Facts:

Special civil action filed on August 24, 1977 for (1) certiorari to annul and set aside the
decision dated November 12, 1976 of the Office of the President thru Deputy Executive
Secretary Roberto V. Reyes, which granted respondent Marsman and Co., leave to
terminate petitioner's employment, and reversed the decision of the Secretary of Labor
dated August 22, 1974 ordering the reinstatement of petitioner with back wages, from
the date of his preventive suspension on January 17, 1974, and (2) mandamus to
compel the Office of the President to limit its review of the decision of the Secretary of
Labor solely on the basis of the evidence presented and established during the hearing
conducted at the mediation-fact-finding stage.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the President acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion in conducting new hearings on appeal.

Held:

Petitioner's bare allegation that the Office of the President acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in conducting a new hearing on
appeal is devoid of merit. Firstly, if that were his belief, he should not have taken part in
the hearing, and testified therein. He should have taken proper legal steps to raise his
objection at the earliest opportunity. With his participation and cooperation in said new
hearing, he is now estopped from complaining that the Office of the President
conducted new hearings on appeal. Secondly, petitioner can cite no law or
jurisprudence to support his argument. For the truth is, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, "(T)here is no law which prohibits the Office of the President from conducting
additional hearings in an appealed case" * and that the said Office "is by itself an
administrative body and as such is possessed with fact-finding prerogative, especially
so when the purpose thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper
adjudication of the case." Further, the Solicitor General observed that the new hearing
was necessary because "public respondent found the evidence on record wanting in
some important factual aspects as to be able to determine whether or not petitioner's
suspension and/or dismissal was justified."

G.R. No. L-46732 May 5, 1979

MARIO Z. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA as Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the
President, MARSMAN and Co., Inc., and e.g. Vito, respondents.
Calanog & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

Wilfredo Y. Guevarra for private respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General for the Public respondent.

SANTOS, J.:

Special civil action filed on August 24, 1977 for (1) certiorari to annul and set aside the decision
dated November 12, 1976 of the Office of the President thru Deputy Executive Secretary Roberto V.
Reyes, which granted respondent Marsman and Co., leave to terminate petitioner's employment,
and reversed the decision of the Secretary of Labor dated August 22, 1974 ordering the
reinstatement of petitioner with back wages, from the date of his preventive suspension on January
17, 1974, and (2) mandamus to compel the Office of the President to limit its review of the decision
of the Secretary of Labor solely on the basis of the evidence presented and established during the
hearing conducted at the mediation-fact-finding stage.

On October 7, 1977, private respondents Marsman and Co., Inc. (henceforth Company) and e.g.
Vito filed their comment   to which petitioner filed his reply on October 26, 1977. 
1 2

Respondent public official after extension, filed his comment on December 20, 1977.   On February
3

1, 1978, We gave due course to the petition, considered respondent's comments as answers, and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.   The Solicitor General, in behalf of
4

respondent public official, manifested on February 16, 1978 that he is adopting the comment he filed
as his memorandum.   Petitioner, in turn thru counsel, filed his memorandum on March 21,
5

1978.  Private respondents, Company and e.g. Vito, also after extension, adopted their comment
6

filed on May 29, 1978 as their memorandum.   Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision on
7

June 9, 1978.

The following are the factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise to this petition. Petitioner
Mario Z. Reyes is Credit and Collection Manager and Operations Coordinator of Marsman and Co.,
Inc. On January 17, 1974, the Company thru its Vice- President, e.g. Vito, herein private respondent,
suspended him indefinitely for "misappropriation of company funds." At that time, petitioner has been
with the Company for seven years, six months and twelve days.  8

It appears that in December, 1973, the Company sponsored a sales promotional contest to advertise
its pondocillin products. A certain Evangeline R. Tagulao, a nurse employed at Singer Industries
Phil., Inc., won the first prize — a Volkswagen Beetle 1200. However, Miss Tagulao chose to receive
the cash value of the car which was P24,000.00. Accordingly, the Company issued PCIB Check No.
416234 dated December 19, 1973 for P24,000.00 in favor of Miss Tagulao. The check was delivered
to Miss Tagulao by petitioner Reyes, accompanied by his co-employee Victor Santos. Together, the
three of them went to a bank   to cash the check.
9

On January 16, 1974, the Company received two handwrite ten letters from Miss Tagulao:

First letter

January 16, 197

 Marsman Co. Leo

Pharmaceutical Inc.

This is to certify that I only received P20,000 from Mr. Mario Reyes, and I expect to
receive the balance of P4,000.

(Sgd) E.R Tagul

Evangeline R. T

Second Letter

January 16, 1974

Marsman Co.

Leo Pharmaceutical Inc.

The following are the circumstances the of the P20,000 to me.

Sometime December 20, 1973 Mr. Mario Reyes came to my clinic bringing the
P24,000 check supposedly the equivalent of (1 200 Beetle VW) which I won in
the pondocillin raffle .

From the clinic we proceeded to Rizal Commercial Bank (sic) at Buendia to cash the
check. I was surprised when I received only P20,000, but Mr. Reyes explained that
the remaining P4,000 will go to the consolation prizes. I didn't complain at that time
thinking that what Mr. Reyes told me was true and I found out later that the whole
amount of P24,000 is due to me.

(Sgd)
E.R.
Tagula
o

Evange
line R.
Tagula
o 
10

On the following day, January 17, 1974, respondent Company wrote to Miss Tagulao attaching
RCBC Check No. 1363018 for P4,000.00, and indicating that the said check was in lieu of the
amount withheld by petitioner Reyes. The Company thereafter advised petitioner Reyes that he was
being placed on suspension starting January 18, 1974. It also filed with National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on January 21, 1974, an application for clearance to terminate complainant's
services alleging that "(P)ending further investigation and considering that this constitutes
misappropriation of company funds, and in accordance with existing policy as well as the applicable
rules and regulations, Mr. Reyes has been placed under preventive suspension effective as of the
close of office hours on January 17, 1974 pursuant to Section 2 of NLRC Implementing Instructions
No. 1 issued on November 9, 1972 and Presidential Decree No. 21 issued on October 14, 1972." It
added further that "the preventive suspension of Mr. Mario Z. Reyes is necessary in order to prevent
further violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other statutes as well as the
established employment policies and reasonable company rules and regulations, said violation
being inimical to the interests of the company." 
11

Toward the latter part of January 1974, the Company received two letters from Miss Tagulao this
time informing it that she was returning the check for P4,000.00 because she ... actually received
the full amount of P24,000.00 ...   One of the letters reads:
12

January 24, 197

Mr. E.G. Vito

Exec. Vice Pres.

Marsman and Co. Inc.

Sir:

In all conscience now that I know the truth and everything is clear to me, I'm
voluntarily returning the cheek in the amount of P4,000.00. I would like to retract an
the previous statement I have given.

I hope this statement of mine closes the case and clear Mr. Mario Reyes of whatever
charges.

I don't expect to be bothered again about this matter. I hope this closes the case.

Yours
truly,

(Sgd.)
E.R.
TAGUL
AO

EVANG
ELINE
R.
TAGUL
AO 13

On January 30, 1974, petitioner Reyes filed with the NLRC an "Opposition to Request for Clearance
to Dismiss" which was docketed and considered as a complaint for illegal dismissal.   He alleged
14

that "in spite of results of investigations tending to exculpate him from the charges, he has been
placed under harassing situations to the prejudice of himself and his family ... and prayed that
respondent Company be ordered "to immediately reinstate (him) to his former position with full back-
salaries ..."

The case was assigned to Mediator-Fact-finder Mirasol Corleto for mediation and/or fact-finding.
After hearing, she submitted a "Mediation Report"   dated February 25, 1974 to the NLRC wherein
15
she found petitioner innocent of the charge of misappropriation and recommended his reinstatement
with backwages, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS:

In order to shed light to this case, Miss Tagulao personally testified during the
mediation stage and stated that without her knowledge, the amount of P4,000 was
taken by Mr. Victor Santos from the envelope containing the cash prize. She was at
that time, personally indebted to Mr. Victor Santos of the sum of P4,000 for a
diamond ring which she purchased on installment basis on November 15, 1973 as
evidenced by hereto attached promissory note. She further testified that she did not
have any intention of filing a complaint against Mr. Mario Reyes were it not for the
instigation and prodding of Mr. Romeo Henson.

The other witness Mr. Victor Santos also testified to the fact that he was the one who
took the P4,000 as payment to him by Miss Tagulao for a diamond ring. When Mr.
Santos explained the whole thing and after he had issued a receipt to Miss Tagulao
for the P4,000, Miss Tagulao withdrew her complaint from Marsman and returned
the check to respondent Co.

It is crystal clear from the evidences and testimonies presented by witnesses that
complainant Mario Reyes was innocent of what had transpired to the sum of P4,000
and he was just a victim of an honest mistake.

Respondent company does not have any right to suspend complainant after Miss
Tagulao had clarified the whole matter to them.

Respondent does not have any sound basis to lose their trust and confidence in
complainant who had rendered service with the Company for almost 8 years.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that complainant be

reinstated with backwages and request for clearance of respondent be denied.

The NLRC   issued an Order  dated February 14,1974 adopting the "findings of Mediator-Fact-
16 17

finder Mirasol Corleto dated 25 February 1974 (sic)." Contrary to Corleto recommendation however,
the NLRC ordered the Company to reinstate petitioner without backwages.

From the NLRC's order, both parties appealed to the Secretary, now Minister, of Labor. Respondent
Company's, "Motion for Reconsideration"   dated April 2, 1974, which was denied, was considered
18

as its appeal to the Minister of Labor. The Company based its appeal on the following grounds:

1. Vital evidences were disregarded, which if otherwise considered would have

substantially changed the nature of the Order.

2. Assuming arguendo that substantial evidence on the whole had been considered,
the circumstances of the case do not warrant the relief granted.
Petitioner on the other hand, on April 8, 1974, appealed that portion of the NLRC's order which
denied him backwages.  19

The Minister of Labor's "Decision"   dated August 22, 1974 ordered the reinstatement of petitioner
20

with backwages. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:

xxx xxx xxx

Based on the evidence, we hold complainant completely blameless from the

imputation and charges which were the bases for respondent's application for
clearance to dismiss complainant. Consequently, loss of trust may not be imputed to
complainant. Also, the grounds in support of complainant's preventive suspension,
namely: 'to prevent further violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and
other statutes as well as the established employment policies and reasonable
company rules and regulations' would be gratuitous assertions devoid of factual
foundation. On this basis, complainant's prayer to modify the Commission's Order to
one of reinstatement with backwages deserves utmost consideration.

The Minister of Labor decided in favor of petitioner on the strength of the "diamond ring story"
mentioned in Mediator-Fact-finder Corletos Report (supra), and sustained by the NLRC, thus:

At the mediation-fact-findings stage, Miss Evangeline Tagulao declared that she did
not know that Mr. Victor Santos deducted the amount of P4,000 from the envelope
containing her rash prize. She further declared that at that time she was indebted to
Mr. Santos of the sum of P4,000 for a diamond ring she purchased from him on
installment basis on November 15, 1973 as evidenced by a promissory note she
executed in his favor. Further testimony reveals that she filed the complaint against
Mr. Mario Reyes because of the instigation and prodding of Mr. Romeo Henson,
Promotions Coordinator at Marsman & Company, Inc.

These facts were confirmed by Mr. Victor Santos who was presented as witness for
complainant and further admitted that he took the amount of P4,000 from the
envelope containing Miss Tagulao's cash prize as payment of the balance of the
diamond ring he sold to her. It appears that after these circumstances were
explained to her, on the basis of which she issued a receipt for P4,000 as full
payment of the diamond ring by Mr. Victor Santos, Miss Evangeline Tagulao
withdrew her complaint against complainant Mario Reyes and returned the check for
P4,000 which was earlier issued to her by respondent company.

Despite these clarifications by both Miss Tagulao and Mr. Santos of an apparent
misunderstanding of which complainant was the unsuspecting victim, respondents
continued with their suspension of complainant.

Respondents Company and e.g. Vito filed a Motion for Reconsideration   dated September 2, 1974
21

alleging that —

1. The decision treated the evidence unfairly and with manifest subjectivity in favor of
complainant;

xxx xxx xxx

 2. The consideration of complainants' appeal has denied respondents their right to
due process; and

xxx xxx xxx

3. The reinstatement and backwages ordered in the decision of August 22, 1974 is
without legal basis.

The Minister of Labor, Hon. Blas F. Ople, found the Motion for Reconsideration "lacking of merit"
and denied the same in an Order   dated December 23,1974.
22

A Second Motion for Reconsideration   dated January 16, 1975 filed by respondents was again
23

denied "(F)or lack of merit" in an Order   dated March 22, 1975.

24

Respondents then appealed to the Office of the President, praying for the reversal of the Order of
the Minister of Labor dated March 22, 1975 denying their motion for reconsideration, on the
following "extraordinary grounds" :  25

1. The Order is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter and

2. The Order contains serious errors in the findings of facts and would cause grave
or irreparable damage and injury to the appellants.

Anent the first ground, respondents allege that reinstatement with payment of backwages cannot be
ordered "in the absence of a finding of unfair labor practice (as in this case)", and that mere loss of
confidence win suffice for the dismiss of a supervisory or managerial employee, such as petitioner in
this case. As to the second ground, the main thrust of respondent's argument is that it was clear
error for the Minister of labor to hold petitioner Reyes ... blameless from the imputation and
charges ..." by the mere fact "that the complaint and previous statement of the winner, Evangeline
Tagulao, had already been with drawn or retracted by her. They allege that in termination cases,
direct and positive evidence of an employee's guilt of the charges, as required in criminal cases,
need not be shown.

The Office of the President decided the appeal by a 1st Indorsement   dated November 12, 1975.
26

The decision was arrived at after additional hearings were conducted by it on July 15, July 25 and
October 22, 1975. It reversed the decision of the Minister of Labor dated August 22, 1974 ordering
the reinstatement of petitioner with backwages, having found Tagulao's "diamond ring story"
implausible, thus:

At the fact-finding proceedings of February 18, 1974, Miss Tagulao for the first time
stated the reason for her retraction. According to her, she owed Victor Santos (the
promotions supervisor with whom she and the complainant proceeded to the bank
for the cashing of the prize money check) the balance of P4,000 for a diamond ring
which she purchased from the latter on installment basis since November 15, 1973,
as per a promissory note she executed in his favor. She testified that she filed the
complaint against Mario Reyes because she was allegedly instigated by Romeo
Henson, production coordinator of the respondent. Received for all and whatever it is
worth, the promissory note allegedly executed by Tagulao in Victor Santos' favor
sans the formalities ordinarily attendant to such undertakings exists as a document
the truth of which can never really be ascertained except on the verbal testimony of
the person supposedly its author. The existence of this note, however, was never
 revealed to the respondent at the time Miss Tagulao complained on January 16,
1974. If as alleged by Miss Tagulao the P4,000 deducted from the prize money on
the very day the check was cashed represented payment of the promissory note,
then Victor Santos, the supposed creditor, could have simply asked for the P4,000
balance from her, the alleged debtor, and just demanded a receipt for the payment of
such amount, nothing more. Instead, in her letter-complaint against Mario Reyes,
Tagulao charged that she was made by the complainant herein to believe that the
P4,000 deducted from her prize money was for consolation prizes. This contradictory
allegations of Tagulao puts her credibility in serious doubt.

Moreover, a week or so had passed since the filing of her Complaint on January 16,
1975, up to her retraction on January 24, 1975, and within this period, Miss Tagulao
set up entirely different and opposite explanations. So also, during the entire period
of time that passed from the encashment of the check in December 1973 to the filing
of the complaint on January 16, 1974, the P4,000 was not delivered to the winner
Miss Evangeline Tagulao. This leads this of office to gravely doubt the integrity of her
retraction and suspect that her letter of January 24, 1975 was, more than anything
else, made to exculpate the complainant-appellee. Under the circumstances, this
Office is inclined to hold that complainant's guilt as complained has not been
satisfactorily erased.

On the finding of the Minister of Labor that the complaint against petitioner was due to "instigation
and prodding of Mr. Romeo Henson, Promotions Coordinator at Marsman and Company, Inc. ", the
Office of the President made the following observations:

For his part, Romeo Henson, testifying on oath before this Office on October 22,
1975, disclosed that as promotions manager of the respondent, he had to see to the
proper and orderly disposition of awards in promotional contests, including that in
which the complainant was allegedly irregularly involved and in which Evangeline
Tagulao emerged winner.

Tipped off by one Romeo Real promotions supervisor of the pharmaceuticals

division of the respondent, on alleged anomalies attending the aforesaid contest,
Henson accordingly proceeded to investigate the matter and visited Tagulao at the
latter's residence. Whereupon he learned from the winner that she received P20,000,
the complainant having allegedly told her that the P4,000 was allocated for
consolation prizes. He therefore informed her that she should have received
P24,000, and that the company shall forthwith remit to her the balance of P4,000,
upon her proper notice to the respondent, Thereafter Tagulao drafted a handwritten
letter to the company which Henson picked up at the winner's office the following
day.

Henson, who admitted being a "compadre" and a personal friend of the complainant
averred that both he and Tagulao never discussed anything beyond the winner's
desire to have the balance of her prize money remitted to her by Marsman &
Company. He therefore expressed surprise at Tagulao's subsequent "retraction".
Further, he vehemently denied having prodded or instigated Tagulao to file the
complaint against Mario Reyes, and that his only purpose was to help Miss Tagulao
recover the balance of the prize due her. ... A circumspect consideration of the
testimonies adduced in this case leads this Office to believe the version of Henson
than Tagulao's. For in the natural course of things no amount of prodding by Henson
could have moved Tagulao to make the complaint against anybody if she were not
 short-changed in the payment of the prize. And if there really was a private
transaction between her and Victor Santos and/or Mario Reyes which accounted for
the withholding or non-remittance to her of the P4,000, it is beyond comprehension
why she would still file, as she did file, the complaint in question.

Finally, the Office of the President concluded:

There is, therefore, basis for the respondent to claim that it had lost confidence on
the complainant employee, in the light of the fact that the complainant-appellee
deliberately withheld the sum of P4,000 from Miss Tagulao, the latter receiving only
P20,000 from the original prize money of P24,000. The turnabout of events as
manifested in Tagulao's retraction fails to convince this Office of the innocence of the
complainant-appellee from the irregularity. Verily, tile complainant has sufficiently
given his employer, the respondent, ground for loss of confidence.

xxx xxx xxx

This Office (so) holds that the foregoing circumstances are sufficient for the
respondent employer to terminate (the services of) the complainant employee. It is
not wise to tolerate the latter to remain in his position simply because of the
questionable retraction by the winner of the sales promotional contest because the
breach of trust has already been committed. The interest not only of the respondent
corporation, but of the public itself it involved, since promotional contests such as the
one involved herein are advertised to the public at large. The respondent was,
therefore, justified in requesting the termination of the services of its managerial
employee, the complainant herein The decision of the Secretary of Labor dated
August 22, 1974, is therefore hereby reversed, and the request for clearance to
terminate complainant's employment is granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration   dated December 29, 1975 of the decision of the
27

Office of the President. It was however denied for lack of merit by said Office thru Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs, Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, in a letter   dated February 8, 1977. Hence
28

this petition.

Petitioner alleges that the Office of the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned decision
dated November 12, 1976 and the resolution dated February 8, 1977 denying his Motion for
Reconsideration, on the grounds that the Office of the President —

1. Does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the appeal; and

2. Has no authority to conduct a new hearing on appeal for the purpose of fishing
new or additional evidence.

With respect to the first ground, petitioner argues that the appeal of respondents does not fall under
Section 13, Rule XIII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, infra, since the
grounds alleged in the said appeal are not those prescribed by the aforesaid provision.

Anent the second ground, petitioner insists that the Office of the President "committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when, apart from reviewing the case on the basis of the
evidence on records, (it) went further thereby conducting a new hearing on appeal .. . ."
Private respondents Marsman and Co. and e.g. Vito on the other hand contend that -

... The allegation of being contrary to law and jurisprudence is really one such purely
on questions of law which is therefore in keeping with par. (b) of Sec. 13, Rule XIII
and, the allegation that serious errors in the findings of facts would definitely lead
one to conclude as the prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion and therefore
substantially in keeping with par. (a) of Sec. 13, Rule XIII.

On the allegation that the Office of the President does not have jurisdiction to conduct a new hearing
on appeal, they maintain that a new hearing was necessary because of patent inconsistencies" in
the case for the complainant which must be clarified so that the Office of the President may render a
"judicious decision."

The Solicitor General   postulates - similarly with the private respondents - that "serious errors in the
29

findings of facts" relied upon by respondents may be considered as falling under "abuse of
discretion" (par. [a], Sec. 13, Rule XIII) whereas the averment that "the order is contrary to law and
jurisprudence on the matter" may be considered as a ground raising a question of law (par. [b], sec.
13, Rule XIII)

On the propriety/legality of the new hearings conducted by the Office of the President, the Solicitor
General maintains that "(T)here is no law which prohibits the Office of the President from conducting
additional hearings in an appealed case. Furthermore, it is by itself an administrative body and as
such is possessed with fact-finding prerogatives, especially so when the purpose thereof is
necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper adjudication of the case. In the case at bar, public
respondent found the evidence on record wanting in some important factual aspects as to be able to
determine whether or not petitioner's suspension and/or dismissal was justified. Thus it could not be
said that public respondent abused its discretion in conducting additional hearings prompted as it
was by its desire to render a correct and just decision."

From the foregoing discussions/arguments the following issued emerge for Our resolution, i.e. —

1. Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
of private respondents, under Rule XXI, Sec. 13 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines:

2. Whether or not the Office of the President acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in conducting new hearings on
appeal; and

3. Whether or not petitioner's dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is

justified.

Now to resolve the foregoing in seriatim

1. We perceive no difficulty in sustaining respondents' claim on the first issue. They relied in their
appeal to the Office of the President on the following.

a) The Order is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter; and

xxx xxx xxx

 b) The Order contains serious errors in the findings of facts and would cause grave
or irreparable damage and injury to the appellants; "

whereas, the grounds provided under Rule XIII, Section 13 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code, are:

a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion;

b) If made purely on questions of law and

c) If there is a showing that the national security or social and economic stability is
threatened.

Petitioner's allegation that the grounds relied upon are not those provided for is more apparent than
real. For the truth is, as the Solicitor General and the private respondents point out, the allegation
that "(T)he order is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter" raises a question of law and
hence can be subsumed under paragraph (b), aforequoted. Indeed when one alleges that an order
is contrary to law and jurisprudence, plain common sense dictates that the order is being attacked
on question of law.

Again, the second ground - that "the order contains serious errors in the findings of facts and would
cause grave or irreparable damage and injury to appellants - is in the final analysis tantamount to
alleging "abuse of discretion", and may be subsumed under paragraph (a), supra. Serious errors in
the findings of facts may not per se be equated with abuse of discretion. Under Rule XIII, Section
7   of the Rules and Regulations providing for appeals from the decision of the Labor Arbiter or
30

compulsory arbitrator to the NLRC, "abuse of discretion" and "serious errors in the findings of facts"
are two separate and distinct grounds, i.e. (a) and (d) thereof. In this case, however, a careful
perusal of private respondents' appeal wig show that they are raising principally grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Minister in rendering decision. As previously stated, the main thrust of
respondents' argument is that under the circumstances of the case, the Minister made a palpably
erroneous conclusion in holding that petitioner did not commit a breach of respondents' trust and
confidence. This is tantamount to ascribing to him an abuse of discretion.

In any event, the first ground, which raised a question of law, already conferred jurisdiction in the
Office of the President to entertain the appeal.

2. Petitioner's bare allegation that the Office of the President acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in conducting a new hearing on appeal is devoid of
merit. Firstly, if that were his belief, he should not have taken part in the hearing, and testified
therein.   He should have taken proper legal steps to raise his objection at the earliest opportunity.
31

With his participation and cooperation in said new hearing, he is now estopped from complaining
that the Office of the President conducted new hearings on appeal. Secondly, petitioner can cite no
law or jurisprudence to support his argument. For the truth is, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, "(T)here is no law which prohibits the Office of the President from conducting additional
hearings in an appealed case"  * and that the said Office "is by itself an administrative body and as such is possessed with fact-
finding prerogative, especially so when the purpose thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper adjudication of the case." Further,
the Solicitor General observed that the new hearing was necessary because "public respondent found the evidence on record wanting in
some important factual aspects as to be able to determine whether or not petitioner's suspension and/or dismissal was justified."

3. Is petitioner's dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence justified?

Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee, and proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the employee's misconduct - apparently demanded by the Minister of Labor - is not required
to dismiss him on this charge.   It is sufficient if there is "some basis" for such loss of
32

confidence;   or if the employer has reasonable grounds to believe, if not to entertain the moral
33

conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his
position. 
34

In the case at bar, it is an admitted fact that petitioner is a managerial employee, one in whom
respondent Company has given its complete trust and confidence.   He was, at the time of the
35

anomaly, per his own claim, "concurrent Acting Manager of Leo Pharmaceutical (a division of
respondent Company) and Credit and Collection Manager   The Company, therefore, was justified
36

in expecting that his actuations should be above suspicion. Because of petitioner's involvement in
the raffle anomaly, i.e., having withheld from the winner Miss Tagulao, P4,000 of the P24,000 prize
money, which withholding he was not able to explain convincingly much less disprove, 'it is not in the
words of the decision of the Office of the President, "wise to tolerate the latter (petitioner) to remain
in his position . . . because the breach of trust has already been committed.  37

The petitioner would also pray that the writ of mandamus issue against the Office of the President,
directing said Office to confine its review of the decision of the Minister of Labor solely on the
evidence presented and established during the hearing conducted at the mediation-fact-finding
stage. Petitioner would, in effect, request this Court to prevent said Office from considering the
evidence presented at the hearings conducted by the said Office, in its resolution of the appeal .

This petition also lacks merit. In the first. place, the office of the writ of mandamus is to direct "any
tribunal ... , board or person" to perform " an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station ... . "   In the instant case, there is no duty that the Office of the
38

President neglected to do which would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Secondly, as
has been observed earlier, the petitioner did not take legal steps to prevent said hearings. On the
contrary, he participated in the same. He is therefore now estopped from questioning the said
proceedings through a request for the issuance of a writ of mandamus which, obviously, is not the
proper remedy.

WHEREFORE, let this Petition be as it is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Office of the
President dated November 12, 1975 — granting respondent company's application for clearance to
terminate petitioner's employment is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Abad Santos JJ., concur.