MANGILIMAN, Neil Francel D.

PLM JD 2nd Yr. Blk. 2

201980051
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGESTED CASES

1. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (2003) G.R. No. 104768

FACTS:
• Then President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to its mandate to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, PCGG
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board to investigate corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether
in the active service or retired.
• The AFP Board investigated reports of unexplained wealth of Major General Ramas, the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986 (with the rank of Major General) and
filed a petition for forfeiture against him and his office clerk and alleged mistress, Elizabeth
Dimaano.
• During the trial, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the PCGG does not
have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held
without a showing that they are “subordinates" of former President Marcos.
• Moreover, during the raid conducted on Dimaano’s residence, there were items seized that
were not included in the search warrant. Respondents therefore seek these items to be
excluded from evidence for being illegally seized.
• Notably, the search and seizure was conducted on March 3, 1986 or five days after the EDSA
revolution. According to the Republic, the items seized are admissible since at the time of
their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right. What was in place at
the time of the seizure was a revolutionary government and it effectively with held the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which was the basis of respondents’ exclusionary right.
ISSUE: WoN seizures made under the revolutionary government are valid.
RULING: No.
During the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of
Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. Also,
during the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
The EDSA Revolution took place on February 23-25, 1986. The INTERREGNUM refers to period
after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the
cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to March 24, 1986 -- immediately before the adoption
of the Provisional Constitution).
Notwithstanding the interregnum, the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration), almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.
 The Declaration, to which the Philippines is a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that
“no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration
did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted
the Declaration as part of the ‘generally accepted principles of international law’ (customary
international law) and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated
under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.
After the EDSA Revolution, the resulting government was a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The search warrant, issued during the interregnum, was valid. However, the seizure of the
items not included in the warrant was void, unless these items are contraband per se, which they
are not.
 2. Republic of the Philippines vs. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, US Court of Appeals
FACTS:
 3. United States vs. Noriega (746 F.Supp. 1506 [1990])
FACTS:
• On February 4, 1988, Manuel Noriega (defendant) was indicted on drug-related charges.
Noriega had used his position as commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces in the
Republic of Panama to help traffic cocaine into the United States.
• After declaring war between Panama and the United States and subsequently losing control
over Panama during the ensuing combat, Noriega surrendered to United States military
officials on January 3, 1990, and was brought to Miami for trial on drug-related charges.
• Subsequent to the indictment, the Court granted General Noriega’s motion to allow special
appearance of counsel, despite the fact that Noriega was a fugitive and not before the Court at
that time. Noriega’s counsel then moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that United
States laws could not be applied to a foreign leader whose alleged illegal activities all occurred
outside the territorial bounds of the United States. Counsel further argued that Noriega was
immune from prosecution as a head of state and diplomat, and that his alleged narcotics
offenses constituted acts of state not properly reviewable by this Court.

ISSUE: WoN Noriega should enjoy immunity as Head of a State.

RULING: No.
Sovereign Immunity
Grounded in customary international law, the doctrine of head of state immunity provides
that a head of state is not subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts, at least as to official acts
taken during the ruler's term of office. The rationale behind the doctrine is to promote international
comity and respect among sovereign nations by ensuring that leaders are free to perform their
governmental duties without being subject to detention, arrest, or embarrassment in a foreign
country's legal system.
In order to assert head of state immunity, a government official must be recognized as a
head of state. Noriega has never been recognized as Panama's Head of State either under the
Panamanian Constitution or by the United States. Title VI, Article 170 of the Panamanian
Constitution provides for an executive branch composed of the President and Ministers of State,
neither of which applies to Noriega. Officially, Noriega is the Commandante of the Panamanian
Defense Forces, but he was never elected to head Panama's government and in fact abrogated the
Panamanian presidential elections of May 7, 1989. More importantly, the United States
government has never accorded Noriega head of state status, but rather continued to recognize
President Eric Arturo Delvalle as the legitimate leader of Panama while Noriega was in power.
Despite the actuality that Noriega may have in fact run the country of Panama does not
mean he is entitled to head of state immunity, since the grant of immunity is a privilege which the
United States may withhold from any claimant. Because states grant immunity from their
jurisdiction as a privilege, the United States would not extend immunity to officials of governments
with which it does not have diplomatic relations.
deference to the Executive branch in matters concerning relations with foreign nations is the
primary rationale supporting immunity for heads of state. Since the only reason Noriega would
be entitled to immunity as a head of state is because of such judicial deference to the Executive,
his claim to a "right" of immunity against the express wishes of the Government is wholly without
merit.
To hold that immunity from prosecution must be granted "regardless of his source of power
or nature of rule" would allow illegitimate dictators the benefit of their unscrupulous and possibly
brutal seizures of power. No authority exists for such a novel extension of head of state immunity,
and the Court declines to create one here. Since the United States has never recognized General
Noriega as Panama's head of state, he has no claim to head of state immunity.

Diplomatic Immunity
Noriega concedes at the outset that his assertion of diplomatic status does not fit within the
confines of either the Diplomatic Relations Act or the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, the two bodies of law governing diplomatic privileges and immunities. Diplomatic
immunity generally deals with eligible persons who are present in the United States." In this case,
Noriega was neither eligible nor present in this country as a diplomat.
Noriega relies principally on the fact that he traveled on a Panamanian diplomatic passport
and was on three occasions granted an "A-2" visa by the United States. The "A-2" visa does not
establish anything of significance in the way of diplomatic immunity. The issuance of United
States visas is an administrative action in connection with United States immigration law and is
quite independent of the process of diplomatic accreditation.
The mere possession of an A-category visa by a person not accredited to the United States
in accordance with these procedures, promulgated by the Chief of Protocol, gives such person no
claim to diplomatic or consular status in the United States, and thus no entitlement to the privileges
and immunities extended to persons in diplomatic or consular status.
 4. Island of Palmas Case ([1928] II RIAA 829)
FACTS:
• Palmas (also referred to as Miangas) is an island about two miles long by three fourths of a
mile wide which at the time of this case had a population of about 750 and was of little strategic
or economic value. It sits about halfway between the islands of Mindanao in the Philippines
and Nanusa in the Netherlands Indies.
• In 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States in the Treaty of Paris (1898) and
Palmas lay within the boundaries of that cession to the U.S.
• In 1906 an American General, Leonard Wood, visited Palmas and discovered that the
Netherlands also claimed sovereignty over the island.
• The claim of the U.S. was back up with the fact that the islands had been ceded by Spain by
the Treaty of Paris in 1898, and as successor to the rights of Spain over the Philippines, it based
its claim of title in the first place on discovery.
• On the part of the Netherlands, they claimed to have possessed and exercised rights of
sovereignty over the island from 1677 or earlier to the present.
• An agreement was signed on January 23, 1925, between the United States and the Netherlands
to submit the dispute to binding arbitration.
ISSUE: Whether the Islands of Palmas in its entirety forms part of the territory belonging to USA
or of Netherland’s territory.
RULING of HUBER (Assigned Arbitrator):
There were three (3) principles that was discussed by the arbitrator, namely; (1) Right by
Discovery, (2) Contiguity, and (3) Continuous display of sovereignty.

As to Right by Discovery
The United States argued that Spain acquired title to Palmas when Spain discovered the
island and the island was terra nullius. Spain's title to the island, because it was a part of the
Philippines, was then ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Paris (1898) after Spain's defeat
in the Spanish-American War. However, for a sovereign to maintain its initial title via discovery,
the arbitrator said that the discoverer had to actually exercise authority, even if it were as simple
an act as planting a flag on the beach. In this case, Spain did not exercise authority over the island
after making an initial claim after discovery and so the American claim was based on relatively
weak grounds.

As to Principle of Contiguity

The title of contiguity, understood as a basis of territorial sovereignty, has no foundation

in international law. The arbitrator held that mere proximity was not an adequate claim to land
noted that if the international community followed the proposed American approach, it would lead
to arbitrary results.

As to Continuous Display of Sovereignty

The Netherlands' primary contention was that it held actual title because the Netherlands
had exercised authority on the island since 1677. The Netherlands was able to show that the Dutch
East India Company had negotiated treaties with the local princes of the island since the 17th
century and had exercised sovereignty, including a requirement of Protestantism and the denial of
other nationals on the island.
USA, on the other hand, had failed to show documentation proving Spanish sovereignty
on the island except those documents that specifically mentioned the island's discovery.
Additionally, there was no evidence that Palmas was a part of the judicial or administrative
organization of the Spanish government of the Philippines. The arbitrator pointed out that if Spain
had actually exercised authority, then there would have been conflicts between the two countries
but none are provided in the evidence.
Conclusion:
THREE important rules for resolving island territorial disputes were decided:
• Firstly, title based on contiguity has no standing in international law.
• Secondly, title by discovery is only an inchoate title.
• Finally, if another sovereign begins to exercise continuous and actual sovereignty, (and the
arbitrator required that the claim had to be open and public and with good title), and the
discoverer does not contest this claim, the claim by the sovereign that exercises authority is
greater than a title based on mere discovery.
 5. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecution, House of Lords, December 18, 1946
PRINCIPLE: Protective Principle. If a crime committed outside of the country by a foreign
national which effect that country he may be charged for High Treason
FACTS:
• The defendant, Joyce, was a natural-born American citizen, taken to Ireland by his parents at
the age of three, who apparently became secretly naturalized by British subjects.
• In 1921, he came to England where he stayed until 1939. On 4 July 1933, he applied for a
British passport describing himself as a British subject by birth, born in Galway.
• He asked for the passport for the purpose of holiday touring in Belgium, France, Germany,
Switzerland, Italy and Austria which was granted for a period of five years.
• When he applied for renewal when his passport expires he then again described himself as a
British subject which was also granted.
• During his second renewal of passport it was proved that he had been employed by the German
radio company of Berlin as an announcer of English news from 18 September 1939 and that
he had broadcast propaganda on behalf of Germany (the enemy).
• However, the passport was not found in his possession when he was arrested outside the realm.
He was charged with High Treason by adhering to the King’s enemies elsewhere than in the
King’s Realm, to wit, in the German Realm, contrary to the Treason Act 1351. Having been
convicted of high treason, he appealed.
ISSUE: Whether an alien can be convicted of high treason-act committed outside the United
Kingdom.
RULING: YES.
The appeal was dismissed. An alien abroad holding a British passport enjoys the protection
of the Crown and if he is adherent to the King’s enemies he is guilty of treason. So long as has not
renounced that portion.
Lord Jowitt LC referred to ‘the reciprocal duties of protection and allegiance’ between a
citizen and the state, saying: ‘The contention is a different one: it is that by the holding of a passport
he asserts and maintains the relation in which he formally stood, claiming a continued protection
of the Crown and thereby pledging the continuance of his fidelity. In these circumstances I am
clearly of the opinion that so long as he holds the passport he is within the meaning of the statute
a man who, if he is adherent to the King’s enemies in the realm or elsewhere commits an act of
treason. Moreover the special value to the enemy of the appellant’s services as a broadcaster was
that he could be represented as speaking as a British subject and his German workbook showed
that it was in this character that he was employed, for which his passport was doubtless accepted
as the voucher’.
The capability of a state to prosecute and punish its nationals on the sole basis of their
nationality is based upon the loyalty which the person charged with the crime owes to the State of
which he is a national. It is now generally accepted that a state may prosecute its nationals for
crimes committed anywhere in the world.
 6. Attorney General vs. Adolf Eichmann (Criminal Case No. 50/61)
FACTS:
• Adolf Eichmann (defendant) was a German Nazi officer involved in the internment and
extermination of Jewish people during World War II. When the war ended, Eichmann escaped
to Argentina, where years later, he was kidnapped by Israeli officers and forcibly brought to
Israel for trial for war-crime charges.
• Eichmann challenged the Israeli court's jurisdiction, arguing that the court was not empowered
to adjudicate the case against Eichmann because his illegal kidnapping by Israeli agents
violated international law. The attorney general of Israel (plaintiff) contended that the legality
of the means of arrest and of the transfer of a fugitive were not relevant jurisdictional issues
for the court to address.
• Additionally, at the time of Eichmann's seizure, Argentina complained to the United Nations
Security Council (Security Council), alleging a violation of Argentina's sovereignty by Israel's
actions. The Security Council issued a Resolution, recognizing that Israel's conduct would
disrupt international relations if the conduct were permitted in the future, and requesting that
Argentina and Israel reach an agreement on the settlement of the dispute.
• As a result, before Eichmann's indictment, Argentina and Israel settled the issue, with
Argentina clearing Israel of responsibility for any violations related to Eichmann's kidnapping.
The Supreme Court of Israel then considered Eichmann's challenge to Israel's jurisdiction.
• The trial commenced on 11 April 1961 with the indictment charging Eichmann with 15 counts
of crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, war crimes and membership in
an organisation declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 15 years
earlier
ISSUE: WoN Israel can try Eichmann, who is not a national of Israel, for offenses alleged to have
been committed outside Israel against persons who were not nationals of Israel at the time of the
commission of these offenses.
RULING:
Every country applies only its own penal law, and every country punishes-subject to
exceptions dictated by diplomatic or sovereign immunity-all offenses committed on its own
territory.
In this case, the offenses charged are not alleged to have been committed in Israel, nor by
a national of Israel, nor against nationals of Israel, nor against the State of Israel. But there is a
permissive, possibly even directive, rule of public international law covering the offenses alleged
to have been committed by Adolf Eichmann.
The question at hand is whether the international law permit a state to punish an alien for
an committed abroad which is punishable both under the law of the place of commission and under
the law of the place of prosecution, provided the punishment imposed does not exceed the penalty
incurred in the place of commission? The answer can only be in the affirmative.
 All states are interested in bringing alleged criminals to justice no state is interested in
harboring fugitives from justice. On the other hand, no state is obliged, in the absence of treaty, to
extradite persons who are alleged to have committed offenses abroad; the machinery of extradition
is rather cumbersome, to say the least, even where states are willing, in the absence of treaty, to
effect extradition, formal obstacles such as the lack of diplomatic relations may well prevent or
delay the delivery of the person accused.
While extradition remains cumbersome and of limited applicability, the answer to the
dilemma, at least as between states which have little or no formal pre-admission procedures for
aliens, is criminal law enforcement by proxy.
Many states have adopted this principle, and at least where there are genuine obstacles to
extradition, its compatibility with international law seems recognized by the weight of authority.
In the instant case, the obstacles are real, for while there are official relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany and Israel, there are no diplomatic relations, and there is no extradition
treaty.
Therefore, since Adolf Eichmann cannot readily be extradited by Israel to the Federal
Republic of Germany-and since Germany, along with Poland and the Soviet Union, by approving
of Eichmann's trial by Israel, have, in effect, waived extradition-Eichmann can be tried by proxy
in Israel.
 7. US vs. Yunis (924 F.2d 1086 [1991])
FACTS:
• In 1985, Fawaz Yunis (defendant) and four other men hijacked a Jordanian Airlines flight in
Beirut, Lebanon with two American citizens on board. The plane immediately took off and
unsuccessfully attempted to fly to Tunis, where a conference of the Arab League was under
way. Yunis and the others sought the removal of all Palestinians from Lebanon. Eventually,
the plane landed back in Beirut, the passengers were set free, and the hijackers held a press
conference reiterating their demands. The men then blew up the plane and fled from the airport.
After an FBI investigation identified Yunis as the likely leader of the hijackers, an arrest
warrant was obtained and “Operation Goldenrod” was put into motion to arrest Yunis.
Undercover FBI agents lured Yunis onto a yacht in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and arrested
him once the craft entered international waters.
• Yunis was then transferred to a U.S. Navy munitions ship and interrogated for several days.
Thereafter, Yunis was flown to Washington, D.C., and charged with conspiracy, aircraft
piracy, and hostage taking. Yunis was convicted and he appealed, claiming that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to try him on the charges.
• Appellant Fawaz Yunis challenges his convictions on conspiracy, aircraft piracy, and hostage-
taking charges stemming from the hijacking of a Jordanian passenger aircraft in Beirut,
Lebanon. He appeals from orders of the district court denying his pretrial motions relating to
jurisdiction, illegal arrest, alleged violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, and the government's
withholding of classified documents during discovery.
• Appellant's principal claim is that, as a matter of domestic law, the federal hostage-taking and
air piracy statutes do not authorize assertion of federal jurisdiction over him. Yunis also
suggests that a contrary construction of these statutes would conflict with established principles
of international law, and so should be avoided by this court. Finally, appellant claims that the
district court lacked personal jurisdiction because he was seized in violation of American law.

ISSUE: Whether USA had the jurisdiction to try the case

HELD: YES.
Although this appeal raises novel issues of domestic and international law, we reject Yunis'
objections and affirm the convictions.
Jurisdiction is not precluded by norms of customary international law. The district court
concluded that two jurisdictional theories of international law, the "universal principle" and the
"passive personal principle," supported assertion of U.S. jurisdiction to prosecute Yunis on
hijacking and hostage-taking charges.
Under the universal principle, states may prescribe and prosecute "certain offenses
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks
on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism," even
absent any special connection between the state and the offense.
 Under the passive personal principle, a state may punish non-nationals for crimes
committed against its nationals outside of its territory, at least where the state has a particularly
strong interest in the crime.
The court held Mr. Yunis Responsible and also concluded that the assertion of such
jurisdiction is fully consistent with norms of customary international law.
USA adopted and applied the Passive Nationality Principle, as there were few American
citizens in the plane they have been traumatized and therefore affected by Mr. Yunis.
Yunis argues that hostage taking has not been recognized as a universal crime and that the
passive personal principle authorizes assertion of jurisdiction over alleged hostage takers only
where the victims were seized because they were nationals of the prosecuting state. Whatever merit
appellant's claims may have as a matter of international law, they cannot prevail before this court.
Yunis seeks to portray international law as a self-executing code that trumps domestic law
whenever the two conflict. That effort misconceives the role of judges as appliers of international
law and as participants in the federal system. Our duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of USA, not to conform the law of the land to norms of customary international law.
"Statutes inconsistent with principles of customary international law may well lead to
international law violations. But within the domestic legal realm, that inconsistent statute simply
modifies or supersedes customary international law to the extent of the inconsistency."
U.S. courts are "obligated to give effect to an unambiguous exercise by Congress of its
jurisdiction to prescribe even if such an exercise would exceed the limitations imposed by
international law".
Courts will not blind themselves to potential violations of international law where
legislative intent is ambiguous, but the statute in question reflects an unmistakable congressional
intent, consistent with treaty obligations of the United States, to authorize prosecution of those
who take Americans hostage abroad no matter where the offense occurs or where the offender is
found.
 8. US vs. Alvarez-Machain (504 US 655)
FACTS:
• Respondent, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He was indicted
for participating in the kidnap and murder of United States Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) special agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar and a Mexican pilot working with Camarena,
Alfredo Zavala-Avelar.
• The DEA believed that respondent, a medical doctor, participated in the murder by prolonging
Agent Camarena's life so that others could further torture and interrogate him. Respondent
moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that his abduction constituted outrageous
governmental conduct, and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to try him because he was
abducted in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. The
District Court rejected the outrageous governmental conduct claim.
• However, after concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District
Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between
the United States and Mexico and ordered respondent's repatriation. The court of appeals
affirmed.
ISSUE: WoN the US has jurisdiction over the case and, thus, may validly try the same.
RULING: Yes.
The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for
violations of this country's criminal laws.
(a) A defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an extradition treaty. However,
when a treaty has not been invoked, a court may properly exercise jurisdiction even though the
defendant's presence is procured by means of a forcible abduction. Thus, if the Extradition Treaty
does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule of Ker applies and jurisdiction was proper.
(b) Neither the Treaty's language nor the history of negotiations and practice under it supports the
proposition that it prohibits abductions outside of its terms. The Treaty says nothing about either
country refraining from forcibly abducting people from the other's territory or the consequences if
an abduction occurs. In addition, although the Mexican Government was made aware of the Ker
doctrine, the Treaty's current version contains no such clause.
(c) General principles of international law provide no basis for interpreting the Treaty to include
an implied term prohibiting international abductions. It would go beyond established precedent
and practice to draw such an inference from the Treaty based on respondent's argument that
abductions are so clearly prohibited in international law that there was no reason to include the
prohibition in the Treaty itself. It was the practice of nations with regard to extradition treaties that
formed the basis for this Court's decision in Rauscher, to imply a term in the extradition treaty
between US and UK. Respondent's argument, however, would require a much larger inferential
leap with only the most general of international law principles to support it. While respondent may
be correct that his abduction was "shocking" and in violation of general international law
principles, the decision whether he should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside the Treaty,
is a matter for the Executive Branch. REVERSED and REMANDED.
 9. World Health Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131 | 1972-11-29
FACTS:
• When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the
Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed
free entry from duties and taxes. The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation's
warehouse at Mandaluyong, Rizal, "pending his relocation into permanent quarters upon the
offer of Mr. Berg, Vice President of Eternit who was once a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the
Congo."
• Respondents COSAC officers seeks to justify their act of applying for and securing from
respondent judge the warrant for the search and seizure of ten crates consigned to petitioner
Verstuyft and stored at the Eternit Corporation warehouse on the ground that they "contain
large quantities of highly dutiable goods" beyond the official needs of said petitioner "and the
only lawful way to reach these articles and effects for purposes of taxation is through a search
warrant."
• Respondent judge issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date of respondents
COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of Republic Act 4712
amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code 3 directing the search and seizure of
the dutiable items in said crates.
• The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer for the quashal of the
search warrant. Respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the search warrant
disregarding Foreign Secretary Romulo's plea of diplomatic immunity on behalf of Dr.
Verstuyft. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering
the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of
petitioner Verstuyft.
HELD: YES
It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was assigned on December
6, 1971 by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host
Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health
Organization. Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and
immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability of the official's properties, exemption from local
jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation and customs duties.
The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly recognized that petitioner
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement.
The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine
court summons without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government"
and asked for the quashal of the search warrant, since his personal effects and baggages after
having been allowed free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed
to have been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by
respondents COSAC officers. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the Government,
7 likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the
quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, 8 and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his direction. 9 Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm
of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the
judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not
embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."
As already stated above, and brought to respondent court's attention, 13 the Philippine Government
is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations for consultations between the Host
State and the United Nations agency concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of
occurrence of the abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other
recourses. This is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as
such, has the force and effect of law. Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical
assurance of the executive branch of government that respondent judge had some ground to prefer
respondents COSAC officers' suspicion that there had been an abuse of diplomatic immunity, the
continuation of the search warrant proceedings before him was not the proper remedy. He should,
nevertheless, in deference to the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of the executive branch of
government to act on the matter, have acceded to the quashal of the search warrant, and forwarded
his findings or grounds to believe that there had been such abuse of diplomatic immunity to the
Department of Foreign Affairs for it to deal with, in accordance with the aforementioned
Convention, if so warranted.
The Court, therefore, holds that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner.
 10. Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116
FACTS:
• On 24 August, 1811, John McFaddon & William Greetham, of the State of Maryland, filed
their libel in the District Court of the United States for the District of Pennsylvania against the
Schooner Exchange, setting forth that they were her sole owners, on 27 October, 1809, when
she sailed from Baltimore, bound to St. Sebastians, in Spain.
• That the ship was violently and forcibly taken by certain persons, acting under the decrees and
orders of Napoleon, Emperor of the French, it was disposed of by those persons in violation of
the rights of the libellants and of the law of nations in that behalf. That she had been brought
into the port of Philadelphia, and was then in the jurisdiction of that court, in possession of a
certain Dennis M. Begon, her reputed captain or master.
ISSUE: Are National ships of war viewed as been exempted by the consent of the power of the
friendly jurisdiction whose port the ship enters?
RULING: (Marshall, C.J.) Yes. National ships of war are viewed as been exempted by consent of
the power of the friendly jurisdiction whose port the ship enters. A nation’s jurisdiction within its
sovereign territory is exclusive and absolute.
The Exchange been a public armed ship, currently under the control and supervision of a foreign
power, who at the time of the ship’s entry into the United States territory, was at peace with the
United States, must be viewed as having entered the states territory under an implied promise that
while in such environment, would be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country. Reversed.
Therefore, Marshall concluded that "a principle of public [international] law [is] that national ships
of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered as
exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction.
Applying that analysis to the facts at hand, Marshall found that the courts did not have jurisdiction
over the case.