The International Journal of the History of Sport

ISSN: 0952-3367 (Print) 1743-9035 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fhsp20

The Development of the Olympic Narrative

in Chinese Elite Sport Discourse from Its First
Successful Olympic Bid to the Post-Beijing Games
Era

Richard Xiaoqian Hu & Ian Henry

To cite this article: Richard Xiaoqian Hu & Ian Henry (2016) The Development of the Olympic
Narrative in Chinese Elite Sport Discourse from Its First Successful Olympic Bid to the Post-
Beijing Games Era, The International Journal of the History of Sport, 33:12, 1427-1448, DOI:
10.1080/09523367.2017.1284818

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2017.1284818

Published online: 22 Feb 2017.

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The International Journal of the History of Sport, 2016
VOL. 33, NO. 12, 1427–1448
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2017.1284818

The Development of the Olympic Narrative in Chinese Elite

Sport Discourse from Its First Successful Olympic Bid to the
Post-Beijing Games Era
Richard Xiaoqian Hu and Ian Henry
Centre for Olympic Studies & Research, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
As a phenomenon exogenous to China, the Olympics have been Olympic Games; Beijing
proactively interpreted in the local context since China’s entry (and Olympics; discourse; policy;
subsequent re-entry in 1984) into the Olympic movement. With China
China’s increasing involvement in promoting three bids to host
the Olympic Games, two of which were successful, respectively, in
2001 and 2015, the nature of the discourse of key stakeholders in
relation to Chinese elite sport has both reflected and reshaped the
meaning of the Games to Chinese elite sport. This paper examines the
discursive construction process of the Olympics in the Chinese elite
sport system by key stakeholders through analyzing statements of
political figures on sport and Olympic phenomena, Chinese elite sport
policy documents, and the commentaries of leading Chinese sport
academics. The analysis of discourse highlights two main features in
the construction of the Games in official accounts during the period
under investigation. The development of these two themes reflects
the nature of the Chinese Olympic discourse, manifests the political
power over the interpretation of the Olympics in Chinese context,
and continues to characterize the on-going major themes in Chinese
elite sport policy.

Introduction
Even though Chinese society had traditionally shown limited enthusiasm for physical
activities, particularly competitive sport, and had experienced a century of humiliation
since the Anglo-Chinese War in 1839, it has recently demonstrated an increasing interest
in modern sport, and in particular the Olympics, subsequently forming its own ‘Olympic
dream’.1
Rather than simply ‘translating’ Western versions of the doctrine of the Olympic ideology,
key groups in China’s political and sports administration world have proactively interpreted
and reconstructed the Olympics, in order to advocate a competitive culture in Chinese
society and to provoke the restoration of the Chinese nation through promoting modern
sport, particularly elite sport.2 Elite sport and the Olympics are hence closely associated with

CONTACT  Richard Xiaoqian Hu  richard_x_hu@tsinghua.edu.cn, richard.x.hu@gmail.com

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
1428   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

political elements since its introduction to Chinese society. Instances can be seen from the
relationship between the promotion of competitive body culture and the requirement of
the salvation of China in the nineteenth century,3 to Changchun Liu’s endeavour to become
the first Chinese, rather than Japanese, Olympian in 1932 during Japan’s invasion of China.4
The communist regime of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC), established in
1949, was fully aware of the political significance of the Olympics. Less than a month after
its official establishment, the PRC initiated the reform of the Chinese Olympic Committee
(hereafter, COC), which has then become another banner of the governmental organ in
sport.5 Even though only one athlete of the first PRC Olympic delegation which was sent
to Helsinki in 1952 actually competed in the Games, the then Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai
highly valued China’s first Olympic appearance as ‘a victory for [communist] China, even
if we could do nothing but just fly our flag in the Olympic village’.6
Six years later, there was another political matter, i.e. the ‘Two-China’ issue.7 In this case,
the PRC terminated its relationship with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in
1958, a relationship which was not re-built until the Nagoya IOC session in 1979.8 Thanks
to significance associated with the Olympic Games and elite sport performance in the
Chinese context, the reinstatement of the PRC’s position in the IOC has resulted in a strong
emphasis on elite sport and a considerable increase in its Olympic performance since then.9
Since the last decade of the twentieth century, China’s interest in being involved with the
Olympics has increased from participation to another level, to the point where it has bid
for the hosting of the Olympic Games on three occasions, two of which were successful,
namely 2001 and 2015, respectively. In this context, the political significance of the 2008
Beijing Games to China has been thoroughly investigated by academics.10
Given the significance of the 2008 Beijing Olympics to China11 and the traditional close
association between the Olympics and elite sport in a Chinese context,12 this research seeks
to explore the development of the Olympic discourse in the Chinese elite sport system
since China was awarded the 2008 Olympic Games in 2001, and to identify discourse
themes defining the nature and significance of Olympics to Chinese elite sport. Accordingly,
Fairclough’s Critical Realism-Based Critical Discourse Analysis framework is employed
in the research to investigate those documents that strategically focus on the overall
development of Chinese elite sport and other supporting material.

Methodology
The research question revolves around the way the Olympics has been (continuously or
differently) constructed in the Chinese elite sport system since China won its first Olympic
bid, through to the post-2008 era. The period chosen for the research starts from the year
2001, in which China was awarded the 2008 Olympic Games and published its first Olympic
Glory Plan that covers a full decade,13 and ends with the current Chinese President Xi
Jinping’s speech in 2014 to the Chinese delegation for the Sochi Winter Olympics.14 The
year 2008 is recognized as a watershed dividing the period, because of not only the Beijing
Olympic Games in that year but also the then Chinese president Hu Jintao’s speech at the
Awards Ceremony for the 2008 Olympics and the Paralympics,15 which provides a new
mission for Chinese sport.
Wodak and Meyer suggests that discourse analysts must focuses on ‘a dialect relationship
between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1429

Table 1. List of key policy documents and speeches.

Government documents Author Year
The SPCSC’s Opinion on Deepening the Reform of The SPCSC 1993
Sport System
The Sport Law of the PRC National People’s Congress 1995
2009
The Olympic Glory Plan The SPCSC 1994
The GAS 2001
2011
The Central Committee of the CPC and the State The Central Committee of the CPC and the State 2002
Council’s Guidelines for Further Strengthening Council
and Improving Sporting Affairs in the New Era
Speeches by political leaders
Jiang Zemin’s speech to the Chinese delegation of The then-President of China 2000
the XXVII Olympics
Hu Jintao’s Speech at the Awards Ceremony for the The then-President of China 2008
2008 Olympics and the Paralympics
Hu Jintao: The Chinese People are Capable of The then-President of China 2008
Making More Contribution to the Human Race
Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Chinese camp in the Sochi The President of China 2014
Olympics
Speeches by top sport officials
Yuan Weimin’s Report in the Ceremony of Beijing’s The then-Sport Minister 2001
Successful Olympic Bid
Hezhenliang’s Report in the Ceremony of Beijing’s The former President of COC 2001
Successful Olympic Bid
Sport Minister’s report at the All States Sports The Sport Minister 2001–2013
Minister Conference
The Speech of Deputy Sport Minister at All States The Deputy Sport Ministers 2001–2013
Sports Minister Conference

Table 2. Protocol of CDA.

Chronology Pre-2008 Post-2008
Genre The action implied in discourse (relationship with, and attitudes towards, others; action over others)
Discourse The perspective and presentation of topics (knowledge about event & structure; control over things)
Style How the identity is constructed (knowledge about, relations with self, e.g. Zhuanye system and
reformists)
Modified from Norman Fairclough, ‘Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism’, Organizational
Studies 26, no. 6 (2005), 915–39; Norman Fairclough, ‘A Dialectical-Relational Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis in
Social Research’, in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Sage, 2009),
162–186.

structure(s), which frame it’, as discourse is a multi-aspect social phenomenon.16 In his

CDA framework, Fairclough furthers this point and identifies discourse as a manifestation
and regulation of social identity, social practice, and social representation/construction.17
He states that ‘discourse’ embraces not only the linguistic and semiotic term, but also
embodies a dialectical social process and with three aspects: a way of being, acting and
materializing. Thus, through employing Fairclough’s CDA framework for a cross-language
discourse analysis,18 this research seeks to unveil social actors’ constructive activities and
their relationship with Chinese elite sport, while scrutinizing ‘real’ social structures, which
facilitate and constrain the discursive construction.
Table 1 provides a list of the main documents analyzed for this research. As the first
step, all publicly accessible Chinese elite sport policies and speeches of Chinese political
leaders and top sport officials announced during the period that is investigated in the
1430   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

research were reviewed. Those documents and speeches that strategically focus on the overall
development of Chinese elite sport were selected as the main documentary source subject
to the analysis, which sought to concentrate on the influence of Olympic discourse on the
construction of the general development of Chinese elite sport. In addition, supporting
references also include other documents concerning concrete practices, for example the
ideological education of Chinese elite athletes, and academic and media material from
institutions, such as Beijing Sport University, the China sport press and the Chinese sport
daily, which are directly affiliated to, and controlled by governmental sport organs and thus
are a part of the Chinese elite sport system.19
As shown in Table 2, the data is analyzed following Fairclough’s concept of the order of
discourse, namely genre, discourse and style, which are three textual elements that ‘reflect
structural feature in a certain society’.20 Fairclough indicates that genre which constructs
relationships between the respective sides of a discursive construction, can be identified
at different levels of abstraction. These include those at an abstracted level, i.e. argument,
discussion and statement; those at more concrete level, i.e. interview, advertisement
and report; and those at micro level, which construct relationships in communication
through conveying different concrete active meanings via terms such as ‘to promote’ or ‘to
implement’.21 It is the genre at micro level that is investigated in this research, which aims
to explore purposes of communication, the relationship with, and attitude towards others
constructed in the discursive ‘actions over others’.22
The objects that fall into the column of discourse include not only representation of
discourse, but also the perspectives of representation and interpretation (e.g. the diverse
and/or consistent ways in which the Olympics are framed). These diverse perspectives of
construction compose a ‘panoramic view’ of Chinese Olympic discourse and its relationship
with elite sport development. They also reflect the structural elements, facilitating or
constraining the actors’ knowledge of events (the Olympic Games, especially the 2008
Games) and of social structure (Chinese elite sport and political elements).
Style symbolizes the discursive facet of identity,23 in other words, how actors view and
construct their own and others’ social identity. For example, being a sport official requires
not only certain managing behaviours, but also certain discursive ‘manners’, such as speaking
like other administrators do. Through investigating the style constructed with Chinese
Olympic discourse, the research explores the different/consistent role of the Olympics within
the development of Chinese elite sport overarching the 2008 Games.

The Pre-2008 Chinese Olympic Discourse Themes: Politicizing the Games,

Emphasizing Performance
Extrinsic Functions of the Olympics
As stated in the introduction, the Olympics, and modern sport in general, are often associated
with political elements in the Chinese context, which could be argued are a consequence of
the original purpose for which these Western phenomena were introduced to China. The
political, economic and cultural implications of the Olympics are recognized as its ‘extrinsic
function’; while the ‘intrinsic functions’, which is common to all types of sport, refer to its
impacts on education, health promotion and entertainment.24
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1431

Among all its ‘extrinsic functions’, the political implications of the Olympic movement
and Olympic Games are often directly and positively stated in elite sport policies, and
are recognized as an essential motivation for China’s involvement with the international
Olympic movement. And after Beijing was awarded the 2008 Olympics, these political
implications were then explicitly associated with the Beijing Olympics. For instance, the
Olympic Glory Plan 2001–2010, which was published in 2002, comments that:
Winning the bid of the 2008 Games … will have significant impact on the economic and social
development [of China] in the new century, on the establishment of an ‘all-dimensional’, multi-
tiered and wide-ranging ‘opening-up’ of our country, as well as on enhancing its international
status.25
In the same year, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (hereafter, the
CPC) and the State Council indicate that:
Winning the bid of the 2008 Games fully reflects the great accomplishments that have been
achieved through the reform and opening-up … It is a mutual duty of all Party members,
governments at various levels and Chinese people of all ethnicities … to try their best to make
the 2008 Olympic Games the most outstanding Olympics in history … in order to promote
the development of the socialist material progress, and cultural and ethical progress, of our
country.26
The political implications of the Olympic movement are emphasized in both quotations from
key elite sport policy publications by the GAS and the core of the PRC regime. These official
discourses not only stress the political function of the Olympics, but also indirectly regulate
the means for realizing this function, i.e. the 2008 Olympic Games, through explicitly
acknowledging the political significance of the Beijing 2008 Games.
This accentuation of the Olympic Games per se is not only evidenced in the quoted
policy statement but also in the two original documents, in which, the term ‘Olympic’ is
only mentioned once without being directly linked with terms such as ‘Games’ or ‘strategy’.
It is in the 2001 Summary that it is stated ‘[we should] utilise the opportunity of the Beijing
Games … to energetically promote the Olympic spirit, [in order to] make the whole society
emphasize and support the Olympic strategy’. Nonetheless, even in this solely exceptional
case, the Olympic strategy was still identified as the ultimate goal for promoting the Olympic
spirit. In contrast to the overwhelming emphasis on the Games per se in these two important
documents, terms such as ‘the Olympic spirit’, ‘the Olympic Movement’, etc. are employed
more frequently in the previous edition, i.e. the 1994 edition of the Olympic Glory Plan.27
The emphasis on the political significance of the Olympics and on elite sport performance
in the Olympic Games is evidenced not only in the Olympic discourse in policy documents,
but also in the interpretation of the Olympic movement in other resources.28 For instance,
Douyin Xiong, a renowned Chinese sport scholar, indicates that:
We experienced a 27-year conflict with the IOC fighting about the ‘two-Chinas’ [issue],
during which it was obviously impossible to promote the Olympic movement, let alone to
have Olympic education [in China], therefore it is natural that Chinese people, even sport
personnel and media have not had abundant knowledge about the Olympic [movement] …
[and] regard the Olympic [movement] merely as a sport competition, for winning gold medals,
which is a superficial understanding.29
The political interests of the PRC, which are related to the ‘two Chinas’ issue in its political
conflict with the IOC, are identified as the principal, if not the sole, concern of the communist
regime in promoting the Olympic movement (including Olympic education) in China. This
1432   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

account implicitly acknowledges that the guarantee of meeting its interests was a condition
of the PRC’s involvement with the international Olympic movement. Such prioritization
of the political interests is consistent with Xuanjian Ma’s argument that ‘Chinese Olympic
policy is essentially an important part of the diplomatic policy of China. Diplomacy relates
to core national interests, to which sport affairs [therefore] have to be subordinate and
serve’.30 For Xiong and Ma, who are both internal researchers of the GAS, the Chinese
government’s influence on the Chinese Olympic movement is embraced, or more precisely
internalized, as the condition and premise of the establishing of the Chinese Olympic
movement.
In addition, it is also worth noting that Xiong normalizes the sole emphasis on Olympic
performance in China as a consequence of the political conflict. Even though Xiong
criticizes this exclusive attention paid to the competition side of the Olympic movement
as a ‘superficial understanding’, this account indirectly endorses the accentuation on the
Olympic performance, at least in elite sport policies, through portraying it as a consensus
that is ‘natural’ for Chinese people.
Nonetheless, it is important to address that this suggests neither that the political
usefulness of the Olympic Games had been the sole motive of the PRC government for
hosting it, nor that the discourse of the 2008 Games, particularly those in relation to
performance in the Beijing Games, had replaced all other Olympic discourses in China
after 2001. However, we would argue that the political features, and the focus, of the
Chinese Olympic discourse do reflect the Chinese government’s emphasis on the political
implications of the Olympic Games, which is in line with its political interests. While the
emphasis on elite sport performance structures the way in which the key impact of the 2008
Games should be achieved, and thus increases the significance of Olympic performance,
particularly of the performance in the 2008 Games, which was officially recognized as the
premier political task for Chinese elite sport.
In addition to the positive portrayal of the impact and political function of the Olympics
in the official discourse, the negative side is also normally stated in policy documents,
which follows and reflects a dialectical materialist style of discussion (which might be said
to have its roots in the Marxist origins of the PRC regime). To contrast with the explicit
acknowledgement upholding the national interests and political features in the positive
portrait, the negative implications are usually stated vaguely, for example, portraying the
2008 Games as ‘a rare historical opportunity, as well as a new challenge’.31
Several years after Beijing’s first successful bid in 2001, Xuanjian Ma, an official/researcher
in the GAS, provided further details of both the potential positive and negative political
impacts of the Beijing Games on China in his work, stating that:
Hosting the 2008 Games in Beijing … we will be able to have more communication with
the IOC, IFs and NOCs … to make more friends … The … challenges are that the increase
of interaction … may result in more problems and conflicts. Therefore, we have to hold the
dialectical materialist and historical materialist stance, in order to understand, maintain and
develop the Olympic policy of our country, [we have to] analyse and adjust relevant policies
for the Beijing Olympiad as soon as possible.32
A protective attitude is constructed in the above quotation through employing a number
of conservative terms, such as ‘have to hold’, ‘in order to … maintain’. This defensive
perspective is associated with the construction of the identities of different parties, for
example, international organizations are portrayed as those with whom China would have
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1433

‘more problems and conflicts’ as a result of the increase in their interaction. By contrast,
the mainstream political ‘dialectical materialist and historical materialist’ ideology of the
PRC is acknowledged as the foundation to react in these potential ‘problem-provoking’
interactions associated with the opportunity of hosting the 2008 Olympic Games.
We may argue that the conservative tone and terms illustrate the nature of ‘analysis
and adjustment [of] relevant policies for the Beijing Olympiad’ is to address the greater
occurrence of ‘problems and conflicts’. In other words, from a negative perspective, Ma’s
prediction of the potential challenges in the Beijing Games and the ‘defensive’ suggestions
further emphasize the political significance and implication of the Beijing Games and
ultimately promotes the political interests of the socialist regime.
Thus, on the one hand, there was a growth in the quantity of activities in relation to the
Olympic movement in China and an increase in China’s interaction with the international
communities, especially the IOC and other international organizations,33 during the
preparation for the Beijing Olympics. And China was also confronted with fierce, if not
more, criticisms coming from the international community in relation to various areas,
including its sport system.34 On the other hand, a conservative tone, which was in line
with political mainstream of the Chinese society, was carefully maintained, at least, in the
Chinese elite sport system, which was mainly based in a socialist planned economy and
was seen as ‘a reserve field’ in China’s market-oriented reform for the conservative attitude
and limited achievement in terms of reform in this area.35
It is worth noting that due to the importance of the socialist character of the PRC, we
choose to leave further investigation of its function in, and impacts on, Chinese Olympic
discourse to a specific section. We now turn to the other two major political features of the
Chinese Olympic discourse, i.e. nationalism and patriotism.

Nationalism and Patriotism in Olympic Discourse

In their encyclopaedia, Nations and Nationalism, Herb and Kaplan view nationalism as ‘the
process that defines, creates, and expresses the essential loyalty … holding people’s allegiance
… to a nation’.36 Bairner indicates that the nationalist elements in sport, such as representing
one’s nation in international event, are closely related to cultural nationalism.37And
patriotism, which sometimes is relatively politically influenced, is also evidenced in the
sport domain, for example, in the desire to express national identity.
Due to the PRC government’s concerns with the ethnic denotation of the concept of
nationalism, which might have a negative impact on the minority ethnicities, the communist
regime consistently employs ‘patriotism’, associating with its conflicts with imperialism and
colonialism, and avoids using the term ‘nationalism’ (particularly its ethnic denotation).38
The government also redefines the nature of the concept of ‘Chinese nationalism’ based on
political criteria, i.e. the communist notion of the revolutionary class, and vague cultural
principles.39 Therefore, the concepts of patriotism and nationalism, in the Chinese context,
are naturally associated with the Marxist ‘class struggle’ theory and an international narrative
of independence in the Third World, and commonly overlaps each other for their political
connotation.
As indicated in the previous section, elite sport and the Olympics are closely associated
with political significance in Chinese narratives, thus both of the concepts, nationalism
and patriotism, are regarded as integral features of Chinese elite sport and the Chinese
1434   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

Olympic movement.40 For example, a typical narrative in the Chinese Olympic discourse
constructing the linkage between western Olympism and the Chinese nation is the notion
of the ‘Olympic dream’ of China.41 The speech of Weimin Yuan, the then-Minister of Sport,42
in the ceremony of Beijing’s successful bid in 2001 provides a good example of the ‘Olympic
dream’ narrative and the politicization of this national aspiration. He states that:
Hosting an Olympic Games in China is a dream of generations of Chinese people, and is also a
common wish of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. As early as the 1950s, and 1960s, the leaders of
the Party and of the country had repeatedly stated that China would host an Olympic Games.
Yuan also reminds the audience that this suggestion or aspiration was repeated by Deng
Xiaoping in February 1972, and again in July 1990, and he went on to argue:
… Now, we are able to give consolation to the older generations of revolutionaries that under
the leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Jiang Zemin at the core, thanks to
the endeavours of Chinese people and of BOBICO as well as the support and understanding of
the IOC members and international community, Beijing was finally awarded the 2008 Olympic
Games.
Yuan portrays the opportunity of hosting an Olympic Games not only as a national dream
which had lasted for generations, but also an expectation, particularly, of the political leaders
of the PRC, despite the fact that the first three Chinese Olympic delegations were sent
by its rival during the Chinese civil war, i.e. the Republic of China.43 Through quoting
statements of the top PRC leaders, Yuan emphasizes the role of these political leaders in the
‘realisation of the Olympic dreams’ and subtly mixes their identity with ‘the Chinese people’
in terms of the Olympic dream. These politicians then represent, if not replace, the Chinese
people as those who have finally been able to realize their Olympic dream and to achieve
their Olympic goals. This transformation of the subjects of the Olympic dream manifests a
way in which a nationalist discourse, i.e. the realization of Chinese Olympic dream, is shaped
as synonymous with the Party’s Olympic dream, and is therefore utilized as an endorsement
of the regime. This is similar to the function of the previous quotation crediting the 2008
Games to ‘the great accomplishment that has been achieved in the reform and opening-up
of society’.44 Such an account reflects the political power over Olympic discourse exerted
by the regime, which regulates the way in which the Chinese Olympic dream should be
interpreted and to whom the achievement should be credited.
This national ‘Olympic dream’ is recognized as a ‘part of the project to reinsert China
into an international narrative of history and progress’.45 As with the relationship between
political implications of the Olympics and Olympic performance in the Chinese context,
this connotation of national restoration and salvation is also often associated with Olympic
performance, especially victories, which is recognized as ‘the political task’ of Chinese
elite sport. And thus, the features of nationalism and patriotism, particularly the latter, are
normally employed in the narrative of the ideological education for Chinese elite athletes.
Taking the scenario of the speeches of Peng Liu, the Sport Minister, in All States Sport
Minister Conferences before the Beijing Games, Mr Liu indicates in 2007 that:
It is pointed out by comrades in the leading core [of the CPC] that, the spiritual character …
of [how] the Chinese female volleyball team and Chinese table tennis team worked tenaciously
to win glory for the country … is the foundation of the [Chinese] elite sport to prepare for
the battle of the 2008 Games … the victory of the Long March was achieved by the Red Army
due to their recalcitrant spirit under the tough conditions; preparing the battle of the Olympic
Games also needs the same recalcitrant spirit.
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1435

Winning glory for the country is the eternal topic of the ideological and political work of elite
sport teams. Facing the Beijing Games, [we] have to make our athletes realize that winning glory
for the State is not only a slogan, but also a heavy responsibility and an honourable mission.46
One year later, the Sport Minister reinforces that:
The construction of the ideology and the sportsmanship [and positive behaviour] of elite sport
teams is as important as training … in the battle-preparation [for the 2008 Games]. All Centres
… have to regard the education of patriotism … the honing of [an appropriate] mentality as
important elements in the battle - preparation [for the 2008 Games].47
In both quotations, patriotism, as an element of the ideological education of Chinese athletes,
is portrayed as a crucial factor for the preparation of the 2008 Beijing Games. Chinese elite
sport and athletes, in return, had also been utilized and internalized as a metaphor of
patriotism, such as in the case of the Chinese female volleyball team and Chinese table
tennis team in the above quotation. Because of the victories of Chinese table tennis players
and female volleyball players in the pre-reform era and the early stage of China’s reform,
these two sports are not only closely associated with national pride, but also well recognized
as incentives for patriotic feelings with socialist hints and symbols for China’s restoration
from the damage of Cultural Revolutions.48
Thanks to the traditional ideological education and political portrait of Chinese elite
sport, ‘winning glory for the country’ in international events has been recognized as an
innate and essential duty of Chinese elite sport.49 Moreover, this heavily used patriotic phrase
is not only linked with Chinese elite athletes, but also associated with political metaphors,
such as the revolutionary spirit of the Red Army. In addition to the notion of the Red Army,
other revolutionary spiritual concepts or phrases, such as ‘recalcitrant spirit’ and ‘working
tenaciously to win glory for the country’, are also portrayed as essential content of the
ideological education of Chinese elite athletes in their striving to achieve Olympic success.
This linkage between Chinese Olympic discourse and the features of the socialist regime
is also illustrated in the previous quotation from the speech of the then Minister of Sport,
Yuan Weimin, and is analysed in the following section looking at socialism narratives in
Chinese Olympic discourse in the elite sport system.

Socialism in Olympic Discourse

As one of not many countries that remain labelled (by itself or others) as a socialist one,
China has embraced and merged its socialist character into the Olympic discourse in two
principal ways. On the one hand, it associates China’s achievements in the Olympics (in
terms of both its successful bid and elite sport performance) with the fact of its socialist
characteristics as a means of legitimating its political system. On the other hand, socialism
provides the ideological foundation on which it bases its interaction with the international
community.
The socialist character of the PRC is associated with Chinese Olympic victories both
in the Olympic stadia and during its bidding procedure for hosting Olympic Games. For
instance, the successful bid for the 2008 Games was officially identified as a victory that
‘fully reflects the great accomplishments that have been achieved through the reform and
opening-up …’ in a number of policy documents and official publications.50 Given the
strong political connotation of ‘the reform and opening-up’, symbolizing the socialism
with Chinese characteristics, we would maintain that such official rhetoric, which was
1436   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

commonly employed in Chinese society in the pre-2008 era, portrays the successful bid of
2008 as an endorsement of the socialist regime and its development route, albeit there is
no direct reference to socialism.
The speech of He Zhenliang, the former President of the COC, which is recognized as
another title of the GAS,51 in the celebration ceremony for the successful 2008 bid in 2001
provides a more obvious example, stating that:
This [winning the 2008 bid] is the [IOC’s] recognition of our achievement in the reform
and opening-up, and of the support of our government and Chinese people [to the bid] …
Genuinely speaking, I would ascribe [the successful bid] to the leadership of the Party, to our
achievement in the reform and opening-up, to the People’s support.52
In the above quotation, the successful bid is not only identified as a product of the socialism
with Chinese characteristics (represented by the terms ‘reform and opening-up’) but also
portrayed as a symbol of the international recognition of this development route. Given
He’s ambiguous expression, ignoring the difference between the accomplishments of the
reform of China in different domains, for example the economy and politics, we would
suggest that this account, implicitly generalizes the nature of the international recognition
and thus subtly endorses the political theme of the PRC.
It is also worth noting that in the second part of the above quotation, He identifies the
domestic factors leading to the successful bid. In contrast to his interpretation from the
international perspective, the Party’s leadership is explicitly indicated as the leading and
foremost factor. This feature of He’s account in relation to the role of the Party’s leadership
is in line with a pattern of embracing political rhetoric in Chinese Olympic discourse, in
which the socialist character of the regime is normally portrayed as the foundation for
excellence in Olympic performance in terms of both resource and ideology.
At the same time the excellent Olympic performance of Chinese athletes, in turn,
embodies the superiority of socialism. For instance, it is stated by the Central Committee
of the CPC during the preparation for the 2008 Olympics that:
Drafting the Plan for Winning Olympic Glory in the new era … [we should] further utilize
the superiority of socialism, [we should] insist and refine Juguo Tizhi … [and] better integrate
sport resources from the whole country.53
The phrase of ‘[the capability of] concentrating all national resources for a major task’ is
acknowledged as an embodiment of the ‘superiority of socialism’ by Hu Jintao, the former
President of China.54 This is also consistent with the main feature of Juguo Tizhi,55 the
support of the whole nation for the elite sport system, and with the notion of ‘integrat[ing]
sport resources from the whole country’ in the above quotation. Given the close relationship,
constructed by the core of the CPC, between the socialism and Juguo Tizhi and the Olympic
Glory Plan, we would argue that this promotion of the socialist features of Chinese elite sport
officially reinforces and endorses the status of Juguo Tizhi and the significance of excellent
Olympic performance in the PRC.
In ideological terms, the account in relation to the ideological education of elite athletes
for the preparation of the Olympics provides another good example of the socialist elements
in Chinese Olympic discourse. It is stated in a GAS document that is specifically published in
2006 for the ideological education of elite athletes preparing for the Beijing Olympic Games:
Further strengthening the ideological education of the national teams is an urgent need in the
preparation for the Olympics, and is an important means to guarantee the effectiveness of the
preparation of the 2008 Games.
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1437

It is worth addressing specifically that some athletes … have even behaved in libertarian,
hedonistic, ways exhibiting extreme individualism and materialism [money-worship] …
[because] they have abundant opportunities for competing overseas, they are susceptible to
Western ideology, values, cultural products and unhealthy practices …

All of the new members of the national teams have to be given [ideological education] tutorials
… [We] must educate [athletes] about the history of the [Communist] Party … the ‘Socialist
concept of honour and disgrace’ … [which should be] reflected in their love of the country
and the organizations [to which they belong] … in order to let them clearly understand the
essential task of, and the significance of, the preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games.56
In the above quoted statement from The Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving
the Ideological Education of National Teams, the ideological education of the elite athletes is
identified as compulsory and a necessary condition for Chinese elite athletes to win Olympic
glory, especially for 2008. In other words, education in the socialist ideology is legitimated
by the significance of Olympic victory in Chinese society.
As exemplified in the above quotation, such ideological education is consistent with the
patriotic character of Chinese Olympic discourse, ‘love of the country and the organizations’;
and with the political character of China, i.e. socialism of the PRC, education in ‘the history
of the [Communist] Party … [and] the “socialist concept of honour and disgrace”’. From
a counter perspective, the ‘misbehaviour’ of elite athletes, which is identified as a result of
the influence of other, i.e. Western, ideologies, is portrayed as the target of the ideological
education. Given the close relationship with the term ‘Western’ and capitalism in the Chinese
context, the socialist features of this ideological education are subtly promoted through
criticizing capitalist and Western values. This is consistent with previous quotation from
Ma, accentuating the importance of maintaining the ‘dialectical materialist and historical
materialist’ stance in dealing with ‘problems’ caused by the increased interaction with
international organizations for the staging of the Beijing Games.57
As previously demonstrated, providing satisfactory Olympic performance is recognized
as the essential duty of Chinese elite sport, especially of those relying on government funds.
We would thus argue that the ideological education is, to a degree, consistent with the
interests of the Chinese elite system and the individual interests of elite athletes, given that it
is designed to promote Olympic performance. In other words, even though it is the collective
and national interests that are ultimately promoted in the socialist discourse advocating
ideological education for Chinese Olympians, this does not necessarily lead to a full rejection
of the interests of the individual. To a certain extent, the collective and individual interests
are consistent with each other in the ideological education to which Chinese elite athletes
are subjected. Thus, through fulfilling the collective and national interests, certain individual
interests have been satisfied and vested interest groups have subsequently been formed. Such
groups proactively promote the national and their own interests, which are to be realized
through providing satisfactory Olympic performance, and thus reject the pursuit of ‘extreme’
individual interests threatening the preparation for the Olympics.
Even though the conflicts between some ‘Western ideology’ and socialist philosophy are
well recognized, the socialist development of the country remains portrayed as a beneficiary
of the Western-origin Olympics, particularly through the 2008 Beijing Games. As indicated
in the previous quotation from the documents of the Central Committee of the CPC, the
Beijing Games is portrayed as an opportunity ‘to promote the development of the socialist
material progress, and cultural and ethical progress, of our country’.
1438   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

As a brief conclusion of this section, we would argue that the Chinese Olympic discourse
is influenced by the ‘superficial understanding’ of the nature of the Olympics in the Chinese
context. Along with imminence of the Beijing Games, the political significance of the
Olympics was projected to, and was employed in, the accentuation of the significance of the
Olympic performance. These two themes of the official Olympic discourse, i.e. the emphasis
on the political significance of, and on the performance in, the Olympics, are in line with
the interests of the government and of the Chinese sport authority, which is also a state
organ. It also reflects its dominant power over discourse, regulating both the perspective
of constructing the nature of the Olympics in Chinese elite sport systems and the approach
of realizing the significance of the Olympics through Chinese elite sport.

The Post-2008 Olympic Discourse: Constant Political But Declining

Performance Rhetoric
After realizing the ‘century-long Olympic dream’, the interpretation of the experiences and
implication of the expected ‘opportunities and challenges’ of the Beijing Games became
one of the most important parts of the post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse.58 Despite
this change in the content of the Chinese Olympic discourse, the emphasis on the political
implications of the Beijing Games and of the Olympics in general is continuously evidenced
in the post-2008 era. For example, as with the manner of ‘politicizing’ the successful bid
of the Beijing Games, the staging of the 2008 Olympics is interpreted as a communication
opportunity conveying the restoration of the national status of China, and/or linked to
the political character of the communist regime. For instance, in the officially-published
summary of the 60-year development of Chinese elite sport, Hua Li, a senior sport official
states that:
In 2008, one year before the 60-year anniversary of the PRC, Beijing hosted the XXIX Olympiad,
[by which] the Chinese nation fulfilled its century old wish. From a suffering and humiliated
‘sick man of Asia’, to [a country that is] … capable of hosting a ‘truly exceptional’ Olympics,
to the number 1 in gold medals, China’s tremendous change has surprised and convinced the
world … [which] show [their] respect and admiration, representing international appreciation
for the magnificent 30-year reform …59
In the above quotation, the Beijing Games is explicitly associated with the development
of the PRC, and is recognized as a symbol of one stage of the development of China
from the humiliating past to the glorious present. China’s peak performance in the
2008 Games is portrayed as a means by which China was able to ‘surprise and convince’
the international community, which is consistent with the pre-2008 Chinese Olympic
discourse linking satisfactory Olympic performance with the extrinsic functions of the
Olympic Games.
This account implies the success of the Beijing Games in fulfilling its expected extrinsic
function of constructing a positive image of the re-establishment of the Chinese nation to
the world. It also indirectly constructs the identity of the world in the Beijing Games, as
witness to the development of China. Thus, through associating the Beijing Games with
‘the magnificent task of the 30-year reform’ of China, the author also frames the world’s
acceptance of the Beijing Games as a recognition and an endorsement of development of
China and thus of the achievement and the reign of the socialist regime.
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1439

Peng Liu’s speech at the 2009 All States Sports Minister Conference provides a more
explicit example of this linkage constructed between the 2008 Olympics and global
recognition of the communist regime. The Sport Minister indicates that:
The successful Beijing Games and the outstanding results of Chinese [elite] sport are a true
reflection of the PRC’s glorious procedure of striving [to become] prosperous and strong; is
a showcase of the great achievement of the reform and opening-up of Chinese society and
the modernization of China; is a successful practice of a mode of sport development with a
Chinese character that is consistent with the Chinese context … 2009 is the 60-year anniversary
of the PRC, is a new beginning for Chinese elite sport; [Chinese elite sport] experienced its
glory in the Beijing Games … is facing the future, is working around the clock, tirelessly and
continuously striving to transcend [its former success].60
The Beijing Games is explicitly framed by the Sport Minister as a ‘reflection’ and a ‘showcase’
of the accomplishment of the PRC since its establishment. Implying the nature of the
information ‘reflected’ and ‘shown’ via the 2008 Olympics, these two terms indirectly
construct the international connection, and the exogenous origin, of the Olympics in
the Chinese context. Thus, Liu suggests that the success in the Beijing Games should be
interpreted not only as positive images conveyed to the world; but also a proof via an
international means of the appropriateness of the socialist route that is implied in terms,
such as ‘PRC’s glorious procedure’ and ‘the great achievement of the reform and opening-up’.
Furthermore, the top Chinese sport bureaucrat also identifies the general success of the
Beijing Games as ‘a successful practice of the mode of sport development with a Chinese
character’. In other words, not the successful performance of Chinese elite sport in the
Beijing Games, but ‘the successful Beijing Games’ is portrayed as an endorsement of the
effectiveness of the Chinese elite sport system. Therefore, in order to ‘continuously transcend’
the successes in the Beijing Games, which would constantly reflect the ‘great achievement
of the reform and opening-up’, the current direction and means of elite sport development,
i.e. Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport, have to be maintained after this ‘new beginning of
Chinese elite sport’.
More than simply maintaining this political feature of Chinese Olympic discourse, we
would argue that there is a more explicit knowledge in terms of the extrinsic function of the
Olympics constructed in the post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse. For example, during
Jinping Xi’s visit to Sochi, the President of China emphasized in his speech to the Chinese
delegation that:
We have realized the Olympic dream through successfully staging the Beijing Games. At the
moment, we are closer to the target of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation than ever before.
Everyone’s dream, the dream of [being] a Sport Power is closely associated with the China
Dream.61
Two significant phenomena, ‘China Dream’ and ‘Sport Power’ are employed in Xi’s statement.
The first, ‘China Dream’, is a political idiom Xi promoted himself, and is ‘a strategic thought
in relation to realize the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’.62 Secondly, the current Chinese
President links his political idea to his predecessor’s mission assigned to Chinese sport, i.e.
‘becoming a Sport Power’.63 The concept of ‘becoming a Sport Power’ was identified as ‘the
new outline and objective for the future development of Chinese sport’ and was immediately
embraced within Chinese elite sport discourse as its main slogan of development.64 For
example, in the latest version of the Olympic Glory Plan, i.e. the 2011 Plan, it is identified
as the 10-year goal of the development of Chinese elite sport in the section Guiding Theory
and Principle.65
1440   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

It could be argued that through associating the concept of the ‘China Dream’, which
embraces traditional nationalist connotation (i.e. the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation),
into his interpretation of the Olympics, President Xi indirectly re-emphasizes the nationalist
connotation of the ‘Olympic Dream’. And his reference to ‘Sport Power’ subtly endorses
the consistency of both political rhetoric of Chinese Olympic discourse and the political
task of Chinese elite sport, which was assigned by President Jintao Hu, in the post-2008
era. Subsequently, as with the concept of ‘Sport Power’, this high-profile speech has been
seriously ‘studied’ by Chinese elite sport authorities, has received a great amount of positive
feedback, and has been embedded in Chinese elite sport discourse.66
From an international perspective, the changes in the policy statements of three editions
of the Plans provide a good example of the development in the Chinese understanding of
the Olympics. There are two brief statements relating to the social impact of the Olympics
in the 1994 Plan.67 The first focuses on the Olympic performance and its impact on ‘the
socialist material progress, and cultural and ethical progress’. The second emphasizes the
benefit of ‘promoting the Olympic ideology and [of] advocating the Olympic spirit … for
stimulating the opening-up of our country and its international communication’.
For the second (2001–2010) edition of this series of documents, thanks to the successful
bid of the 2008 Games, the 2001 Plan focuses solely on the social influence of the Beijing
Olympic, such as its ‘significant impact on the economic and social development … the
“opening-up” … and international status of the country’.68
Compared to the brief statements in the 1994 Summary and the 2008-focused account
in the 2001 Summary, the authors of the 2011 Summary not only assign the significance of
the Olympics to different international events but also associate these sporting events with
various strategic practices of states. It is stated that:
International sport events, represented by the Olympic Games, [could be used as a means for]
international comparison, [performance in which] is the benchmark and character of progress
[towards becoming a] ‘Sport Power’ … Elite sport and the Olympic strategy will remain its
significant role and implication in the economic, social and cultural development [of China]
in the following decade … the Olympic Games … has become an important platform for
international communication, competition and cooperation as well as a shop window for the
image of the general strength of nations.69
Straightforwardly, it could be argued that the above quotation from the second section
of the 2011 Summary, the majority of which focuses on the extrinsic function of the
Olympics, provides a more detailed account than the statements, covering the same topic,
in the previous two versions. From an international perspective, terms that imply national
practices associated with the Olympics, including ‘competition’, ‘cooperation’, ‘international
comparison’ etc., are employed in the above quotation. We would argue that these terms
implying different practices of states not only suggest an increased Chinese understanding
of the extrinsic function of the Olympics; but also construct various relationships between,
and/or the different identities of, the participant countries of the Olympics Games.
Even though there is no direct mention of elite sport performance in the above quotation
from the 2011 Plan, given the high media exposure and thus public attention to the Olympic
medal table, it could be argued that the notions of ‘international comparison’, ‘competitions’
among different states and the ‘benchmark’ of being a ‘Sport Power’ subtly constructs elite
sport performance as the criterion of ‘comparison’ between delegations from different
NOCs. Thus, in order to realize this role as a ‘Sport Power’, it is subtly suggested in the
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1441

policy from the GAS that elite sport performance, and consequently Juguo Tizhi and the
Zhuanye sport system, needs to be maintained.
This association between Olympic performance, Olympic strategy and Juguo Tizhi is
also evidenced in the official interpretation of the concept of ‘Sport Power’, which was
made by a group of renowned Chinese sport scholars summoned by the GAS and led by
its researching institution.70 It is stated that:
Given the scarce resources of China and the unbalanced development among elite sports,
maintaining Juguo Tizhi … [and] implementing Olympic strategies is a necessary and inevitable
choice … After the Beijing Games, as evidenced by the general strength of elite sport, there is
no doubt that China has become a Sport Power in elite sport … Reinforcing and maintaining
this advantaged position in elite sport is the primary requirement of the implementation of the
strategy of becoming a Sport Power, [which aims to] lead the overall development of Chinese
sport with the development of elite sport.71
In the above quotation, the authors portray the sustaining of excellent performance as a
requirement for maintaining the position of China as a ‘Sport Power’. This account utilizes
this powerful statement, i.e. ‘Sport Power’, from the top leader of China to legitimize the
maintenance of Juguo Tizhi, at a time when it has been identified as a target of Chinese elite
sport reform.72 Besides stressing the importance of maintaining the 2008 success through
linking it with the notion of ‘Sport Power’, Hu, the author, also associates the implementation
of Juguo Tizhi with the character of Chinese society, i.e. ‘the scarce resources’ and ‘the
unbalanced development among elite sports’, which is a supporting narrative that is also
evidenced in the pre-2008 discourse.
However, the comprehensive development of Chinese sport is also identified as a crucial
feature of ‘Sport Power’, which accentuates the development of mass sport and the sport
industry and thus, to a degree, deemphasizes elite sport performance and the Olympic
strategy.73 In line with this feature of this significant narrative introduced to the post-2008
Chinese Olympic discourse, Hu also identifies ‘the overall development of Chinese sport’
as the ultimate goal of developing elite sport in the above quotation.
In contrast to the brief, and to a degree indirect, account in relation to the development
of other parts of Chinese sport, i.e. mass sport and the sport industry, the Sport Minister’s
speeches in the All States Sports Minister Annual Conference in the post-2008 era
provide a more explicit illustration of the decreasing emphasis on elite sport. For instance,
straightforwardly from a quantitative perspective, the terms of ‘the Olympic Games’ and
‘Juguo Tizhi’ were, respectively, mentioned 27 and 13 times in the 2009 version; and the
number was reduced to 12 and three references, respectively, in the 2013 edition.74
In sum, the further emphasis on, and more explicit reference to, the extrinsic functions
of the Olympics (including both the 2008 edition and other Olympic Games) is the defining
character of post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse. The peak performance of Chinese elite
athletes in the Beijing Olympic Games is recognized in the Chinese context as a significant
characteristic of the 2008 Games. As a consequence, this excellent performance is employed
as an endorsement of the effectiveness and success of Juguo Tizhi and the Olympic strategy.
Nonetheless, though the importance of Olympic performance to Chinese elite sport has
been consistently acknowledged in official discourse, it has been gradually deemphasized in
Chinese society. This characteristic of the post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse, especially
that within Chinese elite sport policy documents and official publications, is in line with the
narratives emphasized by core actors of the PRC regime, and reflects the consistent political
power over the Chinese elite sport system and discourse.
1442   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

Conclusion
Consistent with the original purpose for which modern sport and the Olympics were
introduced to China by the national elite, these Western phenomena have accumulated
remarkable political significance in the Chinese context. The Chinese Olympic discourse
has thus been associated with nationalist and patriotic rhetoric, such as the restoration of
the Chinese nation from its century of humiliation; and with socialism and other related
ideologies, such as collective interests and values.
Olympic success has been identified as an important approach through which these
‘extrinsic functions’ of the Olympics are to be realized. Such emphasis on Olympic
performance is consistent with the portrait and understanding of the nature of
the Olympics in the Chinese context, for competition among individual athletes is
recognized as an embodiment of international competition and is thus accentuated as
a symbol representing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the superiority of
the socialist regime. The great attention paid to outstanding Olympic performance is
also in line with the interests of those within the Zhuanye sport system of Chinese elite
sport, whose essential duty is to provide successful Olympic performance in order to
realize these ‘extrinsic functions’.
Thus, in the official Olympic discourse, especially that from the Chinese elite sport
authorities, the significance of successful Olympic performance is what was accentuated.
This reflected the role of the sporting elite in terms of its ‘power over’ Olympic discourse
in the pre-2008 and the hosting era, laying down the nature of Olympic success and the
approach to realizing it, and promoting the notion of a politically significant sport event in
which successful performance should be prioritized.
With China’s increasing involvement with the international Olympic movement,
especially after the Beijing Games, there is a more explicit account in relation to the extrinsic
function of the Olympics evidenced in the construction of the concept of ‘Olympic’ in the
Chinese context. The political connotation of, and political influence on, Chinese Olympic
discourse (reflecting the political ‘power over’ discourse) have been maintained in the post-
2008 era. However, the thrust of the discourse has changed. Powerful political terms have
been added into the post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse, including the notion of China
as a ‘Sport Power’ and the ‘China Dream’.
In contrast to the extreme emphasis on Olympic performance during the run up to
the Beijing Games, the new addition to Chinese sport discourse, to a degree, decreases
the significance of Olympic performance in Chinese society. Thus, even though Olympic
performance remains an important factor, if not the important factor, to Chinese elite
sport, and is continuously stressed in policy documents, there has been a declining trend
in the emphasis given to Olympic performance in Chinese sport policies. It could be
argued that although these changes at discursive level influence the value of, and vested
interests within, Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport, whose core duty is to ‘win glory for
the country’, the discourse of the party elite is consistently and proactively supported
by the administrators of these sporting bodies, because the Chinese sport bureaucrats
are still actors within state organs and the Chinese sport system remain dependent
upon the support of the party elite.
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1443

Notes
1.  Susan Brownell, Beijing’s Games: What the Olympics Mean to China (Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2008); Jingxia Dong and J.A. Mangan, ‘Beijing Olympics Legacies: Certain
Intentions and Certain and Uncertain Outcomes’, The International Journal of the History of
Sport 25, no. 14 (2008), 2019–40; Hong Fan, Ping Wu, and Huan Xiong, ‘Beijing Ambitions:
An Analysis of the Chinese Elite Sports System and its Olympic Strategy for the 2008 Olympic
Games’, The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 4 (July 2005), 510–29; and
Guoqi Xu, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895–2008 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2008), 23.
2.  Brownell, Beijing’s Games; and Xu, Olympic Dreams.
3.  Shi Wang, Yan Fu Ji [Collection of Yan Fu’s Work] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986); and
Zhang, ‘Quan Xue Pian’ [Encouragement to Learning], in Junmei Xue (ed.), Xingshi Congshu
[Waking Lion Series] (Henan: Zhongguo Guji Chubanshe, 1998).
4.  Wenxue Yuan, Liu Changchun: The First Chinese Athlete in Olympics (Liaoning: Dalian ligong
daxue chubanshe [Dalian Sci-Tech University Press], 2008).
5.  Yuanwei Li et al., ‘Guanyu Jinyibu wanshan Woguo Jingji Tiyu Juguo Tizhi de Yanjiu’, [Research
on the Further Perfection of Juguo Tizhi of Elite Sports of China], China Sport Science and
Technology 39, no. 8 (2003), 1–5.
6.  Shaozu Wu, 中国体育史 [The History of Sport in the People’s Republic of China] (Beijing:
China Book Press, 1999); and Luzeng Song, ‘Jianchi Wei Guojia Zhengti Liyi Fuwu de Woguo
Tiyu Waishi Gongzuo’ [Serving the General National interests: Sport in the Diplomacy of
China], in GAS (ed.), 60 Years of New China’s Sport (Beijing: People’s Press, 2009).
7.  The conflict focuses on whether the PRC government in Mainland China or the ROC
government in Taiwan should be the legitimate representative of China in the IOC.
8.  Douyin Xiong, ‘Beijing Aoyunhui Yu Zhongguo Tiyu Fazhan’ [The Beijing Olympic Games
and the Development of the Sport in China], Journal of Sports and Science 23, no. 6 (2002),
9–12.
9.  Peng Liu, ‘Cong Xiri “Dongya Bingfu” Dao Shengshi Tiyu Huihuang’ [From the ‘Sickman in
East Asia’ to the Glory], in GAS (ed.), 60 Years of New China’s Sport (Beijing: People’s Press,
2009); Jiandong Yi, Olympic History in 100 Years (Jiangxi: Baihuazhou Wenyi Chubanshe
[Baihuazhou Literature and Arts Press], 2008); and Bin Long, ‘Zhongguo Aoyunhui Chengji
Tanyin: Yi Bajie Xiaji Aoyunhui Weili’ [Researches on the Chinese Olympic Performance
in Eight Summer Olympics], Hubei Sport Science and Techonology 32, no. 2 (2013), 141–4.
10. Kevin Caffrey, ‘The Beijing Olympics as Indicator of a Chinese Competitive Ethic’, The
International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 2 (2009), 1122–45; Jingxia Dong, ‘Woman,
Nationalism and the Beijing Olympics: Preparing for Glory’, The International Journal of the
History of Sport 22, no. 4 (2005), 530–544; Xiaoqian Hu, ‘An Analysis of Chinese Olympic
and Elite Sport Policy Discourse in the Post-Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Era’ (PhD thesis,
Loughborough University, 2015); Glos Ho, ‘Attitudes Towards Mainland China Beijing
Olympics Under “One Country Two Systems”: An Ethnographic Study of Hong Kong
Students’ Attitudes towards Mainland China’, The International Journal of the History of Sport
27 (2010), 570–87; Susan Brownell and Kevin William, ‘The Beijing Olympics as a Turning
Point? China’s First Olympics in East Asian Perspective’, YALE CEAS Occasional Publications
3, no. 23 (2011), 185–204; Monroe Edwin Price and Daniel Dayan, Owning the Olympics:
Narratives of the New China; Susan Brownell, Beijing’s Games: What the Olympics Mean to
China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008); and Victor Cha, Beyond the Final
Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
11. Jintao Hu, ‘Hu Jintao’s Speech at the Awards Ceremony for the 2008 Olympics and
the Paralympics’ (China News Agency, 2008), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-09-
29/125116381584.shtml (accessed 4 November 2011).
12. Xiong, ‘Beijing Aoyunhui Yu Zhongguo Tiyu Fazhan’ [The Beijing Olympic Games and the
Development of the Sport in China].
13. GAS, The Summary of the Olympic Glory Plan 2001–2010 (2002).
1444   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

14. Tong Qian and Chen Zhi, ‘Xi Jinping Qinqie Kanwang Suoqi Dongaohui Zhongguo
Daibiaotuan’ [Xi Jinping Visits the Chinese Delegation for the Sochi Winter Games], Xinhua
News (2014).
15. Hu, ‘Hu Jintao’s Speech at the Awards Ceremony for the 2008 Olympics and the Paralympics’.
16. Ruth Wodak and Micheal Meyer, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and
Methodology’, in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis
(London: Sage, 2009), 5–6.
17. Norman Fairclough, ‘A Dialectical-Relational Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis in
Social Research’, in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds), Methods of Critical Discourse
Analysis (London: Sage, 2009), 162–186.
18. Ibid.
19. Fan, Wu, and Xiong, ‘Beijing Ambitions’; GAS, The Political Affairs of the General Administration
of Sport, 2016, http://www.sport.gov.cn/n315/index.html (accessed 6 April 2016); and Fan
Wei, Fan Hong, and Lu Zhouxiang, ‘Chinese State Sports Policy: Pre- and Post- Beijing 2008’,
The International Journal of the History of Sport 27, nos 14–15 (2010), 2380–402.
20. Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (London:
Routledge, 2003), 37; Norman Fairclough, ‘Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The
Case for Critical Realism’, Organizational Studies 26, no. 6 (2005), 915–39; and Fairclough, ‘A
Dialectical-Relational Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis in Social Research’.
21. Fairclough, Analysing Discourse; and Fairclough, ‘A Dialectical-Relational Approach to Critical
Discourse Analysis in Social Research’.
22. Ibid.
23. Fairclough, Analysing Discourse.
24. Douyin Xiong, ‘Beijing Aoyunhui Yu Zhongguo Tiyu Fazhan’ [The Beijing Olympic Games
and the Development of the Sport in China], Journal of Sports and Science 23, no. 6 (2002),
9–12.
25. GAS, The Summary of the Olympic Glory Plan 2001–2010, 2002, 1. It is worth noting that
The Olympic Glory Plan (hereafter The Plan), which is the source of the first quotation, is a
periodically renewed Chinese elite sport policy. There have been three editions, respectively
covering 1994–2000, 2001–2010, 2011–2020 (hereafter, The 1994 Plan, The 2001 Plan and
The 2011 Plan). Though specifically named after the Olympics, The Plans are regarded as
essentially the most representative political guidelines for the development of Chinese elite
sport [see Hao, Qin, and Hai Ren, ‘Lun “Juguo Tizhi” Yu Aoyun Zhengguang Jihua de Guanxi’
[Discussion on the Relationship between ‘Juguo Tizhi’ and the Strategic Plan for the Winning
Olympic Glory], and Tiyu Wenhua Daokan [Tiyu Culture Guide] 12 (2003), 3–6; Xiong, Xia,
and Tang, Woguo Jingji Tiyu Fazhan Moshi de Yanjiu [Studies on the Developing Model of Elite
Sport of Our Nation]], and ‘the strategic blueprint guiding Chinese elite sport for its steady
development, [and] the programmatic document directing the development of Chinese elite
sport and the implementation of Olympic strategy’ [see GAS, The Summary of the Olympic
Glory Plan 2011–2020, 1].
26. The Central Committee of the CPC, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu
Jiaqiang He Gaijin Xinshiqi Tiyu Gongzuo de YIjian [The Central Committee of the CPC and
the State Council’s Guidelines for Further Strengthening and Improving Sporting Affairs
in the New Era] (PRC, 2002), 1, http://www.sport.gov.cn/n16/n1092/n16849/127397.html.
27. SPCSC, The Summary of the Olympic Glory Plan, 1994–2000, 1.
28. Luzeng Song, ‘Jianchi Wei Guojia Zhengti Liyi Fuwu de Woguo Tiyu Waishi Gongzuo’
[Serving the General National Interests: Sport in the Diplomacy of China]; Zhenliang He,
‘Aolinpikeyundong de Pubian Jiazhi Yu Duoweihua Shijie’ [The Universal Value of the Olympics
and Multi-Cultural World], Tiyu Wenhua Daokan [Tiyu Culture Guide] no. 2 (2002); Weimin
Yuan, Yuan Weimin Zai Beijing Shenao Chenggong Baogaohui Shang de Baogao [Yuan Weimin’s
Report in the Colloquium of Beijing’s Successful Olympic Bid] (Beijing, China, 2001),
http://sports.sohu.com/64/76/sports_news163357664.shtml; and Xiong, ‘Beijing Aoyunhui
Yu Zhongguo Tiyu Fazhan’ [The Beijing Olympic Games and the Development of the Sport
in China].
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1445

29. Xiong, ‘Beijing Aoyunhui Yu Zhongguo Tiyu Fazhan’ [The Beijing Olympic Games and the
Development of the Sport in China], 11.
30. Xuanjian Ma, ‘Lun Zhongguo de Aolinpike Zhengce’ [Discussion on the Olympic Policy of
China], Tiyu Wenhua Daokan [Tiyu Culture Guide] 11 (2005), 27–31.
31. The Central Committee of the CPC, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu
Jiaqiang He Gaijin Xinshiqi Tiyu Gongzuo de YIjian [The Central Committee of the CPC and
the State Council’s Guidelines for Further Strengthening and Improving Sporting Affairs in
the New Era], 1.
32. Xuanjian Ma, ‘Lun Zhongguo de Aolinpike Zhengce’ [Discussion on the Olympic Policy of
China], Tiyu Wenhua Daokan [Tiyu Culture Guide] 11 (2005), 27–31.
33. Cha, Beyond the Final Score.
34. Minky Worden, China’s Great Leap: The Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights, 1st ed.
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008); and Dong and Mangan, ‘Beijing Olympics Legacies’.
35. Xinping, Zhang, China’s Sport in Post-2008 Era (Guangzhou: Zhongshan University Press,
2009).
36. Guntram Herb and David Kaplan (eds), Nation and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview
(Volume 3, 1945–1989) (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), xi.
37. Alan Bairner, ‘Sports and Nationalism’, in Guntram Herb and David Kaplan (eds), Nation
and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 998.
38. Orion Lewis and Jessica Teets, ‘China’, in Guntram Herb and David Kaplan (eds), Nation and
Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 1190–200.
39. William Callahan, ‘National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism’,
Alternatives 24 (2004), 199–218; and Lewis and Teets, ‘China’.
40. Duan Shijie, Guojia Tiyu Zongju Fujuzhang Duan Shijie Zai 2007 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang
Huiyi Shang de Zongjie Jianghua [The Conclusion Speech of Deputy Sport Minister Duan
Shijie for 2007 All States Sports Minister Conference] (2008); Brownell, Beijing’s Games; Dong
and Mangan, ‘Beijing Olympics Legacies’; and Xu, Olympic Dreams.
41. Hu, ‘Hu Jintao’s Speech at the Awards Ceremony for the 2008 Olympics and the Paralympics’;
Zhenliang He, He Zhenliang Zai Beijing Shenao Chenggong Baogaohui Shang de Baogao
[Hezhenliang’s Report in the Colloquium of Beijing’s Successful Olympic Bid] (2002);
Yuan, ‘Yuan Weimin Tongzhi Zai 2001 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi Huiyi Shang
de Jianghua’ [Comrade Yuan Weimin’s Speech at the Conference of All-State Sports
Ministers]; Tong Qian and Chen Zhi, ‘Xi Jinping Qinqie Kanwang Suoqi Dongaohui
Zhongguo Daibiaotuan’ [Xi Jinping Visits the Chinese Delegation for the Sochi Winter
Games], Xinhua News (2014); Yan Tang. ‘Dui Woguo “Aoyun Zhengguang Jihua” de
Duowei Shenshi’ [A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Chinese Olympic Gold Medal Winning
Program], Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education 41, no. 2 (2007), 17–21; Liqun
Xu. ‘Liu Peng: Juguo Tizhi Will Be Carried on and Consummated’, People’s Daily (2008),
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/7830416.html; and Peng Liu, Guojia Tiyu Zongju
Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2007 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi Shang de Jianghua [The
Speech of Sport Minister Peng Liu for 2007 All States Sports Minister Conference] (2007),
http://zhuanti.sports.cn/07tiyujuzhang/fy/2007-01-18/1024430.html.
42. Weimin Yuan, ‘Yuan Weimin Zai Beijing Shenao Chenggong Baogaohui Shang de Baogao’
[Yuan Weimin’s Report in the Colloquium of Beijing’s Successful Olympic Bid], 1.
43. The PRC was established in 1949. Thus, Yuan subtly isolated those politicians of the Republic
of China (hereafter the ROC. It is the regime that lost the Chinese civil war to the Communist
Party and retreated to Taiwan. The Olympic delegation of the ROC is now officially known
as Chinese Taipei) from the realization of the national dream through explicitly indicating
the date, i.e. 1950s. Mingxin Tang, The History of the Republic of China’s Participation in the
Olympic Games (Taipei: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, 1999).
44. The Central Committee of the CPC, ‘Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu
Jiaqiang He Gaijin Xinshiqi Tiyu Gongzuo de YIjian’ [The Central Committee of the CPC
and the State Council’s Guidelines for Further Strengthening and Improving Sporting Affairs
in the New Era].
1446   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

45. Brownell, Beijing’s Games; Andrew Morris, Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and
Physical Culture in Republican China (University of California Press, 2004), 3; and Xu, Olympic
Dreams.
46. Liu, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2007 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi
Shang de Jianghua’ [The Speech of Sport Minister Peng Liu for 2007 All States Sports Minister
Conference], 1. The Long March (October 1933–October 1935) was a military retreat of
9000 km by the Red Amy, the CPC military force which was being chased by the KMT army.
It has been constantly used as a theme of propaganda, delineating the fighting spirit and spirit
of stubborn determination under tough conditions of the Chinese people, a spirit accredited
to the leadership of the CPC. Zhang and Vaughan, Mao Zedong as Poet and Revolutionary
Leader: Social and Historical Perspectives (Lexington Books, 2002).
47. Peng Liu, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2008 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang
Huiyi Shang de Jianghua’ [The Speech of Sport Minister Peng Liu for 2008 All States Sports
Minister Conference] (2008), 1.
48. Kevin Latham, Pop Culture China!: Media, Arts, and Lifestyle (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, 2007).
49. Wu, The History of Sport in the People’s Republic of China; Duan Shijie, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju
Fujuzhang Duan Shijie Zai 2007 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi Shang de Zongjie
Jianghua’ [The Concluding Speech of Deputy Sport Minister Duan Shijie for 2007 All States
Sports Minister Conference] (2008); and Long, ‘Zhongguo Aoyunhui Chengji Tanyin: Yi
Bajie Xiaji Aoyunhui Weili’ [Research on Chinese Olympic Performances in Eight Summer
Olympics].
50. The Central Committee of the CPC, ‘Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu
Jiaqiang He Gaijin Xinshiqi Tiyu Gongzuo de YIjian’ [The Central Committee of the CPC
and the State Council’s Guidelines for Further Strengthening and Improving Sporting Affairs
in the New Era], 1; Jianjun Guo, ‘Weiguo Zhengguang Zhuzaohuihuang – Xin Zhongguo
Jingjitiyu 60 Nian’ [60 Years of Chinese Elite Sport], in GAS (ed.), 60 Years of New China’s
Sport (Beijing: People’s Press, 2009); Liu, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2007
Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi Shang de Jianghua’ [The Speech of Sport Minister Peng
Liu for 2007 All States Sports Minister Conference] (2007); and He, ‘Zhenliang Zai Beijing
Shenao Chenggong Baogaohui Shang de Baogao’ [Hezhenliang’s Report in the Colloquium
of Beijing’s Successful Olympic Bid], 1.
51. Li et al., ‘Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan Woguo Jingji Tiyu Juguo Tizhi de Yanjiu’ [Research on
the Further Perfection of Juguo Tizhi of Elite Sports of China].
52. He, ‘Zhenliang Zai Beijing Shenao Chenggong Baogaohui Shang de Baogao’ [Hezhenliang’s
Report in the Colloquium of Beijing’s Successful Olympic Bid], 1.
53. Ibid.
54. Jintao Hu, ‘Zhongguo Renmin You Nengli Wei Renlei Zuochu Gengda Gongxian’ [The Chinese
People are Capable of Making More Contribution to the Human Race] (Beijing: PRC, 2008), 3,
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-09-29/125116381584.shtml.
55. Juguo Tizhi, often used as a byword for the system of Chinese elite sport, is normally
translated and elaborated as ‘whole-country support for the elite sport system’. However, we
would argue that Juguo Tizhi should also be understood as a framework that administers
and operates Chinese sport affairs as a whole, especially the planned-economy based and
government-controlled-and-governed elite sport system, i.e. Zhuanye sport. Fan, Wu, and
Xiong, ‘Beijing Ambitions’, 215; Tien-chin Tan and Barrie Houlihan, ‘Chinese Olympic Sport
Policy: Managing the Impact of Globalisation’, International Review for the Sociology of Sport
48, no. 2 (2012), 131–52; and Fan Wei, Fan, and Lu, ‘Chinese State Sports Policy’.
56. GAS, ‘Jinyibu Jiaqiang He Gaijin Guojiadui Sixiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo Yijian’ [Opinions on
Further Strengthening and Improving the Ideological Education of National Teams], (Beijing:
2006), 1.
57. Ma, ‘Lun Zhongguo de Aolinpike Zhengce’ [Discussion on the Olympic Policy of China].
58. Hu, ‘Hu Jintao’s Speech at the Awards Ceremony for the 2008 Olympics and the Paralympics’.
 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT   1447

59. Hua Li, ‘60 Nian Fenji, 60 Nian Rongyao – Xinzhongguo Youyong Shiye de Fanzhan Yu
Chengjiu’ [60 Years of Development, 60 Years of Glory, the Development and Achievement
of the Diving of the New China], in GAS (ed.), 60 Years of New China’s Sport, 1st ed. (Beijing,
PRC: People’s Press, 2009), 242.
60. Peng Liu, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2009 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi
Shang de Jianghua’ [The Speech of Sport Minister Peng Liu for 2009 All States Sports Minister
Conference] (Beijing, 2009), 1.
61. Tong Qian and Zhi Chen, ‘Xi Jinping Qinqie Kanwang Suoqi Dongaohui Zhongguo Daibiaotuan’ [Xi
Jinping Visits the Chinese Delegation for the Sochi Winter Games] (Beijing: Xinhua News, 2014), 1,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-02/07/c_119234468.htm.
62. Qiangan Wang, ‘The Origin of the Words “China Dream”’, Contemporary China History Studies
20, no. 6, 110–7; Wang, ‘The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context’, Journal of Chinese Political
Science 19, no. 1 (2014), 1–13; and The Centre for Studies and Researches of the Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics, ‘Shenke Bawo Zhongguomeng de Fengfu Neihan He Tezhi’ [Profoundly
Comprehending the Rich Content and Charactersitics of ‘China Dream’], People’s Daily,
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0606/c40531-25111271.html (accessed 2 August 2015).
63. Hu, ‘Hu Jintao’s Speech at the Awards Ceremony for the 2008 Olympics and the Paralympics’.
The notion of a ‘Sport Power’, representing the future target of Chinese elite sport, is combined
by Hu with the term ‘Sport Giant’ in his speech, which refers to the status of China after the
Beijing Games. These two terms are also translated as ‘Strong Sporting Nation’ and ‘Major
Sports Nation’. Research Group of the Studies on Theory and Practice of Stepping from a
Major Sports Nation to a Strong Sporting Nation (eds), Strategic Research on Strong Sporting
Nation, 1st ed. (Beijing: Renmin Tiyu Chubanshe [People’ Sport Press], 2010).
64. Liu, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2009 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi
Shang de Jianghua’ [The Speech of Sport Minister Peng Liu for 2009 All States Sports Minister
Conference]; GAS, The Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic Glory 2011–2020 (Beijing, 2010),
http://www.sport.gov.cn/n16/n1152/n2448/1917247.html; Peng Liu, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju
Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2010 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi Shang de Jianghua’ [The
Speech of Sport Minister Peng Liu for the 2010 All States Sports Minister Conference] (Beijing,
2010); Jianjun Guo, ‘Weiguo Zhengguang Zhuzaohuihuang – Xin Zhongguo Jingjitiyu 60
Nian’ [60 Years of Chinese Elite Sport], in GAS (ed.), 60 Years of New China’s Sport (Beijing:
People’s Press, 2009); and Research Group of the Studies on Theory and Practice of stepping
from a Major Sports Nation to a Strong Sporting Nation (ed.), Strategic Research on Strong
Sporting Nation, 1.
65. GAS, ‘The Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic Glory 2011–2020’.
66. Li Li, Peng Gao, and Haoming Wang, ‘Zhuanjia Jiedu Xijinping Suoqi Dongao Jianghua’,
Xinhua News, 10 February 2014, http://sports.qq.com/a/20140210/017339.htm.
67. SPCSC, ‘The Summary of the Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic Glory 1994–2000’, 1.
68. GAS, The Summary of the Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic Glory 2001–2010 (Beijing, 2002), 1,
http://tyj.xinjiang.gov.cn/zcfg/2012/33947.htm.
69. GAS, ‘The Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic Glory 2011–2020’.
70. Research Group of the Studies on Theory and Practice of Stepping from a Major Sports Nation
to a Strong Sporting Nation (ed.), Strategic Research on Strong Sporting Nation.
71. Lijun Hu, ‘The Strategic Research of Elite Sports in Strong Sporting Nation’, in Research Group
for the Theory and Practice of Stepping from Major Sporting Nation to Strong Sporting Nation
(ed.), Strategic Research on Strong Sporting Nation (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 2010), 45.
72. SPCSC, Guoajia Tiwei Guanyu Shenhua Tiyu Gaige de Yijian [The SPCSC’s Opinion
on Deepening the Reform of Sport System] (Beijing, 1993), http://china.findlaw.cn/
fagui/p_9/97826.html; SPCSC, The Summary of the Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic
Glory 1994–2000; GAS, The Summary of the Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic Glory
2001–2010; and GAS, The Summary of the Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic Glory
2011–2020.
73. Research Group of the Studies on Theory and Practice of Stepping from a Major Sports Nation
to a Strong Sporting Nation (ed.), Strategic Research on Strong Sporting Nation.
1448   R. X. HU AND I. HENRY

74. Liu, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2009 Nian Quanguo Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi
Shang de Jianghua’ [The Speech of Sport Minister Peng Liu for 2009 All States Sports Minister
Conference]; and Peng Liu, ‘Guojia Tiyu Zongju Juzhang Liu Peng Zai 2013 Nian Quanguo
Tiyu Juzhang Huiyi Shang de Jianghua’ [The Speech of Sport Minister Peng Liu for 2013
All States Sports Minister Conference], http://sports.people.com.cn/n/2013/1224/c22176-
23935760.html.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on Contributors
Richard Xiaoqian Hu is an assistant lecturer in the Division of Sport Science and Physical Education
of Tsinghua University. His research interests embrace areas relating to sport and leisure policies,
governance and Olympic studies. He graduated from Tsinghua University in 2004 with a BA in
Journalism and Communication before completing an MSc in Sport Management (2010) and a PhD
(2015) both at Loughborough University. Before studying in the UK, he worked for the Xinhua News
Agency as a sports journalist from 2004 to 2009.
Ian Henry is a professor of Leisure Management and Policy and Director of the Centre for Olympic
Studies and Research in the School of Sport and Exercise Sciences. His principal research interests are
focused in issues relating to sport and leisure policies, politics, and governance at the transnational,
national, urban and regional levels, and in relation to Olympism and Olympic policy.