[B. M. No. 1036.

 June 10, 2003] the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent. comment on the complaint against him.
DECISION In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to
CARPIO, J.: represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice
The Case Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that
passes the bar examinations. he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same
The Facts date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
Examinations. complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of
(complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Attorneys.
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent
pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave of the government.
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim
counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor.  In this OBCs Report and Recommendation
pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for
Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan). Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his
court or administrative body. moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a
candidate. government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the
lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of MBEC.
The Courts Ruling

1
 We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held
the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
Bar. shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. [3]
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege.  It is
that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust [4] since a lawyer is an officer of
respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him without a license.[5]
before the MBEC and similar bodies. The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,
[6]
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent  a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll
as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his
Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona- True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers
Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. [8] Respondent
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that: Attorneys.[9]
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to
for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.
[11]
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting  Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that
xx Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, no authority to practice law.
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to SO ORDERED.
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and  Azcuna,
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. JJ., concur.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called G.R. No. 154207             April 27, 2007

2
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,  indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally
vs. tenable.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
LAGUILLES, Respondents. petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has
DECISION no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court. RTC.
The antecedents: On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Reconsideration.
Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may assigns the following errors:
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner I.
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having
prosecution of the said criminal case. established the necessity of granting the writ;
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner II.
to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial. 3 PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law III.
Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
Court alone. RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order IV.
against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC. THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE
proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S). 4
an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature
Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5

3
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with
in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A.
appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school. expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides: an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
RULE 138-A Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple
in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar
the legal clinic of the law school. Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for a private prosecutor is not possible.
and in behalf of the legal clinic. It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was
clarified: no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s
the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is
provides: also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party civil action prior to the criminal action.10
without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied) The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
thus:8 private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner

4
in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a
supervision of the public prosecutor. vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against
No pronouncement as to costs. whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further
SO ORDERED. complainants illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a judicial
  proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was
[A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004] appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent. order stating [i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent
RESOLUTION stated: Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant)
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which complainant replied: The
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that
Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is
2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated pumasa ka muna out
in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a of indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is
hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation
Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired: against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not? principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another malicious
replied: prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit
xxx xxx. the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of
Thereafter, the respondent said: Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise
himself to be a lawyer! denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A,
To this the complainant remarked: Sections 1 and 2.
Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx. Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said: Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku masama
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x. yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the Honorable Courts Third
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to Division which stated among others: That the questioned remarks of respondent were
ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainants actuations and taking into
public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a
for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the
complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his complainant. Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of
honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was merit.
handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and for investigation, report and recommendation.
humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public. In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating
misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding otherwise improper.
appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
on the respondent.

5
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board
respondents averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning. [2]
communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any
case in question under trial before the said court. misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case.
against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and
later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has
pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City. opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases. [3] This
Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in case falls within the exception.
contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does
the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed
with others. out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted
manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him that appear ka ng that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of
but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It
bar examination required of them. has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the
his purpose relative to complainants appearance in court; although the latter appeared court to condone even contemptuous language.[5]
only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from
(Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court. litigating personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case. SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
dismissal of the case for lack of merit. litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
Board of Governors which states: This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions;
the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first
Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied) aid to himself.
In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the requirement The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney  by acting in a representative
based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus: capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point defined by this Court as follows:
out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent

6
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar
payment for such services. x x x. Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law. [7] rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted
the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated,
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP
dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive
[8]
 Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court,
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. [9] In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in
merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
duties as an officer of the court. payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
SO ORDERED. protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga,  and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,  concur. the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that
he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He
adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-
OF IBP DUES. practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
DECISION practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: inactive lawyers-members reside.
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is,
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 2003?
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became We rule in the negative.
part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
working in the USA. by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. [2] which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment [3] stating inter alia: that prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which

7
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. [5] is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty
lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6] amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to his constitutional rights.
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the wise:
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate . . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
regulatory program the lawyers.[7] powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar [8] - which power required a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration. compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
Philippine Bar,[9] thus: burdened with conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
is attempting to levy a tax. drastic move.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is
a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership
an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt
be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such practice of law.
exaction. SO ORDERED.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting Tinga, and  Garcia, JJ., concur.
from his required payment of the annual dues. [A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues DECISION
subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of MENDOZA, J.:
practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.
Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
could have been discontinued. appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a

8
 number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available) report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, [4] dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged:[5]
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which 3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139- respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme
Roll of Attorneys." Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief
action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set
Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge
Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
tax. Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
furnishing some of these courts). practice law.
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. 4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
Llamas, as shown by: delinquent in his dues.
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA ) Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of
Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at
Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration Calauan, Laguna.
of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior
Appeals). Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice,
number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an
Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification [3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing

9
 at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay Rule 139-A provides:
such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
contrary. Esmsc such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution [6] adopting and approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a
found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of heirs of deceased members thereof.
the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, [7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months. months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows: and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", Attorneys.
"B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
Rizal 259060 for at least three years." paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991." determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,"
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to
1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is
which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
example." Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
.... deceitful conduct.
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum). THE COURT.
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the by any artifice.
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed
his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue. age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until
having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this

10
decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
courts in the land. connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00
SO ORDERED. a month. Among other things, he said:
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. ULAN " ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997] voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
Court, Marawi City, respondent. maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and
DECISION pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
NARVASA, C.J.: itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends. And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited,
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
the company. He wrote: Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the
sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith refund of ** (his) payments."c
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi
Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests." filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea 1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you ignorance and evident bad faith;"
that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not 2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against 3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to 4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
annul the controversial contract." may properly use.
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the
the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed. baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance

11
the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he
** " still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; [12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after
the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co.,
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. [2] Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" [3] in which he questioned the payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, which he ever saw.[13]
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for
of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and
voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean
Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex- It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **." [4] Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his
obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU
order that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan report and recommendation.[14]
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary. The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. [7] He declared that there was no 1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation,
basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he 2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the 3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to 4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co.,
the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and
the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting
honest mistake.[9] in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken deducted from his salary.[15]
for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer. 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of the Code commands that
man unduly prejudiced and injured." [10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain
trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for public safety and public interest." [17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the

12
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the SO ORDERED.
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco,  and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, 
respect of the public for the judiciary."[18] vs.
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- R E SO L U T I O N
however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate.
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action REGALADO, J.:
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." [19] Righteous pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is Annex A
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. SECRET MARRIAGE?
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, P560.00 for a valid marriage.
menacing, or otherwise improper. [20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and ANNULMENT. VISA.
word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, — 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged. Annex B
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion GUAM DIVORCE.
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the DON PARKINSON
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. [21] While one who has an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
practice law in this jurisdiction. CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
attorney. hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation. advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. allowed supposedly 

13
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977. respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we legal services.
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), the public, the advertisements in question give the impression that
(5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes
International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes The impression created by the advertisements in question can be
note with appreciation and gratitude. traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the
herein complained of. term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper connotes doctors.
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s)
on the issues involved in this bar matter. of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines: operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In
xxx xxx xxx addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are the service or services being offered.
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as
basic institutional services from government or non-government any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements
constitutes practice of law? in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
xxx xxx xxx that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance
with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to in question are only meant to inform the general public of the services
advertise one's legal services). being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code,
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that
advertising the same through newspaper publications. is:
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Article 26. . . .
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4 foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
xxx xxx xxx thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse

14
 capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law. respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
as follows: respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is
union between a man and woman entered into that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which
and family life.  It is the foundation of the family and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
an inviolable social institution whose nature, destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and xxx xxx xxx
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from
settlements may fix the property relation during the causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
marriage within the limits provided by this Code. advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by services to the public in general.
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
worst, this is outright malpractice. encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening no choice but to prohibit such business.
confidence in the legal system. Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer
such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage (equal) in skill.
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
publication of applications for a marriage license. tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the the protection of the public. Technological development in the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. prevention of illegal practice.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to
committed  perform all of its services, but only if such services are made available
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
place where the crime is committed. more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may

15
be offered to the public in general and which should be made available Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the
may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
involved. rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation  employing
not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious
action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
sanctions for illegal practice of law. subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act
exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
services. another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are
profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6
without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. 3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues
the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be stated herein, are wit:
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must 1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional 2. Such practice is unauthorized;
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5 3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
2. Philippine Bar Association: misleading and patently immoral; and
xxx xxx xxx. 4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and xxx xxx xxx
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which outside of court.
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign

16
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is,
other related laws. as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
knowledge and experience. Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight
the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7 aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
4. U.P.  Women Lawyers' Circle: 5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit
consideration should be given to the protection of the general public cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above
from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
who may be engaged in the practice of law. Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement
course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that
and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
qualified to practice law. marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
to the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the
of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under
with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact marriage is not necessary.
remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for
dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are
without being qualified to do so. the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal amended so that such act could become justifiable.
services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that
Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when
instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8 attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of

17
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is major non-legal problem.
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
elimination from the Bar. 10 If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados: his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
xxx xxx xxx architect in respect to the building code and the like,
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as then an architect who performed this function would
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily case. The most important body of the industrial
make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law. relations experts are the officers and business agents
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
can render effective service unless he is familiar with Among the larger corporate employers, it has been
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not the practice for some years to delegate special
to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. responsibility in employee matters to a management
It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in
the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or
determining what measures he shall recommend, do lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only defendants have the same service that the larger
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact employers get from their own specialized staff.
that most men have considerable acquaintance with The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the recognized profession for which appropriate courses
law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct are offered by our leading universities. The court
not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when should be very cautious about declaring [that] a
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and widespread, well-established method of conducting
laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
the laws touching their particular business or men who customarily perform a certain function have
profession. A good example is the architect, who must no right to do so, or that the technical education given
be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who their business.
draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. In determining whether a man is practicing law, we
This is not practicing law. should consider his work for any particular client or
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
measure that he recommends, a decision of the client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing along the path charted by law. This, of course, would
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in
fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only

18
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by
the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits other representative. Rules and Regulations,
the kind of building the architect may plan. The September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
incidental legal advice or information defendant may means a licensed attorney, and ther representative'
give, does not transform his activities into the practice one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows,
his work, he performed services which are customarily even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v.
reserved to members of the bar, he would be Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
program, he drew employees' wills. 1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
Another branch of defendant's work is the calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
representations of the employer in the adjustment of practice of law provided that:
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or (a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of problem;.
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and (b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject the bar; .
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to (c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
accept the employment whether or not he is a All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an client as a whole.
exception where the business turns on a question of 1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
role of the negotiator is to assess the probable client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite 1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
between an employer and his men grows from with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal
it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez
But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-
the situation is not presented by the proofs. lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged
Defendant also appears to represent the employer in the unauthorized practice of law.
before administrative agencies of the federal 1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce,
government, especially before trial examiners of the absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
granted by the Congress, may regulate the buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and
representation of parties before such agency. The determines by himself what courses of action to take.
State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
such determination or to forbid representation before information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party constitute unauthorized practice of law.

19
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
which publication of a legal text which purports to say assistance in the preparation of necessary documents
what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may constituting the practice of law, particularly with
be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is defendant relating to specific problems of particular
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should annulment of separation agreement sought and
be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
But that is the situation with many approved and [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at 1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the
a particular individual. Nor does there exist that services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA
status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND disposition of this case.
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR xxx xxx xxx
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general 2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
advice on common problems, and does not purport to impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage
defendant's publication does not purport to give can be secret.
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a 2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second
designated or readily identified person in a particular paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first
situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
such publication and sale did not constitutes the "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we
there was no proper basis for the injunction against note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
annulment or separation agreement any printed Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
judgment against defendant having an interest in any practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce skill. 12
and against his having any personal contact with any The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
$100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
course of personal contacts concerning particular principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
problems which might arise in the preparation and them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for

20
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
enforcement of law. 14 services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
to that extent, practicing law. 18 effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of
laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus: work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation
Black defines "practice of law" as: to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
the practice of law when he: drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852). respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v.  Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176- The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
177),stated: seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and

21
 modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact counsellors and attorneys.
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or the services of the big law firms.
employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer referred to one of our specialists.
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of
in dispensing or administering legal services. 20 minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to explains Atty. Nogales.
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the case. 21
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
so forth. controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of assailed in this proceeding.
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop
Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.

22
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22 be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
practice law. 23 constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law in the state. 32
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24 Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.  33 He is not
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the
who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27 A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The  Director
should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
adoption as it has done. respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, improper advertising or solicitation.
there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
American Paralegal Association. 29 wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself
and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of

23
 mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. under a designation of special branch of law. 44
"The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
Ethics.). exceptions.
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40 former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons
the restrictions. 41 expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent at bar.
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and these characteristics of lawyers:
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; Professional from 71% to 14%
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees Honest from 65% to 14%
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other Dignified from 45% to 14%
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42 systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43 In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the

24
same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more - The crime for which Hamm was sentenced to life imprisonment is for the murder
severely. of Morley and Well, who were killed by Hamm along with two accomplices,
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the Garland Wells and Bill Reeser. The three robbed and killed Morley and Well by
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and shooting them with a gun and leaving their bodies lying in the dessert.
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since - While in prison, Hamm exhibited good conduct and became a model prisoner
it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is which earned him a conditioned parole. Hamm was released after serving nearly
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly seventeen years in prison. From conditioned parole, Hamm absolutely
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of discharged on December 2001.
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the - While on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State University College of
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical Law. In July 1999, Hamm passed the Arizona bar examination and, in 2004, filed
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly his Character and Fitness Report with the Committee.
rendering the alleged support services. - In its report, the Committee stated that, in reaching its conclusions, it considered
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and the following:
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo  Hamm’s unlawful conduct, which included the commission of two
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the violent “execution style” murders and his testimony as to the facts
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin- surrounding the murders
off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may  Hamm’s omissions on his Application and his testimony in explaining his
be necessary under the circumstances. failure to disclose all required information.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal  Hamm’s neglect of his financial responsibilities and/or violation of a
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement longstanding child support court order and his testimony as to his failure
in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of to comply with the court order.
this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or  Hamm’s mental or emotional instability impairing his ability to perform
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let the functions of an attorney including his testimony as to any diagnosis
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of and treatment.
the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, ISSUE: Whether or not Hamm can be admitted to the Bar.
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
In the Matter of JAMES JOSEPH HAMM
Arizona Supreme Court No. SB-04-0079-M HELD: No, the Supreme Court decided that Hamm failed to prove his burden that he is of
211 Ariz 458, 123 p.3d 652, 2005 good moral character on the following grounds:
- Hamm failed to show rehabilitation from past criminal conduct by not accepting
Petitioners: James Hamm full responsibility for serious criminal misconduct - Staples’ murder although he
Petition: To review the recommendation provided by Committee on Character and Fitness accepted responsibility for the death of Morley.
(the Committee) denying the Petitioner’s application for admission to the State Bar of - Hamm was not completely up-front in his testimony to the murder of which he
Arizona (the Bar). claims that he only intended to rob and not to kill. This is contrary to the facts –
he accepted the gun and brings it with him in the car, shot Morley without
attempting robbery and shot hit again to ensure he is dead and shot Staples
FACTS: when he attempted to escape.
- Hamm, the Petitioner, was sentenced to life in prison for one-count of first - Hamm’s failure to fulfill his long overdue obligation to support his child who he
degree murder to which he pled guilty. Prior to serving his sentence, Hamm had was aware existed.
been separated from his wife with whom he had a son and had supported - Hamm’s failure to disclose the incident involving him and his wife, Donna, when
himself by selling and using marijuana, other drugs and drinking alcohol. he submitted his application to the Committee. This incident gave rise to Hamm
25
 being questioned by the law enforcers which should have been reflected by On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa
Hamm in the application – Question 25. urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide.
- Hamm’s act of quoting lines from Supreme Courts’ decision and use the same in On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI informing the
the introduction for his petition. latter that said office found Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was
evaluated "to possess desirable social antecedents in his life." 4
G.R. No. 97239 May 12, 1993 On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner,  his job at IRRI.
vs. On April 22, 1990, J. K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B. he was convicted involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged
MICOSA, respondents. of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's Personnel Manual.
Jimenez & Associates for petitioner. On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on
Santos & Associates for private respondent. February 6, 1987 arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that
his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his
conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted
NOCON, J.: to him.
Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee who
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment recommended to the Director General, his continued employment. However, on May 21,
and corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude. 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter's employment was to terminate
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by effective May 25, 1990.
the Philippine government and accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.
granted to organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired private respondent On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the
Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the
Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz: date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the same is
C. Conviction and Previous Separation hereunder quoted:
l. . . . WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are hereby
2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense entered:
involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from the service. 1 1. Finding the termination of complainant's services illegal;
On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house 2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to reinstate
in Los Baños, Laguna. complainant Nestor B. Micosa to his former position without loss of
On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the seniority rights and other privileges appurtenant, thereto immediately
pendency of the criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special upon receipt hereof;
Separation Program. However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe 3. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to pay
expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove Micosa's application for separation complainant Nestor B. Micosa his full backwages computed from the
because of IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess. 2 date of his dismissal on May 25, 1990 up to actual reinstatement based
On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of on his latest salary rate of P41,068.00 per month.
homicide, but appreciating, however, in his favor the presence of the mitigating 4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute, to pay
circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the total complainant's counsel the amount of Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00,
absence of any aggravating circumstance. representing his attorney's fees; and.
Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law. 5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit.
On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his SO ORDERED.5
appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in agreement with the
appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated except for findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31,
justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code. 3 1991, it affirmed the appealed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

26
 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification under Article 282 (d) refer to an offense against the person of his employer or any
deleting the award of attorney's fees. immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes
SO ORDERED.6 must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under
Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues: Article 282. Clearly lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or
1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS ACTED WITH to his employer.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IRRI HAD NO RIGHT In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of
NOR AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY OTHER CAUSE/S FOR DISMISSAL IF the IRRI complex, having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a
THE SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE OF THE non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his
LABOR CODE. misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer and was not directed or committed
2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE against IRRI or its authorized agent.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT "THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the
PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE PERSONNEL MANUAL IN DISMISSING THE safety and welfare of its employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its
COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT HIS CONVICTION OF special obligations to its host country. It did not present evidence to show that Micosa
HOMICIDE CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE.7 possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he posed a clear and present
The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that
is a crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is no record whatsoever that he was
Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations. involved in any incident similar to that which transpired on that fateful night of February
In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including 6, 1987. In fact, even after his conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his
those concerning employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid confidence in him when he disapproved his application for special separation in a letter
personnel manual, petitioner justifies its action as a legitimate act of self-defense. It dated January 8, 1990 and when he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to promote him to
admits that Micosa's interests — in his employment and means of livelihood — are the status of a regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a
adversely affected; that a convict should not be discriminated against in society and that letter dated February 1990. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance saying that
he should be given the same opportunities as those granted to other fellow citizens but they were mere  pro-forma communications which it had given to numerous other
claims that at times, one's right is deemed superior than that of another. In this case, workers. But whether or not such letters were "form letters, they expressed the message
petitioner believes that it has a superior right to maintain a very high degree or standard that were meant to be conveyed,i.e., that Micosa is fit for continued employment. In
not only to forestall any internal problem hampering operations but also to prevent even addition, the employees at IRRI's Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of
the smallest possibility that said problems could occur considering that it is an Micosa when they recommended his retention despite his conviction showing that the
international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid very employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they were placing their
creating disturbance or give occasion for such disturbance. very own lives in danger with Micosa's retention.
It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also
from the IRRI's Director General that as regular core employee he "may not be terminated found worthy of probation. This means that all the information regarding his character,
except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor antecedents, environment, as well as his mental and physical condition were evaluated as
Code."8 Thus, IRRI could not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable cause required under Section 8 of the Probation Law and it was found that there existed no
as defined by the Labor Code. undue risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his period of probation and that
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may his being placed on probation would be to the benefit of society as a whole.
terminate an employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on Micosa's termination.
one of these justifiable causes. Neither may said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) Certainly, said termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual
nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or willful breach by the employees of the trust basis as well.
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative under Article 282 (c) Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa's on the
refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of his duty ground of his conviction for homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions
rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. of said personnel manual mentions of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a
It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust must be related to the performance of the ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is
employee's function.9 On the other hand, the commission of a crime by the employee conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view.

27
Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re Basa11 and Tak Ng v. grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
Republic12 as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act despotically.18
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. SO ORDERED.
As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to  Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
determine.13 Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792
homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which  
resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:
has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude. Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit [1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon,
IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
the killing of a man is conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed the victim more than what was necessary involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction,
to repel the attack. violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; [2] and constitutes
IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. [3]
show that Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his  
fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint,
urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and
was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. [4] 
shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis
the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was of the Complaint and its attachments. [5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his
not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004. [6] Afterwards, the case was deemed
mitigating circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence submitted for resolution.
of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were  
not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
the crime.14 Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by  
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for
surrounding circumstances.15While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in seor the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely  
involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are  mala x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and
prohibita only.16 It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver
exclusion as the cases are reached. overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of
In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
Relations Commission in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the
was illegally dismissed. For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The
with centuries of both civil and common traditions. 17 The abuse of discretion must be accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his
shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door

28
 causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such
accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on
the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help the following facts:
him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and  
was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him 1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again 2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only
and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he 3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same
car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he unarmed;
noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up 4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out
intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the and fled;
same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the 5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence,
accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;
thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The 6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he
incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, persons; and,
Roberto Soriano.[8] 7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to
  date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant. [12]
   
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano  
and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution
on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco  
Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver. approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
   
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a
on several conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be
court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano. [10] no longer possessed of good moral character. [13] In the instant case, respondent has been
  found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues
to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide
Appeals.[11] involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
   
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
involving moral turpitude. social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
  honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has
been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, [15]  a labor case

29
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed
Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend
Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his
disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. intention to escape punishment for his crime.
That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:  
  The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance.
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)  lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of
  a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of  
aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the
of the crime are quoted as follows: Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed
  firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. [19] 
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We
then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist remind him that, both in his attorneys oath [20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the  
attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a
that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended
swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years [21] since he was
latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has
not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [17] lost.
    
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. [22] Where their
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit
when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and
mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. [23]
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers  
assault.
 

30
 We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of
moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent,
practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. [24] honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
[32]
   Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel  
Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants family. [25] But when this effort failed, We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish
that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. [26] the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence
  to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons. [27] The be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal  profession -- that every lawyer be
trial court had this to say: a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
   
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a
doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but
three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has
boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he profession.
said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the
the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In
incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent
chest. x x x.[28] clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
   
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name
more important than truthfulness. [29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Hence, lawyers must not his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated
mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
expected to act in good faith. courts in the country.
 
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
are competent intellectually,  Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and encroachment of professional services.
the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
reproach.[31] financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce them to hire
  his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they  
reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio
the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate. attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
 

31
complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6] distinct violations of ethical rules.
  Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
Front by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
   
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL
LAW OFFFICE USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not
  a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.
[13]
Fe Marie L. Labiano  To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
Paralegal degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render
  that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820  
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821 Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719  
  RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
Back DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
SERVICES OFFERED:  
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, ground for disbarment.[16]
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH  
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
ABROAD.  
(emphasis supplied) RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
Hence, this complaint. INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and CAUSE.
circulation of the said calling card.[7]  
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [8] business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)
[17]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and  as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. [18]
recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the
of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10]and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the  
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty. admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify  
the recommended penalty. Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means respondent could produce a more favorable result.

32
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the Court cards.
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to  
his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal (a)         lawyers name;
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. (b)        name of the law firm with which he is connected;
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, (c)         address;
respondent violated Rule 16.04: (d)        telephone number and
  (e)         special branch of law practiced.[28]
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
matter he is handling for the client. away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence
stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client. and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
   
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to  
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24] Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for  
the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes SO ORDERED.
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the G.R. No. 180363               April 28, 2009
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession. EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, 
  vs.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere
reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate
The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was
to its findings.
convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan1 involved moral turpitude.
 

33
The facts of the case are undisputed. II.

Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF
of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent WILL DETERMINE PETITIONER’S QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN
Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify 2petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. FUTURE ELECTIONS.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest III.
in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST
crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual DIVISION WHICH RULED THAT PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION
disqualification from public office. 4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME
assigned to the COMELEC’s First Division. INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.

On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the A.
position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his
Certificate of Candidacy.5
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE SHOULD BE RESOLVED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
denied in its assailed October 9, 2007 Resolution for being moot, thus:
B.
It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections
for the position of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS THE
Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF
FACTS" DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007 TURPITUDE.7
filed by respondent Edgar Y. Teves challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First
Division) promulgated on 11 May 2007 is hereby DENIED for having been rendered moot
The petition is impressed with merit.
and academic.
The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007 elections did
SO ORDERED.6
not effectively moot the issue of whether he was disqualified from running for public
office on the ground that the crime he was convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds: a justiciable issue which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely declaring
that the disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioner’s defeat.
I.
Further, there is no basis in the COMELEC’s findings that petitioner is eligible to run again
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, in the 2010 elections because his disqualification shall be deemed removed after the
WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN expiration of a period of five years from service of the sentence. Assuming that the
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED elections would be held on May 14, 2010, the records show that it was only on May 24,
TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE 2005 when petitioner paid the fine of P10,000.00 he was sentenced to pay in Teves v.
SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182. Sandignbayan.8 Such being the reckoning point, thus, the five-year disqualification period

34
will end only on May 25, 2010. Therefore he would still be ineligible to run for public Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial
office during the May 14, 2010 elections. or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of
R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official
Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner’s violation capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.1avvphi1 transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by
the Constitution or by law.11
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, Local Government Code of 1991. The Court held therein:
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves,
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn
granted amnesty.lawphil.net application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that
effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z.
Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. 9
Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it
was direct.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992,
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of
gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides
xxxx that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and
in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any
public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the xxxx
Constitution or by law.10

35
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction involved moral
unit…. [Emphasis supplied]. turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According
to the COMELEC:
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest. 13 In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not
involve moral turpitude, still the totality of facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of interest or any instance wherein the
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the public official would favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The
violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by holding
such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being out that the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel
positively prohibited, as in the instant case. Teves. Later on, he would aver that he already divested himself of any interest of the
cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw through the ruse and declared
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that: that what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the ownership.
And even if the ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless
have an interest thereon because it would still belong to the conjugal partnership of gains,
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to
of which the [petitioner] is the other half.
what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving
the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in
se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was [Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to
set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit: divest himself but he did not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew
that it was prohibited he nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he
hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of the
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling on
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his
inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the
moral depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his
moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of
fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by
themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."
the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and
duty, honesty and good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly
This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in involves moral turpitude.15
"International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime
On the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:
as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet
but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and
are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is
surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1 "not well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the
Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year
1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January
Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding
1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the
petitioner’s conviction and found that the same does not involve moral turpitude.
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the
First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a
official capacity in connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or
transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material
people.
36
time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-
Bayan.16 one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of
P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s violation was not intentionally done contrary
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the
to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide prohibition.
his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife
considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public
prohibiting possession of such interest. morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of
the LGC involves moral turpitude.
As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation. 19 While it is
until 31 December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable
was not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:
1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In
accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her renewal application mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for
1992, which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte
compliance with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has
of the cockpit registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee. 17 (Emphasis consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.
supplied) Well has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.
That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but
local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function
does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these
possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents
officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v. who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on
x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves
the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became unlawful or from running for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are
prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed by
Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.
interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of
the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although SO ORDERED.
ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the
imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979
1991.18 (Italics supplied)

37
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant,  Quezon City; that the respondent never tried to unduly influence the complainant in the
vs. discharge of the latter's duties and responsibilities; that while respondent's language in
DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent. his letter dated March 11, 1976 is strong, the same could not be considered
contemptuous either directly or indirectly, in as much as he was merely expressing the
FERNANDEZ, J.: sentiments of an aggrieved employee who deserves a better treatment from his superior
after more than six years and nine months of highly dedicated and very efficient service in
In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme Court, Hon. Remigio E. Zari, the City Court of Quezon City; that if ever respondent requested favors from his superior,
Presiding Judge of Branch VI. City Court of Quezon City, recommended the dismissal from these were all done in the spirit of friendship which the complainant professed to him
the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on before he left Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City on March 9, 1976; that from
the following grounds: October 15, 1975 up to his illegal transfer on March 8, 1976, the respondent was
practically doing the work of the complainant; that the respondent has tutored the
complainant on the fine interpretation and application of the law; that it was Judge Zari
1. Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967, (Criminal Case No. Q- 7171),
who tried to corrupt him as may be gathered from the following instances: On January 8,
Branch IV, Court of First Instance, Quezon City), a crime involving moral
1976, after the trial in Criminal Case No VI-5783 vs. Juanito Chua and two criminal cases
turpitude. He was sentenced to pay a fine of P500.00, which he paid on
against Emerito Lim, Judge Zari instructed the respondent to conduct an ocular inspection
July 18, 1974, under Receipt No. 4736418.
on the illegal constructions, subject of the cases; that Judge Zari, likewise, told the
respondent to join him for lunch at Alfredo's Steakhouse in Quezon City; that after
2. Presistent attempts to unduly influence the undersigned amounting conducting the ocular inspection, the respondent proceeded to Alfredo's Steakhouse
to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his where he joined Judge Zari, Fiscal Loja and the defense counsel of Chua and Lim; that
handwritten notes to the undersigned and to my present deputy clerk of thereafter, Judge Zari directed the respondent not to prepare anymore his report on the
Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano. ocular inspection to the site; that up to the time of his illegal transfer, the respondent did
not see the records of said cases anymore; that in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 vs.
On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from his position as Deputy Corazon and Macaria Tolentino, for the crime of estafa, the respondent was instructed to
Clerk of Court upon request of the undersigned primarily to dissociate convict both the accused because the complainant was a relative of a certain Judge
myself from these actuations of Mr. Flores, which I strongly disapproved Erochi; and that in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 versus Gerundio
of, and to avail my Court of the services of a full-fledged lawyer with Villanueva y Elazo, Dominador Garcia y Orteza and Balbino Domingo y Ramos, for the
unquestionable integrity. After his transfer, as can be seen from his crime of theft, he was instructed by Judge Zari to convict the accused Dominador Garcia y
handwritten notes, he persisted in taking this unwarranted course of Orteza because according to said judge, the complainant is AVESCO.
action in at least three (3) cases of Branch VI.
In a resolution dated September 1, 1976, 4 this Court required Judge Zari to file a reply to
3. Gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled the answer of the respondent within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in
addressing the City Judges, when he wrote a letter, dated March 11, The complainant alleged in his reply to the answer of the respondent that he had not
1976. 1 allowed the respondent to interfere in the preparation of orders and decisions; that while
the complainant is aware of his limitations, he is certainly not so naive as to allow
In a resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1976, Deputy Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores someone not a member of the Philippine Bar to "tutor" and give him finer interpretation
was required to file his answer to the letter of Judge Remigio E. Zari and this case was of the law; that he admits that Criminal Cases Nos. VI-5783 against Juanito Chua and 
transferred to the First Division. 2 VI-5788-5789 against Emerito Lim are pending before this court; that he did not call the
respondent to his chamber and instruct him to conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal
The respondent filed his answers 3 on August 12, 1976 wherein he alleged, among others, constructions; that he did not invite the respondent for lunch that day; that the truth was
that his conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude; that the then Commissioner that after the trial, he went to Alfredo's Steakhouse in the company of his fiscal, Fiscal
Abelardo Subido, who was also convicted of the crime of libel and was fined P5,000.00, Guillermo Loja; that while in the said place, the complainant was surprised to see the
had approved his appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of respondent in the company of the accused; that he counseled the respondent to be more
38
circumspect as these people had cases before his sala; that it is true that from then on up of P5,000.00 which he paid on July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No.
to the relief of the respondent on March 8, 1976, the records of the aforesaid case could 276418.
not be found by the respondent because the complainant had the records brought inside
his chamber in order to forestall any attempt on the part of the respondent to manipulate Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act
the records; that he did not instruct the respondent to convict the accused in Criminal done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
Case No. VI-166624 and in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 just because the morals. 7
complainant is a relative of a certain Judge Erochi and AVESCO, respectively; and that he
requested Atty. Reynaldo Elcano to affix his initial in all orders, decisions and sentences in Some of the particular crimes which have been held to
order to pinpoint responsibility. 5 involve moral turpitude are adultery,
concubinage, 8 rape, arson, evasion of income tax,
In his reply, the complainant additionally charged that when the respondent applied for barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, 9 criminal
the position of Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted, conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling, embezzlement,
among others, an affidavit dated June 10, 1969 that contains the following statement extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of
"That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of
criminal or police record;" that the respondent also accomplished Civil Service Form No. public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses
212 (1965) which was subscribed and sworn to before then Judge Oscar A. Inocentes; that against pension laws, perjury, seduction under
in the aforesaid data sheet, the respondent admits having acted as counsel for three promise of marriage, 10 estafa, 11 falsification of public
companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and others who are not document, 12 estafa thru falsification of public
admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, because document. 13
such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations
lawfully established in the practice of law. "Moral turpitude" has been defined as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
This administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge of Rizal, Quezon City, for social duties which a man owes his fellow men, to
investigation, report and recommendation after City Judge Minerva Genovea and City society in general, contrary to the accepted and
Judge Aloysius Alday had been allowed to inhibit themselves from investigating this  customary rule of right and duty between man and
case. 6 woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. 14 It implies something
District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol who conducted the investigation of this administrative immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
case recommended that the respondent be separated from the service on the following punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala
findings: prohibita but, the act itself must be inherently
immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its
The first charge is "conviction for libel which is a crime allegedly prohibition by statute fixes the moral
involving moral turpitude." turpitude. 15 Moral turpitude does not, however,
include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but
Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10 provides that one of the whose illegality lies in the fact of their being positively
grounds for disciplinary action is "conviction of a crime involving moral prohibited. 16 Hence, the crime of illegal possession of
turpitude." firearm or ammunition does not involve moral
turpitude for under our laws, what is punishable is the
possession of a firearm or ammunition without a
Evidence adduced by the complainant which was admitted by the
license or authority. 17
respondent was that on April 28, 1967 respondent was convicted of the
crime of Libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of Branch IV of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City. Respondent was sentenced to pay a fine Bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral
turpitude. 18
39
 However in another, the Supreme Court seems to finer interpretation and application of the law, and he was preparing the
imply that libel is not a crime involving moral decisions in both criminal and civil cases. Thus he was not trying to
turpitude. influence the complainant.

The mere filing of an information for libel, or serious The notes marked as Exhibits "F", "F-1, "F-2", & "F-3" speak for
slander, against a municipal officer is not a ground for themselves. There is no need for the undersigned to quote the same.
suspending him from office, as such offenses do not
necessarily involve moral turpitude. 19 A proposition by an attorney to his client to visit with
his wife the family of the judge before whom the
When respondent submitted his application for the position of Deputy client's cause is to be heard, and to endeavor, in
Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted conversation thus to be had in advance of the hearing,
among others an affidavit dated June 10, 1969, which reads as follows: to commit the judge to an expression of opinion
favorable to the client's case warrants his dismissal
That I am a person of good moral character and from the bar. 22
integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police
record. The acts of the respondent amounts to conducts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. 23
On blank space of a personal data sheet opposite
question No. 10, which asked if applicant has The Third charge is "discourtesy to superior Officers as manifested by
previously been convicted of a criminal offense, respondent in calling for and unjust use of strong and contemptuous
accused placed no. It was later discovered that language in addressing the city judges when he wrote the letter, dated
accused was previously convicted of theft. Accused March 11, 1976."
was acquitted of falsification of public document
under Art. 171, par. 4, because there is no legal To quote the pertinent provisions of Exhibit "D":
obligation to reveal previous conviction. 20 However he
maybe guilty of perjury under Art. 183. 21 'By the tenor of your reply, you have made the change
of heart and have developed cold feet. You have badly
One of the grounds for disciplinary action under PD 807, Sec. 36(b) shaken my belief in your credibility. Indeed, you are
under No. 13 is "falsification of public documents." truly a woman, very fickle and unpredictable, but very
impulsive.
The second charge is "persistent attempts to unduly influence the
complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before I take this as a clear indication of your desire to enlist
Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the complainant and to the sympathies and, if possible, like the other five (5)
his present Deputy Clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano." judges, involved them in the mess originally of your
own making and design and align them with you
Respondent admitted that in writing the four (4) notes (Exhibits "F", "F- against me, hoping to impress upon me that by the
1", "F-2", & "F-3"), he intervened for and in behalf of Gaw Chin in tyranny of numbers, I will be convinced that mine is a
Criminal Case No. VI-6196 pending before the sala of the complainant lost cause.
because the accused was a compadre of his friend, Salvador Estrada.
However, I regret to inform the six of you that by your
On the other hand, the defense of the respondent is that he was conduct, you have dismally failed to live up to your
practically doing the work of the complainant and tutoring him in the oaths, ...
40
 Kindly pardon me if I say that, the six of you must be interest of the service requires. In the latter case, the
out of your wits when you all decided to lay the blame assignment shall be made in consultation with the
on me and condemned without trial for the alleged Presiding Judge of the branch (sala) concerned; and in
inefficiency. case of disagreement, the assignment of the Executive
Judge shall be effective immediately, unless revoked
Yes, when you all decided to sacrifice me you are all by the Supreme Court.
laboring under deep and nagging hallucinations,
induced and prompted by your serious concern to The transfer was made in consultation with the presiding judge of the
save the face of a colleague. branch concerned who is the complainant in this case.

By the way, could any of the Honorable Judges of A detail is the movement of an employee from one
Branches I, III, V & IX honestly and truthfully say the agency to another without the issuance of an
public service in their respective branches is efficient, appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited
so that they could now come to the succor of a period in the case of employees occupying
colleague and are also competent to promote the professional, technical and scientific positions. If the
efficiency in Branch VI. My God, if that is true, employee believes that there is no justification for the
promotions of Judges in the City Court would be fast, detail, he may appeal his case to the commission.
the Purge in the Judiciary would not have affected Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee
Quezon City and the unprepared and the shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the
inexperienced would not have come to the Bench.' commission. 24

Respondent reasoned out that the use of strong language by him in his An employee may be reassigned from one
letter was justified and very much called for it being the indubitable organizational unit to another in the same agency.
manifestation of the indignation and disgust of the respondent, urged Provided: That such reassignment shall not involve
upon him by the complainant who engineered the respondent's illegal reduction in rank, status or salary. 25
transfer from Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City which he holds
a valid and subsisting appointment to the Appeal and Docket Division, In the instant case there was actually a reassignment of employee from
by virtue of a letter of the Executive Judge (Exhibit "43"), to quote the one branch to the Office of the Clerk of Court in accordance with
pertinent provision of which: Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court and in consonance
with PD 807.
'as a measure to promote more efficient public
service, after due and circumspect deliberation by and The language of attorney in his motion for
among the judges. ' reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court as a
"Civilized, democratic tribunal," but by innuendo
pursuant to the authority granted to the executive judge under would suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit,
Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court which provides as categorizing the Court's decision as "false, erroneous
follows: and illegal" and accusing two justices for being
interested in the decision of the case without any basis
To re-assign temporarily the personnel of one branch in fact; asking the other members of the Court to
(sala) to another branch (sala) or to the Office of the inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from
Clerk of Court, in case of vacancy in the position of any of the petitioners including the President —
Presiding Judge of a branch (sala), or when the constitute disrespectful language to the Court. It

41
 undermines and degrades the administration of Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before Branch VI of the City Court of
justice. Quezon City presided by the complainant is inimical to the service. This alone warrants
severe disciplinary measures.
The language is necessary for the defense of client is
no justification. It ill behooves an attorney to justify his In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June
disrespectful language with the statement that it was 10, 1969, the respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity
necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause and have no administrative, criminal or police record. " This averment is not true because
does not permanent an attorney to cross the line the respondent had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of
between liberty and license. Lawyers must always First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a
keep in perspective the thought that "since lawyers sworn statement is another ground for serious disciplinary action.
are administrators of justice, oathbound servants of
society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by the evidence adduced
suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this during the investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of the Court of First
their client's success is wholly subordinate; and their Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City.
conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics. 26 WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of
Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement
Thru the use of uncalled language, respondent had privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as
committed insubordination, a ground for disciplinary well as, in any government instrumentality or agency including government owned or
action. 27 controlled corporations effective upon the finality of this decision.

The evidence of record supports the findings of the investigating judge. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record.

It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the SO ORDERED.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. 7 While this fact alone is not
sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the respondent's conviction for libel shows his Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
propensity to speak ill of others. His letter dated March 11, 1976 to Judge Minerva C.
Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City 8 contains defamatory and
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
uncalled for language.
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant, 
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI
vs.
of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
that the respondent had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases
mentioned therein. 9
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C.
Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public
the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
officer. 10 However, the fact of conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together with
the letter he wrote to then Executive City Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Judge
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to the
Minerva C. Genovea, shows the tendency of the respondent to malign people.
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).

As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the parties
and their witnesses who were residing in the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the
42
Provincial Fiscal of said province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with
submit a report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits submitted by the consent of her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at 7:00
the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20). p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her house and went to
the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00 p.m. of
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but before taking
Recommendation, viz.: her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and took her to the
airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep by the
Evidence of the complainant: beach where there were no houses around; that in the course of their
conversation inside the jeep, respondent reiterated his promise to
marry her and then started caressing her downward and his hand kept
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of
on moving to her panty and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122,
Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager and first
tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered:
year in college she came to know respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in
"Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and reminded her also
1969 as he used to go to their house being a friend of her sister Norma;
that "anyway, December is very near, the month we have been waiting
that they also became friends, and she knew the respondent as being
for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do
single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General
not be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his promise and assurances, at
Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO)
the same time pulling down her panty; that she told him that she was
and subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO compound at
afraid because they were not yet married, but because she loved him
Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September
she finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with him at the back seat
30, 1976).
of the jeep; that after the intercourse she wept and respondent again
reiterated his promises and assurances not to worry because anyway he
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to would marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
be one of the usherettes in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog 122-124, tsn, id.).
City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told respondent to ask the
permission of her parents, which respondent did, and her father
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside
consented; that for three whole days she served as usherette in the
usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about twice or
convention and respondent picked her up from her residence every
three times a week, after which he would take her to the airport where
morning and took her home from the convention site at the end of each
they would have sexual intercourse; that they had this sexual
day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
intercourse from August to October 1973 at the frequency of two or
three times a week, and she consented to all these things because she
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
house and invited her for a joy ride with the permission of her mother
who was a former classmate of respondent; that respondent took her to
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed
Sicayab in his jeep and then they strolled along the beach, and in the
that her menstruation which usually occurred during the second week
course of which respondent proposed his love to her; that respondent
of each month did not come; she waited until the end of the month and
told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within six (6)
still there was no menstruation; she submitted to a pregnancy test and
months from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that she
the result was positive; she informed respondent and respondent
would think it over first; that from then on respondent used to visit her
suggested to have the fetus aborted but she objected and respondent
in their house almost every night, and he kept on courting her and
did not insist; respondent then told her not to worry because they
pressed her to make her decision on respondent's proposal; that on July
would get married within one month and he would talk to her parents
7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and respondent
about their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
continued his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they
agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).

43
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and (ZANECO) and it was dismissed and thus she filed the present
talked to her parents about their marriage; it was agreed that the administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a scandal as
complainant was already pregnant; complainant and her mother left for Evidence for the Respondent
Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while respondent would follow by
plane; and they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the house of The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one
complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132- exhibit, the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent declared
135, tsn, id.). substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda Sumaylo in Liloy in
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years old; that because of
her mother at Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that he could incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in
not marry complainant because he was already married (p. 137, tsn, id.); 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced the Islam
complainant's mother got mad and said: "Trans, so you fooled my Religion (pp.
daughter and why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). 173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father
Later on, however, respondent reassured complainant not to worry since 1952 because he was his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's
because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16 years and mother because they were former classmates in high school; that he
he would work for the annulment of his marriage and, subsequently became acquainted with complainant when he used to visit her sister,
marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to Norma, in their house; they gradually became friends and often talked
deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a monthly support of with each other, and even talked about their personal problems; that he
P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and mentioned to her his being estranged from his wife; that with the
actually sent the promised support; he came back to Manila in January consent of her parents he invited her to be one of the usherettes in the
1974 and went to see complainant; when asked about the annulment of Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973
his previous marriage, he told complainant that it would soon be (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him to fetch her
approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and in March from her residence and take her home from the convention site; that it
1974 and told complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant was during this occasion that they became close to each other and after
wrote her mother to come to Manila when she delivers the child, but the convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a
her mother answered her that she cannot come as nobody would be left week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since then he used to
in their house in Dipolog and instead suggested that complainant go to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
Cebu City which is nearer; complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974
and, her sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant
Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual to be his partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez
Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening after the affair,
Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.). complainant complained to him of a headache, so he decided to take
her home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to have a joy ride, so he
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and drove around the city and proceeded to the airport; that when they
tried to contact respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but to no were at the airport, only two of them, they started the usual kisses and
avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their house; she got sick they were carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and they
and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical treatment; she made love; that before midnight he took her home; that thereafter they
came back after two weeks but still respondent did not come to see her indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they went on joy
(tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was the only
case against respondent with the National Electrification Administration; place they could be alone
the case was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (p. 195, tsn, id.).

44
 That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma
told him of her pregnancy; that they agreed that the child be delivered at her residence; that he also befriended complainant and who became
in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would take care of expenses; a close friend when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one
that during respondent's talk with the parents of complainant regarding of the usherettes during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog
the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was married but estranged from City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence
his wife; that when complainant was already in Manila, she asked him if in the morning and took her home from the convention site after each
he was willing to marry her, he answered he could not marry again, day's activities;
otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but he promised to file an
annulment of his marriage as he had been separated from his wife for 4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship,
16 years; that complainant consented to have sexual intercourse with complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the
him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force, trickery, evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents' permission
deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed against him by was respondent's partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the
complainant because of his failure to give the money to support Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that
complainant while in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child and, also evening, they left the place but before going home, they went to the
to meet complainant's medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, where
City for medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.). there were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they
consummated the sexual act and at about midnight they went home;
FINDING OF FACTS that after the first sexual act, respondent used to have joy ride with
complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not make love twice or three times a week; that as a result of her intimate
disputed: relations, complainant became pregnant;

1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, 5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and
and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the time (July-October complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant would deliver her
1975) of her relationship with respondent, having been born on child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22, 1973
December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-
General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her
years old at the time of the said relationship, having been born on there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in February
August 6, 1932; and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to deliver the child
in Cebu City in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at
has a son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized on September Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl
24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza
Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that said respondent had Barrientos"; that about the last week of June 1974 she went home to
been separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City,
relationship with complainant; the respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an
administrative case against respondent with the National Electrification
Administration; which complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite
instituted the present disbarment proceedings against respondent.
sometime, having been a former student of complainant's father in
1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres
Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with xxx xxx xxx
complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually with her other

45
 In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. In
after hearing, respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings because he was already married and would open him to a charge of
and recommendation of the Solicitor General. bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a moslem convert
entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming, why did he not marry
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by complainant? The answer is supplied by respondent himself. He said
respondent attorney of his real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous while he was a moslem, but, having been married in a civil ceremony, he
marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even could no longer validly enter into another civil ceremony without
then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been committing bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn,
estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance January 13, 1977). Consequently, if respondent knew, that
that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he cannot marry
it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. More importantly, complainant, then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual
respondent knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a ground for intercourse with complainant because he knew the existence of a legal
annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage. impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape responsibility thru
his dubious claim that he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was also p. 49).
studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He never introduced his son and went
around with friends as though he was never married much less had a child in the same By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent
locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that complainant and her Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct
family were aware of his previous marriage at the very start of his courtship. The Court is unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character is a condition which
sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in accordance with the precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with
nature of the educated, cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is, her upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess
father being the Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to allow a daughter to (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]),
have an affair with a married man. otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.

But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's moral As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo  (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA
values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being 395 [1992]):
married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion.
Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is
membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos  (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that: not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA
alive and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character
justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he
is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350
such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying [1933]).
complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the

46
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a lawyer SO ORDERED.
who convinced a woman that her prior marriage to another man was null and void  ab
initio and she was still legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,
supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her, abandoned her and the child, and Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).

Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and
marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the [A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998]
required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with
complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise
to marry her, and then deserted her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct. JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting DECISION
standards of mental and moral fitness. Respondent having exhibited debased morality,
PER CURIAM:
the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action —
disbarment.
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the
bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard
Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the
admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient either moral character or On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint [1] for
education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]). disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having
violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. [2]
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
The complainant narrated:
also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M.
officer of the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts
keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such a manner as to avoid and Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita,
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty.
(Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the
Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]). legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty.
Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be acceded to his wishes.
allowed continued membership in the ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v.
Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]). They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the
community, but which they managed to keep from me. It therefore came as a
terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral
husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous
conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and
circumstances.
his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished
to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the
Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent Daarol. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at
the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro

47
 Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with jealousy cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the
Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was
member of the Bar. then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy. [18]
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of
has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his respondent to the IBP.[19] In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C.
former student in the tertiary level[.][3] Jose, respondent alleged the following:[20]
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the 2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [4] square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and
meaningful education. Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from parents who value material possession more than education and the higher and
complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.
alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and
spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were 3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love,
forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from emotional confusion arising from extreme forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and
jealousy. The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and raised in an entirely different environment. Her value system is the very
responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous opposite.
relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. [5] Supporting her letter were
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in
an Affidavit of Desistance[6] and a Motion to Dismiss, [7] attached as Annexes A and B, which
thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave
she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline. [8] In a Decision dated October 8,
his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education, companionship,
1991, the IBP Board of Governors [9] dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to
and most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and
prosecute.[10]
compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this remained calm and never inflicted violence on them. His children are all now
Court[11] received another letter[12] from the complainant, with her seven children [13] as co- full-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. x x x
signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she
had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her. [14] x x x x x x x x x
In his Comment on the complainants letter of November 11, 1991, filed in
compliance with this Courts Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, [15] respondent prayed that Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.
the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant
harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit has been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of
of Desistance[16] and Motion to Dismiss,[17] even appearing before the investigating officer, their marriage and their family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in
Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and which Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED,
Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof. TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a
abandoning his family to live with his paramour.However, he described his wife as a nightmare.
person emotionally disturbed, viz.: For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve
possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires their family and their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never
off letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she
without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of became more fierce and predatory.
her loving jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her
48
 Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not 3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage.
seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. x x x
landscape. 3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No.
4061. DISMISSED.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from 3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan.
enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in Death and the Maiden, can the torturer I.S. No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (x x x). Complainant filed Motion for
and the tortured co-exist and live together? Reconsideration. DENIED. (x x x).
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind 3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x
whose only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, x x). DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x
with perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of x).
Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. x x x. 3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC, Tumauini,
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your Isabela. Pending. x x x[22]
Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He
preserved the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x x) are
sickness and in health. . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cecilia
anything derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (x
these things to defend himself. x x).
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells x x x x x x x x x
everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and
immoral. She goes to colleges and universities, professional organizations, II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted
religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil, Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the
bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as employment of said woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit
Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as
this love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a mans dearest husband and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of
possession in life - his good name, reputation and dignity? its barangays, or in any other place. He never begot a child or children with
her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs.
Because of Complainants virulent disinformation campaign against her husband, Narag are false and fabricated, x x x
employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your
Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and x x x x x x x x x
humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons
mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant. [21]
forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty.
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many times with the help of
presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him and mutual friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried
Gina Espita: several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings
of the disbarment case, he offered to return home and to reconcile with
3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. x
3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. xx
xxx
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent,
Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. x x x vindictive, scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of
the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured,
49
 abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, Except for the testimonies of respondents witnesses whose testimonies tend to
mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, x x x. depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and
possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did
V. Complainant Julieta Narags claim in her counter-manifestation dated not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his
March 28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour,Gina Espita, to
dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is disprove the adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten
not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and their illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle
absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of Dominador N. Espita. Worse, respondents denial that he is the father of the two
stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent Atty. Narag and is a ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case
No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to
MTC on May 3, 1996. x x x. disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession. [25]
x x x x x x x x x In its Resolution[26] issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the
investigating commissioners recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man - a senior citizen of 63 years respondent.[27] Subsequently, the complainant sought the disbarment of her husband in a
- sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer
degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied respondents Motion for
very physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him Reconsideration.
unfit and unable to do the things attributed to him by the
complainant. Please see the attached medical certificates, x x x, among After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented
many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments. Respondent by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the
is also suffering from hypertension.[23] penalty of disbarment.
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, [24] recommending the The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said
report read as follows: Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
by the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the
the legal profession, and support the activities of the
case, namely:
Integrated Bar.
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
abandonment of respondents own family and [whether he was]
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
living with his paramour, Gina Espita;
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children discredit of the legal profession.
with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent [28] to the practice of
appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondents Comment vis-a-vis
law, but a continuing  qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is
his handwritten love letters, the due execution and contents of
found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. [29]
which, although he objected to their admissibility for being
allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
stand much less presented and offered proof to support shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
otherwise. community.[30] Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly  immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so

50
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [31] or committed under such During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. [32] repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she
had two children:
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol[33] that, as officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral Q  Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the wife. You claim that?
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
A Yes, sir.
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is Q  Why do you say that?
flouting those moral standards.
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order already two children and I know that that is really an immoral act which you
to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values dont allow me that my
will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and sister is living with a married man like you.
satisfactory evidence.[34]
Q  How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself, [35] were: Charlie Espita, house?
[36]
 Magdalena Bautista,[37] Bienvenido Eugenio,[38] Alice Carag,[39] Dr. Jervis B. Narag,
[40]
 Dominador Narag, Jr.,[41] and Nieves F. Reyes.[42] A Yes, si[r].

Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated x x x x x x x x x
complainants charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the Q  You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic
investigating officer: and Kyle Dominador, is it not?
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag? A Yes, sir.
A  Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita. Q  How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him? A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family.[44]
A  Yes, sir. In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag) love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade
him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings.[45]
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this
ATTY. NARAG: wise:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner. Q  Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT A I know him very well, sir.
A  Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as Q  Could you please tell us why do you know him?
husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and
Kyle Dominador. A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie
Espita.
x x x x x x x x x [43]
x x x x x x x x x
Q  Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
51
 A  At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir. Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the
same time, he depicts his wife as a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending, and as
Q And this is located where? an insanely and pathologically jealous woman, whose only obsession was to destroy,
A  Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir. destroy and destroy him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges
against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98)
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. pieces of documentary evidence[50] and ten (10) witnesses.[51]
Narag?
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not
A  Yes, sir. establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that
x x x x x x x x x would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the
fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his family and lived with Gina
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them testified on matters which they had
husband and wife, is it not? no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either respondent himself
or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife.
A  Yes, sir.[46]
Respondent may have provided well for his family -- they enjoyed a comfortable life
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that
and his children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a
she learned from the Narag children -- Randy, Bong and Rowena -- that their father left his
successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient
family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept the respondent
to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law.
back, that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent went back to his
woman, and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. [47] We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to
support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and
establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent
spiritual guidance.[52] As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe
any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the
mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support. [53]
respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had
home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he
sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two
abandoned his family to live with his paramour, who bore him two children. It would
children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant also submitted as
appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good husband or a good father. His
evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that
children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must have scarcely felt the
handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those
warmth of their fathers love.
admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of
evidence were written by one and the same person. [48] Besides, respondent did not Respondents son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his fathers moral
present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he frailties in his testimony:
merely denied that he wrote them.
Q  My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of
the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional
his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although I am a God-fearing
charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least
this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. [49] This he failed realize his mistakes, sir.
to do. x x x x x x x x x
COMR. JOSE:
52
 I think it sounds like this.  Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is Q  Why did your wife leave you?
the worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.
disbarred?  That is the question.
Q  In your wifes family?
CONTINUATION.
A In our family, sir.
A  With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a
lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience Q  And what do you mean by that?
all the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime.
A What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a puta in provincial
flesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst government, which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really
man on earth, is that what you are saying. affected us.  And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit
relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle
A  Sort of, sir.
Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has Honor.[55]
sinned, you have no more father, am I correct?
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts
A  Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he
because my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to
that?  Yes, he gave me life, why not?  But for sure, sir, you did not give me love. [54] her until death.
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova[56] The moral delinquency that affects
trauma he went through: the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.
father is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable
Commission the effect on you? In Toledo vs. Toledo,[57] the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when
he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a
A  This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, child.
especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I
and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[58] the respondent was disbarred after the
ways.  This is one reason that affected us. complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways? maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
A  Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing
not face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
well-known family in our community. members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting,[59] a lawyer may be
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those. disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
A  Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my
mother. WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record
x x x x x x x x x of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
53
 SO ORDERED. She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the
neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and  Purisima, JJ., concur. August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his
coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when
A.C. No. 376             April 30, 1963 respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while
her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n.,
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,  hearing of August 5, 1959).
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent. The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958,
BARRERA, J.: he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as
technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n.,
Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the
the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine
referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal
liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had
and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last
reads as follows: intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had
sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she
foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case
the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster
second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the
back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed
dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she
the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual
intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on xxx     xxx     xxx
the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he
warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her FINDINGS AND COMMENT
and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until
5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the
of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under
birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced
1959). that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her
consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to

54
have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing,
honor .... respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a
lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in
conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not
Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor
parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the
him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar
adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at
Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of
of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage
seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the
promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation
to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of of his name from the roll of attorneys."
her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are
her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint
not resist him. lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court."
Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn complaint be dismissed.
petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral
character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the
bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were
as the Court may fix.." duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum
which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1)
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed
to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by
Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the
married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment,
unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife,
Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer. Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:

xxx     xxx     xxx ... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent
on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia
RECOMMENDATION Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was

55
 already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's
from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as
them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice
told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar
stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this
her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles);
26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form
were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his
Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was
(t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he
she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to March 6, 1962).
live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25).
Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent
already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with
Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free
Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by
presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to
6, 1962, pp. 5-6]." the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his
petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be
averring, among others, the following:. suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962.
sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was
above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no
intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with
adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2,
accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous
who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other manner, from 1942 up to the present.
evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had
been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina
thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are
married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could
he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his
she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never
illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a
to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3
married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him
56
turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient
adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in  In Re
based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the
which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404),
not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of to wit:.
the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing
that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of
Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally
power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.
doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with
attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis
derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good supplied).
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law
for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a
for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor
professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the
of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede
or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's
so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for
apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity
refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
he himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her
and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he
the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The
looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with
of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his
an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his
of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his
and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining
respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify
same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married
to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar. the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous
57
relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional
conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral
practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
C.J.S. 735). [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den.
[N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that
an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a
14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered
which state:. then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston
hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his
findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
unless the court orders differently. concur.
Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the
Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he [A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence
introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with
direction to answer the same within fifteen days. Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires Leslie Ui.
the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint
originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should The relevant facts are:
the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall
file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the
Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children,
respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter
examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of
own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what
a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then
Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral
visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as
character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child
58
with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the
out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the
respondent would come to an end. present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent
and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her
husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
husband in his company. charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the
relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, [2] respondent "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show
bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the
in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got
married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 [3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of
with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in
because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26
accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together. [4] Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they,
admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties.
During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the
she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie
Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then established by complainants evidence, this same evidence had failed to
left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the
two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang
firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create
Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of
communicating with her. complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact
of cohabitation does not make the complainants evidence thereto any
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis
true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never
lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her
59
 It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the
complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause legal profession; and
for the offense charged.
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8] conducted herself in an immoral manner.[17]

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in
of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9]on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married,
prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos
527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status
of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a so open in his courtship.[18]
Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged
respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no
was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier
Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who
USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos
Ui was within the wedlock. [12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent
a violation of Articles 183 [13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a
the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and
and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, [19] does not prove that she acted in an
immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), [15] respondent averred taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented
that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against
faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession. respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui
in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless,

60
nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act
be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him. on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion
the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed
immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished
two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, by every single girl.
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were
clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. [23] It was thus highly x..........................x..........................x"
improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have
been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
made known to respondent. DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for
knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
Report and Recommendation, finding that: more severe penalty."

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted We agree with the findings aforequoted.
by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The
Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
of contemporary human experience. practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm are:
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men. a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) b. a resident thereof;
true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of
1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro
Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other
d. a person of good moral character;
because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did
they live together.
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
61
 f. possess the required educational qualifications; and must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied) situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about
Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that
an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion
moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children
has been held - with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest
effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a
the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [28]
what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency
and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid
conduct that warrants disbarment. scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."[29]Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
C.J.S. 959).[26]
powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
[30]
 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos
Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her
married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the
not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to
legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far human experience and highly improbable.
cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus
62
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an
attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman and Acting C.J.), Mendoza, Quisumbing,  and Buena, JJ.,  concur.

63