SUBMITTED TO: Sir Aqal wazir

SUBMITTED BY: Anam Naseer

Introduction:
It is a fact that consequent to the overt nuclearization of India, Pakistan had no choice but to
follow to redress the strategic balance on which peace and security in South Asia depends. It is
also an indisputable fact that Pakistan’s nuclear capability, assisted by the conventional
capability, has been the main factor for limiting crises with India from spiraling to unwanted
levels. A key example was that the Indian coercive arms buildup on Pak-India borders in 2000-
2001 neither achieved its aims, nor led to an outbreak of all-out war.
At the same time, the very possession of nuclear weapons carries with it an overriding national
and international responsibility that these weapons, assets, materials, and technologies on which
they are based, are under strong and failsafe custodial and operational control, that their purpose
is meant to deter and that they would only be used in an ‘in extremis’ necessity. In essence, every
nuclear state has to credibly demonstrate and project that it is ‘a responsible nuclear state.’
On this particular premise, Pakistan’s nuclear program has been the focus of discussion in
national and international media, think tanks, and officials of global powers. More often than not,
foreign state and non-state organizations and agencies raise certain questions and concerns, in
one way or another, over the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, fissile material, and
technological knowledge, as well as Pakistan’s role in the international fora, such as Conference
on Disarmament (CD). Similarly, Pakistani media, analysts and officials also raise their voices
over the differential treatment of some powerful capitals vis-à-vis India.
In this context, it is important to track down the global and domestic concerns, analyze those
concerns in the backdrop of Pakistan’s institutional and legislative structure of forfeiting its
nuclear assets, and examine Pakistan’s concerns over the conduct of international community
towards its nuclear program vis-à-vis India, and evaluate Pakistan’s position and role in the CD
in comparison with the role and position of other powers over the years. This analytical exposé
would be helpful in understanding whether the concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear program hold
substantial grounds, whether the international community really needs to pay heed to the
ominous scenarios coming out in international media every now and then, or whether Pakistan is
genuinely a victim of global politics and world powers as Pakistani analysts and officials believe.
Global Concerns
An important global concern about nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities in general revolves
around the potential threat of nuclear terrorism. The extent of such a threat, its use to enforce
controls—both national and plurilateral—and also as a pressure point may be debated. However,
the concern is real and has to be appreciated and met.
The IAEA in the context of potential nuclear terrorism has highlighted four key areas:
• Theft of a nuclear weapon
• Theft of material to make an improvised nuclear explosive device
• Theft of other radioactive material for an RDD
• Sabotage of a facility or transport
In the context of Pakistan, there have been concerns regarding the nuclear security of Pakistan in
general, based on a number of assumptions. The perceived threats to Pakistan’s nuclear assets,
which have been highlighted by the western media and academics, revolve around four main
scenarios.
1. Extremist government in Power
2. Radicals’ take over
3. Terrorist attacks on nuclear installations
4. The insider dimension
The scenarios of an extremist government gaining power in Pakistan, or of a takeover by radical
elements, were mainly projected as the gravest threat to global security in international media
before the elections of 2008 in Pakistan. Furthermore, terrorist attacks and incidents within
Pakistan, coupled with extremist movements and tendencies, have continuously been used as
grounds for portraying the vulnerability of nuclear assets in Pakistan’s hands.
Besides the issue of security and safety of nuclear assets, concerns have also been shown
regarding the proliferation of nuclear material, technology and knowledge of nuclear weapons
development. The country was particularly slandered in the aftermath of the discovery of an
underground nuclear proliferation network, which was, in fact, incorrectly labeled after the
architect of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
Pakistan has also been projected as the only country that is halting the progress on Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which, whether true
or not, is deemed essential for ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
On the face of it, all these concerns and projections could seem genuine if one accepts the
questionable presumption that Pakistan, being a developing country and beset by incessant
incidents of terrorism and extremism, might not have the capability to put up a credible
command and control system, or the aptitude to understand the importance of nuclear free world,
or the resources to build credible deterrence against a fast growing adversary. Considering these
global concerns, it is extremely important to delve deeper into the matter and bring the realities
of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, its structure, and command and control system into the
limelight.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security System
An examination of the evolution of nuclear safety and security system in Pakistan shows that the
country is not standing still on what it has achieved in the field of safeguarding its assets and
capabilities. There is a constant process of reviewing all aspects of controls with a view of
improving them continually.
Institutional Framework: Pakistan has put in place a comprehensive institutional framework with
the National Command Authority (NCA) at the apex for policy formulation, employment and
development of strategic systems. The Prime Minister is the Chairman while the Strategic Plans
Directorate (SPD) is the Secretariat to the NCA. This structure makes it clear that the final
authority on the use of nuclear weapons rests with the civilian chief executive and that any such
decision would require detailed consideration in the NCA set up for this purpose.
The Security Division of SPD has also been significantly expanded since its inception, to
maintain a close watch on all aspects and organizations of the nuclear program, with a special
security emphasis on sites, activities, material management, material inventory, personnel
reliability and counter intelligence. It also controls a significant armed security force—a
specialized armed force—which has only recently been further augmented for physical security.
There is also a training academy to impart specialized training and skills.
Then there are the Services Strategic Forces of all the three Armed Forces of the Army, Navy
and Air Force. While technical, training & administrative control rests with the respective
services, operational control is vested in the NCA.
There are two Committees: the Employment Control Committee and the Development Control
Committee. The former, with the Foreign Minister as its Deputy Chairman, includes Minister for
Defense, Minister for Interior, Minister for Finance, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee
(JCSC), Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) and Chief of Air Staff (CAS)
as its members. Others, if required, can attend by invitation. Its Secretary is the Director General
of the SPD. Chairman JCSC is also the Deputy Chairman of the latter, and the COAS, the CNS,
the CAS, and the Scientists who head the Strategic Organizations are its members. DG SPD is
the Secretary of this Committee as well.
Legislative Framework: There is also now the NCA Act which replaces the former NCA
Ordinance, thereby continuing to give legislative cover to the administrative and executive order
which set up the NCA in 2000, which in turn formalized at that time the structure put in place in
1998. The purpose of this legislation is to give cover to the NCA for complete command and
control over research, development, production and use of nuclear and space technologies and
other related applications in various fields, and to provide for the safety and security of all
personnel, facilities, information, installations or organizations and other activities or matters
connected therewith or ancillary thereto.
In effect, the Act entrusting upon the NCA with three major areas of responsibility; (i) effective
command and control of the strategic programs (ii) safety and security of strategic programs and
(iii) maintenance of a system of personnel reliability. The Act has a very wide scope extending to
the whole of Pakistan and applies to any person who commits an offence under the Ordinance.
The application of the Ordinance is, therefore, not limited to the employees of the strategic
organization only. It empowers the NCA to bring charges against any citizen of Pakistan as well
as foreign nationals.
Initiatives for WMD Non-Proliferation: In the process of improving and institutionalizing the
export control system, which was built on a number of longstanding ordinances, rules and
practices, there have been frequent interaction with friendly countries to learn and to benefit
from best practices elsewhere in export controls against WMD proliferation.
Under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, national export controls against WMD
proliferation are enjoined and reports have to be submitted. These were being studied for
implementation much before the 1540 process in which Pakistan actively participated being a
member of the Security Council when the resolution was negotiated and adopted. The second
required national report from Pakistan had an extensive matrix requiring detailed information.
Pakistan’s response to this matrix, in its second report, may be said to be a model in this respect.
The Government of Pakistan, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Missions abroad, in
interactions within the UN, in the IAEA, bilaterally, in academic conferences, and with the
media, has constantly projected a strong national commitment against proliferation of WMD,
through command, control and custodial systems, export controls, and the institutional basis on
which they rest. The SPD has also given briefings in this regard.
There are a variety of legislations which deal with the safety, security and export control in the
strategic field, and these have been legislatively brought under the overarching centralized
control of the NCA.
Pakistan claims its export controls being amongst the best in the world. The export controls legal
framework is governed by the following legal and administrative instruments:
I. The Import and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 Act No. XXXIX of 1950: This Act authorizes the
Federal Government to prohibit, restrict or control the import or export of goods and regulate all
practices and procedures connected therewith. Section 5(1) of the Act provides for penalty of an
individual, without prejudice to any confiscation to which he may be liable under the provisions
of the Customs Act 1969-(IV 0f 1969), as applied by sub-section (3) of this Act, as punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or both.
II. Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance of 1984 and
Regulation of 1990 which contains provisions for control of import/export of nuclear substances
and radioactive materials, extending to the whole of Pakistan, has been further strengthened with
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2001.
III. Pakistan’s Trade Policy 2004-05: This encompasses Import Policy Order and Export Policy
Order to regulate trade on all items. These orders take into account all previous Statutory
Regulation Orders (SROs) and Ordinances issued by the Government of Pakistan from time to
time and regulate import and export of sensitive materials.
IV. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance 2000, Ordinance No. LIV of
2000: This law enables the full implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and fulfills Pakistan’s obligations under Article VII of the
Convention mandating national implementing measures. This legislative framework regulates
and controls the import and export of chemicals in accordance with the CWC and provides for
criminal penalties in case of violations. Para 12 of the EPO 2000 pertains to export control of
chemicals as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The National Authority
established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the focal point for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of the Ordinance. These measures constitute fulfillment of the
requirements of UNSC Resolution 1540 in the context of CWC.
V. Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance (PNRA), 2001, Ordinance No. III of 2001:
Under this Ordinance, PNRA issues the required ‘no objection certificate’ (NOC) for all imports
and exports of any radioactive materials or radiation sources. The PNRA is responsible for
controlling, regulating and supervising all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation
protection measures in Pakistan. Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of sections
19, 20, 21, 22 or 23 of the Ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to 7 years, or with a fine which may extend to one million rupees, or both.
Notification SRO III (1) 2004 as amended on 16 February 2004; Nuclear Substances,
Radioactive Materials and any other substance or item covered by PNRA Ordinance, 2001 (III 0f
2001); and Equipment used for production, use, or application of nuclear energy or activity,
including generation of electricity and spares, are subject to NOC from PNRA as per procedure
notified by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA).
In September 2004, new legislation namely, Act No. V of 2004, was enacted to provide export
control on goods, technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological
weapons and their delivery systems. The Act entered into force on September23, 2004.
Salient elements of the new Export Control Act include:
- Controls over export, re-export, transshipment and transit of goods, technologies, material and
equipment covered. Prohibition of diversion of controlled goods and technologies.
- Wide jurisdiction (also includes Pakistanis visiting or working abroad).
- Provides for an authority to administer rules and regulations framed under this legislation. Also
provides for the establishment of an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of this
legislation.
- Comprehensive control lists and catch all provisions.
- Licensing and record keeping provisions.
- Penal provisions: Up to 14 years imprisonment and Rs.5 million fine or both, and on
conviction, offender’s property and assets, wherever they may be, shall be forfeited by the
Federal Government. Right of appeal provided for.
• For the purposes of the Export Control Act, the authority rests with the Federal Government
and the Federal Government, as and when necessary, may -
a) make such rules and regulations as are necessary for implementation of this Act;
b) delegate authority to administer all activities under this Act to such Ministries, Division,
Departments and Agencies as it may deem appropriate;
c) establish a government Authority to administer export controls established under this Act;
d) designate the agency or agencies authorized to enforce this Act;
e) establish an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of this Act; and
f) require licenses for exports from Pakistan of goods and technology, and the re-export of goods
and technology that originated in Pakistan.
• Moreover, officials of the designated agency or agencies are authorized to inspect
consignments declared for export and review, acquire or confiscate records or withholding an
export license under this Act. The Federal Government may vest any investigatory powers and
powers of arrest authorized by law in officials of the customs administration or other appropriate
agencies.
It should also be noted that the Act provides for catch-all controls, and covers intangible
transfers. Section 5(3): An exporter is under legal obligation to notify to the competent authority
if the exporter is aware or suspects that the goods or technology are intended, in their entirety or
in part, for use in connection with nuclear or biological weapons or missiles capable of
delivering such weapons.
Under the Act, the definition of ‘technology’ includes: on-the-job training, expert advice and
services attached therewith. The definition of ‘services’ includes: ‘training and technical
assistance including intangible transfer such as disclosure of technical data relating to the
purposes of the Act’.
Under this Act in October 2005, under a Statutory Notification, the GoP notified comprehensive
control lists of goods, technologies, material and equipment. These fully cover the control lists of
the NSG, MTCR and the Australia Group, which are the world class gold standard in this
respect.
Under the Act in 2007, the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) was set up in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the authority to implement the 2004 Act. SECDIV is staffed by
officials from various departments and Ministries dealing with all aspects of this important task.
SECDIV includes officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Strategic Plans Division,
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC),
Ministry of Commerce, and Pakistan Customs and Customs Intelligence.
An Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of the Export Control on Goods,
Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their
Delivery Systems Act No. V of 2004, and also the setting up and functioning of SECDIV, has
also been set up in 2007. It has 11 members, 10 of whom are government officials in their ex-
officio capacity. It is headed by the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Director
General SECDIV is a member and acts as the Secretary to the Oversight Board. The other
Members of the Board are the Additional Secretary (UN&EC) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Additional Secretary (CS&M), Cabinet Division, Additional Secretary (III), Ministry of
Defense, Additional Secretary (I), Ministry of Interior, Member Exports, Central Board of
Revenue, Director General Security Division, National Command Authority(NCA), Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Executive Member,
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority(PNRA), and a Pakistani Expert, with experience in
export controls, serving in an honorary capacity.
Terrorist or Terrorism Threat: The holding of free and fair elections, in which the previous
government was voted out of power, and replaced by major political parties at the federal and
provincial level should take care of the apprehension that Pakistan’s nuclear assets may fall into
the hands of radical elements.
The analysis of the command and control, custodial and export control systems shows that it is,
indeed, second to none in the world. It is also not fully appreciated that unlike some of the other
nuclear states, apart from technical controls and safeguards, despite being a developing country
and perhaps for that reason, Pakistan can and does afford maximizing specialized personnel and
troops dedicated for safeguarding its assets against internal and external threats.
Therefore, the threat of any terrorist attack on nuclear facilities to try to seize any of the assets or
fissile material, in reality, does not exist. Multiple physical and personnel reliability systems, as
well as inventory controls and checks, rule out any insider-outsider threats.
Pakistan has also interacted with other countries, including Japan, UK, US and the EU. While it
is true that Pakistan does not need a security clearance from any quarter, it is prudent to meet
international concerns, and this is the policy of every nuclear state. It is for this reason that when
media hype was at its high water mark, those foreign officials and academics who were best
informed, including for that matter the official spokesman of the U.S government, expressed full
confidence on the safety and security of our nuclear assets.
As political stability increases, and terrorism and extremism are brought under control, such
apprehensions and projections will abate. At the same time, Pakistan also needs to recognize that
strengthening the democratic process and the attainment of long-term political stability are vital
elements for its credibility as a responsible nuclear state.

International concern
Since its 1998 nuclear tests, there has been grave international concern about the possibility of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons or technology falling into the hands of extremists, either through
infiltration, lax security procedures, or the fall of the current military or a subsequent democratic
government.