MODULE 4

GE 8: ETHICS
COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES
Virtues play a big role in our formation as moral beings. Most people act in a manner consonant
to the virtues they are instilled with. Therefore, it is only fitting the one should examine carefully the
virtues he practices day to day. Further, we Filipinos are known to be a people filled with warm and
welcoming attitude. Filipinos are always easy to get along with because of the morality they have gotten
used to. This module seeks to emphasize the importance of building virtues and expressing them
habitually particularly those peculiar to our Filipino culture and tradition.
CONTENTS OF THE MODULE
This module contains the following lessons:
Lesson 1: Virtue Theories and Filipino Morality
Lesson 2: Applied Ethics

DIRECTIONS ON HOW TO USE THE MODULE PROPERLY

In order to benefit profoundly from this module, please be guided by all the key points presented below.
This module contains two (2) lessons. Each lesson is explained substantially. Read the
explanations thoroughly so that you could understand the lesson fully.
1. On the first page of the lesson, you will find the specific learning outcomes (SLOs) of each
lesson. SLOs are knowledge and skills you are expected to acquire at the end of the lesson.
Read them heartily.
2. You must answer the Learning Activities/Exercises (LAEs). The LAEs are designed to help
you acquire the SLOs.
3. Feel free to chat, call, text or send an email message to me if you have questions, reactions, or
reflections about the contents or activities in the module.
4. The Practice Task/Assessment and the Assignment shall be checked by me.

Motivation
Reflecting on your life today, do you think Filipinos retained their traditional virtues?
LESSON 1 – Virtue Theories
Specific Learning Outcomes
At the end of the lesson, you must be able to:
1. Appreciate the importance of performing one’s duties in living an ethical life.
2. Apply the relevance of Aristotle’s virtue theories to your life.
3. Embody a strong pursuit for excellence and “will to power” in any endeavor.
DISCUSSION
1.1 INTRODUCTION

From the ancient period of philosophy to the Enlightenment, virtue ethics stood as the dominant
and unrivaled ethical theory of the age. The theory was founded and advanced by some of the greatest and
most influential minds of history. In the West, it was developed by Plato and Aristotle. In the East, it can
be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. That it has been upheld by such diverse thinkers in
geographically isolated regions is a testament to its moral insight. After all, there is something distinctly
intuitive and human about its emphasis on good character over and above mere actions. Virtue ethics
remained the unrivaled theory until it was briefly eclipsed in the 19th century by utilitarianism and
deontology. Nevertheless, both theories still saw the importance of virtue ethics and reinterpreted it under
their system. Kant wrote about it in the Doctrine of Virtue and Mill wrote about it in Utilitarianism.
1.1.1 Virtue

A virtue is an excellent trait of character or a behavior showing high moral standards. It is a

disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that goes all the way down—to notice, expect,
value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a
certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the
wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person
cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. If such
actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear
being caught out, rather than through recognizing that to do otherwise is dishonest as a more relevant
reason, then they are not actions of an authentic honest person. A virtuous person always transcends and
see what negatives comes out from not practicing a virtue and thus is convinced to do what is virtuous.
Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or
perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal. Most people
who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be
described as dishonest, self-centered and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do
not act for the reasons one would expect. Therefore, someone honest or kind in most situations, and
notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be
disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent. To say it plainly,
no one can actually perfectly achieve a state of completeness in virtue.
1.1.2 Practical Reason

Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis—moral
or practical wisdom. The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a
virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels as she should. These
are commonly accepted truisms. Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through
reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses.
First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its
consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act.
1.2 ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS

Aristotle, a Greek philosopher, was the originator of the virtue approach to ethics and one of the
greatest intellectual figures of western history. Aristotle was the student of Plato at the Academy and the
teacher of Alexander the Great. Even today, his approach to virtue ethics (or positive character traits) has
a profound influence on modern virtue ethicists and scholars in all health and social care professions
across the globe. Roughly speaking, Aristotle’s virtue ethics distinguishes itself from other virtue ethics
theories for the following six specific reasons:
(1) The focus in virtue ethics is on the person and his/her character traits, not on a particular
decision or principle;
(2) Virtues are good habits and are learned by practicing;
(3) Appropriate virtues are discovered by witnessing and imitating behavior;
(4) To become virtuous, one must see others practicing good habits;
(5) Virtues should be examined within a ‘community’ setting;
(6) Aspirations are key motivators in virtue ethics.
Aristotle’s virtue ethics remains one of the most influential virtue ethics theories in western moral
philosophy as mentioned above. Aristotle was the first to look at virtues as part of human nature and take
a scientific approach to explore and better understand their role in the people’s personal and social well-
being. He was influenced by Socrates and Plato’s ideas on virtues and followed them in taking virtues to
be central to a life well-lived. But he was the first to put the conception of virtue ethics into the socio-
political context from the viewpoint that human experience is a holistic process
1.2.1 Eudaimonistic

According to Aristotle, virtues are good habits of the heart (soul/psyche) and mind (or learned
dispositions) and are essential for developing and maintaining good ethical character and behavior. In
Aristotle’s view, virtues are equivalent to excellence and are socially situated and cultivated. For
Aristotle, virtues are also the most important habits for people looking to achieve eudaimonia. The
concept of eudaimonia, which is central to Aristotelian philosophy, is often translated into English as
happiness. But in the literature of ethics, it is also known as ‘human flourishing,’ ‘wellbeing,’ or ‘good
life,’ though all these terms do not accurately describe its content; the concept in all its subtleties and
nuances is difficult to capture.
Broadly speaking, the concept of eudaimonia is in correlation with the well-lived life, both
individual (personal) and social, and is considered to be as a holistic concept. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is
the ultimate and objective goal for which all other intermediate goals are pursued; for him, it is an end
(final purpose) of human life rather than a temporary state. If we want to apply Aristotle’s concept of
eudaimonia to today’s social work, we can easily say that the end of social work as a value-based
profession, is to promote and sustain the wellbeing of individuals, families and communities, as well as to
achieve social justice for all. But given that the concept of eudaimonia is not only meant as the final goal
of life (personal or professional), but also as inherent self-development and self-realization, social work
needs to look at this concept both as a process and a goal.
In order to further explain eudaimonia, Aristotle described it as a rational activity of the human
soul, as it is related to the use of reason; reason is the human ability to think rationally about what to do
and make the right decisions. Aristotle, who is the founder of logic and rationality, distinguished between
theoretical and practical reason, though he recognized that both types of reason are vitally important for
cultivating and applying ethical reasoning to the challenges of everyday life. As he pointed out, both
‘right’ desire and ‘right’ reason are basic prerequisites for making good ethical choices. In today’s
complex and fast-changing world, Aristotle’s view on ethical reasoning as virtuous activity is paramount
in the social work profession.
1.3 NIETZSCHE’S VITUE ETHICS

Unlike many other philosophers who wrote about ethics, a great deal of Nietzsche’s actual
writing on morality is not concerned with identifying a fundamental moral principle and showing how to
practice it. Instead he is concerned with both describing morality itself and, once we have a clear
understanding of it, how we should be approaching it. This is not to say he does not make value claims
(of which he makes many), but these are secondary to his describing what morality is and how we should
address it. He states:
“We need a critique of all moral values; the intrinsic worth of these values must, first of
all, be called in question. To this end we need to know the conditions from which those values
have sprung and how they have developed and changed […] The intrinsic worth of these values
was taken for granted as fact of experience and put beyond question […] What if morality should
turn out to be the danger of dangers?”
1.3.1 Custom and Natural Morality

First, he claims that moralizing is a natural occurrence. Just like any other drive, its purpose is to
aid the individual in thriving in his environment. Nietzsche describes the first position while he is making
the continual comparison between humanity’s use of ethics and the animal kingdom’s attempts at security
and survival.
He expressed two important ideas concerning morality. First, early developments of moral
inclinations and virtues are natural (if one takes “animal” to be synonymous with natural) occurrences in
each person. They are a manner of fitting into one’s environment more securely and thriving. These early
moral inclinations then are not simply culturally dependent ideas that are completely derived from one’s
society but natural drives that aid in survival. Second, the Socratic idea of separating man from animal
because of humanity’s reason is an error. Morality is simply a skill humanity has, similar to an animal
using camouflage or any unique survival mechanism, to cope with our environment.
An example will elucidate this early form of morality (hereafter called natural morality for
clarity). When in a society that is frequently at war, values that promote this society’s ability to excel at
war should be valued (courage, honor, self-sacrifice, physical prowess, etc.). However, if that society
becomes peaceful, these values should be eschewed for more helpful values. If the now peaceful nation
requires values to promote healthy trade with their neighbors then a separate set of values is required
(cultural sensitivity, bartering ability, economic intelligence, etc.). This new growth of values allows for
the aggrandizement of certain abilities that ensure the survival of the community. Just as if an animal
discovered a certain hunting technique no longer worked, the animal would need to adapt, stop using the
old technique, and discover a new one to survive.
The second position Nietzsche presents is that of morality from custom (hereafter referred to as
custom morality). It is the non-reflective following of what was natural for one’s predecessors. Nietzsche
is particularly critical of this form of morality. In this form of morality, what was useful for one society
becomes untouchable, unquestionable, holy. This is an inflexible code that stunts the change and
evolution of a society’s morality. This inflexibility is perpetuated by the seriousness that surrounds this
kind of ethic.
Custom morality is not adopted for its usefulness but simply because it commands. Custom
morality is the blind following of tradition simply because it is tradition. Nietzsche claims that the most
moral person in this system of ethics is he who is most willing to sacrifice himself to custom. This idea of
self-sacrifice is the antithesis of natural morality, which is developed and followed for human thriving
rather than being followed for its own sake. While Nietzsche criticizes custom morality because of its
inhibition of change and growth, he also criticizes it for its inhibition of self-reflection and critical
thinking. While those in natural morality may understand morality as a tool for thriving, those of custom
morality did not themselves devise this morality and thus do not understand the origin of this morality.
They simply obey because it commands.
1.3.2 Master-type and Slave-type Morality

It is important to understand that when speaking of master-type and slave-type moralities,

Nietzsche is not referencing individuals as masters and slaves. Rather, he is illustrating moral archetypes.
The master type morality could be thought of as an extension of natural morality, while slave-type is an
elaboration on custom morality.
Noble-type or master-type moralities are robust, energetic, individualistic types that Nietzsche
describes with some amount of admiration. The noble type does what Nietzsche so passionately endorses:
she creates value. She does not ask for the values of others but unabashedly creates her own. She sees
what is harmful or helpful to her goals, and she places value on those qualities that reduce the harmful
and advance the helpful. Here noble morality seems to be a matured form of natural morality. These noble
types glorify those parts of themselves that allow them to excel, and this is where they find value. This
attitude toward morality allows for a constantly evolving morality for each individual, just like natural
morality.
Converse to this group are the slave-types. They reject the master-type’s morality, Nietzsche
argues, because they are not strong enough to embody the values that make the master-types thrive.
However, they creatively persuade themselves that the master-types are not as joyous as they seem, so
that they may ameliorate their own feelings of jealousy. The slave-types do not simply reject the master-
type’s morality but substitute it with their own. Slave morality, instead of enhancing life and driving its
adherents to higher goals, acts as a kind of palliative treatment to life; never advancing it but at least
easing its pain. The slave-type is focused on the diminishing of suffering and the promotion of pleasure; it
is a calculated morality of utility.
Opposite of this, the master-types are not seeking ease, nor are they calculative in their
moralizing. This is also where master morality separates itself from natural morality. While natural
morality calculates advantage and disadvantage, master morality is less an attempt at gaining anything
and more an aggrandizement of the natural overflow of each master-type’s drive. For example, an
advocate of natural morality will see the uses of courage and then promote courage so that he will garner
the fruits of courage. An advocate of master-type morality, though, will act courageously, because it is a
natural overflow of her drives; she will attach value to acting on this overflow. Master-type moralities are
most dependent upon each individual’s personal drives and the causes of these drives.

2. FILIPINO MORALITY
2.1 Introduction to Filipino Morality
The Filipino value system or Filipino values refers to the set of values that a majority of the
Filipino have historically held important in their lives. This Philippine values system includes their own
unique assemblage of consistent ideologies, moral codes, ethical practices, etiquette and cultural and
personal values that are promoted by their society. As with any society though, the values that an
individual hold sacred can differ on the basis of religion, upbringing and other factors.
Filipino values are, for the most part, centered at maintaining social harmony, motivated
primarily by the desire to be accepted within a group. The main sanction against diverging from these
values are the concepts of "Hiya", roughly translated as 'a sense of shame', and "Amor propio" or 'self-
esteem'. Social approval, acceptance by a group, and belonging to a group are major concerns. Caring
about what others will think, say or do, are strong influences on social behavior among Filipinos.
2.1.1 Discovery of Filipino Values
The scholarly interest on Filipino values can be traced to Frank Lynch’s famous article “Social
Acceptance” of 1961. Lynch was an American Jesuit anthropologist who worked at the Ateneo De
Manila University. He was one of the directors of the research for the Area Handbook on the Philippines,
and he also founded the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC) at Ateneo in 1960. The article “Social
Acceptance” was the first article of the book Four Readings on Philippine Values, which went through no
less than four editions, the last one in 1973. This work was instrumental in establishing the field of
research on Filipino values.
2.2 Filipino Virtues
 The values of Filipinos specifically upholds the following items: solidarity of the family unit,
security of the Philippine economy, orientation to small-groups, personalism, the concepts of "loob" or
"kalooban" (meaning "what’s inside the self", the "inner-self", or the "actual personal feelings of the
self"), existence and maintenance of smooth interpersonal relationships, and the sensing of the feelings or
needs of others (known as pakikiramdam).
Loób (pronounced as two syllables with short o’s, lo-ob.) – This word is literally
translated into English as “inside.” It is used to describe the inside of physical objects such as a
house or a pot. However, when used for a person, it talks about the person’s “holistic and
relational will,” i.e. his will towards others. This concept is fundamental because the Filipino
virtues are mostly compound words which say something about the kind of loób that a person
has.
Kapwa – This word is literally translated into English as “other” or “other person” but in
a way it is untranslatable into English. This is because it is embedded in an entirely different
worldview and web of meanings unique to Philippine culture and history—namely, a Southeast
Asian tribal and animist tradition mixed with a Spanish Catholic tradition. It is tribal and Catholic
at the same time. Kapwa therefore has been variously translated by local scholars as “shared
self,” “shared identity,” or “self-in-the-other,” but these translations require much qualification.
2.2.1 Kagandahang-loob
Kagandahang-loób is literally translated as “beauty-of-will.” “Beauty” here should not mean an
aesthetic kind of beauty but rather a moral beauty in how one treats the kapwa. It is practically
synonymous with another Filipino term kabutihang-loób or “goodness-of-will.” For the sake of simplicity
kagandahang-loób will be used to account for kabutihang-loób. This is perhaps the single most important
virtue in Filipino virtue ethics since this is where everything begins. The “kabutihang-loob and
kagandahang-loob may be considered as the root paradigms of the culture. They express our deepest and
most basic assumptions about social coexistence.”
Kagandahang-loób at first might seem just like any act of kindness or altruism. But it is not just
any kind of altruism but one with groundings in a tribal and familial context. I suggest that the main
source and inspiration of kagandahang-loób within the family is the mother’s love for her child. The
mother loves and protects her child for no other reason except that he or she is her child.
Kagandahang-loób is most manifest when other people are in a situation of grave weakness or
need. Disasters, terminal illness, or extreme poverty provoke the showing of kagandahang-loób. The
situation is analogous to newborn children who are also in desperate need. Of course, even when they
become adults and less dependent on their mother, they are still the recipient of generous acts of love and
kindness though no longer as a matter of life and death. And so kagandahang-loób manifests itself in
various other minor gifts and services, like “the act of lending utensils to neighbors or graciously
accommodating a guest.”
2.2.2 Utang-na-loób
Kagandahang-loób and utang-na-loób constitute the central dynamic or “beating heart” of
Filipino virtue ethics. Utang means “debt,” and utang-na-loób means a “debt of will.” In the early days of
research on Filipino “values,” utang-na-loób received the most attention from American scholars
particularly because of how different it was from the usual understanding of “debt.” The experience of
kagandahang-loób inspires the corresponding motion utangna-loób. I call this the “central dynamic” or
the “beating heart” of Filipino virtue ethics because the cycle of kagandahang-loób and utang-na-loób
strengthens and affirms the kapwa relationship more than anything else. The mechanism most obviously
related to kagandahang-loob is utang na loob… One who is truly magandang-loob deserves utang na
loob.
Consider this scenario: I lack money to pay my tuition for a semester in college. A friend hears
about my situation and insists that he lend me money rather than I postpone my studies. I gratefully
accept his offer. After several semesters I save enough money and repay him. However, I do not consider
my utang-na-loób to be fulfilled, since the money itself is not the utang-na-loób. Rather I am eagerly
disposed to help him should any opportunity arise. Years later, as professionals, it does arrive. He loses
his job and cannot find another one to support his big family. Being a manager in my own company I go
the extra mile to secure him a good position while ‘pulling some strings’ along the way. He ends up with
a better job than the one he lost. My utang-na-loób has translated into a significant kagandahang-loób for
him, such that now—given the gravity of his predicament—the tables have turned and he is the one with
an utang-na-loób towards me.
2.2.3 Lakas-ng-loob
 Lakas-ng-loób is literally “strength of will” and corresponds to the cardinal virtue of courage or
fortitude. But to say that it is simply “courage” may be misleading. The tribal tradition considered
courage primarily in the form of the tribal warrior hero, such as those found in the epics. The epics depict
a heroic age similar to the time of Homer in such a heroic age “courage [was] important, not simply as a
quality of individuals, but as the quality necessary to sustain a household and a community.” In other
words courage was about the survival of the tribe, or about those exploits which would benefit the tribe
and the community as a whole.
This tribal form of courage was eventually transformed by the Pasyon (Passion of Christ) play,
which one could argue became the new epic for the Tagalogs during the Spanish period. In a population
with very low literacy this play was a tremendous influence, and in fact the Pasyon was what molded the
sentiments of the masses who joined the Philippine revolution (in contrast with the ilustrado or
“enlightened” class who studied in Europe) (Ileto 1979). The suffering Christ became the new tribal hero.
But instead of killing and pillaging he won through suffering and self-sacrifice. Nevertheless, it was a
sacrifice for the collective, this time represented by Mother Country (Inang Bayan). This formed the
unique criteria for the bayani or “hero”: the mixture between a tribal warrior and the suffering Christ. His
courage must be both collective and sacrificial.

LESSON 2 – Applied Ethics

Specific Learning Outcomes
At the end of the lesson, you must be able to:
1. Enumerate different socio-ethical issues at the forefront of the world today.
2. Apply ethical frameworks in assessing the morality of current ethical issues.
3. Possess an increased awareness of the ethical issues relevant to date.
DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION

One way of categorizing the field of ethics (as a study of morality) is by distinguishing between
its three branches, one of them being applied ethics. By contrasting applied ethics with the other branches,
one can get a better understanding what exactly applied ethics is about. The three branches
are metaethics, normative ethics (sometimes referred to as ethical theory), and applied ethics. Metaethics
deals with whether morality exists. Normative ethics, usually assuming an affirmative answer to the
existence question, deals with the reasoned construction of moral principles, and at its highest level,
determines what the fundamental principle of morality is. Applied ethics, also usually assuming an
affirmative answer to the existence question, addresses the moral permissibility of specific actions and
practices. Applied ethics, unlike the other two branches, deals with questions that started this article – for
example, under what conditions is an abortion morally permissible?  And, what obligations, if any, do we
have toward the world’s global poor?
1.1 Euthanasia

There is an old adage that only two things in life are certain — death and taxes. While the
morality of the latter would be an interesting topic itself, it is the morality of an issue connected to the
former that draws the focus of this chapter. Specifically, we consider the ethical issues surrounding
euthanasia (sometimes labelled as “mercy killing”). The etymology of euthanasia helps to reveal the
meaning of the term. Like most upstanding and respectable philosophical terms, euthanasia has its roots
in Ancient Greek language; it is based on a combination of the terms eu meaning “well” and thanatos
meaning “death”. Euthanasia is thus the act of seeking to provide a good death for a person who
otherwise might be faced with a much more unpleasant death — hence the term “mercy killing”. There
are different ways to categorize the various types of euthanasia and it is critical to be confident and
familiar with these categorizations.
1.1.1 Kinds of Euthanasia

Voluntary Euthanasia- Voluntary euthanasia occurs when a person makes their own choice to
have their life terminated in order to avoid future suffering.
Non-Voluntary Euthanasia- Non-voluntary euthanasia occurs when a decision regarding
premature and merciful death is made by another person, because the individual to be euthanized is
unable to make a decision for themselves. This form of euthanasia is most commonly associated with
young infants or patients in a coma who cannot, due to the nature of their age or condition, make any
decision for themselves. The above offers a differentiation of types of euthanasia in terms of the
person making the decision. In addition, we can differentiate between types of euthanasia based on
the method involved in ending a life.
 Active Euthanasia- If a person is actively euthanized it means that their death was caused by
external intervention rather than natural causes, most likely through a lethal injection or the voluntary
swallowing of a deadly cocktail of drugs.
Passive Euthanasia- Passive euthanasia occurs when a person is allowed to die due to the
deliberate withdrawal of treatment that might keep them alive. Thus, a person who is passively
euthanized is allowed to die via natural causes even though methods to keep them alive might be
available. A person who has a life-support machine switched off, for example, dies via natural causes
but only as a result of a decision to allow natural causes to take effect. Although euthanasia that is
both voluntary and passive is not particularly common, euthanasia could come in any combination of
methods and decisionmakers as laid out. Legality of the forms of euthanasia varies from nation to
nation; Belgium allows for voluntary and active euthanasia, the UK does not.
1.1.2 Cases

Case One: Persistent Vegetative State

A person is in a Persistent Vegetative State (hereafter PVS) when they are biologically able to support
their own continued existence, but they have no meaningful psychological interaction with the world
around them. A patient in a PVS, according to the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, can
neither follow an object with their eyes nor respond to the sounds of voices and will show no discernible
sign of emotion. The vegetative state is defined as persistent when the condition is in place for up to a
year and doctors view no prospect of recovery as plausible. The PVS label may seem crude or upsetting,
but the message about the difference between the physical and the psychological state of the patient is
stark.
When considering the morality of euthanasia for patients in a PVS, it is clear that we should be
considering only non-voluntary euthanasia, due to the fact that such patients are clearly unable to make
any kind of voluntary decision regarding their future interests. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume
there are no relevant letter of intent from such patients, written in case they should lose their faculties,
describing their desires should they fall into such a condition.
Case Two: Incurable and Terminal Illness
Imagine a patient who has been diagnosed with an incurable disease that will ultimately bring about
their death. As the condition progresses over time, the patient knows that their ability to live a normal life
will decrease and that their physical suffering will increase. You can imagine for yourselves the range of
diseases and conditions that may have such unfortunate effects upon a person.
Unlike the patient in a PVS, the patient in this example retains the ability to ask for euthanasia
themselves and so these cases can highlight moral issues surrounding voluntary euthanasia. Again, for
simplicity in our discussion, we do not consider where the line can be drawn regarding patients in fit or
unfit psychological states when it comes to an ability to make a voluntary decision to be euthanized,
although this is also an issue that would reward further moral thought.
1.1.3 Pro-euthanasia Arguments

First. This initial argument can be labelled as the argument from quality of life. According to this
relatively simple idea, sometimes life is actually less preferable than death. On such occasions, when
quality of life is so dreadful that a person would be “better off” dead, then euthanasia would be morally
justifiable.
Deprived of happiness and other capabilities, the life of a patient in a PVS seems to be at best utterly
neutral and at worst negative in respect of quality of life, perhaps depending on any experience of
physical pain. Patients in a PVS are not merely bed-ridden like some who might have suffered severe
strokes or other such afflictions; they are biological entities lacking the distinguishing psychological
qualities of typical human beings. This may go some way to explain why some (but by no means all)
partners and parents of people in PVS’s are willing to favor an end to the patient’s life.
Second. The second argument we can offer in support of euthanasia—both in voluntary and non-
voluntary forms — can be labelled the argument from resource use. Whereas the former argument
attempted to defend the moral acceptability of euthanasia by utilizing the perspective of the patient and
their associated quality of life, this argument may seem a little more detached and you may or may not
view this as a strength or weakness. According to Peter Singer, the non-voluntary euthanizing of a
severely disabled and suffering young infant child (who cannot express any wishes regarding their future)
may be justifiable if the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better
prospects of a happy life, then the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed.
Third. The final argument we will offer in favor of euthanasia is an argument often viewed as the
most powerful in this applied ethical area, the argument from personal autonomy. This argument
proceeds from the fairly plausible assumption that people should have the right to make their own
decisions and should be able to decide the paths of their own lives. If the right to choose our own path
applies in life, then why would this not apply in respect of our choice of how and when to die?
1.1.4 Anti-euthanasia Arguments

First. The first objection to euthanasia may be termed the objection from Sanctity of Life. The
Sanctity of Life ethic is usually founded on religious, and specifically Christian, thinking. Essentially, a
belief that life is sacred suggests an absolute value to life, of a type that means it is worthwhile in all
circumstances; in Glover’s earlier words it is the view that life has an intrinsic value that supersedes any
qualitative aspect. For Sanctity of Life theorists and supporters as described in this section, problems with
the quality of a life never undermine the ultimate value and worth of a life.

Second. A related objection to euthanasia, premised on a commitment to Christianity, is the

objection from valuable suffering (keep in mind that not all Christians, by any stretch, would defend an
objection of this type). The Catholic Declaration of Faith states that “According to Christian teaching,
however, suffering, especially suffering during the last moments of life, has a special place in God’s
saving plan; it is in fact a sharing in Christ’s passion and a union with the redeeming sacrifice which He
offered in obedience to the Father’s will.”
Thus, even if someone requests euthanasia in order to avoid pain, that request should not be granted
because it deprives a person of an element of God’s plan for them; the experience of suffering at the end
of life brings that person closer to sharing in the experience of Christ.
Third. A third anti-euthanasia objection is the objection from modern treatment. This objection
brings together two distinct, but relevantly similar, lines of thought. Firstly, it might be suggested that to
euthanize those who are terminally ill, or those in a PVS, is to kill people earlier than would otherwise
happen and thereby to artificially eliminate their chances of living to experience a cure to their condition.
At the very least, if not a cure, euthanized people are not around to benefit from any step-forward in
treatment that might alleviate their suffering.

1.2 Sexual Ethics

Philosophers since at least Plato have discussed sex as it raises a number of interesting
philosophical questions. Sex is about relationships and interactions between people and consequently it
seems to be a moral issue. Anyone that believes that sex is not a moral issue should ask themselves
whether they think rape or pedophilia is morally wrong. However, when we move past such clear-cut
cases, the issues become more subtle and complex. We considered a number of philosophical theories
which give very different views. The Natural Law Theorist uses the idea of function and goal to ground a
“conservative” view of sex. The Kantian also uses the idea of autonomy and respect for a person to
ground a conservative view of sex, with a splash of pessimism about the unbefitting nature of sexual
desire thrown in for good measure. Utilitarianism and Virtue Theory are less pessimistic and, as with their
views on the other issues we have looked at in this book, more open to see what arises in different
situations.
1.2.1 Sex and Natural Law

If you recall when we discussed Natural Law Theory (NLT), something is good if that thing
fulfils its function. A good knife is one that cuts well, a good guitar is one that plays well, etc. Therefore,
in order to work out what “good” sex is we need to ask what sex is for. What is its function? In answering
this question, we should then be able to work out what is morally acceptable sexual activity.
St. Aquinas and other Natural Law theorists would say that our sexual faculties have one true end
— procreation. True, sex is pleasurable but it is pleasurable in order to fulfil this end. If this is correct
then sexual activity is good if, and only if, it is consistent with procreation and bad in so far as it frustrates
that end. It is important to understand that the outcome is independent of desires, wants, reasons, hopes,
fears etc. and that for the Natural Law Theorist (NLT) it is simply an objective fact whether a sexual act is
wrong or right, something which is not affected by culture, religion, etc. This means that for the NLT
there are objective moral truths regarding how we ought, and ought not, to behave sexually.
We can say then that, for the traditional NLT, premarital sex, masturbation, bestiality,
contraception, homosexual acts, pornography and adultery are all wrong. Premarital sex is wrong because
children would be brought into the world outside the safe confines of marriage. Homosexual acts have no
tendency towards procreation at all; contraception frustrates procreative ends; masturbation and
pornography focus the sexual acts inwards towards oneself, frustrating procreative ends.
1.2.2 Sex and Kantian Ethics

Kant thinks that sex is morally permissible within the context of a heterosexual, lifelong, and
monogamous marriage. Any sexual act outside these contexts — homosexuality, masturbation, adultery,
premarital sex — is morally wrong. His reasons for thinking this are very complex, not least because his
writing on the subject, like just about all of his writing, is incredibly dense, but broadly speaking, his
views on sex are based on his Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: act in such a way that
you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means, but always at the same time as an end.
Kant believes that treating others as whole persons is key to being moral, but for him, this is
precisely what is missing in sexual desires. That is, in sex we are treating others as objects and not
treating them as whole persons and hence we are acting immorally. In the language of his second
formulation of the Categorical Imperative: in having sex we are treating people merely as a means to an
end.
As it stands it looks like any sexual desire or act is going to be morally wrong, but if that is the
case, then that means that for Kant the continued existence of the human race is evidence of immoral
behavior! That is surely wrong. Well, for Kant, the only reason it is not wrong is the role of marriage. In
the context of marriage, and only in marriage, Kant thinks that sex and sexual desire is more than simply
treating another merely as a means to an end. Therefore, we can avoid the charge of objectifying and
using a sexual partner merely as a means to an end because in sex within marriage you are treating each
other as a whole person and thus there is reciprocity. Sex within marriage is about the whole person and
not simply the genitals, sexual desire and pleasure.
1.2.3 Sex and Utilitarianism

As you will recall, Utilitarianism does not rule out an act on the basis of it being a particular act.
This means that if Utilitarianism is correct, we cannot say that any particular sex act is always wrong.
Premarital sex, or homosexual sex, or masturbation, or oral sex can be morally acceptable. The matter is
decided by whether or not performing that act brings about more pleasure overall than not doing so. This
leaves a few questions and qualifications that need to be made.
First, although sex will typically lead to pleasure that does not mean that Utilitarianism is
committed to the claim that the act of having sex is always good. Utilitarianism does leave space for us to
show that rape and pedophilia are morally wrong. For even though the rapist or pedophile might get
pleasure from their act, it does not take much to see that the overall unhappiness, the mental and physical
suffering of the victim, the distress of relatives and loved ones etc. is much greater because the act has
taken place.
Second, just because sex is typically pleasurable it does not mean Utilitarianism is committed to
the claim that we have a duty to have as much sex as possible. For there are things we can do that bring
about more overall happiness. Or we might suppose that having sex all the time might have detrimental
effects on relationships and one’s mental and physical health.
Lastly, Mill gives a different answer to Bentham to questions regarding what we ought to do
when considering various sex acts because of his distinction between higher and lower pleasures. In
general Mill did not value sex and he took the pleasures that arose from it to be fleeting and of lower
value. This is because Mill thought that some pleasures are qualitatively distinct from others and thus
outweigh other, lower, pleasures. Bentham however would not make this distinction. So, if we keep this
distinction in mind, we might be able to distinguish between types of sex acts. Perhaps some sex acts are
lower and some higher than others.

1.3 Business Ethics

The label “business ethics” is relatively new. The customer is now very sensitive to how “ethical”
a business is and thus any signs of moral wrongdoing by a business will lead to a slump in profits. This
leads to a general question whether there is any incentive to be — rather than simply appearing to be —
ethical. For any business, whatever its size, the key feature will be that it sells goods or services for profit.
Ethics arises because relationships exist. That is, if there is a relationship then there is a legitimate
question of how ought we to behave in that relationship.
1.3.1 Business and Shareholders (Employer and Employees)

A business has a relationship with its shareholders — the people who own a share of the
company. However, if the shareholders want to reduce the wages of the workers so they can get a larger
dividend, would they be doing something morally wrong? After all, they might arguably be said in some
sense to “own” the business and can do what they want with it.
Imagine a company abusing their employees for the reason given that they are looking out for the
betterment and profit of the entire company. Remember that for an “act utilitarian,” an act is morally right
if, and only if, it brings about more happiness than any other act, so maybe then, in this case, the company
did not do anything morally wrong.
 Moreover, the act utilitarian has no time for “rights” in general and an “employee’s rights” in
particular. However, we suspect most people would believe that what the company did was morally
wrong and even if it were legal, people would judge that the company ought not to have acted in the way
that it did. That said, perhaps we do not need to draw this conclusion even if we are act utilitarian. This is
because Mill said it would be better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. He thought that there
were “higher” and “lower” pleasures. Only humans can experience higher pleasure, non-human animals
cannot.
Mill argues that pleasure should not just be weighed on the qualitative “hedonic” calculus. If we
introduce higher and lower pleasures, then we can respect the intuition that what the company did was
morally wrong. Mill thought that higher and lower pleasures were qualitatively distinct. If this is true then
we might think that the lower pleasures of, say, a million people having a new tennis racket or owning the
latest trendy trainers, is outweighed by the higher pleasure of the three quarter of a million employees
being treated fairly.

1.3.2 Business and Costumers

A business has a relationship with its customers — the people who are buying the goods and
services. For instance, if a business knowingly reduces the amount of health advice it provides on its
labels in order to increase profits, has it done something morally wrong?
It is clear that businesses can directly affect how a customer thinks about goods or services, the
world around them, and themselves. If they could not then they would not spend millions of pounds on
advertising each year! But given this then they occupy a position of trust. With this trust comes a question
regarding how much information a company should provide to the customer and in what form.
In all instances, a company cannot lie about what they are selling. Looking at Act Utilitarianism
account it is quite hard to say why it would always be wrong to lie. Presumably, for the act utilitarian, it is
not always morally wrong for a business to lie and to exploit the trust of the customer. If, by lying, a
business produces more happiness than by not lying, then it is morally acceptable for the business to lie.
We might not think that we would get the same result for the rule utilitarian. A plausible rule
might be “do not lie in a position of trust where there are reasonable grounds that you’ll be found out”. If
this were justifiable through utilitarian grounds, then it would be unacceptable for businesses to lie to the
customer. Yet, even on the rule utilitarian account it is true that it is sometimes morally acceptable for a
business to lie.
This contrasts with the Kantian approach. If you recall, for the Kantian it is always morally
wrong to lie. It is true in all instances that one ought not to lie. Kant uses the Categorical Imperative to
show this. Let’s have for example a bank business. It would be irrational for the head of a bank to want
the maxim “lie to the customer if it means making a profit” to become a universal law. It is irrational
because if this is a universal law then there would be no trust in businesses at all and therefore there could
be no profit and no businesses. It is self-defeating and irrational. Therefore, it seems that on Kantian
grounds lying is morally wrong.
1.3.3 Business and The Environment

Corporate Social Responsibility is one common parlance amongst businesses to talk about. A
business works with the goal not just of profit but to be in step with the issues of society as a whole.
Typically, though not exhaustively, this amounts to the business being ethically responsible towards the
environment; this might include things such as not testing its cosmetics on animals or reducing the
amount of non-recyclable plastic bags that the company uses.
It is true that the environment is one of the biggest concerns for businesses and is often an area
where they are heavily criticized. This, like many of the other ethical issues, is only a relatively new
phenomenon. In the past, in the name of profit, businesses could do what they wanted regarding the
environment. There was a view that the world is such a massive place that a business polluting a pond, or
mining on a green space did not really, in the grand scheme of things, matter. But the increase in
globalization, the advancement of science, and the fact we live in connected communities has made
people realize that businesses can, and do, affect the environment; climate change and the hole in the
ozone layer are prime examples of this slow realization.
If we are to be utilitarian, well we cannot talk about environmental rights, for there are no rights
and again we might find it hard to show why this was morally wrong if we are utilitarian. We might think
that the gold produced might cause a lot of happiness, not least because it is used in jewelry, computers,
electronics, dentistry, medicine etc. The fish, plants, and other aquatic life do not have a comparably high
level of pleasure or happiness compared to humans so all things being equal it might not be morally
wrong. Of course, as with the other cases this will depend on how we spell out the details of the case but
Utilitarianism does not appear to be as clear-cut as we perhaps might have hoped.
For the Kantians, we only have moral obligations towards rational agents and thus there is no
such thing as a business’s moral obligation towards the environment, as the environment is not a rational
agent. Now this does not mean that Kant believes a business can do whatever it wants towards the
environment. If a business treats the environment as a means to an end (profit) then they are modelling a
certain type of behavior and this behavior could then lead to businesses treating humans as a means to an
end, which is wrong. So, although the exploitation of the environment is not morally wrong for the
Kantian, it legitimizes and hence increases the possibility of exploitation of people.

REFERENCES:
1. Aristotle. (1999) Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. Martin Ostwald, Library of Liberal Arts, Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey.
2. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 2017, Copyright Jonathan Bennet
3. J. Keeping. (2011) “The Thousand Goals and the One Goal: Morality and Will to Power in
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra” European Journal of Philosophy, 20(1): 73-85.
4. Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher, Ethics For A-Level. Cambridge, UK: Open Book
Publishers, 2017, https:// doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0125.
5. Reyes. (2005) Loób And Kapwa: Thomas Aquinas And Filipino Virtue Ethics. Dissertation,
KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy.