CASE TITLE: Salvador v.
Mapa
G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans. By Memorandum Order No. 61, the functions of the
Committee were subsequently expanded to include all non-
performing loans which shall embrace behest and non- behest
loans.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for
investigation, including the loan transactions between Metals
Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI)
and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Committee
determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as
defined under Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders
and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President
Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI
was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.
Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution, dismissing the
complaint filed by the PCGG against the respondents for violation
of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct
of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint
holding that the offenses charged had already prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
RULING:
No, an ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an
action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime
or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that
which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or
(f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are
those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
Here, the subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not
come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13
creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not
mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference
for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative
Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be
characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis
for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.