Cayetano vs.

Leonidas

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia. She executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat, and that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila, leaving property both in the Philippines and
in the United States of America.

The Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by the
Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills.

Nenita C. Paguia, daughter or the testator, was appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.

This was opposed by Adoracion’s father, Hermogenes Campos, who earlier filed an Affidavit of Self-
adjudication not being aware that Adoracion had left a will. He later died and was substituted by Polly
Cayetano as petitioner in the instant case.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos
merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.

Cayetano alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be
divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a forced heir is entitled to his legitime in case the testator was a citizen of another
country.

RULING:

No.

Applying Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is
the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by
the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

Llorente vs CA
FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo
was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization,
he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother
and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank.
Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived
together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his
properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed
Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the
motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified
the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the
deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled
to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that
they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s
will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by
our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity” since he was a foreigner.

PCIB vs ESCOLIN

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Home » Case Digest » Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs Venicio Escolin

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Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs Venicio Escolin

Published November 5, 2010

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G.R. Nos. L-27860; L-27896; L-27936; L-27937 – 56 SCRA 266 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Application
of Laws – Nationality Principle – Renvoi Doctrine

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while
she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also
stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and
sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer
of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie)
so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the
trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left
a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have
Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will
basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition.
Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually also, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother
and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was
a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional
rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected
regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled
outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce
proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a
question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The
Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable
(and not said law at any other time).
MICIANO vs BRIMO

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in the will
thathis property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation.

The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the
brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.

The appellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the deceased
was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.

RULING: No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16.

According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, suchnational law of the testator is the one to governhis
testamentary dispositions.

The provision in the will is not valid. Said condition then is considered unwritten, hence the institution of
legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective.

TESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY

Facts:

In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, China. He left
real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy.

During his lifetime, he married twice. The first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several
children. The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son, petitioner
Silvino Suntay.

Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While the second wife, the
surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased which was claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929.

The petition was denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof.

After the Pacific War, Silvino claimed to have found, among the records of his father, a last will and
testament in

Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January, 1931 and probated in the Amoy
District Court.

He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 or the will executed in Amoy China on November, 1931.

Issue:

Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in the Philippines. – NO.

Held:
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be proved. The law of
China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for
the execution of the will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence.

There is no proof on these points. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a
probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject.

It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or
both to all interested parties must be made.

The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines.

The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to
a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, it does not measure or come up to the standard of
such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties.

Furthermore, the order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads, as follows:

x x x The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that
there are no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the court.

x x x does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings.

In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate
and allowance of wills.

Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy,
China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will
and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court
of this country.

AZNAR and CHRISTENSEN vs. GARCIA

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became
a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had
always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged
natural daughter.

Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter
is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that
finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children
under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as
it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts
must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are
no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will
remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:

The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and
the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict
rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed
to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being
domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of
the State of California.

ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON

RELEVANT FACTS:

1. Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens who resided in

the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey

died testate, bequeathing her entire estate to Richard. The court named petitioner as
ancilliary administrator. Her will was also admitted to probate by the CFI of Rizal.

Petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s

conjugal share in real estate in Makati, (2) a bank account in Audrey’s name; and (3)

shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.

2. Richard then married respondent with whom he had two children. Richard died testate

bequeathing his entire estate to respondent, save for the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which

he left to Kyle. His will was submitted for probate before the Makati RTC.

3. Petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also

filed on a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾

undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,

and P9,313.48 from the Citibank account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the

Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash. These were

granted and approved by the trial court.

4. Petitioner then filed a project of partition wherein 2

/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in

the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3

/5 thereof were allocated to

Richard’s three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the

State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the

testator in the property subject of the legacy." The trial court ruled in favor of

respondent.

5. Respondent filed with the CA an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial

court’s previous orders. Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his

fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s.

The CA annulled the trial court’s orders.

ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in not holding that the ancillary administrator having

acted in good faith, did not commit fraud, either extrinsic or intrinsic, in the performance of

his duties as ancillary administrator

The CA is correct.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will is governed by her national law

as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code. Notice should be also be given to Section 4, Rule

77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and

Administration of Estate. Petitioner was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent

law of the State of Maryland. The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his

responsibilities as ancillary administrator. The CA likewise observed that the distribution

made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should

equally benefit from the Makati property. Well-intentioned though it may be, petitioner’s

action appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities. While such breach of

duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary

circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as

the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a

circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. It does not rest upon petitioner’s

pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. Respondent was excluded
from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence

of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control.

BELLIS vs BELLIS

FACTS:

Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should
be divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate
in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire
bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies
of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project
partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s
7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition
to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Which law must apply – Texas Law or Philippine Law?

RULING:

YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed.

Doctrine of Processual Presumption:

The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law
shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours. Apply Philippine laws.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that —ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas; there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

MALANG vs MOSON

FACTS:

Abdula contracted marriage with Aida and had 3 sons with her. Abdula then married for a second time
with Jubaida and no child was born out of that marriage. Abdula divorced Aida. Abdula then married
Nayo and they also had no child. Thereafter, he contracted another marriage with Mabay and had a
daughter with her. Not long after, Abdula married 3 other Muslim women but eventually divorced them.
Abdula then married his 4th wife Neng, excluding the wives he divorced. They were childless. Abdula
died without leaving a will.

ISSUE:

What law governs?

The Civil Code since the Muslim Code has not yet taken effect. Abdula died intestate on December 1993.
It is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate
succession and the respective shares of the heirs.

The Muslim Code took effect on February 4, 1977. If a Muslim died before the effectivity of the Muslim
Code, the order of succession shall be governed by the Civil Code. The status and capacity to succeed on
the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon
the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.

If the Muslim marriage took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the effectivity of the
Muslim Code, he cannot marry again because under the Civil Code, only one marriage is valid. But when
the marriage took place when the Muslim Code has taken effect, subsequent marriages are allowed and
valid.

The right of the spouses to inherit will depend on whether or not they have been validly married. If they
are not validly married, then they do not have successional rights over their partner. The status and
capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth
of the child. As to property relations, it is the Civil Code that determines and governs the property
relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages
in question, the Civil Code was the only on marriage relations, including property relations between
spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.