“Jinnah’s concept of Pakistan as a Muslim, liberal, democratic, and
modern nation state naturally predisposed him in favour of close
relations with democratic countries.” The Muslim League under his
leadership had supported the Allies against the Fascist powers during
the Second World War. Jinnah also praised the United States for
inspiring nations.
The Soviet Union, despite its opposition to colonialism and imperialism
“was unattractive to the League leaders because of its restrictions on
freedom, atheist ideology, and sponsorship of subversion in other
countries. ”
Pakistan’s moves to seek partnerships outside the region were driven
by economic and security challenges confronting the country. India’s
refusal to honour partition arrangements, followed by military
intervention in Jammu and Kashmir, “injected a sense of urgency to the
arising Pakistani state’s search for ways and means to bolster its
capacity to resist dictation”.
Britain was the first country to be approached for assistance. But the
country itself was exhausted by the war and was more sympathetic to
India than Pakistan in the subcontinent. The Soviet Union was never a
serious option because of its own economic conditions.Prime minister
liaqat Ali khan Visited Moscow.President of US sent the invitation to the
Pakistan before this sent to the Mr Nehru.
The US, the world’s premier economic and military power was not
sympathetic to the Pakistan movement. As the partition neared, the
Muslim League leader M A Jinnah sounded to the US charge d’affaires
in New Delhi that Pakistan’s foreign policy would be oriented towards
the Muslim countries of the Middle East, and they would stand
together against possible Russian aggression and would look to the US
for assistance. That struck a chord in Washington as evidenced in
Truman’s sympathetic response to Ambassador Ispahani’s expose of
Pakistan’s need ‘to balance our economy, to industrialize our country,
to improve health and education and raise the standard of living.”
Yet, Pakistan’s initial request for large scale US assistance drew a blank.
A change in American thinking came only with the Korean war and an
emerging tussle between the US and the Soviet Union for global
influence. Pakistan fully backed South Korea and the US against North
Korean aggression. In contributing troops to the UN action, Pakistan
offered one brigade provided her security was assured in the event of
Indian aggression. The United States denied for such a commitment.
Pakistan’s supportive actions in Korea compared to India’s neutral
stance won sympathy in the US but not sufficiently to make a significant
commitment to the country’s security needs and economic stability. A
parallel development was Pakistan extending recognition to the
People’s Republic of China and opening a diplomatic mission in Beijing
as early as 1950.
A meeting of the US ambassadors to South Asian countries held in
Colombo in February 1951 ‘favored the idea of Pakistani participation in
the defence of the Middle East.’ In April 1951, American and British
officials agreed that Pakistan’s contribution would probably be the
decisive factor in ensuring defence of the area. Yet, Washington
remained indecisive in lending defence assistance ‘lest arming Pakistan
ensnare the Unites States in India-Pakistan disputes.’ This assessment,
was largely influenced by Britain.
US realization of Britain’s reduced capabilities in the Middle East would
eventually lead to the initiation of contacts for building a new defence
network viz-a-viz the Soviet threat under president Eisenhower who
took office in January, 1953. Secretary of State, Dulles undertook a tour
of the Middle East and South Asia. “Nowhere did he receive a warmer
welcome or was impressed than in Pakistan” where leaders
emphasized the desire to join ‘the free world’s’ defence team. Dulles
returned with the feeling that Pakistan was one country ‘that has the
moral courage to do its part in resisting communism.’
Pakistan’s complete integration in the US-led anti communist alliances
like SEATO(1954) and Baghdad Pact(1955). The two countries entered
into Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement(1954) and Bilateral Defence
Cooperation Agreement(1959). Pakistan also agreed to the
establishment of a secret intelligence base at Badaber near Peshawar,
and permission was given for the US aircraft to use the Peshawar
airbase. Sattar’s account of Pakistan joining the Baghdad Pact later
renamed CENTO after the coup d’etat in Iraq, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali
who expressed reservations about the pact was overruled by president
Iskander Mirza in league with the commander-in-chief, Gen Ayub Khan.
The 1959 Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement contained
provisions for US commitments in support of Pakistan’s defence. Article
1 stated that the US ‘regards as vital to its national interest and to the
world peace the preservation of the independence and territorial
integrity of Pakistan.’ Specific clauses stipulated that in case
of aggression against Pakistan…the USA will…take action including the
use of armed forces as “may be mutually agreed upon”. This meant
that aid would be forthcoming in case of aggression by a communist
country and not India as was witnessed in 1965 and 1971 wars.
Pakistan’s big loss in strategic terms was the deterioration in its ties
with the Soviet Union. Moscow’s anger grew after its air force had shot
down a US spy plane U-2 that had flown out of Pakistan as part of
American operations run from the Badaber base near Peshawar.
The Eisenhower administration that had started cutting aid to India,
took a u-turn as the country was increasingly seen as a democratic
counterweight to communist China. Aid to India was raised from $93
million in 1956 to $365 million in 1957 and went up to $822 million in
1960. The wooing of India became more pronounced under president
Kennedy. n December 1960, Pakistan signed an agreement with the
Soviet Union for exploration of petroleum resources. Moscow
contributed significantly to Pakistan’s industrial base by building
Pakistan Steel Mills.
unlike the Soviet Union, China understood that Pakistan’s motivation in
joining alliances was its security against the Indian threat, not hostility
against China or any other nation. An important step was taken in 1959
when Pakistan approached China for border demarcation between the
two countries. Beijing was hesitant as the matter involved Kashmir and
it did not want to have another argument with India. A formula was
found “whereby the boundary to be demarcated would be between
Xinjiang and the contiguous areas, the defence of which was under the
control of Pakistan.
Pakistan provided valuable support to China in the multilateral fora and
defied US strategy to isolate China by establishing air links. China
consistently supported Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir by stressing that
the dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the
people of Kashmir.
The India-China border war in 1962 profoundly impacted America’s
strategic calculus for South Asia. Nehru appeals Kennedy to help
against china. Washington maintained assistance to Pakistan.Kennedy
take the benefit from indtaagainst china put the Kashmir issue in
danger.
Washington’s attitude towards Pakistan stiffened further after Johnson
succeeded Kennedy. Johnson took a tough line with Pakistan over its
growing ties with China. US military aid to India increased to $100
million in 1963-64. Pakistan’s growing concern over US tilt toward India
was evident in a letter written by Ayub Khan to Lyndon Johnson on 7
July, 1964, protesting against the $500 million military aid plan to India,
that could oblige Pakistan to reappraise CENTO and SEATO. “Johnson’s
response was even more curt, warning the US, too, would be obliged to
re-examine its relations with Pakistan if it continued to develop its
relations with China”.
The troubled trajectory of Pak-US cooperation and friction continued in
the 1970s. Pakistan played intermediary in Washington’s role to Beijing
that miffed Moscow and New Delhi alike. The two entered into a
defence treaty before India invaded East Pakistan. The US, under
president Nixon, permit in the emergence of Bangladesh but warned
India over any aggressive design against West Pakistan. The Bhutto era
witnessed further glitches in relations with Washington notably over
the nuclear issue.
