A.M. No.

RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

Facts:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint
against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the
prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960 filed by the members of the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report
published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national
circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The
respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the
court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He
further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has
made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is
discretionary on his part.

The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters
he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of
the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also
an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who were
already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the government the right to be
heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the
published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been
officially in force and effect of the law.

Respondent judge filed his comment, contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await
publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange
controls for the simple reason that the public announcement made by the President in several
newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without
qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis of such
announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the President that
the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos,
and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August
18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13,
1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief
Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's
announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent
judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which had become of
public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only
to pending actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the
eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the
accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was
charged

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published
in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

Ruling:

The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can
become effective and binding.

The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot
comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no.
1353 which is the basis of the President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that the
public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such
matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It
is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of
general circulation before its effectivity. When the President’s statement was published in
the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353
thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his
personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court
to take judicial notice of.

The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to
take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the
usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. 14 This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be
disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial
cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they
are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. 18

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact
cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of
the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge
of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that
involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he obtained from
the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that
was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the
right to be heard and of due process. The reason is simple, a law which is not yet in force and
hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable
demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his
discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper
account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial
notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be
considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an
administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued.
Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes
effective. The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot
be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of
the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to
have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time
the improvident order of dismissal was issued.