JOHNNY S.

RABADILLA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS
G.R. No. 113725
June 29, 2000

FACTS:
Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla as a devisee of 511, 855 sq meters of Lot 1392 in Bacolod. The codicil was duly probated and
admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental.

The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be
inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export
sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and should he die, his heir
shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the piculs. Dr.
Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).

 In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil (to
deliver piculs of sugar) and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. A memorandum of
agreement to enforce the codicil was agreed but was only partially complied.

Thereafter, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court
ruling that Dr. Rabadilla is instituted through modal institution and ordered the reconveyance of lot 1392 to
the estate of the testatrix. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no
modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution (to deliver piculs of sugar to private
respondents).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was substitution and not institucion sub modo?

HELD:
NO.
The contention is without merit. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to
take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case
under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix’s near descendants would substitute
him. What the par. 6 of the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfil the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix’s
near descendants.

Further, in a institucion sub modo or modal institution (Art. 882), the testator states the 1) object of the
institution; and 2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator or the charge imposed by
the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect
the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition,
the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The
condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. To some extent,
it is similar to a resolutory condition. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and
not conditional.
G.R. No. 121510 November 23, 1995

FABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR, petitioner,

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Where the defendant in an ejectment case dies before the rendition by the trial court of its decision
therein, does the trial court's failure to effectuate a substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment
render such judgment jurisdictionally infirm?

On July 23, 1970, both private respondents Primitive Nepomuceno and Emerenciana Nepomuceno filed
separate complaints1 with the then Court of Agrarian Relations of Malolos, Bulacan, for ejectment on the
ground of personal cultivation and conversion of land for useful non-agricultural purposes against
petitioner's deceased husband, Benjamin Salazar. After protracted proceedings in the agrarian court and
then the Regional Trial Court2 spanning from 1970 to 1993, the trial court rendered its joint decision3 in
favor of private respondents. An appeal4 therefrom was interposed in the name of petitioner's deceased
husband on the ground that private respondents herein failed to satisfy the requirements pertaining to
personal cultivation and conversion of the landholdings into non-agricultural uses. The Court of Appeals
rejected such contention upon finding that the record was replete with evidence justifying private
respondents' assertion of their right of cultivation and conversion of their landholdings.5

Almost a year after the termination of that appeal, the same trial court decision subject thereof was once
again assailed before the Court of Appeals through a petition6 for annulment of judgment. Herein
petitioner assailed the same trial court decision as having been rendered by a court that did not have
jurisdiction over her and the other heirs of her deceased husband because notwithstanding the fact that
her husband had already died on October 3, 1991, the trial court still proceeded to render its decision on
August 23, 1993 without effecting the substitution of heirs in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court thereby depriving her of her day in court.

Petitioner, not having asserted the matter of fraud or collusion in her petition for annulment of judgment,
the Court of Appeals decided the same on the basis of the sole issue of non-jurisdiction resulting from the
alleged deprivation of petitioner's right to due process and ruled in favor of the validity of the challenged
decision.7 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court reiterating the
trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of petitioner's deceased husband as a consequence of the
failure of the trial court to effectuate a valid substitution of heirs. Said motion was denied in a resolution
promulgated on August 14, 1995. Hence this petition.

The petition is bereft of merit.

The need for substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process accruing to every party in any
proceeding.8 The rationale underlying this requirement in case a party dies during the pendency of
proceedings of a nature not extinguished by such death, is that

. . . the exercise of judicial power to hear and determine a cause implicitly presupposes in
the trial court, amongst other essentials, jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. That
jurisdiction was inevitably impaired upon the death of the protestee pending the
proceedings below such that unless and until a legal representative is for him duly named
and within the jurisdiction of the trial court, no adjudication in the cause could have been
accorded any validity or binding effect upon any party, in representation of the deceased,
 without trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court which is the very essence
of the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process.9

We are not unaware of several cases10 where we have ruled that a party having died in an action
that survives, the trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative
or substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the
court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon
whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. This general rule notwithstanding, in denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that formal substitution
of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case
and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant. Attending the case at bench, after all,
are these particular circumstances which negate petitioner's belated and seemingly ostensible
claim of violation of her rights to due process. We should not lose sight of the principle underlying
the general rule that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a
subsequent judgment. Such had been the general rule established not because the rule on
substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional
requirements per se but because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of
the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are
substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Viewing the rule on substitution of heirs in
this light, the Court of Appeals, in the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
thus expounded:

Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a jurisdictional
defect, it should be noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due
process requirements. The original party having died, he could not continue to defend
himself in court despite the fact that the action survived him. For the case to continue, the
real party in interest must be substituted for the deceased. The real party in interest is the
one who would be affected by the judgment. It could be the administrator or executor or
the heirs. In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. Substitution gives them
the opportunity to continue the defense for the deceased. Substitution is important
because such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process. Such
substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which may
be called the formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process of letting the
substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they
should therefore actively participate in the defense of the deceased. This part may be
called the substantive aspect. This is the heart of the procedural rule because this
substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect to the purpose of the
rule. It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive aspect of the rule despite
failure to comply with the formal aspect may be considered substantial compliance. Such
is the situation in the case at bench because the only inference that could be deduced
from the following facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in the defense
of the deceased after his death:

1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the deceased. It would be absurd to think
that the lawyer would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying him his fees.
The lawyer continued to represent him in the litigation before the trial court which lasted
for about two more years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee. With or without payment
of fees, the fact remains that the said counsel was allowed by the petitioner who was well
aware of the instant litigation to continue appearing as counsel until August 23, 1993
when the challenged decision was rendered;

2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the petitioner in the instant case, even
testified in the court and declared that her husband is already deceased. She knew
therefore that there was a litigation against her husband and that somehow her interest
and those of her children were involved;
 3. This petition for annulment of judgment was filed only after the appeal was decided
against the defendant on April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic) after the
decision was rendered (even if we were to give credence to petitioner's manifestation that
she was not aware that an appeal had been made);

4. The Supreme Court has already established that there is such a thing as jurisdiction by
estoppel. This principle was established even in cases where jurisdiction over the subject
matter was being questioned. In the instant case, only jurisdiction over the person of the
heirs is in issue. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the court more easily
than jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by
the simple appearance of the person in court as did herein petitioner appear;

5. The case cited by the herein petitioner (Ferreria et al. vs. Manuela Ibarra vda. de
Gonzales, et al.) cannot be availed of to support the said petitioner's contention relative to
non-acquisition of jurisdiction by the court. In that case, Manolita Gonzales was not
served notice and, more importantly, she never appeared in court, unlike herein petitioner
who appeared and even testified regarding the death of her husband.11

Consequently, we rule that, as in the case at bench, the defendant in an ejectment case having
died before the rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its failure to effectuate a formal
substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment, does not invalidate such judgment where the
heirs themselves appeared before the trial court, participated in the proceedings therein, and
presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant, it undeniably being evident that the heirs
themselves sought their day in court and exercised their right to due process.

Respondent Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that ejectment, being an action involving recovery of
real property, is a real action which as such, is not extinguished by the defendant's death.

. . . The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong
complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to
the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental.12

There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party, which death did not
extinguish the deceased's civil personality.13 More significantly, a judgment in an ejectment case
is conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action.14 Thus, we have held that:

. . . In such a case and considering that the supervening death of appellant did not
extinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to
proceed as it did with the case. There is no showing that the appellate court's
proceedings in the case were tainted with irregularities.

It appears that petitioners are heirs of Adela Salindon. In fact, it was because of this
relationship that the petitioners were able to transfer the title of Adela Salindon over the
subject lot to their names. . . . Considering all this, the appellate decision is binding and
enforceable against the petitioners as successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action (Section 49 [b] Rule 39, Rules of Court). Furthermore, . . .
judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against defendants therein but
also against the members of their family, their relatives, or privies who derive their right of
possession from the defendants (Ariem v. De los Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). Under the
 circumstances of this case, the same rule should apply to the successors-in-interest . . . .
15

While it is true that a decision in an action for ejectment is enforceable not only against the defendant
himself but also against members of his family, his relatives, and his privies who derived their right of
possession from the defendant and his successors-in-interest,16 it had been established that petitioner
had, by her own acts, submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. She is now estopped to deny that she
had been heard in defense of her deceased husband in the proceedings therein. As such, this petition
evidently has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED