PUP COLLEGE OF LAW
Persons and Family Relations
Psychological Incapacity
INSTRUCTIONS: (PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY)
Prepare a brief but comprehensive presentation of the historical development of the
definition and application of the concept and rule on psychological incapacity.
1. From the earliest cases – how was psychological incapacity interpreted and
applied by the Supreme Court?
2. As the years passed, in what way did the SC modify or revise the meaning and
application of psychological incapacity?
3. Cite and discuss the illustrative cases that exemplify the shift in the SC’s
definition and application of the concept and rule on psychological incapacity.
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PSYCHOLOGIAL INCAPACITY
Art. 36, Family Code
January 11, 2018
G.R. No. 218630
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological
incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be
grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b)
juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
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manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c)
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.19
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals20has set out the guidelines that has been the core of
discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage on
the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We have decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. xxx
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(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. xxx21
Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently
prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the duties expected of a husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all
the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not
solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.22 Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly
wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's
statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite
notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was he
interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and
Marilyn B. Matudan23is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and
finding of the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to
substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological
incapacity of his wife.
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It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the
proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the
respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some
extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however,
that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time the
respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her
mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a
witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been
expected to know what was happening between her parents until
long after her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning spouse,
Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased,
and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling
in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelita Suazo, el al., is illuminating on this
score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the
expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the
psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based
on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated
Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect
manner - she derived all her conclusions from information
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course
be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the
application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave,
severe and incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist,
using meager information coming from a directly interested
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party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required
depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for
the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward
Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions
and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side is, to our
mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'
Xxx xxx
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of
Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically
incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity,
immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a
psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the
level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and
should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations that characterize some marriages. 25 It is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict
a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was then about to assume.26
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Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are
hardpressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of
evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal
conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio.
No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to
prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the
rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not
27
evidence. Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist,
Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate her
allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her
testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no
serious evidentiary value.28
Footnotes
**
Referred to as Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico in the RTC and CA Decisions
and other pleadings.
*
Designated additional Member per Raffle dated November 20,
2017 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Mario V.
Lopez.; Rollo, pp. 25-36.
2
Penned by Presiding Judge Fernando L. Felicen; Id. at 31-34.
3
Id. at 32 and 44.
4
Id. at 26.
5
Id. at 37.
6
Id. at 42.
7
Id. at 26.
8
Id. at 37.
9
Id. at 46.
10
Id. at 47.
11
Id. at 38.
12
Id. at 48.
13
Id. at 52.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 53.
16
Id. at 33-34.
17
Id. at 29.
18
Psychiatric and psychological interviews, Rhodes Sentence Completion
Test, Draw a Person Test, Zung Anxiety and Depression Scale, Examination
of Mental Status and Mental Processes, Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale,
Social Case History. and Survey of Interpersonal Values, see rollo, pp. 54-
55.
19
Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017.
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20
335 Phil. 664 (1997) and 268 SCRA 198.
21
Id. at 676-679.
22
Mendoza v. Rep. of the Phils., et. al., 698 Phil. 241, 0254 (2012).
23
G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016.
24
Castillo v. Republic, supra note 19.
25
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1083 (2009).
26
Id at 1092.
27
Castillo v. Republic, supra note 19.
28
Id.
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