Case Analysis
Case Analysis
Administrative Law
SUBMITTED TO
SUBMITTED BY
1
(2013) 3 SCC 118: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 347
Mrs. Sushma Sharma
Harsh Sahu
NLIU, Bhopal Roll No. - 2017 BA LLB 88
Enrolment no: A-1864
S. No. Topics Page No.
1. Acknowledgement 3
2. Relevant Laws 4
3. Facts of the Case 6
4. Before Karnataka High Court 8
5. Arguments put both the Parties 10
The Commission suggested that there should be one authority dealing with complaints against
the administrative acts of Ministers or Secretaries to Government at the Centre and in the States
and another authority in each State and at the Centre for dealing with complaints against
administrative acts of other officials and all these authorities should be independent of the
executive, the legislative and the judiciary.3
Based on the above report The Karnataka Lokayyukta Act 1984 was presented before the
Karnataka Legislature. The Bill provides for the appointment of a Lokayukta and one or more
Upa-Lokayuktas to investigate and report on allegations or grievances relating to the conduct of
public servants. If after investigation, the Lokayukta is satisfied that the public servant has
committed any criminal offence, he may initiate prosecution without reference to any other
authority. Any prior sanction required under any law for such prosecution shall be deemed to
have been granted. The Vigilance Commission is abolished. But all inquiries and investigations
and other disciplinary proceedings pending before the Vigilance Commission will get transferred
to the Lokayukta.4
The institution of Lokayukta was set up for improving the standards of public administration so
as to examine the complaints made against administrative actions, including the cases of
corruption, favouritism and official indiscipline in administrative machinery. The institution aims
to provide transparency and thus creates transparency in the minds of the general public.5
2
https://darpg.gov.in/about-arc
3
The Administrative Reforms Commission a book by Shriram Maheshwari
4
http://home.karnataka.gov.in/en/Documents/The-Karnataka-Lokayukta-Act.pdf
5
LOKPAL: THE PROPOSED INDIAN OMBUDSMAN book by P. K. Tripathi
Relevant Laws
Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 19846
Section 3: Appointment of Lokayukta and Upalokayukta.-
(1) For the purpose of conducting investigations and enquiries in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, the Governor shall appoint a person to be known as the Lokayukta
and one or more persons to be known as the Upalokayukta or Upalokayuktas.
(2) (a) A person to be appointed as the Lokayukta shall be a person who has held the office
of a Judge of the Supreme Court or that of the Chief Justice of a High Court and shall be
appointed on the advice tendered by the Chief Minister in consultation with the Chief
Justice of the High Court of Karnataka, the Chairman, Karnataka Legislative Council, the
Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, the Leader of the Opposition in the Karnataka
Legislative Council and the Leader of the Opposition in the Karnataka Legislative
Assembly.
(b) A person to be appointed as an Upalokayukta shall be a person who has held the
office of a judge of a High Court and shall be appointed on the advice tendered by the
Chief Minister in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka, the
Chairman, Karnataka Legislative Council, the Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly,
the Leader of the Opposition in the Karnataka Legislative Council and the Leader of the
Opposition in the Karnataka Legislative Assembly.
(3) A person appointed as the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta shall, before entering upon his
office, make and subscribe, before the Governor, or some person appointed in that behalf
by him, an oath or affirmation in the form set out for the purpose in the First Schedule.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Lokayukta may investigate any action which is
taken by or with the general or specific approval of,-
(i) the Chief Minister;
(ii) a Minister or a Secretary;
(iii) a member of the State Legislature; or
(iv) any other public servant being a public servant of a class notified by the State
Government in consultation with the Lokayukta in this behalf.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, any person may make a complaint under this Act to
the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta.
6
https://lokayukta.kar.nic.in/pages/kla_act.html
(2) Every complaint shall be made in the form of a statement supported by an affidavit and in
such form and in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) Where the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta proposes, after making such preliminary
inquiry as he deemed fit, to conduct any investigation under this Act, he-
(a) shall forward a copy of the complaint to the public servant and the competent
authority concerned;
(b) shall afford to such public servant an opportunity to offer his comments on such
complaint;
(c) may make such order as to the safe custody of documents relevant to the
investigation, as he deems fit.
(4) Save as aforesaid, the procedure for conducting any such investigation shall be such, and
may be held either in public or in camera, as the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta, as the
case may be, considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
(5) The Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta may, in his discretion, refuse to investigate or cease
to investigate any complaint involving a grievance or an allegation, if, in his opinion,-
(a) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith;
(b) there are no sufficient grounds for investigating or, as the case may be, for
continuing the investigation; or
(c) other remedies are available to the complainant and in the circumstances of the
case it would be more proper for the complainant to avail of such remedies.
(6) In any case where the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta decides not to entertain a complaint
or to discontinue any investigation in respect of a complaint he shall record his reasons
thereof and communicate the same to the complainant and the public servant concerned.
(7) The conduct of an investigation 1 [under this Act against a public servant] in respect of
any action shall not affect such action, or any power or duty of [any other public servant]
to take further action with respect to any matter subject to the investigation.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, for the purpose of any investigation (including
the preliminary inquiry if any, before such investigation) under this Act, the Lokayukta or
an Upa-Lokayukta may require any public servant or any other person who, in his
opinion, is able to furnish information or produce documents relevant to the investigation
to furnish any such information or produce any such document.
(2) For the purpose of any investigation (including the preliminary inquiry) the Lokayukta or
Upa-Lokayukta shall have all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on
oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of any document;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office;
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
(f) such other matters as may be prescribed.
Section 12 provides that the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta can sent a report with certain
recommendations and findings to the competent authority to take the required action. The
competent authority will further intimate the Lokayukta about the action taken within 12 months.
However if the competent authority fails to take any action the Lokayukta can send a special
report to the Governor entailing his recommendations and also suggest him to take appropriate
actions in lieu of the same.
The office of the Karnataka Upa-Lokayukta fell vacant on the resignation of Justice R. Gururajan
and the Chief Minister initiated steps for filling up that vacancy. Following that, the Chief
Minister on 18-10-2011 addressed separate letters to the Chief Justice of the High Court of
Karnataka, Chairman of the Karnataka Legislative Council, Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative
Assembly, Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Council and Leader of the Opposition in
the Legislative Assembly requesting them to suggest a panel of eligible persons for appointment
as Upa-Lokayukta on or before 24-10-2011.
In response to the letter of the Chief Minister, the Chief Justice recommended the name of
Justice Rangavittalachar; the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly recommended Justice
Chandrashekaraiah; the Chairman of the Legislative Council recommended Justice
Chandrashekaraiah; the Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly recommended
Justice Mohammed Anwar and Justice Ramanna; the Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative
Council recommended Justice Mohammed Anwar and Justice Ramanna. Therefore, as many as
four retired Judges were recommended for appointment as Upa-Lokayukta. It is not clear
whether the names of all these Judges were disclosed to all the constitutional authorities. The
name of Justice Chandrashekaraiah was certainly not disclosed to the Chief Justice, as is evident
from his letter dated 4-2-2012 wherein he stated four times that he was not consulted on the
appointment of Justice Chandrashekaraiah.7
The Chief Justice on 21-1-2012 received an invitation for attending the oath taking ceremony of
Justice Chandrashekaraiah as Upa-Lokayukta. The Chief Justice then addressed a letter dated 4-
2-2012 to the Chief Minister stating that he was not consulted in the matter of appointment of
Justice Chandrashekaraiah as Upa-Lokayukta and expressed the opinion that the appointment
was not in conformity with the constitutional provisions and requested for recalling the
appointment.8
The stand taken by the Chief Justice was widely published in various newspapers; following that,
as already indicated, two writ petitions were filed in public interest for quashing the appointment
7
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/Chandrashekaraiah-is-Upalokayukta/article13376813.ece
8
https://www.dnaindia.com/bangalore/report-it-s-d-day-for-justice-chandrashekaraiah-1670826
of Justice Chandrashekaraiah as Upa-Lokayukta. A writ of quo warranto was also preferred
against the functioning of Justice Chandrashekaraiah as Upa-Lokayukta.9
9
https://www.deccanherald.com/content/239372/chandrashekaraiah-undecided.html
Before Karnataka High Court
The matter went to Karnataka High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court by the
impugned judgment took the view that under the Karnataka Lokayykta Act, 1984 the opinion
expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court has primacy in the appointment of the
Lokayukta/ Upalokayukta when Chief Minister tenders advice in respect of the same to the
Governor.10 The High Court held that since the order passed by the Governor of Karnataka,
appointing Justice Chandrashekaraiah as Upa-Lokayukta was without consulting the Chief
Justice of the High Court, the same was illegal.11
After discussing the provisions of the Act and the case law on the subject, the High Court was of
the opinion12 that the Upa-Lokayukta performs functions that are in the nature of judicial, quasi-
judicial and investigative. The High Court expressed the view that “if the functions of an Upa-
Lokayukta were purely investigative, the legislature would not have insisted on a person who
has held the office of a Judge of a High Court as the qualification for appointment and
consultation with the Chief Justice as mandatory.”
In coming to this conclusion, the High Court drew attention to N. Gundappa v. State of
Karnataka13 wherein it was held that: “the Upa-Lokayukta … while conducting investigation
into a complaint and making a report on the basis of such investigation, exercises quasi-judicial
power. It determines the complaint made against a public servant involving a ‘grievance’ or
‘allegation’ and the report becomes the basis for taking action against the public servant by the
competent authority.”
The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court upheld this conclusion by a very cryptic order
in State of Karnataka v. N. Gundappa14.
The High Court also drew attention to Prof. S.N. Hegde v. Lokayuktha15 wherein the scope of
Sections 9, 11 and 12 of the Act was considered and it was held that proceedings under Section 9
of the Act are judicial proceedings, or in any event, they are quasi-judicial proceedings. It was
said: “Therefore, the investigation to be conducted under Section 9 would be in the nature of a
judicial proceeding and it would be in the nature of a suit and oral evidence is recorded on oath
and documentary evidence is also entertained. Therefore, it is clear that the investigation under
Section 9 of the Act would be in the nature of judicial proceedings or at any rate it is a quasi-
judicial proceeding where the principles of natural justice had to be followed and if any
evidence is recorded the public servant has the right to cross-examine those witnesses.”
10
(2012) 3 AIR Kant R 257 : (2012) 4 Kant LJ 529]
11
https://images.assettype.com/barandbench/2020-03/51d1602e-2af4-42a6-a813-
ca0bb46179a0/Upa_Lokayukta_Judgment.pdf
12
Janekere C. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 3 AIR Kant R 257 : (2012) 4 Kant LJ 529
13
[(1989) 3 Kant LJ 425]
14
[ILR 1990 KAR 4188]
15
[ILR 2004 KAR 3892]
The High Court was of the opinion that to maintain the independence of the office of the
Lokayukta and the Upa-Lokayukta under the Act, the recommendation for appointment to these
offices must emanate only from the Chief Justice and only the name recommended by him
should be considered.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, appeals were filed by Justice Chandrashekharaih
and the State of Karnataka in the Supreme Court.
Arguments put forth by the Parties
Arguments raised by Appellants:
1. Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka took
extensively to the Statement of Objects and Reasons and to the various provisions of the
Act and submitted that the nature and functions of the office of Lokayukta or Upa-
Lokayukta are to carry out investigation and enquiries and the institution of Lokayukta,
as such, does not form part of the judicial organ of the State. The learned Senior Counsel
also submitted that the functions and duties of the institution of Lokayukta, as such,
cannot be compared with the functions and duties of the judiciary, Central Administrative
Tribunals, State Administrative Tribunals or Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums, etc.
2. The learned Senior Counsel, referring to the various provisions such as Sections 3, 7, 9,
etc. of the Act, submitted that Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta are appointed for the purpose
of conducting investigations and enquiries and they are not discharging any judicial
functions as such and their reports are only recommendatory in nature. Consequently, the
Act never envisaged vesting any primacy on the views of the Chief Justice of the High
Court in the matter of appointment of Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta.
3. Shri P.V. Shetty, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Justice Chandrashekaraiah (Retd.)
submitted that the primacy in terms of Section 3 of the Act lies with the Chief Minister
and not with the Chief Justice.
4. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the judgment delivered by the High Court in
Janekere C. Krishna v. State of Karnataka16 holding that the views of the Chief Justice
have primacy relates to cases pertaining to appointment of the Judges of the Supreme
Court and the High Courts, appointment of the President of the State Consumer
Commission, Central Administrative Tribunal and so on and the ratio laid down in those
judgments is inapplicable while interpreting Sections 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Act. The
learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the reasoning of the High Court that there
should be specific consultations with regard to the names suggested by the Governor with
the Chief Justice, is unsustainable in law. Shri P.V. Shetty also submitted that the
expression “consultation” cannot be understood to be consent of the constitutional
authorities as contemplated in the section.
5. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Chief Minister advised the name of Justice
Chandrashekaraiah, suggested by some of the consultees to the Governor who appointed
him as Upa-Lokayukta. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that assuming that the
Chief Justice had not been consulted, the views of the Chief Minister had primacy and the
Governor rightly accepted the advice of the Chief Minister and appointed Justice
Chandrashekaraiah as Upa-Lokayukta. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that in any
view the failure to consult the Chief Justice would not vitiate the decision-making
process, since no primacy could be attached to the views of the Chief Justice.
16
(2012) 3 AIR Kant R 257 : (2012) 4 Kant LJ 529]
6. Without intending to belittle the office of the Upa-Lokayukta, it was submitted by the
learned counsel for the State of Karnataka (hereafter “the State”) that the Upa-Lokayukta
is essentially required to investigate complaints and inquire into grievances brought
before him. In this process, he may be exercising some quasi-judicial functions, but that
does not make him a quasi-judicial authority. The significance of this submission lies in
the further submission that if the Upa-Lokayukta is not a quasi-judicial authority then the
opinion of the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court would not have primacy in the
appointment and consultation process, otherwise it would have primacy.
7. The learned counsel for the State referred to Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees17 to
highlight the difference between a court and a tribunal.
8. Reference was also made to Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Assn. v. Union of
India 18to contend that since the views of the constitutional authorities are not binding on
the Chief Minister, the process of consultation is not mandatory.
17
[AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 SCR 459]
18
[1993 Supp (1) SCC 730 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 252 : (1993) 23 ATC 788]
19
[(2002) 8 SCC 1]
to the posts since they were either former Judges of the Supreme Court or Chief Justices
of the High Courts or Judges of the High Courts.
4. The learned counsel first made a reference to Sarwan Singh Lamba v. Union of
India20 in which the Chief Minister of the State initiated the process for the appointment
of the Vice-Chairman and members of the State Administrative Tribunal. It was
contended that their appointments were, inter alia, contrary to the procedure laid down in
the decision of this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India21.
20
[(1995) 4 SCC 546 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1064 : (1995) 30 ATC 585]
21
[(1987) 1 SCC 124 : (1987) 2 ATC 82].
Size of the Bench and Counsels of the Respective Parties
Bench
The Matter was listed before a division bench of Justice KSP Radhakrishnan and Justice Madan
B. Lokur.
2. The Act has, therefore, clearly delineated which are the matters to be investigated by the
Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta. They have no authority to investigate on a complaint
involving a grievance in respect of any action specified in the Second Schedule of the
Act, which are as follows:
a. Action taken for the purpose of investigating crimes relating to the security of
the State.
b. Action taken in the exercise of powers in relation to determining whether a
matter shall go to a court or not.
c. Action taken in matters which arise out of the terms of a contract governing
purely commercial relations of the administration with customers or
suppliers, except where the complaint alleges harassment or gross delay in
meeting contractual obligations.
d. Action taken in respect of appointments, removals, pay, discipline,
superannuation or other matters relating to conditions of service of public
servants but not including action relating to claims for pension, gratuity,
provident fund or to any claims which arise on retirement, removal or
termination of service.
e. Grant of honours and awards.23
3. The Act has also been enacted to make provision for making enquiries by the Lokayukta
and Upa-Lokayukta into the administrative action relatable to matters specified in List II
or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, taken by or on behalf of the
Government of Karnataka or certain public authorities in the State of Karnataka,
including any omission or commission in connection with or arising out of such action,
etc.
4. The Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta under the Act are established to investigate and report
on allegations or grievances relating to the conduct of public servants which includes the
Chief Minister; all other Ministers and Members of the State Legislature; all officers of
the State Government; Chairman, Vice-Chairman of local authorities, corporations,
owned or controlled by the State Government, a company in which not less than fifty-one
per cent of the shares are held by the State Government, societies registered under the
Societies Registration Act, cooperative societies and universities established by or under
any law of the legislature.
22
http://home.karnataka.gov.in/en/Documents/The-Karnataka-Lokayukta-Act.pdf
23
https://lokayukta.kar.nic.in/pages/kla_act.html
5. As to the contention of the Petitioner that since the “consultor” is not bound by the
conclusion arrived at, he need not go through the consultation process would be
stretching the law laid down in IAS Assn.24 to the vanishing point.
6. The Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta while exercising powers under the Act, of course, is
acting as a quasi-judicial authority but his functions are investigative in nature. The
Supreme Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals 25
held that “Whether or not an administrative body or authority functions as a purely
administrative one or in a quasi-judicial capacity, must be determined in each case, on
an examination of the relevant statute and the rules framed there under.”
7. This Court in Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare26 held that
while dealing with the powers of the Election Commission of India under the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, held that while exercising power under Section
29-A, the Commission acts quasi-judicially and passes quasi-judicial orders. The Court
held that: “What distinguishes an administrative act from a quasi-judicial act is, in the
case of quasi-judicial functions under the relevant law the statutory authority is required
to act judicially. In other words, where law requires that an authority before arriving at
a decision must make an enquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi-
judicial authority.”
8. In Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority27 the Supreme Court
held that “the nature of functions to be discharged by the Designated Authority took the
view that the authority exercising quasi-judicial functions is bound to act judicially. The
Court noticed that the Designated Authority determines the rights and obligations of the
“interested parties” by applying objective standards based on the
material/information/evidence presented by the parties”.
9. In the present case provisions of Sections 9, 10 and 11 clearly indicate that the Lokayukta
and Upa-Lokayukta are discharging quasi-judicial functions while conducting the
investigation under the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act also states that for
the purpose of any such investigation, including the preliminary inquiry the Lokayukta
and Upa-Lokayukta shall have all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the matter of summoning and enforcing the attendance
of any person and examining him on oath. Further they have also the power for requiring
the discovery and production of any document, receiving evidence on affidavits,
requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office, issuing
commissions for examination of witnesses or documents, etc. Further, sub-section (3) of
Section 11 stipulates that any proceedings before the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta shall
be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 of the Penal
24
[1993 Supp (1) SCC 730 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 252 : (1993) 23 ATC 788]
25
AIR 1958 SC 398
26
(2002) 5 SCC 685
27
(2011) 2 SCC 258
Code28. Therefore, the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta, while investigating the matters are
discharging quasi-judicial functions, though the nature of functions is investigative.
10. The Governor of the State, acting in his discretion, if accepts the report of the Lokayukta
against the Chief Minister, then he has to resign from the post. So also, if the Chief
Minister accepts such a report against a Minister, then he has to resign from the post. The
Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta, however, has no jurisdiction or power to direct the
Governor or the Chief Minister to implement his report or direct resignation from the
office they hold, which depends upon the question whether the Governor or the Chief
Minister, as the case may be, accepts the report or not. But when the Lokayukta or Upa-
Lokayukta, if after the investigation, is satisfied that the public servant has committed
any criminal offence, prosecution can be initiated, for which prior sanction of any
authority required under any law for such prosecution, shall also be deemed to have been
granted.29
11. The purpose of appointment of the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayuktas is clearly spelt out in
Section 3(1) of the Act which indicates that it is for the purpose of conducting
investigation and enquiries in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The procedure
to conduct investigation has been elaborately dealt with in the Act. The scope of enquiry
is however limited, compared to the investigation, that is, only to the ascertainment of the
truth or falsehood of the allegations. Also all five dignitaries as mentioned in Section 3 of
the Act have to be consulted before tendering advice by the Chief Minister to the
Governor of the State.
12. Legislatures of various States have adopted different eligibility criteria, method of
selection, consultative procedures, etc. in the matter of appointment of Lokayukta, Upa-
Lokayukta in their respective States. For instance, in Andhra Pradesh Lokayukta Act 30 the
Chief Minister as such has no role and the only consultee for the post of Lokayukta is the
Chief Justice. Further in the States of Assam31, Delhi32, Gujarat33, etc. the Chief Ministers
have no role as such. However, in the States of Chattisgarh 34 , Haryana35, etc. the
Governor appoints on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Chief Justice of the High
Court is a consultee, in the Lokayukta Acts of Assam 36, Bihar37, Delhi38, Gujarat39,
28
http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1860-45.pdf
29
http://home.karnataka.gov.in/en/Documents/The-Karnataka-Lokayukta-Act.pdf
30
http://lokayukta.ap.nic.in/act-pdfs/A.P.Lokayuta%20Act,%201983.pdf
31
http://assamlokayukta.gov.in/assam-lokayukta-upa-lokayukta-act-1985.pdf
32
https://ar.delhigovt.nic.in/content/delhi-lokayukta-and-uplokayukta-act-1995
33
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/3233?view_type=browse&sam_handle=123456789/2455
34
https://cg.nic.in/lokayogmis/
35
http://www.hrlokayukta.gov.in/hi/maananaiya-laokaayaukata-kaa-daauraa#:~:text=The%20Haryana
%20lokayukta%20Act%2C%202002,Notification%20in%20the%20official%20Gazette.&text=In%20case%20the
%20aggrieved%20person,a%20complaint%20before%20the%20Lokayukta.
36
http://assamlokayukta.gov.in/assam-lokayukta-upa-lokayukta-act-1985.pdf
37
http://lokayukta.bih.nic.in/Act.htm
38
https://ar.delhigovt.nic.in/content/delhi-lokayukta-and-uplokayukta-act-1995
39
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/3233?view_type=browse&sam_handle=123456789/2455
Jharkhand40 and so on. However, in the Kerala Lokayukta Act 41, the Chief Justice is not a
consultee at all.
13. In the case of State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta42 held that “the views of the Chief Justice
have primacy in the matter of appointment of Lokayukta in the State of Gujarat.”
14. The Constitution of India and its articles, judicial pronouncements interpreting various
articles of the Constitution confer primacy to the views of the Chief Justice of India or to
the Chief Justice of a High Court in the matter of appointment to certain posts the
incumbents of which have to discharge judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the case of
Chandra Mohan V. State of U.P.43 held that the view of the High Court has primacy in
the matter of appointment of District Judges. Interpreting the word “consultation” in
Article 233, the Supreme Court took the view that “the exercise of power of appointment
by the Governor is conditioned by his consultation with the High Court, meaning thereby
the Governor can only appoint a person to the post of District Judge in consultation with
the High Court.” In Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court44 consultation
with the High Court under Article 233 is not an empty formality. It was also stated that
“Consultation or deliberation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make
their respective points of view known to the other or others and discuss and examine the
relative merits of their views.” In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab45 it was held that
“it is a cardinal principle of the Constitution and has been relied on to justify the
deviation, is guarded by the relevant article making consultation with the Chief Justice of
India obligatory.” In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of
India46 while interpreting Article 217 of the Constitution i.e. in the matter of appointment
of Judges to the higher judiciary, it was held that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India
has got primacy in the process of consultation. In the matter of appointment of the Judges
of the Supreme Court as well as that of the High Courts, the opinion of the Collegium of
the Supreme Court of India has primacy. In Union of India v. Kali Dass Batish47 the
Supreme Court has interpreted the expression “after consultation with the Chief Justice of
India” as appearing in Section 6(7) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and held
that “the judicial powers are being exercised by the Tribunal and hence the views of the
Chief Justice of India be given primacy in the matter of appointment in the Central
Administrative Tribunal. Similar is the situation with regard to the State Administrative
Tribunals as well, where the views of the Chief Justice of the High Court have primacy,
since the Tribunal is exercising judicial powers and performing judicial functions.” This
40
http://lokayuktajharkhand.nic.in/Act.html
41
https://kerala.gov.in/documents/10180/622777/lokayukta%20act%2099
42
(2013) 3 SCC 1 : (2013) 1 Scale 7
43
AIR 1966 SC 1987 : (1967) 1 SCR 77
44
[(1969) 3 SCC 56]
45
[(1974) 2 SCC 831 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 550]
46
[(1993) 4 SCC 441 : AIR 1994 SC 268]
47
[(2006) 1 SCC 779 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 225]
Court in Ashish Handa v. Chief Justice of High Court of P&H48 held in the matter of
appointment of the President of the State Commissions and the National Commissions
under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the consultation with the Chief Justice of the
High Court and the Chief Justice of India is in the same manner, as indicated by the
Supreme Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. case49 for appointment of
the High Court and Supreme Court Judges. The Court noticed that “the functions
discharged by the Commission are primarily the adjudication of consumer disputes and,
therefore, a person from the judicial branch is considered to be suitable for the office of
the President.” In N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose50 the Court held that primacy must be
with the opinion of the Chief Justice inter alia because the appointment is to a judicial
post and in view of the peremptory language employed in the proviso to Section 16(1)(a)
of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Court held that “the word “consultation”
may mean differently in different situations depending on the nature and purpose of the
statute.” In N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose51, the appointment of the President of the
State Commission under Section 16 of the Consumer Protection Act once again came up
for consideration. After referring to Ashish Handa52, Ashok Tanwar53 and National
Consumer Awareness Group54 it was held in para 153 of the Report that the process of
selection must be initiated by the High Court. It was observed that “the Chief Justice
should recommend only one name and not a panel, for if the choice of selection from a
panel is left to the executive, it would erode the independence of the judiciary.”
15. The judgments discussed above would indicate that the consultation is held to be
mandatory if the incumbent to be appointed to the post is either a sitting or a retired
Judge who has to discharge judicial functions and the orders rendered by them are
capable of execution. Consultation, it may be noted, is never meant to be a formality, but
meaningful and effective and primacy of opinion is always vested with the High Court or
the Chief Justice of the State High Court or the Collegium of the Supreme Court or the
Chief Justice of India, as the case may be, when a person has to hold a judicial office and
discharge functions akin to judicial functions.
16. The High Court, in the instant case has, placed considerable reliance on the judgment of
this Court in K.P. Mohapatra55 and took the view that “consultation with the Chief
Justice is mandatory and his opinion will have primacy”. The above judgment has been
rendered in the context of the appointment of Orissa Lokpal under Section 3 of the Orissa
Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act. The Court was of the view that the judgment of in K.P.
48
[(1996) 3 SCC 145]
49
[(1993) 4 SCC 441 : AIR 1994 SC 268]
50
[(2009) 7 SCC 1 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 1]
51
[(2009) 7 SCC 1 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 1]
52
[(1996) 3 SCC 145]
53
[(2005) 2 SCC 104]
54
[(2005) 5 SCC 284 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 530]
55
[(2002) 8 SCC 1]
Mohapatra56 is inapplicable while construing the provisions of the Karnataka Lokayukta
Act, 1984, since the language employed in that Act and Section 3 of the Orissa Lokpal
and Lokayukta Act, 1985 are not in pari materia. Tindal, C.J., as early as 1844, has said
that: “… If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no
more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.
The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the
lawgiver.”57 Blackstone has said “the most fair and rational method for interpreting a
statute is by exploring the intention of the legislature through the most natural and
probable signs which are either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and
consequence, or the spirit and reasons of the law.”58 In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan59 Gajendragadkar, J. stated that: “If the words used are capable of one
construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical
construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with
the alleged object and policy of the Act.” In the present case Sections 3(2)(a) and (b)
when read literally and contextually admit of no doubt that the Governor of the State can
appoint Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta only on the advice tendered by the Chief Minister
and that the Chief Justice of the High Court is only one of the consultees and his views
have no primacy. The Governor, as per the statute, can appoint only on the advice
tendered by the Chief Minister and not on the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice or
any of the consultees.
17. The Chief Minister is legally obliged to consult the Chief Justice of the High Court and
other four consultees, which is a mandatory requirement. The consultation must be
meaningful and effective and mere eliciting the views or calling for recommendations
would not suffice. The consultees can suggest various names from the source stipulated
in the statute and those names have to be discussed either in a meeting to be convened by
the Chief Minister of the State for that purpose or by way of circulation. The Chief
Minister, if proposes to suggest or advise any name from the source earmarked in the
statute that must also be made available to the consultees so that they can also express
their views on the name or names suggested by the Chief Minister. The consultees can
express their honest and free opinion about the names suggested by the other consultees
including the Chief Justice or the Chief Minister. After due deliberations and making
meaningful consultation, the Chief Minister of the State is free to advise a name which
has come up for consideration among the consultees to the Governor of the State. The
advice tendered by the Chief Minister will have primacy and not that of the consultees
including the Chief Justice of the High Court.
18. A contention was raised that since the source consists of persons who have held the office
of the Judge of the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Chief
Justice of the High Court would be in a better position to compare the merits and
56
[(2002) 8 SCC 1]
57
[Ed.: As observed in Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034, p. 1057.]
58
in Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 1, p. 59,
59
[AIR 1957 SC 907]
demerits of those candidates. The Court found it difficult to accept that contention. Apart
from a person's competence, integrity and character as a Judge, various other information
have also to be gathered since the persons who fall in that source are retired Judges. The
Government has its own machinery and system to gather various information about
retired Judges. The Chief Minister, it may be noted, cannot advise a name from that
source without making a meaningful and effective consultation after disclosing the
relevant materials. This is a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary selection and advice.
Further, as already noticed, the duties and functions of the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta
are investigative in nature and their orders as such cannot be executed. Further language
used in Sections 3(2)(a) and (b) to hold that primacy be attached to the opinion expressed
by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka and accepting the contention that the
Chief Justice has got primacy is beyond the scope of the Act.
19. The Chief Minister can recommend a completely different person, other than any of those
recommended by any of the constitutional authorities as long as he does not keep them in
the dark about the name of the candidate and there is a full and complete disclosure of all
relevant facts. In M.M. Gupta v. State of J&K60 this Court explained “consultation” in
the matter of judicial appointments in the following words (which equally apply to the
present case): “It is well settled that consultation or deliberation is not complete or
effective before the parties thereto make their respective points of view known to the
other or others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their views. If one party
makes a proposal to the other who has a counter-proposal in his mind which is not
communicated to the proposer, the direction to give effect to the counter-proposal
without anything more, cannot be said to have been done after consultation.”
20. As to the decision of the High Court that it must be the Chief Justice who should initiate
the process for appointment of Upa-Lokayukta the Supreme Court held that in the
appointment of the Upa-Lokayukta, the Chief Minister must consult not only the Chief
Justice but several other constitutional authorities also and given the fact that the Upa-
Lokayukta is not a purely judicial authority, it hardly matters who initiates the process of
appointment of the Upa-Lokayukta. Ordinarily, it must be the Chief Minister since he has
to tender advice to the Governor and, in a sense, the appointment is his primary
responsibility. But this does not preclude any of the other constitutional authorities who
are required to be consulted from bringing it to the notice of the Chief Minister that the
post of the Upa-Lokayukta needs to be filled up and that the appointment process ought
to commence — nothing more than that. None of them ought to suggest a name since
constitutional courtesy would demand that only the Chief Minister should initiate the
appointment process. There is no reason to hold that merely because the Upa-Lokayukta
is a sui generis quasi-judicial authority, only the Chief Justice must initiate the process of
appointment. It must not be forgotten that the selection of the Upa-Lokayukta is a
consultative process involving several constitutional authorities and in the context of the
60
[(1982) 3 SCC 412 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 32 (2)]
Act, no constitutional authority is subordinate to the other. To this extent, the decision of
the High Court is set aside. It is made clear that this view does not apply to judicial
appointments.
21. The Chief Minister has however committed an error in not consulting the Chief Justice of
the High Court in the matter of appointment of Justice Chandrashekaraiah as Upa-
Lokayukta. The records indicate that there was no meaningful and effective consultation
or discussion of the names suggested among the consultees before advising the Governor
for appointment to the post of Upa-Lokayukta. The appointment of Justice
Chandrashekaraiah as Upa-Lokayukta, therefore, is in violation of Section 3(2)(b) of the
Act since the Chief Justice of the High Court was not consulted nor was the name
deliberated upon before advising or appointing him as Upa-Lokayukta. At this stage, it is
necessary to mention that on a plain reading of Section 3(2)(b) of the Act, there can be no
doubt that consultation with all the constitutional authorities, including the Chief Justice
of the Karnataka High Court, is mandatory. Consequently, the appointment of Justice
Chandrasekharaiah as Upa-Lokayukta cannot stand in the eye of the law and he has no
authority to continue or hold the post of Upa-Lokayukta of the State. His appointment is
therefore void ab initio.61
22. The judgment of the High Court is accordingly set aside, with a direction to the Chief
Minister of the State to take appropriate steps for appointment of Upa-Lokayukta in the
State of Karnataka in accordance with law. Since nothing adverse has been found against
Justice Chandrasekharaiah, his name can still be considered for appointment to the post
of Upa-Lokayukta along with other names, if any, suggested by the other five consultees
under the Act.
61
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/supreme-court-quashes-appointment-of-
upalokayukta/article4297906.ece
Conclusion
The broad spectrum of functions, powers, duties and responsibilities of the Upa-Lokayukta, as
statutorily prescribed, clearly bring out that not only does he perform quasi-judicial functions, as
contrasted with purely administrative or executive functions, but that the Upa-Lokayukta is more
than an investigator or an enquiry officer. At the same time, notwithstanding his status, he is not
placed on the pedestal of a judicial authority rendering a binding decision. He is placed
somewhere in between an investigator and a judicial authority, having the elements of both. For
want of a better expression, the office of an Upa-Lokayukta can only be described as a sui
generis quasi-judicial authority. He does not adjudicate a lis nor does he render a “judicial
decision” derived from the judicial powers of the State. The final decision rendered by the Upa-
Lokayukta, called a report, may not bear the stamp of a judicial decision, as would that of a court
or, to a lesser extent, a tribunal, but in formulating the report, he is required to consider the point
of view of the person complained against and ensure that the investigation reaches its logical
conclusion, one way or the other, without any interference and without any fear. Notwithstanding
this, the report of the Upa-Lokayukta does not determine the rights of the complainant or the
person complained against. Consequently, the Upa-Lokayukta is neither a court nor a tribunal.
Therefore, in my opinion, the Upa-Lokayukta can best be described as a sui generis quasi-
judicial authority.
However, the issue is more specifically dealt with in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N.
Sharma62. In that case, Kania, C.J. held [Kania, C.J. in P.N. Sharma case reiterated his own
observations made in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani63] “It seems to me that the
true position is that when the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires
a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not
necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well-recognised
principles of approach are required to be followed.”
The principles, as I apprehend them, are: (i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a
court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the
statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the
contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a lis and prima facie, and in the absence
of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the
decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to
do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties
apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the
subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act
provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.
62
[AIR 1965 SC 1595 : (1965) 2 SCR 366]
63
AIR 1950 SC 222, p. 226, para 7. : (AIR p. 1600, para 10)
As mentioned above, an Upa-Lokayukta does function as an adjudicating authority but the Act
places him short of a judicial authority. He is much more “judicial” than an investigator or an
inquisitorial authority largely exercising administrative or executive functions and powers.
Under the circumstances, taking an overall view of the provisions of the Act and the law laid
down, my conclusion is that the Upa-Lokayukta is a quasi-judicial authority or in any event an
authority exercising functions, powers, duties and responsibilities conferred by the Act as a sui
generis quasi-judicial authority.
Having held that the Upa-Lokayukta is a sui generis quasi-judicial authority, the question for
consideration is who should initiate the process for the appointment of an Upa-Lokayukta. The
significance of this is that it is tied up with the primacy of the views of the Chief Justice of the
High Court. That in turn is tied up with not only maintaining the independence of the office but
also of the Upa-Lokayukta not being dependent on the executive for the appointment.
When consultation is prescribed with more than one person, there cannot be bilateral
consultations or parallel consultations, behind the back of others, who are to be consulted in the
process. Consultation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective
points of view known to the other and discuss and examine the relative merit of their views.
They may discuss, but may disagree. They may confer but may not concur. However,
consultation is different from consentaneity. For a better view attention must be drawn to the
conclusion of Fazal Ali, J. in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India64 (after referring to Union of
India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth65) that both the “consultor” and the “consultee” must have
before them full and identical facts.
And as per the judgments cited by the Supreme Court it is clear that opinion of the Chief Justice
will have primacy when the functions to be discharged by the authority are judicial in nature but
if the functions to be discharged are quasi judicial then the opinion of Chief Justice will not have
any primacy. But so as to make the authority independent of the executive and ensure
transparency in the appointment process the recommendation and consultation with the Chief
Justice is mandatory.
64
[1981 Supp SCC 87]
65
[(1977) 4 SCC 193 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 435]