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THIRD DIVISION

RAFFY T. TULFO, G.R. No.187113

Petitioner,

-versus-

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - ----------------x x--------------------------x
ALLEN A. MACASAET and G.R. No. 187230
NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR.,
Petitioners, Present:

LEONEN, J., Chairperson,

HERNANDO,
-versus- INTING,
DELOS SANTOS, and
ROSARIO, JJ.

CARLOS T. SO and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondents. January 11, 2021
x------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ \ . ~__9~o--'m' --------- - - x

DECISION

LEONEN,J.:

The need to protect freedom of speech and of the press cannot be (

understated. These freedoms are the most pervasive and powerful vehicles
Decision 2 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

of informing the government of the opinions, needs, and grievances of the

public. It is through these guarantees that the people are kept abreast of
government affairs. Without these rights, no vigilant press would flourish.
And without a vigilant press, the government's mistakes would go
unnoticed, their abuses unexposed, and their wrongdoings uncorrected. 1

In this regard, journalists and the media enjoy a wide latitude of

discretion in investigating, gathering, and reporting news pertinent to public
affairs. Public affairs encompass a wide array of matters, including
information on public officials' exercise of their official functions. Imbued
with public interest, these officials are expected to execute their mandate in a
manner consistent with law, morals, and public policy.

Consistent with the right to deliver information on public matters,

journalists and members of the press may at times write inaccurate articles.
Nonetheless, liability should attach only if it is proven that the article was
written and published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard for the truth.

Commentaries on matters of public affairs are not always expected to

conform with what is acceptable. More often, these commentaries will
contain a degree of crudeness bordering on boorishness when they are
directed against unscrupulous public officials. Even then, the Constitution
remains steadfast in protecting these kinds of commentaries.

These consolidated criminal cases originated from 14 Informations for

libel filed against the writer, publisher, and managing editor of the Abante
Tonite column, "Shoot to Kill," which covered stories on the alleged
anomalous dealings of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So (Atty. So) of the Bureau of
Customs. At issue are the Revised Penal Code provisions on libel vis-a-vis
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press and statements involving
public officers in the exercise of their official functions.

Abante Tonite columnist Raffy T. Tulfo (Tulfo) filed a partial Petition

for Review,2 docketed as G.R. No. 187113, assailing a portion of the Court
of Appeals' Amended Decision3 that affirmed his conviction for six of 14
counts of libel. Abante Tonite publisher Allen A. Macasaet (Macasaet) and
managing editor Nicolas V. Quijano (Quijano) also filed a partial Petition
for Review,4 docketed as G.R. No. 187230, assailing the same Decision.

1 See Perfecto V Fernandez, Freedom of the Press in the Philippines, 33 Phil. L. J. 473,477 (1958).
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), pp. 11---<i0.
Rollo (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 53---<i7. The March 17, 2009 Decision was penned by Associate Justice
Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alifio-Hormachue!os
and Pampio A. Abarintos of the Special Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4
Id. at 3-51.
Decision 3 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

On April 12, 1999, after the ninth publication in Abante Tonite about
his purportedly dubious activities at the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So filed a
Complaint-Affidavit for nine counts of libel against the three accused for
their abusive and malicious imputations against him. He later filed two
more Complaint-Affidavits, in connection with the April 14, 19, 21, and 23,
and May 12, 1999 issues of Abante Tonite, when Tulfo refused to stop his
alleged defamatory statements. 5

The 14 Informations read:

1. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1463:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of March 1999 in Pasay City,

Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, being then the colunmist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said
publication on March 3, 1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO KILL",
quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Noong August 14, 1996 ay nag-strike ang mga

brokers at hiningi mapatalsik si So dahil sobra umano ito
kung mag-extort sa kanila."

Muling nag-strike ang mga brokers laban sa kanya

nitong December 1998 dahil sa reklamo nilang sobra kung
mangikil si So. Pero hindi na nasibak si So sa kanyang
puwesto sa pagkakataong ito.

"Ang modus operandi ni So sa NAIA ay

"pinababantayan" niya at 'pina-a-alert' ang lahat ng
kargamentong ipinapasok ng mga brokers."

"Hindi para patawan ng karampatang taxes kundi

para mag-extort sa mga ito. Ayon sa aking source,
PS0.000.00 pataas and hinihingi na pang-areglo ni So sa
kada cargo."

"ldinagdag pa ng source na kaya malakas diumano

ang loob ni So sa kanvang extortion activities ay dahil (ka-)
tandem niya si Collector Templo."

Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), pp. 90-91.

Decision 4 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

"Sa 100 cargoes araw-araw na dumating ay bahala

na kayong malula sa kakuknwenta kunir gaano kalaking
halaga ang nakukurakot ni So."

"Walang pwedeng humarang sa departamento niya

(District Collector Templo) at pagdating sa Intelligence and
Investigation Service ay naroon and partner niyang si So.
Talagang sisiw sa kanila ang smuggling."

"Kaya ayon sa aking source, sky is the limit kung

"magparating" itong si Templo ng kargamento."

"Kung sina Hemandez-Taguba raw ang "The Most

Formidable Tandem in Customs Smuggling History", sa
panig ng mga brokers, itong sina So-Templo naman daw
and Mafia ng mga bantay-salakay sa Customs."

"Si So ay may Mercedes Benz, Nissan Patrol,

Pajero, Honda Civic at Estrada. Kung gusto ninyong
makakita ng tunay na mansion ay magpunta kayo sa Fort
Bonifacio at ang pinakamalking (sic) bahay na may blue
gate at malapit sa gold course and mansyong ni So diyan sa
loob."

"Paano nga pala ito nakasingit sa loob ng Fort

Bonifacio samantalang puro military officers and hile-
hilerang nakatira diyan at hindi naman miyembro ng militar
si So."

"Kamakailan Jang na-promote si So bilang CIIS

Chief. Sa plantilla niya noon bilang Intelligence Officer I
ay P8,000.00 lang kada buwan ang suweldo niya. Paano
niya nga kaya nakuha ngayon ang ganito kalaking
kayamanan?"

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all
as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 6 (Emphasis in the original)

2. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1464:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of March 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the colunmist, publisher, and
f
managing Editor, respectively of "Abante Tonite", a tabloid published
daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit

6 Rollo (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 141-143.

Decision 5 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

or dishonour complainant CARLOS T. SO and with the malicious intent

of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on
March 5, 1999, its daily column "Shoot to Kill", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Si Jerry Yap and isa sa mga pinakamalaking

smuggler diyan sa NAIA, ayon sa aking source. Ang
protector na naman umano nito ay ang dalawang
walanghiyang Customs Officials na sina Atty. Ding So,
Chiefng CIIS, at si District Collector Celso Templo."

"Isang halimbawa ay noong September 1998,

walong vans na dineklara niyang personal effects and
pinarating niya sa NAIA, hinuli ito ng EIIB pero bigla raw
namagitan si So at Templo."

"Ayon pa sa aking source, kapalit ng protection ni

So ay P25,000.00 daw, Weekly 'tong' mula kay Yap."

"Sa ganitong klaseng sistema nina Templo at So ay

hindi nga matitigil and smuggling diyan sa NAIA."

"Kaya tinatawagan ko ng pansin si Customs Acting

Commissioner Nelso Tan, dapat bantayan mong mabuti
itong sina Jerry Yap, So at Templodahil kung hindi ay
sayang lang ang ginawa mong re-shuffle kamakailan."

"Magiging inutil pa rin ang hangarin mong malinis

ang Customs."

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all
as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 7 (Emphasis in the original)

3. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1465:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accused RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of March 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and

7 Id. at 144-146.
Decision 6 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to

discredit and dishonour complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said
daily publication on March 12, 1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO
KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

'Kamakailan ay inilantad ko rito sa SHOOT TO

KILL and mga katarantaduhan ng isang miyembro ng INC.
si Atty. Ding So na Chief ng ens sa Customs sa NAIA.'

'Ayon sa aking mga importante (sic) fil:

nagyayabang pa si So matapos kong bombahin.
Ipinagmamalaki niya na hindi siya apektado sa kahit na
anumang batikos dahil kaibigan daw niva si Boy Manalo na
kamag-anak ninyo, ay ito raw and pader na sinasandalan
niya sa INC. Kaya walang sinuman daw ang puwedeng
gumalaw sa kanya.'

'Gusto kong isa-isahin ang mga katarantaduhan ni

Ding So para sa inyong kaalaman, Ka Erdi.'

'Una, noong Aug. 14, 1996 ay nagstrike ang mga

brokers sa NAIA at hiniling na patalsikin si So dahil sobra-
sobra umano ito kung mag-extort sa kanila. Pinatalsik
naman si So na noon ay Asst. Chief pa lang ng ens.'

'At nitong Dec. 1998 ay muling nag-strike ang mga

brokers at ang sobra-sobrang extortion pa rin ni So and
inireklamo nila ngayong Chief na ito ng ens. Pero hindi
na napatalsik [p ]a ang miyembro ng INC na ito.'

'Panglawa, si So ay sumesweldo lang ng P8,000.00

kada buwan sa posisyon niya sa Customs bilang (Assistant)
Chief ng ens noong nakaraang taon. Pero siya ay nakabili
ng Mercedes Benz, Nissan Patrol. Pajero, Honda Civic at
Estrada. Bukod pa rito ay may palasyo siyang naipatayo sa
loob ng Fort Bonifacio, sa tabi ng golf course.

'Pangatlo, sa kultura ng Pinoy, marahil ay tanggap

ng (sic) ang pagiging babaero ng maraming lalaki. Pero
kakaiba ang trip ni So. Ayon sa aking source, ang mga
pinapatos ni So ay may baba( eJng (may-) asawa.'

'I sang halimbawa ang sekretarya sa isang opisina

rin sa NAIA na may asawa na. Alam ng maraming taga-
NAIA ang pakikipag-relasvon dito ni So sa babaing ito na
may initial na 'G' .'

'Ikaapat, isang Josie Ocampo na broker ang hindi

na nakatiis at nagdemanda laban kay So. Ang dahilan ay
labis namang pangingikil nito at pang-iipit sa pobreng
broker.' J
'Nagbibigay naman si Ocampo ng lagay at malaki
naman daw para hindi na siva ipitin pa ni So. Pero
Decision 7 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

talagang (sobra)-sobra raw kung mangotong ito kaya

napilitan na lang si Ocampo na idemanda si So.'

'Ikalima, ayon sa aming mga source sa Customs, si

So ay nagtalaga ng 'Quota' sa lahat ng brokers. biyahero at
biyahera (B & B) ng halagang P25,000.00 sa bawat isa sa
kanila ling{u)-lingo.'

'Kapag hindi raw nakapagbigay o kulang ang

ibinigay ng mga brokers at B&B ay agad na hinuhuli ni So
ang kanilang mga kargamento.'

Ikaanim, minsa(n) ay nahuli sa (c)amera ang pagpa-

facilitate ni So ng mga parating na cargo sa airport at sinabi
nito na para raw iyon sa INC.'

'Kulang ang espasyo rito Ka Erdi, para ibulgar ko

ang lahat ng katarantaduhan ng miyembro ninyong si Ding
So. Pero siguro naman ay more than enough na ang mga
nabasa ninyong ito para itiwalag ninyo sa INC si Atty.
Ding So.'

'Sa ngayong at sukdulan na ang kanyang pang-

(e)extort, pangungurakot at pagnanakaw pero walang
(m)angahas na galawin siya dahil ipinagmamalaki niya ang
pagiging INC member at malakas daw ka 'Boy Manalo' na
kamag-anak ninyo.'

Ako ay naniniwala Ka Erdi[,) na hindi kayo

papayag na masisira and respetadong pangalan ng I(N)C
dahil sa kutong lupa at barumbadong si So.'

'Ikaw naman Ding So, ito ang gustong iparating sa

iyo ng mga ngitngit na ngitngit na brokers. Maa(a)ring
nakalusot ka sa mga kawalanghiyaan mo sa Customs, pero
ang kakaiba mong bisyo na pagpapatol sa asawa ng may
asawa ay baka siyang totodas sa iyo kapag natiklo ka
balasubas ka!'

'Sige, Acting Customs Commissioner Nelson Tan,

sibakin mo na si So at hindi na makikialam ang Iglesia ni
Cristo!'

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all
as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 8 (Emphasis in the original)

4. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1466:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accused RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
I
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

8 Id. at 147-150.
Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

That on or about the 19th day of March 1999 is Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonour complaianant (sic) ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule[,] write and publish in the regular
issue of said daily publication on March 19, 1999, its daily column
"SHOOT TO KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

'Ngayon ay tapos na ang maliligayang araw ni

Luna. Dahil ayon sa aking source sa Customs ay sinibak na
ito. Okey 'yan Acting (Com.) Tan(.) (T)alagang
umaaksyon ka nga!'

'Pero paano itong masahol pa kay Luna na si Atty.

Ding So. chief ng CIIS divan sa Customs? Inilantad ko na
rin ang lahat ng katarantaduhan nito at sampung beses pa
ang matinding pangungurakot nito kaysa kay Luna. Siguro
(ayl dapat din(gl sumunod ito kay Luna. Sibakin mo na rin
Acting Commissioner Tan itong si Ding So!'

'Anyway, ipinarating ko na kay Ka Erdi Manalo ng

Iglesia Ni Cristo ang mga katarantaduhan ni So. Kaya
naninniwala (sic) ako na hindi na makikialam si Ka Erdi
kung sisibakin man si So. Dahil hindi kinukunsinti ni Ka
Erdi ang mga rniyembro ng INC na masasamang damo !'

'Kung hindi ka gagawa ng aksyon laban kay So,

Acting Com. Tan, iisipin ng mga tao na takot ka sa INC.
Para din sa kaalaman mo Acting Com. Tan, itong si So ay
hindi rin ginagalaw ng kanyang Director na si George
Jereos.'

Nalaman ko sa aking source na ito ay dahil din sa

takot si Jereos sa INC. Bukod dito, para hindi na Jang
umirnik si Jereos ay tinatapalan umano [nli So ng kuwarta
ang mukha nito!'

'Sinabi rin ng aking source na ikaw Acting Com.

Nelson Tan ay hindi tumatanggap ng suhol kay So. Kaya
wala kang utang na loob sa [I]ntsik na ito. AT wala ka ring
utang na loob sa INC kaya sibakin mo na si So!!!'

wherein said complainant was indicatied as an e[x]tortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all
as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to !aw. 9 (Emphasis in the original)

I
9 Id. at 151-152.
Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

5. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1467:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22 nd of March 1999 in Pasay City, Metro

Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONlTE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule[,] write and publish in the regular issue of
the said daily publication on March 22, 1999, its daily column "SHOOT
TO KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"At napag-usapan na rin lang ang black-sheep,

divan sa Customs ay wala ng titindi a sa pagka-black-sheep
ni Atty. Ding So, ang Chief ng CIIS. Kaya dapat na
talagang gumawa ng hakbang si Acting Com. Tan para
madisciplina ang abusado at kurakot na si So!"

"Ang bagong kawalanghiyaan ni Ding So ay

nagpatawag siya ng [pressconl kamakailan. Inimbita pa
niya si Acting Com. Tan para magpasikat siya dito na many
ginagawa siyang panghuhuli."

"Pero ito ang istorya, ang sinasabi niyang hinuli nya

ay ang KCJS Fleet Management. Ang halaga ng anim na
boxes na "hinuli' niya ay US$99,415.00 at ang laman ng
mga ito ay computer( s) at electronic equipment[.] Hinuli
kuno ito ni So dahil ang declaration sa kargamento ay
US$3,000.00 Jang."

"Pero ang totoo ay early February, last month pa

lang ay ipina-alert na ito [nil So. (Sa leng[g]uwahe ng
Customs, ang ibig sabihin ng 'pina-alert' ay 100 percent
ang top to bottom examination sa mga cargos)."

"Ngunit ang gi[n)agawa ni So ay pinending niya ito.

At ayon sa aking source, kinikilan niva kasi ang may-ari ng
kargamentos ng halagang !'150,000.00. Tumawa[dl ang
may-ari pero hindi pumayag si So."

"Nagkaroon sila ng mahabang negosasyon

hanggang sa humingi pa ng panahon ang may-ari ng
kargamento para mailikom niya ang hinihingi ni So."
J
"Pero katakot-takot na bomba na ang inabot ni So sa
walang tigil kong expose sa katiwalian niya at nainip na rin
Decision 10 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

siya sa kahihintay sa 'lagay' mula sa may-ari ng KCJS

Fleet kaya 'pinatay' na niya ang cargo. Agad na
nagpa[presscon) ang mayabang na si So para bumango ang
napakabaho at nabubulok na niyang pangalan! Tsk, Tsk,
Tsk."

"Simple Jang naman ang gagawin kong hamon sa

kagalang-galang na pinuno ng Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) na si
Ka Erdi Manalo at kay Acting Com. Nelson Tan."

'Kung gusto n'yo talaga ng mga katibayan kung

gaano kawalanghiya si Ding So, bakit hindi n'yo isa-isang
tanungin ang lahat ng brokers at mga biyahero at biyahera
(B&B) na sukang-suka na sa katarantaduhan ni So? At sila
mismo ang nagrereklamo sa akin.'

'Madalas ko na itong naririnig sa kanila, 'Mr. Tulfo,

ang inaasahan lang naming (Brokers at B&B) ay masibak
na ang buwayang iyan (Ding So), Pwe'!'

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all
as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 10 (Emphasis in the original)

6. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1468:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUUANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of March 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule(,) write and publish in the regular issue of
the said daily publication on March 24,1999, its daily column "SHOOT
TO KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Bukod pala kay Atty. Ding So na kurakot sa

Customs ay may kakambal siva na dapat ko ring bombahin.
Ito ay si Ramon Anquilan, Chief ng Close Circuit
Television Section.... "

"Kung inyo pang natatandaan ang sinulat ko na

nagstrike December last year ang mga brokers sa Customs
at ang unang-una sa listahan ng hinihiling nila na patalsikin
I
ay si Atty. Ding So. Ang pangalawa sa plakards na

10 Id. at 153-155.
Decision 11 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

ninabandera nila ito ay si Ramon Anquilan. Dahil katulad

din ni Ding So. itong si Anquilan ay nanggigipit din sa
kanilib ayon sa aking source."

"Ayon pa nga sa isang broker, "Mr. Tulfo,

nagbibigay talaga kami. Kasama sa negosyo namin yan.
Marami kaming inaabutan sa Customs. Natutuwa kami
dahil nakakatulong din sila sa amin. Kaya magaan din sa
loob naming ang pagbibigay sa marami sa kanila.
Samantalang 'yang hayop na si Ding So at si Ramon
Anguilan, hindi marunong makuntento."

"Nang tanungin ko kung bakit nila nasabi na hindi

nakukuntento sina So at Anquilan ay sinabi ng kausap ko
na, "kapag nag-o-offer ka halimbawa ng i"l,000.00 na
standard naman sa Customs ay hihingan ka ng i"l0,000.00
at bibigyan pang deadline"'

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law." 11 (Emphasis in the original)

7. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1469:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court(,)
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule(,) write and publish in the regular issue of
the said daily publication on April 5,1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO
KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Kagaya ni Atty. Ding So. marami na rin ang

katarantaduhang ginawa ni Aguino. Pero kahit papaano ay
may hiya pa rin si Aguino. Kumpara kay Ding So na
makapal talaga ang mukha..."

,,
"Pero hindi tulad ni Ding So na ubod ng suwapang. I
11 Id. at 156-157.
Decision 12 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 12 (Emphasis in the original)

8. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1470:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of April 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule(,) write and publish in the regular issues of
said daily publication on April 7,1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO
KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Lalo pang dumagsa ang mga nakikipag-ugnayan sa

akin na mismong mga empleyado ng Customs. Hinihikayat
pa nila na !along batikusin si Atty. Ding So at sa tuwing
may nakikipag-usap sa akin ay tinatanong kung bakit
ngitngit na ngitngit sila kay So."

"Iisa ang sagot sa mga ito, 'malala kasi talaga 'yan

Raffy, pati kami ay nadadamay.' Ayon sa isa sa
nagsumbong sa akin na malapit kay So. "inambus na nga
'yan minsan at ang dami ng tama ng bala. Kaso
Masamang-damo kaya nabuhay pa."

"May kinausap din akong taga-Customs para i-

confirm ang tungkol sa ambush na ito at sinabi niya rin na
"totoong inambush 'yan noong early '90s tadtad ng bala
ang katawan. Nabuhay pa rin dahil siguro marami ang
misyon si Satanas at siya ang maghahasik niyan dito sa
mundo."

"Ayon pa sa kausap kong taga-Customs, ang

dahilan daw ng ambush ay may kinalaman sa smuggling
kung saan nan-double cross diumano si So sa mga kausap
niyang sindikato."

"Ngayon Nelson Tan, alam mo na pala noon pa man

ang mga katarantaduhan ni Ding So. gumawa ka na ng
I
imbestigasvon at sibakin mo na si Ding So."

12 Id. at 158-159.
Decision 13 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

"Panahon na para sibakin mo ang gagong ito dahil

nagtataka na rin ang maraming empleyado ng Customs sa
'yo. Malaki ang respeto nila sa 'yo pero ang tanong nila ay
kung bakit daw hindi mo magalaw-galaw si Ding So?"

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 13 (Emphasis in the original)

9. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1471:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of April 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule write and publish in the regular issues of
said daily publication on April 12, 1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO
KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Sa pagpapatuloy ng expose ko sa (mga) katarantaduhan ni

Atty. Ding So diyan sa Customs ay heto pa ang bagong
balita ng aking source."

"Ayon sa aking source, sa kaso ni Ding So ay nagkakaroon

siya ng modus. Dahil sa continuing alert order niyang ito
ay napipilitan ang mga brokers, biyahero at biyahera ng
(B&B) na lumapit umano kay So."

"Dito nagkakaroon ng suhulan para hindi na sila maabala

sa alert order niya."

"Kaya naman, ayong sa aking source, naging arogante lalo

si So at palagi nitong bukambibig na lamakas siya sa INC.
Bagama't hindi naman siya kinukunsinti ng INC ay hindi
nalalaman ng sektang ito ang kanyang mga
katarantaduhan."

"Ayon sa isang kakilala ni So na miyembro din ng INC,

"alam mo Raffy, hindi lang talaga nakakarating kay Ka
I
Erdi ang mga katarantaduhan niya (So). Nahaharang kasi

13
Id. at 160-162.
Decision 14 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

ng mga taong nakapaligid kay Ka Erdi. Pero kapag

nalaman 'yan ng matanda (Ka Erdi) tiyak na ititiwalag
'yang si So."

"Isa pang INC member na nakakakilala rin ay Ding So ang

nagsabi naman na "ikinahihiya namin siya (So). Kasi alam
naman sa NAIA na pinapatos niya ang babaing may-asawa.
Si Gemma Laurel na taga-MIAA (Manila International
Airport Authority). Kung hindi siya matitiwalag sa aming
sekta, baka siya'y ma-ambush na naman."

"Talaga pang malala na si So at sukang-suka na sa kanya

pati mismong mga kapatid niya sa INC."

"Sir Raffy, lahat naman sila sa Customs ay nakakatikim

dahil sa SOP na talaga 'yan. Maliban na Jang kay Nelson
Tan. Pero itong si Ding So ay talagang matindi at may
sarili siyang presyo. Kaya para kami makabawi at kurnita
rin ay natuto na kaming mag-adjust sa aming binabayad sa
gobyemo (tax and duties)" ayon pa sa isang broker na
nagsusumbong."

"Paano ba ito Acting Comm. Nelson Tan, napakabigat na

pasanin mo pala itong si Ding So? Kung patuloy mo
siyang babalikatin ay baka balang araw tuluyang bumagsak
ang boung Customs at samasama kayong lumubog diyan?

"Bitawan mo ang pabigat na si Ding So!"

Noo[n] pa man ay double-crosser na si Aguino katulad ni

Ding So. Dagdag pang aking source. Malamang umano na
ma-ambush din itong si Aguino tulad ni So.

Si George Jereos, director ng CIIS ang sinasabi ng aking

source na protector ng dalawang loko-lokong sina So at
Aguino. Topnotcher daw kasi sina So at Aguino pagdating
sa pag-aabot kav J ereos ayaon pa sa aking source.

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 14 (Emphasis in the original)

10. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1472:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY /

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,

14 Id. at 163-165.
Decision 15 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

the above-named accused, conspmng and confederating together and

mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule(,) write and publish in the regular issue of
said daily publication on April 14, 1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO
KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Marami na rin ang galit kay Jereos na mga taga-

Customs at ang dahilan ayo sa aking source, ay dahil sa
sobra na rin daw kung mangikil ito at naging katulad na ni
Ding So. Sinasabi ng aking source na ni-require ni Jereos
ang lahat ng chiefs ng iba't ibang units ng CHS na
magbigay sa kanya ng "tara" weekly. Ang malalaking
units na under sa kanya ay sa NAIA, MICP, South Harbor,
Intelligence Division, Internal Inquiry Division, Cebu at
Batangas ay kinikilala niya.

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 15 (Emphasis in the original)

11. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1473:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of April 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule[,] write and publish in the regular issue of
said daily publication on April 19,1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO
KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Matapos ibalita sa akin ng isang kapatid ni Atty.

Ding So sa Iglesia Ni Cristo na si Gemma Laurel diumano
ang babaing may-asawa na pinapatos ni So diyan sa Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) ay agad na
I
tumawag daw ang mga tauhan ng asawa ni Gemma na anak
ni dating Bise Presidente Doy Laurel.

15
Id. at 166-167.
Decision 16 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

Nag tanong-tanong ngayon ang mga Laurel sa mga

brokers at sa ibang Customs employees para ikumpirma
ang sinulat ko. Nagagalak narnan ang mga brokers na galit
sa abusadong si Ding So sa pagkumpirma sa mga tauhan ng
mga Laurel. Sinasabi nila na totoo nga ang umano'y
pakikialarn ni So kay Gemma.

Kaya nagwawala daw ngayon ang anak ni Doy at hina-

hunting na ngayon nito si So. Ito ang masasabi ko, Mr.
Laurel happy hunting po.

Ikaw narnan Ding So, happy-hiding!"

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 16 (Emphasis in the original)

12. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1474:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 21 th day of April 1999 in Pasay City, Metro

Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule write and publish in the regular issue of said
daily publication on April 21,1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO KILL",
quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Kung sa iba lang siguro inalok ni Erap ang

posisyon na ito ay tiyak na hinihimud na nila ang puwit ng
Pangulo ngayon sa sobrang kagalakan!

Saludo ako sa pinakita mong katapatan sa tungkulin

Nelson Tan. Pero kung ganito kang klaseng tao ay dapat
panindigan mo rin ang pagiging matapat at matapang.
Matuto kang sibakin diyan ang mga sinasabing
'untouchables' sa Customs!

Dahil ang mga ito ang sisira sa Pangalan mo kahit tunay

I
kang malinis. Ang isa sa 'untouchables' dito ay itong
abusadong si Atty. Ding So.

16 Id. at 168-169.
Decision 17 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

Paulit-ulit nang inilalantad ang mga katiwalian niya rito at

marami na ang kapwa niya taga-Customs at mga brokers
ang galit sa kanva. Kahit pa nga ang rnismong mga kapatid
niya sa Inglesia ni Cristo (INC) ay galitna rin kay So at
kinokondena na nila ang mga kawalang-hiyaan nito.

Matagal na siyang nasibak pero nabalik din dahil

tumatakbo ito sa INC at ito ang ipinagmamalaki niya kapag
natatanggal siya sa puwesto diyan sa Customs.

Pero once again Acting Com. Tan, imbestigahan mong

mabuti ang lahat ng anomalyang ini-expose ko tungkol kay
Ding So at saka aksiyunan mo na ito!

Sibakin mo na rin si Ding So dahil tiyak na si Ka Erdi

Manalo, bilang respetadong leader ng INC ay hindi
kumukunsinti sa masasamang rniyembro nila at hindi niya
ipagpipilitan ang tulad ni Ding So na isang masamang
damo!''

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 17 (Emphasis in the original)

13. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1475:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23 th day of April 1999 in Pasay City, Metro

Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule(,) write and publish in the regular issue of
said daily publication on April 23,1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO
KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"Matapos kong mabanggit dito ang pangalan ni Gemma

Laurel dahil ibinalita sa akin ng isang miyembro ng Iglesia
j
ni Cristo na galit kay Atty. Ding So na si Gemma raw ang

17 Id. at 170-172.
Decision 18 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

babaing may asawa na "pinakikialaman" m So ay

nakipagugnayan sa akin si Gemma.

Umiiyak ito at nakikiusap na linawin ko ang paoig nya.

Ayon kay Gemma, hindi totong may kaugnayan siya kay
So.

Okey, kung nabanggit ko man ang pangalan mo rito ay

hindi ko intensiyon na siraan ka. Ang layunin ko kung
bakit ibinulgar ko ang mga kawalanghiyaan ni So ay para
masibak na ito sa Customs at matigil na ang kanyang
pagkaabusado. Wala sa intensiyon ko na ibulgar pati ang
personal na aktibidad ni So.

Pero nagkataon na dahil sa dami ng mga taong galit na galit

na talaga kay So at nagbo-volunteer ng mga impormasyon,
pati na ang ilang kapatid niya sa Iglesia ni Cristo, (na
siyang nagkuwento tungkol daw sa pakikialam ni So kay
Gemma) ay nadawit lang ang pangalan ni Gemma sa isang
!§VJ!.

At ito ay dahil labag sa do[k]trina ng INC ang pakikialam

ng isang miyembro nila sa isang taong may-asawa, ayon na
rin sa taga-INC na nagparating sa akin ng bagay na ito."

"Tinanong ko na noon ang kagalang-galang na si

Ka Erdi Manalo ng INC kung bakit pati ang mga kapatid ni
So ay galit na galit sa kanya. Ang sagot nito ay napaka-
elementary, sukdulan na raw kasi ang kawalang-hiyaan ni
So kaya gusto nilang masibak na ito sa Customs!

Ayon nga sa isang hindi miyembro ng INC na taga-

Customs, "Raffy, okey Jang sa amin kung talagang gusto
nilang maglagay ng isang taga-INC sa puwesto ni Ding So
sa Customs. Kahit pa nga puro INC members ang iluklok
nifa dito ay [o]key Jang dabil karamihan sa kaoila ay
disiplinado at sumusunod talaga sa aral ng Bibliya. Puwera
Jang yang si Ding So!"

"Paano ba ito, Ka Erdi Manalo?

Panawagan na rin kay Pangulong Erap Estrada, ayon sa

isang reliable source ko divan sa Customs, kaya raw hindi
masibak-sibak si So ay dahil wala kang go signal kay
Acting Com. Tan dahil matindi raw si Sosa INC?!"

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 18 (Emphasis in the original) I

14. In CRIM CASE NO. 99-1476:

18
Id. at 173-175.
Decision 19 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses RAFFY

TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., of
the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of May 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and
managing editor, respectively of "ABANTE TONITE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant ATTY, CARLOS T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule(,) write and publish in the regular issue of
said daily publication on May 12,1999, its daily column "SHOOT TO
KILL", quoted hereunder, to wit:

"ATTY. DING SO NANGHIHIMOD NG PUWET?"

"May bagong source na nakikipag-ugnayan sa akin at

sinabi niya na itong si Atty. Ding So na matagal ko nang
binobomba rito dahil sa maraming katarantaduhan
ginagawa niya diyan sa Customs ay nawala ng apat na
araw. Kaya tuwang-tuwa ang mga maraming brokers at
nakahinga sila kahit papaano mua sa pang-gigipit in So."

Pero noong araw daw ng Huwebes, alas-kuwatro ng

hapon ay bigla itong sumulpot at ipinatawag agad ang mga
brokers. Mainit daw ang ulo nito at sinisingil sila ng
weekly tara na tig-Pl0.000.00 bawat isa.'

"Ayon sa aking source, nahuhulaan na niya kung

bakit mainit ang ulo ni Ding So. Hirap na hirap na daw
kasi ito ngayon sa kagagapang at namamaga na rin ang dila
sa kahihimod sa puwet ng mga mai-impluwensiyang tao na
nilalapitan niya."

"Ang dahilan ng kanyang pangga-gapang at

panghihimod ay magkakaroon ng re-shuffle sa Customs ay
nanganganib na isa siya sa masisibak! Tsk, Tsk. tsk,
ganoon na ba talaga katindi ang pagsamba mo sa puwesto
mo Ding So!"

wherein said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public

official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.

Contrary to law. 19 (Emphasis in the original) I

The bulk of the Informations accuses Tulfo of writing columns that,
allegedly, maliciously impute Atty. So for his "shady dealings in the Bureau

19
Id. at 176-177.
Decision 20 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

of Customs"; particularly, his reported extortion activities against brokers

and shippers. Tulfo also wrote about Atty. So allegedly having an affair
with a married woman. 20

Tulfo later filed his Counter-Affidavit, which Macasaet and Quijano

adopted as their Joint Counter-Affidavit. Subsequently, So filed a Reply-
Affidavit, to which Tulfo filed a Rejoinder-Affidavit. 21

On August, 12, 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Abdulkalim A. Askali

issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause against the three accused
for 14 counts of libel. The three accused moved for reconsideration, which
Atty. So opposed. 22

On arraignment, the accused refused to enter any plea. As a result, the

Regional Trial Court entered a plea of not guilty for all of them. 23

According to the prosecution, Tulfo continued lambasting Atty. So in

his column, particularly in the August 23, 1999, December 17, 1999,
February 16, 2000, February 28, 2000 and April 5, 2000 issues. 24

For his defense, Tulfo contended that the statements he used in his
articles were merely reported to him by brokers-complainants whose
identities he could not reveal. He said that he verified these statements from
"other sources" who were Bureau of Customs employees and KCJS staff
members, among others. He claimed that his column serves as the voice of
those with complaints but who are at a disadvantage against those being
complained of. He argued lack of malicious intent to publish as both he and
Atty. So had not known each other before the complaints were filed. 25

For their part, Macasaet and Quijano insisted that the law does not
mention a publisher and managing editor as those liable for libel. 26

In its February 28, 2005 Decision, 27 the Regional Trial Court found
Tulfo, Macasaet, and Quijano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 14 counts
of libel and imposed on them the penalty of imprisonment and fine. It
further ordered the three accused to solidarily pay Atty. So moral,
exemplary, and compensatory damages: 28

20
21
Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 63----04.
ld.at91.
I
22
Id.
23
Id. at 91-92.
24 Id. at 91.
25 Id. at 93.
26
Id. at 94.
27 Rollo (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 178-225. The Decision was penned by Judge Priscilla C. Mijares of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108.
28
Id. at 225.
Decision 21 G.R. Nos.187113 and 187230

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the three (3)

accused, RAFFY T. TULFO, ALLEN A. MACASAET, and NICOLAS
V. QUIJANO, JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel
defined under Article 353 and penalized by Article 355 in relation to
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, in fourteen (14) counts, Criminal
Cases Nos. 99-1463 to 99-1476, and consequently each of the accused is
hereby sentenced as follows:

A. To suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (I)

day of prision correccional minimum, as the
minimum penalty, to two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as
the maximum penalty for each count of Libel as
herein charged;

B. To pay individually a fine of Six Thousand Pesos

(P6,000.00) for each case with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;

C. To jointly and severally indemnify the private

complainant, Atty. Carlos "Ding" T. So, in the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) for each case as moral damages;

D. To jointly and severally pay private complainant in

the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for
each case as exemplary damages;

E. To jointly and severally pay private complainant in

the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as compensatory damages for all the
cases; and

F. To pay the costs ofsuit.

SO ORDERED. 29 (Emphasis in the original)

Tulfo, Macasaet, and Quijano appealed. 30 However, in its July 31,

2006 Decision,31 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

On motion for reconsideration, 32 the Court of Appeals issued its

Amended Decision33 reconsidering in part its July 31, 2006 Decision. It
acquitted the three accused on eight counts of libel, but sustained their

z, Id.
30
Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 62.
31 Id. at 62-133. Toe Decision dated July 31, 2006 was penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
(now retired member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court) of the Tenth Division, Court of Appeals,
Manila.
32
Id. at 134-181.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 53-{57. The Decision dated March 17, 2009 was penned by Associate
Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alifio-
Hormachuelos and Pampio A. Abarintos of the Special Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
Decision 22 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

conviction for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1463, 99-1465, 99-1471, 99-1473, 99-
1474, and 99-1475:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of this

Court dated July 31, 2006 is RECONSIDERED in part.

1. The conviction of the three (3) accused, RAFFY T. TULFO,

ALLEN A. MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., in Criminal
Case Nos. 99-1463; 99-1465; 99-1471; 99-1473; 99-1474 and 99-1475 is
AFFIRMED together with the corresponding sentences and fines set forth
in paragraphs A and B, respectively, of the February 28, 2005 Decision of
Branch 108, RTC, NCJR, Pasay City in said cases;
2. All three (3) aforenamed accused are likewise ordered to jointly
and severally indemnify the private complainant, Atty. Carlos "Ding" T.
So, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1463; 99-1465; 99-1471; 99-1473; 99-1474
and 99-1475

a) in the amount of :Pl 00,000.00 as moral damages in each of said

cases;

b) in the amount of :P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in each of

said cases;

c) in the amount of Pl 00,000.00 as nominal damages for all the

said cases; and

to pay the costs of suit.

All three (3) accused RAFFY T. TULFO, ALLEN A.

MACASAET and NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., are ACQUITTED in
Criminal Case Nos. 99-1464; 99-1466; 99-1467; 99-1468; 99-1469; 99-
1470; 99-1472 and 99-1476.

SO ORDERED. 34 (Emphasis in the original)

In so ruling, the Court of Appeals applied the doctrines laid down in

Borja! v. Court ofAppea!s35 and Vasquez v. Court ofAppeals,36 and decreed:

Anent Crim. Case Nos. 99-1464; 99-1466; 99-1467; 99-1468; 99-

1469; 99-1470; 99-1472; and 99-1476 this Court finds the ruling in Borja[
vs. Court of Appeals (supra) applicable, the discreditable imputations
alleged in the said informations being in connection with acts of a public
official in the discharge of his public functions. Said actuations have to be
gauged, therefore, in accordance with the standards in Borja! and Vasqeuz,
as to whether they are false and if so, whether they were made with actual
malice - that is, with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not. This Court has to go along with accused
Tulfo that bare denials made by Atty. So cannot prove falsity of the
imputations. After a thorough revisit of the entire records, this Court
entertains doubt as to whether the evidence introduced by the
!
34
Id. at 66.
35 361 Phil. I (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
36 373 Phil. 238 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
Decision 23 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

prosecution had adequately established the falsity of the subject

imputations or the existence of actual malice as de.fined in Borjal and
Vasquez and ACQUITS all three (3) accused in Crim. Case Nos. 99-1464;
99-1466; 99-1467; 99-1468; 99-1469; 99-1470; 99-1472; and 99-1476. 37
(Emphasis supplied)

Hence, petitioners filed these two partial Petitions for Review,3 8

assailing the portion of the Amended Decision that affirmed their conviction
for six counts of libel.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of

the Philippines, filed its Consolidated Comment." 39 In turn, petitioners filed
their Replies. 40

For this Court's resolution are the following issues:

First, whether or not petitioner Raffy T. Tulfo is liable for libel under
Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;

Second, whether or not the published articles can be considered

privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code;

Third, whether or not petitioners Allen A. Macasaet and Nicolas V.

Quijano, Jr., as publisher and managing editor of Abante Tonite, are also
liable for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code; and

Finally, should petitioners be found guilty, whether or not the penalty

of fine should be imposed instead of imprisonment, pursuant to
Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, or the Guidelines in the Observance of
a Rule ofPreference in the Imposition ofPenalties in Libel Cases.

This Court finds the Petitions meritorious.

In construing libel laws, regard must always be made to the guarantees

provided by our Constitution. 41 Criminal prosecutions for libel must undergo
the rigorous and exacting standard of ensuring that they do not violate the
right to free expression and the press. 42 Our libel laws must not be broadly
construed as to deter comments on public affairs and the conduct of public
f
37
Rollo (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 63---M.
38 Rollo (G.R. No. 1871 i3), pp. 11-60, petitioner Tulfo's partial petition, and rollo (G.R. No. 187230),
pp. 3-51, petitiouers Macasaet and Quijano's partial petition.
39
Id. at 463-499.
40 Id. at 503-523, petitioner Tulfo's Reply, and 530 - 545, petitioners Macasaet and Quijano's Reply.
41 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 744 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
42 Elizalde v. Judge Gutierrez, 167 Phil. 192, 193 (1977) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division] citing
Bocobo v. Estanislao, 164 Phil. 516, 520---521 (1976) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
Decision 24 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

officials. Courts must examine libel cases involving a public officer's

exercise of official functions within the context of these constitutional
guarantees. 43

Unless the prosecution proves that the defamatory statements were

made with actual malice-that is, "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" 44-a criminal case for libel
involving a public officer's exercise of official functions cannot prosper.

Freedom of speech and of the press is a hard-fought right dating as far

back as the Spanish regime. At that time, censorship had been legitimate,
and such liberties were not only recurrent demands of propagandists, but
leading causes for revolution. 45

Freedom of the press rests its philosophical basis within the larger
scope of the right to free discussion and expression. 46 Freedom of the press
"is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and
efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration
would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed." 47

However, the freedoms of speech and of the press are not absolute, but
subject to certain restrictions, such as laws against libel. 48 The recognition
of libel as a limitation is rooted in one's right to protect their reputation from
malicious attacks. 49 "The right of a person to public esteem is as much a
constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property." 50

In the Philippines, libel first emerged during the Spanish colonial

regime. 51 The old Spanish Penal Code then in force included provisions on
defamacion, penalizing those "who by ,vriting shall defame, abuse, or insult,
any minister of the Crown, or other person in authority"; 52 calumny, or "the

43 Flor v. People ofthe Philippines, 494 Phil. 439,450 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]. /
44 Id. citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 11 Led. 2d 686; and Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,
373 Phil. 238,254 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
45 See Perfecto V. Fernandez, Freedom of the Press in the Philippines, 33 PHIL. L. J. 473, 473 (1958).
See also United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 739-740 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
46
Id. at 476.
47
Id.at477.
48 See Bienvenido C. Ambion, Liability for Libel Under the Present State of Philippine Jurisprudence, 19
PHIL. L. J. 316, 316 (1939-1940); See also Miriam Defensor Santiago, The Supreme Court Applies
"Clear and Present Danger": But Which One?, 60 PHIL. L. J. 57, 57-59 for discussion on free speech
as not an absolute right, but occupying a preferred position.
49 See Perfecto V. Fernandez, Freedom of the Press in the Philippines, 33 PHIL. L. J. 473,486 (1958).
50
Id. at 487.
51 Justice Leonen Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 29, 385
(2014) [Per J, Abad, En Banc].
52 See Bienvenido C. Ambion, Liability for Libel Under the Present State of Philippine Jurisprudence, 19
PHIL. L. J. 316, 318 (1939-1940) quoting Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, which provides:
Decision 25 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

false imputation of a crime"; 53 and insult, which "consists of any statement

or act which tends to bring another person into disrepute, discredit, or
contempt. " 54

Later, the Unites States Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 277,
which punished both civil and criminal libel. 55 Act No. 277 repealed the
Spanish Penal Code provisions on calumny and insults when expressed
publicly in writing. 56

The Philippine Legislature then enacted Act No. 3815, or the Revised
Penal Code, which repealed Act No. 277. 57 The provisions of the Libel Law
vis-a-vis the Revised Penal Code on libel are as follows: 58

Act No. 277 (1901) Revised Penal Code (1932)

SEC. 1. A libel lS a malicious ART. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel
defamation, expressed either in writing, is a public and malicious imputation of a
printing, or by signs or pictures, or the crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
like, or public theatrical exhibitions, imaginary, or any act, onnss1on,
tending to blacken the memory of one condition, status, or circumstance
who is dead or to impeach the honesty, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
virtue, or reputation, or publish the or contempt of a natural or juridical
alleged or natural defects of one who is person, or to blacken the memory of one
alive, and thereby expose hlm to public who is dead.

ARTICLE 256. Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive conduct does not take place in the
presence of such minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor.
53 The Spanish Penal Code, Title X, Ch. I, art. 452 provides:
ARTICLE 452. Calumny is the false imputation of a crime upon which a prosecution might be
instituted by the Government of its own motion.
54 The Spanish Penal Code, Title X, Ch. II, art. 456 provides:
ARTICLE 456. The offense of insult (injuria) consists of any statement or act which tends to bring
another person into disrepute, discredit, or contempt.
55 J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 29, 385
(2014) [Per J, Abad, En Banc].
56 People v. Castro, 43 Phil. 842, 848 (1922) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
57 REV. PEN. CODE, art. 367 provides:
ARTICLE 367. Repealing Clause. - Except as is provided in the next preceding article, the present
Penal Code, the Provisional Law for the application of its provisions, and Acts Nos. 277, 282 ,480,
518,519, 899, 1121, 1438, 1523, 1559, 1692, 1754, 1955, 1773, 2020, 2036, 2071, 2142, 2212, 2293,
2298, 2300, 2364, 2549, 2557, 2595, 2609, 2718, 3103, 3195, 3244, 3298, 3309, 3313, 3397, 3559,
and 3586, are hereby repealed.
58 See Bienvenido C. Ambion, Liability for Libel Under the Present State ofPhilippine Jurisprudence, 19
PHIL. L. J. 316, 324-325 (1939-1940), thus:
Many of the provisions of the old libel law have not been incorporated into the Revised Penal
Code such that some of the existing theories are modified. Under Act 277, the proof of truth and
defamatory imputation was always admissible (Sec. 4) but under the Revised Penal Code "proof of the
truth of an imputation of an act or omission, not constituting a crime, shall not be admitted unless the
imputation shall have been made against government employees with respect to the facts related to the
discharge of their official duties. (Art. 361). Under the old law person libelled was entitled to recover
actual pecuniary damages for injury to feelings and reputation and such exemplary damages as the
Court may determine (Sec. 1 I) but under the Revised Penal Code recovering exemplary damages is not
allowed.
The incorporation of the libel Jaw into the Revised Penal Code automatically made applicable to it
certain general principles of the said Code on criminal and civil liabilities.
Decision 26 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

hatred, contempt, or ridicule

SEC. 3. An injurious publication is ART. 354. Requirement for publicity. -

presumed to have been malicious if no Every defamatory imputation is
justifiable motive for making it is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
shown. true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in
the following cases:
SEC. 9. A private communication made
by any person to another, in good faith,
in the performance of any duty, whether 1. A private communication made by
legal, moral, or social, solely with the any person to another in the performance
fair and reasonable purpose of protecting of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
the interests of the person making the
communication or the interests of the
person to whom the communication is
made, is a privileged communication,
and the person making the same shall
not be guilty of libel nor be within the 2. A fair and true report, made in good
provisions of this Act. faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative, or other
SEC. 7. No reporter, editor or proprietor official proceedings which are not of
of any newspaper 1s liable to any confidential nature, or of any statement,
prosecution for a fair and true report of report, or speech delivered in said
any judicial, legislative, or other public proceedings, or of any other act
official proceedings, or of any statement, performed by public officers m the
speech, argument, or debate in the exercise of their functions.
course of the same, except upon proof of
malice in making such report, which
shall not be implied from the mere fact
of publication.
SEC. 4. In all criminal prosecutions for ART. 361. Proof of the truth. - In every
libel the truth may be given in evidence criminal prosecution for libel, the truth
to the court, and if it appears to the court may be given in evidence to the court
that the matter charged as libelous is true and if it appears that the matter charged
and was published with good motives as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it
and for justifiable ends, the party shall was published with good motives and for
be acquitted; otherwise lie shall be justifiable ends, the defendant shall be
convicted; but to establish this defense, acquitted.
not only must the truth of the matter so Proof of the truth of an imputation of an
charged be proven, but also that it was act or omission not constituting a crime
published with good motives and for shall not be admitted, unless the
justifiable ends. imputation shall have been made against
Government employees with respect to
facts related to the discharge of their
duties.
In such cases, if the defendant proves the
truth of the imputation made by him, he
shall be acquitted.
SEC. 2. Every person who wilfully and ART. 360. Persons responsible. - Any
with a malicious intent to injure another person who shall publish, exhibit, or
publishes or procures to be published cause the publication or exhibition of
any libel shall be punished by a fme of any defamation in writing or by similar
not exceeding two thousand dollars or means, shall be responsible for the same.
imprisonment for not exceeding one
Decision 27 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

year, or both.
The author or editor of a book or
SEC. 6. Every author, editor, or pamphlet, or the editor or business
proprietor of any book, newspaper, or manager of a daily newspaper, magazine
serial publication is chargeable with the or serial publication, shall be responsible
publication of any words contained in for the defamations contained therein to
any part of such book or number of each the same extent as if he were the author
newspaper or serial as fully as if he were thereof.
the author of the same.
The criminal and civil action for
SEC. 11. In addition to the criminal damages in cases of written defamations
action hereby prescribed, a right of civil as provided for in this chapter shall be
action is also hereby given to any person filed simultaneously or separately with
libelled as hereinbefore set forth against the court of first instance of the province
the person libelling him for damages or city where the libelous article is
sustained by such libel, and the person printed and first published or where any
so libeled shall lie entitled to recover in of the offended parties actually resides at
such civil action not only the actual the time of the commission of the
pecuniary damages sustained by him but offense: Provided, however, That where
also damages for injury to his feelings one of the offended parties is a public
and reputation, and in addition such officer whose office is in the City of
punitive damages as the court may think Manila at the time of the commission of
will be a just punishment to the libeller the offense, the action shall be filed in
and an example to others. Suit may be the Court of First Instance of the City of
brought in any Court of First Instance Manila or of the city or province where
having jurisdiction of the parties. The the libelous article is printed and girst
presumptions, rules of evidence, and published, and in case such public
special defenses herein provided for officer does not hold office in the City of
criminal prosecutions shall be equally Manila, the action shall be filed in the
applicable in civil actions under this Court of First Instance of the province or
section. city where he held office at the time of
the commission of the offense or where
the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual,
the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense or where
the libelous matter is printed and first
published: Provided, farther, That the
civil action shall be filed in the same
court where the criminal action is filed
and vice versa: Provided, furthermore,
That the court where the criminal action
or civil action for damages is first filed,
shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion
of other courts: And provided, finally,
That this amendment shall not apply to
cases of written defamations, the civil
and/or criminal actions for which have
been filed in court at the time of the
effectivity of this law.
Decision 28 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

Our Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence have since learned from

history and adapted to the changing times, finding a framework that balances
our freedom of expression with the need to protect other fundamental rights.

In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos, 59 this Court was faced
with the question of how to interpret and enforce the Libel Law in light of
the basic prerogatives of the freedoms of speech and the press. 60 It discussed
the historical development of libel in relation to these freedoms from the
Spanish regime until the enactment of organic acts in the Philippines:

Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set

down the freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was
unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt
was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien
Anos" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the
reforms sine quibus non, " which the Filipinos insist upon, said:

"The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be

reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the
Philippines free and by instituting Filipino delegates."

The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La

Solidaridad" and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the
Filipino people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and of
associations." (See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos
Consitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights,
zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition.

Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the

proposition that a reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won
at so dear a cost, should now be protected and carried forward as one
would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.

Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort.

The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee
the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and
petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in
that Magna Carta of Philippine Liberty, the Instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule
'That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."

The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the
Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of
organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words
quoted are not unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are
the counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which the American people demanded before giving their approval
to the Constitution.

59
37 Phil. 731 (1918) [PerJ. Malcolm, First Division].
60
Id. at 733-734.
Decision 29 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the proposition

never to be forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part
and parcel of the Organic Law - of the Constitution - of the Philippines
Islands.

These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not

threadbare verbiage. The language carries with it all the applicable
jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner
vs. U.S. [1904], 195 U.S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U.S., 470.)
And what are these principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But
included are the following:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government

demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on
the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer
must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be
exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorized defamation.
Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected
criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or
set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary
- to any or all the agencies of Government - public opinion should be
the constant source of liberty and democracy....

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore,
a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of
the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion
will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on
the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of
Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the
individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up
bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one
owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all know of any official dereliction on
the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring
the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish
them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to
the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of
their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but
only in a despotism."

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of

republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility
for the charges made.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration

of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The
Decision 30 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption
of the doctrine ofprivilege. 61 (Citations omitted)

In the past, libel had been punished because it tended "to provoke an
immediate breach of the peace." 62 Modem views, however, justify libel
laws on the value of reputation. 63 History has shown several concepts of
reputation that defamation laws seek to protect: reputation as property;
reputation as honor; and reputation as dignity. 64 The right to enjoy one's
reputation is ancient, long regarded as essential to human society and
civilization, falling under personal security. 65 For this reason, those who
harm another's reputation are penalized.

There appears no real distinction between civil and criminal libels. 66

Act No. 277 had once placed civil and criminal libel actions as separate and
independent remedies even if based on the same acts, as they differed in the
required sufficiency of evidence. 67 This principle was no longer
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code, which strengthened the notion that
exemption from criminal liablity means exemption from civil liability. 68
Nevertheless, Article 33 of the Civil Code still provides:

ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,

a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

As a rule, "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for

recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action[.]" 69 Article 33 provides an exception in
that it permits the institution of "a civil action for the recovery of damages
that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case." 70

It must, however, be clarified that the terms defamation and fraud, as

used in Article 33, should be interpreted in their ordinary sense, "because

61 Id. at 739-742.
62 Perfecto V. Fernandez, Freedom a/the Press in the Philippines, 33 PHIL. L. J. 473,486 (1958).
63 Id. at 487. See also Bienvenido C. Ambion. Liability for Libel Under the Present State of Philippine
Jurisprudence, 19 Pl-lIL. L. J. 316, 316 (1939-1940).
64 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL
L. Rev. 691,693 (1986).
65 Bienvenido C. Ambion, Liability for Libel Under the Present State of Philippine Jurisprudence, I 9
PHIL. L. J. 316,316 (1939-1940)
66 Id. at 320.
67 Id. at 320-321. See Re,ised Rules on Evidence, Rule 133.
68 See Bienvenido C. Ambion, Liability for Libel Under the Present State ofPhilippine Jurisprudence, 19
PHIL. L. J. 316, 321 (I 939-1940). The article discussed that Section 355 "makes civil action an
additional punishment" while Section 360 of the ReTised Penal Code reiterates that "every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable."
69 Madeja v. Caro, 21 I Phil. 469,472 (1983) [Per J. Abad Santos, Second Division].
70 Azucena v. Potenciano, 115 Phil. 465,459 (1962) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
Decision 31 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms
as means of offenses defined therein[.]" 71

How much one suffers from the damage to reputation cannot be

accurately assessed, and courts must exercise sound discretion based on the
circumstances of each case. 72

Here, petitioners are being criminally prosecuted for libel. Thus, this
Court resolves the issues considering the elements of libel as defined under
the Revised Penal Code, and as interpreted and applied in jurisprudence.

II

Petitioners argue that the prosecution failed to prove the falsity of the
allegations subject of Criminal Case No. 99-1463, 73 much less actual malice
in making these imputations. 74 They further argue that, contrary to the Court
of Appeals' ruling, the imputations in the other five cases 75 relate to Atty.
So's public functions, and thus, fall within the ambit of qualified privileged
communications. 76

Petitioners add that the allegations on Atty. So's immorality and

impropriety of conduct involve his failure to meet the standards of conduct
required of public officials 77 under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6713, the Administrative Code, the Civil Service Law, and
the Lawyer's Oath, 78 among others. 79 Atty. So's alleged illicit relationship
violates these provisions 80 since "[t]here is no dichotomy of morality: a
public official is also judged by his private morals." 81 Imputations made on
Atty. So's religious affiliation, they say, also relate to his misconduct as a
public official, such as how his affiliation protects him from prosecution. 82

Respondent counters that petitioners' liability for libel attaches to the

entire text of the articles, and not only to certain portions, as petitioners
insist. 83 It maintains that these ill publications serve no purpose other than
to publicly smear Atty. So's reputation. 84 j
71 Madeja v. Caro, 211 Phil. 469,473 (1983) [Per J. Abad Santos, Second Division] citing Carandang v.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 (1955) [Per J. Labrador, First Division].
n Id. at 322 citing Guevara v. Almario, 56 Phil. 476 (1932) [Per J. Ma!cohn, En Banc].
73 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 44.
74 Rollo (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 19-26; rollo (G.R. No. 187113), pp. 537 and 539.
75 Criminal Case Nos. 99-1465, 99-1471, 99-1473, 99-1474, and 99-1475.
76 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), pp. 52 and 539-540; rollo (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 26--40.
77
Id. at 38-39.
78 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 508.
79 Id. at 45 and 504-505.
80
Id. at 505.
81 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 506; and ro/lo (G.R. No. 187230), 39.
82 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 506; and rollo (G.R. No. 187230), p. 37-38.
83 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), pp. 475 and 477.
84
Id. at 479.
Decision 32 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

In addition, respondent contends that the allegations of extortion and

corruption should have been raised in an administrative action instead of in a
published written letter containing libelous matter. 85 It notes that even after
the charges for libel had been filed, petitioners continued to publish
defamatory statements that show malice. 86 It submits that petitioners
recklessly disregarded their duty to ascertain the truth of the imputations
made against Atty. So. 87

Finally, respondent contends that the attacks on Atty. So's personal

life, such as being a disgrace to the Iglesia Ni Cristo and allegedly having an
illicit affair, cannot be considered as privileged communication under
Articles 354 and 361 of the Revised Penal Code. 88

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines the cnme of libel,
while Article 355, provides for the imposable penalty:

ARTICLE 353. Definition of Libel. - A libel is a public and

malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.

ARTICLE 355. Libel by Means of Writing or Similar Means. -A

libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving,
radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prisi6n correccional
in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000
pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party. 89

In sustaining a conviction for libel, the prosecution must prove the

existence of four elements: "(a) the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and (d) existence ofmalice."90

For the first element, Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that an allegation is considered defamatory if:

85
Id.
86
Id. at 480.
87
Id. at 482.
88
Id. at 488--490.
89 Republic Act No. I 095 I has since amended Article 355 to adjust the amount of fine prescribed. The
imposable fine now ranges from f'40,000.00 to !'1,200,000.00. Nonetheless, we reproduce here Article
355 as originally worded, since the incidents here occurred before Republic Act No. 10951 was passed.
90 Brillante v. Court ofAppeals, 483 Phil. 568,590 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division] citing Vasquez
v. Court ofAppeals, 373 Phil. 238 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
Decision 33 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

... it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a

vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt,
or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. 91 (Citation
omitted)

Jurisprudence 92 laid down the following rules on construction when

determining whether the nature of a statement is defamatory:

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used

are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain,
natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by
persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.

For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication

alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit:

In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co.

(109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this
point: In determining whether the specified matter is
libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously
applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which
will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and
obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public
would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The
published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed
as a whole.

In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court

will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher
on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the
publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been
assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late
to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words
used in the publication. 93 (Citations omitted)

Insulting words are not actionable as libel per se, and a consequent
personal embarrassment does not mean this is automatically equivalent to
defamation. 94 The court must still be satisfied that, from the entirety of the
impugned writing, it is defamatory.

As to the elements of publication and identifiability, Vasquez v. Court

ofAppeals95 discussed them as follows:

91 Vasquezv. Court ofAppeals, 373 Phil. 238,249 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
92 See Buatis v. People, 520 Phil. 149, 161 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martiniez, First Division] citing
Jimenez v. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52, 59---<i0 (1914); Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238, 250 (1999)
[Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] further citing United States v. Sotto, 38 Phil 666, 672---<i73 (1918) [Per J.
Fisher, En Banc].
93 Buatis, Jr. v. People, 520 Phil. 149, 160-161 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martiniez, First Division] citing
Jimenez v. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52, 59---<i0 (1914) [Per J. Trent, First Division].
94 De Leon v. People, 776 Phil. 701 (2016) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
95 373 Phil. 238 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
Decision 34 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

There is publication if the material is communicated to a third

person. It is not required that the person defamed has read or heard about
the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has read or
heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate in
which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself."

On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must

be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to identify him
as the object of the defamatory statement. 96 (Citations omitted)

Here, petitioners do not question the Court of Appeals' findings that

the first three elements exist. 97 They only raise as issue the falsity or
truthfulness of the imputations, and whether these imputations are connected
to Atty. So's official functions. 98 Incidentally, these issues both pertain to
the fourth element of libel, which is malice.

II (A)

Malice exists when the prosecution proves that the author made the
defamatory statement knowing it was false, or even if true, there is no
showing of good intention and justifiable motive. 99 It "implies an intention
to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm" 100 and exists when "the offender is
prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but
merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed." 101

The requisite of malice has evolved, there being a distinction between

libel cases involving private persons and those involving public officers and
public figures. Thus, whether the complainant is a private or public person
is a factor that must be considered. 102

Here, the prosecution admitted during pre-trial that at the time the
articles were published, private complainant Atty. So was a public officer,
the then officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. 103 This
admission shall be considered in determining petitioners' liability for libel. J
96
Id. at 249.
97
Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 263.
98 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113) pp. 44-45 and ro//o (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 13-14.
99 Brilliante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568, 591 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division] citing New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
100 Brilliante v. Court ofAppeals, 483 Phil. 568, 591 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division] citing United
States v. Canete, 38 Phil. 253 (1918) [Per J. Fisher, En Banc].
101 Id.
102 J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 29, 368-374
(2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
103
Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 93.
Decision 35 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

The Constitution mandates that "[p]ublic officers and employees must

at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives." 104

As early as 1918, this Court in Bustos emphasized the need for full
discussion of public affairs and how those in public positions should not be
too thin-skinned when comments are made on their official functions. 105

In the United States, it was not only until the 1964 case of New York
Times v. Sullivan 106 that the United States Supreme Court laid down "the
extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a
State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct." 107 The Court, speaking through
Justice William Brennan, decreed:

The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public

questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our
decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, "was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people."

"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to

the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system." 108 (Citations omitted)

The United States Supreme Court in New York Times went on to

introduce the "actual malice" test. Under this test, a public official cannot
recover damages for a defamatory falsehood on their official conduct unless
they prove "that the statement was made . . . with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 109

In our jurisdiction, this Court adopted with approval the actual malice
test and has since applied it to several cases involving libel. 110
/
104 CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.
105 United States v. Bustos, 376 Phil. 731, 740-741 (1918) [Per J. Malcohn, First Division].
106 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Lopez v. Court of Appeals 145 Phil. 219,233 (1970) [Per J. Fernando,
First Division].
107
Id. at 256.
108 Id. at 269.
109 Id. at 279-280.
110 See Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 145 Phil. 219 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, First Division]; Guingguing v.
Court of Appeals, 508 Phil. 193 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Borja! v. Court of Appeals,
361 Phil. I (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238
(1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]; and Flor v. People, 494 Phil. 439 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
Second Division].
Decision 36 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Hon. Capulong, 111 this Court

extended the "actual malice" requirement in libel cases involving public
officers to "public figures." It decreed that owing to the legitimate interest
of the public in his or her affairs "the right of privacy of a 'public figure' is
necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen." 112

II (B)

Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides that except for
privileged communications, every defamatory imputation is deemed
malicious:

ARTICLE 354. Requirement for Publicity. - Every defamatory

imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any

comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

On the other hand, Article 361 recognizes the truth of an imputation as

a defense in a criminal prosecution for libel:

ARTICLE 361. Proof of the Truth. - In every criminal

prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if
it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants
shall be acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not

constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have
been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to
the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation

made by him, he shall be acquitted.
I
As an exception to the presumption that every defamatory imputation
1s malicious, privileged communication has two kinds: absolute and

111 243 Phil. 1007 (1988) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].

112 Id. at I 024.
Decision 37 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

qualified. 113 The distinction between these two was discussed in Orfanel v.
People, 114 where this Court decreed:

[A] privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or

conditionally privileged. A communication is said to be absolutely
privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has acted in bad
faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the
discharge of their functions as such, official communications made by
public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or
statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or
motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the
answers given by witness in reply to questions propounded to them, in the
course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are
relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the
questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand,
conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which,
although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable
unless made with malice or bad faith. It has, moreover, been held that there
is malice when the defamer has been prompted by ill-will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed. 115 (Citations omitted)

Absolute privileged communications include Article VI, Section 11 of

the Constitution, which states, "No Member [of Congress] shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof." 116 On the other hand, qualified
privileged communications include '"private communications"' and 'fair
and true report without any comment or remarks."' 117

In Borja! v. Court of Appeals, 118 this Court recognized that the

enumeration of qualified privileged communications under Article 354 of
the Revised Penal Code is not exclusive. It decreed that "fair commentaries
on matters of public interest" are likewise deemed privileged by reason of
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press:

The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the

nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in
United States v. Caete, this Court ruled that publications which are
privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be
abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express
recognition in the statute punishing libels.
f
113 See Sison v. David, 110 Phil 662, 671-675 (1961) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]; See also Borja/ v.
Court of Appeals, 361 Phil I, 18 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]; Flor v. People, 494 Phil
439, 449-450 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
114 141 Phil. 519 (1969) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
115
Id. at 523-524.
116
CONST, art. VI, sec. 11.
m Borja/ v. Court ofAppeals. 361 Phil. I, 18 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
ns 361 Phil. I (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
Decision 38 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the

freedom of the press. As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez and reiterated in
Santos v. Court ofAppeals -

To be more specific, no culpability could be

imputed to petitioners for alleged offending publication
without doing violence to the concept of privileged
communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As
was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: Public
policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection
of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result
has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.

The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule
that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public
opinion. This closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as
essential to collective self-determination and eschews the strictly
libertarian view that it is protective solely of self-expression which, in the
words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Piss, makes its appeal to the
individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture...

To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are

privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to
a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of
fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that
the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from thefacts. 119 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 120 this Court reiterated the actual

malice test and discussed Article 361 on the defense of truth:

In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and

the other residents of the Tonda Foreshore Area were not only acting in
their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to
it that public duty is discharged faithfally and well by those on whom such
duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen
in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the
burden of proving that he acted -with good motives and for justifiable ends.

For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no

liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official
I
concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice - that is,

119 Id. at 18-20.

120 373 Phil. 238,254 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
Decision 39 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it

was false or not. Tbis is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New
York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with approval in several
of its own decisions. This is the rule of "actual malice." ...

A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of

allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends
for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the
Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from
performing their duties as members of a self-governing community.
Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding
concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, public
discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people. 121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

As discussed, Bustos has early on recognized the need to read and

interpret our libel laws in relation to the fundamental rights of free speech
and free press. 122 Courts must examine libel cases involving a public
officer's exercise of official functions within the context of these
constitutional guarantees. 123

Bustos discussed everyone's societal duty to assist in the investigation

of any alleged wrongful act or misconduct by public officers, and to give
notice if such matters of public concern come to their attention. To maintain
good government, it is within societal interest to foster an atmosphere that
allows a full discussion of public matters, including comments and criticisms
on the conduct of those holding public office. 124

In United States v. Perfecto, 125 this Court recognized that "[t]he

development of an informed public opinion in the Philippines can certainly
not be brought about by the constant prosecution of those citizens who have
the courage to denounce the maladministration of public affairs." 126

Similarly, in Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 127 it was stressed that "[n]o

inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action
visited in what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form
of printed words or a defamatory imputation[.]" 128

The diminishing viability of criminal prosecutions for libel was noted

in Guingguing v. Court ofAppeals, 129 where this Court decreed: I
121 Id. at 254-255.
122 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 733-734 (1918) [Per J. Malcohn, First Division].
123 Flor v. People, 494 Phil. 439,450 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
124 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 740-741 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
m 43 Phil 225 (I 922) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
126
Id. at 232.
127 145 Phil. 219 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, First Divisio!1]
128
Id. at 234.
129 Guingguing v. Court ofAppeals, 508 Phil. 193, 204-216 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
Decision 40 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

It cannot be helped if the commentary protected by the Bill of

Rights is accompanied by excessive color or innuendo. Certainly, persons
in possession of truthful facts are not obliged to present the same in bland
fashion. These true facts may be utilized to convince the listener/reader
against a particular position, or to even dissuade one against accepting the
credibility of a public figure. Dry facts, by themselves, are hardly stirring.
It is the commentary thereupon that usually animates the discourse which
is encouraged by the Constitution as integral to the democratic way of life.
This is replete in many components of our daily life, such as political
addresses, televised debates, and even commercial advertisements.

As adverted earlier, the guarantee of free speech was enacted to

protect not only polite speech, but even expression in its most
unsophisticated form. Criminal libel stands as a necessary qualification to
any absolutist interpretation of the free speech clause, if only because it
prevents the proliferation of untruths which if unrefuted, would gain an
undue influence in the public discourse. But in order to safeguard against
fears that the public debate might be muted due to the reckless
enforcement of libel laws, truth has been sanctioned as a defense, much
more in the case when the statements in question address public issues or
involve public figures.

In ascertaining the degree of falsity that would constitute actual

malice, the Court, citing New York Times, has even gone so far as
acknowledging:

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are

false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not
prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable
in any scheme of truly free expression and debate.
Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press
should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for
honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language.
There must be some room for misstatement offact as well
as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and
tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as
critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing
Corp. v. Noel we held:

A newspaper especially one national

in reach and coverage, should be free to
report on events and developments in which
the public has a legitimate interest with
minimum fear of being hauled to court by
one group or another on criminal or civil
charges for libel, so long as the newspaper
respects and keeps within the standards of
morality and civility prevailing within the
general community.

To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily

accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules
/
governing liability for injury to reputation are required to
allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some
inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York
Decision 41 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a

public official or public figure may not be imposed in the
absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the
person making the libelous statement. 130 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Every prosecution for libel, therefore, must undergo the rigorous and
exacting standard of ensuring that it does not violate the fundamental right to
free speech and the press. 131 Unless the prosecution proves that the
defamatory statements were made with actual malice, 132 a criminal case for
libel against critics of a public officer's exercise of official functions cannot
prosper.

II (C)

Notably, the facts and issues of the Petitions here are similar to the
2008 case of Erwin Tulfo v. People, 133 where this Court quoted Re: Emil P.
Jurado 134 on the duty of journalists to write responsibly:

Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist who

deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth; or that a newsman may escape
liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a
person or entity, but recognized no obligation bona fide to establish
beforehand the factual basis of such imputations and refuses to submit
proof thereof when challenged to do so. It outrages all notions of fair play
and due process, and reduces to uselessness all the injunctions of the
Journalists Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the potential of his
profession to influence popular belief and shape public opinion, to make
shameful and offensive charges destructive of personal or institutional
honor and repute, and when called upon to justify the same, cavalierly beg
off by claiming that to do so would compromise his sources and
demanding acceptance of his word for the reliability of those sources. 135

Here, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner Raffy Tulfo's

conviction in Criminal Case No. 99-1463 after finding that the imputations
were false, and that he knew them to be false:

Aforesaid news article is false because as testified to by Atty. So

he was a Military Officer and is still a member of the reserved corps. The
allusion that his house is a mansion was contradicted by Judge Mijares
during the trial before her court herself where accused-appellant Tulfo

130 Id. at 221-223.

I
131 See Elizalde v. Judge Gutierrez, 167 Phil. 192, 193 (1977) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division] citing
Bocobo v. Estanislao,164 Phil. 516, 520-521 (1976).
132 Flor v. People, 494 Phil. 439, 451 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division], discussing the
actual malice test laid down in New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, that is, "with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
133 587 Phil. 64 (2008) [Per J. Velaso, Second Division].
134 313 Phil. 119 (J 99 5) [Per C.J. Narvasa, En Banc].
135 Erwin Tulfo v. People, 587 Phil. 64, 87 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Second Division].
Decision 42 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

himself presented the photograph by saying it is a residential house. Not

only is the imputation in said publication of Abante Tonite on March 3,
1999 false; accused Tulfo himself knew it to be false. 136

As for the other five libel cases, 137 the Court of Appeals affirmed his
conviction after finding that the discreditable imputations do not relate to
Atty. So's official functions, and the statements seeking to expel him from
his religious community or to publicize his alleged illicit affair were made
without good intention or justifiable motive. 138

In its original Decision, the Court of Appeals quoted the following

portion of petitioner Tulfo's cross-examination and decreed 139 that
petitioners acted with reckless disregard in ascertaining whether the
imputations were false or not:

Atty. So:
Q: In all the articles that you wrote against Atty. Carlos 'Ding' So in your
'Shoot to Kill' column in Abante Tonite newspaper which are now the
subject of the present cases, you claimed that your reports or information
came from sources or informants whose names you would not like to
divulge before this Court, is this correct?

Witness:
A: That is correct.

Q: And that these reports or information by your sources were not reduced
into writing, or in affidavit form, is it not? ...

Witness:
A: Yes, your Honor.

Atty. So:
Q: And that according to you, those statements written in your articles
against Atty. Carlos 'Ding' So were not based on your personal
knowledge because these were only relayed to you by your sources whose
names you refuse to reveal, is it not?

Witness:
A: Yes, I don't have personal knowledge.

Q: Before you wrote these articles, did you find out if there was any
pending criminal or administrative complaint filed against Atty. Ding So
in relation to his work? ...

Witness:
A: No administrative or criminal cases against him.
f
Atty. So:

136
Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 266.
137 Criminal Case Nos. 99-1465, 99-1471, 99-1473, 99-1474, and 99-1475.
138
Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 271.
139
Id.at119.
Decision 43 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

Q: Despite the lack of any criminal or administrative complaint filed

against Atty. Ding So prior to the writing of these articles, you still wrote
those articles describing Atty. So as syndicated smuggler, coddler and
protector of smugglers, balasubas, swindler, pinapatos ang mga babaeng
may asawa, double crosser, etc., is it not? ...

Witness:
A: The answer is yes." (Cross-examination of accused Tulfo, TSN dated 9
July 2004, pages 31 to 38)

"Atty. So:
Q: You mentioned that complainant Atty. So owns luxury vehicles such as
Mercedez Benz, a Nissan Patrol, a Pajero, a Honda Civic and a Strada, is it
now?

Witness:
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you verify from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) whether
said vehicles were or are registered in the name of Atty. So?

Witness:
A: Those informations (sic) were given to me by your friends ...

Atty. So:
Just answer the question.

Court:
There was no verification?

Witness:
None, your honor." (Cross-Examination of accused Tulfo, TSN dated July
9, 2004, pages 47-48)

"Atty. So:
Q: You have written in your March 3, 1999 Shoot to Kill column that
Atty. So was able to own a house in Fort Bonifacio when he is not a
member of the military, is it not?

Witness:
A: Yes, sir. ...

Q: Did you also verify from the Office of the Armed Forces of the
Philippine Officers Village Association, Inc. whether Atty. So is the owner
of the house that you referred to in your March 3, 1999 column?

Witness:
A: No, sir." (Cross Examination of accused Tulfo, TSN dated July 9,
2004, pages 103-104) 140
I
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, the prosecution failed to
prove that petitioner Tulfo acted with malice, or with reckless disregard in
determing the truth or falsity of the imputations.

140
Id. at 120-122.
Decision 44 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

Here, each Information on the series of articles in Abante Tonite

covering Atty. So includes an ending paragraph stating that "complainant
was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth[.]" 141

The Informations for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1463 and 99-1465 allege,
among others, that the brokers conducted a strike on August 14, 1996 and
sometime in December 1998, seeking Atty. So's removal from his position
"dahil sabra umano ito kung mag-extort sa kanila." 142 The Informations for
Criminal Case Nos. 99-1463, 99-1465, and 99-1471 also state:

"Ayon sa aking source, PS0,000 pataas ang hinihingi na pang-areglo ni So

sa kada cargo"; 143 "Ang modus operandi ni So sa NAIA ay
'pinababantayan' niya at 'pina-a-alert' ang lahat ng kargamentong
ipinapasok ng mga brokers"; 144 "Dahil sa continuing alert order niyang ito
ay napipilitan ang mga brokers, biyahero at biyahera ng (B&B) na lumapit
umano kay So ... Dito nagkakaroon ng suhulan para hindi na sila maabala
sa alert order niya"; 145 "[A]yon sa arning mga sources sa Customs, si So
ay nagtalaga ng 'Quota' sa lahat ng brokers, biyahero at biyahera (B& B)
ng halagang P25,000.00 sa bawat isa sa kanila ling(u)-lingo"; 146 "Sir
Raffy, lahat naman sila sa Customs ay nakakatikim dahil (sa) SOP na
talaga 'yan. Maliban na lang kay Nelson Tan. Pero [itong] si Ding So ay
talagang matindi at may sarili siyang presyo." 147

These allegations all refer to acts related to Atty. So's official

functions at the Bureau of Customs.

The Informations also mention allegations that Atty. So has a

"mansion" or "palasyo" at Fort Bonifacio and a number of cars. 148 Reading
the articles as a whole, these statements imply corruption and smuggling in
relation to Atty. So's official functions, thus:

"Sa JOO cargo(e)s araw-araw na dumating ay bahala na kayong malula

sa kakakuwenta kung gaano kalaking halaga ang nakukurakot ni So"; 149
"Kamakailan Zang na-promote si So bilang CIIS Chief Sa plantilla niya
noon bilang Intelligence Officer I at P8,000.00 Zang kada buwan ang
suweldo niya. Paano niya nga kaya nakuha ngayon ang ganito kalaking
kayamanan?" 150

141 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), pp. 66, 70, 82, 84, 86, 88.
142 Id. at 64. See also id. at 68--ti9.
143
Id. at 65.
144 Id. at 64.
145
Id. at 80.
146 Id. at 69.
147
Id.at81.
148
Id. at 65 and 69.
149
Id. at 65.
150
Id. at 66.
Decision 45 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

For Criminal Case Nos. 99-1465, 99-1471, 99-1473, 99-1474, and 99-
1475, the Informations include statements calling for Atty. So to be removed
from Iglesia ni Cristo for his misconduct, including having an alleged affair
with a married woman. 151

Reading the articles as a whole, these statements indicate Atty. So's

alleged use of connections to stay in position and conceal his misconduct.
They were written to end his purported abuse of public position:

"Ayon sa ak:ing mga impor[m]ante ay nagyayabang pa si So

matapos kong bombahin. Ipinagmamalak:i niya na hindi siya apektado sa
kahit na an\l1Ilang batikos dahil kaibigan daw niya si Boy Manalo(,) na
kamag-anak ninyo, at ito raw ang pader na sinasandalan niya sa INC.
Kaya walang sinll1Ilan daw ang puwedeng g=alaw sa kanya;" 152 "Kaya
naman, ayon sa ak:ing source, naging arogante lalo si So at palagi nitong
bukambibig na (malakas) siya sa INC;" 153 "Matagal na siyang nasibak
pero nabalik din dahil tUlilatakbo ito sa INC at ito an[g] ipinagmamalak:i
niya kapag natatanggal siya sa puwesto diyan sa Customs;" 154 "Isa pang
INC member na nakakak:ilala rin kay Ding So ang nagsabi naman na
'ikinahihiya namin siya (So). Kasi alam naman sa NAIA na pinapatos niya
ang babai,ng rnay-asawa." 155 "Nagtanong-tanong ngayon ang mga (tauhan
ng mga) Laurel sa mga brokers at sa ibang Customs employees para
ikll1Ilpirma ang sinulat ko. Nagagalak naman ang mga brokers na galit (na
galit) sa abusadong si Ding So sa pagkll1Ilpirma sa mga tauhan ng mga
Laurel. Sinasabi nila na totoo nga ang U1Ilano'y pak:ikialam ni (Ding) So
kay Gemma;" 156 "[N]ak:ipag[-]ugnayan sa akin si Gemma. Umiiyak ito at
nak:ikiusap na linawin ko ang panig nya. Ayon kay Gemma, hindi
toto[o]ng may kaugnayan siya kay So. Okey, kung nabanggit ko man ang
pangalan mo rito ay hindi ko intensiyon na siraan ka. Ang layunin ko
kung bak:it ibinu[bu]lgar ko ang mga kawalanghiyaan ni So ay para
masibak na ito sa Customs at matigil na ang kanyang pagkaabusado.
Wala sa intensiyon ko na ibulgar pati ang personal na aktibidad ni So." 157

From these, it can be deduced that the impugned articles fall within
the purview of qualified privileged communications. These columns relate
to Atty. So's exercise of his official functions. His alleged actuations refer
to matters of public interest which the citizenry ought to know. As an
official of the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So is subject to a closer scrutiny by
members of the media, who act as sentinels of the public.

Having established the privileged nature of the Abante Tonite articles,

the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that actual malice exists. 158 The
prosecution is duty bound to show that the alleged defamatory statements

151 Id. at 70, 80, and 84--87.

152
Id. at 68.
153
Id. at 80.
154
Id. at 85.
155
Id. at 80.
156 Id. at 84.
157
Id. at 87.
158 See REV. PEN. CODE, art. 354.
Decision 46 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

were made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." 159 The reason for this rule is based on the New
York Times doctrine, which provides:

[T]o require critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their
factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self-censorship,
since would-be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms
even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt
whether it could be proved or because of fear of the expense of having to
prove it. 160 (Citation omitted)

The "reckless disregard" standard "cannot be fully encompassed in

one infallible definition" 161 and must be applied depending on the facts of
each case. 162 Nevertheless, in Flor v. People, 163 this Court decreed that the
existence of reckless disregard cannot be based on "whether a reasonably
prudent [person] would have published, or would have investigated before
publishing." 164 Instead, it depends on whether sufficient evidence has been
adduced "to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of [their] publication." 165

Here, petitioner Tulfo's testimony on cross-examination does not

show that the allegations were false, or that they were made with reckless
disregard of ascertaining whether the statements were false or not. His
testimony that no administrative case was filed against Atty. So does not
mean that the statements in the articles were false.

Besides, it is not unusual that columnists have no personal knowledge

on the material they report. Perhaps compelled by their societal duty to
maintain good government, people with information on matters of public
interest may contact reporters and columnists to share in confidence what
they know. Columnists cannot be compelled to reveal their sources,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 53, as amended by Republic Act No. 1477. 166
The confidentiality of sources serves as their protection.

159 Flor v. People, 494 Phil. 439, 451 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division] citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 11 Led. 2d 686; and Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238,
254 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
160 Borja/ v. Court ofAppeals, 36 J Phil. I, 22 (I 999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
161 Flor v. People, 494 Phil. 439,452 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division] citing St. Amant v.
Thompsos, 390 U.S. 727, 730 [Per J. White].
162 Id.
163 494 Phil. 439 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
164
Id. at 452.
1Gs Id.
166 Republic Act No. 1477 (1956), sec. 1, amending Republic Act No. 53 (1946), states:
SECTION I. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor,
columnists or duly accrediter reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation
cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news report or information appearing in said
publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reported unless the court or a
House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
Decision 47 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

That petitioner Tulfo has never bothered obtaining Atty. So's side of
the story, as respondent insists, 167 cannot amount to malice. While
substantiatiating facts does play an important role in reporting standands, 168
a reporter may rely on a lone source's information, even if such information
only shows one side of the story, for as long as the reporter "does not
entertain a 'high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity."' 169

This Court has also held that privileged communication "should not
be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or
falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law
throws over privileged communications." 170 No law requires the sources of
a columnist to execute an affidavit putting their testimonies in writing.

Lastly, a defense witness testified on the strike staged by the brokers

complaining about some officials of the Bureau of Customs:

(Direct Examination of witness Romeo B. Sulit)

"Atty. Marigomen:
Q: Now Mr. Witness, the private complainant in this case is Atty.
Ding So. Do you know who Atty. Ding So is, the complaininat in this
case?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: How do you know the complainant in this case?

A: I know him because he was the one of the officials at the Bureau of
Customs na nirereklamo sa asosasyon ng CUCHERO.

Q: Mr. Witness, how do you know that the private complainant was
one of the Customs' officials who were complained of against by
CUCHERO, Inc.?

A: Bilang isang reporter na nakaassign sa Customs, aka 'y pumunta

doon sa lugar ng strike na kung saan binigyan aka ng mga impormasyon
at tsaka mga dokumento na makapagpapatunay na sila ay nagrereklamo
sa mga officials na ito kasama na doon si Atty. So.

Court:
Q: Was there a strike?

A: Yes, your honor.

I
Q: My question, your Honor, is aside from being personally present in
the strikes reported, he was also provided a document by CUCHERO, Inc.,

167 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 485.

168 Flor v. People, 494 Phil 439,454 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
169 Id. citing New York Times Companyv. Connor, 365 F. 2d 567,576 (1966).
170 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 743 (1918) [Per J. Malcohn, First Division].
Decision 48 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

I am showing to him documents that were previously marked by the

defense as Exhs. "4," "5," and "6." I would like him to go over these and
affirm whether or not these are the same documents that were furnished to
him during the broker's strikes.

Court:
Exhs. "4," "5" and "6"

Witness:
A: Yes, ma'am. I am familiar with these documents. These are all
the documents given to us.

Atty. So:

If, your Honor please, may I examine the notes that were referred to the
witness?

Atty. Marigomen:
Your Honor, these are exhibits not notes.

Court:
Atty. Daproza, show him. (Atty. So scrutinizing the documents shown to
him.)

Atty. So:
May I just make some comment on these, your Honor?

Court:
Not yet. Allow him to finish his testimony first.

Atty. Marigomen:
Q: Now Mr. Witness, you mentioned "ito "yung mga sinuply sa
amin", who were you referring to aside from yourself with respect to the
distribution of these documents?

Court:
Supplied by whom?

Witness:
A: Ang document pong iyan, Xerox copy, ay ipinamigay po sa amin
ng members ng CUCHERO sa pangunguna ni Mr. Boy Simborio,
Presidente ng CUCHER0." 171

The Court of Appeals held that this testimony does not prove that
there was no reckless disregard to ascertain if the articles were false or not.
It also found that the documents identified by the witness to support the O
allegations against Atty. So were inadmissible for being photocopies. 172 /

Nonetheless, this testimony confirms petitioner Tulfo's statements in

his articles that the brokers conducted a strike complaining about certain
Customs officials, including Atty. So. At the very least, this corroborates

rn Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), pp. 129-131.

172Id. at 131.
Decision 49 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

petitioner Tulfo's submission that brokers gave him information on Atty.

So's abuse of power in the Bureau of Customs.

Petitioner Tulfo reported on the alleged illegal activities of Atty. So in

the exercise of his public functions. Our libel laws must not be broadly
construed as to deter comments on public affairs and the conduct of public
officials. Such comments are made in the exercise of the fundamental right
to freedom of expression and the press.

Public officers are accountable to the people, 173 and must serve them
"with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 174 Speech that guards against
abuses of those in public office should be encouraged. Petitioner Tulfo
should be acquitted.

III

Since the author of the impugned articles himself is not guilty of libel,
it follows that petitioners Macasaet and Quijano, the publisher and managing
editor of the Abante Tonite columns, must likewise be acquitted.

Nonetheless, this Court sets the record straight on the seeming

confusion as to what accounts for liability for libel under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners Macasaet and Quijano argue that their conviction was

solely because they were the publisher and managing editor of Abante
Tonite, without proof of their actual participation. 175

Assuming they did fail to prevent the publication of the impugned

articles, they say that this was not unlawful. 176 They contend that the use of
positions such as "editor" and "business manager" in Article 360 may have
considered the smaller publishing houses then, and it was reasonable for
legislators to assume that editors and business managers had a direct hand in
publication. 177 On the other hand, corporations today operate on different
levels given the nature and volume of business, rendering the publisher and
managing editor, such as petitioners, "virtually ignorant of the exact contents j
of articles and news items published." 178 Petitioners seek a reconsideration
of the interpretation, if not constitutionality, of Article 360. 179

173 CONST. art. XI, sec. I.

174 CONST. art. XI, sec. 1.
175 Rollo (G.R. No. 187230), pp. 40--48; and rollo (G.R. No. 187113) p. 532.
176 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 532.
177
Id. at 534.
11s Id.
119 Id.
Decision 50 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

Respondent counters that Article 360, as amended by Republic Act

No. 1289, provides that "the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof." 180 It contends that petitioners Macasaet and Quijano should have
prevented the repeated publications of the allegedly defamatory articles. 181

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states:

ARTICLE 360. Persons Responsible. - Any person who shall

publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or

business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and the civil action for damages in cases of
written defamation, as provided in this chapter, may be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the
province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited,
regardless of the place where the same was written, primed or composed.

No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation

of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except
at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended
party.

In Fermin v. People, 182 this Court discussed the logic behind the
criminal liability of persons listed under Article 360 by quoting the 1910
case of United States v. Ocampo: 183

The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons

enumerated in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code was enunciated in
US. v. Ocampo, to wit:

"According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence

of the United States, the printer of a publication containing
libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct
connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents
thereof With regard to a publication in which a libel is
printed, not only is the publisher but also all other persons
who in any way participate in or have any connection with
its publication are liable as publishers."

180 REV. PEN. CODE, art. 360 as cited in rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 492.
181 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 492.
182 573 Phil. 278, 284--286 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
183 18 Phil. I (1910) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
Decision 51 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

In the case of State v. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26

Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St. Rep., 629), the question of the
responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a newspaper
was discussed. The court said, among other things (pp.
782, 783):

"The question then recurs as to whether the manager

or proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal
responsibility solely on the ground that the libelous article
was published without his knowledge or consent. When a
libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is
sufficient evidence prima facie to charge the manager or
proprietor with the guilt of its publication.

"The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we

think ought to be held prima facie criminally for whatever
appears in his paper; and it should be no defense that the
publication was made without his knowledge or consent...

"One who furnishes the means for carrying on the

publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to
servants or employees whom he selects and controls may
be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and
should be held responsible therefore, whether he was
individually concerned in the publication or not, . . .
Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent or servant in
the course of his employment necessarily implies some
degree of guilt or delinquency on the part of the publisher; .

"We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous

article was published in the newspaper without the
knowledge or consent of its proprietor or manager is no
defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor or
manager."

In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107

Mass., 197), this same question was considered and the
court held that in the criminal prosecution of a publisher of
a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is prima facie
presumed to have published the libel, and that the exclusion
of an offer by the defendant to prove that he never saw the
libel and was not aware of its publication until it was
pointed out to him and that an apology and retraction were
afterwards published in the same paper, have him no
ground for exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt,
speaking for the court, said:

"It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper,

which may be used for the publication of improper
communications, to use reasonable caution in the conduct
of his business that no libels be published" (Wharton's
Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishop's Criminal Law,
secs. 218, 221; People vs. Wilson, 64 III., 195;
Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)
Decision 52 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

The above doctrine is also the doctrine established

by the English courts. In the case of Rex v. Walter (3 Esp.,
21) Lord Kenyon said that he was "clearly of the opinion
that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable
criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his servants or
agents for misconduct in the management of the paper."

This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice

Powell, and Mr. Justice Foster.

Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and

Slander, said:

"An information for libel will lie against the

publisher of a paper, although he did not know or its being
put into the paper and stopped the sale as soon as he
discovered it."

In the case of People vs. Clay (86 III., 147) the court
held that-

"A person who makes a defamatory statement to the

agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly
and criminally, and his liability is shared by the agent and
all others who aid in publishing it." 184 (Emphasis supplied)

When the accused has been specifically identified as "author, editor,

or proprietor" or "printer/publisher" of the publication, there is no
requirement to prove that they had knowledge and participation in the
publication of the article. 185

Thus, a claim of absence of participation by those persons responsible

under Article 360 will not shield them from liability. The law is clear: These
persons are liable for libel as if they were the author of the defamatory
writing. 186

Nevertheless, since this Court did not find petitioner Tulfo, who
authored the allegedly libelous articles, to be liable, neither should liability
attach to those persons enumerated in Article 360. Petitioners Macasaet and
Quijano must likewise be acquitted.

1
184 Fermin v. People, 573 Phil. 278, 284-286 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division] citing United States
v. Ocampo, I 8 Phil. 1, 50-52 (1910) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
185 Fermin v. People, 573 Phil. 278, 283-284 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division] citing United States
v. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599 (1914) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc]; People v. Topacio and Santiago, 59 Phil. 356
(1934) [Per J. Vickers, En Banc]; and United States v. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1 (1910) [Per J. Johnson, En
Banc].
186 Tulfo v. People, 587 Phil. 64, 92 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
Decision 53 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

IV

By reason of petitioners' acquittal, this Court need not delve into the
issue of the proper imposable penalty. However, for clarity, we shall discuss
the import of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008.

Petitioner Tulfo argues that the imposable penalty should not include
imprisonment, pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, or the
Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of
Penalties in Libel Cases. 187 He contends that, should he be guilty, only a
fine should be imposed since he is a known media practitioner who wrote
the articles because of his honest duty as ajournalist. 188

Respondent counters that Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 did not

abandon the penalty of imprisonment, as the presiding judge is given sound
discretion to determine whether imprisonment or mere fine should be
imposed. 189 It argues that petitioner Tulfo made ad hominem attacks on the
person of Atty. So, 190 referring to him as, among others, an extortionist, a
"lady killer," a "bribe-taker," a "bribe-giver," "masamang damo," and
"walanghiya." 191 These malicious attacks, respondent says, justify the
penalty of imprisonment. 192

Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, issued on January 25, 2008,

indeed provides that:

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and

taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the
interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative ofjustice[.] 193

Erwin Tulfo, 194 promulgated on September 16, 2008, involved libel

charges for articles published in the daily tabloid Remate, which similarly
indicated Atty. So as, among others, a corrupt public official, an extortionist,
and a smuggler. 195 This Court imposed a fine in lieu of imprisonment, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 196

I
187 Rollo (G.R. No. 187113), p. 56.
188 Id.at 505.
189
Id.at 493.
190
Id.at 494.
191
Id.at 493.
192 Id.
193 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 (2008).
194 587 Phil. 64 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
195
Id. at 71-74.
196
Id. at 99.
Decision 54 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

In Fermin, 197 promulgated on March 28, 2008, this Court likewise

imposed on the convicted petitioner for libel a fine in lieu of imprisonment,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 198 It discussed that
Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 expresses preference for fine in lieu of
imprisonment for libel cases, considering the circumstances of the case. 199
Nevertheless, this Court noted that the Circular allows the exercise of sound
discretion in imposing imprisonment if "a fine alone would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives ofjustice." 200

Even before Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 was issued, there

are libel cases where this Court, after considering the circumstances, deleted
the penalty of imprisonment and only maintained the fine.

In 2005, this Court in Brillante v. Court of Appea!s201 deleted the

penalty of imprisonment, considering that "[t]he intensely feverish passions
evoked during the election period in 1988 must have agitated petitioner into
writing his open letter. " 202

In 2006, this Court in Buatis, Jr. v. Peop!e2° 3 opted to impose the

penalty of fine as it was "petitioner's first offense of this nature" 204 and after
finding that the petitioner believed that the letter he wrote to the private
complainant was in exercise of his civil or moral duty. 205

Of course, since this Court finds that the articles are not libelous,
petitioners should be acquitted, and Administrative Circular No. 08-2008
finds no application.

Besides, the constitutionality of criminalizing libel is doubtful. In

libel, the kinds of speech actually deterred are more valuable than the State
interest the law against libel protects. 206 The libel cases that have reached
this Court in recent years generally involve notable personalities for parties,
highlighting a propensity for the powerful and influential to use the
advantages of criminal libel to silence their critics. 207

/
197 573 Phil. 278 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
198 Id. at 300.
199
Id. at 298.
200
Id. at 299.
201 511 Phil. 96 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
202
Id. at 99.
203 520 Phil. 149 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
204
Id. at 166.
ws Id.
206 J. Leanen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 382 [Per

J, Abad, En Banc].
207
Id. at 388.
Decision 55 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

In any event, alternative legal remedies exist to address unwarranted

attacks on a private person's reputation and credibility, such as the Civil
Code chapter on Human Relations. 208 Civil actions for defamation are more
consistent with our democratic values since they do not threaten the
constitutional right to free speech, and avoid the unnecessary chilling effect
on criticisms toward public officials. The proper economic burden on
complainants of civil actions also reduces the possibility of using libel as a
tool to harass or silence critics and dissenters. 209

This Court is not unmindful of the far-reaching implications that our

deliberation may bring journalists and members of the press actively
engaged in disseminating news. We regard the vital role that the media
plays in ensuring that the government and its officials remain true to their
oath in carrying out their mandates in a manner prescribed by law.

Nevertheless, the constitutionally protected freedoms enjoyed by the

press cannot be used as a shield to advance the malicious propagation of
false information carried out by unscrupulous entities to injure another's
reputation.

The acquittal meted out to petitioners does not mean that journalists
have unbridled discretion in publishing news and information below the
standards expected of them. These standards are prominently provided
under the Philippine Press Institute's (PPI) Journalist's Code of Ethics and
the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) Code of Ethics.

Under the PPI's Code of Ethics, 210 journalists and members of the
press shall scrupulously report news while avoiding the suppression and
distortion of facts. In disseminating news, they "shall refrain from writing
reports which will adversely affect a private reputation unless the public
interests justifies it." 211 Moreover, they shall not "ridicule ... or degrade
any person by reason of sex, creed, religious belief, political conviction,
cultural and ethnic origin." 212

Meanwhile, the SPJ Code of Ethics provides that journalists should

report news accurately and fairly; treat sources, subjects, colleagues, and
members of the public as human beings; place service to the public as their
highest and primary obligation; and be accountable for their work. 213 It
bears emphasis: "An ethical journalist acts with integrity." 214

208
Id. at 376.
209
Id. at 383.
210 Journalists' Code of Ethics, PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE <https://philpressinstitute.net/journalists-
code-of-ethics-2/> (last accessed December 9, 2019).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Society of Professional Journalists, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS CODE OF ETHICS
<https://www.spj.org/pdfi'spj-code-of-ethics.pdf> (last accessed December 9, 2019).
214
Id. See Preamble.
Decision 56 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals' March 17, 2009 Amended Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 29194,
which affirmed the conviction of petitioners Raffy T. Tulfo, Allen A.
Macasaet, and Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr. in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1463, 99-
1465, 99-1471, 99-1473, 99-1474, and 99-1475, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioners are ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

•
nnu•vu.NPAULL.HERNANDO
Associate Justice

HE B. INTING
nvc.,i..; EDG·i-u"\suO L. DELOS SANTOS
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Asso iate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
Decision 57 G.R. Nos. 187113 and 187230

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.