Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

​ ctober 15, 1991

G.R. No. 96859 O

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,

vs.
Notes HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO
D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of representatives,
respondent.

Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of
office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and
privileges pertaining thereto.

On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of

Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents

Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the
Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:

The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections
which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao
del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on
February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not
include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of
the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether
national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso
facto' is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself – by the mere act. And
therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali
Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives; and, therefore,
his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of
the House. ...
the House. ...

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990
and addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my
duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what
action was taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to
regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed
on 31 January 1991.

In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll,
petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not
paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office
suites were occupied by other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from
performing his duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and
qualified congressman from his district.

Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his
seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under
the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present
members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the
House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said
members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while
Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the other hand, the
grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:

a) ​Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;

b) ​Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;

c) ​Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal

in an election contest; and,

d) ​Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the
shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the
Constitution. For if it were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of a Congressman
may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the present
Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only
Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only
reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.

On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from
the Roll of Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently
concludes that respondents acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents'
so-called "administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term
as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional
provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a
congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of
Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues
raised in this petition:

A.

IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

B.

COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY,

'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM
EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF
HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as
the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term
"voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution
does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in
addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among
which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of
disqualification to hold public office.

Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of

resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of
existing laws. They further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere
ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
candidacy.

The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which
reads:

Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:

Sec. 27. ​Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:

Sec. 24. ​Candidate holding elective office. — Any elective provincial, sub-
provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences,
or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day.
His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of his
right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or
causes beyond his control.

The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:

Sec. 30. ​Candidates holding political offices. — Governors, mayors, members of

various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy,
be considered on forced leave of absence from office.

It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the
enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from
the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for
President and Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:

MR. PALMARES:

In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision seems to
be different — I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.

Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer

running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing
these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why
do we have to change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the rationale
behind it?

MR. PEREZ (L.):

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The
purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let
us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the
practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not
assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were just
trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already obtained a mandate to be a
member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the
people give them that mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still
preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the
people's latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...

Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo

Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:

MR. GARCIA (M.M.):

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on constitutional
grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the
Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the ones they are
holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of
office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on
accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution. It states that
(sic) Article XIII, Section 1— Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
shall remain accountable to the people.

Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers?
This only means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have
gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the Batasan
shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of
barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as part of the
Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the
people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow
himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because
his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor
or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he
was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the
mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered
ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that the
Constitution requires of elective public officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of
powers or facilities of his office, but it is because of the Constitution itself which I said
powers or facilities of his office, but it is because of the Constitution itself which I said
under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.

Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for?
If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want to
serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected to? The
mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning
or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to
seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.

As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila
because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact that
Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for which
we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers
not only to the community which voted him to office, but primarily because under this
commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve
their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr.
Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers
holding offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be considered ipso
facto resigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy."

It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on
"Accountability of Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:

Sec. 1. ​Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer
operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of
office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials
serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public
office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their
candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and
not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As
succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office
(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not
change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate
of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not
his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired
portion.
portion.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress,
does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI
provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4)
grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may
be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the
expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does
not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing
other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions
the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but
simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say
that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds
provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such
absurdity.

The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is
presumed to be created. This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of
constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in
construing a constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive
affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered
as inhibiting the power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a
constitutional command. This maxim expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an
aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.

Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:

MR. MAAMBONG:

Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary
renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.

MR. DAVIDE:

Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG:

It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten
us exactly what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE:

Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely

resigning at any given time on the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG:

Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than
abandonment and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE:

It is more general, more embracing.

That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate
of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation
of the elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between then
Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:

MR. RONO:

My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is that
in one case the person is intending to run for an office which is different from his own, and
therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an intention to
relinquish his office.

MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes ...

MR. RONO:

And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.

MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office which
he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite.

MR. RONO:

Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree with
the conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of the
certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an intention; it's already
there.
there.

In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-
quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment
and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited
and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as
We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:

... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent
upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly
made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ...

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces
automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not
necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for
forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture
decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled
out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged
in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding
petitioner's name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the
House of Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to
his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General
perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll
considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the
Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner
had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao,
respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These
officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question
the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have
not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest
to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is
created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to
such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feleciano, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no
power, in purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the
House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them
in Congress.

The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in
Congress may appear logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But
I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in
preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be
particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political respectability, seemingly
defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.

It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or

administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers.
Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a
true for the President and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for
removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to
protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their
functions. It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution
provides must be followed.

The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:

A. ​Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the

government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);

B. ​Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);

C. ​Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an

election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);

D. ​Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)

The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg.
881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)

I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in
the Constitution are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical
causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the
sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its
members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for
by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of
disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the
conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel
him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper
case and controversy. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add
to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do
it.

The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978
Election Code — does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case
of the petitioner.

It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered
resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers.
Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of
provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to
constitutional officers.

It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days
or Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the
filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one's current
position. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by
statute. It has to be in the constitution.

Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public
office? In other words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the
meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the Constitution?

From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted
or for fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the
House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the
passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and
implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary"
refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be
treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I must stress,
however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local government
position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in
position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in
the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his
present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state
that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional
Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing
interpretation of "voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted
by the respondents.

In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by
the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.

As aptly stated by the petitioner:

We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right
of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing
with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to
representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act'
of the respondents.

Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and
strictly against disenfranchisement.

And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law,
both substantive and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires,
administrative act' of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)

The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution

does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When
Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of
his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and
intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections
sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional
officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of
accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of
Congressman Dimaporo.

For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

# Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no
power, in purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the
House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them
in Congress.

The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in
Congress may appear logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But
I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in
preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be
particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political respectability, seemingly
defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or
administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers.
Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a
true for the President and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for
removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to
protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their
functions. It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution
provides must be followed.

The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:

A. ​Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the

government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);

B. ​Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);

C. ​Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an

election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);

D. ​Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)

The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg.
881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)

I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in
the Constitution are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical
causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the
sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its
members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for
by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of
disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the
disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the
conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel
him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper
case and controversy. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add
to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do
it.

The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978
Election Code — does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case
of the petitioner.

It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered
resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers.
Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of
provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to
constitutional officers.

It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days
or Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the
filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one's current
position. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by
statute. It has to be in the constitution.

Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public
office? In other words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the
meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the Constitution?

From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted
or for fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the
House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the
passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and
implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary"
refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be
treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I must stress,
however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local government
position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in
the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his
present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state
that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional
Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing
interpretation of "voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted
by the respondents.

In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by
the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.

As aptly stated by the petitioner:

We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right
of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing
with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to
representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act'
representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act'
of the respondents.

Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and
strictly against disenfranchisement.

And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law,
both substantive and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires,
administrative act' of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)

The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution

does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When
Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of
his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and
intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections
sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional
officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of
accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of
Congressman Dimaporo.

For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.