INTERPRETATION OF

STATUTES AND PRINCIPLES OF

LEGISLATIONS

ASSIGNMENT TOPIC: Interpretation of

Statutes.
SUBMITTED BY: ABHISHEK MARORIA

ROLL NO. 3406 SECTION: A

10TH SEMESTER

SUBMITTED TO: DR. ANUPAM KURLWAL

INTRODUCTION

Maxwell’s ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ has defined statute as the will of the

legislature. Usually, it refers to the act that is enacted by the legislature. The term
statute is generally applied to laws and regulations of every sort law which ordains,
permits or prohibits anything which is designated as a statute, without considering
from what source it arises.

Constitution of India has no particular definition for the word statute but it uses the
term “law” for denoting the actions of legislature and its primary power. Statutes
are divided into classes as mentioned below:

Codification: It is one when they codify the unwritten law on a particular subject.

Declaration: When there is no change in the existing law but merely clarification
or explanation of what it is.

Remedial: This is when they alter the common law or the judge makes a non-
statutory law on a particular subject.

Amendment: This is when the judge or the legislature changes or alters the statute
law.

Consolidation: This is combining several previous statutes relating to the same

subject matter with or without making changes in the same.

Enabling: Removal of restriction or disability.

Disabling or Restraining: Restrain on the alienation of property.

Penal: When there is imposition of penalty or forfeiture.

NEED AND OBJECT OF INTERPRETATION

Salmond directed that, “Interpretation or construction is the process by which the
Court’s seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of
authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”

The main and most important objective of interpretation is to see the intention that
has been merely expressed by the words. The words of the statute are to be
interpreted so as to ascertain the mind of legislature from natural and grammatical
meaning of the words which it has used.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

When the intention of legislature is not clearly expressed, a court needs to interpret
the laws using the rules of interpretation. There are two types of Rules of
Interpretation with sub-categories:

PRIMARY RULES
 The Primary Rule: Literal Interpretation

 The Mischief Rule: Heydon’s Rule

 Rule of Reasonable Construction or Ut Res Magis Valent Quam Pareat

 Rule of Harmonious Construction

 Rule of Ejusdem Generis

OTHER RULES
 Expressio Units Est Exclusio Alterius

 Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege

 Noscitur a Sociis

 Strict and Liberal Construction

The Primary Rule: Literal Interpretation

In construing Statutes, the cardinal rule is to construe its provisions literally and
grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. This rule is
also known as the Plain meaning rule. The first and foremost step in the course of
interpretation is to examine the language and the literal meaning of the statute. The
words in an enactment have their own natural effect and the construction of an act
depends on its wording. There should be no additions or substitution of words in
the construction of statutes and in its interpretation. The primary rule is to interpret
words as they are. It should be taken into note that the rule can be applied only
when the meanings of the words are clear i.e. words should be simple so that the
language is plain and only one meaning can be derived out of the statute.

To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include “definitions” sections within a

statute, which explicitly define the most important terms used in that statute. But
some statutes omit a definitions section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to define
a particular term. The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with
litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by the statute, or on that
of a word found within a definition itself.

Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from taking sides
in legislative or political issues. They also point out that ordinary people and
lawyers do not have extensive access to secondary sources. In probate law the rule
is also favoured because the testator is typically not around to indicate what
interpretation of a will is appropriate. Therefore, it is argued, extrinsic evidence
should not be allowed to vary the words used by the testator or their meaning. It
can help to provide for consistency in interpretation.

Case Law:

In Municipal board v. State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus

stand was changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be
moved within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority according
to section 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after
30 days on the contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge
of the order”. The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and
hence rejected the application as invalid.

Lord Atkinson stated, ‘In the construction of statutes their words must be
interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the
context or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in
which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from
their ordinary grammatical sense.’

The Mischief Rule: Heydon’s Case

In Heydon‟s Case, it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer “that for the
sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discerned and
considered:

 What was the Common Law before the making of the Act?

 What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not
provide?

 What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the Commonwealth?

 What is the true reason of the remedy?

The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the
golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s intent. It can be
argued that this undermines Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as it
takes law-making decisions away from the legislature.
There are certain advantages and disadvantages of the rule. The Law Commission
sees it as a rule that is far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as it avoids
unjust or absurd results in sentencing but for some it is considered to be out of date
as it was established in 16th century when conditions were very different from
now.

Case Law:

The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, applied the mischief
rule in construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India. After referring to
the state of law prevailing in the province prior to the constitution as also to the
chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter-state trade and commerce by
indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers by the different Provincial Legislatures
founded on the theory of territorial nexus, Chief Justice S.R. Das, stated “It was to
cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of interstate
trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without
any provincial barrier that the constitution maker adopted Article 286 in the
constitution”.

A principle to be valued must be capable of wider application than the mischief

which gave it existence. These are designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it’. Mischief Rule is applicable where language is
capable of more than one meaning. It is the duty of the Court to make such
construction of a statue which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

Rule of Reasonable Construction or Golden Rule

The words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, but in
many cases, judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary
meaning of words, does not meet the ends as a fair and a reasonable construction.
Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words may not necessarily
assist a proper construction of the statutory provision in which the words occur.
Often enough interpreting the provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to the
subject matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve.

According to this rule, the words of a statute must be construed ut res magis valeat
quam pareat, so as to give a sensible meaning to them. A provision of law cannot
be so interpreted as to divorce it entirely from common sense, every word or
expression used in an Act should receive a natural and fair meaning.

Case Law:

In RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd, the Supreme Court
stated that if a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, with the glasses
of the statute makers provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses,
phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is
looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must
look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clauses each
phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the
entire Act.

Rule of Harmonious Construction

When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of a
statute then the rule of harmonious construction needs to be adopted. The rule
follows a very simple premise that every statute has a purpose and intent as per law
and should be read as a whole. The interpretation consistent of all the provisions of
the statute should be adopted. In the case in which it shall be impossible to
harmonize both the provisions, the court’s decision regarding the provision shall
prevail.
When there are two provisions in a statute, which are in apparent conflict with each
other, they should be interpreted such that effect can be given to both and that
construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be
adopted except in the last resort.

The important aspects of this principle are:

The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and
they must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.

The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in
another unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile
their differences.

When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory

provisions, the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to
both the provisions as much as possible.

Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a
useless number or a dead lumbar, is not harmonious construction.

To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it loose.

Case Law:

In Raj Krishna v. Binod, two provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951,

which were in apparent conflict, were brought forth. Section 33 (2) says that a
Government Servant can nominate or second a person in election but section
123(8) says that a Government Servant cannot assist any candidate in election
except by casting his vote. The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions
should be harmoniously interpreted and held that a Government Servant was
entitled to nominate or second a candidate seeking election in State Legislative
assembly. This harmony can only be achieved if Section 123(8) is interpreted as
giving the govt. servant the right to vote as well as to nominate or second a
candidate and forbidding him to assist the candidate in any other manner.

Rule of Ejusdem Generis

Ejusdem Generis (pronounced as “eh-youse-dem generous”) is a Latin term which

means “of the same kind.” The term ‘Ejusdem Generis’ in other words means
words of a similar class. The rule is that where particular words have a common
characteristic (i.e. of a class) any general words that follow should be construed as
referring generally to that class; no wider construction should be afforded.

It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. A

particular section of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the Act. The
Ejusdem Generis rule applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning to groups
of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear.

Normally, general words should be given their natural meaning like all other words
unless the context requires otherwise. But when a general word follows specific
words of a distinct category, the general word may be given a restricted meaning of
the same category. The general expression takes its meaning from the preceding
particular expressions because the legislature by using the particular words of a
distinct genus has shown its intention to that effect.

The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great caution, because, it
implies a departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a
meaning on a supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be controlled by
the fundamental rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object
sought to be accomplished. The rule requires that the specific words are all of one
genus, in which case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that
genus.
Case Law:

The Supreme Court in Maharashtra University of Health and others v. Satchikitsa

Prasarak Mandal & Others has examined and explained the meaning of Ejusdem
Generis as a rule of interpretation of statutes in our legal system.

While examining the doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the expression
Ejusdem Generis which means “of the same kind or nature” is a principle of
construction, meaning thereby when general words in a statutory text are flanked
by restricted words, the meaning of the general words are taken to be restricted by
implication with the meaning of restricted words.

The Supreme Court has further held that the Ejusdem Generis principle is a facet
of the principle of ‘Noscitur a sociis’(A latin term for ‘it is known by the company
it keeps’, it is the concept that the intended meaning of an ambiguous word
depends on the context in which it is used). The Latin maxim Noscitur a Sociis
contemplates that a statutory term is recognized by its associated words. The Latin
word ‘sociis’ means ‘society’. Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed with
specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation. Their color and their
contents are to be derived from their context. But like all other linguistic canons of
construction, the Ejusdem Generis principle applies only when a contrary intention
does not appear.

Expressio Units Est Exclusio Alterius

The maxim is given to gauge the intent of the legislature. If the words of the
Statute are plain and its meaning is clear then there is no scope for applying the
rule. The rule means that express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another.
At the same time, general words in a statute must receive a general construction,
unless there is in the statute some ground for limiting and restraining their meaning
by reasonable construction; because many things are put into a statute ex abundanti
cautela, and it is not to be assumed that anything not specifically included is for
that reason alone excluded from the protection of the statute. The method of
construction according to this maxim must be carefully watched. The failure to
make the “expression” complete may arise from accident. Similarly, the
“exclusion” is often the result of inadvertence or accident because it never struck
the draftsman that the thing supposed to be excluded requires specific mention.
The maxim ought not to be applied when its application leads to inconsistency or
injustice.

Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege

The maxim means that a contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in
law. Where the words used in a statute have undergone alteration in meaning in
course of time, the words will be construed to bear the same meaning as they had
when the statute was passed on the principle expressed in the maxim. In simple
words, old statutes should be interpreted as they would have been at the date when
they were passed and prior usage and interpretation by those who have an interest
or duty in enforcing the Act, and the legal profession of the time, are presumptive
evidence of their meaning when the meaning is doubtful.

But if the statute appears to be capable of only interpretation, the fact that a wrong
meaning had been attached to it for many years, will be immaterial and the correct
meaning will be given by the Courts except when title to property may be affected
or when every day transactions have been entered into on such wrong
interpretation.

Noscitur a Sociis
The “Noscitur a Sociis” i.e. “It is known by its associates”. In other words,
meaning of a word should be known from its accompanying or associating words.
It is not a sound principle in interpretation of statutes, to lay emphasis on one word
disjuncted from its preceding and succeeding words. A word in a statutory
provision is to be read in collocation with its companion words. The pristine
principle based on the maxim „noscitur a socitis‟ has much relevance in
understanding the import of words in a statutory provision (K. Bhagirathi G.
Shenoy v. K.P. Ballakuraya, AIR 1999 SC 2143). The rule states that where two or
more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they
are understood in their cognate sense. It is only where the intention of the
legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance, is
doubtful that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied.

Strict and Liberal Construction

In Wiberforce on Statute Law, it is said that what is meant by ‘strict construction’

is that “Acts, are not to be regarded as including anything which is not within their
letter as well as their spirit, which is not clearly and intelligibly described in the
very words of the statute, as well as manifestly intended”, while by “liberal
construction” is meant that “everything is to be done in advancement of the remedy
that can be done consistently with any construction of the statute”. Beneficial
construction to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy is generally
preferred.