RULE 128 – General Provisions

EVIDENCE 2ND SEMESTER, AY 2020-2021

Case Digests
Valenzuela, Jeffrey Carlos M.

Table of Contents
RULE 128 – General Provisions...................................................................................................5
1. Salita vs Magtolis, GR No 106429..........................................................................................5
2. Tantuico vs Republic, GR No 89114.......................................................................................6
3. People vs Ebias, GR No 127130..............................................................................................7
4. Republic vs Gimenez, GR No 174673.....................................................................................8
5. Mancol vs DBP, GR No 204289..............................................................................................9
6. Prats & Co. vs Phoenix Insurance, GR No 28607.................................................................10
7. People vs Yatco, GR No L-9181...........................................................................................11
8. PNOC Shipping and Transport vs CA, GR No 107518.........................................................12
9. People vs Binamira, GR No 110397......................................................................................13
10. People vs Lim, GR No 231989............................................................................................14
11. Lagmay vs Quinit, GR No L-10902.....................................................................................16
RULE 129 – Judicial Notice and Admissions............................................................................17
12. Republic vs CA, GR No L-54886........................................................................................17
13. US vs Blanco, GR No L-12435...........................................................................................19
14. Sardane vs CA, GR No L-47045.........................................................................................20
15. Prieto vs Arroyo, GR No L-17885.......................................................................................21
16. PVAO vs Segundo, GR No 51570.......................................................................................22
17. Gener vs De Leon, GR No 130730......................................................................................23
18. People vs Martinez, GR No 116918....................................................................................24
19. People vs Erit, GR No L-2301.............................................................................................25
20. People vs Hernandez, GR No 108028.................................................................................26
21. State Prosecutors vs Muro, AM No RTJ-92-876.................................................................27
22. Oronce vs CA, GR No 125766............................................................................................28
23. Capitol Motors vs Yabut, GR No L-28140..........................................................................29
RULE 130 – Object Evidence.....................................................................................................30
24. People vs Olarte, GR No 233209.........................................................................................30
25. Daayata vs People, GR No 205745......................................................................................32
26. People vs Nunez, GR No 209342........................................................................................33
27. People vs Romorosa, GR No 237209..................................................................................35
28. People vs Vallejo, GR No 144656.......................................................................................36
RULE 130 – Original Document Rule.......................................................................................37
29. People vs Tandoy, GR No 80505.........................................................................................37
30. US vs Gregorio, GR No L-5791..........................................................................................38

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31. Borje vs Sandiganbayan, GR No L-55436...........................................................................39

32. Pacasum vs People, GR No 180314.....................................................................................40
33. PNB vs Olila, 98 Phil 1002..................................................................................................41
34. Heirs of Gregorio vs CA, GR No 117609............................................................................42
35. Sison vs People, GR No 108280-83; People vs Ferrer, GR No 114931-33........................43
36. College Assurance Plan vs Belfranlt Development, GR No 155604...................................44
37. People vs Zeta, GR No 178541............................................................................................45
38. Republic vs Gimenez, GR No 174673.................................................................................46
39. Heirs of Gregorio vs CA, GR No 117609............................................................................47
40. Skunac vs Sylianteng, GR No 205879.................................................................................48
41. Heirs of Prodon vs Heirs of Alvarez, GR No 170604.........................................................49
42. Capital Shoes Factory vs Traveler Kids, GR No 200065....................................................50
43. Northern Mindanao Power Corporation vs CIR, GR No 185115........................................51
44. MCMP Construction vs Monark Equipment, GR No 201001.............................................52
45. EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and Resort vs BF Corporation, GR No 145842; Del Castillo vs
BF Corporation, GR No 145873................................................................................................53
46. Compania Maritima vs Allied Free Workers Union, GR No L-28999................................54
47. Paras vs Kimwa Construction and Development, GR No 171601......................................55
48. Abella vs Abella, GR No 195166........................................................................................56
49. Lee vs People, GR No 159288.............................................................................................57
50. BPI vs Mendoza, GR No 198799.........................................................................................58
51. Dimaguila vs Monteiro, GR No 201011..............................................................................59
52. Republic vs Mupas, GR No 181892; Republic vs PIATCO, GR No 209917; Takenaka vs
Republic, GR No 209696; PIATCO vs Republic, GR No 209731............................................60
53. Llemos vs Llemos, GR No 150162......................................................................................62
RULE 130 – Parol Evidence Rule..............................................................................................63
54. Syquia vs CA, GR No L-61932...........................................................................................63
55. Heirs of Ureta vs Heirs of Ureta, GR No 165748; Heirs of Ureta vs Heirs of Ureta, GR No
165930........................................................................................................................................64
56. Marquez vs Espejo, GR No 168387.....................................................................................65
57. Sy vs Navarro, GR No 239088............................................................................................67
58. Borillo vs CA, GR No 55691...............................................................................................68
Rule 130 – Interpretation of Documents...................................................................................69
59. RCBC vs IAC, GR No 74851..............................................................................................69
60. Santiago vs CA, GR No 103959..........................................................................................70
61. Garcia vs CA, GR No 119845.............................................................................................71
62. Ortañez vs CA, GR No 110662...........................................................................................72
RULE 130 – Qualification of Witnesses.....................................................................................73
63. Alvarez vs Ramirez, GR No 143439...................................................................................73

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64. People vs Pansensoy, GR No 140634..................................................................................74

65. US vs Antipolo, GR No L-13109.........................................................................................75
66. People vs Carlos, GR No 22948..........................................................................................76
67. People vs Sandiganbayan, GR Nos 115439-41...................................................................77
68. Lim vs CA, GR No 91114...................................................................................................78
69. Chan vs Chan, GR No 179786.............................................................................................79
70. Almonte vs Vasquez, GR No 95367....................................................................................80
71. Lee vs CA, GR No 177861..................................................................................................81
72. PASAR vs Lim, GR No 172948..........................................................................................82
73. Eagleridge Development vs Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, GR No 204700....83
RULE 130 – Admissions and Confessions.................................................................................84
74. Estrada vs Desierto, GR Nos 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo, GR No 146738....................84
75. People vs Manuel, GR No 92503.........................................................................................85
76. People vs Libed, GR No. L-20431.......................................................................................86
77. People vs Cui, GR No 121982.............................................................................................87
78. People vs Palijon, GR No 123545.......................................................................................88
79. People vs Raquel, GR No 119005.......................................................................................89
80. People vs Job, GR No 116084-85........................................................................................90
81. People vs Pilones, GR No L-32754-5..................................................................................91
82. People vs Paragsa, GR No L-44060.....................................................................................92
83. People vs Agustin, GR No 110290......................................................................................93
84. People vs Cayago, GR No 128827.......................................................................................94
85. People vs Del Rosario, GR No 131036................................................................................95
86. Torre vs CA, GR No 102786...............................................................................................96
87. People vs Camat, GR No 112262........................................................................................97
88. People vs Base, GR No 108773...........................................................................................98
89. Nicolas vs Enriquez, GR No L-8371...................................................................................99
90. Cruz vs CA, GR No 126713..............................................................................................100
91. Adelfa Properties vs CA, GR No 111238..........................................................................101
RULE 130 - Hearsay..................................................................................................................102
92. Eugenio vs CA, GR No 103737.........................................................................................102
93. People vs Valdez, GR No 127753.....................................................................................103
94. People vs Mamalias, GR No 128073.................................................................................104
95. People vs Cusi, GR No L-20986........................................................................................105
96. People vs Mayorga, GR No 135405..................................................................................106
97. Feria vs CA, GR No 122954..............................................................................................107
98. People vs Sion, GR No 109617.........................................................................................108
99. People vs Amaca, GR No 110129.....................................................................................109
100. Fuentes vs CA, GR No 111692........................................................................................110

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101. Heirs of Conti vs CA, GR No 118464.............................................................................111

102. In re: Mallare, AC No 533...............................................................................................112
103. People vs Palmones, GR No 136303...............................................................................113
104. Canque vs CA, GR No 96202..........................................................................................114
105. Rodriguez vs CA, GR No 121964...................................................................................115
106. People vs Rendoque, Sr., GR No 106282........................................................................116
107. Manila Electric Company vs Quisumbing, GR No 127598.............................................117
108. Eugenio vs CA, GR No 103737.......................................................................................118
Rule 130 - Opinion.....................................................................................................................120
109. People vs Abriol, GR No 123137....................................................................................120
110. People vs Madarang, GR No 132319...............................................................................121
111. People vs Dumanon, GR No 123096...............................................................................122
RULE 130 – Character..............................................................................................................123
112. In re Villasanta vs Peralta, GR AC-UNAV (1957)..........................................................123
113. People vs Concorcio, Gr No 121201-02..........................................................................124
Rule 131 – Burden of Proof.......................................................................................................125
114. Jacobo vs CA, GR No 107699.........................................................................................125
115. Gumabon vs PNB, GR No 202514..................................................................................126
116. People vs Galam, GR No 224222....................................................................................127

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RULE 128 – General Provisions

1. Salita vs Magtolis, GR No 106429

Facts:
Respondent Espinosa filed against petitioner Salita an annulment of marriage on ground of
psychological incapacity. Salita moved for a bill of particulars. In compliance, Espinosa
submitted a bill of particulars wherein he specified that Salita’s inability to understand the
demands of his profession eventually caused him to lose his job. The trial court found the bill of
particulars adequate.

Still dissatisfied, Salita filed a certiorari petition. The CA denied the certiorari petition, ruling
that to insist on more specific details would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters.
Hence, the present petition for review before the SC.

Issue:
W/N the bill of particulars by Espinosa is sufficient.

Basis:
Ultimate facts vs evidentiary facts: “Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the
expected evidence will support." As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to
the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to
be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the
evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.".”

Circumstances supporting a prayer for annulment are evidentiary matters: “The

aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling involves alleged
"misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail,
bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of
power." The respondents therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages. There, the alleged illicit acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on the other
hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each
and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have to
prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins.”

Held:
Yes. Ultimate facts are those facts which the expected evidence will support. Evidentiary facts,
in contrast, are the details of probative matter by which the material elements are to be
established. The purpose of a bill of particulars is to state the ultimate facts constituting the cause
of action, on the premise that the complaint had not stated the same. To obtain evidentiary
matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars.

In this case, the allegations made by Espinosa in his bill of particulars are enough for Salita to
prepare her responses. The specific circumstances of their marital relationship to support his
prayer for annulment would constitute evidentiary matters that need not be stated in a bill of
particulars. It would be unreasonable for Espinosa to document each circumstance of their
marital disagreement. At least, these matters should be fleshed out during trial.

Wherefore, the instant petition is denied.

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2. Tantuico vs Republic, GR No 89114

Facts:
Respondent Republic filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil complaint for damages against
petitioner Tantuico on the theory that he was in unlawful concert with Romualdez and the
Marcoses to embark on a “systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth” and other acts of
corruption. Petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars. The motion was denied by
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N the Republic should submit a bill of particulars.

Basis:
Ultimate facts, defined: “The term "ultimate facts" as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it
cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. x x x
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the
primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by
which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate,
constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests.”

Evidentiary facts, defined: “Those facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate
facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are based. x x x Facts
which furnish evidence of existence of some other fact.”

Material facts that support conclusions made in a complaint are not evidentiary:
“Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as, names of persons, names of corporations,
dates, amounts involved, specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as
would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On
the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in
the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made
against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.”

Held:
Yes. There are two kinds of facts. Ultimate facts refer to the facts upon which the entire cause of
actions rests. Evidentiary facts are those that are necessary for the determination of ultimate
facts. In a complaint, ultimate facts must be stated to support the allegations made. Otherwise,
the allegations would become conclusions of law without factual basis. In these cases, bill of
particulars is proper.

In the case at bar, the Republic’s allegations of embarking in a “systematic plan to accumulate
ill-gotten wealth” or “taking undue advantage of government position” are held to be conclusions
that require the statement of factual premises. The facts required are not evidentiary in nature.
Thus, the motion for a bill of particulars was the proper recourse for the present case. The trial
court decision denying the motion for a bill of particulars is annulled.

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3. People vs Ebias, GR No 127130

Facts:
Accused-appellant Ebias was found guilty of the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder
and was sentenced to death by the trial court. On automatic appeal with the Supreme Court, the
defense filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, due to the confession
via affidavit by Leonardo Eliseo. The solicitor general opposed the motion because Eliseo’s
confession could not have overturned the positive identification by the surviving victim Narez on
Ebias.

Issue:
W/N the motion for new trial should be granted.

Basis:
Courts may apply liberal interpretation of the rules for the search of truth: “We recognize
that "[c]ourt litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the
rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to
ferret out such truth." Hence, a liberal interpretation of the rule granting a motion for new trial is
called for. We cannot in good conscience convict accused-appellant and impose upon him the
death penalty when evidence which would possibly exonerate him may be presented by him in a
new trial. Neither can we acquit him on the sole ground that another person confessed to having
committed the crime.”

An accused must be granted all possible means to prove his/her innocence: “In previous
cases, we granted the accused's motion for new trial on the basis of affidavits executed either by
witnesses or by the perpetrators of the crime as they tend to establish the innocence of the
accused. In People v. Amparado and Cuenca v. Court of Appeals, affidavits confessing to the
actual commission of the crime were executed by the supposed culprits. The Court remanded the
cases to the trial court because of the possibility that, should the affidavits be proven true, the
conviction of the accused could be reversed or at least modified. As has been said, the overriding
need to render justice demands that an accused be granted all possible legal means to prove his
innocence of a crime of which he is charged.”

Held:
Yes. An accused must be granted all possible means to prove his/her innocence. The confession
by Eliseo may or may not acquit Ebias. Thus, even if there is a possibility that Ebias might be
trying to avoid death penalty, he should nevertheless be given an opportunity to present Eliseo
for testimony in a new trial. The rule granting a motion for new trial may be liberally interpreted
for the search of truth.

Wherefore, the motion for new trial is granted and the case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.

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4. Republic vs Gimenez, GR No 174673

Facts:
The Republic filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
against Sps. Gimenez as dummies of former President Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos.
The Republic failed to file its formal offer of evidence despite several extensions granted by the
Sandiganbayan. Later, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the motion on demurrer to
evidence by Sps. Gimenez. Hence, this petition assailing the dismissal by Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
W/N the Republic may be allowed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence despite several delays.

Basis:
Formal offer of evidence rule is premised on due process: “The rule on formal offer of
evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process. Parties must be given
the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary actions to
secure their case. Hence, any document or object that was marked for identification is not
evidence unless it was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to
object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it." x x x To consider a
party's evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the other party of due
process.”

Formal offer of evidence rule may be relaxed for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth: “Hence,
this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure in cases
involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth: In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the
PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay
or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at
the Sandiganbayan. x x x This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous
documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It
is never easy to prosecute corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the government
and the people of the Republic.”

Held:
Yes. No evidence may be considered if it was not formally offered during trial. Otherwise, the
other party would be deprived of due process. However, courts have adopted a liberal approach
in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth. This is in view of the difficulty in gathering
voluminous documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout
the years. Thus, the Republic should be allowed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence despite
several delays. The dismissal by the Sandiganbayan should be reversed.

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5. Mancol vs DBP, GR No 204289

Facts:
Petitioner Mancol filed a complaint for damages for breach of damages. Mancol alleged that
DBP had not performed its verbal undertaking in a sale contract between them.

DBP was declared in default due to the failure of its counsel to appear before the trial court.
Mancol presented the oral testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. The trial court ruled in
favor of Mancol. DBP moved for reconsideration, alleging that the testimonies presented were
hearsay. The trial court granted DBP’s motion and dismissed Mancol’s complaint. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the testimonies presented by Mancol are admissible.

Basis:
Parol evidence rule: “The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the
terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different
terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.”

Exceptions to the parol evidence rule: “Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any
of the exceptions in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement.
Moreover, as with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party's failure to timely
object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained.”

Admissibility vs probative value: “"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency
to convince and persuade." The admissibility of a particular item of evidence has to do with
whether it meets various tests by which its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered
with other evidence admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to the truth. The weight of
evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses
testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of
the judge trying the case. "Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue." "Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules
of evidence."”

Held:
Yes. The parol evidence rule admits as an exception any terms agreed after the execution of the
contract. Also, parol evidence may be admitted if the other party does not object.

In this case, the testimonies are admissible for falling squarely with the exceptions. However,
they are not ipso facto given probative value. Admissibility is concerned with whether or not an
evidence is to be considered, while probative value is concerned with whether or not an admitted
evidence proves the issue. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

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6. Prats & Co. vs Phoenix Insurance, GR No 28607

Facts:
Petitioner Prats & Co filed an action for recovery of the fire insurance proceeds from respondent
Phoenix. Prats & Co was found to have committed insurance fraud on the strength of great
evidence. However, the trial consumed too much time, spanning for over almost two years and
comprising of fifty separate sessions, due to the objections made over the admission of evidence.

Issue:
W/N the trial court judge should take the liberal approach in the admission of proof.

Basis:
Judges must maintain a liberal practice in the admission of proof: “In the course of long
experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered in
the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to
the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge
of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty
whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of
the attorney ordering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof ordered will be connected later.”

Held:
Yes. Judges must maintain a liberal practice in the admission of proof. If there is uncertainty as
to the relevance of a testimony, there being no bad faith in the part of the counsel, the court may
as a rule safely accept the testimony on the condition that its relevance shall be established later.
Justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections
to the admission of proof are received with least favor. Exclusion of evidence on doubtful
objections should be avoided. Hence, the trial court judge is commended for adopting a liberal
practice in the admission of proof.

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7. People vs Yatco, GR No L-9181

Facts:
Consunji, Panganiban, and an unidentified person were charged of conspiracy for murder.
During trial, the defense counsel objected to the admission of the extrajudicial confession
allegedly made by Consunji, based on hearsay. The trial court excluded the extrajudicial
confession, but on the ground of lack of prior proof of conspiracy. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding the extrajudicial
confession.

Basis:
If a party waives the right to object, courts have no power to motu proprio declare
evidence inadmissible: “By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere
privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not
reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own
motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).”

Courts must use liberal approach in admission of proof in criminal cases: “There is greater
reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of
evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer
appeal.”

Held:
Yes. The right to object to the admissibility of evidence is privilege that parties may waive. If a
party were to waive the right to object, the court would have no power to motu proprio declare
evidence inadmissible. In this case, the defense raised an objection on the ground of hearsay.
This in effect constitutes a waiver of the right to object on the ground of lack of prior proof of
conspiracy. Hence, the court a quo had no power to exclude the confession on such ground.

Courts are advised to use liberal approach in admission of proof, moreso in criminal cases where
an erroneous acquittal of the accused prevents further appeal.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

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8. PNOC Shipping and Transport vs CA, GR No 107518

Facts:
A vessel of private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation (MEFC) collided with
another vessel owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). The PSG found LSC at fault.
MEFC filed a complaint for damages against LSC. Petitioner PNOC was later impleaded as the
defendant when it acquired the vessels of LSC.

The trial court rendered a decision awarding damages based on the sole testimony of MEFC’s
general manager and some documentary evidence. The objections made by PNOC were
disregarded. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N testimony presented by MEFC is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Definition of hearsay evidence: “Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.”

Held:
No. Any evidence is hearsay if its probative value is not based on personal knowledge but on the
knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. As a rule, hearsay evidence has no
probative value.

In this case, MEFC’s witness had no personal knowledge of the price quotations of the
equipment and cargoes of the vessel. Neither were the persons who issued such price quotations
presented as witnesses. Hence, the documents purporting the value of the lost and damaged
property are deemed hearsay evidence.

Wherefore, the challenged decision is modified.

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9. People vs Binamira, GR No 110397

Facts:
Binamira was found by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Binamira filed the present appeal, contending that the trial court rendered a decision based on an
inadmissible extrajudicial confession. The prosecution admitted that Binamira does not appear to
be informed of his right to counsel of choice before he rendered his extrajudicial confession.
However, the prosecution argued that the extrajudicial confession was rendered in 1985, two
years before the 1987 Constitution providing for such right took effect.

Issue:
W/N Binamira’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Extrajudicial confession made in absence of the accused counsel of choice is inadmissible in
evidence: “Significantly, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile promulgated on April 26, 1983, the Philippine
Supreme Court, applying said provision of the 1973 Constitution, laid down for the first time the
guidelines to be observed strictly by law enforcers during custodial investigation, and there had
occasion to state that ". . . No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or anyone on his behalf. . . ." x x x

In its evolution, the right to engage a counsel of choice and its companion rights had
been initially a "judge-made" law, the definitive ruling having been first laid down by this Court
in Morales, reiterated in Galit and subsequent cases and eventually incorporated in the 1987
Constitution.”

Held:
No. The right to counsel of choice is a judge-made law derived from the ruling in Morales, Jr vs
Enrile promulgated in 1983. In the Morales case, the Supreme Court categorically held the
presence of a counsel of choice by the detainee is necessary for the conduct of custodial
investigation. Hence, the right to counsel of choice may be invoked even prior to the 1987
Constitution.

From the records of the present case, it appears that Binamira was not sufficiently apprised of his
constitutional rights, let alone afforded an opportunity to exercise the same. Thus, the resulting
extrajudicial confession must be deemed inadmissible in evidence. The trial court should not
have used the same as basis for its decision rendering Binamira guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is reversed and set aside.

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10. People vs Lim, GR No 231989

Facts:
The PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation resulting in the arrest of accused Lim and co-accused
Gorres. The drug evidence seized were inventoried wanting several stages from the procedure
prescribed by Sec. 21 of RA 9165, such as the signatures of the accused, and the presence and
signature of an elected public official, representative of the DOJ, and the media as witnesses.

Subsequently, an information charging Lim and Gorres of illegal possession and sale of illegal
drugs was filed. The RTC held Lim guilty of the crime charged and acquitted Gorres for lack of
sufficient evidence. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the present petition
where Lim alleges that the buy-bust team’s non-compliance with the procedure mandated in Sec.
21 of RA 9165.

Issue:
W/N the seized drugs may be admitted in evidence.

Basis:
The chain of custody must rule be observed to render a drug item admissible in evidence:
“The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be
authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. To establish a chain of custody sufficient to
make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to
conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. In other words, in a criminal case, the
prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe
that an item still is what the government claims it to be.”

Seizing officers must comply with the procedure in Sec. 21 of RA 9165, or state the
justification for non-compliance; otherwise the case shall be dismissed: “Thus, in order to
weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up
drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its
IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the
justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or
affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court.
Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to
determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its
discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the
case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, 40 Rule 112, Rules of
Court.”

Held:
No. The chain of custody rule serves as a method to authenticate evidence prior to its admission
into evidence. For drug cases, the chain of custody procedure is expressed in Sec. 21 of RA
9165. Hence, seizing officers must comply with Sec. 21, RA 9165, or else the case shall be
dismissed. Notably, non-compliance may be excused provided that the seizing officers show that
earnest efforts were employed but were nonetheless ineffective due to justifiable grounds. In this
case, the PDEA agents were blatantly non-compliant with Sec. 21, RA 9165. They also failed to
show earnest effort for compliance or present justifiable reasons for their non-compliance. Doubt
is therefore cast on the integrity of drug items allegedly seized from the accused. Wherefore, the
accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt.

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11. Lagmay vs Quinit, GR No L-10902

Facts:
Plaintiff Lagmay filed the present action for the recovery of a portion of land allegedly bought
from defendant Quinit. As proof, Lagmay presented a writing in Ilocano appearing at the back of
the original certificate of title of the subject property. The trial court ruled that Lagmay no longer
had right to the property in question. Hence, the present appeal.

Issue:
W/N the Ilocano writing at the back of the OCT is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
A writing without an official translation is not admissible in evidence: “In the first place, the
writing in question is in the Ilocano dialect and no translation thereof appears to have been
presented in evidence. Admission of this writing was objected to by defendants on the ground
that it was not in an official language, and the same was admitted conditionally, subject to
plaintiffs' presenting official translation thereof (t.s.n. pp. 12- 13), which they never did.
Consequently, said writing is not admissible in evidence (Sec. 57, Rule 123, Rules of Court).”

Held:
No. A writing without an official translation is not admissible in evidence. In this case, the trial
court admitted the writing in Ilocano as evidence, on the condition that an official translation is
later presented. Since Lagmay never produced the same, the writing is no longer admissible in
evidence. Wherefore, the assailed judgment is affirmed.

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RULE 129 – Judicial Notice and Admissions

12. Republic vs CA, GR No L-54886

Facts:
An expropriation proceeding was initiated by petitioner Republic over a parcel of land owned by
private respondents. The lower court valued the subject property at P50 per square meter.

The SolGen filed several motions for extension to file record on appeal. All of the motions were
granted by the CFI, except the fifth and last which was allegedly filed beyond the extended
period. Notwithstanding, the SolGen filed its record on appeal. The CFI dismissed the same on
the ground that it was filed out of time.

Petitioner filed a certiorari petition, alleging grave abuse on the part of CFI for dismissing its
appeal. Petitioner argues that its appeal was mailed within the extended period, as certified by
the postmaster. However, the CA ruled that the postmaster’s certification cannot override the
prevailing practice in post offices, which the CA took judicial notice, of immediately stamping
the date of receipt on the letter when posted. Since the date stamped on the SolGen’s final
motion is beyond the extended period, the CA denied the petition.

Hence, the present certiorari, this time assailing the CA order of denial.

Issue:
W/N the alleged post office practice is a proper subject of judicial notice.

Basis:
Facts are taken judicial notice if they are so notoriously known that their existence is
assumed without need of proof: “For a matter to be taken judicial notice of by the courts of
law, it must be a subject of common and general knowledge. In other words, judicial notice of
facts is measured by general knowledge of the same facts. A fact is said to be generally
recognized or known when its existence or operation is accepted by the public without
qualification or contention. The test is whether the fact involved is so notoriously known as to
make it proper to assume its existence without proof. The fact that a belief is not universal,
however, is not controlling for it is very seldom that any belief is accepted by everyone. It is
enough that the matters are familiarly known to the majority of mankind or those persons
familiar with the particular matter in question (20 Am Jur 49-50; Martin, Rules of Court 37,
Second Edition). Furthermore, a matter may be personally known to the judge and yet not be a
matter of judicial knowledge and vice versa, a matter may not be actually known to an individual
judge, and nevertheless be a proper subject of judicial cognizance.”

Taking judicial notice should be exercised by courts with caution: “Indeed, the doctrine of
judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice
is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative
(31 CJS 522; Martin, Rules of Court 38, Second Edition).”

Held:
No. Facts are taken judicial notice if they are so notoriously known that their existence is
assumed without need of proof. In this case, the stamping practice of post offices cannot be said
to be a proper matter of judicial notice. The certification by the postmaster is a very clear
manifestation that the said post office practice is not of unquestionable wisdom.

Courts should be cautious with exercising the power to take judicial notice, such that whenever
there is reasonable doubt upon the subject, it should be resolved in the negative.

Wherefore, petition is granted.

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13. US vs Blanco, GR No L-12435

Facts:
Defendant Blanco was convicted in the first level court for a violation of a municipal ordinance.
An appeal made with the CFI resulted again in a conviction. Hence, the present appeal where
defendant contends that the lower court should not have assumed the effectivity of the ordinance
in question because its date of effectivity was not pleaded by the prosecution.

Issue:
W/N the trial court may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their jurisdiction.

Basis:
Municipal courts should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in their
jurisdiction; and on appeal of the same case, the RTC must likewise take judicial notice:
“We have no doubt, however, that a court of a justice of the peace may, and should, take judicial
notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality wherein it sits; and we are
furthermore of opinion that in an appeal from a judgment of a court of the justice of the peace the
appellate courts may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in the municipality
wherein the case originated, and to that end may adopt the findings and conclusions of the court
of the justice of the peace in that regard as developed by the record, in the absence of affirmative
proof that such findings and conclusions are erroneous. (U.S. vs. Herniated, 31 Phil. Rep., 342;
Cf. sec. 51, Manila Charter.)”

Held:
Yes. A municipal court may and should take judicial notice of a local ordinance in force in the
municipality where it sits. Further, a trial court entertaining an appeal from a municipal court
decision may take judicial notice of such local ordinance, even in absence of affirmative proof.
In view thereof, the effectivity of the ordinance violated by Blanco need not be pleaded because
the CFI have taken judicial notice of its effectivity. The appealed judgment is affirmed.

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14. Sardane vs CA, GR No L-47045

Facts:
A collection suit based on promissory notes was filed by respondent Acojedo against petitioner
Sardane. Due to Sardane’s default, Acojedo was able to present the promissory notes ex-parte.
The lower court ruled in favor of Acojedo.

On appeal with the CFI, Sardane testified in open court that the documents were not promissory
notes but merely receipts of his partnership contributions. The CFI gave credence to the oral
testimony and reversed the lower court ruling.

In a petition for review with the CA, Acojedo argued that the documents are presumed genuine
due to the implied admission rule, and that his failure to cross-examine Sardane does not
constitute waiver of the presumption. On this ground, the CA reversed the CFI decision.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes are deemed admitted.

Basis:
Admission of the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document is inferred if
not specifically denied under oath: “The record shows that herein petitioner did not deny under
oath in his answer the authenticity and due execution of the promissory notes which had been
duly pleaded and attached to the complaint, thereby admitting their genuineness and due
execution. Even in the trial court, he did not at all question the fact that he signed said
promissory notes and that the same were genuine. Instead, he presented parol evidence to vary
the import of the promissory notes by alleging that they were mere receipts of his contribution to
the alleged partnership. x x x [T]he said genuineness and due execution of said promissory notes
were not affected, pursuant to the provisions of Section 8, Rule 8, since such aspects were not at
all questioned but, on the contrary, were admitted by herein petitioner.”

Held:
Yes. According to the implied admission rule, the genuineness and due execution of an
actionable document are deemed admitted if not specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party. In this case, the records show that the Sardane did not deny under oath the authenticity of
the documents before the lower court and the trial court. Thus, the genuineness and due
execution of the promissory notes are deemed admitted. The claim by Sardane that the
documents were mere receipts are not admissible due to his implied admission as well as the
parol evidence rule. Wherefore, the assailed judgement is affirmed.

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15. Prieto vs Arroyo, GR No L-17885

Facts:
Appellees Arroyo filed a petition for the correction of their titles to a parcel of land. The same
was granted by the CFI. Later, appellant Prieto filed a petition to alleging that the CFI order on
the Arroyo petition was void ab initio. Since Prieto did not appear during the hearing, the CFI
dismissed his petition for failure to prosecute.

Prieto filed the present action for annulment of the Arroyo petition and the CFI order therein. He
argues, among others, that the lower court should have taken judicial notice of the case records
of the Arroyo petition as supporting evidence for his first petition.

Issue:
W/N records of other cases are subject to judicial notice.

Basis:
Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of contents of the records of other cases,
even if tried or pending in the same court: “In the first place, as a general rule courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge (Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna, et al., vs. Colegio de San Jose, et al.,
65 Phil., 318). Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such
records he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of
sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly
denied.”

Held:
No. In general, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of contents of the records of other
cases. This is applicable even if such cases were tried or pending in the same court. In this case
therefore, the CFI was under no duty to take judicial notice of the records of the Arroyo petition
for the resolution of the Prieto petition. Hence, the CFI correctly dismissed the Prieto petition for
failure to prosecute.

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16. PVAO vs Segundo, GR No 51570

Facts:
Segundo, the widow of a WWII veteran, was granted pension benefits. PVAO’s policy is that the
pension benefit shall be cancelled if she remarries or if she receives similar benefits from the US.
Later, PVAO cancelled Segundo’s pension benefits because she is a recipient of a similar benefit
from the US Veterans Administration.

Decades later, the Supreme Court held in Del Mar vs Phil. Veterans Administration that the
above policy is null and void. The trial court issued an order directing PVAO to pay Segundo’s
monthly pension. Dissatisfied, PVAO filed the present appeal.

Issue:
W/N Supreme Court decision in Del Mar is binding in this case.

Basis:
Supreme Court decisions are laws in their own right: “At any rate, it cannot be seriously
denied that to sustain the veteran's office is to allow it to perpetuate a policy the Court had
already and precisely declared null and void. And it is plain that Del Mar notwithstanding, the
veteran's office had not exerted efforts to restore cancelled pension benefits insofar as non-
parties (to Del Mar) are concerned. Let it be admonished that decisions of the Supreme Court
"applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution . . . form part of the legal system of the
Philippines," and, as it were, "laws" by their own right because they interpret what the laws say
or mean. Unlike rulings of the lower courts, which bind the parties to specific cases alone, our
judgments are universal in their scope and application, and equally mandatory in character. Let it
be warned that to defy our decisions is to court contempt.”

Held:
Yes. Supreme Court decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of
the legal system of the Philippines as they are laws in their own right. Unlike the rulings of lower
courts, Supreme Court decisions are universal in scope and application, and equally mandatory
in character.

For this case, the previous ruling in Del Mar finds application. To sustain PVAO’s appeal would
be to perpetuate the policy which was declared void in Del Mar. The present appeal is dismissed.

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17. Gener vs De Leon, GR No 130730

Facts:
Respondents filed a forcible entry case against petitioner, alleging that the latter unlawfully
deprived respondents of possession of their property. In contrast, petitioner claimed that the
property was his and it was respondents who forcibly entered as evidenced by two criminal cases
filed previously against them. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the lower court decision. Respondents sought recourse with the
CA, which reinstated the lower court decision. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:
W/N the lower court should have taken judicial notice of the criminal cases related to the present
controversy.

Basis:
As exception, a court may take judicial notice of other cases absent objection and with
knowledge of opposing party: “While, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried
or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge, this rule is subject to the exception that "in
the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a
case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it,
by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated."”

Held:
Yes. Indeed, the general rule is that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the records
of other cases. However, as an exception, a court may take judicial notice of other cases in the
absence of objection and with knowledge of the opposing party. In this case, it appears that
respondents did not raise an objection when the criminal cases against them were presented as
evidence by petitioner. Thus, the lower court should have taken judicial notice of such criminal
cases, which would resolve the issue of prior possession in favor of petitioner.

Wherefore, petition is granted.

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18. People vs Martinez, GR No 116918

Facts:
In 1991, the Buenvinida house was intruded by three robbers who took several valuable articles
from the house and even raped one of the dwellers. Years later, appellant Martinez was identified
as one of the robbers and was convicted of the composite crime of robbery with rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. As to his civil liability, he was ordered to indemnify the
Buenvinidas P73,000 as the value of the stolen personal properties and to pay the rape victim
P30,000 by way of moral damages.

In this appeal, Martinez argues among other things that the value of stolen properties should not
have been sustained by the lower court because it was not proved by the prosecution.

Issue:
W/N the value of stolen goods is subject of judicial notice.

Basis:
Value of stolen goods is subject of judicial notice: “Also not to be overlooked is the fact that
the trial court has the power to take judicial notice, in this case of the value of the stolen goods,
because these are matter of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration.
The lower court may, as it obviously did, take such judicial notice motu proprio. Judicial
cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence
since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve.
Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume (especially since the
trial court was presided by a lady judge) are undeniably within public knowledge and easily
capable of unquestionable demonstration.”

Held:
Yes. The value of stolen goods are matters of public knowledge and capable of unquestionable
demonstration. Thus, they are subject of judicial notice. In this case, the lower court correctly
took judicial notice of the value of the stolen articles, e.g. appliances, canned goods, and
perfume. There was no need for the prosecution to prove the value of the said items. Wherefore,
the appealed judgment is affirmed.

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19. People vs Erit, GR No L-2301

Facts:
Appellants Erit et al. were found guilty of robbery based on the statement of the witnesses who
testified that they saw the Erit brothers standing lookout in the yard. In this appeal, the Erit
brothers raise the question of identity.

Issue:
W/N the phases of the moon may be taken judicial notice.

Basis:
Laws of nature such as phases of moon are subjects of judicial notice: “We may take judicial
notice of the fact that the moon was in its last quarter on September 18, 1946, and rose on the
16th at 10:20 p. m. Granting that the night was not overcast, still we are not satisfied that a
quarter moon afforded the people inside the house sufficient light to recognize the people in the
yard with a reasonable degree of certainty. A person may be recognized through his size, his
height, movements, and the shape of his body by another to whom those features are familiar.”

Held:
Yes. The court may take judicial notice of the phases of the moon, as they constitute the laws of
nature. In this case, judicial notice is taken on the fact that at the time of the robbery, the moon
was in its last quarter. Thus, the court is not satisfied that the light of a quarter moon afforded
sufficient light for the witnesses, then inside their homes, to recognize the people in the yard with
reasonable degree of certainty. Wherefore, the Erit brothers are acquitted.

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20. People vs Hernandez, GR No 108028

Facts:
A complaint for illegal recruitment was filed against appellant Hernandez. The trial court found
her guilty of the charge. In this appeal, Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to prove her
lack of license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement. Hernandez avers that the
trial court treated her lack of license/authority as a stipulated fact which is not allowed in
criminal cases. Further, Hernandez claims that the lower court wrongfully took judicial notice of
another illegal recruitment case pending against her.

Issues:
W/N the stipulation of facts in a criminal case is binding upon parties as judicial admissions.

Basis:
In criminal cases, stipulation of facts is now allowed and recognized as constituting judicial
admissions: “By virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now
expressly sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of the objective of expediting trial by dispensing
with the presentation of evidence on matters that the accused is willing to admit, a stipulation of
facts should be allowed not only during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during trial
proper itself. Parenthetically, although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of court, a
stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal cases has long been allowed and recognized as
declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties.”

The right of the accused to confrontation and to present own evidence are waived upon
engaging in stipulation of facts: “Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio, this Court deemed as
a waiver of the right of confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if present
would testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution. xxx In the same vein, it
may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the right of an accused to present evidence on
his behalf. Although the right to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself for the protection of the accused, this right may be waived expressly or impliedly. “

Held:
Yes. The amendments made to the Rules on Criminal Procedure now sanctions stipulation of
facts for the purpose of expediting trial. There is no constitutional infirmity in allowing
stipulation of facts in criminal cases because the rights of the accused to confrontation and
presentation of evidence are subject to waiver. As an effect, the stipulated facts are considered
judicial admissions and are therefore binding to all parties.

In this case, records show that the fact of Hernandez’s lack of license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement activities was stipulated. It is therefore binding to all parties. The trial
court did not err in using the same as basis for her conviction.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

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21. State Prosecutors vs Muro, AM No RTJ-92-876

Facts:
Respondent Judge Muro was charged by petitioner State Prosecutors with ignorance of the law
and other violations. Accordingly, Judge Muro dismissed 11 cases against Imelda Marcos for
violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions based merely on newspaper reports of
the President declaring that all foreign exchange restrictions shall be lifted.

Judge Muro contended that there was no need to await the publication of the Central Bank
circular repealing the foreign exchange laws because the President had already made an
announcement, and that he cannot be blamed for relying on the statements of the President.

Issue:
W/N the court may take judicial notice of administrative regulation that are not yet published.

Basis:
Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective: “Respondent judge,
in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is
sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the
supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered
of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative
regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence
dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. The reason is
simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements
before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.”

Held:
No. Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. This is because a law
not yet in force is still inexistent. Hence, it cannot be considered one of common knowledge
capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration.

In view thereof and other considerations, Judge Muro is dismissed from service.

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22. Oronce vs CA, GR No 125766

Facts:
Respondent PBGDC obtained from CBC a loan secured by its Gilmore property. Due to irregular
payment of the amortization, interests and penalties accumulated through the years. PBGDC sold
the Gilmore property to the Oronces. By virtue of the sale, the Oronces became bound to pay
PBGDC’s indebtedness.

Despite payment, PBGDC would not vacate the premises. Hence, the Oronces filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer, attaching therewith the contract of sale as proof of PBGDC’s violation.
PBGDC challenged the MTC’s jurisdiction on the ground that the contract was intended to be an
equitable mortgage, therefore it did not confer ownership to the Oronces.

Without considering the contract, the MTC ruled that the Oronces are the owners of the property.
PBGDC filed an appeal, but while the same was pending, the Oronces were able to secure a writ
of execution of the MTC ruling. PBGDC filed a petition for certiorari, with a prayer that the writ
of execution be stayed. The CA, acting on the certiorari petition, annulled the MTC ruling.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N the contract should have been admitted as evidence.

Basis:
Due execution and genuineness of documents, if not denied under oath, are deemed
admitted: “However, while it quoted paragraph (c) of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage that embodies the agreement of the parties that possession of the Gilmore property and
its improvements shall remain with the vendor that was obliged to transfer possession only after
the expiration of one year, MTC Branch 41 apparently did not examine the terms of the deed of
sale. Instead, it erroneously held that the issue of whether or not the document was in fact an
equitable mortgage "should not be properly raised in this case." Had it examined the terms of the
deed of sale, which, after all is considered part of the allegations of the complaint having been
annexed thereto, that court would have found that, even on its face, the document was actually
one of equitable mortgage and not of sale. The inferior court appears to have forgotten that all
documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied
under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of
introducing evidence thereon.”

Held:
Yes. Due execution and genuineness of documents, if not denied under oath, are deemed
admitted. In the case at bar, the MTC should have admitted and examined the contract since no
party denied the same under oath. Instead, the MTC incorrectly dismissed the contract due to its
refusal to rule on the issue of ownership raised by PBGDC, unaware that lower courts are
empowered to rule on ownership even in ejectment cases.

Wherefore, the questioned CA decision is affirmed without prejudice to the filing of an action by
either party for the determination of ownership over the Gilmore property.

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23. Capitol Motors vs Yabut, GR No L-28140

Facts:
A collection suit was filed by appellee Capitol Motors against Yabut, based on a promissory note
allegedly executed between them. Capitol averred that Yabut has been behind his obligation, and
thus he must be ordered to pay the principal and interest due thereon. Yabut unable to
specifically deny the allegations against him. On this note, Capitol moved for judgment, claiming
that Yabut’s failure to make specific denials is tantamount to admission of facts. The CFI granted
the motion. Hence, this appeal on a question of law.

Issue:
W/N there was judicial admission of the promissory note.

Basis:
No specific denial if averment of lack of knowledge is palpably untrue; mere allegation of
lack of knowledge is insufficient: “In Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. L-
9531, May 14, 1958 (103 Phil., 662), this Court said that the rule authorizing an answer to the
effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact
as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant's
knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue. x x x

[A] mere allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint, is insufficient to raise an
issue; the defendant must aver positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so
alleged.”

Held:
Yes. There is no specific denial if the averment of lack of knowledge is palpably untrue. Mere
allegation of lack of knowledge is not sufficient to establish the same. The defendant must also
aver positively how it is that he/she is ignorant of the facts so alleged. Hence, the mere allegation
of lack of knowledge made by Yabut is not tantamount to a specific denial. Wherefore, the
appealed judgment is affirmed.

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RULE 130 – Object Evidence

24. People vs Olarte, GR No 233209

Facts:
Accused Olarte was charged for illegal or unauthorized possession of a hand grenade and an
unlicensed pistol. The information filed by the prosecution alleged that Olarte was seen
attempting robbery in an LBC branch when policemen apprehended him. The hand grenade and
unlicensed pistol was found in the subsequent search.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of a hand
grenade. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling on appeal. Hence, the present appeal, where the
accused claims that the hand grenade was not admissible in evidence for non-compliance with
the chain of custody rule.

Issue:
W/N the seized hand grenade is admissible in evidence against Olarte.

Basis:
An object evidence is either actual or demonstrative: “Object evidence is classified into: (a)
actual physical or "autoptic" evidence: those which have a direct relation or part in the fact or
incident sought to be proven and those brought to the court for personal examination by the
presiding magistrate; and (b) demonstrative evidence: those which represent the actual or
physical object (or event in the case of pictures or videos) being offered to support or draw an
inference or to aid in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness. x x x”

Actual evidence may be objects that are unique, made unique, or non-unique: “Further,
actual evidence is subdivided into three categories: (a) those that have readily identifiable marks
(unique objects); (b) those that are made readily identifiable (objects made unique) and (c) those
with no identifying marks (non-unique objects).”

Definition of unique objects: “[U]nique objects either: (a) already exhibit identifiable visual or
physical peculiarities such as a particular paint job or an accidental scratch, dent, cut, chip,
disfigurement or stain; or (b) have a readily distinguishable mark such as a unit-specific serial
number in case of an industrially manufactured item.”

Definition of non-unique objects; importance of authentication of non-unique objects:

“[N]on-unique objects such as narcotic substances, industrial chemicals, and body fluids cannot
be distinguished and are not readily identifiable; that is why they present an inherent problem of
fungibility 106 or substitutability and contamination which adversely affects their relevance or
probative value. This is the reason why non-unique objects have to be made unique by law
enforcers upon retrieval or confiscation in order for these articles to be authenticated by a
sponsoring witness so that trial and reviewing courts can determine their relevance or probative
value.”

Chain of custody rule as manner of authentication is only applicable when seized item can
be easily planted: “Historically, the Court has applied the "chain of custody" rule as a mode of
authenticating illegal drug substances in order to determine its admissibility. However, such rule
has not yet been extended to other substances or objects for it is only a variation of the principle
that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. At this point, it
becomes necessary to point out that the degree of fungibility of amorphous objects without an
inherent unique characteristic capable of scientific determination, i.e., DNA testing, is higher
than stably structured objects or those which retain their form because the likelihood of tracing
the former objects' source is more difficult, if not impossible.”

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Testimonial sponsorship is sufficient to authenticate items that are unique, readily

identifiable, and relatively resistant to change: ”In this regard, the Court emphasizes that if the
proffered evidence is unique, readily identifiable, and relatively resistant to change, that
foundation need only consist of testimony by a witness with knowledge that the evidence is what
the proponent claims; otherwise, the chain of custody rule has to be resorted to and complied
with by the proponent to satisfy the evidentiary requirement of relevancy. And at all times, the
source of amorphous as well as firmly structured objects being offered as evidence must be
tethered to and supported by a testimony.”

Held:
Yes. As a rule, object evidence must be authenticated before it may be admitted. When the
evidence is a non-unique object that is highly fungible, the authentication must be via application
of the chain of custody rule. However, if the evidence is a non-unique object that is relatively
resistant to change, testimonial sponsorship is sufficient.

In this case, the seized hand grenade need not be authenticated via chain of custody rule because
it is relatively resistant to change. The testimonies based on personal knowledge of the
apprehending officers are sufficient to authenticate the item.

Wherefore, the present appeal is dismissed.

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25. Daayata vs People, GR No 205745

Facts:
Petitioners Daayata et al. were charged with frustrated murder for allegedly assaulting
relentlessly Bahian on his way to the barangay hall. The defense claimed that Bahian’s injury
was caused by him hitting the pavement after engaging in a fist fight with petitioner Salisi.

The RTC held petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision on appeal. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove that petitioners assaulted Bahian.

Basis:
Assault claim is not believable in the absence of marked physical injuries as evidence:
"Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses." They have been characterized as "that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth
which rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." Thus, in People v. Vasquez, this Court
refused to undiscerningly lend credence to the incriminating assertions of prosecution witnesses
as to an alleged mauling, and stated that "[t]his Court cannot be persuaded by the prosecution's
claim of perpetration of physical violence in the absence of any marked physical injuries on the
various parts of the victim's face and body." x x x”

Held:
No. Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. An allegation of assault is not believable
in the absence of marked physical injuries as evidence. In this case, the prosecution’s assertion
that Bahian was relentlessly assaulted is belied by the presence of only one injury to the head
that Bahian sustained. More doubt is cast over the said assertion in light of the version of the
defense, which was admitted by Bahian himself and corroborated by several other witnesses, that
Bahian sustained the head injury because of his own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioners are acquitted.

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26. People vs Nunez, GR No 209342

Facts:
An information for robbery with homicide was filed against Pobre and several others. Later,
accused Nunez was apprehended on the premise that he was actually Pobre. Trial ensued, where
prosecution witnesses identified Nunez as one of the robbers.

The RTC convicted Nunez of the charge. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling on appeal. Hence, the
present appeal.

Issue:
W/N the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove that Nunez is one of the robbers.

Basis:
Prosecution must not solely rely on positive identification for evidence: “The frailty of
human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of inordinate reliance on human memory in
criminal proceedings, where conviction results in the possible deprivation of liberty, property,
and even life, is equally established.”

Witness identification of perpetrators must be appreciated in view of the totality of

circumstance test: “People v. Teehankee, Jr. introduced in this jurisdiction the totality of
circumstances test, which relies on factors already identified by the United States Supreme Court
in Neil v. Biggers: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length
of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.

A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering the first two factors, i.e., the witness'
opportunity to view the malefactor at the time of the crime and the witness' degree of attention at
that time, based on conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little and fleeting as it may
have been, for the witness to be exposed to the perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain
their identity. x x x

Rather than a sweeping approbation of a supposed natural propensity for remembering the faces
of assailants, this Court now emphasizes the need for courts to appreciate the totality of
circumstances in the identification of perpetrators of crimes.”

Initial identification is more crucial than identification made during trial: “Still, certainty on
the witness stand is by no means conclusive. By the time a witness takes the stand, he or she
shall have likely made narrations to investigators, to responding police or barangay officers, to
the public prosecutor, to any possible private prosecutors, to the families of the victims, other
sympathizers, and even to the media. The witness, then, may have established certainty, not
because of a foolproof cognitive perception and recollection of events but because of consistent
reinforcement borne by becoming an experienced narrator. Repeated narrations before different
audiences may also prepare a witness for the same kind of scrutiny that he or she will encounter
during cross-examination. Again, what is more crucial is certainty at the onset or on initial
identification, not in a relatively belated stage of criminal proceedings.”

Held:
No. Courts should not solely rely on the positive identification by eyewitnesses for evidence. The
frailty of human memory is not only detailed by scientific research data but also recognized in
the Philippine jurisdiction. Eyewitness testimony must be viewed in light of the totality of
circumstance test, wherein circumstances surrounding the witness are examined to determine the
credibility of his/her testimony. Among the considerations of the said test is the degree of

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certainty by the witness at the moment of identification. Initial identification is more crucial than
identification during trial.

In this case, the RTC and CA failed to recognize several circumstances which cast serious doubt
on to the identification of the prosecution witnesses. First, one of the witnesses admitted to not
remembering the appearance of the fourth robber but later claim the same as Nunez. Also, when
the witnesses took the stand, eight years had passed since the robbery incident. Finally, the
witnesses’ identification of Nunez did not come until he had been arrested and was the sole
object of identification. The ultimate conclusion is that the prosecution failed to prove Nunez’s
guilt.

Wherefore, the accused is acquitted for reasonable doubt.

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27. People vs Romorosa, GR No 237209

Facts:
Accused Romorosa et al. were charged of sale and possession of illegal drugs in violation of RA
9165. The accused were apprehended during a buy-bust operation by the NBI, based on a tip by
a confidential informant.

The RTC and the CA on appeal convicted Romorosa of illegal sale of shabu. Hence, the current
appeal. Herein, Romorosa alleges that the chain of custody rule was violated because the forensic
chemist failed to turn over the seized shabu to an evidence custodian prior to submission of the
same to the court.

Issue:
W/N the chain of custody rule was violated.

Basis:
Turnover of seized drug to an evidence custodian is not a requirement in the chain of
custody rule: “Contrary to appellant's assertion, the failure of SFC Purificando to turn-over the
shabu he examined to an "evidence custodian," prior to submitting the same to the court, did not
render doubtful the integrity of the shabu so submitted. We find that such failure did not create a
gap in the chain of custody of the shabu retrieved from the appellant x x x.

Since neither law nor jurisprudence specifically condemns a direct submission of drug evidence
by the forensic chemist to the court, We cannot ipso facto make the conclusion that the shabu
submitted by SFC Purificando is no longer reliable solely on the ground that he by-passed the
evidence custodian of the NBI. This holds true even though such action by SFC Purificando may
have constituted a deviation from a "standard practice" of the NBI. Again, there is simply no law
or jurisprudence that renders a drug evidence inadmissible just because it was not forwarded to
an "evidence custodian" and was instead submitted directly to the court by the forensic chemist.”

Held:
No. Turnover of seized drug to an evidence custodian is not a requirement in the chain of
custody rule. It is not prescribed nor required under RA 9165 and its implementing rules. This
holds true even if failure to make such turnover is a deviation from the standard practice of the
NBI. Therefore, in this case, the integrity of the seized shabu was not tainted by failure of the
forensic chemist to turnover the same to an evidence custodian. The Court is satisfied that the
corpus delicti of the offense was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Wherefore, the instant appeal is dismissed.

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28. People vs Vallejo, GR No 144656

Facts:
Accused Vallejo was charged of rape-slaying a 9-year old child. The trial court admitted the
DNA test performed on the vaginal swabs taken during the autopsy of the deceased child. The
DNA test yielded a DNA profile matching that of Vallejo. The said DNA test, on top of an
extrajudicial confession and several circumstantial evidence, formed basis of the RTC’s
conviction of Vallejo. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the trial court erred in admitting DNA analysis in evidence.

Basis:
Guidelines in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence: “In assessing the probative
value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following
data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.”

Held:
No. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the court must consider the data on the
collection, handling, possible contamination, procedure of analysis, standards of conducting
tests, and qualification of the analyst. In this case, the DNA test yielded both a positive and a
negative match with the accused’s DNA profile. However, the negative match was accounted for
by considering the data surrounding the collected samples, which were either inadequate or
contaminated. The positive match therefore was found to be definite and enough to corroborate
with other evidence pointing to the conclusion that accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

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RULE 130 – Original Document Rule

29. People vs Tandoy, GR No 80505

Facts:
In a buy-bust operation by the Anti-Narcotics Unit, accused Tandoy was arrested. An
information was against the Tandoy for the charge of possession of sale of illegal drugs. The trial
court found Tandoy guilty. Hence, the instant appeal where accused invokes the best evidence
rule against the admission of the xerox copy of the marked money used in the buy-bust
operation.

Issue:
W/N the xerox copy of the marked money is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Best evidence rule is not applicable if the document is not indispensable to the issue:
“Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the
conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately
proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money
itself would not constitute a fatal omission.”

Held:
Yes. The best evidence rule is not applicable if the document is not indispensable to the issue. In
this case, the sale of the marijuana was adequately proven by the police officers. The failure of
the prosecution to present the marked money is therefore not a fatal omission.

Wherefore, the appeal is dismissed.

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30. US vs Gregorio, GR No L-5791

Facts:
Some real property of judgment debtor Balistoy was attached for public sale. Appellant Gregorio
claimed that Balistoy had sold to him one of the real property, and requested that the same be
excluded from attachment. As proof of sale, Gregorio submitted a document signed by Gregorio
and Balistoy.

A complaint was filed against Gregorio and Balistoy for the crime of falsification of a private
document. The CFI pronounced both of them guilty. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N a copy of the original is sufficient for a conviction of falsification of document.

Basis:
The original is indispensable evidence for cases of falsification of document: “In criminal
proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have
before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order
that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced in the cause, whether or not the crime of
falsification was committed, and also, at the same time, to enable them to determine the degree
of each defendant's liability in the falsification under prosecution. Through the lack of the
original document containing the memorandum alleged to be false, it is improper to hold, with
only a copy of the said original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; in the absence
of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a copy of the said original in
view, that there has been a falsification of a document which was neither found nor exhibited,
because, in such a case, even the existence of such original document may be doubted.”

Held:
No. The original is indispensable evidence for cases of falsification of document. Conversely, it
is improper to hold a conviction for falsification of document with only a copy of the original in
view. In this case, the original document setting forth the memorandum allegedly falsified was
not presented. In lieu thereof, a copy of the original was presented as evidence. This is not
sufficient basis to convict the appellants.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed.

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31. Borje vs Sandiganbayan, GR No L-55436

Facts:
Borje was accused in an information for falsification of public documents. During trial, the
authenticity of several official forms pertaining to the payroll of Ducusin was placed in issue.
Ultimately, the Sandiganbayan found Borje guilty of the crime charged.

Hence the present petition, where Borje contends that corpus delicti was not established in the
case because only the copies of falsified documents were presented in court.

Issue:
W/N the copies of the official forms in question is sufficient basis for proving falsification.

Basis:
Gregorio doctrine still applicable despite development of copying devices: “Secondly, the
Gregorio doctrine is still tenable notwithstanding modern copying devices for a falsified
document, passed off as an original can also be duplicated by xeroxing and thereafter, certified
as true copy of the original as in Exh. "D".”

Held:
No. The Gregorio doctrine states that the original document is indispensable for cases of
falsification of document. This doctrine is still applicable despite development of copying
devices. In this case, since only xerox copies of the official forms alleged to have been falsified
was presented, there is no sufficient basis for a conviction of falsification.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside.

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32. Pacasum vs People, GR No 180314

Facts:
Pacasum was charged in an information for falsification of public documents for allegedly
imitating the signature of a HRM officer in her Employee Clearance to claim her salary. In the
course of the trial, the prosecution presented as documentary evidence before the Sandiganbayan
a photocopy of the falsified Employee Clearance, among other documents.

The Sandiganbayan found Pacasum guilty of the crime charged. Hence, the instant petition
where Pacasum argues, among others, that the photocopied document should not have been
given probative value in a falsification case.

Issue:
W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence a photocopied document.

Basis:
Secondary evidence may serve as basis for conviction of falsification if original is
unavailable: “This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified document
is not, or may no longer be produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may still prosper if
the person wishing to establish the contents of said document via secondary evidence or
substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the best or primary evidence — the
original of the document — is not available for any of the causes mentioned in Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.”

Held:
No. Secondary evidence may serve as basis for conviction of falsification if the original is
unavailable for reasons enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the
prosecution was able to show that the original Employee Clearance was in the custody of
Pacasum, who failed to produce the same despite several notices. Thus, the prosecution is
justified in presenting secondary evidence and the Sandiganbayan did not err in admitting the
same.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

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33. PNB vs Olila, 98 Phil 1002

Held:
Secondary evidence, like a copy of the original, is admissible as an exception if the original
writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of
the party offering the secondary evidence. This exception does not only cover loss or destruction
but also other reasons for the failure to produce the original in court even if the original is not
lost or destroyed.

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34. Heirs of Gregorio vs CA, GR No 117609

Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of a property which title was allegedly acquired by
Spouses Tan through forged deeds of conveyance. Thereafter, the original of the said documents
were burned in a building fire. Petitioners nevertheless pushed through with the action for
reconveyance.

The trial court rendered the assailed documents falsified and forged. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court ruling and declared the Spouses Tan’s ownership as valid. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:
W/N the CA erred in upholding the best evidence rule when the original can no longer be
produced.

Basis:
In cases of forgery, the original document is indispensable evidence: “Basic is the rule of
evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is
admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible
pursuant to the best evidence rule. This is especially true when the issue is that of forgery.”

Held:
No. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document itself. This is especially true in cases of forgery, where the original
document is indispensable for determining whether or not a signature was forged. A comparison
based on a mere xerox copy cannot produce reliable results. Thus, in this case, the fact of forgery
cannot be established because the original document could no longer be produced.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

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35. Sison vs People, GR No 108280-83; People vs Ferrer, GR No 114931-33

Facts:
Informations for murder were filed against several Marcos loyalists. During trial, the prosecution
presented witnesses and documentary witnesses consisting of newspaper accounts and
photographs taken during the mauling.

The trial court held the accused guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA merely acquitted
one of the accused and increased the penalties of the rest. Hence, the present appeal, impugning
the admissibility of the photographs because they were not identified by the photographer.

Issue:
W/N photographs are inadmissible in evidence for lack of proper identification.

Basis:
Photographs may be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness:
“The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified
by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they
were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can
identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation
of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who
made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or
by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.”

Held:
No. Photographs may be identified by the photographer who took them or by any other
competent witness who can attest to the accuracy of the portrayal made in such documents. In
this case, the absence of the testimony of the photographer who produced the photographs
submitted by the prosecution is not fatal to the identification of such photographs. The defense
identified the accused in the photographs and used the same to explain their presence in the
mauling. The accused in effect admitted the accuracy of the photos. Thus, the photos were
admissible in evidence in the case at bar.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed with modifications as to the penalties.

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36. College Assurance Plan vs Belfranlt Development, GR No 155604

Facts:
A building owned by Belfranlt and leased by CAP was razed by fire. Belfranlt made a demand
for CAP to vacate the building and pay for repairs. CAP did not repair the building. After two
more unsuccessful demands, Belfranlt filed a complaint with the RTC. The evidence presented
by Belfranlt was the investigative report issued by the BFP pointing towards negligence as cause
of the fire. On this ground, the RTC ruled against CAP. On appeal, the CA merely modified the
damages to be awarded. Hence, this petition, where the admissibility of the BFP report is
impugned because they were presented by Fireman Sitchon, an officer who had no personal
knowledge of the fire.

Issue:
W/N the documents issued by the BFP are inadmissible in evidence for lack of proper
identification.

Basis:
Entries in official records are exempted from the hearsay rule: “Contrary to petitioners'
claim, Fireman Sitchon is competent to identify and testify on Exh. "P-2" and Exh. "P-3"
because, although he did not sign said documents, he personally prepared the same. What
Fireman Sitchon did not prepare were the documents which his investigation witnesses
presented. However, Fireman Sitchon emphasized that he interviewed said investigation
witnesses namely, Ronald Estanislao, the security guard on duty at the time of fire; and Dr.
Zenaida Arcilla, manager of CAPP, before he prepared Exh. "P-2" and Exh. "P-3." Hence, while
Fireman Sitchon may have had no personal knowledge of the fire incident, Exh. "P-2" and Exh.
"P-3," which he prepared based on the statements of his investigation witnesses, especially that
of Ronald Estanislao whose official duty it was to report on the incident, are exceptions to the
hearsay rule because these are entries in official records. Consequently, his testimony on said
documents are competent evidence of the contents thereof.”

Held:
No. Entries in official records are exempted from the rule excluding evidence obtained from
persons other than the witness taking the stand, otherwise known as the hearsay rule. In this case,
the BFP investigative report, being part of official records, is admissible even if authenticated by
Fireman Sitchon who did not sign such report.

It is worth noting that the investigative report was prepared by the Fireman Sitchon. Further, the
report was based on the witnesses whose official duty was to make reports on such incidents.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

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37. People vs Zeta, GR No 178541

Facts:
An information filed before the RTC charging appellant of murder. Witnesses appeared to testify
against appellant. The primary witness was Aleine, the niece of Ramon’s common-law wife, who
was living with him at the time. Accordingly, Aleine invited appellant inside their house as she
went up to wake Ramon. When Ramon came down, appellant gunned him dead.

The RTC rendered a decision convicting appellant of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto
the RTC decision. Hence, the present appeal, alleging that there no moral certainty to Aleine’s
identification because she only saw the side of his face.

Issue:
W/N the positive identification of Aleine is enough to support a conviction.

Basis:
A person can still be properly identified by looking at the side portion of his/her face: “x x x
A person can still be properly identified and recognized even by merely looking at the side
portion of his face. To be sure, Aleine recognized and identified appellant in the police line-up
and during trial as the one who shot Ramon. Experience dictates that precisely because of the
unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, witnesses can remember with a high
degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time. A startling or frightful experience
creates an indelible impression in the mind that can be recalled vividly. It bears stressing that
Aleine was less than one meter away from appellant when the latter shot Ramon. The crime
scene was also well-lighted during the incident because there was a fluorescent bulb inside the
house.”

Inconsistencies and deficiencies in testimonial evidence may be supplanted if in harmony

with documentary and object evidence: “The testimonies of Aleine and of the other
prosecution witnesses are in harmony with the documentary and object evidence submitted by
the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their testimonies to be credible and
trustworthy. The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored
on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings
were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.”

Held:
Yes. A testimony, albeit incomplete, may be given probative value when in harmony with the
documentary and object evidence. In this case, documentary and object evidence where in
harmony with the testimony of Aleine. Hence, the RTC, affirmed by the CA, afforded probative
value on Aleine’s testimony despite only seeing a side portion of the face of the appellant. These
findings are thus binding upon the SC.

Besides, a person can still be positively identified even with only a side portion of his/her face.
This is especially true in times when unusual acts of violence are being witnessed because
witnesses can remember the event with a high degree of reliability.

Wherefore, the appeal is denied.

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38. Republic vs Gimenez, GR No 174673

Facts:
The Republic filed a complaint for reconveyance of ill-gotten wealth against the Gimenez
spouses before the Sandiganbayan. The Republic failed to formally offer evidence despite
several extensions by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the Sandiganbayan declared that the Republic
waived its formal offer of evidence.

Gimenez filed a motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence. The Republic finally filed its formal
offer of evidence. The Sandiganbayan granted the former and denied the latter. Hence, the
present petition.

The SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan should not have denied the formal offer of evidence by the
Republic, despite being filed belatedly. Courts should relax its rules in cases of recovery of ill-
gotten wealth. With this issue settled, the next issue is considered.

Issue:
W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the demurrer to evidence by Gimenez.

Basis:
Demurrer is proper when the evidence shows no right of relief: “This court has laid down the
guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence: A demurrer to evidence may be issued when,
upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's
evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom
does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained.”

Totality of evidence must be considered in deciding on a demurrer: “Notably, the

Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its main reason
for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence to
consider due to petitioner's failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the totality
of evidence on which petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from
the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence
presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring
petitioner's testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were
offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses. x x x The court cannot arbitrarily
disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency
of the plaintiff's evidence.”

Held:
Yes. Demurrer is proper when the evidence shows no right of relief. In deciding demurrer, the
courts must consider totality of evidence. In this case, the Sandiganbayan ruled on the demurrer
based mainly on the Republic’s failure to formally offer its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
dismissed the probative value of the documentary evidence because they were mere certified true
copies, losing sight of the Rules which allow for the admission of secondary evidence. The
Sandiganbayan also disregarded the testimonial evidence presented by the Republic for no
substantive reason. Courts cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence in resolving a demurrer.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.

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39. Heirs of Gregorio vs CA, GR No 117609

Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of a property which title was allegedly acquired by
Spouses Tan through forged deeds of conveyance. Thereafter, the original of the said documents
were burned in a building fire. Petitioners nevertheless pushed through with the action for
reconveyance.

The trial court rendered the assailed documents falsified and forged. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court ruling and declared the Spouses Tan’s ownership as valid. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:
W/N the CA erred in upholding the best evidence rule when the original can no longer be
produced.

Basis:
The best evidence rule is especially applicable in forgery cases: “Basic is the rule of evidence
that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best
evidence rule. This is especially true when the issue is that of forgery.”

Held:
No. The best evidence rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself. This rule is especially
applicable in cases of forgery, where the original document is indispensable for determining
whether or not a signature was forged. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy cannot
produce reliable results. Thus, in this case, the fact of forgery cannot be established because the
original document could no longer be produced.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

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40. Skunac vs Sylianteng, GR No 205879

Facts:
A parcel of land is the subject of an ownership dispute between Skunac and Sylianteng. The
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Skunac and declared the TCT under the name of Sylianteng
as null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. Hence, the present petition, where
Skunac alleges that the duplicate Deed of Sale presented by Sylianteng should not have been
admitted for violating the best evidence rule.

Issue:
W/N the lower courts erred in admitting in evidence the duplicate Deed of Sale introduced by
Sylianteng.

Basis:
Best evidence rule is applicable only when the issue pertains to the content of the
document: “The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case. The said rule applies only
when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account
for the original. In the instant case, what is being questioned is the authenticity and due execution
of the subject deed of sale. There is no real issue as to its contents.”

A duplicate original may be introduced in evidence without the original: “In any case, going
to the matter of authenticity and due execution of the assailed document, petitioners do not
dispute that the copy of the deed of sale that respondents submitted as part of their evidence is a
duplicate of the original deed of sale dated June 20, 1958. It is settled that a signed carbon copy
or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate
original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the
original.”

Held:
No. The best evidence rule is applicable only when the issue pertains to the content of the
document. If the issue pertains to the existence of the document, any substitutionary or
testimonial evidence is admissible. In this case, there is no issue as to the contents when
Sylianteng presented the duplicate Deed of Sale.

Nonetheless, the duplicate Deed of Sale is regarded as an original. A duplicate may be

introduced in evidence without the original, as it is equally considered an original. Wherefore,
the petition is dismissed.

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41. Heirs of Prodon vs Heirs of Alvarez, GR No 170604

Facts:
A complaint for quieting of title was filed by respondents against Margarita Prodon. Respondents
pray that the entry in their TCT stating that the subject property has been sold to Prodon be
cancelled, on the ground that such deed of sale is inexistent. In their reply, the petitioners could
not produce the said deed of sale, but they submitted the Notarial Register containing the same.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
W/N secondary evidence is admissible in the case at bar.

Basis:
Best evidence rule is applicable only when the terms of writing are in issue: “But the evils of
mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the issue
relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of
a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as
the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best
Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. 19 In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even
without accounting for the original.”

Best evidence rule is not applicable in an action for quieting of title if the action is based on
non-existence of a document: “The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a
deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not
be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For
instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not
complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that
evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.”

Held:
Yes. The best evidence rule is applicable only when the terms of writing are in issue. When the
ground for an action for quieting of title is one where the terms of a document is not material, the
best evidence rule does not find application and secondary evidence may be admitted.

In this case, the issue pertains to the existence or non-existence of the subject Deed of Sale. It
does not involve the terms or contents of the Deed of Sale. Hence, secondary evidence such as
the Notarial Register is admissible in evidence as proof of the existence of the Deed of Sale. The
original need not be produced.

Wherefore, the assailed CA decision is affirmed.

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42. Capital Shoes Factory vs Traveler Kids, GR No 200065

Facts:
Respondent TKI defaulted in its obligation under a contract with petitioner CSFL. Despite
several demands, TKI was unable to pay. This prompted CSFL to file a complaint for collection
of a sum of money, wherein sales invoices and order slips were introduced as evidence. TKI
objected on the ground that the documents presented were mere photocopies.

The RTC admitted the documents presented by CSFL. TKI filed a certiorari petition assailing the
admission made by the RTC. The CA partially granted the petition, thereby denying admission
of the invoices for being mere photocopies. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the invoices in question are admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Duplicate originals are admissible in evidence: “In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The
Court of Appeals and Associated Bank, it was stressed that duplicate originals were admissible
as evidence. x x x It is undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals and are
therefore admissible as evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not
bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by petitioner. x x x

The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly explained that
CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to
a client and retaining the other copy. The Court combed through her testimony and found
nothing that would indicate that the documents offered were mere photocopies. She remained
firm and consistent with her statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals as they
were prepared at the same time. The Court sees no reason why Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the
testimony of Chiu.”

Held:
Yes. Duplicate originals are admissible in evidence based on Sec. 4 of Rule 130, Rules of Court.
In this case, the testimony of CSFL’s principal witness explains that invoices executed by CSFL
for any transaction are always prepared in two copies at the same time. The subject invoices
there are considered duplicate originals and not mere photocopies. Consequently, either copy is
admissible in evidence.

Wherefore, the present petition is denied.

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43. Northern Mindanao Power Corporation vs CIR, GR No 185115

Facts:
Petitioner filed an administrative claim for refund due to its alleged incurrence of input VAT in
its purchases from NPC. Since the CIR allegedly did not act on the claim, petitioner elevated the
matter with the CTA. Both the CTA division and en banc denied the claim. Hence, the present
appeal where petitioner avers that invoices are sufficient to establish the actual amount of sale of
services to NPC and sufficient to substantiate the refund claim.

Issue:
W/N a VAT invoice is sufficient to prove sales of services.

Basis:
A VAT invoice is the seller’s best proof of sales while a VAT receipt is the buyer’s best
proof of payment: “Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997 provides that a VAT invoice is necessary
for every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, while a VAT official receipt properly
pertains to every lease of goods or properties; as well as to every sale, barter or exchange of
services. x x x

A VAT invoice is the seller's best proof of the sale of goods or services to the buyer, while a
VAT receipt is the buyer's best evidence of the payment of goods or services received from the
seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be confused and made to refer to one and
the same thing. Certainly, neither does the law intend the two to be used alternatively.”

Held:
No. A VAT invoice is the seller’s best proof of sales of goods or services; while a VAT receipt is
the buyer’s best proof of payment of goods or services. In the present case, petitioner as buyer
should have presented a VAT receipt. The VAT invoice was never intended by law to be
interchangeable with a VAT receipt. Thus, petitioner’s claim has no sufficient basis.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

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44. MCMP Construction vs Monark Equipment, GR No 201001

Facts:
Petitioner MCMP failed to pay the fees as reflected in the invoice for the lease of the heavy
equipment owned by respondent Monark. This prompted Monark to file a collection suit.
Alleging that the original contract was lost, Monark presented its file copy which is a photocopy
of the original. MCMP objected to the admission in evidence of the same.

The RTC ruled in favor of Monark. MCMP appealed but the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the photocopy of the original contract was admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Requisites for a party to present secondary evidence on the ground that the original was
lost: existence, loss, and absence of bad faith: “In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v.
Lagman, the Court set down the requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original document whenever the original copy has been lost: Before a
party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the
offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The
correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.”

Held:
Yes. The requisites for a party to present secondary evidence on the ground that the original was
lost are as follows: existence, loss, and absence of bad faith. In this case, the above requisites are
found present. The testimony of Monark’s witness explained that the original contract was lost,
and diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Both parties did not controvert
such testimony. This was given credence by the RTC and CA, and thus, the SC will respect such
evaluation. Hence, Monark was justified in presenting secondary evidence.

Wherefore, petition is denied.

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45. EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and Resort vs BF Corporation, GR No 145842; Del Castillo vs BF Corporation,
GR No 145873

Facts:
The petitions stemmed from a collection suit filed by BF against ESHRI based on the latter’s
failure to pay the former according to the terms of their construction contract. Allegedly, BF was
supposed to submit monthly progress billings to ESHRI which in turn shall issue a progress
payment certificate for the remittance of payment. However, ESHRI failed to issue the
certificates let alone remit payment.

The RTC ruled in favor of BF. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, the present
petition assigning error in the part of the lower court for admitting in evidence photocopies of
progress billings.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in admitting in evidence photocopies of the document in question.

Basis:
Requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence: existence, unavailability, and good
faith: “Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to
evidence other than the original instrument or document itself. A party may present secondary
evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however,
certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence. x x x

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule
130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there
is proof of the original document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the
original document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.”

Held:
No. Secondary evidence may be admitted in lieu of the original if the latter is within the custody
of the adverse party who refuses or fails to provide the same. Particularly, the following
conditions must be met: proof of the document’s existence, proof of its unavailability, and good
faith in the part of the offeror.

In this case the testimonial evidence by BF sufficiently established the above requirements. The
original documents exist and were in the possession of ESHRI which refuses to produce the
same upon request. Since the original could not be produced, the secondary evidence presented
by BF is admissible in evidence.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is affirmed.

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46. Compania Maritima vs Allied Free Workers Union, GR No L-28999

Facts:
A written contract was entered into by Compania Maritima and Allied Free whereby the latter
union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for a fee. The contention arose from the
company’s refusal to pay for the stevedoring work on the ground that it should be charged
against the shipowner according to the bill of lading.

Following a picket action by the union, the company sued for the rescission of the contract. The
lower court granted the same. The union sought to stay the execution of the lower court decision,
but to no avail. Hence, the present appeal.

Issue:
W/N the trial court erred in awarding damages on the basis of auditor’s reports.

Basis:
Requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence on the ground that the original
consists of numerous accounts: “The company argues that the accountants' reports are
admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts
or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole", the original writings
need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).

That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on
which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established (U. S. vs. Razon and Tayag,
37 Phil. 856, 861; 29 Am Jur 2nd 529).

It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made
accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-
examination (29 Am Jur 2nd 517-8; 32A C.J.S. 111).

Private audit reports are not admissible unless there is a showing of difficulty in the
production of records and examination thereof by the court as evidence: “What applies to
this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like"
(Anno: 52 ALR 1266).

That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a
preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records
in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court (29 Am Jur 2nd 529).”

Held:
Yes. For the presentation of secondary evidence on the ground that the original consists of
numerous accounts, the offeror must lay the following bases: the voluminous character of
records and the summary report is accessible to the adverse party. In this case, the company
failed to prove the above and resorted to the submission of a private auditor’s report. This
likewise violated the rule that an audit made by a private auditor cannot serve as proof of original
records, if there is no showing of difficulty attending the production and examination of the
records as evidence by the court. In sum, the auditor’s report does not have probative value.

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47. Paras vs Kimwa Construction and Development, GR No 171601

Facts:
An agreement was entered into between Sps. Paras and Kimwa, whereby the latter agreed to haul
aggregates. After hauling only 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates, Kimwa transferred to
concession area to another person. Sps. Paras filed a complaint alleging that Kimwa reneged on
its obligation to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates before May 15, 1995. Kimwa invoked
the parol evidence rule, because the agreement did not contain the obligation allegedly breached.

The RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Paras. On appeal, the CA reversed the same, faulting the RTC for
admitting Sps. Paras’s parol evidence. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N parol evidence by Sps. Paras is admissible to modify the agreement between parties.

Basis:
Parol evidence rule, definition: “Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the
formalities observed, "forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed
upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.".”

Requisites in admitting parol evidence: “In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol
evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in
issue in a party's pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the
parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the
presenting party.”

Held:
Yes. Parol evidence as a general rule is not admissible to modify the terms of a written contract.
For parol evidence to be admitted: first, the existence of any of the exceptions in Rule 130, Sec.
9 must be put in issue without objection by the adverse party, and second, the parol evidence
shall serve as the basis of the conclusion of the presenting party.

In this case, the crux of the complaint of Sps. Paras is that the agreement was founded on the
parties’ supposed unwritten understanding that the aggregates must be hauled before May 15 or
else hauling would be rendered impossible. In effect, Sps. Paras was able to put in issue an
exception to the parol evidence rule. Consequently, the parol evidence became admissible and
the CA should have considered the same in rendering its decision.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

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48. Abella vs Abella, GR No 195166

Facts:
Petitioners filed a collection suit and damages against respondents on the account of the latter’s
nonpayment of debt pursuant to a loan contract. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners based on
the terms of the acknowledgement receipt. On appeal, the CA ruled that all payments made by
respondents should not be applied in interest because the agreement contained no interest rate. In
effect, the principal obligation is fully paid.

Hence, the present petition, where petitioners argue that the acknowledgement receipt failed to
show the complete intention of the parties which is to impose a 2.5% monthly interest.

Issue:
W/N the issue of admissibility of parol evidence was timely raised.

Basis:
Admissibility of parol evidence must be raised on trial stage: “The issue of admitting parol
evidence is a matter that is proper to the trial, not the appellate, stage of a case. Petitioners raised
the issue of applying the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule only in the Reply they filed
before this court. This is the last pleading that either of the parties has filed in the entire string of
proceedings culminating in this Decision. It is, therefore, too late for petitioners to harp on this
rule.”

Held:
No. The issue of admitting parol evidence must be raised on trial stage. Raising the same during
the appellate stage is too late. In this case, petitioners raised the issue of admissibility of parol
evidence for the first time in the Reply they filed with the Supreme Court. It is therefore too late
for petitioners to harp on the parol evidence rule. Petitioners can no longer argue for the
admission of parol evidence. Either way, the issue was never about the admissibility of the
pieces of evidence but on the manner of their appreciation by the courts.

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49. Lee vs People, GR No 159288

Facts:
NMI issued several invoices for the sale and delivery of empty white bags in favor of VMCI,
which issued checks covering the amounts stated in the said invoices. The checks were held by
petitioner Lee.

Later, NMI was duly dissolved. The trustee appointed to collect NMI’s receivable wrote to Lee,
demanding the delivery of the checks being held by him. Lee failed to do so despite several
demands.

A complaint for 3 counts of estafa was filed against Lee thereafter. The prosecution however
only presented photocopies of the invoices and checks as evidence. Based on the testimony of
the witnesses of the prosecution, the original invoices were lost during a flood.

Lee objected to the admission of evidence, invoking the best evidence rule. The trial court and
the CA on appeal sustained the admission in evidence of the copies, finding that there was
sufficient proof of the loss of the original. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the copies of the invoices are admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Custodian must prove existence of the original and fruitless search of the same, for
secondary evidence to be admissible: “If the document is one in which other persons are also
interested, and which has been placed in the hands of a custodian for safekeeping, the custodian
must be required to make a search and the fruitlessness of such search must be shown, before
secondary evidence can be admitted. The certificate of the custody of the document is
incompetent to prove the loss or destruction thereof. Such fact must be proved by some person
who has knowledge of such loss.

The proponent is also burdened to prove the due execution or existence of the original as
provided in Rule 130, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court x x x.”

Admission by adverse party is sufficient proof of the existence of the original: “The
admission of that party against whom the document is offered, of the authenticity and due
execution thereof, is admissible in evidence to prove the existence, authenticity and due
execution of such document.”

Held:
Yes. For secondary evidence to be admissible, the loss of the original must be proven by the
custodian’s testimony as to the execution of the original and fruitlessness of the search thereof.
The admission of the adverse party is sufficient proof of the existence of the original.

In this case, the prosecution witness was able to testify as to the loss and fruitlessness of the
search of the original invoices. The existence and due execution of the invoices were sufficiently
proven by no other than Lee through his counter-affidavit, where he admits to receiving such
invoices. The existence, loss, and fruitless search of the original being proved, the trial court and
CA did not err in admitting in evidence the photocopies of the invoices. Petition is dismissed.

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50. BPI vs Mendoza, GR No 198799

Facts:
Amado Mendoza opened a foreign currency account, to which he deposited a US Warranty
check in the amount of $16,264, and a time deposit account, to which he deposited $2,000. After
the clearing period, Amado withdrew everything in the foreign currency account save for $20 for
bank charges. BPI found later that the US Warranty check was dishonored by the US
Government. BPI demanded for reimbursement from Amado. Allegedly, Amado applied the
proceeds of his time deposit account to his outstanding obligation, and executed a promissory
note covering the remaining account. Amado failed to fulfill his obligation despite several
demands, constraining BPI to file a collection suit.

The RTC ruled in favor of BPI. On appeal, the CA dismissed the suit on the ground that the US
Warranty check presented by BPI was a mere photocopy. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the photocopy of the US Warranty check is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Existence, loss, and absence of bad faith must be proven to claim exception to the original
document rule: “Anent the subject check, while the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court states that generally, the original copy of the document must be
presented whenever the content of the document is under inquiry, the rule admits of certain
exceptions, such as "[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror." In order to fall under the aforesaid exception,
it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss
and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence
of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.”

Held:
Yes. To claim exception from the original document rule, the offeror must prove the existence,
loss, and absence of bad faith on his/her part. In this case, records show that 1) both parties
admitted to the existence of the check, 2) BPI proved that it could not produce the original since
it was confiscated by the US Government, and that US Treasury Warrants are not easily
obtained, and 3) no bad faith was attributable to BPI. Thus, the subject check may be admitted,
as exception to the original document rule.

The CA ruling rendering the photocopies of the check inadmissible in evidence is set aside. The
RTC ruling is reinstated. Wherefore the petition is granted.

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51. Dimaguila vs Monteiro, GR No 201011

Facts:
Sps. Montero filed an action for partition on the basis of a sale contract of real property with
Pedro Dimaguila. The impleaded co-owners, the Dimaguilas, countered by stating that no co-
ownership exists because the property had long been partitioned. Sps. Montero accordingly
amended its complaint for recovery of land. The Dimaguilas, in their Answer, contradicted their
earlier position and claimed that the property was not partitioned and thus the Sps. Montero
cannot claim any portion thereof.

During trial, Sps. Montero presented a certified true copy of the cadastral map and list of
claimants showing that the subject property was already subdivided into lots.

The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Sps. Monteiro. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the certified true copy of the cadastral map and list of claimants are admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Certified true copy is sufficient proof of an original in public record: “Anent the best
evidence rule, Section 3 (d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule
132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody or the record.”

Held:
Yes. A certified true copy is sufficient proof of an original in public record. This is an exception
to the original document rule. In this case, the subject cadastral map and list of claimants was
presented and certified by two public officers, who are employees of the Municipal Assessor’s
Office and the DENR. These documents fall under the exception to the original document rule
and are therefore admissible even without production of the original. Wherefore, the petition is
denied.

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52. Republic vs Mupas, GR No 181892; Republic vs PIATCO, GR No 209917; Takenaka vs Republic, GR

No 209696; PIATCO vs Republic, GR No 209731

Facts:
The Government entered into an agreement with PIATCO for the construction of the NAIA-IPT
III. For this project, PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka and Asahikosan. Later,
PIATCO's contracts with the government were nullified by the Supreme Court because of the
finding that PIATCO was not a pre-qualified bidder.

The Government sought to expropriate NAIA-IPT III. The Government appointed an

independent appraiser Gleeds to compute the valuation of NAIA-IPT III. PIATCO, Takenaka,
Asahikosan, and the BOC also submitted their respective computations. The RTC only gave
credence to the Gleeds report.

On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC ruling with modifications. The CA decision, among others, is
being assailed in the present consolidation of petitions. PIATCO claims that its summary of
attendant costs should be admitted as part of just compensation.

Issue:
W/N the summarized computation of attendant costs of PIATCO is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Sources of a summary of voluminous documents must be shown as original and admissible;
otherwise, the summary is deemed double hearsay: “However, as a condition precedent to the
admission of a summary of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation for
the admission of the original documents on which the summary is based. The proponent must
prove that the source documents being summarized are also admissible if presented in court.

In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be original, and not secondary.
Furthermore, the source documents must likewise be accessible to the opposing party so that the
correctness of the summary of the voluminous records may be tested on cross-examination
and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary trial-type proceedings, a proper foundation for
the introduction of a summary may be established through the "testimony of the person who is
responsible for the summary's preparation, or the person who supervised the preparation of the
summary."

The primary reason for these procedural foundations is that the summary of numerous
documents is, in strict terms, hearsay evidence. The trial court should not haphazardly allow a
party to present a summary of numerous documents and immediately admit and give probative
value to such summary without sufficiently laying these foundations. If the source documents of
the summary are nonoriginal, the trial court would commit a grave error in admitting and/or
giving probative value to the summary of non-original documents; the evidence admitted would
be double hearsay.”

Invocation of one exception does not justify the others: “Whenever a party seeks an
exemption under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
he asks permission from the trial court to produce a summary of numerous documents, whose
originals are available to the adverse party for inspection. He does not ask permission from the
trial court to present in evidence the numerous non-original documents. Otherwise, the very
purpose of Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court would be defeated. In that case, every
exhibit of non-original documents would be identified, authenticated, and cross-examined,
leading to a tedious and protracted litigation.”

Held:
No. A summary of voluminous documents may be deemed admissible if the source original
consists of numerous accounts which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and

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the fact sought to be established is only the general result of the whole. To avail of this
exception, the proponent must prove that the source documents are original and admissible.
Otherwise, admission of the summary would be double hearsay.

In this case, the summarized computation of attendant costs is deemed double hearsay because
PIATCO's auditing firm did not state if it examined the original documents in making the
summary.

In addition, photocopies of numerous documents in the summary may not be admitted because
they were not justified as exceptions to the best evidence rule. Invocation of one exception does
not include the others.

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53. Llemos vs Llemos, GR No 150162

Facts:
A complaint was filed by the respondents seeking to declare the nullity of the TCT of the
petitioners on the ground that the property covered was acquired via a forged deed of sale.
Respondents claim that the alleged deed of sale could not have been valid because the seller,
their grandmother, had died years prior the date of the issuance of the OCT.

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of respondents’ failure to authenticate their
grandmother’s Certificate of Death as a private document. According to the RTC, the records of
the Catholic Church are not considered public documents that are deemed exceptions to the
original document rule.

The CA reversed the RTC decision on appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the records of the Catholic Church is admissible in evidence as a public document.

Basis:
Church records are not public documents: “It is well-settled that Church registries of births,
marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the
passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other
private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.”

Held:
No. Church records are not public documents. This has been the case since the promulgation of
General Orders No 68 and Act No 190. As a consequence, church records must be authenticated
as a private writing in accordance with the rules of evidence. Hence, in this case, the records of
the Catholic Church pertaining to the death of respondents’ grandmother are not admissible in
evidence as a public document. The respondents’ failure to authenticate these documents as
private writings rendered the same inadmissible in evidence. Wherefore, the petition is granted.

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RULE 130 – Parol Evidence Rule

54. Syquia vs CA, GR No L-61932

Facts:
Petitioner Syquia was a tenant of the Dutch Inn Building owned by the Litton co-ownership.
When the said co-ownership was dissolved, the new owner, respondent Litton, demanded that
Syquia vacate the premises upon expiration of the lease contract. Syquia manifested his
willingness to renew the contract as per the oral agreement with the original lessor. However,
Litton insisted that the contract does not provide for renewal extension. Since Syquia refused to
vacate the premises, Litton filed an ejectment case. The City Court, RTC, and the CA ruled in
favor of Litton. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the oral agreement is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Written agreements when clear are binding between parties: “Applying the Parol Evidence
Rule to the instant case, it is clear that there being a written agreement between the parties, the
same should be controlling between them. The exceptions provided for in (A) and (B) cannot
apply in the instant case in view of the fact that the contract of lease, Exhibit "G" is clear, thus
precluding any mistake or imperfection or failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties. The Court cannot see any ambiguity in the contract. The tests of completeness of a
written contract is the contract itself, as provided for under Sec. 1494 of Jones on Evidence. x x
x”

Verbal assurance cannot be allowed under Parol Evidence Rule: “Proof of the alleged verbal
assurance of a lease renewal cannot be allowed both under the Parol Evidence Rule and the
Statute of Frauds for failure to put in writing said alleged stipulation.”

Held:
No. Written agreements, when clear and lacking ambiguities, are binding between the parties.
Based on the Parol Evidence Rule, proof of oral agreements cannot be allowed for failure to put
in writing. In this case, the alleged oral agreement cannot be admitted in view of the clear and
unambiguous contract of lease of the subject premises. Syquia should have protected his interests
by reducing the renewal into a written stipulation. His failure to do weakened his claim.
Wherefore, the assailed decision is affirmed.

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55. Heirs of Ureta vs Heirs of Ureta, GR No 165748; Heirs of Ureta vs Heirs of Ureta, GR No 165930

Facts:
Alfonso Ureta executed four deeds of sale in favor of his heirs Policronio and others for the
purpose of reducing inheritance taxes. Alfonso and Policronio died later in different occasions.
The Heirs of Alfonso executed a deed of extra-judicial partition covering the property previously
sold to Policronio and three others. Policronio’s eldest son signed the said deed. When the other
heirs of Policronio learned of this, they filed a complaint putting in issue the validity of the deeds
of sale between Alfonso and Policronio.

The RTC held that the deeds of sale between Alfonso and Policronio were null and void. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling regarding the deeds of sale on the basis of the unrebutted
testimony of Amparo Castillo, the daughter of one of the heirs of Alfonso. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence rule.

Basis:
Parol evidence rule does not apply if validity of the contract or failure to express the true
intent of parties is put in issue: “The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties was clearly put in issue in the Answer of the Heirs of Alfonso to the
Complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment of estate
and inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is
allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear,
it shall prevail over what the document appears to be on its face. As the true intent of the parties
was duly proven in the present case, it now prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale.

The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was precisely one of
the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution. The operation of the parol evidence rule requires
the existence of a valid written agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the
validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be void for lack of
consideration. Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely
simulated and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement.”

Held:
No. The parol evidence rule does not apply if validity of the contract or failure to express the true
intent of parties is put in issue. This is because the operation of the parol evidence rule requires
the existence of a valid written agreement. In this case, the validity of the deed of sale in question
is put in issue by the Heirs of Alfonso. The RTC rendered its decision precisely on the issue of
validity of the subject deeds. Thus, parol evidence is admissible in ascertaining the true intent of
the parties.

Consequently, the subject deeds of sale are declared invalid for being simulated. Wherefore,
petition is denied.

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56. Marquez vs Espejo, GR No 168387

Facts:
The Espejos owned agricultural land in Brgy. Lantap and another in Brgy. Murong, in Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya. The properties were foreclosed by reason of defaulting in a loan, but the Espejos
were able to buy back one of the properties. The corresponding Deed of Sale pertained to the
Murong property. However, the Espejos resumed tilling the Lantap property.

By virtue of RA 6657, RBBI issued a deed of VLT in favor of Marquez, tenants of the Murong
property. In the description, the VLT both mentioned “Brgy Murong” and the TCT No. of the
Lantap property. Upon full payment, the DAR issued CLOAs over the Murong property.

The Espejos contested the CLOAs based on the abovesaid Deed of Sale. The RARAD ruled that
the CLOAs refer to the Lantap property while the Deed of Sale pertained to the Murong
property. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the RARAD ruling.

On further appeal, the CA, applying the best evidence rule, decided that the Deed of Sale is the
best evidence as to which property was bought back by the Espejos. Accordingly, the CA held
that the Espejos owned the Murong property by virtue of the Deed of Sale; while the CLOAs
pertained to the Lantap property. Since Marquez was not a tiller of the Lantap property, the
CLOAs were cancelled.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N the best evidence rule is applicable in determining the true intent of the contracts.

Basis:
Best Evidence Rule not applicable when the contents of the document are not in issue:
“Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best
Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best
evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction,
photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it
reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.

In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule
because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. x x x”

Primacy on the letter of the document is Parol Evidence Rule, not Best Evidence Rule: “The
Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict,
vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that
what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words
of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court
gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence
that would contradict such terms.”

Cases involving intrinsic ambiguity of documents fall under the exception to the Parol
Evidence Rule: “Here, the petitioners' VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs
described the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also
describe the subject property as being located in "Barangay Murong." Even the respondents'
Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-
62096" (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap
property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the
true intent of the parties.

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Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the
parties' respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled
is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the
intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or
ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical
errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.”

Held:
No. The Best Evidence Rule finds no application when the issue does not pertain to the contents
of the document. In fact, when the CA refused to go beyond the wording of the documents, the
court actually applied the Parol Evidence Rule.

In this case, the parties agree as to the contents of the Deed of Sale and the VLT. The issue
therefore is not the contents of the documents. Thus, the Best Evidence Rule is not applicable.

The current dispute arose as to the true intent of the parties. Hence, Parol Evidence Rule is also
not applicable. Cases involving intrinsic ambiguity are exempted from the Parol Evidence Rule.
To resolve the intrinsic ambiguity, it is necessary for the court to consider extraneous evidence
such as parol evidence and ascertain based therefrom the true intentions of the parties.

After examining the factual circumstances, the Court held that the Deed of Sale was intended to
transfer the Lantap property to the Espejos, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong
property to Marquez.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

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57. Sy vs Navarro, GR No 239088

Facts:
Petitioner John Sy borrowed a sum of money from respondent De Vera-Navarro secured by a
mortgage contract over a property co-owned by petitioners. John executed an undated Deed of
Sale as additional security for the loan.

Later, it was found that the title to the subject property was transferred to De Vera-Navarro based
on the Deed of Sale. John and Valentino Sy caused the annotation of an adverse claim on such
title. Thereafter, De Vera-Navarro sold the same property to a previous co-owner, respondent
BHTLI. A new title was issued in the latter’s favor.

Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Sale between John and De Vera-
Navarro. The RTC granted the relief prayed for. This ruling was reversed by the CA on appeal.
Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:
W/N the parol evidence of petitioners may be admitted as evidence.

Basis:
Parol evidence admissible in proving the real nature of a contract purporting to be a sale
with right to repurchase: “The CA's hesitance in accepting the foregoing testimonies just
because they are parol evidence and that the undated Deed of Absolute Sale is unequivocal on
paper in stating that a sale was intended by the parties is misplaced. As the Court previously
held, x x x a document which appears on its face to be a sale — absolute x x x may be proven by
the vendor x x x to be one of a loan with mortgage. In this case, parol evidence becomes
competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a
security for the payment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will
enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the
time of the execution of the contract. Sales with a right to repurchase are not favored.”

Notarization is not a guarantee of validity: “The evidence presented by respondent De Vera-

Navarro center mainly on the fact that the UNDATED Deed of Absolute Sale was properly
notarized. However, as held previously by the Court, the notarization of a document does not
guarantee its validity because it is not the function of the notary public to validate an instrument
that was never intended by the parties to have any binding legal effect on them. Neither is the
notarization of a document conclusive of the nature of the transaction conferred by the said
document, nor is it conclusive of the true agreement of the parties thereto.”

Held:
Yes. When in doubt, the courts are inclined to construe a transaction purporting to be a sale as an
equitable mortgage. In such instances, parol evidence is admissible and competent to ascertain
and enforce the true intention between the parties.

In this case, the oral testimonies of petitioners are therefore admissible and was given probative
weight in proving that the contract with De Vera Navarro was actually that of loan with
mortgage. The fact that the Deed was properly notarized is not material. Notarization does not
validate a contract not intended to be binding between the parties.

Wherefore, the RTC decision was reinstated with modifications.

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58. Borillo vs CA, GR No 55691

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint praying that she and her children be declared owners of several
properties originally owned and continuously possessed by her late husband Elpidio. The
complaint was filed because private respondents, believing that they own the property, ousted
petitioner and her children from the same. The basis for private respondents’ claim is a deed of
sale allegedly executed with Elpidio.

The RTC ruled in favor petitioner but on appeal, the CA held the private respondents as the true
owners of the subject lots. Hence, this petition, assailing the validity of private respondents’ deed
of sale which does not even contain a description of the land subject of the contract.

Issue:
W/N parol evidence is admissible to supply the missing terms of the deed of sale.

Basis:
Parol evidence is only admissible to clarify intrinsic ambiguities; it cannot supply missing
terms of a document: “Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify, explain or
define the subject matter of a writing, it must first be shown that the writing itself already
contains a description sufficient to serve as a foundation for the admission of such parol
evidence; the evidence should also be consistent with the writing. Otherwise stated, in order to
admit parol evidence to aid in the description of the subject matter of a deed or other writing,
there must be a description that will serve as a foundation for such evidence; the writing must at
least give some data from which the description may be found and made certain. Parol evidence
is not admissible to identify the property where the description thereof is so vague as to amount
to no description at all. In other words, parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description,
but only to apply it.”

Held:
No. Parol evidence is only admissible in clarifying intrinsic ambiguities in a document. It cannot
supply the missing terms of a document. Hence, in this case, parol evidence cannot be admitted
to supply the missing description of the deed of sale. The said deed suffers from extrinsic
ambiguity which renders it fatally defective. The deed cannot be a source of the private
respondents’ claim.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

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Rule 130 – Interpretation of Documents

59. RCBC vs IAC, GR No 74851

Facts:
BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments with
the SEC. In the meantime, RCBC moved to foreclose the mortgaged properties of BF Homes.
The public auction concluded with RCBC as the highest bidder. BF Homes applied to enjoin the
sheriff from executing the certificate of sale in favor of RCBC, on the ground that the pendency
of the above petition. The SEC eventually issued an injunction, though belatedly.

RCBC, on the other hand, filed a mandamus for the execution of the certificate of sale of the
auctioned properties. The RTC granted the same. BF Homes filed an original action to overturn
the RTC decision, which the CA granted. RCBC appealed the CA decision with the SC, resulting
in a dismissal.

Hence, the present motion for reconsideration by RCBC.

Issue:
W/N the SC should reverse its decision.

Basis:
Courts must first apply the law: “It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the
Court is to apply the law. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks
in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for
application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708 [1968]). Where
the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has
no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered Bank Employees Association vs.
Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985]; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969];
Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 [1970]).

Interpretation of the law is only applicable when there is ambiguity: Only when the law is
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent. Ambiguity
is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or
of referring to two or more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of
two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to exercise one of its
judicial functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.”

Held:
Yes. Courts must first apply the law. Interpretation of the law should only apply when there is
ambiguity i.e., when the law admits of two or more meanings. In this case, the pertinent law
clearly states that suspension of claims against a corporation etc. is only allowed upon
appointment of a management committee. The previous decision of the SC is therefore
incongruent with the clear language of the law. To enforce the previous decision is judicial
legislation. Therefore, the SC reverses its previous decision and applies the plainly the pertinent
law.

Wherefore, the present motion is granted.

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60. Santiago vs CA, GR No 103959

Facts:
Paula Arcega executed a deed of sale over a parcel of land in favor of petitioners. Despite the
said sale, Paula caused the building of a house over the said land. She lived there with petitioners
until her death.

Private respondent, as heir of Paula, sought for the declaration of nullity of the above deed of
sale on the ground that it is fictitious. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondent, finding that
the sale was merely designed as an accommodation for purposes of loan with the SSS. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling on appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the deed in question should be annulled.

Basis:
Notarization does not operate to validate a void contract: “The conceded fact that subject
deed of absolute sale executed by Paula Arcega in favor of petitioners is a notarized document
does not justify the petitioners' desired conclusion that said sale is undoubtedly a true
conveyance to which the parties thereto are irrevocably and undeniably bound. To be considered
with great significance is the fact that Atty. Luis Cuvin who notarized the deed disclaimed the
truthfulness of the document when he testified that "NO MONEY WAS INVOLVED IN THE
TRANSACTION." Furthermore, though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in
its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public
to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding
legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still is and always will be the
primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.”

Held:
No. The failure of the petitioners to take exclusive possession of the property upon purchase
there is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. The fact of
notarization of the deed does not operate to validate the contract which is void in the first place.
The intention of the parties still is and always will be the primary consideration in determining
the true nature of a contract. Thus, since Paula and the petitioners executed a fictitious sale, the
notarization of the deed did not validate the contract. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the
annulment of the deed of sale by the RTC. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

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61. Garcia vs CA, GR No 119845

Facts:
SBTC agreed to extend a secured EXPORT loan in favor of Dynetics. Subsequently, Dynetics
also obtained another credit accommodation or SWAP loan from SBTC, secured by an
Indemnity Agreement signed by petitioner Garcia and Chuidian.

Dynetics defaulted in payment of the SWAP loan. The mortgaged chattels were foreclosed but a
deficiency balance remained. Dynetics also failed to pay the EXPORT loan. This prompted
SBTC to file a complaint against Dynetics and sureties Garcia and Chuidian.

Dynetics defaulted in payment of both loans. This prompted SBTC to file a collection suit
against Dynetics, as well as against sureties Garcia and Chuidian.

The RTC ruled in favor of SBTC. However, the claim against Garcia was dismissed. On appeal,
the CA held Garcia solidarily liable with Dynetics. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N Garcia is liable as surety for the EXPORT loan.

Basis:
Admissions of counsel in open court is binding to the client and cannot be offset by any
contradictory evidence: “In fine, insofar as the SWAP loan was concerned, SBTC did away
with the Indemnity Agreement and the Continuing Surety, opting instead to rely solely on the
chattel mortgage. The aforequoted declarations of Atty. Bello in the course of the trial are
conclusive. Such admission is binding and no amount of contradictory evidence can offset it.

. . . Judicial admissions verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of
the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to
prove the same and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. (Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc.
vs. Sweet Lines Inc., 212 SCRA 194;204 [1992])

We cannot allow SBTC at this time to water down the admission it made in open court, more so
after the opposing party relied upon such judicial admission and accordingly dispensed with
further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings does not require proof. The record here does not show any attempt on the part of
SBTC to contradict such judicial admission on the ground of palpable mistake.”

Held:
No. Garcia’s liability was waived by the counsel for SBTC, who admitted in open court that the
Indemnity Agreement no longer covers the SWAP loan because the latter is already secured by
the chattel mortgage. This admission is conclusive to SBTC and cannot be offset by any
contradictory evidence. Having waived the applicability of the Indemnity Agreement, Garcia
cannot be held liable therefrom as surety.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed.

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62. Ortañez vs CA, GR No 110662

Facts:
Respondent Rafael filed a complaint for annulment of marriage based on lack of marriage license
and psychological incapacity of petitioner Teresita. Among the evidence presented by Rafael
were 3 cassette types of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified
persons. Despite Teresita’s objections, the trial court admitted all of such tapes in evidence.

Teresita appealed via certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the
present petition.

Issue:
W/N the subject cassette tapes are admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Admissibility in evidence of tape recordings of telephone conversations is subject to RA
4200: “Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes
such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. x x x Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of
Appeals failed to consider the aforequoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the
cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed to recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.”

Held:
No. RA 4200 expressly qualifies the admissibility in evidence of tape recordings of private
communications. Accordingly, there must be a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same. Otherwise, the tape recordings are inadmissible
in evidence. In this case, there is no such clear showing. Hence, the cassette tapes in question are
inadmissible in evidence.

Wherefore the appealed CA decision is set aside.

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RULE 130 – Qualification of Witnesses

63. Alvarez vs Ramirez, GR No 143439

Facts:
Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in a complaint for arson filed against Maximo
Alvarez, husband of Susan’s sister Esperanza Alvarez. During trial, the prosecutor called
Esperanza to the witness stand to testify against Maximo. Maximo moved to disqualify
Esperanza from testifying, based on the marital disqualification rule. The trial court granted
Maximo’s motion.

Susan challenged the trial court order via a certiorari petition with the CA. The CA nullified the
assailed orders. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N Esperanza’s testimony is disqualified under the marital disqualification rule.

Basis:
Marital disqualification not applicable when husband and wife are estranged from each
other: “But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions,
both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the
excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and
domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life,
which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.”

Held:
No. The marital disqualification rule does not apply when the marital relations are so strained
that there is no harmony nor peace to be preserved. In this case, it appears that Maximo and
Esperanza were separated de facto for almost six months due to a strained relationship. Hence,
Esperanza is not disqualified to testify against Maximo under the marital disqualification rule.

Wherefore, the assailed CA decision is affirmed.

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64. People vs Pansensoy, GR No 140634

Facts:
Appellant Roberto Pansensoy was accused of the murder of his wife’s lover Hilario Reyes.
According to the prosecution, which allegations rests on the testimony of Roberto’s wife Analie,
Roberto charged with a handgun into the house rented by Analie and Hilario, and later proceeded
to shoot Hilario to death. In his defense, Roberto alleged that he only acted in self-defense
against the aggression of Hilario. The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s version and
found Roberto guilty of murder.

Hence, this appeal, where the defense raises, among others, as issue the admissibility of Analie’s
testimony.

Issue:
W/N Analie is disqualified from testifying against Roberto.

Basis:
Marital disqualification rule waived if no objection is made when the spouse is first offered
as a witness: “As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analie's testimony would have been
disregarded had appellant timely objected to her competency to testify under the marital
disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to
testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses
generally. The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first
offered as a witness. In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellant's failure to make a
timely objection to the admission of Analie's testimony.”

Held:
No. The marital disqualification rule is waived if no objection is made when the spouse is first
offered as a witness. In this case, records show that appellant failed to raise a timely objection to
Analie’s competency to testify against him when she was first offered as a witness. Hence, it is
now too late to raise Analie’s competency as issue. Analie is not disqualified to testify against
Roberto.

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65. US vs Antipolo, GR No L-13109

Facts:
Appellant Dalmacio Antipolo is charged of murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The defense
presented Susana Ezpeleta, widow of the deceased, as witness. The prosecution objected based
on the marital disqualification rule. The trial court sustained the objection of the prosecution.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N Susana is disqualified from testifying for appellant.

Basis:
Dying declarations regarding the murderer are not confidential communications between
married couples that the law intended to protect: “This case does not fall with the text of the
statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused
persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to
relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made
from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a
person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the
manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense
confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose that it may
be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into
the cause of his death.”

Held:
No. The marital disqualification rule intends to protect confidential communications between
husband and wife. Dying declarations of one, anent the person responsible for his death, are not
among the confidential communications that the law intends to protect. On the contrary, such
declarations were made for the purpose of being communicated to the authorities. Hence, Susana
should not be disqualified from testifying for appellant.

Wherefore, the assailed order is set aside.

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66. People vs Carlos, GR No 22948

Facts:
Defendant Fausto Carlos was charged of murder of one Dr. Pablo Sityar. Carlos alleged that he
merely acted in self-defense, the deceased being the aggressor. This version of the story was
overturned by admission in evidence of a letter written to Carlos by his wife. In the said letter,
Carlos’s wife expressed her fear that Carlos contemplated resorting to physical violence in
dealing with their issues with Dr. Sityar. The trial court treated this as proof of premeditation and
thus held Carlos guilty of murder.

In this appeal, the defense objects to the admission of the letter on the ground of privileged
communication between spouses.

Issue:
W/N the subject correspondence is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Privilege is extinguished if communication between spouses falls into the hands of a third
person without their consent: “Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a
privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. The numerical weight of
authority is, however, to the effect that where a privileged communication from one spouse to
another comes into the hands of a third part, whether legally or not, without collusion and
voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and
the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. x x x Such is the view of the
majority of this court.”

Spousal communication not admissible if the writer-spouse was not put on witness stand,
or the recipient-spouse had not assented to the statements: “The letter Exhibit L must,
however, be excluded for reasons not because in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of
the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach
her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered
for the purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the
statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case
here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on
his part.”

Held:
No. Indeed, a privileged communication between spouses loses its privilege when it comes into
the hands of a third party without consent from either spouse. However, the letter in question
must be excluded because the wife who wrote the letter had not testified at the trial; nor did the
defendant indicated assent to the statements contained in the letter. The fact of possession of
such letter is no indication of acquiescence on his part.

Wherefore, the finding of murder is set aside. Defendant is found guilty of simple homicide.

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67. People vs Sandiganbayan, GR Nos 115439-41

Facts:
A patent and certificate of title secured by respondent Paredes was nullified by the trial court on
the ground that the parcels of land covered were actually reserved as a school site. Subsequently,
a taxpayer sought for the investigation by the Ombudsman of Paredes, along with his counsel
Atty. Sansaet and Honrada, allegedly for conspiring to falsify public documents.

Atty. Sansaet, in an effort evade responsibility, offered to testify against Paredes and Honrada.
The Ombudsman nevertheless filed separate informations against the three respondents.
However, in view of Sansaet’s valuable testimony, the People would later file a motion to
discharge Sansaet as a state witness. This was denied by the Sandiganbayan based on the
attorney-client privilege. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the testimony of Sansaet is barred by the attorney-client privilege.

Basis:
Communications regarding future crimes are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege: “Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already
committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily
existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.”

Held:
No. Communications regarding future crimes are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The privilege only protects those statements made about crimes already committed. In this case,
the projected testimony of Sansaet were about the communications made with his client Paredes
and co-conspirator Honrada as they were about to commit falsification of documents. Hence,
Sansaet’s testimony is not barred by the attorney-client privilege.

Wherefore, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan were set aside.

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68. Lim vs CA, GR No 91114

Facts:
Private respondent Juan Sim filed an annulment of marriage petition on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of his wife, petitioner herein, Nelly Lim. Allegedly, Lim suffered from
schizophrenia. In support of his petition, Sim offered Dr. Lydia Acampado as expert witness.
Lim moved to disqualify Dr. Acampado based on the physician-patient privilege, on the account
that Dr. Acampado had once examined and diagnosed Lim in her professional capacity. The trial
court denied Lim’s motion.

Lim appealed via certiorari. The CA denied her petition. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N Dr. Acampado’s testimony is physician-patient privileged communication.

Basis:
The physician-patient privilege only covers those communications made for the safe and
efficacious treatment of the patient: “The physician may be considered to be acting in his
professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him
"safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized
that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are
therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated.".”

Held:
No. The physician-patient privilege only covers those communications made to enable the
physician to safely and efficaciously treat the patient. A physician is not ipso facto disqualified
from testifying against the patient, so long as the testimony does not touch on their privileged
communication. In this case, it is clear that Dr. Acampado is presented as expert witness. Lim
failed to prove that Dr. Acampado’s projected testimony shall touch their previous diagnosis.
Hence, Dr. Acampado’s testimony is not barred by physician-patient privilege.

Wherefore, this petition is denied.

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69. Chan vs Chan, GR No 179786

Facts:
Petitioner Josielene Chan filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent
Johnny Chan based on the latter’s drinking and drug abuse problem. During trial, Josielene
prayed for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s medical records when he
was confined in a hospital for rehabilitation. Johnny opposed the motion on the basis of
physician-patient privilege.

The RTC sustained the opposition. Josielene’s appeal with the CA was denied. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
W/N Johnny’s medical records constitute physician-patient privileged communication.

Basis:
Information regarding the patient is memorialized by the physician through medical
records; thus, such records are privileged communication: “To allow, however, the
disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
— would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient's consent.
Physician memorializes all these information in the patient's records. Disclosing them would be
the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while
dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent.”

Held:
Yes. While it is true that the physician-patient privilege only covers testimonial evidence, such
also extends to medical records of patients. Information regarding the patient is memorialized by
the physician through medical records. Such records are privileged communication. In this case
therefore, Johnny’s medical records constitute physician-patient privileged communication. They
cannot be produced without Johnny’s consent.

Wherefore, the petition herein is denied.

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70. Almonte vs Vasquez, GR No 95367

Facts:
An anonymous letter was sent to the Office of the Ombudsman. The letter alleged that petitioners
Almonte and Vasquez, during their stint in the EIIB, had been involved in the illegal
disbursement of salaries of “ghost agents”. The Graft Investigation Officer requested for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum on the Chief of the EIIB’s Accounting Division for the
production of relevant personnel records of the EIIB. Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena,
but to no avail. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the personnel records of the EIIB is protected by executive privilege.

Basis:
Executive privilege is meant to protect military, diplomatic, or other national security
secrets: “It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there
is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the
interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in
chambers. x x x On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need
to protect military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in
the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an
absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of
criminal laws.”

Held:
No. Executive privilege is meant to protect military, diplomatic, or other national security
secrets. Where the claim of confidentiality rest merely on the general public interest in the
confidentiality of conversations, the executive privilege does not apply.

In this case, petitioners were not able to prove that the personnel records pertained to military,
diplomatic, or other national security agents. In fact, the COA had stated that only the purchase
of information and payment of rewards shall constitute confidential expenditure. Thus, the
personnel records of the EIIB is not protected by executive privilege. The Ombudsman must be
allowed to procure the same for investigation.

Wherefore, the present petition is dismissed.

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71. Lee vs CA, GR No 177861

Facts:
The Lee-Keh children filed a petition to delete from Emma Lee’s birth certificate the name of
their mother Keh, on the ground that Emma’s actual mother is Tiu. To support the petition, the
Lee-Keh children requested for the issuance of a subpoena on Tiu. In response, Tiu opposed the
motion on ground of parental privilege for being Emma’s stepdaughter. The RTC sustained Tiu’s
opposition.

The Lee-Keh children filed a certiorari petition with the CA, resulting in a reversal. Hence, the
present recourse.

Issue:
W/N Tiu’s testimony is barred by parental privilege.

Basis:
Parental privilege only applies to direct ascendants or descendants: “But here Tiu, who
invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The
privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common
ancestry by her stepmother.”

Held:
No. The rule on parental privilege only applies to direct ascendants or descendants. Being a
stepmother, Tiu is not connected by common ancestry with Emma. Hence, Tiu cannot avail of
the protection of parental privilege.

Wherefore, this petition is denied.

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72. PASAR vs Lim, GR No 172948

Facts:
PASAR filed an injunction suit seeking to restrain respondents, stockholders of PASAR, from
demanding inspection of its confidential records. The RTC granted the suit, holding that the
stockholder’s right to inspection should be limited to ordinary corporate records. Respondents
moved to dissolve the injunction, but to no avail.

On appeal via certiorari, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence, the present petition by
PASAR.

Issue:
W/N respondent stockholders may be granted access to the confidential records of PASAR.

Basis:
Stockholders are entitled to reasonable access to corporate records: “The grant of legal
personality to a corporation is conditioned on its compliance with certain obligations. Among
these are its fiduciary responsibilities to its stockholders. Providing stockholders with access to
information is a fundamental basis for their intelligent participation in the governance of the
corporation as a business organization that they partially own. The law is agnostic with respect to
the amount of shares required. Generally, each individual stockholder should be given reasonable
access so that he or she can assess or share his or her assessment of the management of the
corporation with other stockholders. The separate legal personality of a corporation is not so
absolutely separate that it divorces itself from its responsibility to its constituent owners.”

Held:
Yes. Stockholders are entitled to reasonable access to corporate records. This right is
fundamental for their meaningful participation in the governance of the corporation that they
partially own. Thus, PASAR cannot prevent respondent stockholders from accessing its records.

To avail of the limitation on this right to inspect under the Corporation Code, PASAR must have
raised by way of defense the bad faith of the respondents, as supported by proof. PASAR was
not able to comply with foregoing because it pre-empted the respondents from exercising their
right to inspect.

Wherefore, the herein petition is denied.

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73. Eagleridge Development vs Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, GR No 204700

Facts:
A collection suit was filed by EIB against petitioner EDC and its sureties Naval and Oben. On
the basis of a Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement, EIB executed a Deed of Assignment
transferring EDC’s outstanding loan obligations to respondent Cameron. Cameron substituted
EIB in the collection suit against EDC.

EDC moved to inspect the LSPA between Cameron and EIB. Cameron opposed the motion due
to lack of good cause. The trial court denied the motion. The subsequent certiorari petition was
dismissed by the CA for lack of verification and certification against forum shopping. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
W/N EDC may inspect the LSPA between Cameron and EIB.

Basis:
Other documents detached from one offered in evidence must also be presented:
“Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or
record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by
the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record
necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment was
produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which
was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may
also be inevitably inquired into by petitioners.”

Technical ploys that prevent parties in a litigation to reveal documents material to the
controversy should not be countenanced: “It must be remembered that "litigation is essentially
an abiding quest for truth undertaken not by the judge alone, but jointly with the parties.
Litigants, therefore, must welcome every opportunity to achieve this goal; they must act in good
faith to reveal documents, papers and other pieces of evidence material to the controversy."
Courts, as arbiters and guardians of truth and justice, must not countenance any technical ploy to
the detriment of an expeditious settlement of the case or to a fair, full and complete
determination on its merits.”

Held:
Yes. Documents detached from offered in evidence must also be presented in court. In this case,
the subject Deed of Assignment is based on the LSPA. Hence, the LSPA is patently material in
deciding the validity of the assignment of credit made in favor of Cameron. The adamance of
Cameron in refusing to produce such LSPA is perplexing. Technical ploys that prevent parties in
a litigation to reveal documents material to the controversy should not be countenanced.

Wherefore, the instant petition is granted.

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RULE 130 – Admissions and Confessions

74. Estrada vs Desierto, GR Nos 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo, GR No 146738

Facts:
Petitioner Estrada, then President of the Philippines, was accused with several allegations of
corruption. Eventually, Estrada stepped down due to public clamor. Vice President Arroyo
assumed presidency thereafter.

The Ombudsman created a special panel to investigate the charges against Estrada. To this,
Estrada filed the present petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court. According to the
petition, Estrada is claiming presidential immunity against the investigations by the Ombudsman,
on the theory that Estrada is still the President and that Arroyo did not successfully assume
Presidency.

Issue:
W/N Estrada resigned from Presidency.

Basis:
Instances when silence in face of several advice constitute adoptive admissions: “The Angara
Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about
the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle
it. x x x According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation." Petitioner did not disagree but listened
intently. The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the
petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener
by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and
his family. Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful
and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. 84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner
revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a
week in the palace." This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had
to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the
palace. It was a matter of time.”

Held:
Yes. By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party
embracing or espousing it. In this case, the Angara Diary shows Estrada’s silence and lack of
objection on the advice by Senatory Pimentel to opt for a dignified exit or resignation. Estrada’s
reaction or lack thereof can be taken as an adoptive admission. This is proof that Estrada had
reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign.

On this ground, and on others, the “stepping down” by Estrada should be construed as a
resignation. Arroyo had effectively assumed Presidency in his stead.

Wherefore, the petitions challenging the Presidency of Arroyo are dismissed.

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75. People vs Manuel, GR No 92503

Facts:
Accused Manuel made sexual advances with the complainant, a 15-year-old girl. Mrs. Biag, the
complainant’s mother, raised the matter in the barangay hall. Manuel said that he was willing to
marry the complainant because they were lovers. The complainant refused the marriage.
Manuel’s family offered to settle the matter upon payment of money. The settlement was not
carried out when the complainant’s family filed a rape case against Manuel.

The RTC convicted Manuel of rape. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N Manuel is guilty of rape.

Basis:
Offer of settlement by accused in a rape case is an implied admission of guilt: “It pointed out
that the offer of the appellant's family to simply settle the case constitutes an implied admission
of guilt, the rule being that "(i)n criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.” x x x

In People vs. Manzano, we held that the attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case
with the complainant was considered an implied admission of guilt. We have further ruled that
an offer of marriage by the accused, during the investigation of the rape case, is also an
admission of guilt.”

Held:
Yes. In criminal cases, the offer of settlement by the accused is deemed an implied admission of
guilt. An offer for marriage is an admission of guilt in rape cases. In this case therefor, Manuel,
having offered both settlement and marriage, had impliedly admitted his own guilt. There is no
reason to overturn the RTC conviction.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

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76. People vs Libed, GR No. L-20431

Facts:
Mariano Ringor and his family were plowing their field when their carabao ran wild into the
adjacent field, where accused Libed brothers were also planting corn. As Mariano passed by their
corn field in pursuit of his carabao, the Libed brothers clubbed him, causing his death.

An information for murder was filed against the Libed brothers. Eugenio Libed admitted to
clubbing Mariano but claimed that he did so in self-defense. The RTC convicted both brothers of
the charge. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the Libed brothers are guilty of murder.

Basis:
An unproved claim of self-defense constitutes admission: “Furthermore, as regards appellant
Eugenio Libed, the act of having clubbed the deceased to death is admitted. It was therefore
incumbent upon him to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, his plea of self-defense (People
vs. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105; People vs. Cabrera, L-6197, March 18, 1957.). It is rather obvious that
no such proof was adduced. As the court a quo significantly pointed out, appellant Eugenio
Libed's affidavit, executed the day following the incident, does not state the all-important detail
testified to by him in court, namely, that the deceased chased him with a bolo.”

Held:
Yes. Self-defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. An unproved claim of self-
defense constitutes admission. Eugenio indeed claimed self-defense, but he failed to prove the
fact that Mariano was the aggressor i.e., Mariano chased him with a bolo. Having failed to prove
self-defense, Eugenio had merely admitted to the act of having clubbed Mariano.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

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77. People vs Cui, GR No 121982

Facts:
Armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and Rose Lim. They also abducted their daughter
Stephanie, in exchange for ransom, which the Lim spouses paid.

The incident was reported to the police station, spurring an investigation. The trail led to the
Lims’ house guard Eduardo Basingan, who admitted to knowing the plot of the robbers. On the
basis of Basingan’s statement, among others, the prosecution filed informations against Basingan
and the accused.

Basingan was never able to affirm his statement in court because he escaped prison before
hearing. Nevertheless, the RTC convicted the accused of the charges. On the present appeal,
accused Obeso and Sarte assign error on the RTC for relying on the extrajudicial statement of
Basingan.

Issue:
W/N Basingan’s extrajudicial statement is admissible as proof of guilty of the accused.

Basis:
Admissions by a conspirator after the conspiracy are binding to him/herself and not to
other co-conspirators: “The general rule is that extra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator
made before the formation of the conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are
inadmissible in evidence as against the other co-conspirators, on the ground that the accused in a
criminal case has the constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to
cross-examine them.

In the case at bar, the alleged conspiracy among the accused was not priorly established by
independent evidence. Nor was it shown that the extrajudicial statements of Basingan were made
while they were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. In truth, the statements were made after
the conspiracy has ended and after the consummation of the crime. They were not acts or
declarations made during the conspiracy's existence. Since the extrajudicial admissions were
made after the supposed conspiracy, they are binding only upon the confessant and are not
admissible against his co-accused; as against the latter, the confession is hearsay. In fine, the
extra-judicial statements of Basingan cannot be used against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte without
doing violence against their constitutional right to confront Basingan and to cross-examine him.”

Held:
No. Admissions by a conspirator before or after the conspiracy are binding to him/herself and not
to other co-conspirators. In this case, the statement of Basingan was taken after the
consummation of the crime i.e., after the conspiracy. No other independent evidence was
presented to establish the alleged conspiracy. Hence, Basingan’s statement is binding only to
him, and is not admissible in evidence against his co-accused. Thus, Obeso and Sarte’s
conviction, which was based solely on the statement of Basingan, should be overturned.

Wherefore, Obeso and Sarte are acquitted. The other convictions are sustained with
modifications.

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78. People vs Palijon, GR No 123545

Facts:
An information for robbery with homicide was filed against accused Palijon, Merecene, Decena,
Pria, and other John Does. The accused entered a plea of not guilty, except for Mercene and
Decena who pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide.

Trial ensued against Palijon and Pria. The prosecution built its case from the testimony of
Mercene. The RTC convicted Palijon and Pria of the charges.

Hence, this appeal where Palijon questions his conviction by the RTC on the basis of the
confession of Mercene.

Issue:
W/N the confession of Palijon’s co-accused is admissible against him.

Basis:
Res inter alios acta rule not applicable in judicial confessions because they may be cross-
examined: “In ruling upon Palijon's arguments, we must make a distinction between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant's co-accused since
the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where
the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.”

Held:
Yes. The res inter alios acta does not apply to judicial confessions because the accused is
afforded opportunity to cross-examine them. Thus, the judicial confession of an accused is
admissible against his/her co-accused.

In this case, the confession of Mercene was given on the witness stand. It is admissible and is
deemed competent evidence against Palijon. The RTC did not err in relying on such confession
in convicting Palijon.

Wherefore, the appeal is denied.

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79. People vs Raquel, GR No 119005

Facts:
An information for robbery with homicide was filed against the accused. The accused were
identified mainly through the extrajudicial statement of co-accused Ponce. The accused pleaded
not guilty. While the trial is in progress, accused Ponce escaped from jail and was not able to
testify during trial. Regardless, the trial court convicted the accused of the charge.

Hence, this present appeal.

Issue:
W/N the extrajudicial statement of Ponce is admissible against his co-accused.

Basis:
Extrajudicial statements not admissible if not repeated in open court: “The extrajudicial
statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless
these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his
co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as
against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in
the case at bar.”

Held:
No. The extrajudicial statements of an accused, if not repeated in open court, is not admissible
against his/her co-accused. In this case, it is shown that Ponce was not able to affirm in open
court his extrajudicial statements identifying his co-accused. There was no other evidence
linking the accused to the crime. Hence, such statements should not be admissible against
Ponce’s co-accused.

Wherefore, the accused are hereby acquitted.

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80. People vs Job, GR No 116084-85

Facts:
Acting on a tip by an informant, the police conducted an operation to prevent a kidnapping plot,
which led into a shootout with casualties. Accused Job and Gallego, among the remaining
kidnappers, executed extrajudicial confessions. The co-conspirators named in the confessions
were apprehended.

All the accuse where charged and convicted with kidnapping. Only Dela Torre filed an appeal,
the herein case.

Issue:
W/N the extrajudicial confessions of Gallego and Job are admissible against Dela Torre.

Basis:
Interlocking confessions may be admitted against co-accused even if extrajudicially made:
“As a general rule, an extrajudicial confession by an accused may be given in evidence only
against him, but not against his co-accused. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. Where
several extrajudicial confessions had been made by several persons charged with the same
offense, without the possibility of collusion among them, the fact that the statements are in all
material respects identical is confirmatory of the confessions of the codefendants and is
admissible against other persons implicated therein. Such confessions are commonly known as
interlocking confessions.

Held:
Yes. As a rule, an extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding only on him/her, and not to
his/her co-accused. This rule does not apply in case of interlocking confessions. Otherwise
stated, confessions are admissible against the confessant’s co-accused if made independently and
are identical in material aspects.

In this case, since the confessions of Gallego and Job are in the nature of interlocking
confessions, they may be used in evidence against Dela Torre. The trial court’s admission in
evidence of the extrajudicial confessions is not legally infirm.

Wherefore, the present appeal is denied.

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81. People vs Pilones, GR No L-32754-5

Facts:
A house wherein a vigil was being held was stoned by assailants. Ilagan and Renolia came out of
the house and, before sustaining gunshot wounds, were able to identify the assailants. Fifty days
later, accused Manuel Pilones was arrested for vagrancy. Pilones was identified by Ilagan and
Renolia as the one who shot them. Pilones did not say anything.

After trial, the trial court convicted Pilones of frustrated murder. Hence, the present appeal.

Issue:
W/N Pilones is guilty of the crime charged.

Basis:
Silence in face of direct accusation may be regarded as quasi-confession: “The decisive fact
is that Pilones was not only identified by Ilagan but at the confrontation in the police precinct
between accuser and accused, Pilones, as the accused, just kept silent and did not deny Ilagan's
accusation and the identification made by Renolia's mother. "He who remains silent when he
ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent" (31 C.J.S. 494). x x x

"Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is
made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent person will at
once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and
self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore,
particularly when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent.".”

Held:
Yes. The guilt of Pilones is established not only by the accusation and identification by the
witnesses, but also his failure to deny the same. Silence in face of direct accusation may be
regarded as quasi-confession. This is because an innocent person will at once repel an accusation
of crime as a matter of self-preservation and defense.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed with modification.

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82. People vs Paragsa, GR No L-44060

Facts:
Paragsa was charged of raping the complaining witness Mirasol, a 12-year-old girl. In his
defense, Paragsa admitted that they had intercourse but claimed that they were sweethearts. Both
the CFI and the CA, on appeal, convicted Paragsa of rape. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N Paragsa is guilty of rape.

Basis:
Requisites for silence to be taken as implied admission of truth: “The rule allowing silence of
a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence
is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of
what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at
liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his
rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts
were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his
silence would be material to the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present
case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be
safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.”

Held:
No. The prosecution’s evidence is inconclusive to justify a conviction. Among the circumstances
that engenders doubt on the allegation of rape is Mirasol’s failure to rebut Paragsa’s claim that
they were sweethearts who had intercourse in other occasions. Silence may be taken as implied
admission of truth upon showing: 1) that she heard and understood the statement; 2) that she was
at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some other matter affecting
her rights or in which he was then interest, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts
were within her knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference drawn from her silence
would be material to the issue. These requisites obtain in the present case.

Wherefore, the accused is acquitted.

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83. People vs Agustin, GR No 110290

Facts:
Informations for murder were filed against the accused, for the shooting of the Bayquen family.
According to the prosecution, the accused were identified by Wilfredo Quiaño in his confession
during an investigation conducted by the prosecutor. Jaime Agustin was among the suspects
identified by Quiaño. Agustin was later picked up and taken for investigation before the fiscal’s
office. Therein, Agustin narrated his knowledge regarding the shooting of the Bayquen family
and revealed the identities of his cohorts.

The defense assailed the admissibility of the extrajudicial statement of Agustin on the ground
that the same were extorted through force and intimidation.

The trial court admitted Agustin’s extrajudicial statement, and on the basis thereof, rendered a
judgment convicting Agustin of murder. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the extrajudicial statement of Agustin is admissible in evidence against him.

Basis:
Confession vs Admission: “In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is
usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve an acknowledgement of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged. Wharton defines a confession as follows: "A confession is an
acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged,
while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue,
and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgement of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to
establish the ultimate fact of guilt.".”

Held:
No. The trial court erred in considering Agustin’s extrajudicial statement as a confession and in
using the same as basis for convicting Agustin. A confession is an acknowledgement of guilt.
Nothing in Agustin’s statement indicates that he acknowledged his guilt on the crime charged.
He merely admitted some facts regarding the Bayquen shooting. Thus, his statement is only an
admission, i.e., an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction.

Further, it is found that the extrajudicial admission was obtained in violation of Agustin’s right to
independent and competent counsel of choice. Thus, either way, admission is therefore not
admissible in evidence against him.

Wherefore, appealed judgment is reversed.

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84. People vs Cayago, GR No 128827

Facts:
Cayago reported to the police that he found his wife dead in an abandoned barangay hall. Later,
Cayago admitted that he killed his wife and was willing to give a statement. After securing the
assistance of a lawyer, Cayago wrote down his confession, which he and the lawyer signed.

Cayago was tried and was sentenced guilty of parricide. Hence, the present appeal, where the
lack of custodial rights is raised to assail the admissibility of Cayago’s statement.

Issue:
W/N Cayago’s statement is inadmissible in evidence.

Basis:
Custodial rights are not available in a voluntary admission without an investigation:
“Appellant's contention that the statement he gave to the police is inadmissible in evidence
because it was given without affording him the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
has no merit. It is undisputed that appellant was not arrested because the authorities were not yet
aware of the crime. It was he himself who reported the incident to the police after he went to the
abandoned barangay hall two days later and discovered that his wife's body was still there.
Appellant himself admitted that since he did not know what to do after seeing his wife's relatives
whom he feared for reprisal, he decided to report the matter to the Pasig police. The right to
counsel is afforded by Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution only to "person(s)
under investigation for the commission of an offense." On their way to Camp Crame, appellant
asked that he be accompanied by an officer to the Pasig Church. There, he volunteered
information to the officer on the whereabouts of his wife and stated that he is willing to put his
statement in writing. Custodial rights of a person are not available whenever he volunteers
statements without being asked. x x x”

Held:
No. Custodial rights are not available in a voluntary admission without an investigation. It is
undisputed in this case that it is Cayago who approached the police and reported the death of his
wife. He was not under investigation when he confessed to the killing of his wife. Hence, even
assuming that he was not granted custodial rights, his extrajudicial confession still binds him.

Nevertheless, Cayago was assisted by a lawyer in making his confession, belying his claim that
he was not afforded his custodial rights.

Wherefore, the conviction for parricide is affirmed.

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85. People vs Del Rosario, GR No 131036

Facts:
Paragua left for the public market, leaving her 11-year-old niece Lopez in her house. When
Paragua returned, the house was burning and missing some jewelries. Lopez was found dead.

Accused del Rosario surrendered to the police and even volunteered to recover the stolen items.
A lawyer was called to assist del Rosario in making his confession.

During trial, del Rosario claimed that he was forced by the police to sign a document purporting
to be his confession. The trial court did not give credence to del Rosario’s account, and so
convicted him of robbery with homicide. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N del Rosario’s extrajudicial confession is admissible against him.

Basis:
Requisites for a confession to be admissible: “A confession to be admissible must be: (1)
express and categorical; (2) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the
legal significance of his act; (3) with assistance of competent and independent counsel; (4) in
writing, and in the language known to and understood by the confessant; and (5) signed, or if the
confessant does not know how to read and write, thumbmarked by him.”

Held:
Yes. A confession to be admission must be 1) express, 2) given voluntarily and with knowledge
of legal significance, 3) with assistance of counsel, 4) in writing and 5) signed. The following are
obtained in the written confession executed by del Rosario. In addition, his confession was
signed by Atty. Norberto dela Cruz, whose acts as officer of the court is afforded presumption of
regularity. Hence, del Rosario’s confession is binding upon him and admissible in evidence.

Wherefore, the conviction is affirmed.

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86. Torre vs CA, GR No 102786

Facts:
Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO discovered that six electric meters he
was supposed to inspect were missing. One Danilo Garcia reported seeing four MERALCO
crewmembers removing the electric meters. The police conducted a line-up, where Garcia
pointed petitioner de la Torre as the leader of the group who took down the electric meters.
Based therefrom and from the written statements of other witnesses, an information charging de
la Torre with qualified theft was filed.

The RTC convicted de la Torre of the charge. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court’s
decision. Hence, the present appeal.

Issue:
W/N there is sufficient evidence to convict de la Torre of qualified theft.

Basis:
Hearsay evidence, even if admitted, lacks probative value: “Although hearsay evidence may
be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless without
probative value. The explanation for this is given in People v. Valero, thus: The failure of the
defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or
evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of
the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.”

Held:
No. Under the Rules, declarants of written statements should be presented at the trial for
examination. Otherwise, the documents are considered hearsay. In this case, the documents
material to the guilt of the accused were admitted without being presented in court those who
executed them. Thus, they are hearsay evidence lacking probative value. While hearsay may be
admitted due to the lack of objection of the adverse party, such as in this case, hearsay still lacks
probative value.

Wherefore, de la Torre is acquitted.

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87. People vs Camat, GR No 112262

Facts:
Appellants Camat and Del Rosario were charged of robbery with homicide and frustrated
homicide. On the witness stand, Patrolman Odeo Cariño stated that Camat confessed to him his
and Del Rosario’s participation in the killing of Nelson Sinoy. The trial court rendered a
judgment finding both Camat and Del Rosario guilty of the crime charged.

Hence, this appeal wherein appellants fault the trial court for relying on the extrajudicial
confession of Camat.

Issue:
W/N the extrajudicial confession of Camat is admissible his co-accused Del Rosario.

Basis:
An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant: “As to the implication of
Del Rosario in the extrajudicial confession of Camat, no reliance can be placed on the imputation
therein because it violates the rule on res inter alios acta and does not fall under the exceptions
thereto, especially since it was made after the supposed homicidal conspiracy. An extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. As
against the latter, the confession is hearsay.”

Held:
No. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant, as other persons implicated
therein is not afforded the opportunity to refute the same. This is called the rule on res inter alios
acta. Thus, Camat’s extrajudicial confession is not admissible to his co-accused Del Rosario.

However, Del Rosario’s guilt was established independently by an eyewitness. On this ground,
the findings of the trial court must be sustained.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

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88. People vs Base, GR No 108773

Facts:
Accused Base was identified to be one of the group of men who shot deceased Julianito Luna
and sped away in an owner-type jeep. Trial ensued, resulting in the conviction of Base for
murder. The conviction was based on an extrajudicial confession he executed while in detention.
In the present appeal, Base contends that his confession is inadmissible against him because it
was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.

Issue:
W/N Base’s confession is admissible in evidence against him.

Basis:
Bare assertion of torture by authorities in extracting confession is not sufficient to establish
the same, and render the confession inadmissible: “Accused-appellant explains away these
lapses as the products of his 'fear' of his interrogators. However, his failure to speak up and
disclose his fear at the earliest opportunity subjects to serious doubt the reality and substance of
that supposed fear. Along the same vein, accused-appellant's unsupported claims of physical
abuse in the hands of his interrogators simply ring hollow in the absence of other proof to
corroborate them. Indeed — " . . . bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in
extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient in view of the standing rule enunciated
in the cases of People v. Mada-I Santalani; People v. Balane; and People v. Villanueva, that
where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their
person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did
not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they
did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these were
considered by this Court as factors indicating voluntariness."

Held:
Yes. Bare assertion of torture by authorities in extracting the confession from the confessant is
not sufficient to establish torture and render the said confession inadmissible. In this case, Base’s
subsequent lapses in action after the alleged torture is fatal to his claim. Base did not
immediately complain about his maltreatment, nor tell his wife about it, nor inform his lawyer. In
fact, he was silent for two years until he testified in court. These seriously undermine his claims
of physical abuse in the extraction of his confession.

On the other hand, his confession is corroborated with other evidence such as the corpus delicti
and the confessions of his co-accused. Thus, the confession by Base is not attended by the
alleged defects and is thus admissible in evidence against him.

Wherefore, the conviction of Base is affirmed.

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89. Nicolas vs Enriquez, GR No L-8371

Facts:
A criminal case for concubinage was filed by Corazon Vizcarra against defendants Jimmy
William Nelson and Priscilla Fontanosa. The prosecution presented in evidence the propensity of
defendants to commit concubinage based on prior sexual relations. This was not admitted by the
trial court. Hence, this petition for mandamus.

Issue:
W/N propensity evidence is admissible against defendants.

Basis:
Propensity evidence, in general, is not admissible: “It is a rule of evidence that what one did at
one time is no proof of his having done the same or a similar thing at another time.”

Held:
No. Propensity evidence, in general, is not admissible. In this case, the alleged prior sexual
relations of defendant resulting in the birth of a boy named Paul, was committed five years
before the complainant’s marriage with Nelson. The evidence sought to be admitted is so far
removed in time that there is no rational basis to infer that the sexual relationship persists until
now. Hence, it is inadmissible in evidence.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

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90. Cruz vs CA, GR No 126713

Facts:
The Cruz family owned a parcel of land which they divided via a Deed of Partial Partition. Later,
the Cruz family executed a MOA binding themselves to equally share the proceeds of any sale of
any part of the said land.

Private respondents Spouses Malolos filed and won a collection suit against Nerissa, a member
of the Cruz family, and her husband Nelson Tamayo. As enforcement of the judgment, the court
levied the land owned by Nerissa and sold the same to private respondents as highest bidders. No
redemption was made.

Petitioners Cruzes, claiming to be co-owners of the subject land, filed a partition suit against
Spouses Malolos. The trial court granted the action. On appeal however, the CA reversed the
trial court decision on the ground, among others, that petitioners had disposed of their respective
parcels of land. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N documents of transactions with the petitioners’ land are admissible as proof of lack of co-
ownership.

Basis:
In actions based on fraud or deceit, evidence of similar facts is exempted from the rule of
res inter alios acta: “Petitioners' contention is untenable. Res inter alios acta, as a general rule,
prohibits the admission of evidence that tends to show that what a person has done at one time is
probative of the contention that he has done a similar act at another time. x x x The rule,
however, is not without exception. While inadmissible in general, collateral facts may be
received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or
resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances
surrounding the issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of similar acts may frequently become
relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of
mind or knowledge of a person; it provides insight into such person's motive or intent; it
uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a mistake.”

Held:
Yes. Generally, the rule of res inter alios acta prohibits the admission of evidence that tends to
show that what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that he/she has done
a similar act at another time. However, in actions based on fraud or deceit, evidence of similar
facts is exempted from the said rule.

In this case, the documents of transactions are sufficiently relevant to be treated as an exception
to the rule of res inter alios acta. The documents show that petitioners never treated the parcels of
land as co-owned, having made dispositions in the concept of absolute owners. Hence, these
documents are admissible in evidence against their claim of co-ownership.

Wherefore, this petition is denied.

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91. Adelfa Properties vs CA, GR No 111238

Facts:
Petitioner Adelfa and private respondents executed an “Exclusive Option to Purchase” contract
over the latter’s parcel of land. Under the said contract, a deed of sale over the subject property
shall be executed upon full payment of the purchase price by Adelfa.

However, due to a recovery of possession suit over the subject property filed against the private
respondents, Adelfa suspended payment. In turn, private respondents informed Adelfa that they
are rescinding the contract. But because Adelfa refused to return the certificate of title over the
subject property, private respondents filed a case for annulment of contract.

The trial court ruled that the contract was validly cancelled when Adelfa suspended payment.
This ruling was affirmed in toto by the CA on appeal. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N the rescission by private respondents is valid.

Basis:
Failure to protest a rescission is an admission of its validity: “In the case at bar, it has been
shown that although petitioner was duly furnished and did receive a written notice of rescission
which specified the grounds therefore, it failed to reply thereto or protest against it. Its silence
thereon suggests an admission of the veracity and validity of private respondents' claim.
Furthermore, the initiative of instituting suit was transferred from the rescinder to the defaulter
by virtue of the automatic rescission clause in the contract. But then, the records bear out the fact
that aside from the lackadaisical manner with which petitioner treated private respondents' letter
of cancellation, it utterly failed to seriously seek redress from the court for the enforcement of its
alleged rights under the contract. If private respondents had not taken the initiative of filing Civil
Case No. 7532, evidently petitioner had no intention to take any legal action to compel specific
performance from the former. By such cavalier disregard, it has been effectively estopped from
seeking the affirmative relief it now desires but which it had theretofore disdained.”

Held:
Yes. The right to rescind is subject to the scrutiny of the court if it is contested by the defaulting
party. In this case, it appears on record that Adelfa, though aware of the notice of rescission by
private respondents, did not protest nor reply to the same. Adelfa also did not seek redress from
the courts. Adelfa’s acts suggests an admission of the validity of the private respondents’ claim.

The right to rescind by private respondents is therefore upheld. Adelfa is estopped from seeking
affirmative relief therefrom.

Wherefore, the appealed judgement is affirmed with modified premises.

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RULE 130 - Hearsay

92. Eugenio vs CA, GR No 103737

Facts:
Private respondent Pepsi-Cola filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioners Nora and
Alfredo Eugenio. In their defense, petitioners presented trade provisional receipts allegedly
issued to and received by them from Pepsi-Cola’s route manager Jovencio Estrada, showing
receipts of payment that would extinguish petitioners’ debt.

Azurin testified that Estrada denied issuing and signing the said TRPs. Azurin also presented an
affidavit executed by Estrada, where he affirms his denial. Giving credence to Azurin’s
testimony, the trial court rendered a judgment against petitioners. The same judgment is affirmed
by the CA.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the TRPs may be credited against the balance of petitioners.

Basis:
Witnesses can testify only to those facts from personal knowledge: “The rule is clear and
explicit. Under the hearsay evidence rule, a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules. In the present case, Estrada failed to appear as a witness at the
trial. It was only Azurin who testified that during the investigation he conducted, Estrada
supposedly denied having signed the TPRs. It is elementary that under the measure on hearsay
evidence, Azurin's testimony cannot constitute legal proof as to the truth of Estrada's denial. For
that matter, it is not admissible in evidence, petitioners' counsel having seasonably objected at
the trial to such testimony of Azurin as hearsay. And, even if not objected to and thereby
admissible, such hearsay evidence has no probative value whatsoever.”

Affidavits are barred by hearsay evidence rule if affiant does not affirm the same in court:
“Obviously, neither is the affidavit of Estrada admissible; it is likewise barred as evidence by the
hearsay evidence rule. This is aside from the fact that, by their nature, affidavits are generally not
prepared by the affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
x x x”

Held:
Yes. Witnesses can testify only to those facts from personal knowledge. Azurin’s testimony
cannot constitute legal proof of Estrada’s denial. Estrada should have appeared in court to testify
on his alleged denial.

The affidavit by Estrada is inadmissible on the same ground, not to mention that affidavits are
usually prepared by another.

Thus, the validity of the TRPs is upheld, and the same must be credited against the debt of
petitioners.

Wherefore, the assailed judgment is annulled.

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93. People vs Valdez, GR No 127753

Facts:
Gunshots were fired into the nipa house of Marcelo Valdez, hitting his son Labrador. Marcelo
immediately cried for help, prompting their housemates to check on Labrador. When asked who
the suspect was, Labrador claimed that it was the accused, Domingo Valdez.

On this account, Valdez was convicted of murder by the trial court. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the testimony by Imelda Umagtang on the dying declaration of Labrador is admissible in
evidence.

Basis:
Anyone who heard the dying declaration may testify as to the same: “There is no rule that a
person who hears something cannot testify on what she heard. A dying declaration need not be
particularly directed only to the person inquiring from the declarant. Anyone who has knowledge
of the fact of what the declarant said, whether it was directed to him or not, or whether he had
made inquiries from the declarant or not, can testify thereto.”

Held:
Yes. Anyone who heard the dying declaration may testify as to the same. It is immaterial if the
declarant was talking to somebody else. In this case, it appears that Labrador’s dying declaration
was directed to Rolando Valdez. Even so, Imelda may testify to the dying declaration, being in
the same room and having heard the same.

Further, Labrador’s statements are correctly considered as dying declarations which are
exempted from the hearsay evidence rule. His utterances were about his killer and were made in
view of his impending death realized from the seriousness of his wounds.

Wherefore, the conviction is upheld.

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94. People vs Mamalias, GR No 128073

Facts:
An information for murder was filed against the accused Mamalias. One of the prosecution
witnesses, SPO3 Liberato, testified to the sworn statement executed by one Raymundo, who
allegedly saw two men shoot victim De Vera dead. Mamalias presented an alibi in his defense.

The trial court convicted Mamalias of the charge.

Issue:
W/N the testimony by SPO3 Liberato is barred by the hearsay evidence rule.

Basis:
A conviction based on hearsay is a nullity: “In the case at bar, the trial court merely relied on
hearsay evidence, particularly on the testimony of SPO3 Liberato and the sworn statement of
Epifanio Raymundo who did not testify in the trial court. The records clearly show that
prosecution witness SPO3 Liberato has no personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the
shooting incident. x x x

In the same vein, the sworn statement of Epifanio Raymundo is merely hearsay evidence as he
did not personally appear in court to affirm its content. Its probative value, if any, is little. We
have held that in criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the
constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses testifying
against him and to cross-examine them. A conviction based alone on proof that violates the
constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that rendered it acted without
jurisdiction in its rendition. Such a judgment cannot be given any effect whatsoever especially on
the liberty of an individual.”

Held:
Yes. Admission of hearsay evidence is a violation of the constitutional right of the individual to
cross-examine the witnesses testifying against him/her. A conviction based on hearsay evidence
is a nullity. In this case, SPO3 Liberato’s testimony was based on the account of Raymundo and
the report on the crime scene by PO3 Ko, both of whom were not presented in trial. Thus, SPO3
Liberato’s testimony is hearsay. The conviction, being based on hearsay, must be overturned.

Wherefore, the accused is acquitted.

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95. People vs Cusi, GR No L-20986

Facts:
Accused Puesca et al were charged with robbery in band with homicide. During trial, Sgt. Baño
testified as to the extrajudicial confession made to him by Puesca regarding his participation in
the crime charged and the names of his co-conspirators. The prosecution asked Sgt. Baño to
reveal the names of the co-conspirators. The defense objected due to hearsay. Respondent Judge
Cusi resolved the objection by letting Sgt. Baño continue stating the names except those accused
who objected.

This resolution was challenged by the prosecution via the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the testimony sought by the prosecution is hearsay evidence.

Basis:
Statement placed in record to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of
such statement is not hearsay: “The question involved herein is one purely of evidence. There
is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the
testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the
purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-
8).”

Held:
No. A testimony about the statement of another person is not hearsay if the purpose is merely to
establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. In this case, the
respondent judge should have allowed Sgt. Baño to continue mentioning the names of the
conspirators if the purpose is nothing more than to establish the fact that Puesca mentioned the
names in his extrajudicial confession. Such mentioning shall be understood to be incompetent in
proving the guilt of those named.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

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96. People vs Mayorga, GR No 135405

Facts:
Mayorga was charged with statutory rape of Linayao, a child five years of age. During trial
Linayao testified against Mayorga. Lumague, Mayorga’s cousin, was also presented to testify as
to the extrajudicial confession of Mayorga.

The trial court, relying solely on the testimony of Linayao, convicted Mayorga of the charge.
Hence, this appeal, where Mayorga assails the credibility of Linayao as witness on the ground
that she was tutored by her grandmother.

Issue:
1. W/N Linayao’s testimony is inadmissible in evidence.
2. W/N Lumague’s testimony is inadmissible for being hearsay.

Basis:
Testimony in the witness stand may be admitted even if tutored: “In a similar case, we held,
"assuming that she was indeed tutored on what to say on the witness stand, it is worthy to note
that when she testified, she was alone; hence, any traces of inconsistency would have easily been
detected. More importantly, the complainant took the witness stand . . . to narrate her harrowing
experience, and in all of those instances, she underwent intensive cross-examination from the
defense but her testimony never wavered nor faltered.".”

Extrajudicial admission not covered by the hearsay rule: “Nor is there merit to the court's
finding that Edwin's testimony was hearsay. This is a misinterpretation of the hearsay rule. It
must be pointed out that the statement to him of the accused constitutes an extrajudicial
admission. This admission can be received against the accused since it is not within the purview
of the hearsay rule. Wigmore explains that the hearsay rule is intended to give the parties a right
to object to the introduction of a statement not made under oath and not subject to cross-
examination. Its purpose is to afford a party the privilege, if he desires it, of requiring the
declarant to be sworn and subjected to questions. Wigmore then adds that where the evidence
offered are his statements, the purpose does not apply, and so the hearsay rule does not likewise
apply, as "he does not need to cross-examine himself.".”

Held:
1. No. Testimony in the witness stand may be admitted even if tutored. When a witness takes the
stand, he/she is alone. Inconsistencies are easily detected. In this case, due to the brutality of her
experience, it is but fair that Linayao was tutored. Even if tutored, the Court could not deem her
testimony incredible, as her demeanor while in witness stand was attended by painful cries of
anguish too grievous for a young girl to bear.

2. No. Extrajudicial admissions are not covered by the hearsay rule. The rule intends to give the
parties the right to cross-examine declarant. In extrajudicial admissions, as in this case, the
statement is made by the accused. There is no need for the accused to cross-examine himself.

Wherefore, the conviction is affirmed.

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97. Feria vs CA, GR No 122954

Facts:
Petitioner Feria was detained by reason of his conviction of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Twelve years into sentence, Feria found out that the Commitment Order, Decision, Information,
and copy of the judgment were missing. This prompted Feria to file a petition for habeas corpus.

The petition was dismissed by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC dismissal. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
W/N the news article on the conviction of Feria is admissible as proof of said conviction.

Basis:
Newspaper articles are hearsay evidence twice removed, except if proof of the existence of
publication or the tenor of the news: “Public respondents likewise presented a certified true
copy of People's Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, issued by the National Library,
containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to
"hearsay evidence, twice removed" and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any
probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving
the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that
such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.”

Held:
No. Newspaper articles are hearsay evidence twice removed. Thus, they are inadmissible and
without any probative value unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the
matter asserted. In this case therefore, the news article on Feria’s conviction is not admissible as
proof of the same. However, it may be admitted as proof of the existence of the publication and
the tenor of the news therein stated.

Regardless, the petition must fail due to Feria’s failure to prove illegal restraint.

Wherefore, present petition is denied.

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98. People vs Sion, GR No 109617

Facts:
Fernando Abaoag was assaulted and eventually killed by the accused outside their house. When
his brother and his wife came to him, Fernando was already very weak in the state of dying.
Fernando told his wife that his assailants were the accused. He died upon arrival at the hospital.

The trial court convicted the accused for murder. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N Fernando’s dying declaration is admissible in evidence against the accused.

Basis:
Requisites of dying declaration to be exempted from the hearsay rule: “We find these
statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a dying declaration under
Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and the declarant was
conscious of that fact; (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration within its scope must
be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal
injury or death; and (d) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he survived.”

Dying declarations are admissible because of necessity and trustworthiness: “Dying

declarations are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity
and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's death renders impossible his taking the
witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime;
and trustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every
hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced
by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth." We find no ulterior motive on the part of
Felicitas to fabricate the declarations of her husband.”

Held:
Yes. Dying declarations are exempted from the hearsay rule because of necessity and
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant cannot take the witness stand, and it often
happens that there is no other satisfactory proof of the crime. Trustworthiness, because it is made
at the point of death where every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful consideration to speak the truth. The dying declarations of Fernando are therefore
admissible in proof against the accused.

Wherefore, for other grounds, the challenged conviction is modified to homicide.

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99. People vs Amaca, GR No 110129

Facts:
Accused Amaca and one known as Ogang were charged of murder. The prosecution presented
Mangubat as witness. Mangubat testified that he saw the deceased as the latter was about to be
transported to the hospital. Upon inquiry, the deceased stated that Amaca and Ogang shot him.
Amaca interposed the defense of alibi.

The trial court convicted Amaca of murder. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the dying declaration of the deceased is admissible in evidence against Amaca.

Basis:
Dying declaration is admissible as exception to the hearsay rule: “A dying declaration is
worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to
accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable demise.
Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth." This is the rationale for
this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. x x x”

Dying declaration may also be admissible as part of res gestae: “An ante mortem statement
may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae. This dual
admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of ensuring the statement's appreciation by
courts, particularly where the absence of one or more elements in one of the said exceptions may
be raised in issue. In this manner, the identification of the culprit is assured.”

Held:
Yes. A dying declaration is admissible in evidence as exception to the hearsay rule. It is worthy
of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one aware of his/her impending death to falsely or
even carelessly accuse anyone of being responsible therefor. Either way, a dying declaration may
also be admissible as part of res gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant and has the
advantage of ensuring the declaration’s appreciation by courts.

Thus, in this case, the admission of the dying declaration of the deceased is sustained.

However, there is no evidence to support the conviction of murder. Wherefore, the appeal is
partly granted.

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100. Fuentes vs CA, GR No 111692

Facts:
In a benefit dance, the victim Malaspina was stabbed in the abdomen. Before he expired, he
muttered that petitioner Fuentes stabbed him. During trial, the Fuentes denied the accusation on
the basis of his cousin Zoilo’s admission that it was him who stabbed Malaspina.

The trial court convicted Fuentes of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue:
W/N Zoilo’s declaration against his penal interest is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Declaration against interest is admissible as exception to the hearsay rule: “One of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest.
Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be
true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and
trustworthiness.”

Requisites for admission of declaration against interest: “There are three (3) essential
requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be
available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c)
the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.”

Held:
No. Declaration against interest is admissible in evidence as exception to the hearsay rule upon
concurrence of the following requisites: 1) the declarant is not available to testify; 2) the
declaration must concern a fact not cognizable by the declarant; and c) the circumstances must
render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

In this case, the first and third requisites were not met. The fact that Zoile is at large does not
make him unavailable for testimony. He is not dead, mentally incapacitated, or physically
incompetent. Also, Zoile, being related to the accused, has every motive to prevaricate.
Therefore, Zoile’s declaration is inadmissible in evidence.

Wherefore, the conviction is affirmed.

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101. Heirs of Conti vs CA, GR No 118464

Facts:
A parcel of land was co-owned by Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti. When Lourdes
Sampayo died intestate without issue, private respondents, claiming to be collateral relatives of
Lourdes, filed an action for partition. Spouses Ignacio and Rosario Conti refused the partition.
When Ignacio died, he was substituted by petitioners.

At the trial, private respondents submitted baptismal certificates as proof of that they are siblings
of Lourdes. They were not able to submit birth certificates because the same were razed by fire.

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. This ruling was affirmed by the CA on
appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the baptismal certificates are admissible as proof of filiation with Lourdes.

Basis:
Baptismal certificates may be admitted as exception to the hearsay rule: “The admissibility
of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest
or the official recorder, was settled in People vs. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105
[1914), thus — . . . the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in
the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay
rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of
ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during the course of its business.”

Held:
Yes. Baptismal certificates may be admitted as exception to the hearsay rule. In People vs. Ritter,
baptismal certificates are also considered as entries made in the course of business. Thus,
baptismal certificates may be admitted even without the testimony of the officiating priest or the
official recorder.

In this case, the lower courts correctly admitted the baptismal certificates presented by private
respondents as proof of their filiation with Lourdes. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

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102. In re: Mallare, AC No 533

Facts:
The Supreme Court held in a previous administrative case that Florencio Mallare must be
stricken from the roll of attorneys because he was found to be a Chinese national. Mallare sought
to re-open the case based on newly discovered evidence. The SC granted the same.

During trial, Mallare presented residents of Macalelon, Quezon who testified that the mother
(Ana) of Mallare’s father (Esteban) is a Tagalog, and that she never married the father of
Mallare’s father who is a Chinese national. The conclusion would be that Mallare and his father
are both Filipino citizens.

Issue:
W/N the testimonies of Macalelon residents are admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Reputation is admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, race ancestry, or the live birth of a
child: “The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth
and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana
Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was
reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and
illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth,
race, or race ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of
matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not
members of the family - the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is taken in the
question of the existence of marital relations.”

Held:
Yes. Reputation is admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, race ancestry, or the live birth of a
child. It is particularly true in Philippine rural communities where the subject of reputation are
unconventional martial relationships. In this case therefore, the public reputation that Esteban
was Ana’s natural child, testified to by the witnesses, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy
of the former. Esteban is therefore a Filipino, and axiomatically Florencio is likewise a Filipino.

Wherefore, the complaint against Mallare is dismissed.

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103. People vs Palmones, GR No 136303

Facts:
Accused Palmones and Palmones were charged of murder in an information filed with the RTC.
Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution is Redovan, who testified that his uncle, the
victim SPO2 Mamansal, told him that the accused were the ones who waylaid his uncle. This
was corroborated by several other prosecution witnesses, who were able to talk with Mamansal
before he was operated. Mamansal died the next day.

The trial court convicted the accused of the charge. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the ante mortem statements of Mamansal are admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Awareness of impending death is a requisite for a dying declaration to be admissible in
evidence: “In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be
proven that that the declaration was made "under a consciousness of impending death" which
means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die from his wounds or
injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand, or there
must be "a settled hopeless expectation."”

Awareness of impending death may be established by the declarant’s statements or

circumstances surrounding the declaration: “While it is true that the law does not require that
the declarant explicitly state his perception that he has given up the hope of life, the
circumstances surrounding his declaration must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of
his impending death. In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of the
seriousness of his condition. As testified to by Dr. Mark Aguayo, the vital signs of the victim,
prior to his operation, were quite stable. Moreover, from the time the victim was brought to the
hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at 12:00 midnight, he was still able to talk intelligently
with at least four (4) other persons on various matters. The fact that his vital signs were strong
and that he still had strength to converse with these four (4) witnesses belie the conclusion that
the victim was under the consciousness of death by reason of the gravity of his wounds.”

Held:
No. For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, among the requisites is that the
declaration must be made under the consciousness of impending death. Such consciousness need
not be explicitly stated, as this may be established by the circumstances surrounding the
declaration.

In this case, based on the testimonial evidence, Mamansal was able to talk intelligently to several
people for hours before his surgical operation. The physicians had also testified that Mamansal’s
vitals were stable during that time. The circumstances belie the conclusion that the declaration
was made under the consciousness of impending death. Consequently, the ante mortem
statements of Mamansal cannot be admitted.

Wherefore, the accused are acquitted.

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104. Canque vs CA, GR No 96202

Facts:
Petitioner Canque entered into a contract with private respondent Socor for the construction of
roads in Cebu. After performing its part of the contract, Socor sought payment from Canque. The
latter refused because Socor presented only its Book of Collectible Accounts instead of delivery
receipts as proof of delivery.

Socor filed a collection suit against Canque. The trial court ruled in favor of Socor. This ruling
was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N the Book of Collectible Accounts is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Requisites for admission of entries in corporate books: “The admission in evidence of entries
in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions: 1. The person who made
the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; 3. The
entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; 4. The entries were made in his
professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and 5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.”

Held:
No. To be admissible in evidence, entries in corporate books must, among others, be made by a
person who is in a position to know the facts stated therein, but is unable to testify. In this case,
Dolores Aday, the entrant of the Book of Collectible Accounts, was available for testimony as
she was in fact presented in court as witness. Aday also admitted that she had no personal
knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. As a result, the entries in the corporate books of
Socor is not admissible in evidence.

Wherefore, regardless of the foregoing, the CA decision is affirmed.

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105. Rodriguez vs CA, GR No 121964

Facts:
A fire razed two apartment buildings owned by petitioners. They filed a damage suit against
private respondents, alleging that the fire was caused by the latter’s negligence. Petitioners
submitted as evidence the Fire Investigation Report by the BFP, which the trial court did not
admit for being hearsay.

The trial court dismissed the case. Such dismissal was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the Fire Investigation Report is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Official entries are not exempted to the hearsay rule if the entrant was presented as
witness: “When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report
and made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it
proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the
ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away
with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter
as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in
evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.”

Held:
Yes. Official entries are exempted to the hearsay rule if the public official is presented as
witness, such as in this case. The lower courts therefore erred in declaring the Report
inadmissible based on hearsay. The testimony of the public official regarding the report are
admissible in evidence.

Despite admitting the Report in evidence, the evidence fails to show liability on the part of the
private defendants. Wherefore, this petition is denied.

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106. People vs Rendoque, Sr., GR No 106282

Facts:
The accused arrived at the house of the Abundio, and upon entrance, shot him dead. A criminal
complaint for murder was filed against the accused. During trial, the defense presented, in
addition to testimonies, a police logbook as documentary evidence.

The trial court convicted the accused of the charge. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the police logbook is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Entries in police blotters are not admissible in evidence as proof of their contents: “As to
the police logbook which was presented in evidence to prove the contents thereof, we have held
that entries in the police blotter should not be given undue significance or probative value, as
they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof. Entries in police blotters, although
regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the
truth stated in such entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value
because they are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Sometimes they are based on partial
suggestion or inaccurate reporting and hearsay, untested in the crucible of a trial on the merits.”

Held:
No. Entries in police blotters, although deemed official entries, are not admissible in evidence as
proof of their contents. Police blotters are usually incomplete, inaccurate, and based on hearsay.
Thus, the police logbook presented by the accused is not admissible in evidence.

Ultimately, the accused failed to demolish the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Wherefore, the appeal is denied.

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107. Manila Electric Company vs Quisumbing, GR No 127598

Facts:
The case originated from a petition by petitioner Meralco alleging that public respondent Sec. of
Labor abused its discretion when it issued a wage award based on an All-Asia Capital report
cited by the private respondent Union. The SC granted the petition and set aside the said Order.

Dissatisfied, both parties moved for reconsideration.

Issue:
W/N the All-Asia Capital report may serve as basis for the computation of the rate of wage
increase.

Basis:
An analysis or opinion of matters in a periodical is not admissible in evidence: “Under the
afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited
report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis
or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to
support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence
was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market
and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy,
these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are
not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere
analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report
in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.”

Held:
No. Periodicals may be admitted if published for use and generally relied by persons engaged in
relevant occupations. In this case, the All-Asia Capital report does not meet the requirements as
in the first place, it is not even a periodical but an analysis of a periodical. There is neither proof
that the same is being relied in general by businessmen. Thus, the report is not admissible as
basis for the computation of the rate of wage increase.

Wherefore, for other grounds, the motion for reconsideration is partially granted.

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108. Eugenio vs CA, GR No 103737

Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners. During trial,
petitioners presented in their defense four trade provisional receipts, that, if credited in their
favor, would absolve them from debt. Private respondent presented Azurin as witness, who
testified that when he investigated Estrada, the latter denied having issued or signed the receipts
in question.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. On appeal, the CA remanded
the records for the trial court to render a Constitution-compliant decision. The trial court, in
compliance, rendered another decision still in favor private respondent. The CA affirmed the
same on appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the testimony of Azurin is admissible in evidence.

Basis:
Requirements to render admissible a testimony in a previous judicial or administrative
proceeding by a witness unable to testify –
1. Testimony was given in a previous judicial or administrative proceeding: “Firstly, the
supposed investigation conducted by Azurin was neither a judicial trial nor an administrative
hearing under statutory regulations and safeguards. It was merely an inter-office interview
conducted by a personnel officer through an ad hoc arrangement.”

2. The adverse party was given an opportunity to cross examine: “Secondly, a perusal of the
alleged stenographic notes, assuming arguendo that these notes are admissible in evidence,
would show that the "investigation" was more of a free-flowing question and answer type of
discussion wherein Estrada was asked some questions, after which Eugenio was likewise asked
other questions. Indeed, there was no opportunity for Eugenio to object, much less to cross-
examine Estrada. Even in a formal prior trial itself, if the opportunity for cross-examination did
not exist therein or if the accused was not afforded opportunity to fully cross-examine the
witness when the testimony was offered, evidence relating to the testimony given therein is
thereafter inadmissible in another proceeding, absent any conduct on the part of the accused
amounting to a waiver of his right to cross-examine.”

3. The written testimony was authenticated by the stenographer: “Thirdly, the stenographer
was not even presented to authenticate the stenographic notes submitted to the trial court. A copy
of the stenographic report of the entire testimony at the former trial must be supported by the
oath of the stenographer that it is a correct transcript of his notes of the testimony of the witness
as a sine qua non for its competency and admissibility in evidence. The supposed stenographic
notes on which respondent corporation relies is unauthenticated and necessarily inadmissible for
the purpose intended.”

4. The inability of the witness to testify in the present case must be explained: “Lastly,
although herein private respondent insinuated that Estrada was not presented as a witness
because he had disappeared, no evidence whatsoever was offered to show or even intimate that
this was due to any machination or instigation of petitioners. There is no showing that his
absence was procured, or that he was eloigned, through acts imputable to petitioners. In the case
at bar, except for the self-serving statement that Estrada had disappeared, no plausible
explanation was given by respondent corporation.”

Held:
No. The rules render admissible as exception to hearsay the testimony or deposition in a previous
judicial or administrative proceeding by a witness presently unable to testify. In this case, the
exception does not apply. First, the denial by Estrada was given in a mere inter-office

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investigation. Second, the petitioners had no opportunity to cross-examine Estrada. Third, the
notes of the investigation were not authenticated by the stenographer. Finally, the absence of
Estrada was not sufficiently substantiated. Therefore, the testimony of Azurin as to the denial of
Estrada is inadmissible for being hearsay.

Wherefore, the CA judgment is annulled and set aside.

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Rule 130 - Opinion

109. People vs Abriol, GR No 123137

Facts:
Acting on a report, policemen chased down a Jiffy until they succeeded in cornering the same.
The appellants, a jailguard and several detainees, were apprehended. The jailguard was armed.
The Jiffy contained two pistols. An information for illegal possession of firearms was filed
against the appellants.

During trial, the prosecution presented SPO4 Caser, a ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
as among the expert witnesses. SPO4 Caser reported that the slugs from the corpse of the victim
match the guns found with the appellants.

The trial court rendered appellants guilty of the charge. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N SPO4 Caser’s report is admissible as an expert opinion.

Basis:
Who is an expert witness: “An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling
to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on
questions on which he proposes to express an opinion." There is no definite standard of
determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an
expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2)
particular, firsthand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or
standards upon which his opinion is based. The question of whether a witness is properly
qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.”

Held:
Yes. An expert witness is one who belongs to the profession to which the subject matter of the
inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he/she proposes to
express an opinion. There is no qualifying degree of skill for a witness to be rendered an expert.
This matter rests with the discretion of the trial court.

In this case, SPO4 Caser is deemed as an expert witness on ballistics. As expert ballistician in the
PNP Crime Lab, he had testified to at least 27 murder and homicide cases all over the country.
The lack of microphotographs in his report does not downgrade his credibility. Therefore, the
trial court did not err in giving probative weight on the expert opinion of SPO4 Caser.

Wherefore, the appellants are found guilty of murder.

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110. People vs Madarang, GR No 132319

Facts:
Accused Madarang was charged with parricide for killing his wife, in an information. During
trial, the trial court issued an order directing Madarang to be subjected to a psychiatric
evaluation. The examination of Madarang revealed that he was suffering from schizophrenia.

The trial resumed after two years of confinement of Madarang. He interposed as defense that
when he was in a state of insanity when he stabbed his wife. The trial court nonetheless
convicted him of parricide. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N Madarang was able to sufficiently establish his claim of insanity.

Basis:
Evidence on insanity must pertain to the time preceding or at the moment of the
commission of the offense: “None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he
exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or
simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a single account
of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although
Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid
intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Hence the
importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time
he committed the offense. Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few
months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the
offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately
before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.”

Held:
No. Evidence on insanity must pertain to the time preceding or at the moment of the commission
of the offense. In this case, the diagnosis of schizophrenia was made months after the time of the
stabbing. No witness presented by Madarang attested to him exhibiting symptoms associated
with schizophrenia. Thus, there is no sufficient evidence supporting the claim that Madarang was
under the state of insanity before or during the killing of his wife.

Wherefore, the appealed conviction is affirmed in toto.

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111. People vs Dumanon, GR No 123096

Facts:
Dominga Anib, on behalf of her retardate sister Anacurita, filed a complaint for rape against
accused Dumanon and Labrador. The MCTC stated that Anacurita was indeed a retarded
woman, and that the complaint was properly filed on her behalf.

The trial court convicted the accused of the charge. In the decision, the trial court noted the
personal impression of the judge that Anacurita was mentally retarded. Thus, even though her
recollection of the incident was not detailed, her testimony was nonetheless considered as told by
one who is mentally deficient. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the trial court erred in considering Anacurita as mentally retarded absent expert testimony.

Basis:
Mental retardation may be proved by evidence other than medical evidence, such as the
personal impression of the judge: “It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by
evidence other than medical evidence. Thus, it is our considered opinion that for purposes of
determining whether ANACURITA is mentally normal or does not have the mental capacity of a
normal person, the personal observation of the trial judge would suffice as a measure of
determining the impact on her of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO and RICARDO
vis-a-vis the legal requirement to prove the commission of the crime of rape.”

Held:
No. Mental retardation may be proved by evidence other than medical evidence, such as the
personal impression of the judge. In this case, the trial court took judicial notice of the features
and appearances suggestive of those suffering from mongolism. Based therefrom, the trial court
concluded that Anacurita is mentally retarded. This is sufficient despite lack of expert opinion.

Wherefore, the conviction is affirmed.

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RULE 130 – Character

112. In re Villasanta vs Peralta, GR AC-UNAV (1957)

Facts:
In a previous criminal action, Peralta was convicted for violation of Article 350 of the Revised
Penal Code. The present complaint now seeks to disqualify Peralta from being admitted to the
bar on the ground of immorality.

Issue:
W/N Peralta’s conviction in a previous criminal action may serve as evidence of his immorality.

Basis:
Conviction on cases involving moral turpitude is proof of immorality: “Upon consideration
of the records of G. R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this Court is of the opinion that the
respondent is immoral. He made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of
respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman
while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality.”

Held:
Yes. Conviction on cases involving moral turpitude is proof of immorality. Peralta’s previous
conviction shows that he made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. This is contrary
to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus, Peralta is adjudged to be lacking good moral
character. He is therefore disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

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113. People vs Concorcio, Gr No 121201-02

Facts:
Two informations for murder were filed against the accused. Yungot and Magpatoc were
arrested, while the others remained at large. Among the evidence presented by the defense is the
testimony of Barangay Captain Cahiwat as to the good moral character of accused Magpatoc.
After considering the evidence by both parties, the trial court convicted Yungot and Magpatoc
guilty of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the trial court erred in not appreciating the character evidence presented by Magpatoc.

Basis:
Evidence of good moral character cannot prevail when presumption of innocence is
overcome: “Finally, Magpatoc alleges that the trial court erred in disregarding evidence of his
good moral character. The allegation has no merit. In People vs. Cerelegia, we ruled that " . . . .
[i]t is true that the good moral character of an accused having reference to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged may be proven by him. But an accused is not entitled to an
acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct if the
Court believes he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond peradventure of doubt." After reviewing the
evidence in this case, we are convinced that the prosecution has satisfactorily overcome the
presumption of innocence accorded to every accused and that accused-appellants, Yungot and
Magpatoc are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged; thus, evidence of good moral
character will not prevail.”

Held:
No. Evidence of good moral character cannot prevail when presumption of innocence is
overcome. An accused is not entitled to acquittal simply because of good moral character.
Conviction or acquittal may only be established by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to
the accused. Hence, evidence of good moral character cannot prevail over the same.

Wherefore, the conviction is affirmed.

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Rule 131 – Burden of Proof

114. Jacobo vs CA, GR No 107699

Facts:
An information for homicide was filed against petitioner. At the trial, petitioner invoked self-
defense. While he admits to stabbing the deceased, he contends that the latter was an unlawful
aggressor. However, on cross-examination, petitioner stated that he does not recall having
stabbed the deceased as he was drunk and in a state of confusion.

The trial court convicted petitioner of the charge. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the
CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N petitioner sufficiently established self-defense.

Basis:
Invoking self-defense shifts the burden of proof to the accused: “Firmly entrenched is the rule
that where the accused invokes self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. The burden of proving that
the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution
for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself
has admitted the killing. x x x

It is a hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the
appellant to prove the elements of that claim, i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. But absent the essential
element of unlawful aggression, there is no self-defense.”

Failure to remember is inconsistent with self-defense: “The gist of petitioner's testimony is

that he does not remember having stabbed the deceased. It is inconsistent with self-defense
which in essence is an admission of the killing in order to preserve one's life or limb. Being
evasive, such testimony does not help at all in establishing self-defense.”

Held:
No. In the first place, invoking self-defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defense. In this case, the gist of petitioner’s defense is failure to remember having stabbed the
deceased. This is inconsistent with self-defense. Also, petitioner was not able to rebut the
evidence that he and the deceased mutually agreed to fight. This removes the element of
unlawful aggression. Therefore, the petitioner failed to establish self-defense.

Wherefore, the conviction is affirmed.

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115. Gumabon vs PNB, GR No 202514

Facts:
Petitioner Gumabon consolidated eight savings accounts that the family had been maintaining
with respondent PNB. In the meantime, Gumabon presented her foreign exchange certificates of
time deposit for withdrawal. PNB was able to consolidate the accounts, but it did not honor the
certificates. According to PNB, Gumabon had already pre-terminated, withdrew and/or debited
sums against her deposits.

Gumabon filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. The RTC ruled in her favor. The CA
reversed the RTC ruling on appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N Gumabon is entitled to payment of her time deposits.

Basis:
One who alleges payment has the burden of proving it: “It is a settled rule in evidence that the
one who alleges payment has the burden of proving it. The burden of proving that the debt had
been discharged by payment rests upon the debtor once the debt's existence has been fully
established by the evidence on record. When the debtor introduces some evidence of payment,
the burden of going forward with the evidence — as distinct from the burden of proof — shifts to
the creditor. Consequently, the creditor has a duty to produce evidence to show nonpayment.”

Held:
Yes. One who alleges payment has the burden of proving it. In this case, PNB claims that it had
already paid Gumabon the balance of her time deposits in the consolidated account. However,
PNB presented mere photocopies of the alleged transactions, which are inadmissible under the
original document rule. PNB failed to prove its claim that it had already paid Gumabon the
remaining balance in her account. Thus, Gumabon is entitled to payment of her time deposits.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

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116. People vs Galam, GR No 224222

Facts:
An information for murder was filed against appellants. According to the prosecution, appellants
shot the deceased in the chest after a heated argument. The appellants raised alibi as defense.

The trial court convicted the appellants of the charge. This was affirmed by the CA on appeal.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the burden of evidence to prove innocence is on the appellants.

Basis:
When the prosecution establishes a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of
evidence shifts to the latter: “As for Lito, People v. Villanueva ordains that the prosecution's
burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial,
except in case of self-defense. When the prosecution, however, has succeeded in discharging the
burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the Court of the truth of the
allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, as in this
case, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him or her to adduce
evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case. Here, just like
his brother Dante, Lito failed to discharge such burden of evidence. As it was, Lito did not even
offer any defense on his behalf since the trial court heard the case up until now.”

Held:
Yes. When the prosecution establishes a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of
evidence shifts to the latter. In this case, the appellants were positively identified by several
witnesses. These testimonies were given credence by the court despite any longstanding disputes
with the appellants. Therefore, the burden of evidence had shifted to the appellants. Their alibis,
which is their main defense, were not able to overcome the positive identification by the
witnesses. The appellants failed to discharge their burden of evidence.

Wherefore, the appeal is denied.

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