P a g e | 13

ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff humbly submits the Memorandum of the Plaint under
Order VII Rule 1, read along with S. 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and S. 2 of the
Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2015.

The suit is also maintainable by virtue of the Delhi High Court Original Side Rules, 20181 in
CS.OS.No______ of 2018 (Civil Suit Original Side).

1Delhi High Court Original Side Rules, 2018.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 14
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Wilson was the founder CEO of Essex Corporation whose exponential growth attributable
to the hard work of Wilson. It was to be taken over by umbrella corporation, a giant
conglomerate which could be a turning point of Wilson’s life.

2. On 24.11.2018, the meeting for the takeover was to be held. However, On23.11.2018,
Quibbler TV aired an interview of Rachel were in she levelled various allegations against
Wilson. The news anchor of Quibbler TV- Sartaj Singh carried out a 2 hour story on prime
time where the viewers were asked to vote and a debate was also telecasted pertaining that
issue.The TV channel also started a twitter campaign with the #wilsonthepervert.

3. In light of the developments, Umbrella Corporation called off the deal. Wilson filed a suit
for civil defamation, character assassination and damages before the Delhi High Court against
Rachel, Sartaj Singh and Quibbler tv and sought an public apology along with monetory
damages of 100 crores.Rachel claimed truth as her sole defence, Sartaj Singh claimed immunity
under freedom of press, speech and expression and Quibbler tv contested that they are not
vicariously liable as Sartaj was hired on contractual basis.

BACK STORY OF WILSON AND RACHEL:

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 15
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
1. Rachel was a fresher working under Wilson in Wade Enterprises who grew quite fond of
her. At the company’s new year party, Wilson offered to drop Rachel as she was quite tipsy.
She invited him over, he refused, Rachel then hugged him and kissed him goodbye. Wilson
was happy and the next day he proposed her in the office to which Rachel refused.

2. Deciding not to spoil the friendship, he tried to meet her when she stepped out, followed her
which made her furious. He thought it best if they both don’t work together to avoid any
awkwardness.Rachel was informed about the swap in her department. She felt it was unfair
and Wilson should be transferred instead to which the management disagreed.

3. Rachel then filed a suit against Wilson alleging stalking, physical advaces and detrimental
treatment at her workplace under the Sexual Harassment Act, 2013. Wilson was shocked and
decided to resign. Rachel also resigned after sometime however no other company was too
keen to employee her fearing that negative feedback about her work would invite sexual
allegations. Rachel blamed Wilson for it. Several years later, in the wake of the me-too
movement, she found it right to raised her voice, which led to the present defamation suit.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER RACHEL IS LIABLE FOR DEFAMING WILSON?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER SARTAJ SINGH IS IMMUNE FROM HIS LIABLITY UNDER FREEDOM OF PRESS,

SPEECH AND EXPRESSION?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER QUIBBLER TV IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR SARTAJSINGH’S ACTS?

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 16
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE DAMAGES SOUGHT BY WILSON IS JUSTIFIABLE?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

WHETHER RACHEL IS LIABLE FOR DEFAMING WILSON?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court that Rachel is liable for defaming
Wilson as the statements made by her were defamatory and they were directed towards Wilson
and were also published. Moreover, the defence of truth is not available to Ms. Rachel in the
present suit as the statements made by her were not true and were covered with malicious intent
on her part.

WHETHER SARTAJ SINGH IS IMMUNE FROM HIS LIABLITY UNDER FREEDOM OF PRESS,

SPEECH AND EXPRESSION?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court that Sartaj Singh is not immune from
his liability as his right to freedom of press, speech and expression is constricted by the
reasonable restrictions, one of which is also defamation. Moreover, one’s right to reputation
and privacy acts as a further restriction on the unbridled powers of press. The denfence of
qualified privilege is also not available in the present case due to presence of malice and
reckless reporting on part of Sartaj Singh.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 17
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
WHETHER QUIBBLER TV IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR SARTAJSINGH’S ACTS?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court that Quibbler TV is vicariously liable
for the acts of Sartaj Singh as the actions of Sartaj Singh were subsequently ratified by Quibler
TV. The Doctrine of Retained Control will also come to play in the present case. Further, there
was personal interference by the channel and SartajSingh was in a position of a representative
agent thus making the channel vicariously liable.

WHETHER THE DAMAGES SOUGHT BY WILSON IS JUSTIFIABLE?

It is humbly submitted before this Honb’le High Court that the damages sought are justified as
all the factors to be considered before awarding exemplary damages are satiated in the present
suit as Mr. Wilson suffered mental agony, loss of privacy and reputation along with monetory
losses thereby justifying the claim of exemplary damages. Further, he also lost furture business
opportunities thereby further justifying his claim for damages.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1

1. WHETHER RACHEL IS LIABLE FOR DEFAMING MR WILSON?

It is the humble submission of the Plaintiff that Ms Rachel is liable for defaming Mr Wilson,
as the statement made by her were defamatory [A] it specifically referred to the Defendant [B]
and the statement was published [C]. Further, the defense of truth is also not applicable in the
present case owing to the malicious propaganda she made on Quibbler TV2

A. THE STATEMENT MADE BY RACHEL WAS DEFAMATORY:

(a)From the facts of the instant case, it is explicit that Ms Rachel leveled numerous allegations
on Mr. Wilson in the interview aired by Quibbler TV. 3 The litmus test for what amounts to
being a defamatory statement is generally accepted as a statement that “tends to lower the

2
Paragraph 4, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
3
Ibid.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 18
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
plaintiff in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society generally”. 4Or one which
exposes a person to ‘contempt, hatred or ridicule, or tends to injure him in his profession or
trade, or causes him to be shunned or avoided by his neighbours. 5 The language used by Ms
Rachel was extremely vituperative. The usage of words like “stalked” and “harassed” pose a
very harsh comment on the morale and character of Mr Wilson, who was in a very respectable
position in the society. 6

(b)The statement made by Ms Rachel, when understood in its ordinary and natural meaning 7,
when the whole of it is read together 8 is highly defamatory in nature. The remarks made by her
were highly unrelenting which caused mental agony to Mr Wilson 9 ; sabotaged his reputation 10;
also led to him losing the biggest deal of his lifetime 11, for which he had toiled day in and day
out.

B. THE STATEMENT SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO WILSON:

(a)It is explicit from the facts of the given case that Ms Rachel had specifically referred to Mr
Wilson while making the defamatory statement on air on Quibbler TV. 12 Further, the timing of
making such a statement13also explicitly shows that the statement definitely referred to Mr
Wilson. So, the Plaintiff humbly contends that this limb of defamation of the statement
specifically referring to the Plaintiff is also satiated.

C.THE STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED:

(a)The third essential that has to be satiated for establishing a case of defamation is that the
statement has to be published. 14 Publishing can be defined as the action of making something
generally known. 15 The Plaintiff contends that Ms Rachel made a defamatory statement on

4
Sim v. Stretch, (1936) 2 All ER 1237. Also in: Munroe v. Hopkins, (2017) EWHC 422 (QB);Umesh Kumar v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 10 SCC 591.
5
Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, (1924) 1 KB 461. Also in: Radio 2 UE Sydney
Pty Ltd. v. Chesterton, (2009) HCA 16;W.B. Shanthi v.Arunachalam, (2015) 1 LW 555; Greville v. Chapman,
(1844) 5 QB 731.
6
Paragraph 1, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
7
Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty, (1882) LR 2 AC 772. Also in: Indian Express Newspaper (Bom) Pvt. Ltd.
v. Jagmohan, AIR (1985) Bom 229; Rubber Improvement Ltd. v. Daily Telegraph Ltd., (1964) AC 234.
8
Australian Newspaper v. Bennett, (1894) AC 288.
9
PurushothamLal v. Prem Shankar, AIR (1966) All 377. Also in: Hindustan Radiators Co. v. Hindustan Radiators
Ltd., AIR (1987) Delhi 353; Filmistan Distributors (India) v. HansabenBaldevdasShivlal, AIR (1986) Guj 35.
10
Sushil Kumar Gupta v. Jindal Charitable Trust, CM Nos. 2688/2017 & 2690/2017.
11
Paragraph 6, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
12
Ibid.
13
Paragraph 2, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
14
Rustom K. Karanjia&Anr.v. Krishnaraj M.D. Thackersey, AIR 1970 Bom 424.
15
Merriam- Webster Dictionary, since 1824.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 19
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
air.16 Making a statement on a media platform, which is defamatory, definitely amounts to
publication. 17 Based on this defamatory statement, the TV channel also started a Twitter
Campaign with the hash tag #wilsonthepervert and they also conducted a debate following Ms
Rachel’s interview18.

(b)There is a possibility that this hash tag would have been re- tweeted several times and every
re-tweet is a separate cause of action that amounts to being defamatory. 19The above mentioned
acts have caused serious damage to the image, reputation and goodwill of Wilson before the
whole society which is his asset and which takes years of hard work to earn.

D. MALICIOUS INTENT IS LUCIDLY PRESENT; DEFENSE OF TRUTH NOT AVAILABLE:

(a)In every false and defamatory statement, malice is presumed 20 . However, when the
Defendant takes and substantiates the defense of truth or fair comment, the Plaintiff has to
prove express or actual malice to rebut the same. 21 The allegation of malice means nothing
more than that the Defendant published a defamatory statement without a lawful excuse. 22 In
the instant matter, Ms Rachel has claimed that truth is her sole defense23; however, this defense
is not available to her as she had a malicious intention.

(b)Ms Rachel chose to make a statement24, exactly one day prior to Mr Wilson signing a very
important deal with Umbrella Corporation25 Further, it is clear from the facts of the instant case
that Ms Rachel could not stop blaming Wilson for ruining her career 26; this ipso facto proves

16
Paragraph 4, Moot Court Proposition, Page 4.
17
ArunJaitley v. ArvindKejriwal, CS(OS) 236/2017.
18
Paragraph 5, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
19
Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, (1849) 14 QBD 185. Also in: Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited, (2001) QB
201; Khawar Butt v. AsifNazir Mir &Ors., CS(OS) 290/2010.
20
Rustom K. Karanjia&Anr.v.Krishnaraj M.D. Thackersey, AIR (1970) Bom 424. Also in: TarapadaMajumdar v.
K.B. Ghosh And Co., AIR (1979) Cal 68.
21
Bromage v. Prosser, (1825) 4 B & C 247.
22
PandeySurendraNathSinha v. BageshwariPd, AIR (1961) Pat 164. Also in: Grant v. Torstar Corp, (2009) SCC
61.
23
Paragraph 7, Moot Court Proposition, Page 2.
24
Paragraph 4, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
25
Paragraph 3, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
26
Paragraph 21, Moot Court Proposition, Page 4.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 20
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
that she does have an ulterior motive and a malafide intention in making such baseless
allegations.Malice can be implied from the publication of this defamatory statement 27

E.ARGUENDO:

(a)The Plaintiff has already established that when malice is present, the defense of truth is not
available28. However, even if his Hon’ble High Court is of the opinion that there is no malice
on the part of Ms Rachel, even then, the defense of truth is not available to her as there is not
even an iota of truth in the statements made by her. She has claimed that Mr Wilson “stalked”
and “harassed29” her. Both are crimes defined by the Indian Penal Code, 1850 and thus, at this
juncture the Plaintiff would like to examine the definitions of both these terms.

E [1]. THERE IS NO “HARASSMENT” IN THE GIVEN CASE:

(a) The acts which amount to sexual harassment are mentioned in the Indian Penal
Code.30When the facts of the instant case are comprehended, it is crystalline that none of the
limbs stand satisfied. Mr Wilson had never indulged in such kind of acts with Ms Rachel. In
fact, it was Ms Rachel who hugged and kissed him about which he was very apprehensive and
hesitant31.

(c)The Plaintiffs would also like to point out that it was purely an administrative decision by
Wade Enterprises to swap Ms Rachel’s department instead of changing Mr Wilson’s as he was
an asset to the Securities and Investments Division 32. Mr Wilson had no say in this decision.
Therefore, there is no element of truth in Ms Rachel stating that she was “harassed” as the acts
of Mr Wilson do not amount to harassment as defined by the Indian Penal Code.

27
Supra Note 20. Also in: Sturt v. Blagg (1847) 10 QB 906.
28
Roberts v. Bass, (2002) HCA 57. Also in: Barbaro v. Amalgamated Television Services Pvt Ltd, (1985) 1
NSWLR 30.
29
Paragraph 4, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
30
S. 354A, Indian Penal Code, 1860. (Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013).
31
Paragraph 12, Moot Court Proposition, Page 2.
32
Paragraph 18, Moot Court Proposition, Page 3.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 21
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
E [2]. THERE IS NO “STALKING” IN THE PRESENT CASE:

(a) Ms Rachel has also claimed that Mr Wilson stalked her 33 which is a criminal offense.34
Based on the legal maxim, “actus non facitreum nisi mens sit rea”, no act amounts to a crime
unless accompanied with a guilty mind. 35 The Plaintiff would like to most reverently submit
that Mr Wilson called Ms Rachel continuously and texted her repeatedly only to ensure that
there was no awkwardness in their relationship 36.The acts done were in good faith andno act
done in good faith can constitute a crime 37. Therefore, the Plaintiff most reverently submits
that the actions of Mr Wilson do not amount to stalking also as he had no mensrea and this
actusreus does not fall under the definition of neither “harassment” nor “stalking”

Summing up, the Plaintiff has sufficiently established that the statements made by Ms Rachel
on Quibbler TV are inarguably defamatory and the case clearly falls under the purview of
defamation. Further, the defence of sole truth is also not applicable as it has been clearly
proven.

ISSUE 2

2. WHETHER SARTAJ SINGH IS IMMUNE FROM HIS LIABILITY UNDER FREEDOM OF

PRESS, SPEECH & EXPRESSION?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Sartaj Singh cannot seek immune for
defaming Wilson as his right to freedom of speech and expression is subject to reasonable
restrictions which includes defamation within its ambit.

A. GUARANTEE OF PRESS FREEDOM:

(a) The freedom of press in Indian Constitution flows from freedom of speech & expression
which is guaranteed to ‘all citizens’ under Art.19(1)(a), thus the Press stands on no higher
footing than any other citizen, and cannot claim any privilege as distinct from those of any
other citizen. 38 If no guarantee of individual right can be absolute, so is the freedom of the

33
Paragraph 4, Moot Court Proposition, Page 1.
34
S. 354D, Indian Penal Code, 1860.(Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013).
35
Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand , (2011) 3 SCC (Cri.) 232. Also in: State Of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram @
Vishnu Dutta, (2012) 1 SCC 602.
36
Paragraph 15, Moot Court Proposition, Page 3.
37
Jagmal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1991) SC 1928. Also in: ShriVasudeva Bank Ltd. v. Union of
India, 1990 (48) ELT 214 Mad.
38
Sharma v. Srikrishna, AIR 1959 SC 395 (402).

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 22
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
Press, must be reconciled with the collective interests of the society, otherwise known as the
‘public interest’39.

(b)Freedom of speech & expression cannot be taken to mean absolute freedom to say or write
whatever a person chooses recklessly and without regard to any person’s honour& reputation.
Defamation, being one of the exceptions to the freedom of expression, as enumerated in Article
19 (2) of the Constitution, it follows that a Press would be liable for defamation, like any other
individual, if the matter printed or published is defamatory of a person.

(c) It is humbly contended that the freedom of the press is extolled as one of the great bulwarks
of liberty. However, it does not mean that the press is free to ruin a reputation or to break a
confidence misunderstood. or to pollute the course of justice or to do anything that is unlawful.
Press can publish whatever it chooses to publish. But it does so at its own risk. If they damage
the reputation of innocent people, they may be made liable in damages. 40

B. DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF PRESS:-

(a) Just as the freedom of the press is necessary for the dissemination of information about
public affairs and other matters of public interest, it is equally in the public interest to see that
not merely the reputation of an individual but his private affairs, which are unrelated to public
affairs, should be protected from unwanted publicity in the press, particularly in modern times,
when the press is overstepping, in every direction, the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency41.

(b) In case of grievance ventilated by individuals on ground that defamatory statements were
deliberately broadcasted and publicized, the Court must try to equally balance the reputation
of the concerned aggrieved party on one hand and freedom of press on the other. The journalists
are expected to be careful and cautious while proceeding to make publications. 42 Reporting of
distorted and deviated versions with comments, without proper verification of facts, might not

39
Gitlow v. N.Y. (1925) 268 US 652; Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080(1099).
40
Schering Chemicals v. Falkman, (1981) 2 All ER 321 (330, 347) CA.
41
Cox broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, (1975) 420 US, 469 (487n).
42
Salendandasi v. GajjalaMalla Reddy, AIR 2008 (NOC) 299 (A.P.).

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 23
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
fall within the umbrella of protective journalism, the Court ruled. Such defamatory statements
made in publication could not be warded off under the guise of freedom of press.

C. UNBRIDLED POWER OF MEDIA HAS BEEN MISUSED:-

(a) The media has wide powers in impressing the minds of the people and it is essential that
persons responsible for broadcasting anything on air should take reasonable care and
circumspection before propagating anything which tends to harm the reputation of a person.
Reckless comments ought not to be protected. 43

(b) The reach of the media is to every nook and corner of the world. A large number of people
tend to believe as correct that which appears in the media. For these reasons alone, the mass
media has to be cautious while disseminating news. 44 It is obligatory that those concerned with
the media must maintain high professional standards and are obliged to verify the correctness
of the news circulated. Publication of false news cannot be regarded as a public service, but a
disservice to the public. 45

(c) Judiciary periodically emphasizes the need of maintaining journalistic discipline in

reporting cases. The freedom of press does not lay in highlighting news of commercial value
or which is of sensational value. 46 Hence, Power of press must be carefully regulated and must
reconcile with a person's fundamental right to privacy. Art.19 (1) (a) does not give free hand
to publish defamatory matter under the guise of free expression. A journalist shall not distort
any fact or publish information which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true; nor
shall he allow his personal interest to influence his professional conduct. Journalist must be
conscientious in disseminating news. It is the duty of a true and responsible journalist to strive
to inform the people with an accurate and impartial statement of news. As far as facts and
information are concerned, they must be truthful, objective, comprehensive and without any
distortion. It is a great responsibility not to disseminate false news, because, their statements
have a much greater circulation and impact, than those of an individual47.

(d) Sartaj Singh should have been more cautious while making scandalous imputations against
Mr.Wilson since the high position and status of Quibbler TV and their method of publicizing

43
Sahib Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 1451 : (1965) 2 CrLJ 1126 (Cal).
44
Rajendra Sail v. MP High Court Bar Associaition, (2005) 6 SCC 109.
45
Court on its Own Motion v. State and Ors.,146 (2008) DLT 429.
46
Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. State WP © No. 17595/2006 decided on 27th November, 2006.
47
Re, Harijai Singh, (1996) 6 SCC 466.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 24
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
did more harm, than the imputation which was actually made by Rachel, because some sanctity
is generally attached to what is broadcasted in the media. The defense of fair comment only
protects statements of opinion, it does not extend to defamatory allegation of facts 48.Freedom
of expression or freedom of press would not certainly include freedom to defame 49.

(e) Moreover, Sartaj Singh, with no iota of doubt, breached the Code of Journalistic ethics that
has been drafted by the Press Commission of India in its report of 1954.50 A grave concern and
dismay is the decline of ethical and professional standards among journalists. The present case
is the manifestation of the general erosion of the professional values of the journalists; hence
the counsel humbly prays that such unethical practices must not be given protection.

D. QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE NOT APPLICABLE:-

(a) In particular circumstances a person is allowed to make defamatory statements so as to incur
no liability even if the statement be untrue. A defence founded on such a right is called the
defence of ‘privilege’. When an occasion of qualified privilege exist a person, provided he is
not actuated by malice, is entitled to make defamatory statements about another 51.

(b) If the defense of qualified privilege sought to rely, it is for the defendant to prove the facts
and circumstances which establish that the occasion was privileged. If he does so, the burden
of showing actual or express malice rests upon the plaintiff, and, if this is shown,
communications made even on a privileged occasion, can no longer be regarded as privileged
communications.52 Statement is privileged, only if it is made under certain limits; if such limits
are disregarded there is an ‘excess of privilege’ which will be an evidence of malice and destroy
the privilege. Malice need not be ‘express malice or ill-will’, it would include any ‘indirect or
improper motive’; motive other than a sense of duty or interest 53.

(c) Defence of Privilege is ruled out by establishing the malice on the part of defendants. Firstly
Sartaj Singh & the Quibbler TV recklessly without verifying the statements claimed by Rachel
circulated widely for cheap publicity54; further a dubious and suspicious notion is shaped since

48
T.G. Goswami v. The State ,AIR 1952 Pepsu 165.
49
Abk Prasad v. Union Of India, 2002 (3) ALT 332, 2002 Cri LJ 2464.
50
https://www.livelaw.in/the-code-for-journalistic-ethics/; http://presscouncil.nic.in/OldWebsite/NORMS-
2010.pdf (accessed on 22.12.2018).
51
Horrocks v. Lowe, (1974) 1 All ER 662 (666, 671) HL.
52
Pandey Surendra Nath Sinha v. Bageshwari Pd., AIR 1961 Pat 164.
53
Stuart v. Bell, (1891) 2 QB 341.
54
Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 QB 431 (444).

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 25
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
such a defamatory statement, which is sternly alarming the character and reputation of Wilson,
was publicized through the medium of press, which has its impact on the nook and corner of
the world, a day prior to the Wilson’s important business deal which would eventually turn him
into the Country’s Youngest Billionaire. The day of publicizing the news of such a great
magnitude builds skepticism. Hence, Quibbler TV inorder to raise its own economic benefits
(TRP ratings) tried to pull down the fame and prominence of Mr. Wilson. A finding on the
question of malice in an action of defamation is a question of fact 55, thus, the malice on the part
of Quibbler TV and Sartaj Singh has been established with the facts of the case at hand, and
therefore, the defense of qualified privilege has been excluded.

(d)Summarizing the entire issue, Sartaj Singh cannot claim protection u/freedom of press as
the facts suggest that there is a deliberate, conscious and malicious repetition of defamatory
statements against Wilson. Though defamatory statements were initially given by Rachel;
neither the Quibbler TV nor Sartaj Singh took any steps to verify the truth in the matters
asserted by Rachel; without proper authentication, Sataj Singh carried out a two hour story on
prime time wherein the alleged personal conflict between Rachel and Wilson was dragged in
to question his professional capacity. Further a twitter campaign #Wilsonthepervert has also
been made; thus repeated defamation and character assassination has been made by the
defendants. Moreover, the right to reputation and privacy had been infringed by unwarranted
interference and degrading the character of Wilson in the minds of general public. Hence Sartaj
Singh must neither be given immunity from liability under Art.19 (1) or under qualified
privilege; as his act is in direct breach of journalistic ethics and values.
ISSUE 3

3. WHETHER QUIBBLER TV IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR SARTAJ SINGH’S ACTIONS?

The Plaintiff humbly submits that Quibbler TV is liable for Mr. Sartaj Singh’s actions as (A)
vicarious liability is applicable- (A1) by virtue of ratification; (A2) doctrine of retained control;
(A3) personal interference of the channel; also, (B) Mr. Sartaj Singh is a representative agent
of Quibbler TV.

A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY IS APPLICABLE:

55
Sabhapathi v. Huntley, AIR 1938 PC 91.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

 P a g e | 26
ND
2 SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2019
(a) Generally, a person is not made liable for the acts of another person, except in cases of
vicarious liability. Vicarious liability refers to the imputed responsibility of one person for the
acts of another. 56 It is based on two legal maxims “qui facit per aliumfacit per se”57 which
literally means “he who does an act through another is deemed to have done it himself” and
“respondeat superior”58 which means “let the superior be liable”.

(b) From the facts of the given case, it is crystalline that Quibbler TV has denied any kind of
responsibility in the present defamation suit as Mr. Sartaj Singh is hired on a contractual basis.59
A contractor can be defined as “who undertakes to produce a given result, so that in actual
execution of the work, he is not under the order or control of the person for whom he does it,
he may use his own discretion in things not specified beforehand. 60” As a general rule, the
master is not liable for the torts committed by an independent contractor engaged by him. 61
However, this rule is subject to some exceptions, which will be applicable in the present case.

(c) The Plaintiff further submits that a corporation is also liable for the slander or libel published
by its agent or officers within their scope of authority in the same way as an individual. 62 Their
liability rests on the same grounds.63

A[1].LIABILITY BY RATIFICATION:

(a) A master can be held liable for the acts of an independent contractor when he subsequently
ratifies his actions 64. Ratification is a principal's approval of an act of its agent that lacked the
authority to bind the principal legally. 65 Ratification is based on the maxim, “Omnis
ratihabitioretrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur”, which literally means every
ratification of an act relates back and thereupon becomes equivalent to a previous request. The
essential considerations which arise before a person can be held liable for a tort by ratification
are:

56
John A. Yogis, Q.C., Canadian Law Dictionary, 5th ed., (New York: Barron’s, 2003).
57
H.E. Nasser Abdulla Hussain v. DCIT, (2003) 84 ITD 43 (MUM.).
58
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 122 A.2d 457 (Md. 1956).
59
Paragraph 8, Moot Court Proposition, Page 2.
60
Pollock on Torts, 15th ed., p.62, Adopted y McKardie, J. in Performing Rights Society ltd. v.
MtichellLtd., (1977) 106 ITR 11.
61
Govind Prasad Sharma v. Board of Revenue And Ors., AIR (1965) MP 66.
62
Citizens Life Assurance Company v. Brown, (1904) AC 423; Glasgow Corporation v. Lorimer, (1911) AC 209.
63
Hillman’s Ariways, Ltd. v. Soceitte Anonme D’Editions Aeronautiques Internationals, (1934) 2 KB 356.
64
Loth v. Columbia Theatre Co., (1905) 197 Mo. 328. Also in: Gayle v. Foundry Co., (1903) 177 Mo. 427; City
of Independence v. Slack, (1895) 134 Mo. 66 ; Barry v. St. Louis, (1852) 17 Mo. 121.
65
Vivienne Harpwood, Modern tort law, Routledge Taylor and French Group, 7th Edition (2009).

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF