of the property.

Respondents, therefore, failed to

Rule 70 – Forcible Entry alleged that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 
and Unlawful Detainer ISSUES:

Quinagoran v. CA, G.R. No. 155179, 24 August 2007 1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all
cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value
VICTORINO QUINAGORAN, Petitioner, of the property involved?
vs. CA and THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA
CRUZ, Respondents. 2. Whether the complaint must allege the assessed
value of the property
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
RULING:
The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or
accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless of the 1. No. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of
value of the property – no longer holds true.  As things possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC
now stand, a distinction must be made between those regardless of the value of the property -- no longer
properties the assessed value of which is below holds true.  As things now stand, a distinction must be
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if made between those properties the assessed value of
within. A complaint must allege the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and
the real property subject of the complaint or the interest P50,000.00, if within.
thereon to determine jurisdiction.
Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the
answer of the defendant or even upon agreement, SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial
waiver or acquiescence of the parties. Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

FACTS: The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a complaint (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or
for recovery of a parcel of land with damages before possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
RTC of Cagayan against Quinagoran.  where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro
Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00 except
RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under R.A. No. for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
of the MTC to include all civil actions which involve title upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
therein which does not exceed P20,000.00.  He argued
that since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to In Atuel v. Valdez  (G.R. No. 139561, 2003),  the Court
the contested property has an assessed value of likewise expressly stated that: Jurisdiction over an
P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under controversy accion publiciana is vested in a court of general
would not be more than the said amount. jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court
exercises exclusive original jurisdiction “in all civil
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the actions which involve x x x possession of real property.”
basis that the action is accion publicciana and However, if the assessed value of the real property
therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in MM, and
the value of the property. The CA affirmed decision of P20,000.00 outside of MM, the MTC exercises
the RTC. jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that
under RA 7691, the jurisdiction falls in the MTC. He 2. Yes. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already
likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of
that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
the property involved. The complaint does not alleged thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over
that the assessed value of the land in question is more the action. This is because the nature of the action and
than P20,000.00. There was also no tax declaration which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
attached to the complaint to show the assessed value the same is determined by the material allegations of
the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 1

plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect
or all of the claims asserted therein.  when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims
Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of asserted therein.
the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore
no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC Motions to Dismiss; Where the plaintiff fails to allege in
has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the his complaint the assessed value of the subject
respondents. Indeed, absent any allegation in the property, the trial court seriously errs in denying a
complaint of the assessed value of the property, it motion to dismiss—all proceedings in said court are null
cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has and void.—Nowhere in said complaint was the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned.
action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the There is therefore no showing on the face of the
assessed or market value of the land.  complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
the action of the respondents. Indeed, absent any
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
answer of the defendant or even upon agreement, property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or
waiver or acquiescence of the parties. Indeed, the the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and petitioner’s action. The courts cannot take judicial
the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend notice of the assessed or market value of the land.
upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the
to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction answer of the defendant or even upon agreement,
would depend almost entirely on the defendant. waiver or acquiescence of the parties. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend
complaint the assessed value of the subject property, upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion
the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
dismiss.  Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are would depend almost entirely on the defendant.
null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC. Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their
complaint the assessed value of the subject property,
SYLLABUS
the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to
dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are
Actions; Jurisdictions; The question posed in the
null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.
present petition is not complicated, i.e., does the RTC
have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of FULL TEXT
possession regardless of the value of the property
involved? The answer is no. The doctrine on which the Before the Court is a Petition for Review
RTC anchored its denial of petitioner’s Motion to on Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA—that all cases of assailing the Decision1 of the (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with 60443 dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution2 dated
the RTC regardless of the value of the property—no August 28, 2002, which denied petitioner's Motion for
longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction Reconsideration.
must be made between those properties the assessed
value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro The factual antecedents.
Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen
Pleadings and Practice; A complaint must allege the dela Cruz (respondents), filed on October 27, 1994 a
assessed value of the real property subject of the Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land
complaint or the interest thereon to determine which with Compensation and Damages against Victorino
court has jurisdiction over the action.—In no uncertain Quinagoran (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court
terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must (RTC) Branch XI of Tuao, Cagayan, docketed as Civil
allege the assessed value of the real property subject of Case No. 240-T.3 They alleged that they are the co-
the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which owners of a a parcel of land containing 13,100 sq m
court has jurisdiction over the action.This is because located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited
the nature of the action and which court has original from the late Juan dela Cruz;4 that in the mid-70s,
and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined petitioner started occupying a house on the north-west

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 2

portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance Cruz adequately set forth the jurisdictional requirements
of respondents; that in 1993, they asked petitioner to for a case to be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
remove the house as they planned to construct a The Complaint is captioned "recovery of portion of
commercial building on the property; that petitioner registered land" and it contains the following
refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they allegations:
suffered damages for their failure to use the
same.5 Respondents prayed for the reconveyance and 7. That since plaintiffs and defendant were neighbors,
surrender of the disputed 400 sq m, more or less, and the latter being the admitted owner of the adjoining lot,
to be paid the amount of ₱5,000.00 monthly until the the former's occupancy of said house by defendant was
property is vacated, attorney's fees in the amount of only due to the tolerance of herein plaintiffs;
₱20,000.00, costs of suit and other reliefs and
remedies just and equitable.6 8. That plaintiffs, in the latter period of 1993, then
demanded the removal of the subject house for the
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the purpose of constructing a commercial building and
RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic which herein defendant refused and in fact now claims
Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive ownership of the portion in which said house stands;
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to
include all civil actions which involve title to, or 9. That repeated demands relative to the removal of the
possession of, real property, or any interest therein subject house were hence made but which landed on
which does not exceed ₱20,000.00. He argued that deaf ears;
since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the
10. That a survey of the property as owned by herein
contested property has an assessed value of
plaintiffs clearly establishes that the subject house is
₱1,730.00, the assessed value of the lot under
occupying Four Hundred (400) square meters thereof at
controversy would not be more than the said amount.7
the north-west portion thereof, as per the approved
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in an survey plan in the records of the Bureau of Lands.
Order dated November 11, 1999, thus:
xxxx
The Court finds the said motion to be without merit. The
It is settled that when the complaint fails to aver facts
present action on the basis of the allegation of the
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
complaint partakes of the nature of action publicciana
where it does not state how entry was effected or how
(sic) and jurisdiction over said action lies with the
and when dispossession started, the remedy should
Regional Trial Court, regardless of the value of the
either be an accion publiciana or an accion
property. This is so because in paragraph 8 of the
reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. In the
complaint, it is alleged that the plaintiff demanded from
latter instances, jurisdiction pertains to the Regional
the defendant the removal of the house occupied by the
Trial Court.
defendant and the possession of which is "Only due to
Tolerance (sic) of herein plaintiffs".
As another legal recourse from a simple ejectment case
governed by the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion to dismiss
an accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
is hereby denied.8
right of possession when dispossession has lasted
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied more than one year or when dispossession was
by the RTC.9 effected by means other than those mentioned in Rule
70 of the Rules of Court. Where there is no allegation
Petitioner then went to the CA on a Petition that there was denial of possession through any of the
for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of methods stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
the Orders of the RTC.10 Court, or where there is no lease contract between the
parties, the proper remedy is the plenary action of
On May 27, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed recovery of possession. Necessarily, the action falls
Decision dismissing petitioner's action and affirming in within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Thus,
toto the RTC.11 Pertinent portions of said Decision, we find that the private respondents [heirs of dela Cruz]
read: availed of the proper remedy when they filed the action
before the court a quo.
At the onset, we find that the complaint filed by the
Heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 3

Undoubtedly, the respondent court therefore did not act the body of their complaint before the RTC does it state
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to or in that the assessed value of the property is below
excess of jurisdiction in denying Quinagoran's Motion to ₱20,000.00;20 the contention of petitioner in his Motion
Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration, thereof, to Dismiss before the RTC that the assessed value of
because it has jurisdiction to hear and decide the the disputed lot is below ₱20,000.00 is based on the
instant case. assessed value of an adjacent property and no
documentary proof was shown to support the said
xxxx allegation;21 the tax declaration which petitioner
presented, together with his Supplemental Reply before
It would not be amiss to point out that the nature of the the CA, and on the basis of which he claims that the
action and jurisdiction of courts are determined by the disputed property's assessed value is only ₱551.00,
allegations in the complaint. As correctly held by the should also not be given credence as the said tax
Regional Trial Court, "the present action on the basis of declaration reflects the amount of ₱56,100.00 for the
the allegation of the complaint partakes of the nature entire property.22
of action publiciana and jurisdiction over said action lies
with the Regional Trial Court regardless of the value of The question posed in the present petition is not
the property. Therefore, we completely agree with the complicated, i.e., does the RTC have jurisdiction over
court a quo's conclusion that the complaint filed by the all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the
Heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela value of the property involved?
Cruz, is in the nature of an accion publiciana and hence
it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC
the action, regardless of the assessed value of the anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as
property subject of present controversy.12 affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of
possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on trial courts regardless of the value of the property -- no
August 28, 2002 for lack of merit.13 longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction
must be made between those properties the assessed
Petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for value of which is below ₱20,000.00, if outside Metro
review claiming that under R.A. No. 7691 the Manila; and ₱50,000.00, if within.
jurisdiction of the MTC, Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Republic Act No. 769123 which
was expanded to include exclusive original jurisdiction amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 12924 and which was
over civil actions when the assessed value of the already in effect25 when respondents filed their
property does not exceed ₱20,000.00 outside Metro complaint with the RTC on October 27,
Manila and ₱50,000.00 within Metro Manila.14 He 1994,26 expressly provides:
likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement
that the complaint should allege the assessed value of SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases –  Regional Trial
the property involved.15 In this case, the complaint does Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
not allege that the assessed value of the land in
question is more than ₱20,000.00. There was also no (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or
tax declaration attached to the complaint to show the possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
assessed value of the property. Respondents therefore where the assessed value of the property involved
failed to allege that the RTC has jurisdiction over the exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for
instant case.16 The tax declaration covering Lot No. civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
1807 owned by respondents and where the herein Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except for forcible
disputed property is purportedly part -- a copy of which entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
petitioner submitted to the CA -- also shows that the original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
value of the property is only ₱551.00.17 Petitioner then Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
prays that the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
and set aside and that the complaint of herein
respondents before the trial court be dismissed for lack SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
of jurisdiction.18 Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. --- Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Respondents contend that: the petition is without Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
factual and legal bases, and the contested decision of Courts shall exercise:
the CA is entirely in accordance with law; 19 nowhere in

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 4

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions February 3, 1977, and are all residents of Centro, Piat,
which involve title to, or possession of , real property, or Cagayan;
any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty 4. That plaintiffs inherited from x x x Juan dela Cruz x x
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in x a certain parcel of land x x x containing an area of
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not 13,111 square meters.
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages or whatever kind, attorney's fees, 5. That sometime in the mid-1960's, a house was
litigation expenses and costs: Provided That in cases of erected on the north-west portion of the aforedescribed
land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of lot x x x.
such property shall be determined by the assessed
7. That since plaintiffs and defendant were neighbors,
value of the adjacent lots.(Emphasis supplied)
the latter being the admitted owner of the adjoining lot,
The Court has also declared that all cases involving title the former's occupancy of said house by defendant was
to or possession of real property with an assessed only due to the tolerance of herein plaintiffs;
value of less than ₱20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila,
8. That plaintiffs, in the latter period of 1993, then
falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial
demanded the removal of the subject house for the
court.27
purpose of constructing a commercial building and
In Atuel v. Valdez28 the Court likewise expressly stated which herein defendant refused and in fact now claims
that: ownership of the portion in which said house stands;

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana  is vested in a 9. That repeated demands relative to the removal of the
court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional subject house were hence made but which landed on
trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction "in all deaf ears;
civil actions which involve x x x possession of real
10. That a survey of the property as owned by herein
property." However, if the assessed value of the real
plaintiffs clearly establishes that the subject house is
property involved does not exceed ₱50,000.00 in Metro
occupying Four Hundred (400) square meters thereof at
Manila, and ₱20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the
the north-west portion thereof, as per the approved
municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions
survey plan in the records of the Bureau of Lands.32
to recover possession of real property.29
Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of
That settled, the next point of contention is whether the
the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore
complaint must allege the assessed value of the
no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC
property involved. Petitioner maintains that there should
has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
be such an allegation, while respondents claim the
respondents.33 Indeed, absent any allegation in the
opposite.
complaint of the assessed value of the property, it
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has
complaint must allege the assessed value of the real original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon action.34 The courts cannot take judicial notice of the
to determine which court has jurisdiction over the assessed or market value of the land.351avvphi1
action.30 This is because the nature of the action and
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the
which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
answer of the defendant or even upon agreement,
the same is determined by the material allegations of
waiver or acquiescence of the parties. 36 Indeed, the
the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and
plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,
the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some
upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion
or all of the claims asserted therein.31
to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
In this case, the complaint denominated as "Recovery would depend almost entirely on the defendant.37
of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their
Damages," reads:
complaint the assessed value of the subject property,
1. That plaintiffs are the only direct and legitimate heirs the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to
of the late Juan dela Cruz, who died intestate on dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are
null and void,38 and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.39

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 5

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA's the real estate taxes on the real properties of the
Decision in CA-GR SP No. 60443 dated May 27, 2002 estate. The probate court approved the release of
and its Resolution dated August 28, 2002, P7,722.00. Thereafter, Edmond withdrew his opposition
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate
Court’s Orders dated November 11, 1999 and May 11, court admitted the will to probate and ordered the
2000, and all proceedings therein are declared NULL issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned
and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 240-T is upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
dismissed without prejudice. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Then the petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with
Hilario v. CA, G.R. No. 121865, 7 August 1996  Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an “Ex-Parte Motion for
Release of Funds.” It prayed for the release of the rent
ANTONIO HILARIO and/or HEIRS OF CESAR payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.
HILARIO, petitioners,
vs. CA, ROSAURO PALILEO and JOSEFINA Respondent, Montes, opposed and prayed that the
ANASTACIO,* respondents.  release of rent payments be given to the three
granddaughters and for the distribution of the testator’s
REGALADO, J.: properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the
Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the
FACTS: On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a provisions of the holographic will. The probate court
holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, denied petitioner’s motion for release of funds but
Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private granted respondent Montes’ motion in view of
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three petitioner’s lack of opposition. It thus ordered the
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, release of the rent payments to the decedent’s three
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the
Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to
substantial cash, personal and real properties and the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon
named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. the filing of a bond. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the Court of Appeals sustained the
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately probate court’s order.
thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court, after
respondents in accordance with the decedent’s will. For admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority:
not take any action for the probate of his father’s
holographic will. Four years after the testator’s death, it (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who for the support of the testator’s grandchildren;
filed before the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, a petition
for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and
for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to
ground that the will was executed under undue the executor of the will.
influence.
RULING:
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the
estate, which is the house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig, 1.) On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of
which the testator bequeathed to his three the Revised Rules of Court provides:
granddaughters was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to
“Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family.—The widow
third persons. Thereafter, the probate court ordered
Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased
person, during the settlement of the estate, shall
rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.”
property. Subsequently, in compliance, Edmond turned
over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the
The provision expressly states “children” of the
balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for
deceased which excludes the latter’s grandchildren.
repair and maintenance expenses on the estate. Then
Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support
Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay
from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 6

limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does ** Although Section 1, Rule 46 provides that the title of
not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, a case on appeal “shall remain as it was below,” the
regardless of their minority or incapacity. title of the case at bar has been modified by eliminating
the appellation “SPOUSES” or “SPS.” for being
2.) Respondent courts also erred when they ordered unauthorized and improper under conventional rules of
the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to pleading and practice.
private respondents six months after the date of first
publication of notice to creditors. In settlement of estate Then, on April 15, 1994, Republic Act No. 7691 took
proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties effect and expanded the jurisdiction of the metropolitan
can only be made: trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit
trial courts, amending for the purpose the pertinent
(A) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of portions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The jurisdiction
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax of the aforesaid courts as defined in Section 33(2) of
have been paid; or Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was, however, retained by
said amendatory Act. As the law now stands, inferior
(B) before payment of said obligations only if the courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed the question of possession cannot be resolved without
by the court conditioned upon the payment of said passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject
obligations within such time as the court directs, or to the same caveat that the issue posed as to
when provision is made to meet those obligations. ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole
purpose of determining the issue of possession.
3.) The SC ruled that the petitioner must be reminded
that his right of ownership over the properties of his Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue
father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional
been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action
mere trustee of his father’s estate. The funds of the between the same parties involving title to the land. The
estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
order. Petitioner, as executor, cannot unilaterally assign where the only issue to be settled is the physical or
to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and material possession over the real property, that is,
the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory possession de facto and not possession de jure.
and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his Allegations in the complaint for ejectment should
administration, the expenses of administration, the sufficiently make out a case for forcible entry or
amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which unlawful detainer as the case may be otherwise
are subject to a determination by the court as to their jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court.—It is
veracity, propriety and justness. underscored, however, that the allegations in the
complaint for ejectment should sufficiently make out a
SYLLABUS case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the case
may be; otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; Ejectment; In turn, the 1983
inferior court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is,
Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 1 of which after all, determined by the nature of the action as
originally conferred on inferior courts jurisdiction to try in
alleged or pleaded in the complaint. Thus, even where
summary proceedings cases of forcible entry and the defendant alleges ownership or title to the property
unlawful detainer except where the question of
in his or her answer, the inferior court will not be
ownership was involved or where the damages or divested of its jurisdiction. A contrary rule would pave
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered exceeded
the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment
P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint, suit, which is summary in nature, as he could easily
was later revised by a resolution of the Court En Banc
defeat the same through the simple expedient of
which took effect on November 15, 1991. At present, all asserting ownership.
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases have to be
tried pursuant to the Revised Rule on Summary The settled rule is that a complaint for unlawful detainer
Procedure regardless of whether or not the issue of is sufficient if it contains the allegation that the
ownership of the subject property is alleged by a party. withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is
unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology
of the law. The complaint must aver facts showing that

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 7

the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case, such as substantial argument was advanced in support of that
how defendant’s possession started or continued. Thus, argument.
the allegation in a complaint that the “plaintiff verbally
asked the defendants to remove their houses on the lot The municipal trial court rejected the contentions of
of the former but the latter refused and still refuse to do private respondents and, affirming its jurisdiction over
so without just and lawful grounds” was held to be more the case, it ruled that the deed of conveyance in dispute
than sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional was basically a deed of sale which vested in the
requirements. If the possession is by tolerance, as has Hilarios the right of ownership and, consequently, of
been alleged in the complaint of the Hilarios in this possession. The decretal part of the decision, dated
case, such possession became illegal upon demand to May 18, 1994, reads:
vacate and the possessor refused to comply with such
demand. Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
FULL TEXT
a. Ordering defendants and/or other persons claiming
We have given due course to this appeal for the authority under them to vacate the premises covered by
singular purpose of elucidating upon stressing one Tax Declaration No. ARP No. 02009-0955 and to
again the rule that in forcible entry and unlawful restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
detainer suits, the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts
of the first level in our integrated judicial system 1 is not b. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of
or affected by the interjection in said cases of an issue P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. 2
concerning the ownership of the real property involved.
Defendants then elevated the matter on appeal to the
The ejectment suit which culminated in this appellate Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, of Malolos, Bulacan in
recourse, docketed as Civil Case No. 732 of the Civil Case No. 628-M-94. Said court, finding no
Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, alleges that reversible error in the judgment of the lower court,
the spouses Cesar Hilario (now deceased) and Antonia affirmed the same in its entirety. Defendants once more
Hilario purchased a house and lot in Poblacion, appealed, this time to respondent Court of Appeals
Guiguinto, Bulacan from the spouses Rosauro Palileo where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
and Josefina Anastacio, herein private respondents, 35977.
under a deed of sale dated March 5, 1986. A separate
document, executed on the same day by the parties, On the reasoning that the issue raised by private
respondents ultimately rested upon and involved the
granted the vendors the right to repurchase the
property within one year from said date. question of ownership, particularly on its assumption
that the deed of conveyance was actually a mortgage
It appears, however, that the Hilarios further allowed contract, on June 27, 1995 respondent court reversed
private respondents to remain in possession of the and set aside 3 the judgment of said Regional Trial
premises on the verbal understanding that the latter Court and the lower court. Thus, it dismissed the
would vacate the same after two years from the date of complaint for ejectment against the vendors, now the
the sale. Said period passed without private private respondents in this case. As the motion for
respondents complying therewith, even after several reconsideration of the Hilarios was thereafter rebuffed
demands by the Hilarios, hence a complaint for by respondent court in its resolution of September 8,
unlawful detainer was instituted by herein petitioners on 1995, they have now come on appeal by certiorari to
August 12, 1993. us.

Private respondents, as defendants, alleged in their For resolution here is the question of whether or not the
answer inter alia that the purpoted deed of mortgage conflicting positions of the litigants, namely petitioner's
and that their corresponding obligation had been claim of their right to possess the subject property
extinguished by payment of the sum of P165,000.00 pursuant to the deed of sale, on the one hand, and
therefor. They thus remained as owners and their private respondents insistence that they remained
continued physical possession of the premises bolsters owners of the realty because the purported deed of sale
their assertion that it was only a mortgage contract that in realty a mortgage contract, on the other hand, would
was executed between them and the Hilarios. Private impale the controversy on the issue of ownership. The
respondents likewise impugned the jurisdiction of the latter theory could plausibly deprive the municipal trial
inferior court over the controversy, although no court of jurisdiction over the case and private
respondents so argue, contending that as they had

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 8

precisely put in issue their ownership of the property, portions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The jurisdiction
that trial court was ab initio barred from taking of the aforesaid courts as defined in Section 33(2) of
cognizance of the suit lack of jurisdiction. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was, however, retained by
said amendatory Act. As the law now stands, inferior
Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, prescribes courts retrain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if
the jurisdiction of inferior courts in forcible entry and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
unlawful detainer cases as follows: passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject
to the same caveat that the issue posed as to
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial purpose of determining the issue of possession. 5
Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trail Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue
Courts shall exercise: of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional
and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible between the same parties involving title to the
entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in land.6 The foregoing doctrine is a necessary
such cases, the defendant raises the question of consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
ownership in his pleadings and the question of unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the settled is the physical or material possession over the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be real property, that is, possession de facto and not
resolved only to determine the issue of possession. possession de jure. 7
This Court subsequently promulgated the In Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation, et al . vs. Court of
corresponding Interim Rules and Guidelines in the Appeals, et al., 8 the Court catalogued the cases which
implementation of said law and, on the jurisdiction of should not be regarded as prejudicial to an ejectment
inferior of inferior courts in ejectment cases, it provides: suit, to wit:
10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. — Metropolitan trial 1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in
courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial ejectment actions in the municipal trial court or other
court, without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920
and unlawful detainer even if the question of ownership [1966]) do not abate the latter; and neither do
is raised in the pleadings and the question of proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim,
possession could not be resolved without deciding the 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue et al. v. Gonzales, 87
issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall Phil. 81 [1950]).
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession
(Emphasis supplied). 2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an
ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former
In turn, the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure, Section (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]).
1 of which originally conferred on inferior courts
jurisdiction to try in summary proceedings cases of 3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is
forcible entry and unlawful detainer except where the concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial
question of ownership was involved or where the Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the
damage or unpaid or unpaid rentals sought to be judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only
recovered exceeded P20,000.00 at the time of the filing issue involved is the material possession or possession
of the complaint, was later revised by a resolution of the or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F.
Court En Banc which took effect on November 15, Guballa, Sr. v. C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 [1988]).
1991. At present, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases have to be tried pursuant to the Revised Rule on 4. An action for quieting of title  to property is not a bar
Summary Procedure regardless of whether or not the to an ejectment suit involving the same property
issue of ownership of the subject property is alleged by (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, SCRA 139 [1972]).
a party. 4
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not
Then, on April 15, 1994, Republic Act No. 7691 took affect ejectment actions (e.g.; to compel renewal of a
effect and expanded the jurisdiction of the metropolitan lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA
trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit 1184 [1966]; Pardo de Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22
trial courts, amending for the purpose the pertinent SCRA 632 [1968]; Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 9

[1987]; Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 162 SCRA 264 one of mortgage, the municipal trial court could not be
[1988]). divested of its jurisdiction over the case since, to
repeat, it could very well resolve that particular issue
6. An action for reformation of instrument  (e.g., from albeit provisionally, as what happened in this case.
deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro)
does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same Parenthetically, private respondents herein are not
parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975]). without remedy in their stance. They could still assert
ownership over the property but it should be done in the
7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion manner required by the Rules. In fact, they did just that
reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits when they themselves initiated an action for
regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 reconveyance involving the same property against
SCRA 549 [1963]; Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
De la Cruz v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]; Drilon v. Bulacan in Civil Case No. 87-M94 thereof. The record
Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching v. Malaya. 153 discloses that said action is still pending in that court.
SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippines Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v.
C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 The basic complaint for unlawful detainer in this case
[1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of sale and categorically alleges that a certain parcel of land
reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 consisting of 81 square meters, more of less, located at
SCRA 608 [1990]; Leopoldo Sy v. C.A., et al., Poblacion, Guiguinto, Bulacan, was acquired by
[annulment of sale and reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818, petitioners from private respondents under a document
Aug. 2, 1991). of sale dated March 5, 1986, and that the latter were
allowed to stay in the premises on an oral covenant that
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or they would vacate the same within two years. It is
document affecting property operate to abate ejectment further asserted that said period elapsed without the
actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. vendors complying with that verbal agreement and,
Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of despite verbal and written demands to vacate, they
mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable continued to occupy and unlawfully withhold possession
mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC of the premises from and to the damage and prejudiced
[annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; of petitioners. 11 From the foregoing, no interpretative
Caparros v. C.A. [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 exercise is needed to conclude that the requirement
[1989]; Dante v. Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. regarding sufficiency of the allegations on the
[annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]). jurisdictional facts in ejectment cases had been
indubitably complied with by petitioners.
It is underscored, however that the allegations in the
complaint for ejectment should sufficiently make out a The settled rule is that a complaint for unlawful detainer
case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the case is sufficient if it contains the allegation that the
may be; otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is
inferior court. 9 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is, unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology
after all, determined by the nature of the action as of the law. 12 The complaint must aver facts showing
alleged or pleaded in the complaint. Thus, even where that the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case,
the defendant alleges ownership or title to the property such as how defendant's possession started or
in his or her answer, the inferior court will not be continued. 13 Thus, the allegation in a complaint that the
divested of its jurisdiction. 10 A contrary rule would pave "plaintiff verbally asked the defendants to remove their
the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment houses on the lot of the former but the latter refused
suit, which is summary in nature, as he could easily and still refuse to do so without just and lawful grounds"
defeat the same through the simple expedient of was held to be more than sufficient compliance with the
asserting ownership. jurisdictional requirements. 14 If the possession is by
tolerance, as has been alleged in the complaint of the
In the case at bar, the submission of private Hilarios in this case, such possession became illegal
respondents could not prosper, both under the rule that upon demand to vacate and the possessor refused to
inferior courts have the undoubted competence to comply with such demand. 15
resolve the issue of ownership provisionally, and on the
well-grounded principle that jurisdiction is determined IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed judgment
by the allegations in the complaint. Indeed, while and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are
private respondents did raise the question of ownership hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of
when they asserted that the contract of sale was in fact the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan in Civil

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 10

Case No. 732 promulgated on May 18, 1994, and the 2. That plaintiffs are owners pro-indiviso of a certain
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, of residential lot situated in the Barrio of San Sebastian,
Malolos, Bulacan affirming said disposition of the Hagonoy, Bulacan, and more particularly bounded and
inferior court, are hereby REINSTATED. described as follows:

SO ORDERED. (Description omitted)

3. That through the tolerance and goodwill of plaintiffs,

thru the intervention and entreaty of one Maximo
Santos, father of the defendants, the latter used and
occupied said land free of charge, under the following
conditions, to wit: (a) that instead of paying rentals on
the premises defendants undertook to pay the
corresponding real estate taxes on the land; and (b)
that said defendants will leave and vacate the premises
anytime the plaintiffs so demand;

4. That sometime in February, 1968, plaintiffs verbally

notified defendants that said plaintiffs were in need of
the land, hence, said defendants should vacate and
Reyes v. Hon. Sta Maria, GR No. L-33213, 29 June leave the same, but said defendants
1979 unreasonably refused at the same time claiming
ownership of the property, and alleging further that they
ARTEMIO C. REYES and HILARION C. bought the same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo;
REYES, petitioners,
vs. HON. ANDRES STA. MARIA, Presiding Judge, 5. That in order to quiet the title of ownership over this
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, HILARIA land, the plaintiffs have been compelled to institute the
SANTOS VDA. DE LOPEZ and PILAR present action and, as a consequence, she suffered
SANTOS, respondents. damages in the sum of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00), Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;
TEEHANKEE, J.:
6. That the defendants thru their acts stated above
The Court sets aside the lower court's Order which have therefore maliciously and unlawfully detained the
dismissed petitioners-plaintiffs' complaint filed before it land of plaintiffs since February, 1968; and
for recovery of the property in the possession of
respondents-defendants and for declaration of 7. That for the unlawful occupation of the land, an
ownership thereof as against said respondents' estimate of Fifty (P50.00) Pesos monthly rental is
contrary claim of ownership on the ground of alleged hereby claimed as reasonable damages suffered by
lack of jurisdiction. Such action was clearly an accion plaintiffs since February, 1968. 2
publiciana  for the recovery of the right to possess
(possesion de jure) (if not an accion reivindicatoria) Petitioners accordingly prayed in their complaint for
falling within the lower court's jurisdiction and not a judgment (a) "declaring [them] to be the owners of the
mere action for detainer to recover physical possession property described ... "; (b) "ordering the defendants to
(possession de facto) which would fall within the vacate the premises and return the possession of the
jurisdiction of the municipal court (if filed within one year same to plaintiffs;" (c) "ordering the defendants to pay
after unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession) plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Fifty Pesos
as erroneously held by the lower court in its dismissal (P50.00), Philippine Currency, rental or damages every
order. month effective the first day of February, 1968, until the
possession of the premises is finally restored in favor of
Petitioners as plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of plaintiffs;" and further ordering defendants to pay them
Bulacan had filed on April 1, 1968 an action which they (d) P1,000.00 attorney's fees and (e) costs of suit.
termed as one to quiet title to a certain residential lot in
Barrio San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area Upon respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint on
of 368.5 square meters and to recover the possession the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction over the
thereof from respondents as defendants, 1 wherein they nature of the action or suit" and that the action
made the following averments: embodied in petitioners' complaint "is actually one for

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 11

ejectment or unlawful detainer. Consequently, the case the jus fruendi also brought in the Court of First
falls within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Instance. 3
inferior court or municipal court" as against petitioners?
opposition that "plaintiffs' complaint is principally one to It has been said that "(T)he only issue in forcible entry
quiet title to property, the question of possession being and detainer cases is the physical possession of real
merely reduced to an incidental issue," the lower court property possession de facto and not possession de
issued its appealed order of August 15, 1968, finding jure If plaintiff can prove a prior  possession in himself,
the motion to dismiss to be "well founded" and he may recover such possession even from the owner
dismissing the case "for lack of jurisdiction".The lower himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
court reasoned that: possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has
the security that entitles him to stay on the property until
A perusal of the actual averments of facts in the he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right
complaint do not reveal any allegation of ultimate facts by either accion publiciana or accion
which could sufficiently support an action to quiet title. reivindicatoria. 4 Petitioners' action was not merely for
Upon the other hand, it is plain that the allegations of recovery of possession de facto. Their action was
facts are only constitutive of an action for unlawful clearly one of accion publiciana for recovery of
detainer. The allegation in paragraph 5 of said possession de jure if not one of accion
complaint 'that in order to quiet the title of ownership reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership of the
over this land, the plaintiffs have been compelled to land.
institute the present action ... is not sufficient by itself to
consider this case as an action for quieting title under As reaffirmed by the Court in the analogous case
Article 476 of the New Civil Code. Neither does the of Aguilon vs. Bohol  5 petitioners action is at least "an
prayer of said complaint asking that the plaintiffs be accion publiciana, which action 'correspondent al que
declared the owners of the property in question tiene derecho a la possession, contra el que posee sin
constitute a cause of action. derecho o' con titulo menos firme para que se ponga la
cosa en poder del actor con todas las accesiones,
Hence, the present petition for review and setting aside frutos ets' (I Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola 450)," and
of the dismissal order, which the Court finds to be such accion publiciana or the plenary action in an
meritorious. The lower court was clearly in error in ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and
issuing its dismissal order on its mistaken notion "that legal right to possess (independently of title) clearly falls
the allegations of facts are only constitutive of an action within the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance and
for unlawful detainer" since the complaint shows on its not of the Municipal Courts. The Court further
face that respondents' refusal to deliver the possession underscored therein "that an action for recovery of
of the property was due to their adverse claim of possession is an urgent matter which must be decided
ownership of the same property and their counter- promptly to forestall breaches of peace, violence or
allegation that they had bought the same from a certain even loss of life and, therefore, the court should act
Pablo Aguinaldo, and, therefore, petitioners' action was swiftly and expeditiously in cases of that nature.
clearly one for recovery of their right to possess the
property (possession de jure) as well as to be declared Petitioners, therefore, correctly filed their accion
the owners thereof as against the contrary claim of publiciana before the lower court as against
respondents. respondents! claim that they should instead have filed a
summary action for detainer in the municipal court.
As restated by the late Chief Justice Moran: "There are Having been fully apprised of respondents' refusal to
three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of surrender possession and their contrary claim of
real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary action for ownership of the same property, petitioners properly
forcible entry or detainer (denominated accion filed their accion publiciana with the Court of First
interdictal  under the former law of procedure, Ley de Instance to avoid getting enmeshed in what would
Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of certainly have been another jurisdictional dispute, since
physical possession only and is brought within one year they could reasonably foresee that if indeed they had
in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion filed a summary action for illegal detainer instead in the
publiciana which is for the recovery of the right to municipal court, respondents would then have
possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil contended, contrary to their present claim, that the
proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (3) accion municipal court is without jurisdiction over the detainer
de reivindicacion  which seeks the recovery of case by virtue of their contrary claim of ownership of the
ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and property. 6

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 12

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the (2) the accion publiciana, which is for the
lower court's dismissal order of August 15, 1968 and the case is recovery of the right to possess and is a
remanded to respondent Court of First Instance with instructions
plenary action in an ordinary civil
to expedite the proceedings and trial and determination thereof
on the merits. With costs against respondents. This decision is
proceeding in a Court of First Instance;
immediately executory. and

#Footnotes (3) accion de reivindicacion, which seeks

the recovery of ownership (which of
1 Civil Case No. 3648-M, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, entitled
"Artemio C. Reyes and Hilarion C. Reyes, Plaintiffs, vs. Hilaria Santos Vda.
course includes the jus utendi and the jus
de Lopez and Pilar Santos, Defendants. fruendi), also brought in the CFI.”

2 Note in parenthesis and emphasis supplied.

3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed, p. 298.

4 Idem at pp- 303-304.

5 79 SCRA 482 (1977).

6 It is to be noted, however, that in R.A. 5967 enacted on June 21, 1969,

enlarging the jurisdiction of city courts, said city courts have now been
granted the concurrent jurisdiction with courts of first instance "in ejectment
cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings,
the issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in conjunction with the
issue of possession." (Sec. 3[c]).

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Accion

Publiciana; Refusal to deliver possession of property of
a party and adverse claim of ownership of the same Consing v. Jamandre, G.R. No. L-27674, 12 May 1975
property by another entitles the former to the remedy of
G.R. No. L-27674 May 12, 1975
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, not
ejectment or unlawful detainer.—The lower court was SOLEDAD T. CONSING, assisted by her husband,
clearly in error in issuing its dismissal order on its ANTONIO M. CONSING, plaintiffs-petitioners,
mistaken notion “that the allegations of facts are only vs. JOSE T. JAMANDRE, personally, and as Judicial
constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer” since the Administrator of the Estate of Cirilo
complaint shows on its face that respondents’ refusal to Jamandre, defendant-respondent.
deliver the possession of the property was due to their
adverse claim of ownership of the same property and ESGUERRA, J.:
their counter-allegation that they had bought the same
from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo, and, therefore, SYLLABUS
petitioners’ action was clearly one for recovery of their
right to possess the property (possession de jure), as Lease; Sublease; Stipulation authorizing sublessor to
well as to be declared the owners thereof as against the take possession of leased premises, without resorting
contrary claim of respondents. to court action, upon failure of sublease to comply with
terms and conditions of contract valid and binding;
Civil Law; Possession; Kinds of actions for recovery of Reason.—The stipulation is in the nature of a resolutory
possession of real property.—As restated by the late condition, for upon the exercise by the Sub-lessor of his
Chief Justice Moran: “There are three kinds of actions right to take possession of the leased property, the
for the recovery of possession of real property, namely, contract is deemed terminated. This kind of contractual
stipulation is not illegal, there being nothing in the law
(1) the summary action for forcible entry or proscribing such kind of agreement.
detainer (denominated accion interdictal
under the former law of procedure, Ley de Judicial action necessary only in the absence of
Enjuiciamiento Civil), which seeks the stipulation in contract granting power of cancellation.—
recovery of physical possession only and Judicial permission to cancel the agreement was not,
is brought within one year in the justice of therefore, necessary because of the express stipulation
the peace court; in the contract of sublease that the sub-lessor, in case
of failure of the sub-lessee to comply with the terms and
JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 13
conditions thereof, can take-over the possession of the and conditions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the contract of
leased premises, thereby cancelling the contract of sub- sub-lease which read as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
lease. Resort to judicial action is necessary only in the
absence of a special provision granting the power of 3. That the SUB-LESSEE Soledad T. Consing shall pay
cancellation. the SUB-LESSOR Cirilo Jamandre 1,000 piculs of "C"
sugar every crop year and to effectuate said payment
Forcible entry; Court may receive evidence on the Lopez Sugar Central is hereby authorized to
possession de jure to determine nature of possession. register in the name of the SUB-LESSOR Cirilo
—While it is true that the only issue in forcible entry or Jamandre a proportion of 10% of the weekly sugar
unlawful detainer action is the physical possession of milled by the SUB-LESSEE properly quendaned until
the leased property, that is possession de facto—not the full amount of 1,000 piculs of "C" sugar shall have
possession de jure, yet the court may go beyond that if been fully paid and satisfied not later than the month of
only to prove the nature of the possession. (Pitargue vs. February of every year.
Sorilla, L-4302, September 17, 1952; 48 O.G. 3849).
The court may receive evidence upon the question of 4. That the SUB-LESSEE Soledad T. Consing shall pay
title, or for that matter possession de jure, solely for the the SUB-LESSOR the amount of TWENTY
purpose of determining the character and extent of THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) by way of advance
possession and damages for the detention. payment every crop year until the duration of the lease.
For the payment therefore, the amount of 1,000 piculs
Judgment; Summary judgment; Absence of any of "C" sugar referred in par. No. 3 shall be assigned
genuine issue as to any material fact.—Summary and/or endorsed to the SUB-LESSEE Soledad T.
judgment can only be granted where there are no Consing and after proper liquidation of the same the
questions of fact in issue or where the material surplus from the proceeds of 1,000 piculs of C sugar
allegations of the pleadings are not disputed. Hiquiana shall be paid to the SUB-LESSOR Cirilo Jamandre not
vs. Commission on Elections, 64 SCRA 1, No. L-27674 later than the month of February of each crop year.
May 12, 1975
As justification for the take-over of the leased premises,
FULL TEXT defendant-respondent cited paragraph 9 of said
contract of sublease as his authority, the text of which
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the will be quoted hereafter.
Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 36711-R reversing
that of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental After the issues had been joined, the Municipal Court of
and dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs- Sagay, Negros Occidental, rendered judgment on June
petitioners, besides ordering them to pay the 5, 1964, in favor of plaintiffs-petitioners, the dispositive
defendant-respondent the amount of P19,000.00. portion of which is as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The factual background of the case is as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court
renders judgment for the plaintiff and against the
Plaintiffs (now petitioners) filed in the Municipal Court of defendant Jose T. Jamandre, personally and in his
Sagay, Negros Occidental, a Complaint for Forcible capacity as Judicial Administrator of the estate of the
Entry and Detainer against defendant (now respondent) late Cirilo Jamandre, to vacate from and restore to
for taking possession of Haciendas "Aida" and "Fe" plaintiff, Soledad Tumbokon Consing, the possession of
through force, intimidation, stealth and strategy despite Hdas. "Aida" and "Fe" covered by Lots Nos. 1257,
the contract of sublease (Annex "A" of the Complaint) 1258, 806 and 694 all of Sagay Cadastre, and with
executed on October 19, 1962, (the date plaintiffs- costs against the defendant.
petitioners took possession and management of the
leased premises) by and between the former, as sub- Defendant-respondent appealed to the Court of First
lessee, and the father of the latter, Cirilo Jamandre, as Instance of Negros Occidental where the appeal was
sub-lessor. docketed as Civil Case No. 246 on July 25, 1964.

Defendant-respondent filed his answer and averred that On August 5, 1964, defendant-respondent filed his
he took-over the haciendas in question on September amended answer with the Court of First Instance of
11, 1963, seven (7) months after the death of his father, Negros Occidental.
Cirilo Jamandre, on February 11, 1963, because of the
failure of plaintiffs-petitioners to comply with the terms On August 18, 1964, plaintiffs-petitioners filed their
Motion To Strike And For Summary Judgment,

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 14

attaching thereto as Annex "A" the affidavit of Soledad First: Whether the stipulations in the contract authorize
Tumbokon Consing in support of the motion for the defendant in the taking of the possession of the
summary judgment. property subject of the litigation; and

Defendant-respondent objected to the motion to strike Second: The damages that may be adjudicated to
out the amended answer and for summary judgment. either of the parties in the event that a judgment is
rendered.
On August 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental admitted the amended answer of Therefore, the trial now will be confined to the
defendant-respondent and denied the motion to strike interpretation of the contract and the determination of
out and for judgment on the pleadings. damages. There is no need of evidence with reference
to the fact of prior possession because that is admitted
The plaintiffs-petitioners moved for the reconsideration in the pleadings and in the open manifestation of the
of the Order of August 29, 1964, and on September 15, parties.
1964, they filed their Supplement To Motion For
Reconsideration to which the defendant-respondent On August 4, 1965, the Court of First Instance of
objected. Negros Occidental, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over Forcible Entry and Detainer cases,
On October 9, 1964, the Court of First Instance denied rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
the motion for reconsideration, as follows:têñ.£îhqw⣠reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£

After considering the pleadings in the present case and IN VIEW OF the foregoing, judgment is hereby
the provisions of Rule 19 in connection with the Rule 34 rendered as follows:
of the Rules of Court, the Court is of the opinion and so
holds that the plaintiff is not entitled to summary 1. The defendant is ordered to vacate the premises of
judgment.. Lots Nos. 1257, 1258, 806 and 694 of the cadastral
survey of Sagay, known as Hdas. "Aida" and "Fe" and
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court denies the to deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
motion for reconsideration dated September 11, 1964.
The Clerk of Court is directed to set the trial of this case 2. The defendant is ordered to make an accounting of
on the merits in the November calendar at San Carlos his expenses and income from the leased property from
City. September 11, 1963 up to the date when the plaintiffs
shall have been restored to the possession thereof and
After the plaintiffs-petitioners had filed their Reply With the profit or net income shall be paid the plaintiffs;
Answer to Counterclaims, the case was set for pre-trial.
On March 31, 1965, the Court of First Instance issued 3. The defendant shall pay the costs; and
its Pre-Trial Order, to wit:têñ.£îhqwâ£
4. No award for attorney's fees as there is no evidence
After hearing the manifestations of both counsel, the that the acts of the defendant were inspired by fraud,
Court finds that there is no possibility of an amicable malice or evident bad faith.
settlement. According to the theory of the plaintiffs,
considering that the prior possession of the plaintiffs is The defendant-respondent appealed to the Court of
admitted by the defendant, the acts of the defendant in Appeals which rendered judgment reversing that of the
taking the possession of the property are illegal, and court a quo, the dispositive portion of which reads as
that the only question to be resolved in this case insofar follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
as the plaintiffs are concerned is the determination of
damages. The defendant, however, contends that WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed
according to the stipulations of the contract which is and another one entered dismissing the complaint of
attached to the complaint and admitted by the the plaintiffs, and ordering said plaintiffs to pay the
defendant, the plaintiffs have violated the terms of the defendant, on the counter-claim, the amount of
stipulations and conditions therein, and by virtue of the P19,000.00, which however, should be deducted from
stipulations of that contract the defendant is authorized the proceeds of the sugarcane harvested by the
to take possession of the property. The issue, therefore, appellant, who is ordered to render an accounting of the
to be resolved by this Court are: sugar cane he harvested for the crop year 1962-63, the
excess thereof, if any, after such accounting is made, is
ordered to be delivered to the appellees.

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 15

On equitable considerations, without special taking of possession by the sub-lessor(respondent in
pronouncement as to costs. the present case) and, therefore, the same is not
offensive to the law against forcible entry or to public
The plaintiffs-petitioners' motion for reconsideration and policy which, for the preservation of the public peace,
Addendum to Motion For Reconsideration having been does not allow taking the law into one's own hands.
denied, the herein petition for review on certiorari was
filed. I

Plaintiffs-petitioners maintain that summary judgment The principal issue, therefore, to be resolved is whether
should have been rendered by the court a quo in view or not the stipulation in the contract of sub-lease
of the failure of the defendant-respondent to file a between the parties authorizing the herein respondent,
counter affidavit or verified opposition. Besides, as sub-lessor, to take possession of the leased
defendant-respondent admits having taken possession premises including all its improvements thereon without
of the leased premises. Plaintiffs-petitioners likewise compensation to the sub-lessee (herein petitioners) and
maintain that the original case being one of forcible without the need of judicial action is valid and binding.
entry, reception of evidence should have been limited
only to that of possession de facto, and that the For a better understanding of the controversy, the
contractual stipulation no. 9 of the Contract of Sublease contractual stipulation is hereunder quoted:têñ.£îhqwâ£
(Annex "A" of the Complaint and submitted as Exhibit
"A") authorizing defendant-respondent to take 9. That in case of the failure on the part of the SUB-
possession of the leased premises without the need of LESSEE to comply with any of the terms and conditions
a court action is illegal. thereof, the SUB-LESSEE hereby gives an authority to
the SUB-LESSOR or to any of his authorized
Petitioners further contend that the only issue in forcible representative to take possession of the leased
entry case is the physical possession of the property premises including all its improvements thereon without
involved which is only possession de facto  and compensation to the SUB-LESSEE and without
not possession de jure;  that what is needed to be necessity of resorting to any court action but in which
proved only in forcible entry case is prior possession, case the SUB-LESSEE shall be duly advised in writing
and that if one could prove prior possession of the of her failure to comply with the terms and conditions of
property under litigation, he is entitled to stay thereon the contract by way of reminder before the take-over.
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
right either by accion publiciana or accion This stipulation is in the nature of a resolutely condition,
reivindicatoria. for upon the exercise by the Sub-lessor of his right to
take possession of the leased property, the contract is
Petitioners argue that the contractual stipulation in the deemed terminated. This kind of contractual stipulation
contract of sub-lease with the herein respondent, is not illegal, there being nothing in the law proscribing
authorizing the latter to take possession of the leased such kind of agreement. As held by this Court in Froilan
premises even without resorting to court action is illegal vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,  G.R. No. L-11897,
and violative of due process. They maintain that this is October 31, 1964; 12 SCRA 276, 286:têñ.£îhqwâ£
tantamount to a renunciation of one's day in Court and,
therefore, null and void. Besides, this might open the Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, in case of
floodgates to violence which our law seek to suppress. reciprocal obligations, the power to rescind the contract
where a party incurs in default, is impliedly given to the
Respondent on the other hand maintains that he took injured party. Appellee maintains, however, that the law
possession of the leased property because he is contemplates of rescission of contract by judicial action
authorized to do so under the contract (Annex "A" of the and not a unilateral act by the injured party;
Complaint; Exh. "A"). Respondent further maintains that consequently, the action of the Shipping Administration
the appellate court did not err in proceeding with its contravenes said provision of the law. This is not
interpretation of the contract of sub-lease of the parties entirely correct, because there is also nothing in the law
and in determining the amount of damages because the that prohibits the parties from entering into agreement
parties so agreed during the pre-trial of the case. that violation of the terms of the contract would cause
Respondent also claims that the stipulation "without cancellation thereof, even without court intervention.In
necessity of resorting to any court action", in the other words, it is not always necessary for the injured
contract of sub-lease (stipulation no. 9, Annex "A" of the party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. As
Complaint; Exh. "A") is not tainted with illegality already held, judicial action is needed where there is
because it does not provide for the use of force in the

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 16

absence of special provision in the contract granting to Rafael Maninang & Soledad Maninang v. CA, G.R. No.
a party the right of rescission. L-3603, 19 June 1982 – Unsearchable, instead:

Judicial permission to cancel the agreement was not, Co tiamco v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-7, January 22, 1946.
therefore, necessary because of the express stipulation
in the contract of sub-lease that the sub-lessor, in case ANTONIO CO TIAMCO, petitioner,
of failure of the sub-lessee to comply with the terms and vs.
conditions thereof, can take over the possession of the POMPEYO DIAZ, Judge of First Instance of Manila,
leased premises, thereby cancelling the contract of sub- YAO BOOM SIM (alias Co Hue), YAO KA TIAM
lease. Resort to judicial action is necessary only in the (alias Chua Kui), and SY GUI GAM (alias Go Si
absence of a special provision granting the power of Pio), respondents.
cancellation. (De la Rama Steamship Co., vs. Tan, G.R.
No. L-8784, May 21, 1956; 99 Phil. 1034). MORAN, C.J.:

II SYLLABUS

On the question that the reception of evidence should 1. ACTION; UNLAWFUL DETAINER; WHEN IS
have been limited to possession de facto only, We rule DEMAND A PREREQUISITE. — A demand is a
that the court a quo did not err in going further by prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the
interpreting the contract sub-lease. While it is true that action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with
the only issue in forcible entry or unlawful detainer the conditions of his lease," and not where the action is
action is the physical possession of the leased property, to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its
that is possession de facto — not possession de jure, term.
yet the court may go beyond that if only to prove the
2. ID.; LEASE; EXPIRATION OF TERM; NOTICE
nature of the possession. (Pitargue vs. Sorilla, L-4302,
September 17,1952; 48 O.G. 3849). The court may UNNECESSARY. — A lease ceases upon the
expiration of its term without the necessity of any notice
receive evidence upon the question of the title, or for
that matter possession de jure, solely for the purpose of to the tenant who thenceforth becomes a deforciant
withholding the property unlawfully "after the expiration
determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for the detention. (Sec. 88, Judiciary Act of or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue
of any contract, express or implied," as provided in Rule
1948, as amended by R.A. Nos. 2613 and 3828,
approved June 22, 1963). 72, section 1. In other words, upon the expiration of the
term of a lease, the
III
landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if
As to the legal question that summary judgment should the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for
have been rendered by the court a quo, We rule that unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against
plaintiffs-petitioners are not entitled, as a matter of right, him even before the expiration of the fifteen or five days
thereto. Summary judgment can only be granted where provided in Rule 72, section 2.
there are no questions of fact in issue or where the
3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; COMPLAINT IN
material allegations of the pleadings are not disputed.
Such is not true in the case at bar. Firstly, defendant- UNLAWFUL DETAINER; TACIT RENEWAL OF LEASE
A MATTER OF DEFENSE. — There may be a tacit
respondent maintains that plaintiffs-petitioners failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of their renewal of a lease (tacita reconduccion), as when, with
the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues
agreement. Secondly, in view of such failure on the part
of plaintiffs-petitioners, the defendant-respondent enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days as provided in
article 1566 of the Civil Code; and the lessor's
maintains that under their contract of sub-lease he is
authorized to take-over the possession of the leased acquiescence may be inferred from his failure to serve
a notice to quit. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 619.) But
premises.
tacit renewal, in such case, being a new contract (10
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision Manresa, Codigo Civil, p. 619), is a matter of defense
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed. Costs which may be alleged by defendant in his answer, no
against petitioners. SO ORDERED. allegation being necessary in the complaint by way of
anticipation of such defense.

4. ID.; ID.; LACK OF ALLEGATION REGARDING

NOTICE TO QUIT CURED BY EVIDENCE. — Where a

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 17

notice to quit was in fact made, though not specifically 9. ID.; COMPLAINT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER;
pleaded in the complaint, and said notice had been SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
offered and admitted in the municipal court as REGLEMENTARY FORM. — The complaint for
evidence, the deficiency of the complaint, supposing unlawful detainer filed in the municipal court, which is
there was any, was cured by evidence. not only a substantial, but almost a literal, copy of the
form given in the Rules of Court, is sufficient.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ON
MATTER NOT ALLEGED IN PLEADING AGAINST 10. ID.; ID.; FORM PROVIDED BY LAW IS PART OF
OBJECTION OF ADVERSE PARTY; AMENDMENT OF THAT LAW. — A form provided by law is a part of that
PLEADING BEFORE ALLOWING EVIDENCE. — law and, as such, it must be respected, regardless of
When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the what we might desire as to how it should be. After all,
pleadings, the court may admit it even against the our duty is to construe the law and not our will, for in
objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to administering the law we have no will but the will of the
satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence law. The form provided by the rules is not a figment of
would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the mind but a practical expression of a fundamental
the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance policy. It discloses that in an action for unlawful
to enable him to meet the new situation created by the detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is
evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing the unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is made
evidence, as a matter of formality, should allow an sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply
amendment of the pleading. possession on the part of the defendant, which was
legal in the beginning having no other source than a
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON AMENDMENT NOT contract, express or implied, possession which has later
TO BE APPLIED RIGIDLY TO MUNICIPAL COURT expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
PARTICULARLY WHERE NO SURPRISE OR
PREJUDICE IS CAUSED TO OBJECTING PARTY. — 11. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING FORM. —
Although the municipal court failed to order an The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this
amendment before admitting objected evidence, the form of pleading rests upon considerations of public
same may be allowed as a harmless error, since the policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are
rule on amendment should not be rigidly applied to said summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of
court which is not one of record and where the failure social order which must be restored as promptly as
does not appear to have caused surprise or prejudice to possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details
the objecting party. Well-known is the rule that
departures from procedure may be forgiven where they of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays
do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of should carefully be avoided. And these cases are to be
the parties. tried and decided by justice of the peace or municipal
courts who are in close contact with the masses.
7. COURTS; BRANCH OF COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE TO RESPECT FINAL AND EXECUTED 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY WHEN COMPLAINT IS
JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER BRANCH. — Where a VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS OR INDEFINITE. — Simplicity
branch of the Court of First Instance has judicial of pleading is the ideal of modern procedure. Under the
knowledge of a judgment of another branch ordering new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed
the municipal court to admit certain evidence, which upon the ground that the complaint is vague,
judgment has become final and obeyed, the former is in ambiguous or indefinite (See Rule 8, section 1),
duty bound to give due regard and full weight to said because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more
final and executed judgment. particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to
disclose more relevant facts under the different
8. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PURPOSE OF RULES methods of discovery provided by the Rules.
OF PLEADINGS; ELIMINATION OF PROCEDURAL
POINTS. — Rules of pleadings are intended to secure 13. MANDAMUS; PROPRIETY IN CASE OF
a method by which the issues may be properly laid DISMISSAL OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION. —
before the court. When those issues are already clear As to the propriety of the present action for
before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the
rules should not be given undue importance. What is mandamus, little need be said. Unlawful detainer is
important is that the case be decided upon the merits summary in nature and
and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural
points.

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 18

requires speedy action, and since the dismissal is Landlord to proceed against tenant only after
predicated upon a demand. — No landlord, or his legal representative or
assign, shall bring such action against a tenant  for
misconstruction of the law regarding the court's failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions
jurisdiction, the writ may be of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay
such rent or comply with such conditions for a period of
granted. fifteen days, or five days in the case of building, after
demand therefore, made upon him personally, or by
serving written notice of such demand upon the person
found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the
FULL TEXT
premises if no persons be found thereon. (Emphasis
Antonio Co Tiamco filed an action in the Municipal supplied.)
Court of Manila against Yao Boom Sim ( alias Co Hue),
It is apparent from this provision that a demand is a pre-
Yao Ka Tiam ( alias Chua Kui), and Sy Gui Gam
requisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the
(alias Go Si Pio) for unlawful detainer of the building
action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with
located at 503 Sto. Cristo Street, Manila. At the trial,
the conditions of his lease," and where the action is to
plaintiff offered Exhibit A as evidence, which is a notice
terminate the lease because of the expiration of its
to quit alleged to have been served upon defendants
term. This is in conformity with articles 1565 and 1581
prior to the action. Objection was to the evidence upon
of the Civil Code.
the ground that the fact sought to be proved thereby
was not alleged in the complaint. The objection was
ART. 1565. If the lease has been made for a fixed
sustained, and an action for mandamus was brought by period, it expires on the day fixed without the necessity
plaintiff to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The writ
of any notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
of mandamus was granted, and when the trial was
resumed in the municipal court, the evidence was ART. 1581. If no term has been fixed for the lease, it
admitted. After trial, judgement was rendered against shall be understood as from year to year when an
defendants who appealed to the Court of First Instance. annual rent has been fixed, from month to month when
The notice, Exhibit A, was a part of the record elevated the rent is monthly, and from day to day when it is daily.
on appeal. In the Court of First Instance, the complaint
filed in the municipal court was reproduced. Defendants In every case the lease ceases, without the necessity
filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there of a special notice, upon the expiration of the term.
was no allegation in the complaint of a notice to quit or (Emphasis supplied.)
vacate the premises served upon them prior to the
action and, therefore, the municipal court had no A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without
original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action the necessity of any notice1 to the tenant who
and, as a consequence, the Court of First Instance had thenceforth becomes a deforciant withholding the
no appellate jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The property unlawfully "after the expiration or termination of
motion was sustained and the case dismissed. Hence, the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
this action for mandamus against the Court of First express or implied," as provided in Rule 72, section 1.
Instance of Manila to reinstate the petitioner's case. In other words upon the expiration of the term of a
lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy
We believe, and so hold, that the order of dismissal is it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an
erroneous on the following grounds: (1) It relies on a action for unlawful detainer may immediately be
wrong construction of the Rules of Court; (2) it is brought against him even before the expiration of the
unwarranted under the circumstances of the case; and five days provided in Rule 72, section 2.
(3) the complaint filed is sufficient in itself.
Indeed, upon the expiration of the lease, there may be
1. We will begin by reviewing the construction placed by a tacit renewal thereof (tacita reconduccion), as when,
the respondent court on a provision of our Rules of with the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee
Court. The position taken by the respondent court is continues enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days, as
that, in all actions for unlawful detainer by a landlord provided in article 1566 of the Civil Code; and the
against a tenant, a demand, as required by Rule 72, lessor's acquiescence may be inferred from his failure
section 2, is jurisdictional. Such provision of the Rules to serve a notice to quit. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil,
is as follows: 619.) But tacit renewal in such case, being a new
contract (10 Manresa Codigo Civil, p. 619), is a matter

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 19

of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his parties. (Rule 52, section 3; Alonso vs. Villamor, 16
answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint Phil., 315; Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil.,
by way of anticipation of such defense 921.)
(Canfield vs. Tobias, 21 Cal., 349).
It is true that the case was dismissed by the respondent
2. Passing now to the facts of the case before us, we court, it was there on appeal and for trial de novo,
find that there has been in that case a notice to quit, independently of any evidence that had been presented
though not specifically pleaded in the complaint. That in the municipal court. But the admissibility of the notice
notice, which is Exhibit A, has been offered and to quit as evidence, should have been considered by
admitted in the municipal court as evidence. And even the respondent court as a closed question in so far its
supposing, without conceding, that the complaint is jurisdiction was concerned, for it was one of the
deficient in that regard, the deficiency was cured by branches of that court which, in an action
evidence. True that this evidence was admitted upon for mandamus, issued a writ compelling the municipal
objection of the defendant. But there is nothing wrong in court to admit the evidence. The jurisdiction of the court
that admission even applying Rule 17, section 4, which to issue the writ was never questioned. The judgement
is as follows: rendered by the court in such action had become final,
the appeal taken therefrom having been dismissed by
Amendment to conform to evidence. — When issues the court. And the judgment was executed by the
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or municipal court by admitting the evidence then in
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in question. All these circumstances were within the
all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. knowledge of the respondent court at the time it acted
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be upon the motion to dismiss. It may be argued that, as a
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence general rule, mandamus does not lie to control rulings
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of on questions of evidence in order not to delay the trial
any party at any time, even after judgement; but failure of cases and because the proper remedy is appeal. But
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of when the writ has been issued and has become final
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on and has been obeyed, it is perfectly valid and should be
the ground that it is not within the issues made by the respected. Specially is this so in the instant case where,
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be as will be shown later, the complaint filed was sufficient
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation and under its allegations the municipal court was bound
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby to admit the evidence.
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in We, therefore, believe and so hold that the respondent
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court having judicial knowledge of
court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting the mandamus proceedings was in duty bound to give
party to meet such evidence. (Emphasis supplied.) due regard and full weight to the final and executed
judgment therein rendered and, had it done so, it would
Under this provision, when evidence is offered on a have found that the supposed deficiency of the
matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit complaint pointed out in the motion to dismiss had
it even against the objection of the adverse party, already been supplied by evidence admitted by order of
where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the one of its branches; that the curative evidence was
admission of the evidence would prejudice him in already before it as a part of the record elevated on
maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court appeal by the municipal court; and that to throw away
may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the the whole case only because the complaint was silent
new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the on a fact well known to all the parties and to the court
court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of was certainly to defeat the paramount interests of
formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading justice for the sake of a useless technicality. It was a
and the municipal court did not do so in the case. useless technicality, because if the purpose of the
Since, however, the municipal court is not one record, pleading is to apprise the adverse party and the court of
the rule on amendments should not therein be rigidly the essential facts, that purpose is sufficiently
applied. And, furthermore, where the failure to order an accomplished once the court and the adverse party
amendment does not appear to have caused surprise have acquired a judicial knowledge of the real issues.
or prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed as Rules of pleadings are intended to secure a method by
a harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures which the issues may be properly laid before the court.
from procedure may be forgiven where they do not When those issues are already clear before the court,
appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 20

be given undue importance. What is important is that That a statement in unlawful detainer in justice court,
the case be decided upon the merits and that it should which is in the form given in Rev. St. 1880, p. 2262, and
not be allowed to go off on procedure points. The new Rev. St. 1855, Append., is sufficient, is stare decisis.
rules are really simple and liberal and, in the language (Bradford vs. Tilly, 65 Mo. App., 181; Mo. App. Rep'r.,
of Professor Sunderland, "the purpose which they seek 1204.)
to accomplish is to eliminate technical matters by
removing the basis for technical objections, to make it A complaint setting forth a charge of unlawful entry and
as difficult as impossible, for cases to go off on detainer in the language of the statute is sufficient.
procedural points, and to make litigation as (Armour Packing Co. vs. Howe, 75 P., 1014; 68 Kan.,
inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient, as can 663.)
be done." (Vol. XIII, University of Cincinnati Law
Review, 1939 [No. 1], p. 1.) Complaint in a forcible entry and detainer is sufficient if
substantially in the words of the statute.
We conclude, therefore, that the dismissal of the action (Locke vs. Skow, 91 N. W., 572; Neb. [Unof.], 229.)
is unwarranted under the peculiar circumstances of the
case. The complaint need not state the particular facts relied
upon to constitute the alleged forcible entry or forcible
3. But we prefer to base our decision not alone upon detention, but it is sufficient if it contains the language
the peculiarities of the case but upon an important rule of the statute. (Rice vs. West, 33 P., 706, overruled. —
of policy. We hold that the complaint filed with the [1897], Richardson vs. Penny, 50 P., 231; 6 Okl., 328
municipal court is sufficient. It reads as follows: [1903]; Greenmeyer vs. Coate, 72 P., 377; 12 Okl.,
452.)
Plaintiff  alleges that defendants unlawfully withhold
from him the possession of the building located at No. In a summary action under Code Civ. Proc., section
503 Sto. Cristo St., Manila. 1023, for the possession of land, plaintiff need not set
out facts constituting his cause of action, the complaint
Wherefore  he prays that he be restored to the being sufficient where it follows the language of the
possession of said premises, with damages and costs. statute. (Blachford vs. Frenzer, 44 Neb., 829; 62 N. W.,
1101.)
Manila, 20 April 1945.
In forcible entry or detainer, it is not necessary for the
This complaint is almost a verbatim copy of Form No. 1 complaint to contain a statement of the particular facts
of the Rules of Court, which in turn is a copy of the form relied on to constitute the alleged forcible entry or
provided in section 81 of our former Code of Civil detention, but the complaint is sufficient if it is in the
Procedure. The form as provided in the Rules is as language of Wilson's Rev. & Ann., St., 1903, section
follows: 5090, relating to such action. (Schlegel vs. Link, 105 P.,
652; 25 Okl., 263.)
FORM 1. — Complaint for Ejectment
In Roque vs. Logan  (40 Off. Gaz. [No. 14], 10th Supp.,
Plaintiff alleges that defendant has unlawfully turned p. 56), in which damages were not alleged in the body
him out of possession (or unlawfully withholds from him of the complaint but merely in the prayer, the Court,
the possession, as the case may be) of certain lands relying upon the form provided in section 81 of the
and building (here described the premises), situated in former Code of Civil Procedure, held the complaint to
the municipality of .......................................... be sufficient. In another case (Aguilar vs. Cabrera and
Flameño, G. R. No. 49129), for illegal detainer, where
Wherefore, he prays that he be restored to the
the complaint was made to conform to Form No. 1 of
possession of said premises, with damages and costs. the Rules, this Court issued a writ
of mandamus compelling the municipal court to try and
Substantial compliance with this form is sufficient
decide the case, thus impliedly upholding the
according to the Rules. The complaint filed in the
sufficiency of the form. Upon the other hand, no case —
municipal court only a substantial, but almost a literal,
Filipino or American — has been cited to us holding the
compliance with the form. It has been held that:
view that such form, or a similar one, is not sufficient in
A complaint in unlawful detainer, before a justice, actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. This form
substantially in the form given in Rev. St. p. 780, is has been a part of our statutes for more than forty years
sufficient. (Cabanne vs. Spaulding, 14 Mo. App., 312.) and has been used extensively in the provinces, as is
the observation of members of this Court who had been

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 21

trial judges in the provinces for years, and its sufficiency how it should be. After all, duty is to construe the law
has never been questioned until now, and now and not our will, for in administering the law we have no
precisely when it is more in consonance with the will but the will of the law. In the instant case, the form
tendency of modern procedure which is to liberalize the provided by the rules is not a figment of the mind but a
rules of pleadings so as preclude the failure of actions practical expression of a fundamental policy. It
upon mere technicalities of form. discloses that in an action for forcible entry a simple
allegation in the complaint that defendant turned the
Our attention is invited to the ruling of this Court plaintiff out of possession is sufficient, for, undoubtedly,
in Gumiran vs. Gumiran (21 Phil., 174, 179), wherein it the words "turned out" imply force in the taking of the
was held that "it is general rule of pleading and practice possession. (Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752,
that in all pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, 756.) And in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple
the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding
specially alleged and set out." But the complaint in said possession from plaintiff is made sufficient, for the
case merely alleged that "the plaintiff has been words "unlawfully withholding" imply possession on the
'deprived' of the land of which he is and has been the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning
owner for a long period," and, therefore, is not in accord having no other source than a contract, express or
with the form provided by the Rules. One may be implied, possession which has legal in the beginning
deprived of possession without force and there is no having no other source than a contract, express or
forcible entry; but when plaintiff is alleged to have been implied possession which has later expired as a right
turned out of possession by defendant, as is the and is being withheld by defendant. Thus, a form of a
allegation contained in the form, force is implied pleading is devised which is brief and concise and
(Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752, 756), and the though apparently too general it is so worded as clearly
complaint is sufficient. to apprise the defendant of the substance of the claim.
Other detail like the one-year period within which the
The syllabus in the case of  Melliza vs. Towle and action should be brought, and the demand when
Mueller  (34 Phil., 345, 346) is also relied upon. But the required to be made by the Rules must be proved but
complaint in such case does not allege, according to need not be alleged in the complaint.
the very language of this Court, "that possession was
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of It is true that according to Rule 4 section 3, the
the right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, or in complaint in an inferior court shall state "the grounds of
any other manner required by section 80" (of the former action " but no other facts are required in the form to be
Code of Civil Procedure), and, evidently, is not in stated aside from those that are already therein stated
conformity with the form. which are thus deemed sufficient grounds for action. In
this connection it must be observed that when a form
The rule laid down in Tengco vs. Jocson (43 Phil., 715), provided in the Rules is required to be supplemented by
applicable in ejection cases, has no application in additional facts the form itself says so by appropriate
actions for forcible entry or illegal detainer. The words enclosed in parenthesis. See, for instance form
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Street in Gonzales vs. No. 3, third paragraph; form No. 4, third paragraph;
Salas (49 Phil., 1), and the ruling laid down in  Lizo vs. form No. 7, on third-party complaint and other. But form
Carandang  (2 Off. Gaz. [No. 3], March, 1943), are No. 1, for complaint in forcible entry or illegal detainer
correct for there is no doubt that a complaint is cases, requires no additional statement of facts except
sufficient where it shows the facts sustaining the action the description of the premises and the name of the
for forcible entry or illegal detainer. There is, however, municipality where the property is located.
nothing in said opinion or in said ruling showing the
insufficiency of the form here in the question. The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this
form of pleading rests upon considerations of public
There is no fairness in holding a form to be insufficient policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are
after all the litigants were told by our Rules to follow it. It summary in nature for they involve perturbation of
is said that a form is but an illustration, a guide, or an social order which must be restored as promptly as
outline containing a general idea of what may be done. possible and accordingly technicalities or details of
But obviously, it cannot be a good illustration when it procedure which may cause unnecessary delay should
leaves something in the dark. It cannot be a right guide carefully be avoided. And these cases are to be tried
when it misguides. And it cannot be an honest outline and decided by justice of the peace or municipal court
when it is incomplete and is deceitful. A form provided who are in close contact with the masses. Simple and
by law is a part of that law and, as such, it must be practical methods of procedure should be afforded
respected, regardless of what we might desire as to these masses so that they may not fail through their

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 22

ignorance in obtaining a just redress for their "The real test of a good pleading under the new rules is
grievances. Poor and ignorant people living in distant whether the information given is sufficient to enable the
barrios and towns and peacefully enjoying their small party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion
pieces of land and homes, may be driven out of life by may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything
unscrupulous and violent individuals, and they may else if it gives the proper information. If the party wants
come for protection to the courts of the town completely more he may ask for more details in regard to the
unaided either because there are no lawyers in the particular matter that is stated too generally." (Vol. XIII,
locality or because they have no means to employ the Cincinnati Law Review, January 1939.) This justifies the
services of such lawyers. By the quality of attention form of complaint provided by the Rules in cases of
which they may receive in said courts will they learn forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
whether this government is also their own or only of the
powerful, rich or intellectual. Moreover, there can hardly As to the propriety of the present action for mandamus,
be one case out of a hundred which is so fictitious that little need be said. Unlawful detainer is summary in
the defendant is not aware of the trouble complained of, nature and requires speedy action, and since the
particularly in this kind of cases and in small dismissal is predicated upon a misconstruction of the
communities. It is for these reasons that a simple law regarding the court's jurisdiction, the writ may be
pleading containing a single ultimate fact is made granted.
sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the
action and to move the court into a prompt investigation For all the foregoing, it is ordered that a writ
of the facts with a view to a quick restoration of the of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent Court of
public order perturbed. If, in singular case, the First Instance of Manila, ordering it to try the petitioner's
defendant may not fairly prepare his answer or defense case after defendant has answered, and to continue the
because of the form of the pleading, he may ask for same to final judgment, with costs against defendants-
more particulars by discovery through deposition (Rule respondents.
18 in connection with Rule 4, section 19), or he may
very well wait for the trial and listen to plaintiff's
Ozaeta, Paras, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones,
testimony on details and then ask for a short JJ., concur.
postponement to prepare his defense, a petition which
would not be denied if duly justified.
Arevalo Gomez Corporation v. Anders Lao Hian Liong,
We have conscientiously weighed the reasons given by
G.R. No. 70360
some members of the Court holding a contrary view,
reasons which are not altogether wrong except that
they are pervaded with spirit of rigid conservatism in
utter disregard of Rule 1, section 2, which counsels Mara, Inc. v. Hon. Estrella, G.R. No. L-40511, 25 July
liberality in the construction and application of 1975
procedural rules with a view "to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action proceeding."
Decisions in American jurisdiction prior to the Chua v. CA, G.R. No. 113886, 24 February 1998
procedural reform may be found in support of the
contrary view — decisions which are either obsolete or
applicable only in ordinary civil actions triable in inferior
courts. In solving procedural problems, the progressive De Laureano v. Adil, G.R. No. L-43345, 29 July 1976
and liberal spirit of the reform should be our beacon
light.
Valdez v. CA, G.R. No. 132424, 2 May 2006
Simplicity of pleading is the ideal of modern procedure.
Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be
dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague,
ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1), Dela Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 139442, 6 December 2006
because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more
particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to
disclose more relevant facts under the different
methods of discovery provided by the Rules. (Rules 18, Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 97637, 10
20, 21, 22 and 23.) Professor Sunderland once said: April 1992

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 23

Alfredo Arquelada et al v. Philippine Veterans Bank,
G.R. No. 139137, 31 March 2000

Spouses Munoz v. CA, G.R. No. 102693, 23 Sep 1992

Esperanza Sumulong v. CA, G.R. No. 108817, 10 May

1994

Sps. Pedro Ong and Veronica Ong v. Socorro Parel,

G.R. No. 143173, 28 March 2001

JDSPECA | Cases | Rule 70 | 24