Iranian Shahab-3 silo complex near Tabriz

Editor’s Comments Table of Contents

This month I’d like to start by Current Events
welcoming all of the new subscribers, and Latakia Port Facility (Sean O’Connor) 1
welcome back everyone who enjoyed the Air Defense
premier issue of I&A in February. Readers China’s Hybrid SAM Sites (Sean O’Connor) 2
Historical Perspective
of last month’s issue will note that this
OTH-SW Deployment in China (Sean O’Connor) 7
month features a significant increase in the Strategic Warfare
amount of content. Hopefully, the content Iranian SSM Facilities (Sean O’Connor) 9
provided will continue to expand in the Software
future. Facility Drawings in GIMP (Sean O’Connor) 26
One new change this month is the Reading List
addition of a supplementary KML file sent as High-Tech Reading List (Sean O’Connor) 27
an attachment in your subscriber’s e-mail. If Links
you did not receive the KML file, be sure to March 2011 (Sean O’Connor) 28
let me know. The KML file contains Source List
placemarks relevant to the features Source List 29
What Is It?
contained herein, allowing readers to visit
March 2011 (Sean O’Connor) Rear cover
the same locations and make their own
observations.
The highlight of this month’s issue is
the 18 page feature detailing Iranian SSM
facilities. No attempt was made to
significantly ID the types of weapons
employed at each site; that will be for a
future effort!

Sean O’Connor
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Publishing Information
I&A Volume 1, Number 2 (March 2011)
Self-published by Sean O’Connor (Editor)
Cover image courtesy Google Earth

Disclaimer
I&A is an open-source publication. As such, only publicly available material is used in researching
and authoring the features contained herein. All sources referenced are provided in a list at the
end of each issue, organized by the articles which they were used to create. Any questions
regarding the source material or the content presented herein should be referred to the editor.
Current Events as provocative. Israeli threats to respond to
Iran’s transit of the Suez have proved to be
Latakia Port Facility unfounded.
Sean O’Connor
Latakia is Syria’s most prominent port
The Iranian Navy has recently found facility, with berths for the onloading and
itself in the news thanks to the Suez transit of offloading of between 12 and 14 container
the frigate Alvand (FFG-71) and a ships of varying sizes. With the harbor
replenishment vessel Kharg (AORH-431). The protected by a large seawall, a Syrian naval
Iranian vessels crossed the Suez canal and presence is also maintained at the port,
entered the Mediterranean Sea on February primarily consisting of smaller coastal
20th, marking the first time that Iranian vessels combatants such as the Osa II PTFG.
had travelled so far from the Persian Gulf since
the 1979 revolution. Both vessels arrived at The Alvand remains one of the more
the Syrian port of Latakia on February 23rd. modern surface combatants in the Iranian
Navy, despite being in service since 1971. Its
Unsurprisingly, the Iranian Navy’s primary armament consists of Chinese-
publicized Suez transit to Syria was met with supplied C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles.
outrage by Israel, who condemned the transit
1
Air Defense Apart from importing advanced Russian-
made SAM systems, China also began to
China’s Hybrid SAM Sites develop its own indigenous strategic SAM
Sean O’Connor systems. These systems included the HQ-9,
an S-300PMU contemporary, and the HQ-12,
With the introduction of the S-300PMU an evolved variant of the aging HQ-2 (CSA-1
(SA-10B GRUMBLE) in 1993, China began the GUIDELINE).
process of finally modernizing its stagnating
strategic air defense network. Prior to 1993, With the introduction of newer systems,
Chinese strategic SAM units operated the HQ- China began to construct new SAM sites
2, a domestically-produced variant of the designed primarily to house a certain type of
Soviet S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE). These system. Many of these locations were
systems were deployed at fixed sites modeled constructed on former HQ-2 positions by
after the typical Soviet-style S-75 modifying the site locations to accept newer
emplacement. systems. In many cases the former HQ-2 sites
were not suitable for the basing of more
advanced weapon systems. The S-300PMU,
for example, required a larger revetment for its
TEL than the HQ-2 required for the single-rail
fixed launcher.

June 27, 2005 image of a former HQ-2 site being

converted to house an S-300P series SAM system;
rapid construction progress is noteworthy as the
location was operational as an HQ-2 site in early May
(Google Earth)

In March of 2003, the first of a series of

new-style SAM sites appeared near Xiamen in
the Nanjing MR. A second site was soon
identified in April of 2003 near Longtian AB.
This new site featured a hybrid layout capable
Representative Chinese HQ-2 and former Soviet S-75 of supporting either an S-300P series or HQ-2
sites illustrating the similarities between the two strategic SAM battery. Modeled after the
layouts (both images Google Earth) standard Chinese S-300P series SAM site, the
hybrid facility included two additional concrete
2
pads not previously noted at any S-300P but are capable of supporting an HQ-2 single-
installation. rail launcher.
The Xiamen and Longtian hybrid sites
incorporate a combination of features. The Further improvements made to the
layout of the interconnecting roadways hybrid sites during conversion include an
indicates that the site was constructed on the expansion and resurfacing of the target
grounds of a former HQ-2 battery. Where a engagement radar (TER) position. The SJ-202
typical HQ-2 or S-75 site features six or ZD-2 TERs associated with HQ-2 variants
revetments for launch rails, the hybrid site do not require as much surface area as the
features six new concrete pads for various mobile 30N6E (TOMB STONE) associated with
types of launch systems. Four of the pads are the S-300PMU-1. A large pad adjacent to the
sized and shaped to accommodate TELs EW radar berm, used for mounting battery-
associated with the S-300P series of strategic level organic EW assets, was also resurfaced
SAM systems and are analogous to those during the conversion. This likely stemmed
found at dedicated S-300P series SAM sites from space requirements necessary for
throughout China. The remaining two pads erecting the 40V6 mast assembly used to
cannot mount a larger TEL such as the S- mount the S-300PMU-1’s 76N6E (CLAM
300PMU-1’s (SA-20A GARGOYLE) 5P85TE, SHELL) low altitude EW radar system.
3
 is a more likely explanation, however. In the
Throughout most of China, strategic case of the Xiamen hybrid site, imagery
SAM sites are designed to support one primary indicates that an S-300PMU-1 battery was
type of system. Each system, be it HQ-2, HQ- replaced in early 2008 by an HQ-2 battery.
9, or an S-300P family member, requires The only logical explanation for the
differing amounts of surface area to erect replacement of an advanced SAM asset such
system components and place support as the S-300PMU-1 with an aging, far less
elements necessary to operate and maintain capable system is that the systems are being
the battery. The hybrid SAM site deviates from rotated through the site.
this norm by providing prepared surface areas
which may not be required at a given instance.
This deviation may provide insight into the role
of some of these facilities as staging bases for
deployed SAM assets.

The Longtian hybrid site, as imaged in

August of 2006, hosted an HQ-2 battery
making use of all six launch positions. By April
of 2009, imagery indicated that the HQ-2
battery had been removed and the site was
occupied by an S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B
GARGOYLE) battery consisting of four
5P85TE2 TELs, a 30N6E2 (TOMB STONE)
TER, and a 96L6E EW radar.

September 2008 imagery depicting an HQ-2 battery

occupying the Xiamen S hybrid SAM site (Google
Earth)

The use of the Longtian and Xiamen

hybrid SAM sites as deployment locations for
strategic SAM batteries is logical given their
geographic location. Both sites are situated in
the southern portion of the Nanjing MR,
adjacent to the Taiwan Strait. It is likely that
operational SAM batteries are deployed
through these locations to provide combat-
certified units in a high-priority region. The
rotation of SAM batteries also allows SAM
units in less sensitive regions to acquire more
May 2010 imagery depicting the Longtian hybrid realistic training and operational experience in
SAM site; S-300PMU-2 components are visible a high-priority region, enhancing their
(Google Earth) effectiveness and therefore the effectiveness of
the Chinese IADS as a whole.
The removal of HQ-2 components and
replacement by the far more capable S- The Nanjing MR is home to five
300PMU-2 system could normally be taken as additional hybrid sites. To of these sites, near
an indication that the older equipment was Zhangzhou and Putian, correspond to the
replaced. Analysis of a second hybrid facility hybrid facilities described previously. The
south of Xiamen indicates that system rotation remaining three hybrid site locations, situated
4
around Nanjing, differ from those found in the and both are located in close proximity to
southeast. All have been constructed on the airfields where combat aircraft have been
grounds of former HQ-2 batteries, but feature noted in the past.
newly constructed pads modeled after those
found on HQ-9 rather than S-300P series sites. The presence of hybrid SAM sites in
Furthermore, the former HQ-2 launch pad potential conflict zones is a significant
revetments have not been fully replaced in development allowing China to rapidly relocate
these sites, but rather two of them have been suitable SAM batteries to a given region to
retained at each location. bolster the air defenses in the area. While
other hybrid sites appear to serve a more
rudimentary function, the presence of the
hybrid sites in general is indicative of China’s
changing air defense structure. The era of
reliance on aging, static SAM batteries has
clearly come to an end.

Hybrid SAM Site Details

Nanjing MR

Nanjing NE
Location: 32°17'54.57"N 119°11'36.65"E
Type: HQ-9
Activity: Converted from HQ-2 to Hybrid
standard between May 2005 and October
2006. Occupied by a displaced HQ-2 partial
Nanjing E hybrid SAM site occupied by an HQ-9 battery in December of 2007.
battery displaying HQ-9 style TEL pads and retained
HQ-2 style revetments (Google Earth)

Given their different layouts, the HQ-9

hybrid sites may not represent deployment
sites. Retaining two HQ-2 revetments allows
for an HQ-2 battery to be emplaced should the
HQ-9 battery be deployed elsewhere for
operational use or crew training. While this
would result in a loss of capability, it would
allow the defended area to retain a degree of
protection following the dispersal of the HQ-9
battery. Additionally, retaining the confining
revetments does not allow for a system such
as the HQ-12 to be deployed in a standard
configuration.

Two other hybrid sites are located in the Nanjing NE hybrid site; HQ-2 battery is present in
Chengdu MR adjacent to the borders with the upper right corner of the image consisting of two
single-rail launchers and a single TER (Google
Nepal and Bhutan. Both of these sites Earth)
represent S-300P capable installations. Given
the relationship between China and India, Nanjing E
these installations likely represent deployment Location: 31°56'13.78"N 119°12'32.88"E
sites similar to those found in the Nanjing MR, Type: HQ-9
5
Activity: Occupied by an HQ-9 battery in Longtian
December of 2007. Location: 25°35'34.29"N 119°26'58.27"E
Type: S-300P
Nanjing S Activity: Unoccupied in April of 2003.
Location: 31°36'16.69"N 118°59'57.50"E Occupied by an HQ-2 battery in September of
Type: HQ-9 2003 and August of 2006. Occupied by an S-
Activity: Occupied by a partial HQ-2 battery in 300PMU-2 battery in April of 2009 and May of
August of 2007. 2010.

Xiamen W
Location: 24°30'04.64"N 117°52'36.14"E
Type: S-300P
Activity: Unoccupied in March of 2003.
Occupied by an HQ-2 battery in December of
2003 and March of 2005. Occupied by an S-
300PMU-2 battery in October of 2009.

Nanjing S hybrid site occupied by an HQ-2 battery

(Google Earth)

Putian
Location: 25°20'47.26"N 119°04'03.19"E
Type: S-300P
Activity: Constructed after July 2005 as a new-
build site.
Xiamen W hybrid site occupied by an S-300PMU-2
battery. The additional launch pads have been
obscured by vegetation but are clearly visible in
previous imagery (Google Earth)

Xiamen S
Location: 24°12'57.36"N 117°56'18.74"E
Type: S-300P
Activity: Occupied by an S-300PMU-1 battery
in November of 2007. Occupied by an HQ-2
battery in August of 2008 and September of
2008.

Chengdu MR

Shigatze AB
Location: 29°20'43.35"N 89°16'00.83"E
Putian hybrid site (Google Earth) Type: S-300P

6
Activity: Constructed between February 2006 control facility, are separated by distances of
and December 2009 as a new-build site. between 210 and 260 kilometers.

China’s four operational OTH-SW facilities are

Shigatze AB hybrid site. The location may still be arrayed along the coastline opposite Taiwan (Google
under construction or may represent an austere field Earth)
deployment site not intended for long-term
occupation (Google Earth)
China’s OTH-SW radar system is
Gonggar assessed to have an azimuth capability of 90
Location: 29°17'41.80"N 90°58'09.10"E degrees and a range not exceeding 400
Type: S-300P kilometers. Given these characteristics,
Activity: Constructed between March and China’s OTH-SW network appears positioned
October 2005 as a new-build site. Occupied to monitor the Taiwan Strait and a sizeable
by an HQ-2 battery in October of 2005. portion of the sea to the north and southwest of
the island.
Historical Perspective
OTH-SW Deployment in
China
Sean O’Connor

As early as 2003, China began to

construct a network of OTH-SW radar facilities
along the coastline adjacent to the Taiwan
Strait. The OTH-SW network represents a
surveillance system potentially capable of
providing preliminary targeting data to anti-ship
ballistic missile (ASBM) batteries.

Four operational OTH-SW facilities have

been identified to date, along with an additional
test facility near Weihai. The installations, Coverage zones of China’s OTH-SW network.
Accuracy in both range and azimuth is likely greater
each consisting of a separate transmitter and in overlapping coverage zones (Google Earth)
receiver position along with an additional

7
 Analysis of the characteristics of the The northernmost OTH-SW facility near
OTH-SW components at the testing facility and Wenzhou is present in imagery from November
the operational sites allows a historical view of of 2003. As this installation represents the
the system deployment to be generated. Of “second generation” OTH-SW design, it is
the four operational OTH-SW locations, three logical to assume that the Fuzhou OTH-SW
share 650 meter receiver arrays and a similar installation was constructed prior to 2003.
transmitter consisting of four arrays placed 28 Similarly, if the Fuzhou OTH-SW site was
degrees apart. The fourth location, along with constructed prior to 2003, then the Weihai
the Weihai development radar, features a OTH-SW test facility logically must have been
transmitter consisting of two parallel arrays. active for a period prior to 2003 as well.
The receiver array at the fourth installation is
also significantly smaller, with a width of only The case of China’s OTH-SW
455 meters. This data indicates that the deployment illustrates the fact that it is not
Fuzhou OTH-SW likely represents the initial specifically necessary to have access to
operational system. historical or archived imagery data to make a
historical or chronological analysis of a given
series of locations. By evaluating the
characteristics of each location and comparing
them with the trial site near Weihai, a general
timeline for system deployment can be
inferred. In this case, it is likely that the Weihai
facility entered use in the 1985-1990
timeframe, based on reporting related to
China’s OTH-SW development program.
Following a development program, the Fuzhou
OTH-SW facility likely entered service in the
1995-2000 timeframe, with the more refined
positions entering service after the year 2000.

OTH-SW Site Details

Weihai OTH-SW Development Facility

Transmitter: 37°32'25.82"N 122°04'30.24"E
Receiver: 37°32'14.33"N 122°04'26.69"E

Wenzhou (Type 2)
Transmitter: 27°46'58.79"N 120°45'54.46"E
Receiver: 27°45'27.94"N 120°45'05.99"E

Fuzhou (Type 1)
Transmitter: 25°47'16.58"N 119°36'51.18"E
Receiver: 25°47'50.42"N 119°36'46.02"E

Xiamen (Type 2)
Transmitter: 24°04'27.20"N 117°53'43.70"E
Receiver: 24°05'29.10"N 117°53'51.90"E

Fuzhou (upper) and Wenzhou (lower) OTH-SW Shantou (Type 2)

transmitter facilities (both images Google Earth) Transmitter: 22°54'28.34"N 116°12'23.89"E
Receiver: 22°55'27.24"N 116°13'27.18"E

8
Strategic Warfare cases can show evidence of concealment.
With a mobile SSM, however, the launch sites
Iranian SSM Facilities may be separated by a significant distance
Sean O’Connor from the garrison, making them less suitable
for identification purposes. In contrast, the
The Iranian SSM force has grown over high-bay garage is a significant structural
the past decade and at present includes feature of many modern SSM facilities. It
multiple missile types designed to target the allows a TEL to be erected in an enclosed
bulk of the Middle Eastern theater of facility to perform calibration, training, and
operations. By combining the efforts of native maintenance tasks.
designers and foreign assistance from sources
including the Democratic People’s Republic of The ideal method of identification
Korea, Iran has established a powerful military remains the sighting of missile components or
arm capable of exerting a significant deal of TELs. However, such identifications are often
military influence in the region. impossible, due to the resolution of the imagery
available, ongoing concealment efforts, or
Identification of SSM-related facilities is foreknowledge of satellite overflight times
not necessarily a simple task. While certain allowing for missile-related components to be
types of test structures such as rocket engine kept hidden to mask their presence and deny
test stands can be readily identified, an assessment of operational strength.
operational SSM facilities can be more difficult
to conclusively locate. There are two factors Ultimately, it takes a combination of
which can aid in the accurate identification of techniques to accurately identify an SSM
an SSM facility: open-source information facility. Furthermore, such assessments can
regarding weapons deployments and facilities, ultimately be proven to be erroneous at a
and identification of key structural components future point in time. What may appear to be a
of a missile base. high-bay garage may in fact be a completely
unrelated structure. A feature classified as a
Open-source information can be a very launch pad may in truth represent an
valuable tool in locating and identifying a equipment checkout pad or may have an
military facility. The main job of the analyst is unknown purpose. It is only by employing
to select the most reliable or accurate source multiple identification techniques that an
material to draw from when making an accurate assessment can be produced, and it
assessment. In the case of Iran, many open- should always be remembered that the result is
source agencies and publications have given an assessment born out of an analytical
the Iranian missile program a great deal of process, and not necessarily a proven fact.
coverage in recent years, owing to the potential
for Iranian SSMs to serve as delivery platforms Test Sites
for a postulated Iranian nuclear device.
The primary Iranian SSM test facility is
Compared to the vetting of open-source located near Semnan, east of Tehran.
data, the identification of structural components Semnan is home to a launch facility for many
located on the grounds of a missile base can Iranian SSM trials, as well as purported SLV
be a more tedious process. If the analyst launches using modified Shahab-3 series
knows what to look for, structural components airframes. While the facility is surrounded by
can confirm or refute open-source numerous minor support complexes, the
assessments of activity or purpose. In the primary feature is the large launch pad and
case of an SSM facility, there are two missile gantry. The launch pad itself has
significant features to identify: launch sites and recently undergone significant changes.
high-bay garages. Launch sites can be
revetted or otherwise prepared and in some
9
 Between 2004 and 2009, the reinforced
concrete launch pad was replaced by a much
larger circular pad echoing Chinese DF-31A
launch sites. In addition, a large gantry
assembly was erected to facilitate the static
erection and launch of SSMs and SLVs without
necessitating the use of operational or test
TELs. Such a feature permits the flight testing
of SSM or SLV airframes without requiring the
development of a new TEL. Furthermore,
missile designs which are intended to be
emplaced in silos or other hardened facilities
can be flight tested using the launch gantry. At
this point in time no test silos have been
identified at Semnan, but should Iran proceed
with widespread silo basing of ballistic missiles
this may change in the future, providing both a The main support complex at Semnan features an
artillery training range to the southeast (Google
test and training location. Earth)

Semnan’s NE support facility has been under

construction since 2009. It features a large buried
concrete bunker (Google Earth)

Operational Sites

Operational SSM facilities in Iran can be

divided into two categories: basic facilities,
and facilities employing some sort of hardened
launch site. Basic SSM garrison and launch
facilities are large, expansive facilities. High-
bay garages can be found in varying numbers,
as well as communications and support
2004 (upper) and 2009 (lower) imagery depicting the
changes made to the Semnan SSM launch facility
facilities. Operational sites often contain
(both images Google Earth) significant numbers of hardened bunkers for
the storage of SSMs and their associated
10
TELs. UGFs are also typically present in weapons in hardened launch facilities, they can
significant numbers, serving as potential SSM be fueled and armed under cover, denying an
storage facilities. adversary the ability to monitor their readiness.

The use of either hardened bunkers or Hardened Sites – Silo-based

UGFs to store missiles does not appear to be
solely dependent on the geography of the The first hardened launch site identified
location. Typically UGFs are expected to in Iran consisted of a silo complex. Between
appear where there is sufficient terrain for 2003 and 2005, a silo complex was
excavation. In some cases, however, both constructed on the grounds of an existing SSM
UGFs and bunkers are present. Both facilities facility south of Tabriz in northwestern Iran.
may be employed as a cost-saving measure, The complex consisted of two missile silos,
as the construction of a hardened bunker is likely intended to house Shahab-3 series
significantly less costly and intensive as the IRBMs based at the existing facility. Between
excavation of a UGF. 2007 and 2008 a second pair of silos appeared
roughly 700 meters SE of the initial pair. A
Hardened Sites third pair of silos later appeared approximately
14 kilometers to the west near the town of
The presence of hardened launch Khosro Shahr.
facilities in Iran is not a surprising
development. As Iran has created and fielded Hardened Sites – Portal-based
a more capable and expansive SSM force,
logic dictates that it would seek out efforts to The second hardened launch site style
protect these weapon systems from identified in Iran is assessed to be unique to
preemptive attack by a hostile foreign power. the nation. At a launch complex near
As imaging and targeting sensors become Khorramabad, launch portals for SSMs have
more accurate and offer increasing resolution, been identified atop UGFs constructed inside
relying on mobile basing is no longer a of the local terrain. This hardened complex
completely effective solution to asset may predate the silo complexes scattered
protection. around Tabriz as they appear fully constructed
in the oldest available imagery captured in
Iran has chosen to construct three 2004.
distinct types of hardened missile facilities.
While representing static locations, these Hardened Sites – Coffin-based
facilities can offer significant advantages to the
Iranian missile force. Furthermore, Iran has The third hardened launch site style
now become the first nation outside of the identified in Iran remains the only style to be
world’s nuclear powers to deploy ballistic found at geographically separated facilities.
missiles in static launch facilities. SSM facilities near Tehran and Shiraz feature
coffin-style launchers, similar to those
Hardened launch facilities can offer employed by the United States for the CGM-
substantially more protection for missile 16D/E Atlas ICBMs. Construction began at
airframes than simple garages. Hardened both locations in the 2004-2005 timeframe, and
launch facilities also allow Iran to mask the the facilities were complete by 2007 (Tehran)
readiness of its assets. The bulk of Iran’s SSM and 2009 (Shiraz). Coffin launchers allow
force consists of liquid-fueled weapons such as SSMs to be stored horizontally, with the
the Shahab-3. While fueling and arming airframe erected through sliding doors for
activities can be conducted in UGFs or firing. Coffin launchers offer the least amount
hangars, often times these activities can be of protection of the three hardened site
discerned due to the movement of certain methods employed by Iran.
types or equipment. By emplacing these
11
Esfahan HQ and communications site (Google Earth) Northwestern UGF and launch site (Google Earth)

12
Kermanshah UGFs and launch sites (Google Earth) NE bunker complex and high-bay garage (Google
Earth)

13
 The Mashad SSM complex is described
in some sources as having a test role for the
Iranian SSM force. With the extensive test
complex near Semnan, this does not appear to
be likely. Furthermore, the facility is located
near the Iran-Afghanistan border. It is unlikely
that test activity would take place in close
proximity to Coalition military forces. This does
not rule out the prospect of the facility having
been employed in a test capacity in the past,
however. While the modification of the
Semnan launch facility after 2004 may have
been primarily due to the desire to employ the
facility as an SLV launch point, it is possible
that test activities at Mashad were relocated to
Semnan shortly after the start of Coalition
Representative bunkers at the Mashad SSM complex activity in Afghanistan.
(Google Earth)

14
Tabriz N HQ and communications site (Google NW UGF complex and high-bay garage (Google
Earth) Earth)

15
 The Tehran N SSM complex is unusual
in that it does not appear to rely on a significant
number of UGFs to house SSM airframes or
associated launchers. Rather, there is a large
military garrison consisting of numerous high-
bay garages, some of which are likely to
contain TELs. Various TELs and other military
equipment such as artillery pieces can be seen
in available imagery, indicating that the facility
does have an SSM-related function. Prepared
launch pads in the area also serve to bolster
this assessment. There are two UGFs present
which may be used to store missile airframes
or warheads, and an inactive MIM-23 HAWK
SAM site which may also be used as an SSM
launch site as it has not seen any resident
Tehran N possible SSM garrison (Google Earth) SAM battery in imagery since 2000.

16
 Khosro Shahr features two SSM silos
similar to those found at the Tabriz S SSM
complex. The Khosro Shahr complex is
different from that found at Tabriz S as it does
not feature a significant number of additional
SSM-related facilities. Rather, Khosro Shahr
appears to exist solely to support the SSM
silos. While the high-bay garage may be able
to support SSM TELs, a more likely use for the
facility is to service and load SSM silo loaders.
However, the presence of a significant support
complex and high-bay garage may indicate
that Khosro Shahr also retains a limited TEL-
based SSM garrison force. Alternatively, the
size of the support complex may indicate that
plans exist for expanding the silo field in the
Khosro Shahr SSM silos (Google Earth) future.

17
Converted HQ-2 site used as an SSM garrison; two Bunker complex and high-bay garage (Google Earth)
Shahab-3 TELs can be seen adjacent to the main
garage in this 2007 imagery (Google Earth)
18
 The silo complexes at the Tabriz S SSM
facility have been constructed on the grounds
of a pre-existing SSM garrison. The site has
been expanded recently to support an
increased number of SSMs. A bunker complex
north of the main operational area was
constructed between 2003 and 2005. This
corresponds to the construction of the initial
silo pair and suggests that the bunkers may
contain additional SSM airframes for silo
emplacement. The silos themselves are
emplaced in pairs, with exhaust gas vents and
a silo loader alignment pad for each individual
silo. The basic silo layout was also employed
at the nearby Khosro Shahr silo complex.
TEL-based SSM operations are conducted
Tabriz S SSM complex SE silo pair (Google Earth) from a former HQ-2 SAM site.

19
Khorramabad (north) support complex and helipad Khorramabad (north) launch site (Google Earth)
(Google Earth)

20
 The Khorramabad SSM complex,
referred to in some source material as the
Imam Ali base, consists of two facilities
separated by terrain. The northern facility
houses multiple UGFs and high-bay garages
for servicing and launching SSMs. Two launch
methods are provided: prepared concrete
launch pads, and protected launch portals
accessed via a large UGF complex permitting
SSMs to be fired from underground TELs. The
southern facility consists of numerous storage
bunkers and concrete launch pads.
Khorramabad is often cited as an SSM
production facility, explaining the large number
of SSM or TEL storage bunkers located on the
grounds of the southern facility.
2007 imagery providing a clearer view of the SSM
launch portals (Google Earth)

21
Khorramabad (south) bunkers and prepared launch Some bunkers feature concrete pads which may
site placed in the roadway (Google Earth) support SSM launch (Google Earth)

22
2007 imagery depicting the Shiraz SSM coffins under 2009 imagery depicting completed coffin launchers
construction (Google Earth) at Shiraz (Google Earth)

23
Northern UGF concentration at Tehran W SSM UGF entrance leading to a possible drive-through
complex (Google Earth) UGF complex (Google Earth)

24
 The Tehran W SSM complex consists of
two main areas, designated north and south.
The north complex consists primarily of UGFs
and high-bay garages for the operational
deployment of SSMs. The south complex
features the second pair of coffin launchers
identified in Iran. The south complex features
a launch revetment and various other positions
which may be used for operational missile
launches. This may indicate that the north
complex is used to store and prepare SSMs,
while the south complex handles launch
operations. The south facility also features a
much smaller support complex, indicating that
it may rely on the facilities at the north complex
for the majority of its operational support
Tehran W SSM complex coffin launchers (Google requirements.
Earth)

25
Software small facility, with little in the way of unique
features apart from the radar berms.
Facility Drawings in GIMP
Sean O’Connor

There are numerous programs available

enabling users to annotate imagery to provide
detailed illustrations for various purposes.
Google Earth itself offers numerous features
enabling users to create annotated imagery.
Employing a standalone program, however,
can often allow users to create far more
detailed illustrations, permitting the use of an
expanded array of editing tools. Imagery depicting a Chinese 64N6E site (Google
Earth)
One of the programs freely available to
In the completed illustration below,
interested users is GIMP. GIMP is a graphics
various colors have been used to illustrate
editor allowing users to create and manipulate
specific features. Paved areas are grey, with a
images using a variety of built-in tools. One of
darker shade of grey illustrating the sides of
the products which GIMP can produce is a
the radar berms to give them a 3D effect.
facility drawing based on overhead imagery.
Green structures indicate support facilities
such as garages or generators, with red
Overhead imagery, either obtained
structures indicating housing and other
commercially or saved from a source such as
administrative facilities. Water pools are
Google Earth, can be imported into GIMP as a
illustrated in blue, and the terrain is illustrated
base image. By creating a transparent layer
in brown, as the imagery used to create the
above the imagery, users can effectively zoom
image did not yet depict the vegetation seen in
in and trace over relevant features. Features
the above imagery.
can then be filled in as desired using the color
palette.
The facility drawing was created by
importing the imagery into GIMP. Once the
Consider the following example. A
imagery was loaded, a second, transparent
64N6E (BIG BIRD) EW site can be located
layer was created to serve as the tracing
near Shanghai, China. This is a relatively

Chinese 64N6E battle management radar site illustrated using GIMP (Sean O’Connor)

26
template. The image was zoomed in to 200 or GIMP offers a number of additional
400% to most accurately trace the individual features, many of which have been exploited to
features using black lines. The smallest create the annotated imagery found in I&A.
circular paintbrush was used for the facilities Interested users are encouraged to download
and pathways themselves, with the 5x5 the program themselves and experiment with it
paintbrush used to outline the perimeter of the to until they are proficient enough to exploit it
facility. To accurately trace each individual for their own use.
facility, each corner was marked in sequence.
By holding down the shift key, points marked Reading List
after the first will be connected to each
previous point by a straight line. This allows The High-Tech Reading
the illustrator to create straight lines without
having to attempt to trace each structure
List
Sean O’Connor
manually. Once the tracings are completed,
the imagery was deleted from the Layers
There are numerous publications
menu, leaving only the transparent layer
available to the open-source researcher
containing the tracings. Following this, each
dealing with high-technology weapon systems.
individual facility or area was filled in using the
This Reading List will introduce readers to
aforementioned color scheme. Finally, the
some of the more useful and detailed
remainder of the transparent layer itself was
publications available in the field of aerospace.
filled in using white. At this point the image
can be saved for future use. To save the
The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Kenneth
image as a JPEG file, however, the illustrator
P. Werrell, AU Press, 1998). Cruise missile
must first remove the remaining Alpha channel
proliferation is a significant issue facing many
from the image by right-clicking on the layer in
of the world’s governments. These weapons
the Layers menu and selecting the appropriate
often provide low-cost, survivable delivery
command.

Xiamen S hybrid SAM site illustrated using

GIMP (Sean O’Connor)

27
platforms for weapons of mass destruction, understanding of physics and algebra is
and are becoming increasingly accurate to the recommended when tackling the text.
point where conventionally-armed weapons
can be employed in a precision strike capacity. Introduction to RF Stealth (David Lynch Jr.,
Dr. Werrell’s Air University publication provides SciTECH, 2004). Mr. Lynch has, at one time
insight into the development and capabilities of or another, been involved with nearly every
the modern cruise missile, from its major LO program in the US military. He has
conceptualization in the years surrounding the authored the definitive open-source text
First World War to its maturation as a Cold War detailing modern LO design. Interestingly, the
nuclear delivery system. While Dr. Werrell’s text only covers LO aircraft design to a small
book ends with development of the AGM-86B degree, used primarily as an illustration of
and BGM-109, the data and testing information calculating RCS figures of different shapes
provided still make it a very interesting from various angles. The bulk of the text
reference. focuses on “electronic stealth”, namely the
fields of LO emitter and signal designs suitable
From RAINBOW to GUSTO (Paul A. Suhler, for LPI radar systems. Mr. Lynch’s book is an
AIAA, 2009). Dr. Suhler has written what may eye-opener relating the amount of detail
be the single most interesting book on the required to develop a true LO platform. An
Lockheed Blackbird family. Forgoing more accompanying CD-ROM includes numerous
typical subjects such as flight testing or MathCAD programs referenced in the text,
operational use, Dr. Suhler focuses on the assisting the reader’s comprehension of a very
efforts to develop a low-RCS reconnaissance complicated field. The only drawback to Mr.
platform. The entire design process is Lynch’s work is that the level of detail requires
revealed, as are the competing Convair FISH a significant understanding of the physics and
and KINGFISH designs. An accompanying mathematics involved.
CD-ROM contains numerous technical
documents relating to the text, a product which Space Weapons, Earth Wars (Bob Preston et
is worth the price in and of itself. Dr. Suhler’s al., RAND, 2002). RAND’s Space Weapons
book is highly recommended not just for survey is not a detailed accounting of
Blackbird enthusiasts, but also for researchers operational or planned weapon systems, but
interested in the genesis and early maturation rather an interesting look into what types of
of LO technology. weapons may be acquired in the future and the
different ways that they will be employed.
Fundamentals of Fighter Design (Ray Kinetic kill and directed energy weapons are
Whitford, Crowood, 2004). Mr. Whitford discussed, as are more ambitious undertakings
provides readers with a basic look at designing such as the weaponization of asteroids. While
a modern fighter aircraft, covering topics such not a purely technical document, the RAND
as aerodynamics and system integration. survey does provide a sampling of technical
Each section is well illustrated and basic data describing the basics of each weapon
concepts are explained in a manner making system discussed. A reader will not only come
them accessible to enthusiasts or researchers away with a basic understanding of space
lacking formal education in aeronautical warfare, but also of the issues relating to their
engineering. employment and proliferation.

Introduction to Airborne Radar (George W. Links

Stimson, SciTECH, 1998). Mr. Stimson’s book
has long been regarded as one of the premier March 2011
texts available on modern airborne radar Sean O’Connor
systems. While focusing primarily on airborne
radar applications, the text includes a host of This month I&A will highlight three very
information applicable to all uses. A basic useful tools for historians, researchers, and
28
students of varying disciplines. The CIA’s aerospace warfare. Furthermore, given that
FOIA page allows users to access digital the AU Press is hosted on the US military
copies of declassified documents from CIA network of sites, foreign users may not be able
archives. RAND and the USAF’s Air University to access its contents. Many of the AU Press
also allow users to browse through research works are available for download as PDF files.
papers, publications, and digital copies of By entering “Cruise Missile” into the search box
printed materials covering a host of subject on the homepage, for example, Dr. Werrell’s
areas. publication mentioned in the Reading List can
be located for download.
The CIA’s FOIA page is accessed at the
following address: http://www.foia.cia.gov To The aforementioned resources are
search for documents relating to a specific excellent tools for conducting research. While
theme or topic, the user enters a search term each has its own limitation in terms of use or
in the search box at the top of the page. scope, each resource remains a highly
Documents can be viewed directly as GIFs or valuable source of information. All three
downloaded as PDF files. In addition to sources are highly recommended.
searching for materials, users can access
different pre-selected collections on the front Source List
page, including the most frequently requested
documents. The only drawbacks to the CIA’s March 2011
FOIA resource are that some documents are
not entirely legible due to poor scans or poor Overhead imagery courtesy of Google
source copies, and that most documents are Earth except where explicitly noted. All
censored or redacted to some degree to annotations and overlays depicted on such
protect various pieces of information. imagery are the work of the respective article’s
author unless explicitly noted.
RAND is a non-profit organization
producing research materials on a variety of China’s Hybrid SAM Sites
topics relevant to the US and the international
community. Accessed at http://www.rand.org, “S-300PMU (SA-10) Air Defence Missile
the website allows users to browse through System.” Sinodefence.com, May 2008. Online
collections of documents and publications to source.
find material relating to a given area of interest.
Typing in “Space Weapons” in the search bar, OTH-SW Deployment in China
for example, will allow the user to access the
publication mentioned in the Reading List. Liu, Bin-Yi. "HF Over-the-Horizon Radar
RAND’s primary drawback is that many of the System Performance Analysis." Thesis. US
pre-2003 documents are large, partitioned Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.
works, and are available for download as a
series of PDF files rather than a single, larger Stokes, Mark A. China's Strategic
file. Modernization: Implications for the United
States. Rep. Carlisle: Strategic Studies
The USAF’s Air University Press Institute, 1999.
publishes researched books, papers, and
dissertations primarily written by current and Wise, John C. Section 5.1 Over-The-Horizon
former USAF personnel. The AU Press (OTH) Radars. Chinese Radars. 7th ed. 2010.
website, accessed at http://aupress.au.af.mil,
allows users to search by keyword, author, or Iranian SSM Facilities
title to locate items of interest. Unlike the CIA
and RAND, the AU Press offerings are Hildreth, Steven A. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile
primarily focused on areas relevant to Programs: An Overview.” CRS, 2009.
29
“Iran Special Weapons Guide: Facilities.”
Globalsecurity.org. Online source.

“Iran: Missile Overview.” NTI.org, October

2010. Online source.

Various articles formerly published on IMINT &

Analysis were drawn upon in the creation of
this article.

Facility Drawings in GIMP

GIMP can be downloaded at the following

address: http://www.gimp.org

30
What Is It? – March 2011
The ability to accurately identify objects, locations, and activity in overhead imagery is an acquired
skill, and like many acquired skills it can degrade with time. Readers are encouraged to apply their
analytical abilities and attempt to determine the answer to the question “what is it?”

The answer to the current “What Is It” will be posted in this space next month, along with a detailed
explanation of the analysis used to arrive at the proper answer.

What Is It? – February 2011

Last month’s What Is It? featured a former Soviet S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) strategic SAM facility
overtaken by a housing development. The S-25 was arrayed around Moscow in two rings,
containing a total of 56 sites. The major identifying feature of an S-25 site is the “herringbone” site
configuration. While it has been expanded in the February image, the basic pattern remains, albeit
now representing roads rather than missile launch positions. Being able to identify the layout of
certain types of installation makes analysis much easier when they are encountered elsewhere.
While the S-25 only deployed around Moscow, various other SAM systems were marketed
worldwide, often using the same site layout regardless of customer.