Team Code: TC 110_P

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA

IN THE MATTER OF

(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. _______ of 2021)

UNDER ART. 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AMPHISSA

DANIEL & OTHRS. …APPELLANTS

V.

STATE OF UPPAM PRADESH …RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH
(W.P. (CIVIL) NO. ______OF 2021)
UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AMPHISSA

DANIEL & OTHRS. …PETITIONERS

V.

STATE OF UPPAM PRADESH …

RESPONDENT

[MEMORIAL FILED ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS]

COUNSELS APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................................................................................II
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................................................III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................................................................IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.............................................................................................VII
STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................................VIII
ISSUES RAISED..........................................................................................................................X
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS....................................................................................................XI
I. THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 IS MAINTAINABLE........XI
II. THAT THE DENIAL OF BAIL AND ISSUE OF THE WARRANT BY THE LEARNED
MAGISTRATE IS JUSTIFIED OR NOT....................................................................................XI

III. THAT THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE IS ULTRA VIRES PART III AND THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION...................................................................................XI

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...........................................................................................................1
I. THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 IS MAINTAINABLE..........1
A. That there exists a substantial question of law of general public importance.........1

B. That there is a gross injustice to the petitioner and his family in the instant case.. .2

II. THAT THE DENIAL OF BAIL AND ISSUE OF THE WARRANT BY THE LEARNED
MAGISTRATE IS NOT JUSTIFIED.............................................................................................3

A. That there has been no offence under the anti-conversion ordinance......................3

B. That there is no valid ground for denial of bail.......................................................4

C. That the issuance of a non-bailable warrant is not justified....................................5

III. THAT THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE IS ULTRA VIRES PART III AND THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION.....................................................................................6

A. That the ordinance passed by the governor is subject to judicial scrutiny..............7

B. That the anti-conversion ordinance violates art. 14 of the constitution...................9

C. That the anti-conversion ordinance violates art. 19 and art. 21.............................11

D. That the anti-conversion ordinance violates art. 25. of the constitution................13

PRAYER................................................................................................................................XIII

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbol Abbreviations

AIR All India Reporter

AIC All India Cases

APC Amphissa Penal Code

Art. Article

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure

CTC Current Tamil Nadu Cases

Et al Et alia

Etc Et cetera

Hon’ble Honorable

IPC Indian Penal Code

IT Information Technology

M.P. Madhya Pradesh

¶ Paragraph

RCR Recent Criminal Reports

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCJ Supreme Court Journal

§ Section

SLP Special Leave Petition

T.N. Tamil Nadu

U.P. Uttar Pradesh

UOI Union of India

v. Versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Case Name Page No.s

A.K. Roy Ors. v. Union Of India, 1982 AIR 710. 8

Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 SCC 722. 10

Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273. 2
Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397. 11
Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., 1951 AIR 118. 13
Dale & Carrington Investment Ltd. v. P.K. Prathapan, (2005) 1 SCC 212. 1
Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1959 AIR 648. 9
Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, 1991 AIR 2176. 2
Directorate of Revenue v. Mohammed Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370 12
Durga Shankar v Raghu Raj, AIR 1954 SC 520 1
Durgah Committee v. Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402. 13
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3. 10
Evangelical Fellowship of India v. State of H.P., 2013 (4) RCR 283; 12
Ganga Kumar Srivastava v.  State Of Bihar, (2005) 6 SCC 211 1
Govind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2 SCC 148 12
Gurjeet Singh Johar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 210 AIC 682. 6
I.R Coelho (Dead) By Lrs. v. State Of T.N., (1999) 7 SCC 580 7
Inder Mohan Gowswamy v. State of Uttaranchal, 2007 (5) CTC 614 (SC). 6
Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 7
J.B Chopra v. Union Of India, (1987) 1 SCC 422. 7
Janshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, (2004) 3 SCC 214 1
Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 12
Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1. 12
Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu, (1992) 1 SCC 309 7
Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2017 (2) SCJ 136. 7
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union Of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 7
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597. 9
Mohammad Ishaq v. State, AIR 1961 All 522. 9
Mohd. Nadeem V. State Of U.P., 2020 Scc Online All 1496. 4

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Mr. X v. hospital Z, (1998) 8 SCC 296 12

Ms.Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. Thiru.P.Varadarajan, (2018) 5 MLJ 423. 12
N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196 1
Narpatsingh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666 1
P. Sambamurthy v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, (1987) 1 SCC 362 7
Pritam Singh v. The State, 1950 AIR 169. 2
PUCL v. UOI, (1997) 1 SCC 301 12
R Rajagopal v. state of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632 12
R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628 10
Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, AIR 1951 Mad 969 1
S.R. Bommai v Union of India, (1994)3 SCC 1. 8
Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M, (2018) 16 SCC 368. 12
Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493 12
Shreya Singhal v. UOI, (2013) 12 SCC 73 14
State of M.P. v. Baldeo Prasad, 1961 AIR 293. 14
State of Maharshtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 5 12
State of UP through CBI v Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21. 5
State Through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, 2000 (10) SCC 438. 6
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1. 10
The State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, 1951 AIR 318. 14

BOOKS REFERRED LIST OF CASES LIST OF CASES

1. DURGADAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Vol. 1 &

2. (14th ed., 2009).
2. JAIN MP., Indian Constitutional Law (6th ed., Lexis NexisButtersworth, 2010).
3. PANDEY J.N., Constitutional Law of India (57th ed., Central Law Agency, 2020).
4. H.M SEERVAI., Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1 & 2 (4th ed., 2006).
5. K I VIBUTE, PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law (13th ed., Lexis Nexis 2019).
6. B.M GANDHI, Indian Penal Code.

STATUTES REFERRED

1. The Constitution of India, 1950.

2. Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

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3. Indian Penal Code, 1860.

4. Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religious Ordinance, 2020.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

In the Writ Petition of Daniel and Othrs. v. State of Uppam Pradesh, the Petitioners have
approached this Hon’ble Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of Amphissa1.

In the Special Leave Petition of Daniel and Othrs. v. State of Uppam Pradesh, the Appellants
have approached this Hon’ble Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of Amphissa2.

It is submitted that this memorandum for two petitions filed before this Hon’ble Court has
been clubbed together by the power conferred under Article 139A of the Constitution of
Amphissa.3

All of which is respectfully submitted

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Republic of Amphissa is one of the ancient nations in the world and is located in the
South Asian region of Asia. It achieved independence in 1947 before which it was a British
1
Article 32 of the Constitution of Amphissa:
“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part,
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.”
2
Article 136 of the Constitution of Amphissa:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to
appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by
any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.”
3

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colony. The constitution of the Republic of Amphissa came into force in 1950 and has
adopted a Parliamentary system of government wherein President is the executive head of the
government. The majority of the religion of Amphissa is Hindu and covers 75% of the
population and the rest of the population are followers of Islam, Christianity, and Jainism.

The Constitution of the Republic of Amphissa declares various Fundamental rights such as
the right to freedom of religion, right to life and personal liberty, etc. The state has the
Amphissian Penal Code which deals with various offences prescribing punishments for the
same, apart from other laws of the nation.

In March 2019 certain newspapers published a report that stated that there have been 3,000-
4,000 conversions in the past four years having the nature of Love Jihad in the Republic of
Amphissa. Jurisprudence from High Courts across the country has said that conversion is not
a casual manner. In 2014, the High Court of Uppam Pradesh stated in a judgment that if
conversion “is resorted to merely with the object of creating a ground for some claim of
right” it would be “a fraud upon the law”.

The state of Uppam Pradesh is the largest state of Amphissa and has often been in news
because of its controversies like Anti- Romeo Squad, cow vigilantes, and other Hindu
religious organizations. On 20 November 2020, the Uppam Pradesh state cabinet declared
‘The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance’ following
which it was approved and signed by the state governor on 24 November 2020. The Uppam
Pradesh Ordinance makes conversion non-bailable with up to 10 years of jail time if
undertaken through misinformation, unlawfully, forcefully, allurement, or other allegedly
fraudulent means.

In December 2020, Ms. Prabha and Mr. Daniel, a Jain and Muslim by religion wished to
marry each other under the Special Marriage Act, 1956. Prabha decided to convert to Islam
out of her love and respect for Daniel’s family hoping that his family would be more willing
to accept their marriage if she undertakes such a gesture. However, the conversion was kept
secret from Prabha’s family. On 10 January 2021, they got married and shifted into a separate
apartment of their own in Jallabad.

On 11 March 2020, they decided to visit Daniel’s home in Lucknow. Due to rising Covid
cases within the state, a two-week Lockdown was announced in the state on 15 March. In the
midst of this, Prabha’s younger brother fell from the stairs and was put to bed- rest. Prabha
strongly wished to visit him several times but Daniel’s family did not allow her to go due to
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limited transportation options and on an apprehension of her contracting Covid- 19. Prabha
had requested many times to Daniel and her in-laws but they did not permit her to leave.
Hence, she started feeling like a prisoner in the house of her in-laws.

After two months she called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Upon knowing the
details of their marriage and the Conversion, they suspected that Daniel and his family had
forced Prabha to convert into a different religion. Thus, her family filed an FIR in Rainbow
Police Station against Daniel’s family under section 498 APC (Amphissa Penal Code),
section 340 APC as well as under the Uppam Pradesh Anti-Conversion Ordinance. On 20
May 2021, Bajna district police arrested Daniel’s family. The magistrate denied bail to
Daniel’s family and issued a non-bailable warrant against Daniel under section 498A of APC.

Daniel and his family preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and also
filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful
Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020. The SLP is at the admission stage and considering
the substantial questions of law relating to interpretations of the Constitution; both the
petitions are scheduled for hearing before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.

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ISSUES RAISED

[I]

WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 IS MAINTAINABLE?

[II]

WHETHER THE DENIAL OF BAIL AND ISSUE OF THE WARRANT BY THE MAGISTRATE IS
JUSTIFIED OR NOT?

[III]

WHETHER THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE IS ULTRA VIRES PART III AND THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 IS MAINTAINABLE.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Petitioners has approached the
court under Article 136 as it involves a substantial question of law of public importance
and a gross injustice has been done. The Supreme Court has exceptional power which
can be invoked under extraordinary situations and circumstances. The magistrate has
denied the bail to Daniel’s family without taking into consideration valid reasons and
thus there has been a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution which provides the
Right to Personal Liberty. Violation of fundamental rights is a question of law of public
importance and denying bail without following the due procedure is an unjust and
arbitrary decision. Thus, the Special Leave Petition is maintainable before the Hon’ble
Court.

II. THAT THE DENIAL OF BAIL AND ISSUE OF THE WARRANT BY THE LEARNED MAGISTRATE IS JUSTIFIED
OR NOT.

The Petitioners humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that sections 2 and 3 of the Anti-
Conversion Ordinance list down the essential elements required for holding a person liable
under the act. Daniel’s family has not committed an offence under the act. Moreover, no
offence has been committed by them under Article 498A of APC (Amphissa Penal Code)
which holds a husband and relatives of a husband liable for inflicting cruelty to a married
woman. The magistrate has denied the bail without taking into consideration the facts and
evidence available to him. Non Bailable Warrant was issued against Daniel but the learned
Magistrate did not follow the procedure under section 73 of CrPC. No chargesheet or report
has been filed by the police and the court has not taken cognizance. Thus, the denial of bail
and issue of a Non-Bailable Warrant by the Magistrate was not justified.

III. THAT THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE IS ULTRA VIRES PART III AND THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION.

The Petitioners humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that various articles of the Anti-
Conversion Ordinanceviolate Part III of the Constitution and the basic structure of the

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Constitution because they violate several fundamental rights. The Petitioners further contend
that the Ordinance, on its whole, is an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction on the right to
life and religious freedom granted by the Constitution.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 IS MAINTAINABLE.

1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Special Leave Petition filed
by Petitioners, Daniel, and his family is maintainable, as in the instant case, there occurs a
substantial question of law of general public importance and grave injustice has been
done. There has been an infringement of Part 3 of the Indian constitution which
guarantees fundamental rights. Therefore, the Hon'ble Court must accept the SLP filed
under Article 136 of the constitution on the grounds that, [A] there exists a substantial
question of law of general public importance, and [B] there is a gross injustice to the
Petitioners and his family in the instant case.

A. THAT THERE EXISTS A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL

PUBLICIMPORTANCE.

2. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Article 136 empowers the Supreme
Court with a discretionary power4that it can exercise under extraordinary situations or in a
situation where a gross failure of justice occurs5. The residuary power provided by Article
136 to Hon'ble Court is exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law in cases where
the need of justice demands interference by the Supreme Court of the land6.Illegality
should not be allowed to be perpetrated merely for the sake of upholding technicalities.7
3. The Supreme Court can interfere in cases where the due procedure has not been
followed along with non-consideration of relevant materials 8.The term ‘substantial
question of law means a matter which is of general public importance, which directly or
substantially affects the rights of the parties, or it has already been decided by the highest
Court.9
4. In the instant case, there has been a violation of fundamental rights available to Daniel
and his family under Part 3 of the Indian Constitution. They were arrested, denied bail,
and a non-bailable warrant was issued against them under section 498-A of APC 10.
Moreover, in the case of Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, the Hon'ble Court laid down
4
INDIA CONST. art. 136.
5
Narpatsingh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666; See also, N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss,
(2007) 9 SCC 196; Ganga Kumar Srivastava v.  State Of Bihar, (2005) 6 SCC 211, 217 (¶ 10).
6
Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, AIR 1954 SC 520.
7
Janshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, (2004) 3 SCC 214.
8
Dale & Carrington Investment Ltd. v. P.K. Prathapan, (2005) 1 SCC 212.
9
Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, AIR 1951 Mad 969; Sir Chunilal v. Mehta And Sons, Ltd v. The
Century Spinning, 1962 AIR 1314.
10
MOOT PROPOSITION, ¶ 14.

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some guidelines to prevent unnecessary arrest and authorization of detention by

Magistrate11.The proposition remains silent on the steps followed by the police while
making the arrest along with denial of bail by the Magistrate. It can be concluded that
there has been a violation of Article 21 which guarantees personal liberty 12. There has
been non-adherence tothe due procedure laid down under section 198A of CrPC.
13
Therefore, Daniel and his family have been treated unjustly and arbitrarily and it
amounts to a substantial question of law of public importance.

B. THATTHERE IS A GROSS INJUSTICE TO THE PETITIONER AND HIS FAMILY IN THE

INSTANTCASE.

5. Under Special Leave Petition, the Hon'ble Court has ruled that "The plenary
jurisdiction of this Court to grant leave and hear appeals against any order of a court or
tribunal, confers power of judicial superintendence over all courts and tribunals in the
territory of India including subordinate courts of Magistrate and District Judge”14. In the
instant case, there has been gross injustice meted out to Daniel and his family as the
District Magistrate denied bail to them and issued a non-bailable warrant against them
which was an arbitrary decision. This petition filed before the Hon'ble Court involves an
extraordinary situation where injustice has been done15. Thus, the Hon'ble Court can use
its residuary power available under Article 136.
6. There has been a violation of Part 3 of the Indian Constitution which guarantees
Fundamental Rights. Section 3 of the Anti-Conversion Act lays down that conversion by
misrepresentation,force,undue influence, coercion allurement or fraudulent means is
illegal and a punishable offence16. Daniel and his family did not commit an offence under
this section as there was no misrepresentation, force, coercion, undue influence,
allurement or fraud means from their side and it was Prabha's own decision to convert to
Islam17. It is mentioned in the proposition that Daniel's family accepted their marriage
without laying down any condition. Thus, it is brought before the notice of Hon'ble Court
that although there has been no violation of section 3 of Anti-Conversion Ordinance,

11
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.
12
INDIA CONST. art. 21.
13
Crim. Proc. Code § 198A.
14
Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, 1991 AIR 2176.
15
Pritam Singh v. The State, 1950 AIR 169.
16
The Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, No. 21, § 3, Acts of
Uttar Pradesh State Legislature, 2020.
17
MOOT PROPOSITION, ¶ 10.

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Daniel, and his family were arrested and denied bail thus, infringing their Right to
Personal Liberty under Article 21.

II. THATTHE DENIAL OF BAIL AND ISSUE OF THE WARRANT BY THE LEARNED MAGISTRATE IS NOT
JUSTIFIED.

7. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the denial of bail and issue of the
warrant by the Magistrate is not justified on the grounds that,[A]there has been no offence
under the Anti-Conversion Ordinance, [B]there is no valid ground for denial of bail, [C]
the issuance of the non-bailable warrant by the learned Magistrate is not justified.

A. THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFENCE UNDER THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE.

8. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that Section 3 of Anti-Conversion

Ordinance prohibits any conversion by use of misrepresentation, force, undue influence,
coercion, allurement, or by any fraudulent means or by marriage 18. The act lays down
some definitionsthat will be used to establish that there has been no violation of the
Ordinance.
9. 'Coercion' means compelling an individual to act against his/her will by the use of
psychological pressure or physical force causing bodily injury or threat thereof 19. In the
instant case, there has been no event where Daniel and his family had used any force or
pressure to get Prabha converted.
10. 'Force' means a show of force or a threat of injury of any kind to the person converted
or sought to be converted or to any other person or property 20. In the instant case, it was
Prabha's own decision to get converted to Islam and there was no force or threat of injury
on the part of Daniel's family.
11. 'Fraudulent means' which includes impersonation of any kind, impersonation by a
false name, surname, religious symbol, or otherwise21. In the instant case, Daniel did not
change or hide his identity from Prabha and thus it cannot fall under fraudulent means.
12. ‘Allurement' means and includes an offer of any temptation in the form of (i) any
gift, gratification, cash or material benefit either in cash or kind; (ii) employment, free
education in reputed schools run by any religious body; or (iii) better lifestyle, divine
displeasure or otherwise.22 In the present case, Daniel's family accepted Prabha without

18
Supra note 16.
19
Id. at § 2(a).
20
Supra note 16, at § 2(d).
21
Supra note 16, at§ 2 (e).
22
Id. at § 2 (a).

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luring her with the above-mentioned offers and thus there was no violation of this
condition.
13. 'Undue Influence' means the unconscientious use by one person of his/her power or
influence over another to persuade the other to act by the will of the person exercising
such influence23. In the present case, Daniel or his family never asserted their will on
Prabha for conversion; hence this condition is also not fulfilled.
14. It is contended before the Hon’ble Court that at least one of the above-mentioned
essential elements must be fulfilled to hold a person liable under the Anti- Conversion
Ordinance and in this case, no elements have been violated. Thus, it is contented before
the Hon'ble Court that no offence has been done by Daniel and his family under this act.

C. THAT THERE IS NO VALID GROUND FOR DENIAL OF BAIL.

15. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the learned Magistrate did not
follow the due procedure while denying the bail. Section 437 of CrPC lays down that if
further investigation is necessary to prove that the accused is guilty then bail must be
given to him24. From the behavior of Daniel and his family, it does not appear that they
are a threat to society or they can run away or tamper with the evidence.
16. It is contented before the Hon'ble Court that Allahabad High Court in its ruling
observed that: "there is no material before us that any force or coercive process is being
adopted by the petitioner to convert wife of the informant 25" and therefore ruled that "Till
the next date of listing no coercive measure shall be taken against the petitioner in
connection with Case Crime No.0321 of 2020, under Sections 504, 506, 120-B IPC and
Section 3/5 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion
Ordinance 2020 (U.P. Ordinance No.21 of 2020) registered at Police
StationMansoorpur, District-Muzaffar Nagar."26
17. In the case of Stateof U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi, matters to be
considered in an application of bail was given: “(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and
gravity of the charge;(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv)
danger of accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behavior,
means, position, and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being

23
Supra note 16, at§ 2 (j).
24
Crim. Proc. Code § 437.
25
Mohd. Nadeem v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1496.
26
Supra note 25.

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repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii)
danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail."27
18. It is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that in the instant case, none of the
reasonable ground for denying bail has been justified and learned Magistrate did not lay
down the reasons for denying the bail to his family. The Petitioners did not have any
intention of absconding away or tampering with the evidence. Therefore, it is contented
before the Hon'ble Court that bail must have been granted to the Petitioners.

D. THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A NON-BAILABLE WARRANT IS NOT JUSTIFIED

19. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Petitioners have been
arrested after a complaint was filed under Section 489A of APC which holds the husband
or relative of the husband of a woman liable for subjecting her to cruelty 28. This section
makes it a non-bailable offence. According to section 198A of CrPC, the Hon'ble Court
can take cognizance of offence on the report of facts by the police or upon receiving a
complaint by the aggrieved person or his relatives. 29
20. Section 73 of CrPC lays down that against whom a non-bailable warrant can be issued
against any person who is: escaped convict, proclaimed offender,or any person who is
accused of a non-bailable offence andis evading arrest.30
21. The apex court held in the case of Inder Mohan Gowswamy and Anr. v. State of
Uttaranchal &Ors that if the accused is not evading his arrest, then there is no need for
issuance of a non-bailable warrant31. Further, in the case of Gurjeet Singh Johar v. the
State of Punjab, the court held that under Sec. 73 the Magistrate can issue warrants
against a person who is evading arrest, only if such a person was required to appear
before the court under some other order passed under some other provision.32
22. Further, in the case of CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, the Hon'ble Court held that
the Magistrate can judicially exercise his power to issue a non-bailable warrant to arrest a
person who has been absconding after committing a crime.33
23. In the instant case, Daniel does not fall under the ambiguity of Section 73 of CrPC as
it has been contented before the Hon’ble Court that Daniel has not committed any offence
under Section 3 of Uppam Pradesh Anti-Conversion Ordinance and Section 498A of
27
State of UP through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21.
28
Indian Pen. Code § 489A.
29
Id. at § 198A.
30
Crim. Proc. Code § 73.
31
Inder Mohan Gowswamy v. State of Uttaranchal, 2007 (5) CTC 614 (SC).
32
Gurjeet Singh Johar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 210 AIC 682.
33
State Through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, 2000 (10) SCC 438.

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APC. Further, the Police did not file a report or chargesheet and a mere complaint has
been filed. Thus, a Non- Bailable Warrant cannot be issued under the said provision.
24. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that issuance of NBW was an unjust,
unreasonable, and arbitrary decision leading to gross injustice meted out to the
Petitioners.Thus, in the present case, the issue of a non-bailable warrant by the learned
magistrate is not justified.

IV. THAT THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE IS ULTRA VIRES PART III AND THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION.

25. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Anti-Conversion
Ordinance is blatantly violative of Part III of the Constitution as it contravenes Art. 14,
Art. 19(1)(g), Art. 21 and Art. 25 of the Constitution. Moreover, the government has
turned the emergent power under Art. 213 into a source of parallel lawmaking, which is
contrary to the Constitution's design. Hence by intervening with the Fundamental Rights
and the basic design of the Constitution this Ordinance violates the basic structure of the
Constitution on the grounds that, [A] the Ordinance passed by the Governor is subject to
judicial scrutiny, [B]the Anti-Conversion Ordinance violates art. 14 of the constitution,
[C]the Anti-Conversion Ordinance violates art. 19 and art. 21, [D]the Anti-Conversion
Ordinance violates art. 25. of the constitution.

A. THAT THE ORDINANCE PASSED BY THE GOVERNOR IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

26. It is humbly submitted by the Petitioners before this Hon’ble SC that the Ordinance
passed by the Governor is indeed subject to judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of judicial
review is considered a fundamental aspect of the basic structure of the Constitution 34. A
judicial review is a form of creative interpretation that acts as a constant check on the
legislative and executive branches of government.35
27. Governor of a state draws Ordinance making power from Article 213, Chapter IV;
Part VI of the Constitution. All Ordinances promulgated by the Governor in the State
have the same effect and force as an Act of Legislature of the State. If the Governor is
satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate

34
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299; See also, I.R Coelho (Dead) By Lrs. v. State Of T.N., (1999)
7 SCC 580; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union Of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261; Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu, (1992) 1
SCC 309; P. Sambamurthy v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, (1987) 1 SCC 362; J.B Chopra v. Union Of India,
(1987) 1 SCC 422.
35
Henry J. Abraham, The Judical Process 293 (5th ed. 1986). et. al.; Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in The
Contemporary World 98-100 (1971).

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action, he may promulgate such Ordinance as the circumstances appear to him 36. Power to
promulgate an Ordinance can be tested by the presence of the following three
circumstances: (i) Recess of State Legislature; (ii) Legislative competence & (iii)
Subjective satisfaction.37
28. Corroborating with the facts of the present case, the Ordinance fails the test of
subjective satisfaction. According to the judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of
Bihar, Justice DY Chandrachud observed that— “The existence of circumstances is an
objective fact. The Governor (or the President) is required to form a satisfaction of the
existence of circumstances that makes it necessary to take immediate action. Necessity is
distinguished from mere desirability.”38Corroborating this with the facts of the present
case, the Petitioners humbly submits that there exists no necessity that makes it necessary
to take immediate action.
29. When there are no extraordinary conditions, the subjective satisfaction criterion is
incomplete. The question of whether there were genuinely unusual circumstances
warranting immediate response is open to judicial review because the legislative power to
promulgate an Ordinance is conditional. The Supreme Court has unquestionably the
authority to examine and pronounce whether the Governor took immediate action or if it
was an abuse of power.
30. It is further submitted to the Hon’ble Court that 7 judge-bench in Krishna Kumar
Singh v.State of Bihar applied the principles which emerged in the case of S.R. Bommai
v. Union of India and held that “the satisfaction of the President under Article 123(1) or
of the Governor under Article 213(1) is not immune from judicial review”.This implies
that the powers granted by the Constitution are indeed subject to judicial review. As a
result, the compelling circumstances, their importance, and their relationship to the
Ordinance's content and substance are all subject to judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that subjective satisfaction and misuse of authority are both amenable
to judicial review in several decisions. In other words, in a rare case, the court may be
justified in interfering with the exercise of authority if the court decides that the use of
authority is founded on spurious grounds and provides no satisfaction at all.39
31. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Justice Chandrachud pointed out
that while the 38th Amendment to the Constitution amended Articles 123 and 213 to

36
INDIA CONST. art. 213.
37 1. (2) SCJ 136.
Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2017
F

38
Id.
39
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994)3 SCC 1.

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provide that the President's/Governor's satisfaction could not be "questioned in any court

on any ground," These clauses were repealed by the Forty-fourth Amendment 40. As a
result, it was implied that Governor's satisfaction has always been subject to judicial
review and examination. There would have been no need to rescind the 38th Amendment
after the Emergency ended if it had merely been an Amendment to provide clarity,
expressing what had always been the legal situation. The executive was given the power
to legislate by the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly, on the other hand,
did not intend for the executive to abuse the power it had been given. In the present case,
it can be seen that the executive abused the power it had been given by the legislature.
32. Before resorting to the unusual measure of promulgating an Ordinance, Art. 213 of
the Constitution specifies out the prerequisites. In this scenario, the government has
turned the emergent power under Article 213 into a source of parallel lawmaking, which
is contrary to the Constitution's design. As a result, the Petitioners' counsel humbly
submits that there is no extraordinary circumstance at hand, nor is there a grave or
imminent threat to public order that requires quick action, and so the Ordinance fails the
subjective satisfaction test and is thus a misuse of power.

B. THAT THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE VIOLATES ART. 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION

33. It is respectfully submitted to the Hon'ble Court that, without prejudice to the
aforementioned, the major goal of Article 13 is to ensure the supremacy of the
constitution particularly in terms of fundamental rights. The state is prohibited from
making any law which takes away or abridges rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution41. If the state enacts such a legislation, it will be "still born" and void to the
extent that it is violated 42. Though post-constitutional laws that violate fundamental rights
are void from the start, a court declaration of their legality will be required 43. The
Anticonversion Ordinance violates Article 14, 19, 21 and 25 of the constitution, which
makes the Ordinance unconstitutional and void, and a declaration by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court is required.
34. It is humbly submitted that the anti-conversion ordinance is in violation of Article 14
of the constitution. Article 14 of the Constitution states that ‘The State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory

40
A.K. Roy Ors. v. Union of India, 1982 AIR 710.
41
INDIA CONST. art. 13(2).
42
Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1959 AIR 648.
43
Mohammad Ishaq v. State, AIR 1961 All 522.

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of India44’. Article 14 embodies the general principle of equality; it embodies the idea of
equality in the preamble. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Justice Bhagwati quoted
said “The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an
essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades article 14 like a brooding
omnipresence45.” Reasonability is seen as the ‘golden thread’ that goes through the entire
fabric of Republic of Amphissa's Constitution in this case as well.
35. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that inE.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
Nadu, the doctrine of arbitrariness to test State’s actions on three factors of unjustness,
unfairness and arbitrariness was laid down. It was held that“Equality is a dynamic
concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned with traditional
and doctrinal limits. Article 14 strikes at the arbitrariness of the State action and ensures
fairness and equality of treatment.”46
36. It is humbly submitted that, the doctrine of arbitrariness lies at the heart of both
‘reasonable classification’ test as well as the general test of unreasonableness47. The
famous Ajay Hasiadecision is the locus classicus on the issue of reasonableness of law, in
which it was determined by the Hon’ble Court that a classification must meet two
elements in order to be reasonable, (i) that the classification is founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others
left out of the group; and (ii) that differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to
be achieved by the challenged legislative or executive action. If these elements are not
met, the challenged legislative or executive action will be clearly arbitrary, and Article
14's guarantee of equality would be violated.48
37. The Petitioners humbly submit that the Sec. 3 of the Ordinance states that
reconversion to the person’s prior religion is not illegal, even if it is incited by force,
fraudulent means, misrepresentation, allurement etc. This classification between
conversion and reconversion is unreasonable, which negates the possibility of it being
construed as intelligible differentia, and also does not have a rational relation with the
legitimate object of the Ordinance. This is arbitrary and does not fulfil the ‘reasonable
classification test’ which helps determine violations of Art. 14, as observed by this Court
in several decisions. What can be construed as intelligible differentia in this Ordinance

44
INDIA CONST. art. 14.
45
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
46
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3.
47
R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628
48
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 SCC 722.

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would be the difference between voluntary conversion and forced reconversion,

irrespective of whether the person is converting or reconverting.
38. It is contended before the Hon’ble Court that only the law has the power to create and
separate classes based on the requirements and demands of society 49.In this scenario, anti-
conversion ordinance has the potential to be exploited and repressive towards minority
groups, as well as a new tool for harassing and vilifying religious minorities by
generating a hostile and, on occasion, violent environment, which is a serious concern
about the effect of the act’s enforcement on minorities, which promotes class legislation,
which is forbidden by Article 1450.

C. THAT THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE VIOLATES ART. 19 AND ART. 21

39. It is contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Ordinance criminalized the
choice that one possesses to choose one’s life partner among two consenting adults.
40. This has been recognized as a Fundamental Right under Art. 19 and Art. 21 by this
Hon’ble Court in a plethora of cases.
41. It was held by this Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar“It has to
be sublimely borne in mind that when two adults consensually choose each other as life
partners, it is a manifestation of their choice which is recognized under Articles 19 and
21 of the Constitution. Such a right has the sanction of the constitutional law and once
that is recognized, the said right needs to be protected. 51”The freedom of an individual to
live with a person of their choice, regardless of religion, and to declare their choice and
religion is enshrined in Articles 21 and 19 of the Constitution, and this Ordinance restricts
the declaration of choice, therefore breaching Articles 19 and Article 21, which deals with
the right to life and personal liberty, is a broad provision that encompasses the inalienable
right to marry the person of one's choice.
42. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Section 8 of the Ordinance
requires a notification to the District Magistrate from a person who wishes to convert his
or her faith, stating that the conversion is occurring of their own free will, as well as a
notice from the person executing the conversion52. This is followed by a police
investigation. Sec. 9 of the Ordinance requires a person who has converted his or her faith
to make a declaration to the District Magistrate within a certain number of days of the

49
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1.
50
Budhan Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191.
51
Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397.
52
Supra note 16, at § 8.

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conversion date, followed by the person appearing before the Magistrate to verify the
same53. Both of these sections request intrusive information such as parents' names,
address, occupation, monthly income, and even names of the dependents. A Constitution
Bench of nine judges has spent a great deal of time debating the issue of choice in Justice
KS Puttaswamy (retd) v. Union of India, this Hon’ble Court held that “the right to
privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under
Article 21”54.
43. It was observed by the Hon’ble Court in Ms.Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v.
Thiru.P.Varadarajan, that “Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal
intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home, and sexual
orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual
autonomy and recognisesthe ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her
life. Personal choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy”55
44. It has also been observed by the Hon’ble SC that a person does not just have the right
to conscience, right to belief, and the right to change his belief but also the right to keep
his beliefs secret56.
45. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Sec. 8 and 9
of the Ordinance are in gross violation of Art. 21, considering that the right to privacy is
an integral part of Art. 21 of the Constitution. In addition to this, it is submitted that the
right to convert is a Fundamental Right within the meaning of “right to life and liberty” in
Art. 2157. In the instant case, a person is deprived of his right to convert and unreasonable
procedures have been imposed to curtail one’s right to conversion. This deprives the
victim of such conversion of the right to personal liberty, dignity, and privacy envisaged
under Art. 21.
46. Further, it is submitted that Sec. 7 of the Ordinance states that all offences under this
Ordinance will be cognizable, non-bailable, and triable by the Court of Sessions 58, and
this is an arbitrary provision that would lead to abuse of power and infringe on the right to
life and liberty under Art. 21. Sec. 11 promotes disproportionality in sentences by making
53
Id. at § 9.
54
Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1; See also, Govind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2 SCC
148; R Rajagopal v. state of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632; PUCL v. UOI, (1997) 1 SCC 301; Mr. X v.
hospital Z, (1998) 8 SCC 296; Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493; Directorate of Revenue v. Mohammed
Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370; State of Maharshtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 5.
55
Ms.Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. Thiru.P.Varadarajan, (2018) 5 MLJ 423.
56
Evangelical Fellowship of India v. State of H.P., 2013 (4) RCR 283;Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of
India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
57
Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M, (2018) 16 SCC 368.
58
Supra note 16, at § 7.

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guilty even those who urge a person to convert 59, a violation of Art. 21 that is also
arbitrary.
47. Furthermore, according to Section 10 of the Ordinance, if any organisation or
institution violates the provisions of this Ordinance, not only will the responsible persons
be punished, but the organisation or institution's registration will be cancelled, and the
State will be unable to provide financial aid or grants to such an institution or
organisation.60 This is violative of Art. 19(1)(g) and not a reasonable restriction under Art.
19(6), considering the rule is that these restrictions must be checked for
proportionality61.Article 19 (1) (g) provides the right to practice any profession, or to
carry on any occupation, trade, or business, which is an absolute right but subject to
reasonable restrictions which are given in 19(6). It is submitted that under clause (6) of
Article 19, the state is authorized to impose reasonable restrictions on the right to carry on
a trade, profession, or business. However, the conditions for the restrictions must be
reasonable and in the interest of the general public. In this case, there is neither a
reasonable justification for this section of the Ordinance, nor it is issued for the interest of
the general public, this is merely an abuse of power.
48. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that these sections of the
Ordinance are violative of Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

D. THAT THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE VIOLATES ART. 25. OF THE CONSTITUTION

49. The Petitioners respectfully submits that the Ordinance violates Article 25 of the
Constitution because it imposes unreasonable procedures under Sections 8 and 9 of the
Ordinance, which compels the District Magistrate to take note of the notice and look into
it.
50. This Hon’ble Court in Durgah Committee v. Hussain Ali observed that: “This
freedom guarantees to every citizen not only the right to entertain such religious beliefs
as may appeal to his conscience but also affords him the right to exhibit his belief in his
conduct by such outward acts as may appear to him proper in order to spread his ideas
for the benefit of others.”62
51. The Petitioners humbly submits that the assurance provided by Article 25(1) must be
interpreted to include the right to religious propagation and the right to conscience, where

59
Supra note 16, at § 11.
60
Id. at § 3.
61
Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., 1951 AIR 118.
62
Durgah Committee v. Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402.

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one may be influenced by religious propagation and act on that successful propagation. It
is also to be taken note of that the term “allurement” under Sec. 2(a) of the Ordinance is a
willful act committed by the person, although there is vagueness present in this provision.
As both propagation and conscience are fundamental parts of Art. 2563, the Petitioners
claim that conversion is a part of the religious freedom protected by the Constitution and
that it has been limited by the vagueness of the provisions and the intent of the Ordinance
itself. In the judgment of Shreya Singhal v. UOI, the Hon’ble Court, inter alia, struck
down Sec. 66A of the IT Act due to the vagueness in the language 64. Through the years,
there have been several caseswhere vagueness in the language of the Act has been
observed as a reason for striking down the legislation. It has also been observed by the
Hon’ble Court in The State of Bombay &Anr. v. F.N. Balsarathat: “The words "which
frustrates or defeats the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or order made
thereunder are so wide and vague that it is difficult to define or limit their scope.65”
52. It is contended before the Hon’ble Court that the Ordinance's aim is ambiguous.
According to Section 2(k) of the Ordinance, an ‘unlawful conversion’ is not permitted by
the law of the land. When the interpretation of the definition of a crucial term which is
what this Ordinance mandates to prohibit is so wide and vague, the scope of the same
cannot be limited and there is a finding of ‘vagueness’ or ‘over-breadth’, the finding itself
provides a reason for unconstitutionality as this would lead to possible abuse of power. In
a democracy, every law is a result of a parallelogram of forces.
53. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that in the instant case, there is a lot of ambiguity
when it comes to terminologies, and there is no clear direction on how to understand
them. This would place a great deal of discretion in the hands of the government in
determining which actions are prohibited and which are not, putting the government in
violation of the Constitution. This ambiguity also jeopardizes the religious freedom
guaranteed by Article 25 and may lead to power abuse to suppress minority religion.

63
INDIA CONST. art. 25.
64
Shreya Singhal v. UOI, (2013) 12 SCC 73; State of M.P. v. Baldeo Prasad, 1961 AIR 293.
65
The State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, 1951 AIR 318.

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities
cited,the Counsels for the Petitioners humbly pray and implore before this Hon’ble Court to
adjudge and declare that:

1. The Special Leave Petition filed under Art.136 is maintainable and leave is granted.
2. The denial of bail and issue of a Non-Bailable Warrant by the Magistrate was not
justified.
3. The Anti-Conversion Ordinance is unconstitutional as it violates the Fundamental rights
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and the Basic Structure of the Constitution.

And any other relief that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interest of justice,
equity, and good conscience.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONERS SHALL BE DUTY-BOUND

FOREVER PRAY

Respectfully Submitted

Sd /-

Counsels for the Petitioners

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