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BANGLADESH MILITARY ACADEMY

MILITARY HISTORY
CHAPTER 8

BATTLE OF KAMALPUR

"I do not fear an army of lions, if they are led by a lamb.

I do fear an army of sheep, if they are led by a lion."
-Alexander the Great

References:

A. Bangladesh War of Liberation by Major General Imamuz Zaman, Bir Bikrom.

B. Mukti Bahini Wins Victory by Major General A T M Abdul Wahab.
C. Fights for Independence by Lieutenant General A S M Nasim (Retired), Bir Bikrom.

1. Introduction. The battle of Kamalpur occupies a very important place in the

history of the liberation war of Bangladesh. Till the time liberation forces kept themselves
restricted within the limit of defensive role and minor guerrilla operation. After the first
regular ‘Brigade’ Z force was raised on 07 July 71. It carried out first major offensive
operation in Kamalpur. Battle of Kamalpur was one of the fiercely fought battles, where
courage, sacrifice and spirit of the patriotism were best revealed with personal example of
leadership.

2. Aim. To study the battle of kamalpur with a view to utilize the lessons learnt
in future.

3. Enabling Objectives.

a. To learn the background history of the battle.

b. To learn the ORBAT of the battle.

c. To learn the conduct of the battle.

d. To high light the causes own defeat.

e. To bring out the lessons from the battle.

4. Background. Kamalpur is located in Jamalpur district. It was a BOP located

40 miles north of Jamalpur town. It is the south of Garo hills and Tura range where the
Headquarters of Z force was located. It is a flat land interspersed with green vegetation and
swamp. Kamalpur was linked with Jamalpur via Sherpur through metal road. It opens the
gate way to Dhaka through Jamalpur-Mymansing-Tangail. Soon after the crack down,
Pakistan Army occupied the Kamalpur BOP and built it as a fortified strong point. The
enemy had two perimeter defences, outer and inner. The trenches were made shellproof
and of three layers of OHP. First layer was made of earth and tin wall, second layer of rail
beam and third layer of concrete. The entire area was covered by PUNJEES, BOOBY
TRAP and MINES. Near to Kamalpur, Z Force was located in Tura hills opposite to

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Mymensing. Lieutenant Colonel Zia was the first commander of Z force and it consisted of
1, 3, and 8 East Bengal with an artillery battery. Though the Mukti Bahini was carrying out
thousands of minor operation till then no decisive victory could be achieved by the then
liberation force, especially in conventional war. To raise the moral of the fighting troops and
keep the momentum on, it was required to achieve a victory in conventional war.

5. ORBAT. The enemy had one company soldiers of 31 Beluch and one company
of Razakars to hold the strong point. Own forces had 3x companies with a field battery to
launch the attack. The details of own forces are as under:

a. R Group. Major Moin, Officer Commanding 1 East Bengal

(Lieutenant Colonel Zia, Z Force Commander also accompanied the R Group to
have a look at the first attack of his Force).

b. A Company. It was led by Captain Mahboob and acted as cut off party
at Uthanipara.

c. B Company. It was led by Captain Hafiz and acted as left forward

company.

d. C Company. It was led by Captain Salahuddin and acted as right

forward company.

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e. FUP Protection Party. Lieutenant Mannan and Flying Officer Liakat.

f. Assembly Area. It was located at Mahendragonj across the border.

6. The Battle.

a. Reconnaissance. Captian Salauddin Momtaz, who escaped from

Pakistan prison in first week of July 71, joined Mukti Bahini. In the third week of July,
Capt Salahuddn went alone for reconnaissance twice. To be more sure, on 24th
July, he went for the 3 rd time along with Lieutenant Mannan, Subedar Hai , Subedar
Hashim and Naik Shafi. Reaching near BOP, he left his party and only took Subedar
Hai to accompany him to have better look at enemy position. It was night and enemy
troops left the outer perimeter and occupied inner perimeter to have compact
defence. While Captain Slahuddin was approaching the bunkers, suddenly they
came across two Pak soldiers, who were probably coming back from patrolling.
Taken away by the suddenness of the situation Captain Salahuddin, an officer of 105
lbs weight and 5’-5” height jumped on the Pak soldier having a well built body of
about 6’ height. In doing so he probably forgot physical structure of his own.
However, when the Pak soldier realized that he was attacked by his enemy, he
suddenly left aside is 303 rifle, and over powered the Captain by throwing him down
to the ground and was about to strangle him. At this time, the Captain started
shouting for help from Lieutenant Mannan who immediately came rushing to the
scene. He aimed his sten gun at them and asked who it was on the top. Captain
Salahuddin answered some how that the man on top was the enemy. At this
Lieutenant Mannan hurriedly took up position against a tree near by. At about the
same time, Subedar Hai who was nearby, managed to neutralize the other soldiers
by making his hands up. He snatched away the G-3 rifle from the soldier who
suddenly ran away for his life towards a bunker Naik Shafi, who was standing nearby
hesitated a little bit for darkness and confusion, and finally fired a few rounds
towards the fleeing enemy. Subedar Hai with the captured G-3 rifle in hand hurriedly
came near the enemy still engaging in the act of struggling Captian Salahuddin. The
enemy then left the Captian and ran away for his life. The reconnaissance party
came back safe and sound along with the 303 and G-3 rifle. Soon after, it was
discovered that the 303 rifle had a bullet in its chamber while the G-3 had none. The
reconnaissance carried out by Captain Salahuddin and his group considerably
contributed to raise the morale of the Mukti Bahini but at the same time it also helped
the enemy to know the intention of their adversary. They doubled their strength into 2
companies overnight. Only two days after reconnaissance was over, the actual
attack commenced.

b. The Progress of the Battle. H hour was fixed at 0330, artillery fire
support was kept on call as well as on timed programme. It so happened that the
main assaulting force could not reach FUP in time due to poor guidance system. The
move was unusually delayed. The wireless communications got jammed and the
artillery fire support could not be adjusted as per the situation. Rather, before the
troops reached the FUP, own artillery elements started bombarding as per their
timed programmed given earlier. At this, the attacking troops got bewildered and
disorganized. It became extremely difficult to keep command and control which was
the crucial need of that moment. The offensive speed was to be maintained at any

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cost. Hence, came the persuasive call from the accompanying Force commander
Lieutenant Colonel Zia and the battalion commander Major Moin pressed the troops
hard to form up and get on going for the assault. At this the two commanders
Captain Salahuddin and Lieutenant Hafiz somehow managed to form up the SL. But
no sooner had they started off for assault then the enemy artillery fire started pouring
on them. The troops hit the ground. It became really difficult for Captain Salahuddin
now to raise them from the ground and got them going ahead. But he was a
determined soul. He used violent means like kicking, using rough word etc, to get
them up from the ground. Inspite of knowing the fact that his own position would

be revealed to the enemy. It worked and the troops gained their courage and made
an assault on the enemy. They crossed the first line of the enemy’s defence and

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about 20 to 25 of them got inside a community center nearby. There, after in a hand-
to-hand fight only two could come out safely. Others embraced martyrdom. In the
meantime, Subedar Hai who had a platoon of 40, lost about 20 to 25 in the fight. The
enemy under the pressure of the attacking force got back from their first line of
defence and concentrated on their second line to launch a counter attack. Colonel
Zia who was observing the whole situation from the close vicinity shouted “I will
accept 95% casualty, but press them out, Moin“. By now Subedar Hai got struck up
in the minefield. Naik Shafi lost his hand by the stroke of a mine. Bullets of the
enemy came like shower of rain all around. Naik Shafi requested Captain Salahuddin
to take up position on the ground. But it was not for the brave Captain to listen. He
used the megaphone and asked Subeder Hai to go towards the right. His position
was revealed. Suddenly 2/3 artillery shells landed up right in front of him and he
instantaneously embraced martyrdom. While dying, he had been still wearing the
white shirt which he was supposed to put off during night. Attempts were made to
recover his dead body, but only his sten, wristwatch and white shirt could be brought
back. Captain Hafiz saved himself miraculously even though his sten was blown
away by the splinter of an artillery shell. Lieutenant Mannan got injured by receiving
a bullet in his thighs. When he was assisting Major Moin was giving orders from
behind a tree. After the death of Captain Salahuddin, the attack was organized in
small groups, but visualizing impossibility of success, final withdrawal order was
issued at 0720 hours on 01 August 1971. After this, Kamalpur was attacked about 21
times and finally on 04 December 1971, it was liberated. In the battle of Kamalpur,
Pakistan Army came out as the victor. They could withstand the onslaught of the
attacking force and defeated them through a successful counter attack. They
however, incurred quite a huge number of casualties exact figure of which was not
ascertained. Local sources claimed that they saw dead bodies being carried by 3 x 3
ton trucks. Some other source says that it was 50. The battle served to be an eye
opener for Pakistan Army about the brave capabilities of the Mukti Bahini. A sense of
fear was aroused in their mind and they became extra cautious and went on
suffering from kamalpur phobia. Own forces lost one officer and thirty other ranks.
Sixty persons including two officers were injured, though they accepted defeat, they
fought quite valiantly like real tigers. Pakistan Army was made to realize that the
Bangalees fight not only from a distance but they also have the guts to go closer to
the bunkers to drive the enemy out as well.

7. Causes of Defeat. The defeat of Mukti Bahini was due to number of causes.
These are:

a. Faulty Reconnaissance. The reconnaissance carried out by Mukti Bahini

was faulty, because it failed to properly determine the FUP and the route to FUP
from the Assembly Area. As a result troops failed to reach the FUP in time. The hand
to hand fight of the reconnaissance party with the Pak soldiers gave away the
intention of mukti Bahini.

b. Fire Support Plan. As it was a deliberate attack, artillery fire support

was kept both on call and timed programme. But then the timed fire support lacked
flexibility so the mishap took place.

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c. Poor Guidance System. Due to the lack of proper guidance system the
assaulting troops could not maintain direction and hence, failed to reach FUP in time.

d. Poor Communication System. Mukti Bahini did not have any

communication means other than wireless sets. With the jamming of these sets,
communication system failed and it became difficult to organize the troops.

e. Inferior Strength. In this attack, the normal ratio between the attacker and
the defender, 3:1 was not maintained. As it has been shown previously in the relative
strength, it was only 3: 2 and hence, the utter defeat in the offensive took place.

8. Lessons Learnt. From the battle of Kamalpur, following lessons come out clearly:

a. Proper Reconnaissance. Any kind of encounter during the

reconnaissance is hazardous. Route to FUP from assembly area should be marked
well.

b. Proper Guidance System. Any lapse in the direction keeping

procedure makes confusion which may be detrimental to the mission.

c. Artillery Fire Support. It should have flexibility to meet unforeseen

situation.

d. Duplicating of Communication System. It is of great importance in

avoiding confusion and achieving execution of an operation.

e. Superior Military Strength. It is a pre-requisite for an offensive

operation.

9. Conclusion. At the end, it can be said that even though Mukti Bahini was
defeated in their first major offensive at kamalpur, it was a glorious defeat. Lessons brought
out from this battle had a positive influence on the subsequent operations of the Mukti
Bahini. Hence, it can be said that if Mukti Bahini cannot be given the award of a winner,
they certainly deserve the awards of the best looser, Personal example of leadership and
self sacrifice of the martyr will remain as source of inspiration and guidance to the future
generation of Bangladesh.

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