SUCCESSION – Batch 5

July 24

69
Baltazar vs. Laxa
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
Grounds for Disallowance of a Will
FACTS:
 Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect
on Sept. 13, 1981.
 The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament.
 She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
 Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo
Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine.
 Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and
treated Paciencia as his own mother.
 Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo
and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
 More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of
Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his
favor.
 On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio
averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his
predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
 Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or
forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence.

ISSUE: WON the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for
probate.

RULING: Yes. Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. These formalities are
enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code . A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly
states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the
Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of
Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same as
well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the petitioners. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound
so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art.
799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.”

A purported will is not to be denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether it will be probated
would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in the estate of the deceased . It bears stressing that
“irrespective of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will in question, it is
the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or evidence that ought to be before it that is controlling.”

“The very existence of the Will is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testatrix has willed that her estate
be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby.” This, coupled with
Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses,
as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies,
constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

70
PASCUAL vs. PEDRO DE LA CRUZ

Vice of Consent

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of Rizal admitting to probate the purported will of Catalina de la
Cruz.

 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the
age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of her
alleged will was by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the
decedent.
 Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz
contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied
with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its
 execution; that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner; and that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.
 CFI rendered judgment upholding the due execution of the will, and, as therein provided, appointed petitioner
Andres Pascual executor and administrator of the estate of the late Catalina de la Cruz without bond. Court has
taken pains in noting said inconsistencies but found the same not substantial in nature sufficient to discredit their
entire testimony on the due execution of Exhibit "D". It is to be noted that Exhibit "D" was signed in 1954 and
that the attesting witnesses testified in Court in 1962 or after a lapse of eight years from the date of the
signing of the document. It is, therefore, understandable and reasonable to expect that said witnesses will
not retain a vivid picture of the details surrounding the execution and signing of the will of Catalina de la
Cruz. What is important and essential is that there be unanimity and certainty in their testimony regarding
the identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the attesting witnesses, and the Notary Public, and the fact
that they were all present at the time those signatures were affixed on the document Exhibit "D".
 The oppositors appealed claiming that the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed, notwithstanding the existence of
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence that the will was
not signed by all the witnesses in the presence of one another, in violation of the requirement of the law.

ISSUE: W/N undue influence upon testatrix has been established in instant case,

RULING: No. Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as her own son, to the extent that she
expressed no objection to his being made the sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own
lights, we find nothing abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.

 The following are the basic principles on undue influence as laid down by the jurisprudence of the Court:
To be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates
the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather
than his own; that the contention that a will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure
cannot be sustained on mere conjectures or suspicion, as it is not enough that there was opportunity to
exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised; that the exercise of improper
pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised;
that the burden is on the person challenging the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time
of its execution; that mere general or reasonable influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will; nor is
moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed in the testator or omission of relatives, not
forced heirs, evidence of undue influence.
 PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE WHERE BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATES IN DRAFTING OF THE
WILL DOES NOT APPLY IN INSTANT CASE. — Appellants invoke a presumption of undue influence held to
exist by American authorities where the beneficiary participates in the drafting or execution of the will favoring
him; but since the will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, although a nephew of the proponent, we do not
think the presumption applies; for in the normal course of events, said attorney would follow the
instructions of the testatrix; and a member of the bar in good standing may not be convicted of
unprofessional conduct, or of having conspired to falsify a testament, except upon clear proof.
 CONTRADICTIONS AND INCONSISTENCIES IN WITNESSES’ TESTIMONIES DO NOT ALTER PROBATIVE
VALUE OF TESTIMONIES ON DUE EXECUTION IN INSTANT CASE. — The contradictions and inconsistencies
appearing in the testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out by the oppositors- appellants (such as
the weather condition at the time the will was executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses;
and the length of time it took to complete the act), relate to unimportant details or to impressions of the
witnesses about certain details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of
human memory, and which inconsistencies, by themselves would not alter the probative value of their
testimonies on the due execution of the will.

71. Ozaeta v. Cuartero

99 SCRA 1041

(99 PHIL 1041 based in the book). https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c3aa9

MAIN POINT: As to the question of whether or not the will was obtained thru undue influence and improper
pressure, it is not enough that there was an opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it might
have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.

FATCS:

Carlos Palanca married Cesarea Victorina Torres, with whom he begot 3 children.

 When Cesarea died, he lived unmarried with Rosa Gonzales and came to have 8 children with her.
 While living with Rosa, he also sustained relations with another woman, Maria Cuartero, and have 6
children. He and Cuartero later married.
 To put himself right with all his children, legitimate and illegitimate, he decided to make a will
o will was executed on May 19, 1945
o Atty. Ramon Diokno began by explaining the formalities to be followed in the signing of the will,
and once that was done, Palanca signed its original and 2 carbon copies page by page in the
presence the lawyer and 3 other witnesses.
o Next to sign was Jose Diokno, Segundo Gonzales and Adolfo Gruet in that order. 
Designated in the will as substitute executor, Roman Ozaeta,  filed a petition  for the probate of the will, for the
issuance to him of letters of administration, and for his appointment as special administrator pending probate

 Cuartero and her children filed their opposition, alleging that the will was not executed in accordance with
law, that it was procured by fraud and undue pressure and influence on the part of some of the
 beneficiaries or some other person for their benefit, and that the decedent's signatures thereon were
procured thru fraud and trickery, the same having been affixed by him without any intention of making the
document his will.
o First sone of first wife also opposed
 While Rosa and children joined the petition to probate
o they offer the theory that after the petitioner had succeeded in convincing the decedent whom
they picture to be then "a very old man suffering from several ailments besides cataract in both
eyes," to live with him,  he (petitioner), with the tolerance and cooperation of Rosa Gonzales
and her children, who were then living with the decedent in petitioner's house, instilled fear in his
mind and thereafter controlled all his acts in such a way that he could not but do what he was told
and had to sign whatever papers he was asked to sign.
 And that, according to appellants, is how he came to sign the will in question.

ISSUE: Whether the will was procured by fraud and undue pressure and influence

RULING: NO. As to the charge that the will was procured thru undue and improper pressure and influence by those who
stood to profit therefrom or by some other person for their benefit, we note that no direct evidence has been presented
to support it. 

 The decedent, though old and suffering from diabetes would appear, to be still in full possession of his
mental faculties and was not so helpless as appellants would picture him to be, and there is no showing
that before, during, and after the execution of the will, he was not a master of his will but had to take
orders from somebody.
o witnesses also testified that decedent still had good sight, as he can still read in closed-up)
 Moreover, the will was signed by him in the office of a distinguished lawyer, who died a respected
member of this Court, and without the presence of any the beneficiaries named therein or of the petitioner
himself whom appellants apparently suspect of having used pressure or influence in favor of the said
beneficiaries.
 It is obvious that the claim that the will was obtained thru undue influence and improper pressure has no
substantial factual basis but is more a matter of conjecture engendered by suspicion which the weight of
authority regards as insufficient to sustain a verdict defeating a will on that ground.
o It is not enough that there was an opportunity to exorcise undue influence or a possibility that it
might have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence tint it was actually exercised

Appellants' theory is,furthermore, disproved by decedent's failure to revoke or otherwise' alter the questioned
will as soon as' he stopped out of petitioner's house and moved to his own where he led a free man's life up to
five' years after the execution of the will in question.

- This behaviour of the decedent constitutes a silent ratification of the contents of the impugned will and
refutes the claim of undue influence and improper pressure, even supposing that these circumstances
were, duly proved.
72 – LIM
Coso vs. Fernandez Deza
G.R. No. L-16763 December 22, 1921
Vice of Consent (See Arts. 1331, 1335, 1337 and 1338)

MAIN POINT: To be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and
subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make his express the will of another, rather
than his own.

FACTS: Testator: Federico Gimenez Zoboli

 Appeal from a decision of the CFI denying probate of the will on the ground of undue influence alleged to
have been exerted over the mind of a testator by one Rosario Lopez.
 The testator, a married man and resident of the Philippines, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in
Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit returns with her for many years thereafter.
 The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator with said Rosario
Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way the
reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in Barcelona during the years
1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from a severe illness.
 When he returned to the Philippines she followed him, arriving in Manila in February, 1918, and remained
in close communication with him until his death in February, 1919.

ISSUE: W/N there was undue influence over the testator to vitiate his consent - NO

RULING: NO. Decision reversed and will is to be admitted to probate. While it is shown that the testator entertained
strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his
mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own." He was an
intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated
only by a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and by a proper
feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. No imposition or fraud has been shown in the
present case.
Citing Mackall case: Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue,' if no imposition
or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his
property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is
voluntarily made.

73 Musa
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
Vice of Consent

FACTS:
 Testator – Placido Valmonte; Heir – Josefina; Leticia – & family lived with Placido
 Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement until he finally
came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located San Antonio Village, Makati,
which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names.
 Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28
years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr.
 But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down
as COR PULMONALE.
 Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June
15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983.
o 1st page content: testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the
end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental
witnesses.
o 2nd page: continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the
witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin.
 The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on seven grounds, one of which is:
o 7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;
o Alleges that respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary
public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
o Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be
[a] Fil-American pensionado," thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the
probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic and common experience" for
an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

ISSUE: W/N the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido
Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.

RULING: NO. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It
may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document
which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the
testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made."1

Burden of proof
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The
burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever
presented. It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.
That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his
wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family,
who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years."

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion." More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public

74
Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon
33 SCRA 554
Rule of Equality

 Agripina Valdez (testatrix), widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by 7 compulsory heirs,
to wit:
o 6 legitimate children (Estela, Tomas, Bernardita, Angelina, Marina and Josefina – all surnamed
Dizon); and
o Legitimate granddaughter, Lilia Dizon
 Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix) are the oppositors.
 Agripina left a will, written in Pampango dialect with the beneficiaries named above together with 7 other
legitimate grandchildren. In her will, the testatrix commanded that her property be divided in accordance
with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among the beneficiaries.
 The testament was admitted to probate and Marina was appointed as executrix of the testatrix' estate,
thereafter, she filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate given them in the will, plus cash and/or
properties to complete the respective legitimes to P129,254.96 of those given less; while Tomas and
Marina must pay in cash or property an amount necessary to complete the prejudiced legitimes.
  The Oppositors, including Tomas, submitted their own counter-project of partition wherein they proposed
the distribution of the estate to be proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½) of the entire estate
corresponding to the free portion and the other half to be divided among the 7 compulsory heirs as
constituting their legitimes.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free
portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction
- NO. It is in the nature of partition of estate by will. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix,
being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of
the estate, for Article 842 of the CC provides that “One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, Article 912 of the CC covers precisely
the case of the executrix, Marina, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of
her estate in providing that "The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire
property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share
pertaining to him as legitime." Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted
a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the CC, have to be respected insofar as they do
not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

2. W/N the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the CC
- Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix
principally to the executrix, Marina.
- Neither may the appellants insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate
instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available
for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the
heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix
as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact
to her named beneficiaries, principally, Marina.
-
75
Austria vs. Reyes
Institution based on a false cause

Basilia Austria (+)

Perfecto and others – “legally adopted” children of Basilia; instituted as heirs in the will
Ruben Austria and others – nephews and nieces of Basilia

FACTS:
 1956 – Basilia Austria filed a petition for probate of her will.
o In her will, the bulk of her estate was given to Perfecto and others (Basilia’s legally adopted
children).
 Ruben Austria and others (Basilia’s nephews and nieces) opposed the petition, but the probate of the will
was allowed by the court.
 1959 – Basilia died. Perfecto was appointed as executor in accordance with the provisions of Basilia’s
will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt by Ruben.
 The nephews and nieces filed a petition in intervention for partition alleging that:
o They are the nearest kin of Basilia;
o Perfecto and others had not been adopted by Basilia in accordance with law, and thus they are
mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs; and
o Since the intrinsic validity of the will is null and void, intestacy arises in which the entire estate
should be given to them as compulsory heirs.
 CFI – The validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material or decisive on the efficacy of the adoption because
even if adoption was spurious, Perfecto and others will nevertheless succeed as testamentary heirs instituted in
Basilia’s will.
 Contention of nephews and nieces – Basilia used the terms “mga sapilitang tagapagmana” (compulsory
heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime) because she thought she was legally bound to bequeath ½ of her
entire estate to Perfecto as their legitime as the legally adopted children. Had she known the adoption to
be false, she would not have instituted them as heirs in the will. Proof therefore of the falsity of the
adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy.

ISSUE: W/N the institution of Perfecto and others as heirs would retain its efficacy in the event that their adoption by
Basilia is false.

RULING: YES. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
2. The cause must be shown to be false; and
3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause.

Article 850 is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution
of heirs. Where the decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of
heirs, the will cannot be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code. Such institution may be annulled only when it is
clear, after an examination of the will that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the
cause for it to be false.
In this case, the phrases, “mga sapilitang tagapagmana” and “sapilitang mana” were borrowed from the language of the
law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the
inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if
she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of
her estate (libre disposition) which largely favored Perfecto and others shows a perceptible inclination on her
part to give to them more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the
relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners. Were
we to exclude the Perfecto and others from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would
succeed to the bulk of the estate by intestacy—a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Interpretation of will in favor of testacy

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the
testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the
language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. A probate court has found, by final judgment that the late Basilia
was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.

Legality of adoption cannot be subject of collateral attack

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate
action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

76

Aznar, executor vs Duncan

FACTS: Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died testate. The will was
admitted to probate. In his will, he instituted and acknowledged his natural daughter, Lucy Duncan as his only
heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia. The rest of his estate shall be left to
Lucy Duncan. The court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased.

The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan
(whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that
since Helen Garcia was preterited (she was not recognized as heir) in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as
heir was annulled and the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate.

The CFI and Helen Garcia contends that there was preterition, resulting in the annulment of the institution of the
heirs.

Lucy Garcia contends that this is not a case of preterion, considering the provisions of the will whereby the
testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy, nevertheless although less
than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited. Based on Articles 906 and 918 of the
Civil Code. Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy
Duncan as if the succession were intestate.

ISSUE: Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the inheritance of Lucy as
instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of
the entire estate.

RULING:

 The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.
 Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share to a
legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but
without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other
persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the
legitime be completed.
 The omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father,
son, etc, by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some
part of the properties. No preterition in this case • The testator did not entirely omit Helen Garcia but left
her a legacy of Php 3, 600 • Since there is no preterition, Art. 854 does not apply.

77
BALANAY v Martinez
Omitted Compulsory Heir in the Direct Line
Testator: Leodegaria Julian
Heirs: 6 children (Including petitioner & Oppositor)
Oppositor: Avelina Antonio

FACTS:

 Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died in Davao City at 67.
 She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their 6 legitimate children.
 Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed for the probate of his mother's notarial will which is written in English.
 In the will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal
lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her
father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs
during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties

 In Part V of the will she stated that after her husband's death, paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands
(which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that
part of her will.
 She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the
will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *
 Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary
capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate.
 Felix Balanay, Sr. later withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was
interested in its probate, he signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he
"waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children.
 In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that
their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
 Court dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding,
ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding.

ISSUE: WON the preterition of the surviving spouse (Who is a cumpolsary heir) will produce intestacy.

RULING: No. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will
and renounced his hereditary rights. It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the
will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face
is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the
probate of the will is mandatory.

As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie  proof
that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it
is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the
parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments
(Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An
interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will
nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).

Include kona ling din to just in case magask si Atty.

[We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch clerk of court as special
administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and
his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or
devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability.
A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration
of a decedent's estate.]

78. Adi
Acain vs. Intermediate Appelate Court 155 scra 100
Preterition (Art. 854); Omitted Compulsory Heir in the Direct Line

FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari ordering the dismissal of the Special Proceeding.
 Petitioner Constantino Acain filed in the RTC of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will
of the late Nemesio Acain; on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and
his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were
instituted as heirs.
 The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty.
Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
o "THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties, house, lands and money which I
earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO
ACAIN. xxx . In case my brother Segundo Acain predeceases me, all the money properties, lands,
houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given by me
to his children"
 Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs.
 Oppositors (Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the latter’s widow
Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
o (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
 o (2) he is merely a universal heir and
o (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
 CA - ordered to dismiss the special proceeding. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the will is valid because art 854 only refers to preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line and the private
respondents herein are not.

RULING: NO. The SC held that preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not
apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir . Thus, even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she
is not in the direct line.

However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by
the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child
and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.

Effect of Preterition: Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. It has been held that the only provisions which do not result in intestacy are
the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the
legitimes are concerned. Thus, the universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution
of universal heirs—without any other testamentary disposition in the will—amounts to a declaration that nothing
at all was written.

[ruling regarding the other issue questioning the legal standing of petitioner due to the effect of preterition: Intestacy
having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special
Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed.]

79 – Tan
Nuguid vs. Nuguid
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

FACTS:

 Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate.
 Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and 6 brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto.
 On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios filed in the CFI of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. She prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
 Felix and Pax opposed that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, they,
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line, were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.
“I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property,
do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios
Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of
November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.”

ISSUE: W/N the will is completely void on ground of preterition.

RULING: YES. Considering that the will solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and
nothing more, the entire will is null.

Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The
court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The
due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said
court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will
be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or
nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

We should not be led astray by the statement in Art. 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when
they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary
disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. As Manresa
puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "the free portion that
would not have been disposed of by virtue of legacy, improvement or donation. (Googled translated from
Spanish)”

80
Cayetano v. Leonides
G.R. No. L-54919
Gutierrez, J.
Preterition is Governed by the National Law of the Decedent

DOCTRINE OF LAW: The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to the intrinsic and extrinsic
validity of the last will and testament of a U.S. national and resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a person
may give his entire estate to a complete stranger.

Intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during probate of will. The attested will is still valid even if the
compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime because the decedent, at the time of his death, was a citizen of US,
and was governed by Pennsylvania law which does not have a system of legitime and forced heirs. Adoracion
can therefore dispose of her whole estate and deprive Hermogenes of any share in her estate. 

FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.

 As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule
74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of
the deceased Adoracion Campos.

 Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

 xxx alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death xxx;

 that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila;

 that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the
laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor;

 that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered
with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the
administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor
in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and

 that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and
eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.

 On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other
things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will
are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not
apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preterition is proper?

RULING: YES. The governing law is law of Pennsylvania.

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law.

The intrinsic validity of the will normally come only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

81

vda. de Mapa v CA, 154 SCRA 294

FACTS:

1. On January 16, 1965, petitioners Paz Garcia Vda. de Mapa, et al. instituted Civil Case to recover from the
estate of the late Ludovico Hidrosollo,  the properties left by the late Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo.
They claimed that the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, in her last will and testament instituted
Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal heir to the residue of her estate with the obligation as trustee to hold the
same in trust for petitioners herein who are nephews and nieces of the deceased Concepcion Mapa de
 Hidrosollo and for respondents Luis, Teodoro, Victorina, Corazon, Violets, Rosario and Magdalena, all
surnamed Hidrosollo, who are nephews and nieces of Ludovico Hidrosollo; that Ludovico, however, died
without fulfilling the obligation so that the estate of Concepcion formed part of the estate of Ludovico.
2. Respondents, in their Answer, denied the existence of a trust and alleged that Ludovico Hidrosollo, being
the surviving spouse of the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo became the latter's universal heir
when she died without descendants or ascendants; that as such universal heir, Ludovico stepped into the
rights, title and claims of the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, so that the controverted
properties became part of his own estate. They further claimed that Civil Case No. 59566 was barred by
the order of the same court sitting as a probate court in Special Proceedings No. 52229 which denied
petitioners' motion for intervention, and that petitioners, in having instituted Civil Case No. 59566 had
forfeited any benefits under the will.

3. the lower court ruled that a trust was created over the properties of petitioners' claim, however, respondents had
forfeited their rights thereto; Their appeal to the Court of Appeals proved fruitful as the appellate court reversed
the decision of the lower court and ruled instead that no trust nor fideicommissary substitution was created in
Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo's Will and that petitioners' claim was barred by a final judgment.

ISSUE: Whether the Will of Concepcion created a trust, not a fideicommissary, in favor of petitioners

RULING:

1. Yes. Although the word "trust" itself does not appear in the Will, the testatrix's intent to create one is
nonetheless clearly demonstrated by the stipulations in her Will. 1. Paragraph 8 – Ludovico was instituted
as sole and universal heir to the rest of the properties not covered by the legacies 2. Paragraph 9 –
Ludovico was charged with the obligation to deliver the rest of the estate in equal parts to the Mapa,
Salazar and Hidrosollo nephews and nieces as beneficiaries 3. Paragraph 11 – Any obligation shall be
charged against the share corresponding to the Hidrosollo nephews and nieces only (not the Mapa and
Salazar nephews and nieces) 4. All her properties should always remain in co-ownership among her
beneficiaries who should abstain from selling or encumbering 5. Administration must be made jointly by
Ignacio Salazar and Luis Hidrosollo
2. In designating her husband Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal and sole heir with the obligation to deliver
the properties to petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the legal title should vest in him,
and in significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as "beneficiarios," she intended that
the beneficial or equitable interest to these properties should repose in them. To our mind, these
designations, coupled with the other provisions for co-ownership and joint administration of the
properties, as well as the other conditions imposed by the testatrix effectively created a trust in favor of
the parties over the properties adverted to in the Will. "No particular words are required for the creation of
an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. " (Art. 1443, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
3. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as the surviving spouse of the testatrix, Ludovico
Hidrosollo was entitled to a legitime of one-half (1/2) of her hereditary estate. The trust created by
Concepcion Mapa should therefore be, as it is hereby declared to be effective only on the free portion of
her estate, i.e., that portion not covered by Ludovico Hidrosollo's legitime.

Non-existence of fideicommissary substitution – If the testatrix intended to entrust the property to her
husband with the obligation to preserve and to transmit the remaining properties to the petitioners, she could
have said so in an express manner. Even assuming that Clause 9 could be interpreted to be a
fideicommissary substitution, such substitution cannot be given effect because substitution must not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. The second heirs instituted here are merely 'sobrinos'
of the first heir

82. Chua
Ramirez vs Ramirez
FACTS:
1. Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His
will was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila.
2. Petitioner administratrix Maria Palacios submitted a project of partition as follows: a. The property of
the deceased is to be divided into 2 parts.
a. One part shall go to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; the "free portion" shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and
b. the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda with substitutes as stated in the will.
3. Respondent Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the ground that the provisions for
fideicommissary substitutions in connection with Wanda’s usufruct in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
Ramirez are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first
degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code, among others.
4. Lower Court approved the project of partition. Hence, Jorge and Roberto appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether the fideicommissary substitution in connection with Wanda’s usufruct in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horace Ramirez is void

RULING: YES. The substitutes (Jankowski and Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted.
Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
"Degree" is construed by the present Code as generation. The substitution shall not go beyond one
degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related
to and be one generation from the first heir.
As opposed to the SC of Spain’s construction of "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission.
From this point of view, there can be only one transmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be
related to the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the
first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary. The Court’s ordered
distribution is as follows – One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime; One-half (1/2) thereof which is the
free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a
simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

On respondent’s contention that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda with respect to the
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are
invalid because the first heirs widow Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator. Court ruled that the vulgar substitution is
valid. Dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar substitution can be made for it also includes refusal or
incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra

83
Crisologo vs. Singson

FACTS: The Will  of Doña Leona1

Singson: was duly probated after she died on January 13, 1948. The testatrix,
who died single, owned a 193-sqm residential lot located at Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with improvements
thereon, which was a project of partition submitted and previously approved by CFI Ilocos Sur. The will stated
that upon the death of her grandniece, Consolacion Florentino, her share on a residential lot shall belong equally
to testatrix's brothers.

Action for partition by Consolacion of residential lot: Because Dr. Singson, brother of testratix, refused to accede
to her demands. He contends that Consolacion, grandniece of testatrix, was a mere usufructuary and not owner
of one-half pro-indiviso of porperty, thus, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.The issue arose in
differing interpretation by petitioner and respondent on whether or not such substitution is fideicommissary.

The Court ruled that there is no FS, and only a mere sustitucion vulgar. There was an absence of an express
statement by the testatrix of the obligation of Consolacion to preserve and transmit the property to testratrix's
brother. Also, there was no clear statement to the effect that Consolacion shall only enjoy usufructuary rights
over property, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. Thus, Consolacion is an
owner pro-indiviso, entitled to partition of property with the other heirs; and that substitution shall only take
place upon death of Consolacion, whether it happens before or after that of testatrix. Hence, this appeal by
defendant Singson.

ISSUE: WON the testamentary disposition provided for in the will is a sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitution fideicomisaria.

RULING: Sustitucion vulgar. Court used old Civil Code as testatrix died before effectivity of the New Civil Code.
Substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a
clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the
property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. Disposition
merely provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix — her
share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named
therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino—whether this occurs before or after that of
the testatrix—the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the
testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead
of Consolacion Florentino.

If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that Consolacion
Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it
provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over
the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As Manresa
says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the property bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary
rights thereon until the time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it is obvious that the
nude ownership over the property, upon the death of the testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another
person, and the person cannot be other than the fideicomisario.

84

Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals

27 SCRA 546, No. L-28734 March 28, 1969

FACTS:

 Doña Margarita Rodriguez left a last will and testament leaving no compulsory heirs or forced heirs and,
consequently was free to dispose of her properties even to strangers at will as provided in her will. The
testatrix made letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the will.
 The said last will and testament was legalized by virtue of the resolution or order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila without the appellant’s opposition in, hence the extrinsic validity of the will was
substantially not in question. The executor also presented a project of partition and the same was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila, again without the opposition of the appellants. Hence,
the intrinsic validity of the will could never be again questioned
  The trust created by the testatrix was then objected to by private respondents, who claimed to be first
cousins of the deceased. Such an objection was overruled by the lower court which granted letters of
trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the will. Such an order of the lower court was
appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, which, in the original decision affirmed the action taken
by the Court of First Instance.
 The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents resulted in a resolution which set aside its previous
decision and modified the judgment appealed from insofar as the validity of the provision of clause 10 of the will
creating the trusteeship was concerned.
 The disputed clause:

Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang ‘generator’ at automobile)
hindi maisasanla o maipag bibili kailan man, maliban sa pag-aaring nasa Quezon Boulevard,
Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang pondo sa gagamitin sa ipagpapaigi or ipagpapagawa ng
panibago at alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon"

CA held that the above "perpetual prohibition to alienate" the property mentioned, constitutes a clear violation of
Article 867 and Article 870 of the Civil Code. The trust in question is then a nullity for being in violation of the
aforestated rules. There being then no institution of heirs as regards the properties covered by the trust, the
Court of Appeals held that "there should be intestate succession concerning the same, with the nearest relative
of the deceased entitled to inherit the properties in accordance with the law on intestacy

ISSUE: W/N the trust in question should be annulled as being in violation of the rules against perpetuities and the
limitation on the prohibition for the alienation of the property left by the deceased.

RULING: No. It does not admit of doubt that in the disputed clause the testatrix did make clear her purpose not to
mortgage or to sell forevermore (kailan man) certain properties left by her. There would seem then some
justification for the Court of Appeals in the challenged resolution to deny force and effect to such a wish
considering that "a perpetual prohibition to alienate" is by the Civil Code forbidden. 9 The more controlling
provision, however, as already made mention of is supplied by Article 870. Its terms are clear: "The dispositions
of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks categorically. What is declared void is the
testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In the interim, such a provision does
not suffer from the vice of invalidity. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given effect.
This is so even if there could be an element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is concerned. In
the language of a Civil Code provision: If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of
doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.

Respect for the will of a testator as expressed in his last testamentary disposition, constitutes the principal basis
of the rules which the law prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of the will; the words and
provisions therein written must be plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions and real
purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated must be respected and complied with as an
inviolable law among the parties in interest.

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioners could not challenge the provision in question. It had no
right to vindicate. Such a right may never arise. The twenty-year period is still with us. What would transpire
thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power of mere mortals to foretell. At any rate, We
cannot anticipate. Nor should We. We do not possess the power either of conferring a cause of action to a party
when, under the circumstances disclosed, it had none.