CASE 1

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON

GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.
G.R. No. 146710-15
March 2, 2001
 

FACTS: On October 4, 2000, then President Joseph Estrada was embroiled in a corruption
scandal after a close friend, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson, revealed that Estrada and
his family allegedly received money from Jueteng lords.

The revelation prompted Senator Teofisto Guingona to deliver a privilege speech, detailing the
anomalies done by President Estrada. The public now calls for Estrada’s resignation.

On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada  were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic
to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the
impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate
President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 16, 2001, in a vote of 11-10, the Senator-Judges ruled against opening the second
envelope which allegedly contains evidence wherein Estrada held P3.3 billion in a secret bank
account under the name “Jose Velarde.”

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family
later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office.

ISSUE:
WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
No. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the
trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would
really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with
justice and less with prosecution.

Estrada also contends that respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt.
He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal
cases violation of his right to due process.

The court held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage
of publicity.

There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof.

The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial
notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his
alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
duty to which he is entitled.

The evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent
Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of
official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are
reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve
dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if
the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of
probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court. 

There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render
a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a
special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made
by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of
the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and
the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada
and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the
Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an
issue “in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the
government.” Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a “textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of
inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely
to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing
the principle of separation of powers. 

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a coequal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.

WHETHER OR NOT HE ACTUALLY RESIGNED: YES: AYOKO NA ARE WORDS OF RESIGNATION.

CASE 2
RAPE, PROMISE OF
[G.R. No. 92503. July 8, 1991.]

MARRIAGE, COMPROMISE STTLMNT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CAMILO MANUEL, Accused-
Appellant.
.com.ph

"At the early dawn of November 28, 1987, complainant Dolores Biag, a 15-year old and
single college student, along with seven (7) other persons, were hiking home to
Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino (pp. 24,15,16-17, tsn, October 12, 1988; pp. 4-5,13, tsn,
May 9, 1989). They came from sitio Dalemdem, Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino where they
attended a birthday party of one of their friends (p. 4, tsn, October 12, 1988; p. 304,
tsn, May 9, 1989).

"After their other companions were already in their respective houses, appellant Camilo
Manuel, who was behind the complainant and Benita Cabigat, suddenly grabbed
complainant’s hand, twisted it at her back, covered her mouth with his hand and
dragged her to a waiting shed (pp. 6-7, 22-23, 25, 26, 27, 28-29, tsn, October 12,
1988). At this juncture, Benita Cabigat ran away (pp. 23, 24, tsn, ibid.).

"At the waiting shed, appellant made his sexual advances (pp. 78, 28, tsn, ibid.).
Initially, complainant resisted (pp. 6-8, 28, 29, 30, 31, tsn, Oct. 12,1988; p. 9, tsn,
Dec. 12,1988). But appellant boxed her twice which rendered her unconscious (pp. 8,
31, tsn. Oct. 12, 1988; p. 9, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; p. 16, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989). Thus,
appellant succeeded in ravishing and deflowering her (p. 8, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; p. 7,
tsn, June 26, 1989).

"After she regained consciousness, appellant was no longer there and she was writhing
in pain (p. 8, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; p. 14, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; p. 8, tsn, June 26, 1989).
Her clothes were torn (pp. 11-13, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; p. 4, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989). Then she
cried (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; 9-10, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988).

"Hearing her cries, Benita Cabigat came to her succor (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; pp. 12-
13, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; p. 8, tsn, May 9, 1989; pp. 8-9, tsn, June 26, 1989). Cabigat
brought complainant to the house of Cabigat’s sister (pp. 10,12, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988;
pp. 11-12, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989; pp. 9, 20, 22, tsn, May 9, 1989). When asked why
complainant was crying, she did not answer (pp. 8-9, 20-21, tsn, May 9, 1989). Cabigat
then accompanied her home (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; pp. 10, 21, tsn, May 9, 1989).

"Upon reaching their house, complainant revealed everything to her parents, that her
honor and reputation could no longer be redeemed (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; pp. 4,10,
tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; pp. 3-4, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989). Her mother immediately reported the
incident to their Barangay Captain who happens to be the uncle of appellant (pp. 4,11,
tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; pp. 4-5, 7, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989; pp. 2, 3, 7, tsn, May 8, 1989).
Appellant’s parents, their daughter-in-law and brother went to complainant’s house to
settle amicably the case. Appellant would marry complainant (pp. 4-5, 6, tsn, Dec. 12,
1988; p. 7, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989; pp. 4-6, 9-10, 13, tsn, May 8, 1989; pp. 4, 21, tsn, Sept.
4, 1989).

"Complainant, however, refused to marry appellant (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 12,1988; pp. 7-8,
tsn, Jan. 9,1989; pp. 10-11, tsn, May 9,1989). On November 30, 1989, she together
with her mother and brother went to the Integratad National Police of Aglipay, Quirino
and formally filed her complaint against appellant (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 12, 1989; pp. 9-
10, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989).

"The Medico Legal Examination of complainant conducted by the Aglipay District

Hospital, Aglipay, Quirino on November 30, 1989 at 2 p.m. shows the following
findings:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘EXTERNAL EXAMINATION: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

— Nape — kissmark

— Neck — kissmark left side

— Chest — kissmark clavicular area left

— Abdomen — linear abrasion with slight hematoma

— External genitalia: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Labia majora left inflammed (sic)

b. Perineum right reddish.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

— Vagina inflammed (sic)

— Hymenal laceration at 1 o’clock 10 o’clock slight hematoma at 1 o’clock

— Mucoid discharge, brownish color.

VAGINA SMEAR: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

— Negative for sperm cells’

(pp. 4-5, Appellant’s Brief; pp. 3-9, tsn, March 8, 1989)." 2

In his defense, appellant makes the following submissions which, for parity of
presentation and comparative evaluation, we likewise reproduce at length: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The evidence of the defense consist of the testimonies of Nolasco Manuel (barangay
captain of Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino at the time of the incident and brother of
defendant-appellant’s father), Benita Cabigat-Daquioag (who was listed as a
prosecution witness, wife of the cousin of the defendant-appellant), Camilo Manuel
(defendant-appellant), and Adelaida Basa Manuel (sister-in-law of defendant-appellant).
From the testimonies of the defense witnesses, the following facts were established:
that Camilo Manuel is the neighbor of the complainant; that they attended the same
school when they were in high school; that they were sweethearts since 1986; that
complainant used to go to the house of defendant-appellant to watch television shows,
during which times she used to talk to the accused in the veranda (porch) of the latter’s
house prior to November 28, 1987, and she attended prayers (padasal) in the house of
the defendant-appellant; that accused sent love letters to the complainant; that on the
night of November 27, 1987, complainant and defendant-appellant, together with other
companions attended a dance party at Dalemdem, Aglipay, Quirino and left the place
and went home to Pinaripad at about 12:00 o’clock midnight by hiking; that on the in
way home, he and the complainant held each other’s shoulders until they reached the
yard of complainant where they talked while Benita Cabigat proceeded to their house;
that complainant did not enter their house, but instead invited the defendant-appellant
to the waiting shed nearby in order that they could talk; that while in the waiting shed,
complainant asked the defendant-appellant while (sic) the latter did not honor her
invitation to visit her in their house to which defendant-appellant answered that he was
already studying in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya that’s why he could not have visited
her; that after their short conversation, they kissed and embraced each other and when
the complainant laid down, the defendant-appellant continued romancing her while
complainant removed her panty, Defendant-Appellant went on top of her and they had
sexual intercourse for about twenty-minutes; that after their sexual intercourse,
complainant asked defendant-appellant to talk to her parents in order to arrange their
marriage, but defendant-appellant told complainant that he could not marry her yet
because he was still studying, that was the time when complainant asked the
defendant-appellant to just leave her and go home which he did; that at about 2:00
o’clock dawn of that same day, Mrs. Leoncia Biag, mother of complainant, went to the
barangay captain of Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino in the person of Nolasco Manuel, uncle
of defendant-appellant and father of the wife of Mrs. Leoncia Biag’s nephew, and sought
his assistance because her daughter was abused by defendant-appellant; that barangay
captain Nolasco Manuel followed to (sic) the house of Mrs. Leoncia Biag where she
talked to the complainant who told her that she was kissed by defendant-appellant and
when she asked her again, she said that was all that transpired; that after interrogating
the complainant, the barangay captain advised the parents of complainant to settle the
matter because they are related so Mrs. Leoncia Biag told the barangay captain to call
for the parents of the defendant-appellant so that they could talk; that the barangay
captain went to the house of defendant-appellant and told to (sic) the father of the
defendant-appellant about the request of Mrs. Leoncia Biag; that when asked by the
barangay captain what happened, Defendant-Appellant admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with the complainant and when asked if he is willing to marry the
complainant, he said he was willing because she is his sweetheart so his parents
willingly acceded that defendant-appellant marry the complainant; that about 4:00
o’clock of the same dawn, the barangay captain, Mrs. Adelaida Basa Manuel (sister-in-
law) of defendant-appellant who was then having in (sic) the same roof with the latter,
and her husband went to the house of complainant and Mrs. Adelaida Basa Manuel
asked the complainant, in the presence of Mrs. Leoncia Biag, what really transpired
between her and defendant-appellant, to which the complainant answered that she was
kissed and embraced by the defendant-appellant, and when asked if she wanted to
have the defendant-appellant marry her, complainant answered in the affirmative
provided she will not encounter hardship in his company; that when Mrs. Adelaida Basa
Manuel heard complainant’s answers, she (Mrs. Adelaida Manuel) informed
complainant’s father, together with the barangay captain and her husband, about the
decision of complainant, but soon thereafter complainant’s mother joined them and
informed them that complainant is no longer willing to marry the defendant-appellant,
hence Mrs. Adelaida Manuel, her husband end the barangay captain asked permission
to go home in the meantime while they (complainant’s family) will have to think it over;
that after Mrs. Adelaida Manuel, her husband, and the barangay captain left the
complainant’s house, Defendant-Appellant’s father and the barangay captain again
went to talk to the complainant’s family whence Mrs. Leoncia Biag informed them that
her daughter did not like to marry the defendant-appellant but she proposed to settle
the matter for P1,000.00 provided the defendant-appellant will not do it again; that
because they had only P500.00, the barangay captain offered said amount which was
agreed to by complainant’s family; that the delivery of the amount was scheduled but it
was not carried through because they (complainant’s family) lost their temper until they
filed the instant case; that when defendant-appellant’s family went to the house of
complainant, their purpose was to talk about the marriage between complainant and
the defendant-appellant; that defendant-appellant did not go with them because he was
anyway willing to marry the complainant;

"Defendant-appellant did not offer any documentary evidence, and the prosecution did
not offer any rebuttal evidence also." 3

After appraising the contrariant evidence presented by the parties the court a quo
found the version of appellant to be highly improbable. It believed that the evidence of
record yields sufficient proof of the commission of the crime of rape by appellant, hence
it rendered the judgment of conviction stated at the outset of this decision. Appellant,
however, contends that he was erroneously convicted as the evidence does not
substantiate his guilt beyond peradventure of a doubt. cralawnad

We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. The general rule is
that the findings of the judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to be
disturbed on appeal. 4 Moreover, it is a well-established principle that conclusions as to
credibility in rape cases be heavily on the trial court. 5

Thus, the Supreme Court is enjoined from casually modifying or rejecting the trial
court’s factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge’s assessment
of the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses, are accorded great respect on
appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at first hand observing
and examining the testimonial and other proofs as they are presented at the trial and
he is, therefore, better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the
basis thereof. 6

On the other hand, we are constantly aware that while rape is a most detestable crime,
and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it is an accusation easy to be made,
hard to be proved but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent. As
is usually the case, the testimony of the complainant would be the only evidence
presented by the prosecution on how the alleged rape was perpetrated, and the same
should be regarded with utmost caution and the person charged with the offense should
not be convicted unless the complainant’s testimony is impeccable and rings true
throughout. 7

We are gratified to note, however, that the trial court arrived at its conclusion from
considerations anchored on human experience and recognized in law and jurisprudence,
as hereinunder synthesized.

Thus, it emphasized that the testimony of a barrio lass on how she was deflowered is
no trivial matter considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipino woman to
air in public things that affect her honor, hence it is hard to conceive that complainant
would admit the ignominy she had undergone if this were not true. 8

We agree with its disquisition that a young girl like the complainant would not file,
fabricate or concoct the rape charge in the present case. We approve its reliance on
People v. Balane, Et. Al. 9 where we said that it is hard to believe that an artless and
guileless barrio girl, a mere teenager, would publicly disclose that she had been raped
and thereby foreclose the probability of a blissful married life and, instead, expose
herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of public trial, subject her private parts to
examination, allow her honor to be sullied, and heap upon herself untold humiliation
unless she is honestly motivated by a strong desire to bring to justice the culprit who
had grievously wronged her. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It noted that the medical report conclusively shows the absence of any indication that
the complainant had known any other man, as interpreted by the examining physician,
Dr. Era E. Patac, thus lending more credibility to the fact that complainant was indeed
sexually abused by Appellant.

It pointed out that the offer of the appellant’s family to simply settle the case
constitutes an implied admission of guilt, the rule being that" (i)n criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt." 10

As it also aptly observed, the propositions or insinuations of marriage were all rejected
by complainant, which acts reinforce her credibility and resolute desire to bring to the
bar of justice the man who had ruined her life and shattered her future.

In People v. Manzano, 11 we held that the attempt of the parents of the accused to
settle the case with the complainant was considered an implied admission of guilt. We
have further ruled that an offer of marriage by the accused, during the investigation of
the rape case, is also an admission of guilt. 12
On the other hand, while appellant claims that he and the complainant were
sweethearts, he miserably failed to substantiate this allegation. He had never even
actually visited the victim in her home prior to the rape, nor could he come up with any
other proof of his alleged past romantic relations with the complainant.

In People v. Valdez, supra, the Court definitely found a similar story of the appellant
therein to be untrue on the ground that if the said appellant and complainant were
really sweethearts, the latter would have readily accepted the former’s proposal of
marriage. Had there been love between the two, the girl would not have jeopardized
their relationship by exposing everything to her mother and to the authorities, much
less by filing a complaint for rape against him and publicly testifying therein. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On the foregoing premises and our own calibration of the evidence, we are convinced
that the pretensions of appellant must be rejected and the case of the people should be
sustained.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the amount of the indemnity which accused-appellant should pay is hereby
increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in accordance with the present
decisional rule thereon. SO ORDERED.

CASE 3
CARABAO
[G.R. No. L-20431. June 23, 1965.] CARABAO

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENIO LIBED and

MARCELINO LIBED, Defendants-Appellants.

Defendants appeal from a judgment of conviction for the crime of murder.

The prosecution’s evidence, sustained by the court a quo, is as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On February 20,1959, Mariano Ringor, his sons Salvador and Isabelo, his daughter
Tarcelacion, Pedro Datugan and Domingo Lapitan were planting corn on Mariano
Ringor’s land at barrio Candalao, municipality of Bautista, Pangasinan.

After lunchtime, Mariano Ringor’s carabao went wild, ran in various directions, then
proceeded towards Eugenio Libed’s land where the brothers Eugenio Libed and
Marcelino Libed were likewise planting corn. Mariano Ringor pursued his carabao onto
the aforesaid parcel of land.

As Mariano Ringor passed by them, however, Eugenio and Marcelino clubbed him, each
with a piece of ipil wood used in planting corn. They continued beating him even when
he was already down on the ground. Marcelino thereafter ran away. Eugenio left on
horseback and surrendered to the authorities in the adjoining municipality of Alcala,
Pangasinan.

Alcala Police Sergeant Casimiro Cabreros and P.C. Corporal Clemente Parong went to
the scene of the incident and found Mariano Ringor, dying, bloody and unable to talk.
About 15 minutes later, Mariano Ringor died.

Postmortem examination was made by Dr. Emiliano G. Dimalanta, Municipal Health

Officer of Bautista, Pangasinan, resulting in these findings: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This is to certify that I examined the cadaver of Mariano Ringor, 49 years, male,
married, farmer and resident of San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan and found the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. Lesions: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) Contused lacerated wounds, parietal left.

"(a) Anterior portion-wound is roughly triangular in shape of about 1 inch long on each
side with a gap of about 1 inch exposing the bone.

"(b) Middle portion-wound is about 2 inches long, about 1/2 inch wide exposing the
bone.

"(c) Posterior portion-wound is about 4 inches long, with a gap of an inch wide exposing
the bone. Wound runs antero upward and inward.

"(2) There are fractures infront and posteriorly in wounds a & c.

"(3) Hemorrhage, eyeball, right.

"(4) Contusion, forearm right, upper third, lateral aspect.

"II. Death is due to shock secondary to cerebral hemorrhage.

"III. Calculation of the time of death — Death occurred in about 12 hours before post-
mortem examination." (Exhibit B)

The defendants pleaded not guilty to the information for the murder of Mariano Ringor
filed against them in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on April 25, 1959.
Defendant Eugenio Libed admitted having clubbed Mariano Ringor, thereby killing him,
but claimed he did so in self-defense. The defense presented evidence that the
deceased chased Eugenio with a bolo after the latter pulled out some bamboo sticks
that the deceased had put as boundary markers of their adjoining lands. Defendant
Marcelino Libed interposed an alibi, specifically, that at the time of the incident he was
plowing his land, together with Quirino Velasco, about 200 meters from the scene of
the killing.

Sustaining, as stated, the prosecution’s version, the court a quo rendered judgment, on
September 7, 1962, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and after a careful examination of the evidence on
record, and upon a mature weighing of the testimonies of the witnesses for both the
prosecution and the defense, this Court is of the opinion and so finds the accused,
Marcelino Libed and Eugenio Libed, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder as provided for in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing them to
suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased, Mariano Ringor, in the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS
(P3,000.00) and to pay the costs.

"IT SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellants assign seven errors, all reducible to the credibility of witnesses for the
prosecution and the defense. It is contended that the testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses ought not to have been credited because the same proceeded from biased
sources: Isabelo Ringor is the son of the deceased. Pedro Datugan and Domingo
Lapitan are suitors of the victim’s daughter. It is further argued that said witnesses —
Isabelo Ringor, Pedro Datugan and Domingo Lapitan — were not present in the scene
when the killing took place.

Relationship to the victim does not destroy a witness’ credibility. It is not to be lightly
supposed that the relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to
avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they know to be
innocent thereof (People v. Fetalvero, 111 Phil., 718). Similarly, the fact alone that
Pedro Datugan and Domingo Lapitan were suitors of the victim’s daughter is not a
sufficient motive for them to falsely impute on appellants the serious crime of murder.

The presence of the aforementioned witnesses during the incident cannot be doubted in
view of their positive and convincing testimonies as to what then and there took place.
Said witnesses were there as companions of the deceased in planting corn on the
latter’s farm that day. They stated that from a distance of about 30 meters they saw
appellants club the victim to death when the latter passed by in pursuit of his carabao.
The court a quo, finding them credible, believed their testimonies. Since credibility of
witnesses is within the special competence of the trial court to discern, in view of its
observation of the witnesses as they testified, we find in the records no fact nor
circumstance that impels us to doubt or reject what the court a quo has found credible.

Furthermore, as regards appellant Eugenio Libed, the act of having clubbed the
deceased to death is admitted. It was therefore incumbent upon him to prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, his plea of self-defense (People v. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105;
People v. Cabrera, L-6197, March 18, 1957.). It is rather obvious that no such proof
was adduced. As the court a quo significantly pointed out, appellant Eugenio Libed’s
affidavit, executed the day following the incident, does not state the all-important detail
testified to by him in court, namely, that the deceased chased him with a bolo. The
contention that the victim first struck at Eugenio with a bolo, and that the latter parried
the blow with a piece of wood, is belied by the absence of any deep cut on said piece of
wood (Exhibit A). The only cut appellants could show on the piece of wood in question
was admittedly "very shallow only cutting the skin of the ipil wood", which could not
have been caused by a parried blow from the deceased’s bolo, alleged by appellants
themselves to have been very sharp (Tsn., p. 30, Rollo-lazo).

As regards appellant Marcelino Libed, he was positively identified by eyewitnesses to

have likewise hit the deceased with a piece of wood. Such being the case, his defense
of alibi cannot prosper (People v. Fetalvero, supra). We may add that it was not
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at about the time it
was committed, since under his own evidence he was never farther than 200 meters
away. The fact that his brother and co-accused is willing to exclusively own the act of
killing is not a reliable proof of Marcelino’s innocence, since said co-accused has nothing
to lose thereby, in view of high claim of self-defense (People v. Fetalvero, supra).

The evidence, therefore, leaves no reasonable doubt that appellants, with abuse of
superior strength, clubbed the deceased as he passed by them in their land in pursuit of
his carabao, thereby causing his death. The records reveal furthermore that appellants
pleaded for forgiveness from their sister, the widow of the deceased, for such act. Their
attempt to placate her and compromise the case by an offer of P2,000.00, later raised
to P3,000.00, but not finally complied with, likewise appears of record. (Tsn., pp. 29-
30, Abalos) The alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in the statements of some
prosecution witnesses — as to who of the appellants struck the victim first, the number
of blows inflicted on the deceased, the location of said blows, etc. — do not serve to
detract from the credibility of their testimonies positively establishing appellants’ guilt.
Appellants’ evidence as to a grudge between them and the deceased, who was their
brother-in-law, arising from the latter’s having mortgaged their father’s land after
obtaining in his name a duplicate title thereto, only lends further credence to
appellants’ guilt, for it shows that they had sufficient motive to kill the deceased.

The penalty for murder is reclusión temporal maximum to death (Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code). In the absence of generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
penalty of reclusión perpetua imposed on Marcelino Libed is correct. The court a quo,
however, failed to consider in Eugenio Libed’s favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, unattended by any generic aggravating circumstance. Accordingly,
as correctly recommended by the Solicitor General, the penalty imposable on him is
reclusion temporal maximum (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Applying to
him the Indeterminate Sentence Law, his indeterminate minimum may be anywhere
within prisión mayor maximum to reclusión temporal medium (10 years and 1 day to
17 years and 4 months). Regarding, the amount of indemnification, the same should
also be increased from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 in line with our rulings thereon (People
v. Banloc, L-3413, December 29, 1955).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to lower appellant Eugenio

Libed’s penalty to an indeterminate sentence of not less than ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prisión mayor to not more than seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusión temporal; and to raise the amount of the indemnity from Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00); in all other respects
the same is hereby affirmed. No costs in this instance. It is so ordered.

CASE 4
ROBBERY: CONSPIRATOR TESTIMONY, PLUS
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
PEOPLE v. CUI
G.R. No. 121982 - September 10, 1999
Supreme Court First Division

FACTS OF THE CASE

 In the evening of December 5, 1990, 10 armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and
Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The Lims, their 3 children, and the
employees of the family-owned business were able to see the faces of the leader "Toto"
Garcia and two of his men, Mawe Garcia and a certain Edgar. The other robbers could not be
identified as they had sacks over their heads.
 The robbers took cash and jewelries worth P20,000.00 and forcibly abducted 17 year old
Stephanie, and demanded a ransom of P1,000,000.00 for her release which Lim gave in the
afternoon the next day.
 The Lims kept the crime a secret but on the third day reported it to the Cebu Metrodiscom.
The Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST) conducted an investigation. Johnny
was shown 90 photographs of criminal elements to identify the suspects and picked that of
Toto Garcia.
 Toto was known as the leader of a group of armed robbers called the Baong Gang whose
base of operation was pinpointed at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu. Lim’s house guard, Eduardo
Basingan was from the same place and was interrogated.
 His interrogation broke the case wide open. He identified Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia and
Edgar as the three who did not wear masks, Sadam and Rey as the two who held him and the
Lims at gunpoint, and Tata Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a certain Benjie, a certain Leos and a certain
Laring as the look-outs. He named Toto Garcia as the chief plotter and revealed that his
neighbors, Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan. Basingan said he was asked to
join the plot and was assured that he would not be under suspicion.
 On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a sworn statement identifying:
o Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia and Edgar as the three (3) who did not wear masks
o Sadam and Rey as the two (2) who held him and the Lims at gunpoint
o Tata Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a certain Benjie, a certain Leos and a certain Laring as the
look-outs who stayed outside the Lim compound
 o his neighbors and close family friends Leonilo and Beverly Cui participated in the plan
 With these as basis, Assistant Prosecutor Mabanto, Jr. led an Information for Kidnapping
with Ransom against Basingan, the Cuis, and the members of the group of Toto Garcia as
identified by Basingan in his sworn statement
 On the same day, Basingan and Leonilo Cui were arrested. Beverly Cui was also taken into
custody on January 17, 1991. The Cuis were later granted bail and their plea for preliminary
investigation was given due course.
 On March 14, 1991, Tata Garcia, Hilaria “Laring” Sarte and Luis “Leos” Obeso were
arrested in Negros. The next day, however, Tata died due to gunshot wounds. The trial court
ordered his name deleted from the information.
 On March 22, 1991, Obeso and Sarte led their own motions for preliminary investigation.
Their motions were granted in an order dated April 2, 1991.
 On April 1, 1991, Basingan executed a second sworn statement reiterating his first. In
addition, he detailed the role of the Cuis in the planning of the crime at bar.
 After preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Adlawan found that the participation of the Cuis
was only that of accomplices. Thus, on May 13, 1991, the charge against the Cuis was
downgraded as mere accomplices in the kidnapping with ransom of Stephanie.
 On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte were arraigned and they all pleaded
not guilty.
 On June 27, 1991, Basingan escaped from prison.
 Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Basingan was tried in absentia.
 On February 13, 1992, Bienvenido “Rey” Nacario was arrested. On arraignment on April 13,
1992, he pleaded not guilty. However, on May 5, 1992, he escaped.
 On August 18, 1992, the prosecuting fiscal manifested that Toto Garcia had been killed in
Davao.
 On December 6, 1993, the trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and
Nacario.
o The Court is convinced that a conspiracy was hatched by all the accused in perpetrating
the crime charged
o The denial of accused Luis Obeso and Hilaria Sarte was not accepted in court because
they were the renters of the house where Stephanie was placed
o Obeso, Basinga, Nacario, and Sarte are guilty of the crime of kidnapping with ransom
o Leonilo Cui and Beverly Cui are only accomplices to the crime of kidnapping with
ransom
 Nacario, Obeso and Sarte are principals for the crime of kidnapping with ransom
and suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua
 Spouses Cui suffer imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day prision mayor as minimum
to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
o They are further ordered to restitute the victim the ransom money.
 April 21, 1997, Obeso and Sarte prayed for their acquittal on the grounds that the trial court
erred in convicting them on the basis of Basingan’s statement and Sgt. Ouano’s testimony
 which are hearsay and finding the two of them as principals of conspiracy despite the
absence of proof of their culpability.
 On June 25, the Cuis also filed their brief contending that the trial court erred in not finding
that their constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel, and against self-incrimination has
been violated during the custodial investigation and that the court erred in not excluding
hearsay evidence to prove their alleged conspiracy as accomplices.
 On August 13, 1998, the OSG recommended the acquittal of the Cuis, Obeso, and Sarte on
the ground that the prosecution failed to present adequate proof their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

ISSUE/S & RATIO/S:

W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused-appelants on the basis of extra-judicial
statement made by Basingan

Yes, the trial court committed reversible error in admitting and giving weight to the sworn
statements of Basingan. In the same vein, the testimony of Sgt. Ouano confirming the content of
Basingan's sworn statements is not proof of its truth and by itself cannot justify the conviction of
appellants. Both the extrajudicial sworn statements of Basingan and the testimony of Sgt. Ouano
are clear hearsay.
Basingan’s testimony cannot be used because:
 He escaped and never testified in court to arm his accusation against the Cuis, Obeso and
Sarte.
 Even if Sgt. Ouano testified for the statement, it would only be hearsay (any oral or
documentary evidence is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was never
presented on the witness stand.)
 The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized
against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court.
o Extra-judicial – deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine
the confessant
o Judicial – confession is thrown wide open for cross examination and rebuttal.
 The res inter alios has exceptions. Thus, Section 30 of Rule 130 provides: "The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration."
For this provision to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
o That the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
o that the admission relates to the common objects
o that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
CASE 5
ROBBERY HOMICIDE CO-CONSPIRATOR
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ MADELO, JIM
MERCENE y BUSAR @ EMI, CARLITO DECENA y PARDELA, and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC, and JOHN DOES,
accused,.

Facts:

At around two oclock in the morning of August 27, 1993, Rodelo Palijon,[1] Carlos Decena,[2] and Jim
Mercene entered the yard of the residence in San Pablo City of the spouses Gonzalo and Mellorequina
Reyes. Both were elderly returnees (balikbayans), recently arrived from the United States.

Decena entered the house by climbing a post and removing some glass panes from the jalousy windows.
Once inside, Decena and Mercene positioned themselves near the couples bedroom door and waited
for someone to open it so they could take cash and jewelry from the bedroom. Palijon remained outside
the house, as look-out.

Around four oclock A.M., Mrs. Reyes came out the bedroom to go to the bathroom. She did not notice
the intruders. Decena then followed her to the toilet where he kicked and boxed her. Mrs. Reyes
managed to shout for help before she fainted. Mr. Reyes rushed to assist his wife. Decena met him, with
a steel-edged stool and struck him hard several times. Mr. Reyes fell prostrate on the floor. The robbers
ransacked the house then escaped.

Prosecution witness Merly Reyes Alvero, a daughter of the Reyes couple, who lived some distance away,
was roused from her sleep by a phone call from her cousin, Edith Bicomong. A hysterical Bicomong told
Alvero that the latters parents were hospitalized and in critical condition. Alvero dashed off to the
hospital and was able to talk to her mother. Alvero then proceeded to the house of her parents. An
inspection of the bedroom of the spouses Reyes revealed that cash amounting to P17,000.00 and
various pieces of jewelry belonging to her mother, worth P100,000.00 were missing.

At 10:55 A.M., Mr. Gonzales died from his injuries. The immediate cause of death was cardio-respiratory
failure caused by severe contusion hematoma of head (right side, liver, and chest wall due to severe
beatings, with suspicious multiple fractures, ribs, 5th and 7th, right.)[3]

In an Information dated October 14, 1993, the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City charged
Rodelo Palijon, Jim Mercene, Carlos Decena, Myra Pria, and several John Does, with robbery and
homicide, allegedly committed.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-
conspirator?

Ruling:
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property and not
against persons, the homicide being a mere incident of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery
with homicide, it is essential that the robbery itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The onus
probandi is, thus, upon the prosecution to prove the following: (1) the taking of personal property with
violence or intimidation against persons or by using force upon things; (2) that the property taken
belongs to another; (3) that the taking was characterized by animus lucrandi; and (4) that on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide was committed.

The prosecution presented both object and testimonial evidence that personal property of the victims
were taken. Alvero testified that she was familiar with her mothers jewelry having borrowed some of
the items on past occasions. After she inspected her parents house she discovered cash and valuable
pieces of jewelry missing. Alvero also identified, in open court, the broken jewelry box, some pieces of
fancy jewelry and other items of her mother recovered at the crime scene.[Under cross-examination,
Alvero was categorical in her account that the more expensive pieces of jewelry of her mother were
missing. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of Alvero is entitled to great respect. It is binding
on this court in the absence of any showing that the trial courts finding was not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.We also note that the
physical evidence of the prosecution corroborated Alveros account that her parents had been robbed.
Physical evidence is mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates highly in the hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence.
After reviewing the transcripts and circumstances extant to the case, we find that the trial court did
not err in giving credence to the testimony of Mercene. The latter testified that Pria was only 1-1/2
meters away from them when they were plotting the robbery. 34 The house of Palijon where they
hatched their plan is a small, one-room house with an area of approximately twenty (20) meters only.
35 Both facts clearly show that Pria could easily participate in the discussion of the conspirators.
Mercene’s declarations are positive testimonial evidence. They outweigh Decena’s unsubstantiated
denial of Pria’s participation in the criminal conspiracy. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over
the testimony of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. 36

In our view, notwithstanding her absence from the actual crime scene, Pria, as a conspirator, is as
liable for robbery with homicide just as if she had participated in the actual robbing and killing. At the
instant that the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and pursue it, each and
every member of the conspiracy is criminally liable for the felony committed by anyone of them. 37

In seeking an acquittal, appellant Palijon further contends that the trial court erred when it convicted
him on the basis of the confession of his co-accused. Palijon argues that in determining the weight and
sufficiency of the admissions of a self-confessed co-conspirator, the trial court should have exercised
the greatest caution and held that such confession should have been corroborated by other evidence
to establish his participation in the conspiracy or in the commission of the crime. Human experience
teaches that a malefactor who admits the commission of a crime is likely to put the blame as much as
possible on others other than himself alone. 42

In ruling upon Palijon’s arguments, we must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to
cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court 43 applies only to extrajudicial
acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 44 Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was
given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where
several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his
co-accused is competent evidence against the latter. 45

CASE 6
HOLD-UP, UNKNOWN AND UNIDENTIFIED MEN KILLED HUSBAND,
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR

PEOPLE VS. RAQUEL

G.R. No. 119005 (December 2, 1996)

FACTS:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet
and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to
the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise,
heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns
at him.

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband’s
lifeless while a man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for
help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2)
other men ran away but she did not seen their faces. The police came and found
one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from
the victim’s house. He was identified as Amado Ponce.

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and
Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in
progress, however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado
Ponce escaped from jail. Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their
defense and presented witnesses to support their alibi.

The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them
accordingly.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of the crime
charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the
perpetrators of the crime?

RULING:
A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime
charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of
her husband as base from his testimonies.
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the
identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the
extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-
perpetrators of the crime.  As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail
before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be
utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused
never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s
extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against
said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of
appellants, in the case at bar.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another.  An extrajudicial confession is binding
only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused.  The
reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
man’s own acts are binding upon him, and are evidence against him.  So are his
conduct and declarations.  Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
This extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was
made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado
Ponce. Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the
assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the
adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver
must be made with the assistance of counsel. These rights, both constitutional
and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and
accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby
ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

CASE 8
BATUHANG NAGANAP SA LAMAY – SILENCE WHEN
CONFRONTED
PEOPLE VS. PILONES
G.R. No. L-32754-5 (July 21, 1978)

FACTS:

Manuel Pilones was convicted by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for the crime of
murder, for the killing of Antonio G. Renolia (A.K.A Tony), and frustrated murder against
Nicanor Ilagan.

 Ilagan was shot in the knee. Tony went to assist and tried to lift llagan but was shot buy
the same assailant. Llagan saw his assailants face, because of the light of the electric
lamp on the street. The assailant and his companions, Danny Banlag, Milo and others,
who were armed with arrows and carried stones, ran away.

Tony died on the way to the hospital. Ilagan was also brought to the hospital where he
was treated for two weeks.

Pilones refused to give any statement or comment upon investigation.

At the trial Pilones relied on an alibi, but the same was not corroborated by testimonies
of possible witnesses.

ISSUE:
Whether Pilones was sufficiently identified by the prosecution's sole eyewitness, Ilagan?

RULING:
Pilones conspired with his companion in shooting llagan and killing Renolia.

The fact is that Ilagan positively Identified Pilones as the Person

who shot him (Ilagan). Even if Renolia was shot by Pilones'
companion, with a firearm different from the .22 caliber rifle used
against Ilagan, Pilones would still be criminally liable for Renolia's
death because he, obviously, conspired with the person who shot
Renolia. Pilones and his companions were together at the scene of
the crime. They left the place together. They had community of
design.  chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The decisive fact is that Pilones was not only Identified by Ilagan but at the
confrontation in the police precinct between accuser and accused, Pilones, as the
accused, just kept silent and did not deny Ilagan's accusation and the Identification
made by Renolia's mother. "He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be
heard to speak when he should be silent". Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 23. Admission by silence. — Any act or declaration made in the presence and
within the observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be given
in evidence against him.
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of
crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An
innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as
a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an
inference that he is not innocent.
The trial court erred in holding that the crime as to Ilagan is frustrated murder. The
wound in his knee was not sufficient to cause his death. The crime is only attempted
murder.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is affirmed with the modification.

CASE 9:
CONSENSUAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE –
SILENCE OF VICTIM
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias
"BENBEN", defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-44060; July 20, 1978

FACTS:
Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½ year old girl,
Mirasol Magallanes.  The information alleged that victim was alone
in her house when the Benben entered, intimidated her with a
hunting knife, forced her to lie in bed and there they had
intercourse.  The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked
on the door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that
she had seen the accused exiting the house when she came
knocking.  The victim did not reveal what happened to her until 6
days after the incident. 

Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”.  Defense claims in

effect that there was no force or intimidation involved and that what
Aunt Lita saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather
consensual sexual intercourse.  Accused also presented witnesses
claiming that they were indeed sweethearts.

The CFI convicted Benben.  CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:

The main issue boils down to the question of who is more credible,
the defense or the prosecution?  Thus, whether or not the evidence
justifies a conviction.

HELD:

NO.  A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's

evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a
conviction. The Supreme court noted the absence of intimidation
considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her house
where she is surrounded by her neighbors.  The
victim could also have revealed the same the very moment she was
confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to
her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took
place and not 3 days after.

Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the

allegation that the victim and accused were sweethearts.  They did
not bother to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses
to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually
sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual
communications previously.  As to this silence, the Supreme Court
explained:

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied

admission of the truth … is applicable in criminal cases provided: 1)
that he heard and understood the statement; 2) that he was at
liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to
some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested,
and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within
his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be
drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These
requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case.
Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused
and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the
truth of such assertion.

CASE 10:
ACCUSED NOT AFFORDED RIGHTS,
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES SIGNED BY HIM,
NOT AFFORDED COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE
EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT /
ADMISSION
People of the Philippines vs Agustin (1995) - 240 SCRA 541
240 SCRA 541

Facts: Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony’s girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his
daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor’s
residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the
Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The
man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The
Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped
away. All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was able
to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother. Later, she and her
mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny went home and was then brought to the
Hospital for treatment.

Accused Quiaño, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police authorities,
confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he
was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel,
who provided the armalite, and a certain “Jimmy.” During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted
by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed
with the sworn statement of Quiaño was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before
City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded
the privileges like that of Quijano. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at
gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law
partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty.
Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quijano
escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established. Hence this appeal.

Issue: WON accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements admissible as evidence?

Held: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an

acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied of facts
pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just
confessions. The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be
signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes
which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or
decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached
only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. The appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution.
Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not explicitly told of his
right to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any
such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would
agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he could waive
his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his
counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written
waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its
existence. In short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal,
through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him.
Moreso said counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.