Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 10028 December 16, 1916

JOSE VALES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMEON A. VILLA, FELIPE S. SILVESTRE, and MARIA GUIA
GARCIA, defendants-appellants.

Lawrence, Ross and Block and Manuel Torres for appellants.

Haussermann, Cohn and Fisher and Orense and Gonzalez Diez for
appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an action to set aside certain transfers of real estate from

the plaintiff to one of the defendants and to require that defendant
to recover by good and sufficient conveyance the title to such
properties; to refund to the plaintiff a certain sum paid by plaintiff for
the recovery of certain other real estate; and for an accounting by
the defendants of the rents, issues and profits of certain real estate
during a certain period; and for P25,000 damages.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the

defendants as follows:
Requiring the defendant Maria Guia Garcia to elect within fifteenth
days from date hereof, whether she will pay the plaintiff the sum of
P7,274 with interest on P6,500 thereof at 6 per cent per annum
from September 5, 1911, and on P752 thereof at 6 per cent per
annum from the 4th day of April, 1913, and retain the property; or
deed the property described as follows (description of property) and
the property sold to her on the 4th day of April, 1913, to the plaintiff
upon plaintiff's paying her the sum of P7,500, with interest thereon
at 6 per cent per annum from the 5th day of September, 1911, and
of deeding to plaintiff without compensation the parcel of land
deeded by plaintiff to her on the 4th day of April, 1913.

And requiring the defendant, Simeon A. Villa, to elect within 15

days from date thereof whether he will pay the plaintiff the sum of
P8,910.41 and retain the property sold to him by the plaintiff, and
described as follows (description of property) together with interest
thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October,
1911, or deed the property to the plaintiff upon the payment by the
plaintiff to him of the sum of P8,089.59, with interest thereon at 6
per cent per annum from October 17, 1911.

And, upon the failure of either of said defendants to elect, as stated,

the right of election as to performance shall be in the plaintiff, who
may immediately enforce his election by execution, compelling the
defendants to execution the deeds as indicated, upon the payment
of the sum required of him, or to pay the amounts required by them
to be paid, in case of retention of the property, and in favor of the
plaintiff.
And against the defendant Maria Guia Garcia for the sum of
P3,600, together with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from
the 24th day of October, 1913, and, for the costs of the action.

This appeal was taken from that judgment.

It appears that the defendant Felipa Silvestre is a widow, 70 years

of age, and is the aunt of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia, wife of
the defendant Simeon A. Villa.

In 1904 plaintiff was the owner of the following properties, to wit:

(a) Two houses of strong materials, known and designated as Nos.

37 to 47 (now 105-113) Calle Nebraska, district of Ermita, together
with the lots whereon said buildings are erected, said houses and
lots having an assessed valuation of P23,644 Philippine currency;
(b) one house of strong materials, known and designated as No. 49
(now 303-311) Calle Mercado, district of Ermita, together with the
lot whereon the same is erected; (c) one house of strong materials,
known and designated as No. 45 (now 221-225) Calle Mercado,
district of Ermita, consisting of 11 doors or posesiones, together
with the lots wherein the same is erected; (d) two houses of strong
materials situated upon the private street known and designated as
Callejon Maria Paz, and numbered 47a, 47b, and 11, 13, 15 and
17, respectively, together with the lots wherein the same are
erected.
At that time he was in debt to the defendant Felipa Silvestre in the
sum of P20,000. In that year he executed to her a conveyance of
the properties above described in consideration of the debt, the
conveyance containing a clause giving to the vendor the right to
repurchase the premises within one year from the date of the
conveyance by a payment to the vendee of the consideration stated
in the conveyance. Plaintiff did not repurchase, and in March 22,
1909, having become indebted to Felipa Silvestre in an additional
sum of P5,000, he, on that day, conveyed the premises to the
defendant Maria Guia Garcia, at the request of Felipa Silvestre, she
being an elderly woman and Maria Guia Garcia being considered
by her the heir to all her property. The consideration for the transfer
was the debt of P20,000, the purchase price named in the
conveyance of 1904, and P5,000, the additional debt which had
been created during the time intervening between the two
conveyances. The deed was absolute on its face and, so far as
appears, conveys the property in fee simple; but the plaintiff
contends that there was a parol agreement between him and the
defendants entered into at the time the conveyance was executed
and delivered, giving him the right to repurchase the premises so
conveyed at any time on paying the vendee the P25,000 named as
the consideration for the transfer. The defendants deny the
existence of such a parol agreement and the controversy thus
raised is the origin of all the difference between the parties to this
action.

Shortly after the conveyance of March 22, 1909, on parcel of the

property described in that conveyance was sold to Judge Jocson,
and still later a second parcel, the defendant Maria Guia Garcia
appearing in both conveyance as the vendor of the properties. Still
later another parcel of the property described in said conveyance
was sold to one Garchitorena, Maria Guia Garcia being the vendor
in that conveyance.
In 1911, the plaintiff conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia
for P7,580 certain property, also the subject of this action, but not a
part of the property described in the conveyance of the 22d of
March, 1909, located on Calle Salsipuedes; and in 1913 a parcel of
land adjoining the Salsipuedes property for P752. In 1911, plaintiff
also conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia a house and lot
located on Padre Faura Street for P8,000. On the 4th day of April,
1913, the defendant Maria Guia Garcia conveyed to plaintiff the
properties described in the conveyance of March 22, 1909,
remaining unsold, for the consideration of P6,800, plaintiff thereby
receiving on payment that which he claims he was entitled to
receive for nothing under the alleged verbal agreement, he claiming
that he had paid long before the full sum of P25,000 which entitled
him to the reconveyance without further consideration.

This action was commenced on the 25th of October,

1915.lawphi1.net

It is claimed by the plaintiff that, in spite of the conveyance of the

22d of March, 1909, he continued in possession of the properties
described therein as virtual owner thereof, and that all he paid for
such possession was the interest on the P25,000, the consideration
for the conveyance, at the rate of 9 per cent per annum, or P2,250,
a year. He also claims that he rented those portions of the
properties described in the conveyance which he himself did not
personally occupy and that he had the benefits of such rents,
collecting them and using them for his own personal purposes. The
defendants, on the other hand, deny that the plaintiff, after the
conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909, occupied the premises as
owner, but assert that he occupied them as tenant of the defendant
Maria Guia Garcia and that he paid rent to her continuously while in
the occupancy thereof, the amount of the rent being reduced as
portions of the property were sold; and that in December, 1911, and
this plaintiff admits, defendants canceled plaintiff's lease and
thereafter collected the rents themselves from all occupants,
including the plaintiff. Defendants also say that, while it is admitted
that the plaintiff rented portions of the properties to other tenants,
he acted in so doing as a tenant of the defendant Maria Guia
Garcia and under a permission to sublet.

Plaintiff also claims that the consideration received for the

conveyance to Judge Jocson was received by him as the real
owner of the property and that P10,000 thereof was paid to the
defendant Maria Guia Garcia as a part payment of the P25,000
which formed the consideration for the conveyance of the 22d of
March, 1909, and was paid in pursuance of the alleged verbal
agreement to reconvey the premises on the payment of the
P25,000 in full. He makes the same claim with regard to the
purchase price of the property sold to Garchitorena, asserting that
he received the whole of that purchase price as the owner of the
property and that he paid therefrom to the defendant Maria Guia
Garcia the sum of P15,000, said sum, together with the sum of
P10,000 paid from the Jocson sale, constituting the full amount due
to defendant under the verbal agreement to reconvey attached to
the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909; and he asserts that,
upon the payment of that sum, he was entitled to receive a
reconveyance from the defendant Maria Guia Garcia of the
properties described in the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909,
remaining unsold.

It is admitted that, in the sale to Judge Jocson and to Garchitorena,

the plaintiff personally conducted the negotiations. Defendants,
however, deny that he acted in such negotiations as owner, but
allege that he acted as their agent. They also deny that he received
the purchase price of said properties and that he paid them
P10,000 and P15,000 or any sum whatever. They assert, on the
contrary, that the defendant Maria Guia Garcia received the full
purchase price in each case, and that the only sum that plaintiff
received was that paid him by the defendant for his services as
agent in selling the property.

With regard to the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties the

plaintiff claims that they were obtained from him and that he was
induced to execute conveyances therefor in favor of the defendant
Maria Guia Garcia under the threat that, if he did not do so, the
defendants would not reconvey to him the properties described in
the conveyance of the 22d of March 1909; that is, that they would
repudiate the verbal agreement which plaintiff alleges was attached
to that conveyance. He asserts that the consideration paid by the
defendant for these properties was grossly inadequate and that, as
stated, he was induced to accept such considerations and to make
the conveyances by reason of the threat aforesaid. The defendants
deny, as we have seen, that such verbal agreement existed and
also specifically deny that such threat or any threat was made or
that the conveyances of the property referred to were obtained by
virtue thereof.

The history of the transactions between the plaintiff and the

defendant as given by counsel for the parties is not essentially
different. While there is, of course, a wide difference in the claims of
the parties to the action, that difference consists largely in the
reasons which underlie the facts thus stated and the forces and
motives which moved the plaintiff to the performance of the acts
referred to and from the effects of which he asks to be relieved.
Counsel for the plaintiff claim that the conveyance subsequent to
that of the 22d of March, 1909, which is the origin of all the
controversies between the parties, and his appearance as a
witness for the defendants in the various proceedings in the Court
of Land Registration concerning certain of the parcels of land in
litigation and all other acts against his own interests, were induced
either by the fraud of the defendants or by the force and undue
influence which they were able to and did exercise over him by
virtue of the advantages they possessed by reason of the fact that
the conveyance of March 22d, 1909 was absolute in form. Counsel
further assert that one of the elements of the alleged fraud and
undue influence was that there was no consideration for the
transfers to defendants or if there was a consideration, it was
grossly inadequate.

Plaintiff's position with regard to the various transfers and the other
acts of plaintiff is best shown by statements of counsel in their brief
in this court. With respect to the conveyance of March 22, 1909,
counsel say:

On March 22, 1909, under guise of covering the additional P5,000

and to place the property beyond the reach of an impecunious
brother-in-law, the plaintiff was induced to execute a writing, in the
form of an absolute deed (Exhibit 1) in favor of the defendant Maria
Guia Garcia, niece of Felipa Silvestre, and wife of Dr. Simeon A.
Villa. This deed was made upon the express understanding (not
contained in the instrument) that the plaintiff was to pay interest at
the rate of 9 per cent per annum upon his indebtedness of P25,000
and was to have a reconveyance of his property upon the
repayment of said indebtedness. The deed expressly recites that by
an escritura dated September 23, 1904, the land with the
improvements thereon had been conveyed to the defendant Maria
Guia Garcia under pacto de retro for P20,000, that since that time
the plaintiff had received form time to time an additional P5,000, all
of which had been employed in the construction of improvements
on the land. This additional P5,000, none of which was retained by
the plaintiff, was the so-called consideration upon which the
conveyance under pacto de retro was converted into an apparently
absolute conveyance.

After the execution of this deed to Maria Guia Garcia, the plaintiff,
Vales, continued in the absolute possession of the properties (test.,
p. 9) and administered the same for his own use and benefit, free
from any control on the part of the defendants. The revenue from
the property amounting to the sum of P600 per month was wholly
received by the plaintiff, until he sold a part of the property, and
until he was later ousted from the remainder as hereinafter stated.

With regard to the transaction with Judge Jocson, counsel say:

In October, 1909, the plaintiff found a purchaser for one of his

houses in the person of Judge Jocson, who paid P14,000 for the
premises at No. 49 Calle Mercado. Of this sum P2,000 was
employed in building a stable and fences, P10,000 was paid by
plaintiff on account of his indebtedness and the remainder of
P2,000 was retained by plaintiff for his own uses. In thus reducing
his debt from P25,000 to P15,000 the plaintiff was required to
increase his interest payments from 9 per cent to 10 per cent, and
the monthly payments of P187.50 were thereafter continued at the
rate of P125.00.
The sale to Judge Jocson was the occasion of the first intimation to
plaintiff that he had committed a folly in executing a deed to
property worth P78,500 to secure a debt of only P25,000 without
expressing therein its real object. All of the negotiations with Judge
Jocson, extending over several months, were carried on with the
plaintiff exclusively, the price for the sale was fixed by the plaintiff
after the latter had abandoned his efforts to secure a higher price,
and the money was paid to plaintiff by Judge Jocson in the
presence of the defendants, who were present, of course, for the
purpose of signing the formal deed. This is shown not only by the
testimony of plaintiff but also by that of Judge Jocson, who states
that he was informed by Vales that although he was the owner of
the property he had allowed the title to stand in the name of the
defendant Maria Guia Garcia as security for an obligation. The
judge testifies that he explained to Vales that although he, Vales,
might have absolute confidence in the good faith of the defendants,
there would be trouble in the event of the death of said Guia
Garcia, and that in view of said explanation Vales requested the
judge to prepare a suitable document which would show the real
equity of Vales in the property. The judge identified the surveying
sheets of the rough draft of the document so prepared by him
(deposition, Exhibit B, p. 77-8). When this document was presented
to defendant Villa and his wife, Guia Garcia, upon one pretext or
another they failed to execute the same. This attitude of theirs
aroused the suspicion of plaintiff and he forthwith determined to
sacrifice a part of his property in order to obtain the money with
which to discharge the remaining balance of his indebtedness. He
accordingly engaged the service of brokers to find a buyer for the
house and lots at Nos. 105-113 Calle Nebraska, included in the
deed to Guia Garcia. The result of this activity was the sale to
Garchitorena of these properties for the sum of P20,000, although
this was far below their real value, as shown by the testimony of
Goyena, a competent and disinterested witness, who appraises the
said properties at over P36,000.
The broker who made the sale testifies positively that the defendant
Felipa Silvestre informed him that the property in question belonged
to Vales, the plaintiff; that he received all his instructions regarding
the sale from the latter; and that from him he received his
commission for his services in effecting the sale. The testimony of
this witness also corroborates absolutely that of the plaintiff to the
effect that when the P20,000 were received from Garchitorena for
the sale of the property in question P5,000 of it was turned over to
Vales. He also testifies that at the time Vales requested the
defendants, all of whom were there present, to reconvey to him the
rest of the mortgaged property and that the defendant Villa, in the
presence of the other defendants, said that that would be done
after Holy Week (sten. notes, page 39). The details of what
transpired on this occasion were also given by the plaintiff in his
testimony (sten. notes, page 14). This occurred on the night of April
11, 1911.

The situation, therefore, after April 11, 1911, was that the plaintiff
had returned to the defendants the whole amount of his
indebtedness to them, but the titles to the remaining properties,
which had stood as security for the debt, still stood in the name of
the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. The value of these properties, as
established by the undisputed testimony of the witness Goyena,
was P24,437.

Counsel have this to say with regard to the transaction involving the
house on Calle Salsipuedes:
On April 14, 1911, plaintiff requested defendants to reconvey to him
the rest of his property, but was informed that this would not be
done until he had sold them for P7,500 a house and lot of his on
Calle Salsipuedes, the value of which, as fixed by the witness
Goyena, was over P15,000. The details of the discussion which this
outrageous demand provoked are found on page 17, stenographic
notes of plaintiff's testimony. The final upshot was that the
defendants told plaintiff that if he would finish the house as they
wanted it and sell it to them for P7,500, that they would then
reconvey to him the rest of his property, but that if he did not do so,
they would keep it, availing themselves of the fact that the record
title was in the name of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. Fearing
that he would be deprived of his property, and yielding to the threat
of the defendants, the plaintiff completed the house and conveyed it
to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia for P7,500.

This house was completed about August 1, 1911, and on

September 5, was deeded by plaintiff to defendant Maria Guia
Garcia. He then again preferred his request for the restoration of
his Ermita properties, but the rapacity of the defendants was not
satisfied. The plaintiff had purchased a building lot on Calle Padre
Faura, and had planned and commenced a building thereon to cost
about P17,000. This property had apparently excited the avarice
and cupidity of defendants, and under the guise of punishing him
for his ingratitude in telling the true history of his woes to Judge
Ostrand of the Land Court and thus delaying the title to the
Salsipuedes house, they demanded of plaintiff the Padre Faura
house, finished and completed to the taste and requirements of Dr.
Villa for the meager sum of P8,000. The mere fact that the plaintiff
had meekly been haled before Judge Ostrand by Dr. Villa and
frightened into retracting his statements and consenting to the issue
of title unto Maria Guia Garcia, after a two days' delay, seemed to
make no difference. The temerity of plaintiff in even mentioning his
rights was deemed worthy of chastisement, especially such as
would redound to the profit and gain of defendants. And so the
Padre Faura property went the way of the house on Calle
Salsipuedes and settled into the maw of the defendants. Its actual
cost of building (some P14,800) was advanced by Dr. Villa, and so,
when finished the poor plaintiff was owing to defendants the sum of
P6,800 or the excess of cost over the purchase price of P8,000.

Finally in December, 1911, the defendants having discovered that

plaintiff was the owner of a strip of land adjoining the house and lot
already wrested from him and having made unsuccessful demands
upon him for the transfer of that strip to them, put the screws upon
his thumbs a little tighter. In addition to informing him that they
would indefinitely retain his Ermita properties, they ousted him form
the administration thereof, collected the rentals thereof and even
compelled the plaintiff to pay them rental for that part occupied by
himself and family. Succumbing to this pressure, and piling Pelion
on Ossa, the plaintiff made conveyance of this additional tribute.

With the demand of P6,800 above stated the plaintiff was unable to
comply for the some time. Finally, in April 1913, he succeeded in
borrowing this sum from one Rafael Alonso, and with this sum
(P6,800) as a nominal consideration, he succeeded in securing the
refund of the balance of his Ermita possessions (worth about
P24,500). Why the defendants did not complete their undertaking,
but left the plaintiff with an equity of about P18,000 is surprising.
Doubtless the delay in procuring for their demands the ultimate
P6,800, or the threatened fulfillment of the adage that even a worm
will turn, advised them that they were at the end of their rope.
It is thus clear that the real difference between the parties in their
relation of the facts in the main lies in the coloring given them by
the disclosure by the plaintiff of what he alleges to have been the
motives and forces which drove him to the transactions which he
now wishes to have annulled. There appears to be some confusion
as to the precise nature of this action. Counsel for appellants say in
their brief in this case:

This is an action to annul a series of real estate transactions

between plaintiff and defendants on the ground of duress.

This statement is sharply challenged by counsel for appellee in

their brief. They say:

The action has been erroneously described in appellant's brief as

one to annul a series of real estate transactions on the ground of
duress. More correctly this is an action to compel the defendants to
account unto the plaintiff for the proceeds of a series of frauds
practiced upon said plaintiff.

Later in their brief, however, and constituting the very first sentence
of that portion marked "Argument," counsel for plaintiff have this to
say respecting the real issue in the action:

With no dispute or denial of the shameful charges laid at the door of

Villa and his wife by this plaintiff, counsel for appellant seeks
strenuously to avoid the issue of duress.
Counsel then continue:

From this premise he (speaking of counsel for appellant) argues

that as there was no legal obligation to reconvey, manifestly their
refusal to do so could not have coerced plaintiff's volition. Our law
would be indeed a travesty on justice if, upon the facts disclosed by
this record, no relief could be afforded to the plaintiff.

Still later counsel say with respect to the sale of the properties in
question for P5,000 when the undisputed evidence shows they
were worth P78,515:

It is repugnant to common sense to think for one moment that any

sane man would be willing to sell property of this value for less than
a third of its actual worth.

Moreover, the brief of counsel for plaintiff is divided into four parts,
each part headed by a word or phrase in bold face type descriptive
of its contents. They are "Argument," "Duress," "Ratification, "Res
judicata." There is no division of the brief which is devoted to fraud
or deceit and no direct discussion of either element. Under the
heading "Argument" there is a discussion of the claim that the
conveyance of March 22, 1909, was for security and not an
absolute conveyance. This is followed by the part marked "Duress"
where counsel say:
The evidence also shows, however, that instead of performing this
duty, the defendants, conspiring together, and taking advantage of
the fact that the conveyance by way of mortgage was in the form of
an absolute deed, played upon the fears of plaintiff and extorted
from him the money and property described in the complaint. It is
our contention that the consent thus wrung from the plaintiff was
vitiated by the duress to which he was subjected by the defendants,
and that they are bound to make restitution to him of every dollar
which they have extorted from him by their threats and intimidation.

Under the heading "Res judicata" we find this:

But the plaintiff does contend that the defendants must undo their
fraud, and must elect to make up the deficiencies, etc.

It would seem from the foregoing, taken in conjunction with the

allegations of the complaint, that the theory of the action is duress.
We might say, however, inasmuch as fraud and deceit are so
prominently mentioned, that we find no fraud in this case. Most if
not all of the elements of fraud are absent. In none of the
transactions was there a misrepresentation of an existing or past
fact; and plaintiff went into each one of them knowing all of the facts
as well as the defendants. There was no deception. This is a
necessary deduction not only form the fact that there was no
misrepresentation but also from the fact that plaintiff knew precisely
what he was doing — was fully acquainted with the facts; and,
knowing them, again and again accepted the verbal promises of the
defendants to reconvey. Under his own statement and according to
his own theory the defendants did no more than break their verbal
contract with him with respect to all subsequent transactions as
they had with respect to the first. That was not fraud, although it
was done again and again, unless the mere failure to fulfill the
various verbal contracts can be said to constitute fraud or deceit. It
is well recognized however, that a mere failure to live up to a
contract is not fraudulent or deceitful. The furthest the authorities
have gone along this line, and not all have gone that far, is to
declare that if, at the time a contract is made, one of the parties has
present in his mind the purpose and intent to break it, after getting
all he can out of the other party, and that purpose and intent enter
into a the contract as the main element or consideration thereof on
his part, there is fraud and deceit, the authorities holding that the
state of mind of the party is a fact entering into the consideration of
the contract without which it would not have been made; and that,
by virtue of that state of mind, the other party was deprived of
property. That fact however must be alleged and proved and relied
upon before it can be utilized by the person asserting its existence.
It was not alleged or proved in this case and plaintiff does not rely
upon it in his brief in this court. His consent was not obtained by
deceit in any of the transactions. There did not exist in any one of
the transactions complained of a condition where "by words and
insidious machinations on the part of one of the contracting parties
the other is (was) induced to execute a contract which, without
them, he would not have made."

Reduced to the lowest terms this action constitutes an attempt on

the part of the plaintiff to extricate himself from a series of foolish
transactions, if we may accept his allegations respecting them. As
we have said, the sales were all made by the plaintiff with full
knowledge of the facts and there appears nothing in the record
which warrants a rescission of them from the standpoint of fraud.
The ultimate purpose of the action is the recovery of the properties
described in the deed of March 22, 1909, remaining unsold. But, as
appears from the evidence, the plaintiff has already recovered
those properties, having purchased them from the defendants on
April l4, 1913, for P6,800. Before this action was begun, therefore,
plaintiff had obtained the very thing which he had been seeking to
recover all through thus dealings with defendants and to obtain
which he claims he had suffered so much. Having secured before
this action was begun precisely what defendants had promised him
and the very thing he sought, there remains nothing further to be
said or done in that connection. Certainly the repurchase of the
properties which he so much desired was not procured by fraud or
deceit; and it was a complete termination of the relations existing
between the parties arising out of the properties which he claimed
were sold with a right to repurchase. After having obtained the very
thing he desired and having done so in a manner which he deemed
best and most suitable under the circumstances, did he not thereby
terminate all relations between himself and defendants with respect
to, or growing out of those properties, and can he nor repudiate not
only the transaction by which he recovered them but also every
other transaction which he claims related thereto? It is
incomprehensible, from a legal point of view, that plaintiff, having
been deprived of property by fraud and deceit, may recover that
property through a voluntary agreement between him and those
who deceived and defrauded him, and then repudiate not only the
transaction in which he was defrauded of that property but also the
very transaction by which he recovered it.

Dealing with the case from the standpoint of intimidation, it should

be noted of March 22, 1909, was obtained in that form by force or
thereat. The validity of that conveyance is admitted; as is also the
fact that the verbal agreement to reconvey was omitted from the
conveyance knowingly. The claim is simply that there was a verbal
agreement to reconvey on the repayment of the consideration
named in the instrument and that defendants made use of the fact
that the agreement was verbal and, therefore, difficult to prove, as
clever by which they forced him to convey to them additional
properties before they would comply with the verbal agreement.
According to plaintiff's contention, then, each one of the
conveyances between him and defendants subsequent to the
original conveyance was an extortion, using that word in its popular
and not in its legal sense, the defendants, in order to intimidate him
and thereby obtain the conveyance, threatening him with a refusal
to comply with the verbal agreement to reconvey and the
consequent loss of his properties. At each conveyance the
defendants agreed, always verbally, as a consideration therefor, to
reconvey to him the properties remaining, but each time refused to
do so and proceeded, after each such conveyance, to a fresh
extortion. It is contended that plaintiff, by not incorporating the
verbal agreement to reconvey in the instrument itself, placed
himself in a disadvantageous position; and that he executed and
delivered the subsequent conveyances for the purpose of
extricating himself from the unfortunate situation so produced. The
ultimate extortion, the payment of P6,800 to recover the remaining
properties, was the last penalty which he paid for his mistake in not
incorporating the verbal agreement in the conveyance itself.

All men are presumed to be sane and normal and subject to be

moved by substantially the same motives. When of age and sane,
they must take care of themselves. In their relation with others in
the business of life, wits, sense, intelligence, training, ability and
judgment meet and clash and contest, sometimes with gain and
advantage to all, sometimes to a few only, with loss and injury to
others. In these contests men must depend upon themselves —
upon their own abilities, talents, training, sense, acument,
judgment. The fact that one may be worsted by another, of itself,
furnishes no cause of complaint. One man cannot complain
because another is more able, or better trained, or has better sense
of judgment than he has; and when the two meet on a fair field the
inferior cannot murmur if the battle goes against him. The law
furnishes no protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior,
any more than it protects the strong because he is strong. The law
furnishes protection to both alike — to one or more or less than to
the other. It makes no distinction between the wise and the foolish,
the great and the small, the strong and the weak. The foolish may
lose all they have to the wise; but that does not mean that the law
will give it back to them again. Courts cannot follow one every step
of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from
unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul
the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves
guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts
operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome
by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome
illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use
miserable judgment, and lose money by them — indeed, all they
have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and
restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the
commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before
the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it.

Furthermore, even if an actionable wrong be committed in such

manner as to authorize the courts to intervene, the person injured
may renounce his right to take the matter to the courts and may
compromise with the wrong-doer. Or, having been placed in a very
disadvantageous position by the wrong committed against him, he
may be offered by his adversary one or more avenues of escape.
He may be required to lose more property to his enemy or go to the
courts for redress. In such case the payment of an additional sum
as a means of escape is not necessarily a payment voidable for
duress. The act was preceeded by an exercise of judgment. This
much was plain to him: he had either to let the matter stand as it
was with the loss already sustained, or go to the courts to be
relieved. His judgment, operating upon this condition, told him to
pay the additional sum rather than to suffer the inconvenience and
expense of an action in court. A payment made under such
conditions is not voidable. It is the voluntary act of a sane and
mature man performed upon reflection. Not only this; it is a
compromise of the original wrong and a ratification of the relation
which the wrongful act was intended to establish between the
parties.

The same may be said with greater force of a case where a

person's own voluntary act, uninfluenced by another, has put him in
a disadvantageous position — a position which another may
unjustly make use of to his injury. The failure to reduce a contract to
writing, or to have witnesses present when a verbal agreement is
made, or to record an instrument, or to exclude from the operation
of its terms things verbally agreed to be excluded, etc., may place a
person in a disadvantageous position with respect to another; and
the demand that he pay to secure his extrication is not illegal, and a
payment made pursuant to such demand is not necessarily
voidable. He pays for his lack of foresight. While the demand may
be reprehensible morally, it is not illegal' and of itself is not ground
for relief.

There must, then, be a distinction to be made between a case

where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his
good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no
consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act
against his will under a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear
that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law
when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts
spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily
and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and
judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. Between the
two acts there is no difference in law. But when his sense,
judgment, and his will rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as
requested, but is nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to
such an extent that he becomes a mere automation and acts
mechanically only, a new element enters, namely, a disappearance
of the personality of the actor. He ceases to exist as an
independent entity with faculties and judgment, and in his place is
substituted another — the one exercising the force or making use
of intimidation. While his hand signs, the will which moves it is
another's. While a contract is made, it has, in reality and in law, only
one party to it; and, there being only one party, the one using the
force or the intimidation, it is unenforceable for lack of a second
party.

From these considerations it is clear that every case of alleged

intimidation must be examined to determine within which class it
falls. If it is within the first class it is not duress in law, if it falls in the
second, it is.

But into whichever class it falls the party coerced may, as we have
seen, waive his right to annul the contract and to recover damages.
He may do this expressly or impliedly. He may expressly accept the
agreement as it stands, or in a modified from, and live up to it as
thus accepted. Or, he may compromise by paying something to be
relieved from its effects or to have its terms changed. Or, he may
accept benefits under the contract. In any one of which cases, and
there are others not now necessary to mention, he renounces and
waives his defense of intimidation and thereby eliminates that
element as one having any influence on the case thereafter.
Article 1265 of the Civil Code tells us when duress exists: "Consent
given by error, under violence, by intimidation, or deceit shall be
void." Article 1267 provides that "violence exists when, in order to
exact consent, irresistible force is used;" and the "intimidation exists
when one of the contracting parties is inspired with a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury
to his person or
property. . . ." Article 1268 declares the effect of violence and
intimidation on the contract. It provides:

Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation, even if it should

have been employed by a third person who did not take part in the
contract.

There is no question of error or violence in this case; and we have

already disposed of that of deceit. Intimidation resulting from the
fear of losing his property, if he did not comply with defendants'
demands, is the element relied on.

First, then, applying the principles already enunciated: Was there

intimidation in this case under the facts as related by plaintiff
himself, leaving out of account the conclusions drawn and stated in
the brief of counsel? Summing up the whole case under these
facts, it is clear that all that defendants did was to refuse to live up
to their verbal agreement with the plaintiff unless he gave them an
additional consideration therefor. Plaintiff had his choice. He could
refuse to pay again for the right which he had paid for once, and go
into court for relief, or he could pay the price asked. His judgment
operated upon the situation thus presented and he concluded that,
from his point of view, his interests would be best subserved by
paying the additional consideration. But having paid it, he found
himself in precisely the situation he was before. The verbal
agreement to reconvey, which he claims he had twice paid for, was
still verbal, and he was no better off than before. He took no receipt
showing the purpose of the payment; he required no writing to
protect himself from the very trap into which he had once fallen;
but, instead, with the very persons who had refused to live up to
their original agreement because it was verbal, he not only made
another verbal agreement but also paid them, without a scrap of
paper to show for it or specify its object, the sum of P10,000 on that
agreement. Not only this, but he did the same thing a second time.
The defendants having refused to fulfill the second verbal
agreement and having refused to give him credit for the P10,000
paid, he entered into a third agreement under which he paid them
P15,000. But still the agreement was verbal. Still there was no
receipt, no writing, nothing but the naked word that had twice
before been repudiated. Again, for the tried time, there was a
refusal to fulfill and the plaintiff, to obtain the very thing which had
been the subject-matter of these prior verbal contracts, paid a
fourth consideration of P6,800. This time he succeeded. On the
payment of the fourth consideration he secured in black and white
the title to the property which had so eluded him.

If we accept these as facts, and we do for the purposes of the

present discussion, we see that there was no intimidation in law.
There was a lack of sense and judgment; but there was no
imminent and serious injury threatened to his person or property.
There was a simply refusal to comply with the terms of a contract
unless plaintiff did certain things; but there was no threat of
imminent and serious injury to his person or property. If a threat to
refuse to live up to a contract is equivalent to a threat of imminent
and serious injury to the person or property of the other contracting
party, words have lost their meaning and language its significance.
It may be admitted that plaintiff was in an unfavorable position. That
does not mean, however, that the efforts he made to extricate
himself therefrom entailed no consequences; nor does it mean that
he was not dealing at arm's length with the defendants. There was
no relation of trust of confidence. They owed him nothing but the
naked legal; duty to comply with their promise -- to reconvey the
premises on the payment of the debt he owed them. He was free to
resort to the courts at the first refusal of defendants, as he
ultimately did; and his chances for obtaining the relief sought would
have been far better than they are now. By his delay and his
subsequent dealings with the defendants he has not only given
them the opportunity to charge that his conduct casts grave doubts
on the truthfulness of his allegations, but he also laid himself to
open accusation of having compromised with his enemies, with
having ratified and confirmed all that was done, and with having
wailed and renounced his right of action based on intimidation, if
one he ever had. Every person who makes a contract assumes the
risk of a refusal to comply. Breaches of contract are the commonest
cause of litigation; and settlements and readjustments between the
parties after a breach of contract whereby the person injured by the
breach pays an additional consideration to the person breaking it in
order to obtain a fulfillment, are also common. We never have
understood that such arrangements were voidable for intimidation.
A threat to refuse to comply with the terms of a contract without an
additional consideration is not, of itself, intimidation. It is an offer to
make a new contract, to establish new relations, with a statement
from the one making the offer that he will no longer abide by the old
contract. Such an act does not put the other party in the power or
under the control of the one making the threat. He is still free to act
as he pleases. He can still exercise judgment and will; he has still a
refuge from the evil threatened' he still remains free to secure the
same redress which every other person can obtain who is injured
by a breach of contract. There is nothing in this which can produce
intimidation. There is nothing which can engender a well-grounded
fear of imminent and serious injury to person or property — which
destroys volition and chains the will.

But, even though it should be found that the execution of the

conveyance of the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties and the
payment of the consideration of P6,800 for the recovery of the
properties described in the original conveyance remaining unsold,
together with all the other acts of the plaintiff which militate against
his interest, were obtained and procured by means of intimidation,
still we believe that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover on
the record. His acts in general not only contradicted the most
material portions of his testimony, but he must be held to have
ratified the conveyances, payments, and acts referred to and to
have renounce the right o interpose the defense which intimidation
originally offered him.

Before entering upon this branch of the case it is necessary to

correct certain errors into which counsel for the plaintiff appears to
have fallen in their brief. Under the heading "Statement of facts"
counsel say:

The facts upon which this action is based, astounding as they are,
stand absolutely uncontroverted and undisputed. The recital of
woeful abuse which constituted the plaintiff's complaint might
stagger the credence were it the mere version of a litigant, disputed
or contradicted by his opponents, or by a single witness or
document offered in their behalf. Instead, it stands corroborated
and undenied in spite of unusual opportunities afforded to the
defendants of correcting it in any particular in which it may have
been distorted, overdrawn or misrepresented by the plaintiff.
Under the head of "Argument" counsel again say:

With no dispute or denial of the shameful charges laid at the door of

Villa and his wife by this plaintiff, counsel for appellant seeks
strenuously to avoid the issues of duress.

There are several other statement in the brief of similar character.

We find in the record, however, the testimony of Felipa Silvestre,
Maria Guia Garcia, and Simeon A. Villa, the three defendants.
These witnesses, or some of them, deny the material allegations
and testimony of the plaintiff, and some of them testified to facts
demonstrating, if true, the unreliability of the testimony of the
plaintiff. They deny the existence of the verbal agreement upon
which plaintiff bases this case. They declare that the sale of the 22d
of March, 1909, was an absolute sale and was intended as such by
the parties thereto. They assert that plaintiff occupied the premises
after such sale as a tenant, paying them a monthly rental therefor.
They testify that the conveyance of the Salsipuedes and Padre
Faura properties was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff and for a
consideration regarded at the time as adequate in each cae. They
deny that they threatened plaintiff in any way; or that they
intimidated him; or that they influenced him one way or the other in
any of the transactions of which he complains. They deny that he
sold the properties to Judge Jocson and to Garchitorena as owner,
but allege that he acted as their agent in doing so. They deny that
he paid interest and assert that he paid rent, and, to support this
denial, evidence the fact, admitted by the plaintiff, that they finally
ousted him from the possession of the property and collected the
rents themselves. As further corroboration, they point to the fact
that the only receipt introduced in evidence by plaintiff to
substantiate his claim that he was paying interest and not rent
shows upon its face that it was a receipt of rent. They point to the
record showing that, again and again, by word or by letter, they
refused plaintiff's request to reconvey to him and denied that there
was any agreement to reconvey. They deny that plaintiff received
any of the purchase price of the properties sold to Judge Jocson
and Garchitorena, but declare that the purchase price was paid to
them with the exception of certain sums paid to the plaintiff on their
behalf.

Not only this, but defendants point to the absolute nature of the
conveyance of the 22d of March 1909; to the fact that they obtained
Torrent title thereto with the assistance of the plaintiff who testified
to the absolute character of their title; to the conveyances of the
Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties for considerations
expressed; to the fact that the plaintiff assisted them in obtaining
Torrens title to those properties and that he did so after the
defendants had repudiated his contention of the existence of a
verbal agreement to reconvey; to his failure to act when he was
ejected from the premises as a tenant; to his repurchase of the
properties described in the original conveyance remaining unsold
and his payment of the consideration of P6,800 therefor; to his
acquiescence for a period of six months after such repurchase
before the present action was commenced. They call attention to
the inherent improbability of plaintiff's story; to his acts which
contradict his words; to his acquiescence for a long period of time;
to his acts in assisting defendants to procure the registration of their
titles not only to the lands described in the original conveyance but
also to those which plaintiff claims they obtained from him by
threats and intimidation; and in this connection they again invite
consideration of the fact that, after all of the alleged wrongful acts of
the defendants, the plaintiff repurchased the remaining properties,
paying a consideration of P6,800 therefor.
Counsel for defendants on this appeal challenge the truthfulness of
plaintiff's testimony when confronted by the denial of the
defendants and a history of his own acts; and in doing so our
attention is drawn to the admission of counsel for the plaintiff in
their brief where they say: "The recital of woeful abuse which
constitutes the plaintiff's complaint might stagger the credence were
it the mere version of a litigant, disputed or contradicted by his
opponent, or by a single witness or document offered in their
behalf; "and we necessarily recur to the fact that the defendants did
contradict plaintiff not only in their oral testimony but by the
documents and documentary evidence introduced by them. Not
only do they in their oral declarations contradict the plaintiff's
testimony but there is a grave question whether or not the plaintiff is
not bound by their testimony. They were his witness, called by him
by virtue of section 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and while
their testimony was not introduced by the plaintiff, it was offered by
the defendants and accepted as evidence by the court with the
consent and agreement of counsel for the plainful. We do not find it
necessary to decide this question at this time, but refer to it simply
to call attention to the possibility that section 355 may have its
penalties as well as its rewards.

Returning to the question of ratification and renunciation, the Civil

Code provides, article 1309, that "the action of nullity is
extinguished from the moment the contract may have been validly
confirmed;" and article 1311 declares that "the confirmation can be
made either expressly or in an implied manner. It shall be
understood that there is an implied confirmation when, being aware
of the cause of the nullity and such cause having ceased to exist,
the person who may have a right to invoke it should execute an act
which necessarily implies his wish to renounce such a right;" while
article 1313 provides that "confirmation purges the contract of all
defects which it may have contained from the moment of its
execution."

The first rejection of plaintiff's claims of the existence of the parol

agreement in connection with the conveyance of March 22, 1909,
occurred in June or the last part of July of 1909 when the
defendants refused to sign an instrument presented to them by the
plaintiff putting in written form the alleged verbal agreement. That
claim was again rejected in the same year when the Salsipuedes
property was conveyed, and this time in writing. In spite of these
rejections, however, plaintiff continued his dealings with the
defendants, selling them the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura
properties, apparently assenting to their right to eject him as tenant
from the Ermita properties, and by paying them P6,800 for a
conveyance of the properties described in the conveyance of March
22, 1909, remaining unsold. Not only this, but after such rejections,
or at least one of them, the plaintiff assisted the defendants in
obtaining Torrens title to the very properties which he claimed to
own and which he now claims he had been deprived of by
intimidation practiced by the defendants. It is impossible, as we
view the law, for plaintiff, after having been deprived of property by
intimidation, to recover that property through a voluntary agreement
between him and those who intimidated him, and then repudiate
not only the transactions in which he was deprived of that property,
but also the very transaction by which he recovered it. By his
repurchase of the remaining properties in April, 1913, he accepted
everything as it stood at that time and elected to take from the
defendants a conveyance of the remaining properties as a final
termination of all their relations in connection therewith.
Taking the case as a whole, we are therefore of the opinion that
there was no intimidation and that, if there was, the plaintiff has
placed himself in a position where he was not entitled to urge it as a
defense.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint

dismissed, without costs in this instance. So ordered.