing the gunwale of the boat in  which he had come; and while one of the companions of the
defendant  told the latter to submerge the Chinaman at a place where the water was deeper,
Camilo Bas and  Victorino Bas, whose attention had been attracted to the spot by the
Chinaman's cries for help, arrived on the  scene and  prevented the defendant from striking  the
victim of the attack with an oar and took him to  the shore.  Chiang then immediately went to
the lieutenant of the barrio, before whom he presented himself  with  his  clothes wet,  and
reported  that the defendant had thrown  him into the water with  the intention of drowning
him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in rendering judgment of guilty for frustrated
murder to the defendant.
HELD: From the foregoing facts, which were duly proved at the trial, it is concluded that the
crime  of attempted homicide against the person of the Chinaman, Go Sui Chiang, was actually
committed, for the said Chinaman was thrown into the water, where he was exposed to
asphyxia through submersion, as he  did  not know  how to swim,  and it  is therefore
unquestionable that the assailant commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt
acts; if the death of the party attacked was not consummated, it was because of  the opportune
intervention of two  witnesses  who responded to the cries of the Chinaman when he was
sinking and helped  him to  get out of the water and to reach the land;  hence, it may not be 
said that the crime  was not consummated because of any voluntary and spontaneous
desistance on the part of the  aggressor; consequently the crime  under prosecution should be
technically classified as attempted homicide, provided for  and punished by article 404, in
connection  with article 3, second  paragraph, and article 66, of the Penal  Code.
In the commission of the crime, there is no  aggravating circumstance whatever  to be taken
into account, but due weight must be given to the special circumstance of article 11  of the
Penal Code,  in view of  the defendant  being  a native, the nature of the act committed, and his
scant education ; therefore the penalty of prision correccional must be imposed in the
minimum degree.
For the foregoing  reasons, whereby the  errors attributed to the judgment appealed from are
held to have been refuted, with the declaration that the crime committed should be classified
as attempted homicide, we hereby sentence the defendant to the penalty of two years
of prision correctional, the accessories of article 61 of the Penal Code, and to pay the costs of
both instances.  So ordered.

8. People vs. Felipe Kalalo, et. Al. G.R. Nos. L-39303-39305 March 17, 1934

DIAZ, J.:

FACTS: On November 10, 1932, the herein appellants Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo,
and Gregorio Ramos, were tried in the Court of First Instance of Batangas jointly with Alejandro
Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the
first two for murder, and the last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of the parties said
three cases were tried together and after the presentation of their respective evidence, the said
court acquitted Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, and sentenced the other
appellants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the crimes of murder and discharge
of firearms?

HELD: Wherefore, the three appealed sentences are hereby modified as follows:

In case No. 6858, or G.R. No. 39303, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellants
is homicide and they hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Marcelino Panaligan
in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings of both
instances; and by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of the said penalty
of reclusion temporal is hereby fixed at nine years;

In case No. 6859, or G.R. No. 39304, the court likewise finds that the crime committed by the
appellants is homicide, and they are hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Arcadio Holgado
in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of both instances; and in
conformity with the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of the penalty of reclusion
temporal herein imposed upon them is hereby fixed at nine years;

In case No. 6860, or G.R. No. 39305, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo is attempted homicide, and he is hereby sentenced to two years, four months
and one day of prision correccional, it being understood that by virtue of the provisions of said
Act No. 4103, the minimum of this penalty is six months, and he is furthermore sentenced to
pay the costs of the appeal in this case.

In all other respects, the appealed sentences in the said three cases are hereby affirmed
without prejudice to crediting the appellants therein with one-half of the time during which
they have undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code. So ordered.

9. People vs. Orita G.R. No. 88724    April 3, 1990

Lessons Applicable: No frustrated rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
•    March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at
the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her
home from a party.  She knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent
visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck.  Despite pleading for
her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him.  Since the door which led to the 1st
floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his
left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he
dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he commanded her with
the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then
pushed her hitting her head on the wall.  With one hand holding the knife, he undressed
himself. He then ordered her to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra,
pants and panty.  He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He
made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as
told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her.  He then laid
down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis
was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed
out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the
partition, she ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a
window.
•    Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding
house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the
building and knocked on the back door.  When the policemen who were inside the
building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat.
Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house  where they heard and saw somebody running
away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness.  She was taken to Eastern Samar
Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
•    Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
•    RTC: frustrated rape

ISSUE: Whether or Not there is frustrated rape.

HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED, the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P30,000
•    Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
•    Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o    (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony
 o    (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will
•    attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or
agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts
it is his intention to perform
o    If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the
crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
•    in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished.  Any penetration of the female organ
by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
•    The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the
sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration
of the genital organ of the victim.

10. People vs. Domingo Hernandez G.R. No. L-23916 October 14, 1925

OSTRAND, J.:

FACTS: Defendant is 70 years of age and the offended party is a child of 9 years, the
granddaughter of the defendant's wife. There can be no question as to the defendant's guilt.
The evidence shows he had intercourse with the child by force and violence. He admits that he
did so, but maintains that he was intoxicated at the time and did not know what he was doing.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is, however, to the effect that he did not
show any signs of intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime or immediately
afterwards.

The court below found the defendant guilty of frustrated rape and sentenced him to suffer ten
years and one day of prision mayor. In holding that the crime was frustrated, the court seems
to have been of the opinion that there can be no consummated rape without a complete
penetration of the hymen. This view is not accordance with the weight of authority; in fact, it is
contrary to practically all modern authorities. In State vs. Johnson (91 Mo., 439), the court held
that "finding the hymen intact is not always proof that no rape has been committed, nor
virginity; for the case are not rare where the hymen had to be removed after impregnation and
in order to permit delivery."

ISSUE: Whether or not finding the hymen and the child’s virginity intact are proof that no rape
has been committed.
HELD: In the following cases it has been held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
merely, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is sufficient to warrant
conviction of the consummated crime of rape. (Kenny vs. State [Tex. Crim. App.]; 65 L. R. A.,
316; 79 S. W., 817 [1903]. See [Eng.] Reg. vs. Lines, 1 Car. & K., 393 [1844]; 44 N. W., 571
[1890]; [Tex.] Rodgers vs. State, 30 Tex. App., 510; 17 S. W., 1077 [1891]; [Wis.]
Brauer vs. State, 25 Wis., 413 [1870].)

In the present case the physician who examined the offended party immediately after the
commission of the crime found the labia and the opening of the vagina inflamed together with
an abundance of semen, though the hymen was intact. It also appears from the evidence that
the defendant lay on top of the child for over fifteen minutes and continued his efforts of
penetration during that period; the child testifies that the defendant succeeded in a partial
penetration and that she felt intense pain. In these circumstances, the crime must be regarded
as consummated.

The judgment appealed from is therefore modified by finding the defendant guilty of the
consummated crime of rape and, in view of the aggravating circumstances mentioned in the
information, the penalty imposed upon the defendant is hereby increased to seventeen years,
four months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
In all other respects the judgment is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

CONSUMMATED FELONY

10. People v Hernandez

99 Phil. 515

FACTS:
                Amado HERNANDEZ (member of the CPP and President of the Congress of Labor
Organizations) re-filed for bail (previous one denied) for his conviction of rebellion complexed
with murders, arsons and robberies. The prosecution said to deny this again because the capital
punishment may be imposed. The defense however contends that rebellion cannot be
complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The information states that the “…murders, arsons
and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime
of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.”

Issue: Whether or Not rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

Held: No.  Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and
robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed
by HERNANDEZ, as means “necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion and that
the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. Under Article 1346 and 1357,
these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether,
subject to only one penalty. One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the
words of said Article 135, is by “engaging in war against the forces of the government” and
“committing serious violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. These expressions imply
everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute only 1 crime, Article 48 doesn’t apply
since it requires the commission of at least 2 crimes.

11. US vs. Severino Valdes G.R. No. 14128

TORRES, J.:

FACTS: This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney before the
Court of First Instance of this city, charging Severino Valdes y Guilgan and Hugo Labarro y
Bunaladi, alias Hugo Navarro y Bunadia, with the crime of arson.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning of April 28th of this year, M. D. Lewin called Mrs. Lewin
and told her that much smoke was issuing from the lower floor of the latter's house. Then, Mrs.
Lewin had not noticed it, and she ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire. Banal
found a soaked material with kerosene oil and placed between a post of the house and a
partition of the entresol, a piece of a jute sack and a rag which were burning. At that moment
the defendant Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning, while the other
defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.
On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the defendants, having been called
for the purpose by telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the statement,
Exhibit C, drawn up in-the police station, admitted before several policemen that it was he who
had set the fire to the sack and the rag. He had performed such acts through the inducement of
the other prisoner, Hugo Labarro, for they felt resentment against, or had had trouble with,
their masters, and that, as he and his co-accused were friends, he had acted as he did under the
promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such fire that he should start.
For lack of evidence and on his counsel's petition, the case was dismissed with respect to the
other defendant Bugo Labarro.
Owing to the repeated attempts, some policemen were watching the building and one of them,
Antonio Garcia del Cid, one morning prior to the commission of the crime, according to his
testimony, saw the defendant Valdes climbing up the wall of the warehouse behind the
dwelling house, in which warehouse there was some straw that had previously been burned.
ISSUE: Whether or not Severino David is guilty of the crime of frustrated arson.
HELD:
The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an
upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the
burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an
occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it. This crime is provided for and punished by
article 549, in connection with articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and the sole
proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation is the defendant Severino Valdes, for,
notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses conclusive
proof that it was he who committed the said unlawful act and was guilty of having set the other
fires that occurred in said house.
The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the
acts conducive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent of
his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot
be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that
no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag,
soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near the partition of the entresol, the partition might
have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.
There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in connection with the
commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately inferior in
degree to that specified in article 549 of the Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium
degree.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the
modification, however, that the penalty imposed upon the defendant shall be eight years and
one day of presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed in article 57 of the Code.
The defendant shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

12. US v Adiao
G.R. No. 13785, October 8, 1918

Facts:

One A., a Customs' inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at eighty centavos from the
baggage of a Japanese and secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was
found by other Customs employees. The defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector,
inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80, from the baggage of a Japanese named T.
Murakami, and secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by other
customs employee. Thereafter, the defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of
Manila with the crime of theft. He was found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft. He
appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and again he was found guilty of the
crime of frustrated theft, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the defendant was guilty of the
crime of theft.

HELD:  Based on these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime cannot properly be
classified as frustrated, as this word is defined in article 3 of the Penal Code, but that since the
offender performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the felony,
he is guilty of the consummated crime of theft. The fact that the defendant was under
observation during the entire transaction and that he was unable to get the merchandise out of
the Custom House, is not decisive; all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present.
The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain are in point: "The defendant was charged
with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the fruit he
was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the
policeman but sometime later. The court said: ". . . The trial court did not err . . . in considering
the crime as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing
appears in the record showing that the policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the
adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking full possession of the
thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of time." (Decision of the supreme
court of Spain, October 14, 1898.) There exists the aggravating circumstance that advantage
was taken by the offender of his public position. Wherefore, in view of the provisions of articles
517 and 518, No. 5, of the Penal Code, and there being present one aggravating circumstance
compensated by no mitigating circumstance, the penalty must be imposed in the maximum
degree.

13. US v Dominguez
G.R. No. L-17021 February 23, 1921

Facts:
On or about 19th day of January, 1920, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
accused who was a salesman at the Philippine Education Co., Inc. did then and there receive the
sum of seven pesos and fifty centavos (pesos 750) from one Lamberto Garcia as payment for
five copies of Sam's "Practical Business Letters" bought from the store of the said company,
which amount should have been turned over and delivered by him (accused) to the company's
cashier or his authorized representative therein; that instead of delivering the said amount to
the said cashier or his representative therein, which he knew it was his obligation to do, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally misappropriate and convert
it to his own personal use to the damage and prejudice of the said Philippine Education Co., Inc.
in the sum of seven pesos and fifty centavos (pesos 7.50) equivalent to 37 ½ pesetas.
The trial the court found the accused guilty of the crime of estafa; hence, the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not Dominguez is guilty of the crime of estafa.

Held:

Yes. The accused attempted to get certain bundles of merchandise at the station, by means of
the presentation of the tag sent to the consignee in a letter which must have been taken from
the mail, it not having been proven by whom or how it came to the accused, who did not attain
their object, because the bundles had been withdrawn two or three days before by the
consignee, be considered as an attempted or frustrated offense? The supreme court of Spain in
its decision of January 3, 1876, in deciding the appeal taken by the accused, who alleged that
the act constituted only an attempt and not a frustrated estafa, declared that the appeal was
not well taken, on the ground that the offense is frustrated when the accused performs all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime, and, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the actor, and that in said case the appellant,
together with his coaccused attempted to take possession of the two bundles which they
believed were at the station, by going there and presenting the tag, and they did not succeed
because these bundles had already been taken, which constitutes the frustrated crime.

The appellant is guilty of the frustrated offense of estafa of 37 ½ pesetas, inasmuch as he

performed all the acts of execution which should produce the crime as a consequence, but
which, by reason of causes independent of his will, did not produce it, no appreciable damage
having been caused to the offended party, such damage being one of the essential elements of
the crime, due to the timely discovery of the acts prosecuted.

14. People v. Espiritu et al, CA – GR No. 2107-R, May 31, 1949

Frustrated Theft...what?
FACTS: A truck loaded with stolen box of rifles was on the way out of the check point in
South Harbor surrounded by a tall fence when an MP guard discovered the boxes on
the truck. It was held that the crime committed was frustrated theft, because of the
timely discovery of the boxes on the truck before it could pass out of the check point.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is frustrated theft.

RULING: Let's take a look at a case which was held as a consummated theft:
In the Supply Depot at Q.C., the accused removed from the pile nine pieces of hospital
linen and took them to their truck where they were found by a corporal of the MP guards
when they tried to pass through the checkpoint. It was held that the crime committed
was consummated theft.
First of all, I would like to say Diño is a dumb asshole. Secondly, the felony committed,
in my opinion, is not frustrated theft but consummated theft. Unlawful taking with intent
to gain one's personal property is an element which produces a felony in its
consummated stage.

It is not necessary if the person successfully carries away the property from the place or
person where it is taken, as long as that person gets hold of the damned item. No
unlawful taking means there is no theft committed. When a person tries to steal one
property but fails, it is attempted theft. If no unlawful taking in the act of execution
happens, it is an attempted theft.

Diño intended to take away the property without authorization and was able to take hold
of the boxes, even he failed to get them out of the base. Espiritu and co. unlawfully took
away the hospital linen but as they failed to pass through the checkpoint because the
guards discovered them. Both guys had the intent, they took their respective objects
without proper authorization, they were caught by the guards before they had proper
hold of the objects...what's the difference?

SC approves of my opinion, of course. According to the Supreme Court, there can be

no frustrated theft, only consummated theft or attempted theft. In one recent case[3] the
petitioner appealed before the CA that he should be convicted of frustrated theft and not
consummated theft because he was not able to freely dispose of the stolen detergents.

The CA affirmed the trial court's decision, and the Petition for Review was filed for
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled out that the frustrated theft is not a crime
under the Revised Penal Code. Whatever the reason the petitioner claimed to be
frustrated theft, the theory that there is a theft when there is a deprivation of personal
property by one with intent to gain. He already committed all acts of execution, and the
owner was already deprived of property from the accused committed, it is decided
conclusively that the theft was on the consummated stage.

15. People v Dino CA

45 O.G. 3446

Facts:
On June 20, 1946, Roberto Diño was hired as a driver of the US army at a station in
Quezon City. At above 11:30 in the morning, he brought a truck load of articles to Manila
harbor; the article came from the US army. At the check point a guard approached the truck
and found three boxes, containing ten caliber 30 army rifles. The guard brought Diño to the
lieutenant of the US army for questioning, Diño pointed to the gang but later denied. Later Diño
confessed that there were four persons who placed the boxes on board and he was instructed
to bring them out of the area. While they were to meet after the truck passed the checkpoint.

Issue: whether or not the crime f theft was consummated considering the foregoing.

Ruling:
Trial Court: Diño was found guilty as an accomplice in the consummated crime of theft.
Supreme Court: Diño was found guilty as a principal in the frustrated crime of theft. Reason: in
order for the crime of theft to be consummated the article should have passed the checkpoint,
so that the thief could have full control and could dispense of the property

16. People vs. Eustaquio Flores G.R. No. L-45973 May 27, 1938

DIAZ, J.:

FACTS: Appellant was charged with qualified theft of jewels valued at P220, belonging to Luisa
Magbituin. Having pleaded guilty upon arraignment, he was convicted of the crime and
sentenced by the trial court to an indeterminate penalty of one year, eight months and twenty
days to four years, two months and one day of prision correccional.

His appeal is based on the supposed error committed by the lower court in having considered
the offense as qualified theft instead of any simple theft. He contends that the allegation of the
information that he committed the crime with abuse of confidence because he was at the time
living in the house of the owner of the jewels from whom he was receiving his daily subsistence,
is not sufficient to elevate the offense to the category of qualified theft.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in its decision finding the accused guilty of
qualified theft instead of any simple theft.

HELD: The question raised by the appellant is not new, having been decided on more than one
occasion contrary to his contention. It is opportune to repeat here what we stated in the case
of People vs. Syou Hu (36 Off. Gaz., 1385), that "the grave abuse of confidence is a mere
circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the commission of the crime of theft. It is not
necessary for said circumstance to be premeditated in order to be taken into consideration as
an aggravating circumstance qualifying said crime. Its presence in the commission of the crime
is sufficient. The fact that the accused was living in the house of the offended party, who had
sheltered him out of charity, when he took the money belonging to his protector, aggravates
the crime committed by him, inasmuch as he gravely abused the confidence which the owner of
the house reposed in him upon permitting him, out of charity, to live therein, stifling the
sentiment of gratitude awakened in his bosom by his benefactors' charitable act; and thereby
commits the crime of qualified theft. Consequently, the classification given to the offense of the
appellant is in accordance with law.

There is no question as to the penalty imposed on the appellant. Under the provisions of article
310 of the Revised Penal Code, taking into consideration the value of the stolen jewels (less
than P6,000 but more than P200), the crime calls for the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum degree to prision mayor in its minimum degree. In the absence of any aggravating
circumstance to offset the extenuating circumstance of plea of guilty, the minimum degree of
the penalty was imposed by the lower court, which is within the limit of the penalty next lower
in degree to that prescribed by the law, in accordance with the terms of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

17. People v Obillo

G.R. No. 139323 - June 6, 2001

Facts:
On or about April 2, 1992, in the City of San Jose, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring together and mutually helping
one another, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away a motor tricycle with Plate No.
CV-1275 owned by and belonging to Miguel de Belen, against the will of the latter; that on the
occasion thereof and for the purposes of enabling them to take and carry away the motor
tricycle above mentioned, the accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, with evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior strength and with intent to kill,
treacherously attack, assault and shoot the aforesaid Miguel de Belen with an unlicensed
firearm, thereby inflicting wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death. 

On July 21, 1992, Sonny Obillo was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges. However,
the lower court held that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping
with homicide,

Issue:

Whether or not they committed crime of carnapping with homicide.

Held:

Yes, Obillio commited such crime. Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act
Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping", defines carnapping, thus:
 "Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things."[Ibid., sec. 2]

Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of carnapping, is an internal act
and hence presumed from the unlawful taking of the vehicle.Unlawful taking,
or apoderamiento, is the taking of the vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.

In the case before us, when the victim, Miguel de Belen, who is the registered owner of the
tricycle subject of this carnapping case,was last seen by his brother Fernando at the Caltex
station at 9:00 p.m. on April 2, 1992, he (Miguel) was seated beside the accused Sonny Obillo
inside the sidecar of his tricycle which was being driven by the other accused Carlo Ellasos.
Three (3) hours later, Fernando again saw the two accused with the tricycle, but this time
without his brother. When Fernando finally asked the accused about the whereabouts of his
brother, Ellasos answered that Miguel was in a drinking session with his (Ellasos’) father in
Malasin. The following morning, the lifeless body of Miguel de Belen, with a gunshot wound on
the head, was found in Tayabo. In the same morning, the two accused were found sleeping at
the gate of the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in Muñoz, and in possession of a gun and the wheel of
Miguel’s tricycle. The rest of the tricycle was later recovered in a culvert.

On the matter of conviction of the accused based on circumstantial evidence, the following
requisites need to be satisfied: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Or, as
jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty."
The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength
and nighttime cannot be appreciated as no evidence was presented to prove the same. To
establish the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, it must be shown that there
was a period sufficient to afford full opportunity for reflection and a time adequate to allow the
conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will as well as outward acts showing
the intent to kill. Abuse of superior strength is appreciated when the aggressors purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. As
aggravating circumstance, what should be considered is not that there are 3, 4 or more
assailants as against one victim but whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the offense. With respect to nighttime as an aggravating
circumstance, this circumstance must have specially been sought to consummate the crime,
facilitate its success or prevent recognition of the felon.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision is hereby affirmed with the modificaitons that only
Sonny Obillo is convicted of Carnapping with Homicide 

18. People vs. Artemio Garcia & Regalado Bernabe G.R. No. 138470 April 1, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision1 dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 830-M-98, finding Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr.
and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping with
Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On December 17, 1996, Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, was
approached by Garcia and Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brand new Mitsubishi
L300 van for their trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the van was unavailable.

Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purchased a brand new Toyota
Tamaraw FX for P475,500.00.3 Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the
daily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe and Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle from Cortez
for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.00 driver’s fee. They agreed to pay the rental fee upon
their return from Bicol.4

On December 18, 1996, Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacio’s Tamaraw FX at
his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at
8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol.5

Four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez informed the Barangay
Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis’ wife, Nancy, approached Cortez and asked
where her husband was.6

The two accused were seen in front of a store in Brgy. Pangayan, Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija.
When they failed to produce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX, they were brought
to the Moncada Police Station for investigation.8

Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that they attempted to sell the Tamaraw
FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio. In the early morning of December 24, 1996, a joint team of
police officers composed of members of the Moncada and Marilao Police, together with the
Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, were accompanied by Cortez to Moncada, Tarlac,
where the latter positively identified Ignacio’s Tamaraw FX.
Cortez went to visit Garcia and Bernabe in detention. They admitted to him that they stabbed
Elis and dumped him along the highway near the "sabana" in San Rafael, Bulacan. They claimed
that they were compelled to eliminate Elis when he refused to join their plan to sell the
Tamaraw FX. However, the police were unable to find Elis’ body. After returning to Moncada,
Cortez immediately inspected the interior of the vehicle and found bloodstains on the side and
back of the driver’s seat. He also found several personal items belonging to Elis, such as his
clothes and driver’s license,9 as well as Garcia’s bag which contained bonnets, tear gas, the
warranty card and the car registration papers.10

On December 29, 1996, the Moncada police received information that a male cadaver was
found in San Rafael, Bulacan, submerged in mud ten meters away from where they searched
earlier. The cadaver was identified as that of Wilfredo Elis by his wife, Nancy. 11

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, that Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado
Bernabe y Orbe were found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
Carnapping with Homicide in violation of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659.

ISSUES: Appellant Bernabe raises the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF CARNAPPING
AS DEFINED IN REPUBLIC ACT 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT) AS AMENDED ARE PRESENT AND
DULY PROVEN.

II

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE WAS
PART OF AN ALLEGED CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CARNAPPING.

III

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE ON THE

BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE CRIME TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.

1) No, A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of

carnapping were proved in this case.

In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellant’s possession of the
Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the
purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an
unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the Moncada Police Station
where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately admitted to him that
they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle. Their
confession, having been freely and voluntarily given to Cortez, a private individual, is admissible
against the appellant.19  What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his co-accused in
killing the victim. Such is the vital point on which the crime and the nature thereof is to be
determined. This undoubtedly satisfied the element of unlawful taking through violence,
rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.

2) No, appellant contends that he did not conspire with his co-accused to commit the
crime of carnapping. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, 22 which are indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.23 In conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all.

In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proved that Garcia and Bernabe, through Joselito
Cortez, hired the brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio for
their trip to Bicol; that at 8:00 a.m. of December 18, 1996, they left for Bicol on board
the Tamaraw FX driven by Elis; that on December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of
Moncada, Tarlac reported to the Chief of Police that two suspiciously looking persons,
who turned out to be Garcia and Bernabe were offering to sell a brand new Toyota
Tamaraw FX for a mere P50,000.00 in Anao, Tarlac; and that the two were finally
apprehended with the subject vehicle at Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija by elements of the
Tarlac and Nueva Ecija Police.

3) No, appellant Bernabe maintains that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his
admission to Cortez and Ignacio on the grounds that (a) he did not make such
admission; (b) the admission made by Garcia should not prejudice him; and (c) assuming
he made such admission, it should be excluded for having been made under duress and
intimidation.29

In People v. Andan,30 it was held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.
The rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the
slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, and
not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, appellant’s voluntary
admission to Cortez that he and his co-accused conspired in killing the deceased when the
latter opposed their plan to sell the vehicle is admissible as evidence against him.

Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant Bernabe
and his co-accused, Garcia.
The award by the trial court of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim should be affirmed.
When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount
as indemnity for the death, without need of any evidence of proof of damages. 33 This is in
addition to the actual damages of P15,290.50 which was duly substantiated by proof. 34 We,
however, reduce the award of moral damages to P50,000.00, in line with current
jurisprudence.35

Lastly, we find the court a quo’s award of P250,000.00 for loss of earning capacity to be without
basis. Nancy testified that her husband Wilfredo was earning P600.00 a day prior to his
death,36 however, she failed to produce evidence to substantiate her claim. As held in the case
of People v. Panabang,37 a self-serving statement is not enough; the indemnification for loss of
earning capacity must be duly proven.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 21, finding appellant Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe guilty of Carnapping with
Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay
the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,290.00
as actual damages, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: Appellant is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, moral damages in the reduced amount of
P50,000.00. The award of P250,000.00 for loss of earnings is DELETED for lack of factual basis.

19. People v Bustinera

Facts:

Bustinera was driving one of the taxi units of Elias Cirpiano under the “boundary
system”. As one of the drivers, Bustinera would take a unit and use it to transport passengers
then return the unit at a particular time together with the “boundary”. On 25 December 1996,
Bustinera took the taxi unit which he was supposed to return on the following day. He failed to
do so because he was not able to raise the “boundary”. Cipriano then went to the residence of
Bustinera to find out why the unit has not been returned yet but did not find the taxi there
since according to Bustinera’s wife, the latter was still transporting passengers to raise the
boundary. Cirpriano then proceeded to the police and reported his unit as missing. A case of
qualified theft was then filed against Bustinera and after hearing, the Trial Court found him
guilty of the crime. Bustinera appealed the case on the ground that there was no basis for the
court’s conclusion that his failure to return the unit was with the intent to gain among others.

Issue: Whether or Not the taxi was carnapped.

Held:
 The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s finding of guilt but not of qualified theft
under the Revised Penal Code but should be under the Anti-Carnapping Act. “Carnapping is
essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft,
robbery and carnapping being the same. In the 2000 case of People v. Tan where the accused
took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v. Lobitania which involved the taking
of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is
now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or
robbery” (G.R. 148233, June 8, 2004). In answering the main issue raised by Bustinera that
there was not intent to gain, the Court said: “Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but
also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s
consent constitutes gain”. Therefore, when a person takes a vehicle without the owner’s
consent even for the purpose of just going for a “joyride”, he is guilty of carnapping because
“his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and
pleasure.”

20. Valenzuela v People

G.R. No. 160188, EN BANC, June 21, 2007

FACTS

On May 19, 1994, Petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a
supermarket within SM North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning
his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an
identification card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with
cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open
parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket,
and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded
these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Thereafter, petitioner left the parking
area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then
boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was
leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise,
petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene,
and the stolen merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the duo were four (4)
cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of
detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.
The RTC convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Petitioner
filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since
at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen. The CA rejected this contention and affirmed the petitioner’s conviction. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the accused is liable for consummated theft. (YES)

HELD

Under Article 6 of the RPC, a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Finally, it is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Furthermore, the elements
of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there
be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things.

"Unlawful taking" is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of
one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage.
At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could
onlyattempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, the Court can only conclude that under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be
attempted or consummated.

21. People v De La Cruz CA

22. US v Villanueva G.R. No. 307, September 12, 1902

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ATTEMPTED ESTAFA. — One who fraudulently assumes authority to demand
fees for the Forestry Bureau is guilty of attempted estafa if his demands were not complied
with on account of the victim’s inability or unwillingness to pay.

TORRES, J. :

FACTS: Appeal by the defendant, Agustin Villanueva, against the judgment of the 18th of
November, 1897, rendered in case No. 5606 by the court of La Laguna, for attempted estafa, by
which he was condemned to pay 500 pesetas fine, or to the subsidiary personal penalty, and to
the payment of one-third part of the costs.

On the 25th of November, 1884, Celestino Borlasa filed a complaint before the local authorities
of the town of Lilio against Agustin Villanueva, stating that he, accompanied by Juan urna, had
gone to the complainant’s house, and, after having examined the house, by order, as stated by
Villanueva, of the forestry officer, Hermenegildo de Ocampo, and having observed that the
house was built with new lumber, as well as several other houses also examined, demanded of
the complainant the sum of 6 pesos and 2 reals for the purpose of avoiding a fine and with a
view to preparing a petition for obtaining a free permit to cut timber. This amount the
complainant was unable to pay, and Villanueva refused to receive 3 pesos, which was offered
him by Borlasa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of attempted estafa?

RULING: The facts established by the evidence in the case show that the attempt was made to
obtain the sum of 6 pesos and 2 reals by fraudulent representations and for purposes not
justified or authorized by the forestry law. If the estafa was not consummated it was because
the complainant either could not or would not pay the amount demanded, and simply offered a
little less than half, which the defendant, in turn, refused to accept.

The defendant, Agustin Villanueva, is guilty, as author by direct participation, of the crime of
attempted estafa of a sum not exceeding 250 pesetas, by his own confession. Although the
defendant did not succeed in consummating the crime of obtaining the money upon the
fraudulent pretext of having been authorized by the forester, Hermenegildo de Ocampo, an
employee of the Forestry Bureau, the fact is that he attempted to obtain the amount
demanded and refused to receive the 3 pesos which the complainant offered him, this being
less than one-half of the amount demanded.

All these facts are established by the testimony of the two witnesses there present and by
another witness, who affirms that he saw Villanueva in conversation with the complainant,
Celestino Borlasa, although not aware of the subject of their conversation.

The unsupported allegation by the defendant that he had acted under the orders and upon the
authority of the ranger, Ocampo, who was not arrested and is still absent, can not serve as an
excuse or relieve him from the charge brought against him, inasmuch as the forester was not
authorized or empowered to give such orders, nor is such an action authorized by law.

In the commission of the crime, and for the purpose or the imposition of the penalty, the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstance of No. 18 of article 10 of the Code must be
considered, because Villanueva has been already convicted by final judgment of three other
crimes of estafa, and, therefore, no mitigating circumstance being present to offset the effects
of the aggravating circumstance, the defendant must suffer the penalty prescribed by the law in
its maximum degree, although, in consideration of the provisions of article 83 of the Code, and
it not appearing that the financial position of the defendant is such that he may be classed as a
rich man, which appears from the nature of the crime, the fine to which he has become liable
should not be a heavy one, and therefore, by virtue of articles 26, 83, 92, and those above
cited, section 50 of General Orders, No. 58, and the law of August 10, 1901, we are of the
opinion that the judgment appealed should be affirmed with reference to the defendant,
Villanueva, but in case of inability to pay the fine, the subsidiary imprisonment can not exceed
one month and one day, the preventive imprisonment suffered to be computed, the defendant
to pay one-third of the costs of this instance, without special mention as to the defendant Juan
Urna acquitted by the court below. So ordered.

23. People v Gutierrez CA

G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010

Facts:

On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three (3)
counts of attempted murder were filed against appellant. When arraigned, appellant, with the
assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits
then ensued. Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him
of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts. Appellant assails the
trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence. He admits having
killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.

Issue: 

Did the accused act in self-defense?  

Ruling: 
No.  Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only
if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on his part.

In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:

One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden
of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to
prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense
relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no
unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.

In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His
version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by
the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant
suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the
prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to be
more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and respect to the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge has the best
opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such
exceptions obtains in this case.

In Razon v. People, we held:

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and

competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense,
the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellant’s plea of self-
defense.

This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying
circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor
on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby
ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victims.

The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that treachery
was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses, and
unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and appellant’s testimony
that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkling
that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery
was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the
crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-
3639 is correct.

We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated
murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was
offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his death
had medical help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the
victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused
had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death.

24. People v Castillo CA

G.R. No. 172695 29 June 2007

Facts:

In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-appellant came home drunk and angry. His
father-in-law, Guillermo, tried to subdue him but to no avail which caused the former to leave
the house. As he was leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his sling and arrow. Consorcia, the
accused’s wife, was heard crying and screaming. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was seen
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia out of the house and was later taken to the hospital
but was pronounced dead upon arrival. Cause of death was the cut of jugular vein caused by a
fatal weapon which could have been a “pointed instrument like a nail.”

Issue:

Whether the fatal injury inflicted on the victim was accidental.

Held:

The essential requisites for exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act;
(2) with due care; (3) he causes injury to another by mere accident; (4) without fault or
intention of. Causing it. The mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In
penalizing the act, the consideration of the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but
to inflict injury. Also, the fact that the accused-appellant disappeared while his wife was in the
hospital is unbecoming of a husband with a dying wife. Due to the weakness of the defense’s
evidence, the claim that the act was accidental cannot be appreciated in favor of the accused.
Therefore, the accused was found guilty of the crime of Parricide wherein the court imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

25. People v del Rosario CA

G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999

Facts:
ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y
Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos"
and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in
cash and... jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,[3] Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe
alias "Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only
Joselito del Rosario was tried.
On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side
of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked
at a distance of about one and a-half (1½) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by
accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for
possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started
chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman
sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still
on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of
accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind
the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave
chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after
which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident.
Issues:
that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules
of Court.
Ruling:
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the
place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs Sucro[44] we held that
when a police officer sees the offense, although at a... distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his
presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5,... par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be
caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest
of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on
the day following the... commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before
a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the
offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of... arrest must be secured.
Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must
have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody
has committed the crime.[45] Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these
requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the
crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the
time the accused was arrested.
Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway
tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

26. US v Joven

G.R. No. 12066. February 3, 1917

Facts:

The defendant, in the municipality of Bacolor, Pampanga, P. I., on the afternoon of June 13,
1915, armed with a pocket-knife, did willfully, unlawfully and criminally, and with the intent to
kill Edilberto Joven, assault him with his pocketknife and inflict upon him several wounds, and,
if he did not succeed in his said design, it was due to the timely intervention of Fortunato Datu.

On arraignment the defendant plead not guilty. After trial and the introduction of evidence, the
court rendered judgment on October 25th of the same year, finding the defendant guilty as
principal of the crime of attempted homicide. The defendant appealed from the judgement.

Issue: Whether or not defendant is guilty of attempted suicide.

Held:

Yes. The defendant introduced no evidence whatever at the trial, having waived, through
counsel, his right so to do. He now assails the judgment appealed from, which he deems
erroneous, but only as regards the classification of the crime, which he considers should not be
that of attempted homicide, but lesiones menos graves; and in respect to the sentence in so far
as it imposes an indemnity for damages. The appellant argues that damages were not proven at
the trial, and that lower court fixed them under the sole guide of his judicial discretion.

The defendant, in assaulting and wounding Edilberto Joven made use of a weapon adequate to
the purpose of causing on the latter’s body sufficient injury for the realization of the intent to
kill him. The manifest intention of the agent, as shown by his acts and confirmed by his words,
and for the realization of which, means were employed adequate to obtain the result sought by
him, is an element that necessarily must be taken into account for the classification of the crime
which such acts constitute, and for the imposition of the corresponding penalty.

As it does not appear that the commission of the crime of attempted homicide of which the
defendant is guilty as principal by direct participation, was attended by any circumstance
modifying said liability, the penalty that should be imposed upon the defendant, under article
404, in connection with article 66, of the Penal Code, is that of prision correccional in its
medium degree, and not that of presidio correccional in the same degree, which latter penalty
was the one imposed upon him by the lower court in the judgment appealed from. He should
also be sentenced to the accessory penalties mentioned in article 61 of the said Code

27. US v Maghirang
G.R. No. L-9991 December 19, 1914

Facts:

During late at night on the 1st day of May, 1913, the accused Roman Maghirang,
Damaso Rivera, and Francisco Gutierrez, in company with Pablo Sahagun, went to the house of
Cornelio Briones in the barrio of Remedios, municipality of San Pablo, Laguna, carrying banjos
and guitars, for the purpose of giving a serenade in front of Briones' house in honor of his
sister-in-law, to whom Sahagun was paying some attention. The young lady being ill, Briones,
from his window, called to the accused and asked them not to continue the serenade as he was
afraid the music would awaken her. The accused thereupon departed. About 2 o'clock of the
afternoon of the following day Briones, riding a carabao, went to visit a piece of land belonging
to him in Maabu. During the journey he had to cross a dry run which, in the wet season,
emptied its waters into the Patay-na-tubig River. Briones had crossed this run and was in the
act of ascending the opposite bank when suddenly the three accused, Roman Maghirang,
Francisco Gutierrez, and Damaso Rivera, leaped from the bushes in which they were hidden.
Gutierrez seized the carabao while Rivera struck Briones on the left arm with a club. The force
of the blow knocked Briones to the ground. While down, Maghirang approached him with a
bolo and, in spite of the remonstrances and prayers of Briones, struck him two blows, one on
the shoulder and the other across the lips. The accused then withdrew. The blows were heavy
ones and rendered the victim senseless. After returning to consciousness he was able, with
great difficulty, to reach his house.

From the evidence in this case we have no doubt whatever that the accused are guilty of the
acts charged in the information. Briones recognized all three as they attacked him and detailed
clearly and satisfactorily what each one did. The only question calling for discussion in this case
is one raised by the private prosecutor, who insists that the solicitor-general, in this court, has
not properly qualified the crime, the latter insisting that the crime is lesiones graves instead of
frustrated murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused committed frustrated murder.

Held:

No. In this particular case, the accused did not perform "all of the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence." The wounds were not located in a vital
spot. Neither of them was mortal nor likely to produce death; in other words, the wounds
inflicted were not such as "should" produce death, nor such as would naturally and ordinarily
produce death.

Nor is the crime attempted murder; for, in order that the crime be qualified as such, the
offender must commence "the commission of the felony directly by overt acts" but must "not
perform all of the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own voluntary desistance."
In the case at bar the accused voluntarily desisted from injuring the victim further. They
probably knew, which was the fact, that the injuries were not inflicted in a vital part of the body
and were not such as "should" produce death. This presents a condition from which we cannot
say that the accused intended to kill. Without this intention the crime can be neither frustrated
nor attempted murder. 

The crime must be characterized as lesiones graves, as stated by the solicitor-general. There
being present the aggravating circumstances of alevosia, premeditation, despoblado and
superior force, the penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.

28. Mondragon v People

G.R. No. 1-17666, June 30, 1966

Facts:
At about 5:00 in the afternoon of July 11, 1954, complainant Serapion Nacionales was opening
the dike of his ricefield situated in Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, to drain the water therein and
prepare the ground for planting the next day, he heard a shout from afar telling him not to
open the dike, Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the same voice shouted again,
'Don't you dare open the dike.' When he looked up, he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming towards
him. Nacionales informed appellant that he was opening the dike because he would plant the
next morning. Without much ado, Mondragon tried to hit the complainant who dodged the
blow.
appellant drew his bolo and struck complainant on different parts of his body. Complainant
backed out, unsheathed his own bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and forearm and
between the middle and ring fingers in order to defend himself. The appellant retreated, and
the complainant did not pursue him but went home instead. The following day, the
complainant was treated

Issues:
The issue raised by the petitioner in the present appeal is that the Court of Appeals erred In
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted homicide and not of the crime of less serious
physical injuries
Ruling:
There is merit In the contention of the petitioner. We have carefully examined the record, and
We find that the intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party has not been conclusively
shown.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner had the Intention to kill the offended
party is simply the result of an inference from an answer made by the petitioner while testifying
in his own behalf.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals, in our opinion, do not establish the intent to kill on
the part of the petitioner.
IN VIEWS OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from should be, as
it is hereby, modified in the sense that the petitioner is declared guilty of the offense of less
serious physical injuries and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three
(3) months and fifteen (15) days of arresto mayor, with costs.

29. Pentecostes, Jr v People

G.R. No. 167766 : April 7, 2010
Facts:
On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with his brother-in-law. After consuming -
bottle of gin, he left and went to the house of a certain Siababa to buy coffee and sugar. He was
accompanied by his four- year-old son. On their way there, a gray automobile coming from the
opposite direction passed by them. After a while, he noticed that the vehicle was moving
backward towards them. When the car was about two arms' length from where they were, it
stopped and he heard the driver of the vehicle call him by his nickname Parrod. Rudy came
closer, but after taking one step, the driver, which he identified as the petitioner, opened the
door and while still in the car drew a gun and shot him once, hitting him just below the left
armpit. Rudy immediately ran at the back of the car, while petitioner sped away. After
petitioner left, Rudy and his son headed to the seashore. Rudy later went back to the place
where he was shot and shouted for help.4cräläwvirtualibräry

The people who assisted him initially brought him to the Municipal Hall of Gonzaga, Cagayan,
where he was interrogated by a policeman who asked him to identify his assailant. He informed
the policeman that petitioner was the one who shot him. After he was interrogated, he was
later brought to the Don Alfonso Ponce Memorial Hospital at Gonzaga, Cagayan. The following
day, he was discharged from the hospital.

Petitoner pleaded not guild of the crime of Murder, yet was found by RTC guilty of the crime of
attempted murder; hence, the appeal.

Issues:
Whether or not the accused committed attempted murder?
Ruling:
No. Yet, he is guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries, not attempted murder.

The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on
the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a
clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the
aggressor.27cЃa In the present case, intent to kill the victim could not be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of
the latter's body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times
or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill
existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact
beyond reasonable doubt.28cЃa When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the
victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal
Certificate29cЃa issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only
require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day,
the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury
suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
"(A)ny person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical
injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or
shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."

30. People v Marcos (1990)

G.R. No. 83325 May 8, 1990

Facts:

An information was filed by the Second Assistant Fiscal Alberto G. Gorospe at the Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Branch V, Baguio City on December 3, 1985 charging the accused,
Dante Marcos y Sibayan, of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Sale and
Distribution of Prohibited Drugs), having been committed as follows: That on or about the 4th
day of December, 1985, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, and without any authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and distribute dried marijuana leaves weighing
about nine (9) kilos, more or less, contained in a big sack, for P700.00 per kilo or a total of
P6,300.00, Philippine Currency, knowing fully well that said leaves of marijuana is a prohibited
drug in violation of the above-mentioned provision of law.

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. The
trial court gave more weight to the evidence of the prosecution and found the accused-
appellant Dante Marcos guilty as charged; hence, his appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II R.A. No. 6425 (Sale
and Distribution of Prohibited Drugs).

Held:

Yes. Appellant contends that there was an instigation or even frame up and not a real
entrapment. The "buy-bust" operation team who went to the place does not know the accused.
In fact, the alleged buyer had to be introduced. There was no marijuana yet when the
authorities came or when the alleged poseur buyer came to buy the prohibited drug. Thus, the
accused was not about to commit a crime or committing a crime.

The contention is without merit. The testimony of Artizona, the poseur buyer, was clear and
convincing and demonstrated that the accused needed no instigation or prodding to commit a
crime he would not otherwise have committed. Noteworthy is the fact that the accused, as
gathered from the records, had a ready supply of marijuana for sale and disposition to anyone
willing to pay the price asked for the prohibited material. Thus, the acts of the arresting officers
here constituted entrapment, a process not prohibited by the Revised Penal Code (People v.
Sanchez, G.R. No. 77588, May 12, 1989; People v. Borja G.R. No. 71838, February 26, 1990).

The defense that the accused was framed by the apprehending officer can be easily fabricated
and not acceptable for accused being a drug pusher or seller almost always uses such defense.
(People v. Francia, 154 SCRA 694 [1987]). For the defense of having set up or framed up to
prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense,
that is easy to concoct and is difficult to prove (People v. Nabunat, No. 84392, February 7, 1990,
First Division, Gancayco, J.). the appellant was positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses. This should prevail over his denial and inadmission of having committed the crime
for which he was charged, since greater weight is generally accorded to the positive testimony
of the prosecution witnesses than the accused's denial (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 52 [1986];
People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; People v. Marilao, G.R. No. 71681, September 5,1989). As
between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statement of
the accused, the former deserves more credence (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268, 157 SCRA
718; People v. Marilao, G.R. No. 71861, September 5, 1989). Moreover, even if the appellant
denied the participation in the crime, his presence during the negotiation and actual delivery
indicates a common purpose with other accused to sell marijuana (People v. Natipravat, supra).

Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of the witnesses'
testimonies are accorded great weight and respect on appeal because the trial judge has first
hand opportunity to examine and observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during
the giving of their testimonies (People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989; People v.
Tejada, supra; People v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, January 27, 1989; People v. Turla, G.R. No.
70270, November 11, 1988; People v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 404 [1987]). Hence, he is guilty of the
crime charge against him.

31. US v Basa

G.R. No. L-3540. March 19, 1907

Facts:
The municipality of Gasan, on the Islands of Marinduque advertised for proposals to furnish the
municipality with street lamps. Jose Lopez Basa, in answer to such advertisement, submitted a
proposition in writing by which he agreed to furnish the municipality the lamps at a price
therein named. He was at that time a member of the municipal council.
The court held that the submission of his proposition by the defendant, when he was a member
of the council, was a violation of section 28, and he was convicted therefor.
Issue:

Whether or not Basa violated the Sec. 28 of the Municipality Code.

Held:
No. Conviction cannot be sustained because the offer he was never accepted by the
municipality. Therefore, he never became “interested” in any contract work. Sec. 28 of the
Municipality Code does not punish an attempt to commit this crime. Artilcle 6 of the RPC also
does not apply.

32. People v Diego Quin

33. US v Te Tong
G.R. No. 8654. December 29, 1913

Facts:

On the 28th day of August, 1912, A.J. Robertson was a police official known as a comandante of
the Province of Cebu, having his official residence in Cebu, the capital of said province. On said
date the two Chinamen Yap Shut and Te Tong, together with others, were surprised in a
gambling game known as jueteng and were arrested and charged with gambling. At the time of
making the arrest the police officials seized various books belonging to the person in charge of
the game, together with other articles and utensils used therein. These books and articles were
kept under the personal supervision of Comandante Robertson, who placed them in an iron
safe in his office. On the night of the 30th of August an unknown Chinaman was found by
Robertson conversing with his Chinese cook in the kitchen. Robertson asked the cook who the
Chinaman was. In reply the cook informed him that the Chinaman desired to speak with him
regarding certain books which had been seized during the gambling raid made just previously,
saying that certain interested Chinamen desired to be allowed to remove the books from
Robertson’s possession and substitute others in their place. Robertson thereupon agreed to
make the substitution provided that the was paid a sufficient sum of money therefor.
Thereupon the unknown Chinaman departed.

On the night of the 1st of September following, the accused Te Tong went to Robertson’s
house, saying to him that he brought with him a sum of money as a consideration for the
substitution of the books. Prior to that time Robertson had made arrangements with two
members of the police force to place themselves secretly in a position where they could see
and hear all than passed between him and the Chinaman. Robertson lighted the lamp, opened
his iron safe and took out the books. The Chinaman Te Tong thereupon began to examine the
books, picking out of the larger ones, they being those that contained evidence very damaging
to his case. After having picked out the books Te Tong delivered to Robertson other books
similar in appearance which were to be used as substitutes. After the substitution had been
made Robertson asked Te Tong for the money which he had offered to pay for the substitution.
Te Tong answered that the money was at his house; but Robertson insisted upon immediate
payment, and the Chinaman thereupon drew from his pocket a roll of bills amounting to P500
and delivered it to Robertson. As the Chinaman started to leave the office Robertson called to
the two policemen who came forward and stated that they had seen and heard all that had
transpired. The Chinaman was then arrested.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime is attempted, frustrated, or consummated bribery.

Held:

The case of United States v. Tan Gee (7 Phil. Rep., 738) was of a similar nature, and the crime in
that case was held to be that of attempted bribery.

While there is some authority to the contrary, we are of the opinion that we should follow the
substantially uniform holding of this court which declares the crime to be attempted bribery.

34. People v Erinia

Facts:

In 1927, Julian Erinia was found guilty of raping a child aged 3 years and 11 months. A
doctor who examined the girl hours after the incident found slight inflammation on the
exterior of the vagina, but expressed doubt whether the man's penis had entered the
vagina. The mother also testified that a sticky substance covered her child's genitals, but
penetration could not be concluded from this either.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of consummated rape or merely frustrated rape.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Erinia was entitled to the benefit of the doubt due to the lack
of conclusive evidence of penetration. The verdict was modified from consummated rape
to frustrated rape.

Justice Malcolm wrote a dissenting opinion, citing similar past cases. He opined that it was
 consummated rape, following past cases where the tip of the man's penis had entered the
lips of the child's vagina.

35. People v Orita

G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990
FACTS:
•    March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at the St.
Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her home from a
party.  She knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of another
boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck.  Despite pleading for her release, he ordered
her to go upstairs with him.  Since the door which led to the 1st floor was locked from the
inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his left arm wrapped around her neck
and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they
reached the second floor, he commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a
room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the wall.  With one
hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to take off her clothes.
Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty.  He ordered her to lie down on the floor
and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a
knife, she did as told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her.  He
then laid down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his
penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed
out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the partition, she
ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a window.
•    Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding house
and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked
on the back door.  When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they
found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it
around her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house  where they
heard and saw somebody running away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness.  She was
taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
•    Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
•    RTC: frustrated rape

ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.

HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000
•    Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated
stages apply to the crime of rape.
•    Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o    (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony
o    (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will
•    attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency
which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of
the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to
perform
o    If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime
and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
•    in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished.  Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ
•    The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole
basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital
organ of the victim.

36. Tibong v People

G.R. No. 191000, September 15, 2010

Facts:
That on or about the 14th day of April 2006, at Betag, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of
Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and
attempt to rape [AAA[2]] while the latter was sleeping and therefore unconscious, by removing
the latter's pajama and panty, and thereafter holding her vagina and fondling her breasts, and
endeavor to have sexual intercourse with her against her will and consent, thereby
commencing in the execution of the crime of rape but did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the felony as a consequence by reason that the offended party
was awakened, defended herself and escaped from him, which cause is not his spontaneous
desistance, to the damage and prejudice of the said [AAA]. That the accused and [AAA] are
relatives within the 3rd civil degree.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape.

Held:
Petitioner's acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her
breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly
obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that
petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant's sexual organ. Rather,
these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness.
Insisting that there was no attempted rape, petitioner argues that AAA merely testified that he
told her that they would have sexual intercourse; and that "this is not equivalent to carnal
knowledge, or even an attempt to have carnal knowledge," since there is no showing that he
had commenced or attempted to insert his penis into her sexual organ before she fled.
The accused must be, as he is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape.

37. People v Sazon

G.R. No. 89684 September 18, 1990

Facts:

On September 15, 1983, in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was
accosted by appellant near the barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant
and his companions were engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez
which caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longo, who was then present at the scene, approached
and helped the fallen Romualdez and pushed appellant away. This apparently angered
appellant who, in his native dialect said "Andam ka lang Inday kay patyon ta guid," ("Watch out
Inday for I will kill you") to which Longno retorted, "Just do it."

Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o'clock P.M., appellant and his cousin,
Cornelio Altejos, were drinking softdrinks at the shire of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed
by. Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks half-assumed and followed Longno.

Longno eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where the group of Massulini
Dullete, Samuel Canoso and Nathaniel Ramos were sitting. He joined the group in their
conversation by saying, "Upon ako dira." ("I'll go with what you say."). Shortly thereafter,
appellant and Altejos arrived and appellant accosted and pointed a gun at Longno, saying,
"Maano ka?" ("What are you going to do?"). Longno then faced appellant and said, "Brod,
tiruha lang." ("Brod, just shoot.")

Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in the left forearm.
Dullete, Canoso and Ramos then scampered for safety as appellant and the wounded Longno
grappled for the gun. It was while the two were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in
the chest, after which both appellant and Altejos ran away.
Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, "Tay tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto."
("Father, I was shot by Insik and stabbed by Toto."). He was able to run about thirty (30) meters
before he fell. His father, Julio Longno, ran to his son who was then lying sprawled on the
ground. Rushed to the St. Paul's Hospital, Wilfredo Longno died. Later, it was established that
the cause of death was hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound

Appellant's version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno but pleads
self-defense and pleaded not guilty. However, the RTC charged them with the crime of murder;
hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of murder.

Held:

The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only be convicted of homicide and
not murder. The trial court correctly held that the killing was not accompanied by treachery. It,
however, ruled that there was evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We find the
records sorely wanting in evidence to support the latter conclusion.

The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him and that two days later, after
the deceased passed by the store where appellant and Altejos were drinking softdrinks the
latter followed the former and inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion
of premeditated killing.

To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to
his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 22

In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in
that incident of September 15, 1983, warning the victim that the former would kill him, does
not convince us that, under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already
decided to kill the victim. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively
adopted just like that and, worse, publicly announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression
of resentment or bravado on the part of appellant.

Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos were by chance at the store when the victim
passed by cannot be taken as manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his
determination to kill the victim. No evidence was presented to show that appellant purposely
waited there for the deceased. Nor was there any showing that the deceased frequently passed
by the same route as to warrant and explain appellant's waiting for the former at that place.
Indeed, that the meeting may have been purely accidental is not a remote possibility. We are
more inclined to believe that it was the belligerent and defiant demeanor of the victim when
confronted by appellant near the public faucet that precipitated assault.

Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of the
victim was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection, evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act
must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively
as the acts constituting the offense.24 Thus, for the same reason, the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case. Superior strength may
aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take
advantage of it.25 In the absence of any evidence to show that the accused purposely sought to
use their superior strength to their advantage in the present case, a finding to that effect by the
trial court cannot be sustained.

Thus, the judgment of the trial court is modified. Accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon is declared
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide