Rule 92-95
Rule 92-95
W/N respondent judge of Branch IV has the authority or power to take further action in the
special proceedings after the judge of Branch I asserted its jurisdiction? NO.
1. Parco v. CA, 111 SCRA 262 (1982) - Calantoc 2. W/N Branch IV, exercising limited and special jurisdiction as a guardianship court, has
jurisdiction to order the delivery or reconveyance of the three lots to the ward, represented
Doctrine: herein by Francisco? NO.
When a case is filed in one branch of the RTC, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or
judge alone to the exclusion of other branches. However, where one branch of the same court had already Ruling:
resumed its jurisdiction by issuing two orders, the other branch should relinquish its jurisdiction over the (1)
guardianship proceedings and should inhibit itself from taking further action over the case. [Doctrine]
The Presiding Judge of Branch I asserted and assumed its prior jurisdiction by issuing two
Facts: orders, one of which requires Francisco to render an inventory and accounting of the property
This case stemmed from guardianship proceedings for the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez of the ward. On the other hand, respondent Judge of Branch IV, in confirmation of such
which originally pertained to Branch I-Lucena (“Branch I”), and later on succeeded by resumption of jurisdiction, ordered the return of the records of the special proceedings to
respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag (“Branch IV”). The latter took cognizance of the Branch I. However, instead of relinquishing jurisdiction over the case, respondent Judge
proceedings when the Secretary of Justice authorized respondent Judge to help unclog the continued to take further action on the case in total disregard of the two orders of the Presiding
docket of Branch I. Judge of Branch I.
On December 1966, respondent Judge authorized and approved, upon motion of Soledad’s There is no question that the prior proceedings had in Branch IV were valid and regular as they
guardian, Francisco (“private respondent”), the sale to the Sps. Parco (“petitioners”) of two lots were authorized by the Secretary of Justice. It must be emphasized however, that Branch IV
for the support, maintenance and medical treatment of the ward Soledad. lost its jurisdiction when respondent Judge ordered the return of the records to Branch I after
On January 1967, respondent Judge again approved and authorized, upon motion of Francisco, having been informed in a motion for reconsideration of the existence of the two orders issued
the sale to the spouses of another lot. by the Presiding Judge of Branch I.
On May 1968, or almost a year from the approval of the sale of the three lots, Francisco filed o From that point of time, all subsequent proceedings and processes in connection
an urgent petition praying that an order be immediately issued requiring the Sps. Parco to with or related to the special proceedings undertaken by the respondent Judge
appear before the court so that they can be examined as regards the three lots in question became irregular. It amounted to an undue interference with the processes and
which are allegedly in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled and upon proceedings of Branch I.
failure to do so, to hold them in contempt of court. He further alleged that: The Sps. Parco cannot be considered estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the respondent
o The transfer of titles of the first two lots were made pursuant to a loan agreement Judge as they came to know only of the two orders of Branch I when they examined the
(and not an absolute sale) with the express commitment in writing that such lots records of the case. Their silence or inaction was due to their lack of knowledge of respondent
may be recovered within three months; Judge’s lack of authority to retain or take further action on the case.
o Prior to the expiration of the said period, he tried to recover the lots but the same
was not carried out because he was then transacting with the petitioners the sale of (2)
the third lot under the Agreement that they will not sell or convey the first two lots Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually
to anyone, and once the third lot has been sold, the borrowed amount shall be order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed.
deducted from the selling price and the first two lots shall be returned; Where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, the
o The spouses, in bad faith, violated the agreement by selling the aforementioned lots, determination of said title or right must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in
and further refused to turn over the proceeds thereof; guardianship proceedings as held in the case of Cui v. Piccio. However, where the right or title
o The said lots with all the proceeds derived therefrom undeniably belonged to his of said ward is clear and undisputable, the guardianship court can order the delivery or return
ward as trust properties, which are subject the court’s disposition, and are in danger of the embezzled, concealed, or conveyed property of the ward.
of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled due to the acts complained of. In the case at bar, the court does not find that the title or right of the ward Soledad over the
The Sps. Parco, in their Answer, alleged that the three lots have been conveyed to them by way three lots in question is clear and undisputable on the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties.
of absolute sale which were duly approved by the guardianship court. What is certain, however, is the fact that the sale of the properties were duly approved by the
The case was set for pre-trial but the spouses failed to appear, hence, the respondent Judge respondent Judge in accordance with Rule 97 of the ROC.
issued an order authorizing Francisco to present his evidence ex parte. The Sps. Parco sought The court took note of the fact that Francisco contended that the sale of the first two lots was
for a reconsideration of the said order, pointing out that there was a First Order issued by the pursuant to a loan agreement with right of recovery while that of the third lot was subject to a
Presiding Judge of Branch I, stating that said branch will take cognizance of the case. condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated sale. On the other hand, the Sps. Parco alleged that
Respondent Judge of Branch IV granted the motion for reconsideration and ordered the records the sales were all absolute and protected by the Torrens System. Apparently, there is a cloud of
of the case to be transmitted to Branch I. doubt as to who has a better right or title to the disputed properties, the determination of title or
Francisco later filed an amended petition before Branch IV praying that the three lots be ownership which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed
ordered reconveyed to the ward. Respondent Judge granted the same and ordered the Sps. out in a separate ordinary action.
Parco to reconvey the three lots to Francisco.
The spouses filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. A second motion for 2. Paciente v. Dacuycuy et al, 114 SCRA 924 (1982) - Caro
reconsideration was filed, but which was likewise denied.
A petition for certiorari on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion was Doctrine: Where right or title of ward to the property is clear and indubitable, although said right or title
filed with the CA, but the same was dismissed. Hence, this instant petition for review. is determined in a separate ordinary action, not in guardianship proceedings, the court may order delivery
or return of the property to the ward. [This case has more to do with jurisdiction than
Issue/s:
Facts:
Leonardo Homeres died and left a parcel of land to his wife Lilia, and 2 minor children.
Lilia sold this lot to Conchita Dumdum. Florita, as Administratrix, filed with the RTC a Petition praying that Roberto Rafson and
In the Respondent Juvenile Domestic Relations Court of Leyte, Lilia filed a petition for Rudyard be declared as heirs to the intestate estate of Roberto and Florita be appointed
guardianship over the persons and estates of her 2 minor children granted, she took her oath as guardian of the the two.
guardian. Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. De Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto
Conchita then sold the lot to petitioner Patria Paciente, under TCT T-13238 filed a MTD on the ground of improper venue. She alleged that at the time of the Roberto’s
Paciente mortgaged the lot to Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation Acting City Register death, he was a resident of Davao City (Florita filed it in Cotabato City), hence, the RTC of
of Deeds filed a Manifestation informing the court that the lot subject of the guardianship Davao is the proper forum.
proceedings was mortgaged to the Bank. Florita filed an opposition to the MTD contending that this is a petition for guardianship of the
Court then directed Paciente and the Bank to appear and show cause why Paciente’s TCT minor children of petitioner who are heirs to the estate of Roberto and under Sec. 1, Rule 92, of
should not be cancelled for having been alienated without authority from the court they didn’t the ROC, the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides, which is Cotabato City in this
appear. case. She also contended that Roberto died a bachelor and never contracted any marriage.
Instead, Conchita appeared and manifested that she didn’t know that she needed to inform the Thereafter, Florita filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended Petition. It contained identical
court of her sale to Paciente. material allegation but differed in its title which is not a petition of the settlement of the
Paciente’s husband also appeared to argue that she was an innocent purchaser for value intestate estate of Roberto, declaration of heirship, guardianship over the persons and
Respondent court then issued an order requiring Paciente and Conchita to deposit P10k as properties of minors Robert and Rudyard, and issuance of letters of administration. It also
additional consideration for the property, otherwise the mortgage in favor of Consolidated amended par. 4 of the original petition to read as follows: “that Roberto Lim Chua, father of
Bank will be cancelled. the abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992
Paciente filed MR denied. Court also ordered a new TCT to include the minors as co-owners at Davao City.” (Orig. Petition: “That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above- mentioned
with Paciente minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.”)
Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of said motion on
Issue: W/N the court, acting as a guardianship court, has jurisdiction to (1) order the Register of Deeds to 24 July 1992, private Respondent’s counsel allegedly admitted that the sole intention of the
cancel the TCT, and to (2) order the issuance of a new TCT to include the minors as co-owners with original petition was to secure guardianship over the persons and property of the minors.
Paciente? YES. RTC denied the MTD for lack of merit. It ruled that Antonietta had no personality to filed the
MTD, not having proven her status as wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the
Ruling: actual residence of the deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was
Paciente argues that based on Cui v. Piccio and Parco v. CA, the respondent court in hearing a concurrent venue among the RTC’s where the decedent had resided, the RTC of Cotabato had
petition for guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title. already taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent’s estate to the exclusion of all
Case excerpt: the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, [generally], is to cite others.
persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward RTC then appointed the deceased’s cousin as special administrator, and Florita as guardian
for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be instituted over the persons and properties of the two minor children.
by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Only in extreme cases, where property clearly Antonietta then filed a motion praying that the letters of administration issued to Florita be
belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially decided, may the court recalled and that new letters be issued to her. She likewise filed a motion to declare the
direct its delivery to the guardian. proceedings a mistrial. Both were denied. MR denied.
SC found these cases to be inapplicable to this case. Antonietta then filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (Rule 65) with the CA. Denied. It
While the above finding is true, the SC also emphasized in those cases that if the right or title held that the original petition filed was one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of the
of the ward to the property is clear and indisputable the court may issue an order directing its deceased as well as for administration of his intestate estate. While private respondent may
delivery or return. have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the
Here, the right or title of the minors to the lot is clear and indisputable. They inherited a part of fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition unmistakably showed a twin
the land in question from their father. The sale of this land, where they are coowners, by their purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was
mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal. In issuing the above unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a newspaper of general
questioned order and resolution, the respondent court did not exceed its jurisdiction but merely circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for the only reason stated in the
exercised its duty to protect persons under disability. motion for leave: so that the “case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in
The respondent court’s order directing the deposit of an additional consideration of 10k is a clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or
different matter. It was issued without a hearing to determine not only the valuation of the misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition,” which was for
property but the time frame for fixing said valuation which is not clear. Thus, void. guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor children and for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the decedent who was their father. In other words, there being no change in
3. Garcia Vda De Chua v. CA, 287 SCRA 33 (1998) - Celeste the material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the publication of the first
in a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal
Doctrine: The petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and settlement of estate. requirements of notice.
Therefore, the court has jurisdiction over both.
Issue: W/N the CA erred? NO.
Facts:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita Ruling:
A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple had 2 illegitimate children, The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which includes the
Roberto Rafson and Rudyard. Roberto died intestate in Davao. issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition reads:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP,
GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSON AND PROPERTIES OF
MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all
surnamed SHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION
Likewise, the prayer of the petitioner states:
That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the
administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration.
While par. 4 of the original petition filed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of
his death, the omission was cured by the amended petitions.
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be stated in the
petition for letters of administration. Consequently, there was no need to publish the
amended petition as petitioner would insist in her second assignment of errors.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not
related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise.
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof
of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to
produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate
which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other
worthless pieces of evidence. Not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the
deceased, she is likewise not entitled to notice of the proceedings. Therefore, her contention
that she was deprived of due process has no merit.
[Ito lang discussion regarding guardianship wtf.] Finally, petitioner further argues as
supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the Court of Appeals treating the Special
Proceeding No. 331 as one for both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of
our ruling in Gomez vs. Imperial, which the petitioner quotes: “The distribution of the residue
of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining properly not to the guardianship
proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.” This is
misplaced.
In the Gomez case, the action before the lower court was merely one for guardianship.
Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. While
in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and settlement of
estate.
Rule 93 guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with the court a
quo.
4. Alamayri v. Pabale, G.R. No. 151243, April 30, 2008 - Coronel [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not
made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision
Doctrine: The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in
Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no their favor was never raised in the guardianship case. Not long after a motion for substitution
capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as his was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property was
guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help the trial court settle such issues sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should
would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his be substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating
relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him. It is significant to note that the that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The [Alamayri] and that the same was already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion
reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. for substitution should be denied. On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring
It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed minor or that it cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto
incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts Gesmundo
and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith. RTC: After the case was heard on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision, Recognizing
Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land
Facts: records of Calamba, Laguna CA: The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001,
A Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando, granted the appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings.
representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court, invoking
Laguna against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna. It the Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings, which found
alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980. Said Decision already became
was entered into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, final and executory when no one appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave
[Nave] reneged on their agreement. [Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could was already judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she
not be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the subsequently entered into should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale,
following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the subject property in favor of the
handed to her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it was for the Pabale siblings.
sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna, she immediately returned to [Fernando] the said piece It is Alamayri’s position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the
of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. (2) she already sold the property in good RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same fact
faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] may no longer be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res
on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
thereof. Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are
now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include [the Issue/s:
Pabale siblings] as party defendants. 1. W/N the decision on the guardianship proceeding is binding upon the respondents? NO.
Thereafter, [Nave], impleaded as her co-defendant, Atty. Gesmundo, his spouse. Also, she 2. W/N the declaration that Nave was incompetent in 1986 makes the sale in 1984 (Pabale
included as her defense, the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient siblings) void? NO.
based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra.
Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the Ruling:
same was denied by the court a quo. [Nave] then filed a motion for reconsideration thereof (NOTE: Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already
asseverating that in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer
raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment requires only
once and for all whether the contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.)
is null and void. Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in
this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship
of [Nave]. (1)
Decision was rendered in the guardianship proceedings: Based on the “Neuro-Psychiatric No identity of parties
Evaluation Report”, Nave is found an incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of the SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the
Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her
mental processes cannot without outside aid take care of herself and manage her properties, incompetence. A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition having become or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering the penalty of civil
severe since the year 1980. She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty. interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read
Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons
further orders from this Court. not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, subsequently, [Nave] cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming
died on December 9, 1992. Then, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Nave’s] sole heir, executed an thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation."
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave]. On account A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e.,
of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of a petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C
writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for bears the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y
Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain the burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who
names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.
having him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor or Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when
incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition. the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC,
Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986,
has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed
be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20
the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally
supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or failed to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No.
the persons caring for him. It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors 146-86-C.
of the minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a PROC. No. 146-86-C on Nave’s condition "having become severe since the year 1980." 25 But
given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent there is no basis for such a declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said
is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts and Decision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986, 26 and (2) by Dr.
keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon their examination, Nave was
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took part suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Nave’s relatives, nor are they the ones caring for episodes," which impaired her judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports,
her. Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of however, which may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. The
the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Nave’s
actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than
Alamayri’s allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not
two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19 November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she
PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale
supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. siblings, so as to render the said deed void.
However, the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and
of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the said hearings Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Nave’s incompetency by
on their behalf. the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that
Even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended Nave still had capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed
the RTC hearings was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. PETITION DENIED, CA
authority to represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that Jose AFFIRMED.
Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February 1984 over the subject
property, which was executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper 5. Garchitorena v. Sotelo, G.R. No. L-47867, Nov. 13, 1942 - Dolar
authority, Jose Pabale’s presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind
his children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the subject property. Doctrine: Confidence and active good faith are necessary in the relation of guardian and ward, and a
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, guardian cannot serve interests adverse to that of his ward’s interests.
then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
Facts:
(2) Asuncion Jarata mortgaged the subject property to Perfecto Gabriel to secure a loan of P6000.
No identity of issues Jarata died after 2 and a half year, survived by her 8 minor children and husband Gatchalian.
A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 – does not automatically mean she was so in 1984 Prior her death, Jarata executed a will that was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, naming Gabriel
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the the guardian of her children, Gatchalian as the executor, and devised the mortgaged property to
time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a her children.
guardian over her person and estate. In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against Gabriel, as attorney for Gatchalian, filed for the probate of the will and was also appointed a
the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an guardian over the persons and property of the minor children of Gatchalian and Jarata.
incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale Gabriel, in his application to be appointed as guardian, never mentioned that the property of the
siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said sale void. minor children was mortgaged to him. However, after 6 years, Gatchalian was appointed as
While both cases involve a determination of Nave’s incompetency, it must be established at guardian upon Gabriel’s petition.
two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in Gabriel’s last account as guardian showing a deficit of P3,730.10 as found by the Court.
1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court Gabriel, as guardian, also executed a 2nd mortgage over the property of his wards in favour of
ruled that despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court Santa Clara Monastery to secure a loan of P2,500. Gabriel was also the attorney-in-fact of the
only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so Monastery.
when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be Gatchalian then tried to raise capital to engage. He agreed to Gabriel’s plan where Gabriel
gainsaid since Nave’s mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the would sue Gatchalian to foreclose the mortgage to take the property out of the Court’s custody
intervening period. so Gatchalian may in turn mortgage the property.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared Gabriel then filed for the foreclosure of the mortgage and Gatchalian filed an answer admitting
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; all the allegations, and the trial court rendered a judgment in favour of Gabriel.
that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind. The
Gabriel then sold the property to Carmen Garchitorena, who in turn sold the property to Jesus The annulment of the judgment entered in the foreclosure suit necessarily carries with it the
Pellon. annulment of the sale made by the sheriff pursuant to said judgment as well as the annulment
Sotelo was then appointed guardian of the minor children and complained of Gabriel’s conduct of the order of the court approving that sale. The limbs cannot survive after the trunk has
and commenced an action against him to annul the foreclosure of the subject property claiming perished.
that it was obtained through fraud.
The trial court ruled for Sotelo, and ordered the cancellation of Pellon’s title and the issuance
(4)
of a new title in the name of the minors. This was affirmed by the CA.
The trial court found the sale fictitious and the CA found the conclusion had been supported by
sufficient evidence to support it. After considering all the facts and circumstances, We are not
Issue/s:
inclined to disturb the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Garchitorena was not an
1. W/N the facts are sufficient to establish collusion between Gabriel and Gatchalian in the
innocent purchaser. We note further that Garchitorena has not filed any cross-complaint against
foreclosure suit Gabriel brought against Gatchalian? YES.
her co-defendant Gabriel to recover what she claims to have paid to him together with damages
2. W/N the minors were prejudiced by the foreclosure mortgage? YES.
— which she could properly have done. If such omission was voluntary, it would tend to
3. W/N the collusion in the foreclosure suit constituted an extrinsic or collateral fraud which may
strengthen the theory that she had acted merely as Gabriel's dummy. But let us give her the
be ground to have the judgment annulled in a separate action? YES.
benefit of the doubt, as the Court of Appeals apparently did my making the prudent reservation
4. W/N Gabriel’s sale to Gatchitorena was valid? NO.
in the appealed decision to the effect that whatever action Carmen Garchitorena may have
against Perfecto Gabriel to her is left open for determination in a separate suit.
Ruling:
(1)
The judgment of foreclosure was obtained due to Gatchalian’s confession of judgment to the Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
complaint of Gabriel. Due to this, the court being unaware of the agreement of the parties,
granted the complaint. Gabriel insists that Gatchalian had no defense anyway and that the 6. Nery et al v. Lorenzo et al, 44 SCRA 431 (1972) - Loyola
confession was proper and commendable in the interest of prompt administration of justice.
However, Gatchalian was not being sued in his personal capacity. Rather, he was sued as Doctrine: Guardianship; Petition for appointment of guardian; Notice thereof to minor above 14 years of
guardian of the property of his wards. And Gabriel, who sued him was his predecessor as age jurisdictional.—Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the
guardian and was the one who executed the Santa Clara mortgage on behalf of the minors. incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a
Further, it was Gabriel’s duty to preserve the property of the wards. Gabriel was also the guardian.
former employer of Gatchalian, which the CA found that such relationship has exerted a
predominating influence in Gatchalian’s mind. The elements of confidence on one side and
active good faith in the other are essential in the relation of guardian and ward. Honesty and Facts:
fidelity to his trust required of the guardian that he inform the court of the situation so that it A 4ha parcel of land, situated in Malaking Kahoy, Parañaque, Rizal, was sold to vendee
could authorize the sale of the property to best advantage and save something for the minors. spouses Nery by the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo.
Under these circumstances, the agreement and the conduct of Gabriel and Gatchalian in The vendor was Bienvenida (widow), guardian of the decedent's minor children. Two (2) of
connection with the foreclosure proceeding can be considered a collusion between them to whom later assailed the validity of the said transaction.
induce the court into entering judgment in favor of Gabriel without any trial and without giving The latter contended that despite the order of the guardianship court authorizing the sale of the
the minors affected an opportunity to protect their interests. As a lawyer of long experience, he lot, they were not informed of the move. Further, they contended that the guardianship
knew or should have known that he could not serve antagonistic interests, and that if the court proceeding was conducted without notifying the two older siblings although they were already
had been apprised that he was creditor and mortgagee of the estate of said minors, it would not more than 14 years of age at that time.
have appointed him guardian. He not only failed to disclose to the court that he was mortgagee The heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in question,
but deliberately misinformed the court in the guardianship proceeding that the first mortgagee intervened in such action.
was not he but the Santa Clara Monastery. Neither did he inform the court that he was the In the lower court decision, they were adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion
attorney-in-fact and the administrator of the funds of that institution. of the property, the sale by the widow being considered null and void insofar as they were
concerned. The rights of the children of Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half
of the three-fourths appertaining to such spouses were likewise accorded recognition.
The spouses Nery appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared the deed of sale to the
(2) spouses–as to the 3/4 portion–by the guardian as valid, without prejudice to the children
Gabriel bought the property at P9,600 and immediately sold it to Garchitorena for P10,367, demanding from their mother their participation in the proceeds.
thereby enriching himself at the expense of his former wards. Gabriel's attempt to profit, Not being satisfied with the appellate court's decision, the spouses Nery, the children of the
however little, at the expense of the minors cannot be sanctioned by the Court. It was a breach deceased and Bienvenida filed these petitions.
of trust which the law condemns under any and all circumstances.
Issue:
(3) W/N the probate court could have validly authorized the sale of the property? NO.
The collusive conduct of the parties in the foreclosure suit constituted an extrinsic or collateral
fraud by reason of which the judgment rendered therein may be annulled in this separate
action. Petitioners vehemently invoke reasons of public policy which favor the stability of Ruling:
judicial decisions. Suffice it for us to say that such reasons are mute in the presence of fraud, The Court of Appeals failed to give due weight to the jurisdictional defect that the minors over
which the law abhors. 14 years age were not notified. The probate court is therefore correct in not have authorized the
sale due to this clear jurisdictional infirmity. The rights of the young should never be ignored
and it does not matter if their guardian is their mother, as even in some cases, the interest of the
mother is opposed to that of the children.
Finally, when minors are involve, the state being the parens patriae has the duty to protect the
rights of persons or individuals who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position.
Doctrine: The order of the court declaring the incompetency and appointing a guardian is good until
reversed or set aside, and authorizes the guardian, in spite of the appeal, to do whatever is necessary under
the direction of the court, to protect the property of the incompetent or ward. (Mercader v. Wislizenus, 34
Phil. 846, 1916)
Facts:
Petitioner Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte (Zafra for short) petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for the appointment of a legal guardian over the person and property of
Remigia Zafra, who is alleged to be an incompetent person, afflicted with mental disorder and
other ailments that rendered her incapable to take care of herself and to manage her property.
Zafra prayed for her appointment as the legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia.
She claimed that she is her niece, being a daughter of Remigia’s sister.
This petition was opposed by Julian Lua (Lua) and Francisco Unabia (Unabia). Lua claimed to
be the common-law husband of Remigia for more than 30 years, and Unabia claimed to be the
half-brother of Remigia. Hence, they prayed that either of them be appointed legal guardian of
Remigia, should she be found incompetent.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court found Remigia to be really mentally deranged.
Thus, Zafra was appointed as the legal guardian of Remigia’s person and property. Lua and
Unabia submitted their MR. However, on the same date, Zafra directed the issuance of the
letters of guardianship which was granted after she filed a bond of P1,000.00 and had taken her
oath of office as the legal guardian.
When the court denied the MR of Lua and Unabia, they filed their notice of appeal on 2 May
1964, and Record on Appeal on 13 May 1964. The Judge approved the record on appeal and
elevated the case to CA for review. Notwithstanding this, the court ordered Lua and Unabia to
transfer and surrender the person of Remigia to Zafra.
Hence, on 19 May 1964, Lua and Unabia thru an MR of latest order, prayed that the status quo
as to the custody of Remigia, who is under the charge of Felisa Unabia (half-sister of Remigia),
be maintained during the pendency of their appeal. However, this MR was denied.
Upon this denial, they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to prevent the execution of the
order of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court. They obtained a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining or staying the enforcement of the order appointing Zafra as legal
guardian.
Zafra’s MR was denied, thus, this petition for review of the CA’s decision. She alleged a grave
abuse of discretion against CA for countering the quality of immediate enforceability of the
order allowing to assume her functions as the appointed guardian.
Issue: W/N the effectivity of an order appointing a guardian can be suspended in the event of an appeal of
the said order? NO.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of Zafra-Sarte. This excerpt (read the “Doctrine” part) used by Zafra-Sarte to
lobby her cause supported her stand. It was a ruling that made the SC realize that this fear was not without
basis, it was the idea that the property of the person adjudged incompetent could be frittered away during
the pendency of such appeal or converted to the use of designing persons. The above consideration does
not defract from the general principle announced that such appointment of a guardian should be
considered good until reversed or set aside on appeal. No such weighty and persuasive reason that would
call for a different ruling.
Rule 95 Doctrine: The jurisdiction of the court to authorize the sale of the property of minors rests upon the
averments of the petition and adequate publication or appearance of the parties interested. The fact that the
8. Lindain v. CA, G.R. No. 95305, Aug. 20, 1992 - Payad statements of the petition may be untrue with respect to the existence of encumbrances on the property and
Doctrine: Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator the necessity for the sale, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, which rests upon the averments and
of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property not upon the truth of those averments.
of said children without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of
her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and
Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and management. Her power to Facts:
sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must proceed from Hacienda Rosario use to be owned by Don Rafael Sinco, survived by Saturnina Lopez.
the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority and approval. Saturnina is survived by Sergio, Maria Paz and Coloma (deads), who is survived by the
petitioners (minors).
Facts: Sergio offered his 1/3 share of the Hacienda to the Respondents Longa but Longa will only
The plaintiffs, still minors back then, owned a parcel of land. Their mother, Dolores accept if the whole of the lot is sold.
Luluquisin, acting as their guardian, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Sergio, Maria Paz agreed to sell their share.
Registered Land to Sps. Apolonia and Federico. Teves, the guardian of the minors filed a petition in the court to be allowed to sell the minors’
Plaintiffs contention: the sale of the lot by their mother to the Sps. is null and void because it share in the property. – the court agreed.
was made without judicial authority and/or court approval. So the whole property was eventually sold to the Longas.
Defendants contention: the sale was valid, as the value of the property was less than P2,000, 16 years later, the petitioners(not minors anymore), filed this action to annul the sale of
and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the youngest being 31 years old at the time of the the property to the Longas.
filing of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should have been exercised Petitioners claim fraud on the part of the respondents, their uncle and aunt, and Teves their
four (4) years after reaching the age of majority, has already prescribed. guardian.
RTC - ruled the sale as void. Petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the court in allowing the sale of their share
CA - reversed RTC, ruled the sale as valid. because they claim that it is not true that the property is needed to be sold because it is
necessary to support them.
Issue: W/N a sale by a guardian of a minor requires judicial approval? YES.
Issue/s:
Ruling: 1. W/N the court which allowed the sale of the property has jurisdiction? YES.
Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the assailed transaction 2. W/N there is fraud? NO.
occurred, provides: Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is Ruling:
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the (1)
approval of the Court of First Instance.
In the petition it was clearly set forth that the income of the children's property was insufficient
[Doctrine] properly to maintain and educate them and that it was for their benefit that their share should
In the case of Visaya, et al. vs. Suguitan, et al., G.R. No. L-8300, November 18, 1955, we held be sold. It was also therein stated that the property was encumbered. Admitting that these
that: It is true that under Art. 320 of the new Civil Code the mother, Juana Visaya, was the statements of the petition were untrue, the jurisdiction of the court to authorize the sale was
legal administrator of the property of her minor children. But as such legal administrator she not thereby affected, because the jurisdiction of the court rests on the averments of the
had no power to compromise their claims, for compromise has always been deemed equivalent petition and not upon the truth of those averments.
to an alienation (transigere est alienare), and is an act of strict ownership that goes beyond Mere allegation that the income from the sale is sufficient to maintain and educate the minors
mere administration. Hence, Art. 2032 of the new Civil Code provides: is sufficient to grant jurisdiction in the guardianship court.
The Court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians,
parents, absentee's representatives and administrators or executors of decedent's estates.
This restriction on the power of parents to compromise claims affecting their (2)
children is in contrast to the terms of Art. 1810 of the old Civil Code that empowered parents There is no clear and convincing proof of fraud.
to enter into such compromises, without requiring court approval unless the amount involved Experience teaches the danger of lightly accepting charges of fraud made many years after the
was in excess of 2000 pesetas. At present, the Court['s] approval is indispensable regardless transaction which is the subject of question was accomplished, when death may have sealed the
of the amount involved. lips of the principal actors and changes effected by time may have given a totally different
The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in good faith is not credible for color to the questioned transaction.
they knew from the very beginning that their vendor, the petitioners' mother, without court
approval could not validly convey to them the property of her minor children. Knowing her 10. Tavera v. El Hogar Filipino, Inc., G.R. No. L-5893, February 28, 1956 - Sta. Ana
lack of judicial authority to enter into the transaction, the private respondents acted in bad faith
when they went ahead and bought the land from her anyway. Doctrine/s:
The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions over immovables 1. It is not necessary for a grant of authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward to state
prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took place in 1966, the that the income from the property “is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to
action to recover the property had not yet prescribed when the petitioners sued in 1987. maintain or educate the ward when a minor.”
2. Notice is not necessary where the next of kin to the ward and all persons interested in the estate
9. Singco v. Longa, G.R. No. L-27962, Feb. 14, 1928 - Santos are her mother and guardian, uncles and aunts who agreed to make the transfer of their shares
in the property to the corporation to be organized.
Facts: A petition was filed by the guardian Julia Rabacal, alleging that it was necessary to sell parcel
A parcel of land was registered in the name of Andres, Carlos, Maria (3 y/o), Roberto (9 y/o), 4 of the inventory, in order to defray the expenses in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 919 [the
and Carmen (11 y/o), all surnamed de Tavera. case didn’t say what this case was about] and for the support and education of the wards.
They agreed to organize a corporation under the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. for the purpose This petition was approved by the court authorizing the guardian to sell the residential lot and
of building a modern structure on the parcel of land. In turn, they agreed to accept shares of its improvements.
stock of the corporation to be organized in exchange for their respective shares in the land. Jose Margate, intending to buy a house and lot, happened to meet Julia Rabacal, who offered to
In 1930, the mother of Carmen (her duly appointed guardian) filed a petition in the probate sell him the residential lot in question for Php5K. After negotiations, the parties agreed on the
court praying for the approval of the said agreement, and seeking authority to accept the said selling price of Php4K.
shares. It was approved. After the agreement, Rabacal began getting money from Margate, such that when Rabacal
In 1942, Carmen brought an action in the CFI Manila to annul the transfer of her right, secured the authority to sell from the court, she had already obtained from Margate the sum of
share and interest in the property made by her guardian to TaveraLuna, Inc. P500.00, and after having secured the order of authority to sell, Rabacal showed to Margate a
She alleged that the order was a nullity because: copy of the order.
o The petition did not set forth the condition of the estate of the ward and the facts On May 27, 1948, a deed of sale was executed by Julia Rabacal, acknowledged before a
and circumstances upon which the petition was founded tending to show the Notary Public, selling the land in question to Margate for Php4K on which date Margate paid
necessity or expediency of the sale the balance of Php3,500.00 to Rabacal.
o The petition was not verified. Jose Margate filed an application for the registration of a residential land with a house.
o The Court did not direct “the next of kin to the ward, and all persons interested in An order of general default was entered against the whole world, with the exception of the
the estate, to appear before the judge or court, at the time and place therein Director of Lands who did not file any formal opposition, and Julia Rabacal and her minor
specified, not less than four nor more than eight weeks from the time of making children who opposed the application, on the ground that:
such order, to show cause why an order should not be granted for the sale or such o The property was under guardianship proceedings when sold;
estate.” o The sale was not authorized by the court;
o The purchase price of P4,000.00 was not fully paid, as there was a remaining
Issue: W/N the order should be annulled? NO. balance of P500.00 and that the market price of the lot and house was P10,000.00.
After due hearing, the registration court confirmed the title of the applicant to the parcel of land
Ruling: in question, and ordered that the same be registered in the name of Jose F. Margate.
As to allegations in the petition:
The guardian’s petition alleged that the transfer of her ward’s share in the property to the
corporation then to be organized would be to or for her benefit and she expected that the Issue: W/N the sale of the land in question is valid? YES.
construction of a new building would enhance the value of her ward’s share in the property and
increase her income. Ruling:
It is not necessary for a grant of authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward to state Rabacal and her evidence do not deserve any credence after the said court had found that she
that the income from the property “is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to had deliberately deceived the court in the guardianship proceedings. The trial court declared
maintain or educate the ward when a minor.” (doctrine) that notwithstanding the fact that Rabacal had sold parcel 4 of the inventory, and executed a
It is enough, as the other alternative of the law provides, that “it appears to the satisfaction of deed of sale on May 27, 1948, Rabacal still filed in the guardianship proceedings, asserting that
the court that it is for the benefit of the ward that his real estate or some part thereof should be despite her efforts, she was unable to find a buyer for said parcel of land.
sold, and the proceeds thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive security. Appellants (Rabacal and children) argue that the deed of sale, executed by the guardian, Julia
As to notice: Rabacal in favor of applicant, had no binding effect, because the authority to sell was cancelled
Notice is not necessary where the next of kin to the ward and all persons interested in the estate and the sale was not approved by the guardianship Court.
are her mother and guardian, uncles and aunts who agreed to make the transfer of their shares [Refer to Doctrine]
in the property to the corporation to be organized. If the court had been informed of the sale, the court would certainly not have revoked the
authority. Moreover, the revocation was entered without notice to the purchaser Jose F.
11. Margate v. Rabacal, G.R. No. L-14302, April 30, 1963 - Tolentino Margate.
The persuasiveness of those disquisitions cannot be over emphasized. With respect to the lack
Doctrine: The cancellation by the guardianship Court of the guardian’s authority to sell the parcel of land
of approval of the sale by the court, His Honor held that the law merely requires that the
in question did not, and could not, affect the rights of the buyer, because at the time the order cancelling
guardian should be authorized, and that the authority to sell did not impose the condition
such authority was entered, the guardian had already sold the land.
that the deed of sale executed by the guardian should be approved by the Court. The
approval of the sale by the court, under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case,
Facts: would then be merely pro-forma, since the appellants were not able to show any reason why
In his lifetime, Dr. Julio Berina bought a house and lot. the guardianship could would have refused to approved the sale which was already a fait
Dr. Julio Berina died on October 15, 1945, survived by his widow, Julia Rabacal (Rabacal), accompli and within the authority given by said court.
and his minor children.
In 1946, Rabacal filed a petition for the appointment of a guardian of the persons and [Just in case Sir asks about Conjugal Property]:
properties of the minor children of Dr. Berina. The land and house were admittedly the conjugal property of the deceased Dr. Julio Berina and herein
Rabacal was appointed guardian of her minor children and letters of guardianship was oppositor Julia Rabacal. Upon the death of Dr. Berina, said properties descended to the surviving spouse
issued in her favor. Julia Rabacal and his minor children. Under the old Civil Code (whose provisions should apply), Julia
Rabacal was entitled to one-half (1/2) as her share in the conjugal property. This being the case, at least,
the one-half portion belonging to her which was included in the sale of the entire property to the appellee, be prejudiced by the payments made by the mortgagors during the enemy occupation
could stand as legal and valid. amounting to P15,117.29 which was declared invalidated. Furthermore, oppositors objected to
the items listed as the company's commission; attorney's fees; the miscellaneous disbursements
12. Phil. Trust Co. v. Balesteros, G.R. No. L-8532, Oct. 11, 1957 - Villadolid allegedly incurred for the wards; and charged that the Philippine Trust Company did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to protect the interests of the minors with
[Guardianship of James E. Stegner, et al., minors, JUANITA T. STEGNER, petitioner. respect to the participation in La Granja and La Urbana and which negligence resulted in the
PHILIPPINE TRUST Co., guardian and appellee, vs. CATHERINE STEGNER and MILDRED loss of P9,900 belonging to said minors. Thus, they asked the Court to disapprove the
STEGNER, oppositors and appellants.] statement of accounts submitted by the company and that it be' ordered to present a new one
with the objected items eliminated.
(I followed the GR No. and this was the case that showed up, but in the syllabus it says Phil Trust v PTC contends that it relied on the provisions on trust corporations, specifically Section 139 of
Balesteros) the Corporation Law (repealed by Republic Act No. 337, known as the General Banking Act)
which provides that deposits or moneys received by a trust corporation as guardian or trustee
Facts: can be loaned and invested in accordance with the provisions governing loans and investments
W. A. Stegner, an American , was a resident of Pamplona, Cagayan when he died testate. In his of savings and mortgage banks, unless otherwise directed by the instrument creating the trust.
will, testator designated Philippine Trust Company easvxecutor of and trustee , to serve Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the properties of the wards were received by the
without bond and as guardian of his children James E. Stegner,Henry G. Stegner, Ruth H. guardian in a fideicommissary capacity which partakes of the nature of a "commodatum" for
Stegner, and Catherine Stegner. the benefit of said minors, thus requiring court authorization before said funds could be
He left total assets valued at P24,672.86, and in addition thereto, the minors were to receive invested.
monthly pensions from the U. S. Veterans Administration. CFI of Manila issued an order finding the opposition interposed by Catherine and Mildred
On November 11, 1936, Juanita T. Stegner, widow of the deceased and mother of the minors, Stegner as groundless and approved the statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine
petitioned the CFI Manila for the issuance in her favor of letters of guardianship over the Trust Company, authorizing the collection of its commission and attorney's fees; and the
person and properties of her children, which petition was granted by the Court upon the filing delivery to the wards Henry, Catherine and Mildred Stegner of their respective residuary
by a bond in the sum of P500. The Veterans Administration, however, recommended that the estates.
guardianship over the properties be placed in the hands of a solvent trust company doing
business in Manila. Issue: W/N the Philippine Trust Company could be held liable for the investments of the funds of the
Upon subsequent petitions of both parties, the court granted guardianship over the person of wards made without securing the previous authorization of the Court and which resulted in the loss of
the minors to Juanita Stegner and the guardianship ober the property to Philippine Trust P15,117.29? NO.
Company. James E. Stegner reached the age of majority and was consequently released from
guardianship by order of the Court of March 28, 1941, but it appears that he and his sister Ruth Ruling:
were killed by the Japanese in 1945. "It is not necessary for us to pass upon the applicability of section 139 of Act No. 1459,
The remaining wards under guardianship having reached the age of majority, the Philippine because we hold that, under section 5 of Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, the investments in
Trust Company on May 26, 1953, filed a final consolidated statement of account and petition question were valid and binding upon appellant's ward. It is noteworthy that in the four
for discharge containing a detailed statement of cash receipts and disbursements made covering previous inventory-accounts filed by the appellant with the lower court, the mortgage loans
the period from June 1, 1942, to May 20, 1953, in the case of Henry Stegner; from June 1, extended by the appellant and the interest collected thereon were plainly reported; * * *. We
1941, to May 20, 1953, in the case of Ruth, Catherine and Mildred Stegner. It also showed that are of the opinion that this approval had the effect of impliedly validating appellant's acts and
the amount of P15,117.29 in Japanese military notes which was invalidated by Executive making them binding upon its ward"—(Philippine Trust Co. vs. Ballesteros, 98 Phil., 1007).
Orders Nos. 25 and 49 was deducted from the balance of P16,282.32 remaining in favor of the (DOCTRINE)
wards; that the participation in the notes of La Granja, Inc., had been eliminated upon GUARDIAN AND WARD; INVESTMENT OF WARD'S PROPERTIES; AUTHORITY OF
discovery that the balance of the same was duly paid for on January 4, 1940, and was COURT; APPROVAL OF ACCOUNTS.—The court's approval of the annual inventories and
correspondingly noted in the inventory account of July 6, 1940, which was approved by the accounts submitted by the guardian, with the conformity and/or acquiescence of the U. S.
Court on August 29 of the same year; that the value of the participation in the La Urbana was Veterans Administration and the mother of the minors, where the investment of the properties
reduced from P3,200 to P400 in view of the fact that P2,800 had already been paid on April 12, of the wards made without securing previous judicial authority, was mentioned and accounted
1938, as stated in the inventory account dated June 29, 1938, and duly approved by order of the for, amounts to a ratification of the acts of the guardian and compliance with the provisions of
Court of November 3, 1948; that the company was entitled to 5 per cent of the total amount Section 5, Rule 96 of the Rules 01 Court.
received by said guardian as fees. It was, therefore, prayed that the statement of accounts be
approved; that it be authorized to collect the sum of P418.77 as fees or commission and the 13. Soriano v. Latono, G.R. No. L-3408, Dec. 23, 1950 - Yap
amount of P437.31 as attorney's fees; that it be authorized to deliver the estate of the deceased
Ruth Stegner to her brother Henry and sisters Catherine and Mildred, in equal shares; that the
residuary estates of the wards be delivered to them; that it be relieved from further Doctrine:
responsibility as such guardian, and that the proceedings be declared closed and terminated. 1. Where the court’s order expressly authorized the guardian to execute and deliver to purchaser
definitely named, a deed of conveyance to a parcel of land specifically described at a price
Catherine and Mildred Stegner opposed this petition alleging, among others, that although the
already fixed, and it appears that the order was intended as the approval itself of the sale that
guardianship commenced in 1937, the consolidated statement of accounts submitted by the
was already perfected or agreed upon by the seller and the buyers, needing only a judicial go-
Philippine Trust Company started only from 1941; that it did not explain why the minors
ahead signal to reduce the agreement to the statutory form, it would be a useless formality to
should be prejudiced by the sum of P15,117.29 allegedly invalidated; that despite the absence
submit the deed to the court for action in the absence of any clear requirement or direction to
of previous judicial authorization, the company invested the funds of the wards in mortgage
that effect.
loans; that said loans were not contested by the wards when they were informed of the same
because they were still minors at the time; that as the loans were in the name of the Philippine
Trust Company and not in the names of Catherine and Mildred Stegner, these wards should not
2. A sale by the guardian of the property of the ward may be approved before the deed is necessity for the court’s confirmation or a new approval of the conveyance to
executed, depending on the intention of the court and providing that faithful compliance with validate it, and the fact that the purchasers sought such confirmation more than 10
the conditions proposed or imposed has been made. years later did not alter the case.
Ruling:
The court’s order expressly authorized the guardian “to execute and deliver” to purchasers
definitely named a deed of conveyance to a parcel of land specifically described at a price
already fixed. The order was intended as the approval itself of the sale. (See doctrine)
A sale by the guardian may be approved before the deed is executed, depending on the
intention of the court and providing that faithful compliance with the conditions proposed or
imposed has been made. Under the circumstances of this case, it is doubted if the court could
property have set aside or disapproved the sale in the absence of fraud, mistake, or
inadvertence.
Moreover, the formal objection to the deed of sale is of no moment. Had the instrument not
been notarized at all, the same would have been effective as between the parties, as the old
civil code was still in force at the time of conveyance, and all the elements of a valid contract
were present.
With regard to the contention that the sale was indirectly disapproved by the court when it
reversed the lower court’s decision and such disapproval constitutes res judicata.
o Untenable. The court in its order, so far from passing on the validity of the disputed
sale, declined to decide the question since the wards may bring a separate action for
the determination of such issue, if they so desire. Furthermore, there was no