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G.R. No. L-2662             March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel
PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The
Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war"
— comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to
permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say
nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and
therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the fact that this
commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United State of America of
attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our
personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to
practice law in the Philippines.
Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued
by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that —
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and
customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68
the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this
Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said —
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities incident of war may remain pending which should be
disposed of as in time of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel
and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort
have violated the law of war. (Ex parte  Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long as a
technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may
extend beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War  Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of
war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties
to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we
were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries.
These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on
our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said
in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason committed during then Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
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By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our
present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground
that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as
prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary
civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and
constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to
practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually
military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has
submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those
very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which has yielded
to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of
common knowledge that the United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged
before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its
citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
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G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National
Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in
his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of
the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the
fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite
standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner
Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly
persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police
power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative
power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics
show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along
streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals
and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of
the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners,
users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular,
collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or
disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver
thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled
or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and
issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall
also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take
such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of
Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation
Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early
warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and
regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and
regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar
as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of
Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August
29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the
implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor
vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented
provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of
said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered
stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration
certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict
herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as
Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the
assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For
him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He
contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy
a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road
safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and
Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.
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A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) —
Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or
mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss
the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this
Court.16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was
submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner
owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the
effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative
Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation
of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being
that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike
petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation,
the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of
respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and
Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v.
Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road
signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in
language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing
rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be
dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of
respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal
protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power
which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta  thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision
after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso  reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power
in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as
noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government.
It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great
public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for
an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The
police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly
intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has
been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams  found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To
promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations becomes even more apparent
considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American
Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to
declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President
certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation
cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because
allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's
statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there
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being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case
here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another
390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with
stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive
Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest
permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus:
"Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking
lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said
1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of
the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will
not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision. 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the
questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the
early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of
this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor
vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down
in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor
confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so
sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to
enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an
unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and
implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of
unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if
that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of
wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within
the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the
observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into
the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of
powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be
adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines.
Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an
assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta  sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge
of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled
out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is
public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams  is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression
by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made
to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not
only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach
requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress
being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas
clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
 Page 6 of 98

concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to
substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate
occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a
law wig not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at
the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
 Page 7 of 98

RESOLUTION
BARRERA, J.:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified
petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken
and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to
the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed
to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:
(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can
not be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the
stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions within the territory of the Other, . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the
citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in
the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States,
issued by competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws
and regulations of the latter. . . ..
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and 16 thereof,
which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar
examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws
and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).

G.R. No. 173034             October 9, 2007

 Page 8 of 98

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY.
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND
DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Court and all parties involved are in agreement that the best nourishment for an infant is mother's milk. There is nothing greater than for a mother to
nurture her beloved child straight from her bosom. The ideal is, of course, for each and every Filipino child to enjoy the unequaled benefits of breastmilk.
But how should this end be attained?
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012
entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes  (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement.
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein
petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 2 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The main issue raised in the petition is whether respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR. 3
On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing the questioned RIRR.
After the Comment and Reply had been filed, the Court set the case for oral arguments on June 19, 2007. The Court issued an Advisory (Guidance for Oral
Arguments) dated June 5, 2007, to wit:
The Court hereby sets the following issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest;
2. Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health
(DOH) is not constitutional;
2.1 Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code);
2.2 Whether pertinent international agreements1 entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by the
DOH through the RIRR; If in the affirmative, whether the RIRR is in accord with the international agreements;
2.3 Whether Sections 4, 5(w), 22, 32, 47, and 52 of the RIRR violate the due process clause and are in restraint of trade; and
2.4 Whether Section 13 of the RIRR on Total Effect provides sufficient standards.
_____________
1 (1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) the WHO and Unicef "2002 Global Strategy on Infant and Young Child Feeding;"
and (3) various World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions.
The parties filed their respective memoranda.
The petition is partly imbued with merit.
On the issue of petitioner's standing
With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute this case as the real party-in-interest, the Court adopts the view enunciated in Executive
Secretary v. Court of Appeals,4 to wit:
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association
with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the
action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
xxxx
x x x We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized x x x to act as the representative of any individual, company,
entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish
the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are
in every practical sense identical. x x x The respondent [association] is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more
effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
which was reasserted in Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco,6 where the Court ruled that an association has the legal personality to represent
its members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests. 7
 Page 9 of 98

Herein petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation contains a similar provision just like in Executive Secretary, that the association is formed "to
represent directly or through approved representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the Philippine Government and any of its
agencies, the medical professions and the general public."8 Thus, as an organization, petitioner definitely has an interest in fulfilling its avowed purpose of
representing members who are part of the pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized 9 to take the appropriate course of action to
bring to the attention of government agencies and the courts any grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected by the RIRR. Petitioner,
which is mandated by its Amended Articles of Incorporation to represent the entire industry, would be remiss in its duties if it fails to act on governmental
action that would affect any of its industry members, no matter how few or numerous they are. Hence, petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with
its members, should be considered as a real party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by any judgment in the present action.
On the constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR
First, the Court will determine if pertinent international instruments adverted to by respondents are part of the law of the land.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The
defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international instruments 10 regarding infant and young child
nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them
through the RIRR.
The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child;
(2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages
of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy
and lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes.
The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.11 The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. 12
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.13
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code.
Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in
the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk
Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by
the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
On the other hand, Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. (Emphasis
supplied)
embodies the incorporation method.14
In Mijares v. Ranada,15 the Court held thus:
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even
if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states, 17 i.e.,
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, 18 a person's right to life, liberty and due process,19 and pacta
sunt servanda,20 among others. The concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also been depicted in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of international law because they have the "character of
jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J.
296). O'Connell holds that certain priniciples are part of international law because they are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the jus
gentium. These principles, he believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If there should be
doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution. x x
x 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows:
Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave,
and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do.
xxxx
 Page 10 of 98

The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency,
and generality of the practice of states.
The required duration can be either short or long. x x x
xxxx
Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the generality of the practice. x x x
xxxx
Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states
behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief
that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.22 (Underscoring and
Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. 23
WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation. Have they attained the status of customary law and should they then be deemed
incorporated as part of the law of the land?
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies allied with the United Nations (UN) by virtue of Article 57, 24 in relation
to Article 6325 of the UN Charter. Under the 1946 WHO Constitution, it is the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO, 26 and has the power to adopt
regulations concerning "advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce," 27 and to "make
recommendations to members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization." 28 The legal effect of its regulations, as opposed to
recommendations, is quite different.
Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted by the WHA bind member states thus:
Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of the
Organization. A two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the adoption of such conventions or agreements, which shall come
into force for each Member when accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen months after the adoption by the Health Assembly of a convention or
agreement, take action relative to the acceptance of such convention or agreement. Each Member shall notify the Director-General of the action
taken, and if it does not accept such convention or agreement within the time limit, it will furnish a statement of the reasons for non-acceptance. In
case of acceptance, each Member agrees to make an annual report to the Director-General in accordance with Chapter XIV.
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: (a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other
procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease; (b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death and public
health practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use; (d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and
potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce; (e) advertising and labeling of biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce.
Article 22. Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force for all Members after due notice has been given of their adoption by
the Health Assembly except for such Members as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations within the period stated in the
notice.  (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements
under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of
the Organization. (Emphasis supplied)
The absence of a provision in Article 23 of any mechanism by which the recommendation would come into force for member states is conspicuous.
The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA recommendations are generally not binding, but they "carry moral and political
weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of the highest international body in the field of health." 29 Even the
ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere recommendation, as WHA Resolution No. 34.22 states:
"The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly x x x adopts, in the sense of Article 23 of the Constitution, the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes annexed to the present resolution." (Emphasis supplied)
The Introduction to the ICMBS also reads as follows:
In January 1981, the Executive Board of the World Health Organization at its sixty-seventh session, considered the fourth draft of the code,
endorsed it, and unanimously recommended to the Thirty-fourth World Health Assembly the text of a resolution by which it would adopt the code
in the form of a recommendation rather than a regulation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The legal value of WHA Resolutions as recommendations is summarized in Article 62 of the WHO Constitution, to wit:
Art. 62. Each member shall report annually on the action taken with respect to recommendations made to it by the Organization, and with respect
to conventions, agreements and regulations.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions into law
which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, 30 specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up
to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. 31
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of
Justice.32 It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior. 33 Certain declarations and resolutions
of the UN General Assembly fall under this category.34 The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various
cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia ,35 Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,36 Mijares v. Rañada37 and Shangri-la
International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc.. 38
 Page 11 of 98

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency attached to the UN with the mandate to promote and protect intellectual
property worldwide, has resorted to soft law as a rapid means of norm creation, in order "to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of its
constituents."39 Other international organizations which have resorted to soft law include the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (in the form of the Codex Alimentarius).40
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law binding on WHO member states, it provides an excellent example of the
power of "soft law" in international relations. International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of international law-"hard law"-from non-
binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior-"soft law." WHO has during its existence generated many soft law norms,
creating a "soft law regime" in international governance for public health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps in laying the political groundwork for improved international cooperation on
infectious diseases. These resolutions clearly define WHO member states' normative duty to cooperate fully with other countries and with WHO in
connection with infectious disease surveillance and response to outbreaks.
This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of the SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful politically  for two reasons. First, the
SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that participating in, and enhancing, international cooperation on infectious disease controls is in a
country's self-interest x x x if this warning is heeded, the "soft law" in the SARS and IHR Resolution could inform the development of general and
consistent state practice on infectious disease surveillance and outbreak response, perhaps crystallizing eventually into customary international
law on infectious disease prevention and control. 41
In the Philippines, the executive department implemented certain measures recommended by WHO to address the outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by
issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003 and E.O. No. 280 on February 2, 2004, delegating to various departments broad powers to close
down schools/establishments, conduct health surveillance and monitoring, and ban importation of poultry and agricultural products.
It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency, the duty of a state to implement the IHR Resolution was still considered not
binding or enforceable, although said resolutions had great political influence.
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states
because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have
respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the
land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions
cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
Second, the Court will determine whether the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the
Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law.
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national health policy and implement a
national health plan within the framework of the government's general policies and plans, and issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation
of established health policies.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk substitutes provided in some WHA
Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national health policy.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the
Administrative Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive
breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age
six months; (3) micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally difficult
circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it
declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.
The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk
substitutes.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead,
specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a
law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject
RIRR.
Third, the Court will now determine whether the provisions of the RIRR are in accordance with those of the Milk Code.
In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner alleges the following:
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to "young children" or those from ages two
years old and beyond:

MILK CODE RIRR

WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate Section 2. Purpose – These Revised Rules and Regulations
nutrition for infants is provided, there is a need to protect and are hereby promulgated to ensure the provision of safe and
promote breastfeeding and to inform the public about the adequate nutrition for infants and young children by the
proper use of breastmilk substitutes and supplements and promotion, protection and support of breastfeeding and by
 Page 12 of 98

related products through adequate, consistent and objective ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes, breastmilk
information and appropriate regulation of the marketing and supplements and related products when these are medically
distribution of the said substitutes, supplements and related indicated and only when necessary, on the basis of
products; adequate information and through appropriate marketing
SECTION 4(e). "Infant" means a person falling within the and distribution.
age bracket of 0-12 months. Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a person from the age
of more than twelve (12) months up to the age of three (3)
years (36 months).

2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR
provides "exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months" and declares that "there is no substitute nor replacement for breastmilk":

MILK CODE RIRR

WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate Section 4. Declaration of Principles – The following are the
nutrition for infants is provided, there is a need to protect and underlying principles from which the revised rules and
promote breastfeeding and to inform the public about regulations are premised upon:
the proper use of breastmilk substitutes and supplements a. Exclusive breastfeeding is for infants from 0 to six (6)
and related products through adequate, consistent and months.
objective information and appropriate regulation of the b. There is no substitute or replacement for breastmilk.
marketing and distribution of the said substitutes,
supplements and related products;

3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable requirements for advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban
on such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-24 months old or beyond, and forbids the use of health and nutritional
claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which provides for a "total effect" in the promotion of products within the scope of the Code, is vague:

MILK CODE RIRR

SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. – Section 4. Declaration of Principles – The following are the
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, underlying principles from which the revised rules and
whether written, audio or visual, for products within the regulations are premised upon:
scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed, xxxx
exhibited and broadcast unless such materials are duly f. Advertising, promotions, or sponsor-ships of infant
authorized and approved by an inter-agency formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related
committee created herein pursuant to the applicable products are prohibited.
standards provided for in this Code. Section 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions,
sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities for
breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed,
because they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or
impressions that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or
otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or
replacements, as well as related products covered within the
scope of this Code.
Section 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the
scope of this Code must be objective and should not equate
or make the product appear to be as good or equal to
breastmilk or breastfeeding in the advertising concept. It
must not in any case undermine breastmilk or breastfeeding.
The "total effect" should not directly or indirectly suggest that
buying their product would produce better individuals, or
resulting in greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or in
any manner bring better health to the baby or other such
exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Section 15. Content of Materials. - The following shall not be
included in advertising, promotional and marketing materials:
a. Texts, pictures, illustrations or information which
discourage or tend to undermine the benefits or superiority
of breastfeeding or which idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes and milk supplements. In this connection, no
 Page 13 of 98

pictures of babies and children together with their mothers,

fathers, siblings, grandparents, other relatives or caregivers
(or yayas) shall be used in any advertisements for infant
formula and breastmilk supplements;
b. The term "humanized," "maternalized," "close to mother's
milk" or similar words in describing breastmilk substitutes or
milk supplements;
c. Pictures or texts that idealize the use of infant and milk
formula.
Section 16. All health and nutrition claims for products within
the scope of the Code are absolutely prohibited. For this
purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to increase
emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and young child
and other like phrases shall not be allowed.

4. The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code:

MILK CODE RIRR

SECTION 10. Containers/Label. – Section 26. Content – Each container/label shall contain
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the such message, in both Filipino and English languages, and
necessary information about the appropriate use of the which message cannot be readily separated therefrom,
products, and in such a way as not to discourage relative the following points:
breastfeeding. (a) The words or phrase "Important Notice" or "Government
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and Warning" or their equivalent;
easily readable and understandable message in Pilipino or (b) A statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
English printed on it, or on a label, which message can not (c) A statement that there is no substitute for breastmilk;
readily become separated from it, and which shall include (d) A statement that the product shall be used only on the
the following points: advice of a health worker as to the need for its use and the
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent; proper methods of use;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding; (e) Instructions for appropriate prepara-tion, and a warning
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the against the health hazards of inappropriate preparation; and
advice of a health worker as to the need for its use and the (f) The health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of
proper methods of use; and infant formula and other related products including
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning information that powdered infant formula may contain
against the health hazards of inappropriate preparation. pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and used
appropriately.

5. The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula to health professionals; the RIRR totally prohibits such activity:

MILK CODE RIRR

SECTION 7. Health Care System. – Section 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or representatives
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the of products covered by the Code shall be allowed to conduct
purpose of promoting infant formula or other products within or be involved in any activity on breastfeeding promotion,
the scope of this Code. This Code does not, however, education and production of Information, Education and
preclude the dissemination of information to health Communication (IEC) materials on breastfeeding, holding of
professionals as provided in Section 8(b). or participating as speakers in classes or seminars for
SECTION 8. Health Workers. - women and children activities and to avoid the use of these
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to venues to market their brands or company names.
health professionals regarding products within the scope of SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for products
this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual within the scope of the Code are absolutely prohibited. For
matters and such information shall not imply or create a this purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to increase
belief that bottle-feeding is equivalent or superior to emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and young child
breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified and other like phrases shall not be allowed.
in Section 5(b).

6. The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and continuing education of health professionals;
RIRR absolutely forbids the same.
 Page 14 of 98

MILK CODE RIRR

SECTION 8. Health Workers – Section 4. Declaration of Principles –
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the The following are the underlying principles from which the
scope of this Code may assist in the research, scholarships revised rules and regulations are premised upon:
and continuing education, of health professionals, in i. Milk companies, and their representatives, should not form
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by part of any policymaking body or entity in relation to the
the Ministry of Health. advancement of breasfeeding.
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or
representatives of products covered by the Code shall be
allowed to conduct or be involved in any activity on
breastfeeding promotion, education and production of
Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials
on breastfeeding, holding of or participating as speakers in
classes or seminars for women and children activities and to
avoid the use of these venues to market their brands or
company names.
SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health Workers - It
is the primary responsibility of the health workers to
promote, protect and support breastfeeding and appropriate
infant and young child feeding. Part of this responsibility is to
continuously update their knowledge and skills on
breastfeeding. No assistance, support, logistics or training
from milk companies shall be permitted.

7. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits it.

MILK CODE RIRR

SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. – Section 51. Donations Within the Scope of This Code -
(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent donations from Donations of products, materials, defined and covered under
manufacturers and distributors of products within the scope the Milk Code and these implementing rules and regulations,
of this Code upon request by or with the approval of the shall be strictly prohibited.
Ministry of Health. Section 52. Other Donations By Milk Companies Not
Covered by this Code. - Donations of products, equipments,
and the like, not otherwise falling within the scope of this
Code or these Rules, given by milk companies and their
agents, representatives, whether in kind or in cash, may only
be coursed through the Inter Agency Committee (IAC),
which shall determine whether such donation be accepted or
otherwise.

8. The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk Code.

MILK CODE RIRR

  Section 46. Administrative Sanctions. – The following
administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon any person,
juridical or natural, found to have violated the provisions of
the Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations:
a) 1st violation – Warning;
b) 2nd violation – Administrative fine of a minimum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the violation,
including the recall of the offending product;
c) 3rd violation – Administrative Fine of a minimum of Sixty
Thousand (P60,000.00) to One Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P150,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent
of the violation, and in addition thereto, the recall of the
offending product, and suspension of the Certificate of
Product Registration (CPR);
d) 4th violation –Administrative Fine of a minimum of Two
 Page 15 of 98

Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) to Five Hundred

(P500,000.00) Thousand Pesos, depending on the gravity
and extent of the violation; and in addition thereto, the recall
of the product, revocation of the CPR, suspension of the
License to Operate (LTO) for one year;
e) 5th and succeeding repeated violations – Administrative
Fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the recall of the
offending product, cancellation of the CPR, revocation of the
License to Operate (LTO) of the company concerned,
including the blacklisting of the company to be furnished the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);
f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five Hundred
(P2,500.00) Pesos per day shall be made for every day the
violation continues after having received the order from the
IAC or other such appropriate body, notifying and penalizing
the company for the infraction.
For purposes of determining whether or not there is
"repeated" violation, each product violation belonging or
owned by a company, including those of their subsidiaries,
are deemed to be violations of the concerned milk company
and shall not be based on the specific violating product
alone.

9. The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary.

The Court shall resolve the merits of the allegations of petitioner seriatim.
1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's coverage is limited only to children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code states:
SECTION 3. Scope of the Code – The Code applies to the marketing, and practices related thereto, of the following products: breastmilk
substitutes, including infant formula; other milk products, foods and beverages, including bottle-fed complementary foods, when marketed or
otherwise represented to be suitable, with or without modification, for use as a partial or total replacement of breastmilk; feeding bottles and teats.
It also applies to their quality and availability, and to information concerning their use.
Clearly, the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on the kind of product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant
formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct product categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as "a breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy the normal nutritional requirements of infants up to between
four to six months of age, and adapted to their physiological characteristics"; while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to "any food,
whether manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the
nutritional requirements of the infant." An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group
of infants or children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the Milk Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as "any food being marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or
total replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose." This section conspicuously lacks reference to any particular age-group of
children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may
also be intended for young children more than 12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to protect and
promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old.
Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to
said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.
There is, therefore, nothing objectionable with Sections 242 and 5(ff)43 of the RIRR.
2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code, does not recognize that breastmilk substitutes may be a proper and possible
substitute for breastmilk.
The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions thereof, must be considered and construed together. As held in De Luna v. Pascual,44 "[t]he
particular words, clauses and phrases in the Rule should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole."
Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically indicated and only when necessary, the use of breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete
and updated information." Section 8 of the RIRR also states that information and educational materials should include information on the proper use of
infant formula when the use thereof is needed.
Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain cases, the use of breastmilk substitutes may be proper.
3. The Court shall ascertain the merits of allegations 345 and 446 together as they are interlinked with each other.
To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under the RIRR are valid, it is important to deal first with the
nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the DOH, as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative Code, 47 and as delegated in particular
under the Milk Code.
 Page 16 of 98

Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The
sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss it. .48 However, health information, particularly advertising materials on
apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by the DOH. 49
As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands, 50 health information was already within the ambit of the regulatory powers of the
predecessor of DOH.51 Section 938 thereof charged it with the duty to protect the health of the people, and vested it with such powers as "(g) the
dissemination of hygienic information among the people and especially the inculcation of knowledge as to the proper care of infants  and the methods of
preventing and combating dangerous communicable diseases."
Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, which is "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."52 To that end, it was granted
under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to "(6) propagate health information and educate the population on important health, medical and
environmental matters which have health implications."53
When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health
(hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk
substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control such information. These are expressly provided for in Sections 12 and 5(a), to wit:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring  –
xxxx
(b) The Ministry of Health shall be principally responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this Code. For this purpose,
the Ministry of Health shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this Code and the accomplishment
of its purposes and objectives.
xxxx
(4) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary for or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives
of this Code.
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding, for use by families and those involved in
the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility shall cover the planning, provision, design and dissemination of information, and the control  thereof,
on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related
products, in the following manner:
SECTION 5. x x x
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and intended to reach pregnant
women and mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding; (2)
maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding of introducing partial
bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the decision not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether
manufactured industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they shall include the
social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may
idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes.
SECTION 8. Health Workers –
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products within the scope of this Code shall be
restricted to scientific and factual matters, and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section 5(b) .
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the appropriate use of the products, and in such a way
as not to discourage breastfeeding.
xxxx
(d) The term "humanized," "maternalized" or similar terms shall not be used. (Emphasis supplied)
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the
Milk Code54 to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care
system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not
absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
The following are the provisions of the Milk Code that unequivocally indicate that the control over information given to the DOH is not absolute and that
absolute prohibition is not contemplated by the Code:
a) Section 2 which requires adequate information and appropriate marketing and distribution of breastmilk substitutes, to wit:
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code –  The aim of the Code is to contribute to the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for infants by the
protection and promotion of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes and breastmilk supplements when
these are necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate marketing and distribution.
b) Section 3 which specifically states that the Code applies to the marketing of and practices related to breastmilk substitutes, including infant
formula, and to information concerning their use;
 Page 17 of 98

c) Section 5(a) which provides that the government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding;
d) Section 5(b) which provides that written, audio or visual informational and educational materials shall not use any picture or text which may
idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes and should include information on the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of said product;
e) Section 6(a) in relation to Section 12(a) which creates and empowers the IAC to review and examine advertising, promotion, and other
marketing materials;
f) Section 8(b) which states that milk companies may provide information to health professionals but such information should be restricted to
factual and scientific matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding; and
g) Section 10 which provides that containers or labels should not contain information that would discourage breastfeeding and idealize the use of
infant formula.
It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the RIRR regarding labeling and advertising.
Sections 1355 on "total effect" and 2656 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling requirements, specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no
substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and
used appropriately. Section 1657 of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Milk Code, such as claims of
increased emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child.
These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 8. Health workers  -
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products within the scope of this Code shall
be restricted to scientific and factual matters, and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section 5. 58 (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 10(d)59 which bars the use on containers and labels of the terms "humanized," "maternalized," or similar terms.
These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply or create a belief that there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or
which is humanized or maternalized, as such information would be inconsistent with the superiority of breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given to health workers regarding breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and
labels thereof. However, such restrictive application of Section 8(b) will result in the absurd situation in which milk companies and distributors are forbidden
to claim to health workers that their products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk, and yet be allowed to display on the containers and labels of their
products the exact opposite message. That askewed interpretation of the Milk Code is precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to avoid by mandating that
all information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be consistent, at the same time giving the government control over planning, provision,
design, and dissemination of information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state that the product offered is not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable
means of enforcing Section 8(b) of the Milk Code and deterring circumvention of the protection and promotion of breastfeeding as embodied in Section
260 of the Milk Code.
Section 26(f)61 of the RIRR is an equally reasonable labeling requirement. It implements Section 5(b) of the Milk Code which reads:
SECTION 5. x x x
xxxx
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and intended to reach pregnant
women and mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all the following points: x x x (5) where needed, the proper use of infant formula,
whether manufactured industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they shall include
the social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods; and, in particular, the health
hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes . Such materials shall not use any picture or text which
may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes. (Emphasis supplied)
The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the buyers thereof. The buyers of breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants,
and Section 26 of the RIRR merely adds a fair warning about the likelihood of pathogenic microorganisms being present in infant formula and other related
products when these are prepared and used inappropriately.
Petitioner’s counsel has admitted during the hearing on June 19, 2007 that formula milk is prone to contaminations and there is as yet no technology that
allows production of powdered infant formula that eliminates all forms of contamination. 62
Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of the RIRR for the label to contain the message regarding health hazards including the possibility of
contamination with pathogenic microorganisms is in accordance with Section 5(b) of the Milk Code.
The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes and supplements and related products cannot be
questioned. It is its intervention into the area of advertising, promotion, and marketing that is being assailed by petitioner.
In furtherance of Section 6(a) of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. –
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, for products within the scope of this Code shall be
printed, published, distributed, exhibited and broadcast unless such materials are duly authorized and approved by an inter-agency committee
created herein pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code.
the Milk Code invested regulatory authority over advertising, promotional and marketing materials to an IAC, thus:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring  -
(a) For purposes of Section 6(a) of this Code, an inter-agency committee composed of the following members is hereby created:

Minister of Health ------------------- Chairman

 Page 18 of 98

Minister of Trade and Industry ------------------- Member

Minister of Justice ------------------- Member

Minister of Social Services and Development ------------------- Member

The members may designate their duly authorized representative to every meeting of the Committee.
The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) To review and examine all advertising. promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, on products within
the scope of this Code;
(2) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and prohibit the printing, publication, distribution, exhibition and
broadcast of, all advertising promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, on products within the scope of
this Code;
(3) To prescribe the internal and operational procedure for the exercise of its powers and functions as well as the performance of its
duties and responsibilities; and
(4) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of Section 6(a) of this Code. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:
SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for
infants and young children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed, because they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or
impressions that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related
products covered within the scope of this Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes in line with the RIRR’s declaration of principle
under Section 4(f), to wit:
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles –
xxxx
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related products are prohibited.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority given to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition
on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6 thereof for prior approval by IAC of all advertising,
marketing and promotional materials prior to dissemination.
Even respondents, through the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and repeatedly insisted, during the oral arguments on June 19, 2007, that the
prohibition under Section 11 is not actually operational, viz:
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
xxxx
x x x Now, the crux of the matter that is being questioned by Petitioner is whether or not there is an absolute prohibition on advertising making AO
2006-12 unconstitutional. We maintained that what AO 2006-12 provides is not an absolute prohibition because Section 11 while it states and it is
entitled prohibition it states that no advertising, promotion, sponsorship or marketing materials and activities for breast milk substitutes intended
for infants and young children up to 24 months shall be allowed because this is the standard they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or
impression undermine that breastmilk or breastfeeding x x x.
We have to read Section 11 together with the other Sections because the other Section, Section 12, provides for the inter agency committee that
is empowered to process and evaluate all the advertising and promotion materials.
xxxx
What AO 2006-12, what it does, it does not prohibit the sale and manufacture, it simply regulates the advertisement and the promotions of
breastfeeding milk substitutes.
xxxx
Now, the prohibition on advertising, Your Honor, must be taken together with the provision on the Inter-Agency Committee that processes and
evaluates because there may be some information dissemination that are straight forward information dissemination. What the AO 2006 is trying
to prevent is any material that will undermine the practice of breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
Madam Solicitor General, under the Milk Code, which body has authority or power to promulgate Rules and Regulations regarding the
Advertising, Promotion and Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Your Honor, please, it is provided that the Inter-Agency Committee, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
x x x Don't you think that the Department of Health overstepped its rule making authority when it totally banned advertising and promotion under
Section 11 prescribed the total effect rule as well as the content of materials under Section 13 and 15 of the rules and regulations?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
 Page 19 of 98

Your Honor, please, first we would like to stress that there is no total absolute ban. Second, the Inter-Agency Committee is under the Department
of Health, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
x x x Did I hear you correctly, Madam Solicitor, that there is no absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk substitutes in the Revised Rules?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Yes, your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
But, would you nevertheless agree that there is an absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk substitutes intended for children two (2) years old
and younger?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
It's not an absolute ban, Your Honor, because we have the Inter-Agency Committee that can evaluate some advertising and promotional
materials, subject to the standards that we have stated earlier, which are- they should not undermine breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
x x x Section 11, while it is titled Prohibition, it must be taken in relation with the other Sections, particularly 12 and 13 and 15, Your Honor,
because it is recognized that the Inter-Agency Committee has that power to evaluate promotional materials, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
So in short, will you please clarify there's no absolute ban on advertisement regarding milk substitute regarding infants two (2) years below?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
We can proudly say that the general rule is that there is a prohibition, however, we take exceptions and standards have been set. One of which is
that, the Inter-Agency Committee can allow if the advertising and promotions will not undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding, Your Honor. 63
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code.
However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the approval or rejection of advertising, promotional, or other
marketing materials under Section 12(a) of the Milk Code, said provision must be related to Section 6 thereof which in turn provides that the rules and
regulations must be "pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code." Said standards are set forth in Sections 5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code,
which, at the risk of being repetitious, and for easy reference, are quoted hereunder:
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
xxxx
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and intended to reach pregnant
women and mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding; (2)
maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding of introducing partial
bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the decision not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether
manufactured industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they shall include the
social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods of feeding methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may
idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes.
xxxx
SECTION 8. Health Workers. –
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products within the scope of this Code shall be
restricted to scientific and factual matters and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottle feeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section 5(b).
xxxx
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the appropriate use of the products, and in such a way
as not to discourage breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily readable and understandable message in Pilipino or English printed on it, or on a
label, which message can not readily become separated from it, and which shall include the following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as to the need for its use and the proper methods of
use; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning against the health hazards of inappropriate preparation.
Section 12(b) of the Milk Code designates the DOH as the principal implementing agency for the enforcement of the provisions of the Code. In relation to
such responsibility of the DOH, Section 5(a) of the Milk Code states that:
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding, for use by families and those involved in
the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility shall cover the planning, provision, design and dissemination of information, and the control thereof,
on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into operational terms the standards set forth in Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by
which the IAC shall screen advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials.
 Page 20 of 98

It is pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly provided for Section 13 in the RIRR which reads as follows:
SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the scope of this Code must be objective and should not equate or make the product
appear to be as good or equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in the advertising concept. It must not in any case undermine breastmilk or
breastfeeding. The "total effect" should not directly or indirectly suggest that buying their product would produce better individuals, or resulting in
greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner bring better health to the baby or other such exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on advertising, promotion, and marketing. Through that single provision, the DOH
exercises control over the information content of advertising, promotional and marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes,
supplements and other related products. It also sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen such materials before they are made public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs ,64 the Court held:
x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and
welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."65
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with public interest and welfare.
4. With regard to activities for dissemination of information to health professionals, the Court also finds that there is no inconsistency between the provisions
of the Milk Code and the RIRR. Section 7(b)66 of the Milk Code, in relation to Section 8(b)67 of the same Code, allows dissemination of information to health
professionals but such information is restricted to scientific and factual matters.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the giving of information to health professionals on scientific and factual matters.
What it prohibits is the involvement of the manufacturer and distributor of the products covered by the Code in activities for the promotion, education and
production of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials regarding breastfeeding that are intended for women and children. Said provision
cannot be construed to encompass even the dissemination of information to health professionals, as restricted by the Milk Code.
5. Next, petitioner alleges that Section 8(e)68 of the Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and in the
continuing education of health professionals, while Sections 22 and 32 of the RIRR absolutely forbid the same. Petitioner also assails Section 4(i) 69 of the
RIRR prohibiting milk manufacturers' and distributors' participation in any policymaking body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding.
Section 4(i) of the RIRR provides that milk companies and their representatives should not form part of any policymaking body or entity in relation to the
advancement of breastfeeding. The Court finds nothing in said provisions which contravenes the Milk Code. Note that under Section 12(b) of the Milk Code,
it is the DOH which shall be principally responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of said Code. It is entirely up to the DOH to
decide which entities to call upon or allow to be part of policymaking bodies on breastfeeding. Therefore, the RIRR's prohibition on milk companies’
participation in any policymaking body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding is in accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner is also mistaken in arguing that Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving reasearch assistance and continuing education to
health professionals. Section 2270 of the RIRR does not pertain to research assistance to or the continuing education of health professionals; rather, it deals
with breastfeeding promotion and education for women and children. Nothing in Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving assistance for
research or continuing education to health professionals; hence, petitioner's argument against this particular provision must be struck down.
It is Sections 971 and 1072 of the RIRR which govern research assistance. Said sections of the RIRR provide that research assistance for health workers
and researchers may be allowed upon approval of an ethics committee, and with certain disclosure requirements imposed on the milk company and on the
recipient of the research award.
The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to determine how such research or educational assistance may be given by milk companies or under what
conditions health workers may accept the assistance. Thus, Sections 9 and 10 of the RIRR imposing limitations on the kind of research done or extent of
assistance given by milk companies are completely in accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner complains that Section 3273 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving assistance, support, logistics or training to health workers. This
provision is within the prerogative given to the DOH under Section 8(e) 74 of the Milk Code, which provides that manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk
substitutes may assist in researches, scholarships and the continuing education, of health professionals in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Health, now DOH.
6. As to the RIRR's prohibition on donations, said provisions are also consistent with the Milk Code. Section 6(f) of the Milk Code provides that
donations may be made by manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes upon the request or with the approval of the DOH. The law does not
proscribe the refusal of donations. The Milk Code leaves it purely to the discretion of the DOH whether to request or accept such donations. The DOH then
appropriately exercised its discretion through Section 51 75 of the RIRR which sets forth its policy not to request or approve donations from manufacturers
and distributors of breastmilk substitutes.
It was within the discretion of the DOH when it provided in Section 52 of the RIRR that any donation from milk companies not covered by the Code should
be coursed through the IAC which shall determine whether such donation should be accepted or refused. As reasoned out by respondents, the DOH is not
mandated by the Milk Code to accept donations. For that matter, no person or entity can be forced to accept a donation. There is, therefore, no real
inconsistency between the RIRR and the law because the Milk Code does not prohibit the DOH from refusing donations.
7. With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative sanctions that are not found in the Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's objection
thereto.
Respondent's reliance on Civil Aeronautics Board v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.76 is misplaced. The glaring difference in said case and the present case
before the Court is that, in the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was expressly granted by the law (R.A. No. 776) the
power to impose fines and civil penalties, while the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was granted by the same law the power to review on appeal the order or
decision of the CAA and to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise such fine and civil penalties. Thus, the Court upheld the
CAB's Resolution imposing administrative fines.
In a more recent case, Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,77 the Court upheld the Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-
10 implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.  33. The circular provided for fines for the commission of prohibited acts. The Court found that nothing in the
circular contravened the law because the DOE was expressly authorized by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 7638 to impose fines or penalties.
 Page 21 of 98

In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code grants the DOH the authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus,
without any express grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOH cannot provide for those fines in the RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded
its authority by providing for such fines or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision is, therefore, null and void.
The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its rules and regulations. Section 12(b) (3) of the Milk Code authorizes the DOH to "cause the prosecution
of the violators of this Code and other pertinent laws on products covered by this Code." Section 13 of the Milk Code provides for the penalties to be
imposed on violators of the provision of the Milk Code or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to it, to wit:
SECTION 13. Sanctions –
(a) Any person who violates the provisions of this Code or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Code shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a penalty of two (2) months to one (1) year imprisonment or a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) or both. Should the offense be committed by a juridical person, the chairman of the Board of Directors, the
president, general manager, or the partners and/or the persons directly responsible therefor, shall be penalized.
(b) Any license, permit or authority issued by any government agency to any health worker, distributor, manufacturer, or marketing firm or
personnel for the practice of their profession or occupation, or for the pursuit of their business, may, upon recommendation of the Ministry of
Health, be suspended or revoked in the event of repeated violations of this Code, or of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Petitioner’s claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are contrary to the RIRR is frivolous.
Section 57 reads:
SECTION 57. Repealing Clause - All orders, issuances, and rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with these revised rules and
implementing regulations are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders, issuances and rules and regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is
within the DOH's rule-making power.
An administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-making power or the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the Constitution, and subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.78 Such express grant of rule-making power necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same. 79 This is to allow
administrative agencies flexibility in formulating and adjusting the details and manner by which they are to implement the provisions of a law, 80 in order to
make it more responsive to the times. Hence, it is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior issuances of administrative agencies that are
inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the DOH to promulgate and in contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore,
null and void. The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the Milk Code.
Lastly, petitioner makes a "catch-all" allegation that:
x x x [T]he questioned RIRR sought to be implemented by the Respondents is unnecessary and oppressive, and is offensive to the due process
clause of the Constitution, insofar as the same is in restraint of trade and because a provision therein is inadequate to provide the public with a
comprehensible basis to determine whether or not they have committed a violation. 81 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner refers to Sections 4(f),82 4(i),83 5(w),84 11,85 22,86 32,87 46,88 and 5289 as the provisions that suppress the trade of milk and, thus, violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.
The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld
over business interests.90 In Pest Management Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority ,91 it was held thus:
x x x Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, despite the fact that "our present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to
promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our
environment. Thus, in the aforecited case, the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for removal of ‘protective regulations’." x x x It
must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of
trade. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars
for women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of
breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in
restraint of trade.
Petitioner also failed to convince the Court that Section 5(w) of the RIRR is unreasonable and oppressive. Said section provides for the definition of the
term "milk company," to wit:
SECTION 5 x x x. (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the owner, manufacturer, distributor of infant formula, follow-up milk, milk formula, milk
supplement, breastmilk substitute or replacement, or by any other description of such nature, including their representatives who promote or
otherwise advance their commercial interests in marketing those products;
On the other hand, Section 4 of the Milk Code provides:
(d) "Distributor" means a person, corporation or any other entity in the public or private sector engaged in the business (whether directly or
indirectly) of marketing at the wholesale or retail level a product within the scope of this Code. A "primary distributor" is a manufacturer's sales
agent, representative, national distributor or broker.
xxxx
(j) "Manufacturer" means a corporation or other entity in the public or private sector engaged in the business or function (whether directly or
indirectly or through an agent or and entity controlled by or under contract with it) of manufacturing a products within the scope of this Code.
 Page 22 of 98

Notably, the definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term "milk company" the entities defined separately under the Milk Code as
"distributor" and "manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in Section 5(w) the products manufactured or distributed by an entity that would qualify it as a
"milk company," whereas in the Milk Code, what is used is the phrase "products within the scope of this Code." Those are the only differences between the
definitions given in the Milk Code and the definition as re-stated in the RIRR.
Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR providing
for just one term to encompass both entities. The definition of "milk company" in the RIRR and the definitions of "distributor" and "manufacturer" provided
for under the Milk Code are practically the same.
The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR would bring about any change in the treatment or regulation of
"distributors" and "manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the Milk Code.
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code,
constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint
of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are
declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar as the rest of the provisions of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69401

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING
USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH,
MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX,
ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
(AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL
DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound
occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. 1
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese
Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last part
is not included in the modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was
merely to warn the intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon enough.
The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. 2
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and
photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of
ammunition found in the premises. 3
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their
purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination. 4
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the articles alleged to have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to
Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court, Zamboanga City. 5 After receiving the testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties, he submitted the
report and recommendations on which this opinion is based. 6
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of
Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. 7
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the incident in question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior
orders. 8 There was also the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not
excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10
 Page 23 of 98

The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein
against the petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary treatment they received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal
argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated
reports that they were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of
the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the
Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply signify
is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary
punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would
condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly
regrettable for it was incumbent on them, especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather than undermine respect for the law, which it
was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was
probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized
determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every
opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could
have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly
processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military
invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal
arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground
that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they
instead simply barged into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house on
the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient rule,
revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter. But the King of England may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 13
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule
113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. 14
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound
are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. 15 As Judge Learned Hand
observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed. 16 Pending determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as
the corresponding courts may decide. 17
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination
applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations should remain in the past, banished with the secret marshals and their covert
license to kill without trial. We must be done with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold the law must not be the
first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that the martial law regime's
legacy of the law of force be discarded and that there be a return to the force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic, where every individual is entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof
are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the
criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 Page 24 of 98

G.R. No. L-45892             July 13, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-45893             July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty
years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that
they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the
Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered
up to the date of the filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is
fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and
does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in
faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of
an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.1ªvvphïl.nët
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war
does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an
army. This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is
reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests,
and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its
defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because,
in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as,
in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective,
in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves
before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can
obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the appellants. So ordered.
 Page 25 of 98

G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to
prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in
the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what
he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In
spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for
printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by
1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof,
to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly
restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than
judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior
tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to
"functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act
because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari  "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is
that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his
authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section
23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical
background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the
furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the
Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission,
reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the
supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the
Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
 Page 26 of 98

constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our
Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the
minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,
promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"
they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized
here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4,
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [ c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal
holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state ( see  arts.
132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY
FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE
STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same :
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any
portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other
expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the
amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the
postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part
of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is
granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be
sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of
June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity
to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3,
petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as
originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of
that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the
opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate
to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb
any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care
should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny
of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
 Page 27 of 98

the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 106440             January 29, 1996

ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA MANOSCA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES
CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled
"Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al."), this Court is asked to resolve whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent
Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI")
as a national historical landmark.
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square
meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No.
1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06
January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the
measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:
According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or
modification that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y.
Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. It has been held that
places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized . . . .
In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as an agency of the Government charged with the maintenance and care of
national shrines, monuments and landmarks and the development of historical sites that may be declared as national shrines, monuments and/or
landmarks, may initiate the institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in question in accordance with the
procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The proceedings should be instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General in
behalf of the Republic.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation 3 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia, that:
Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was
approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land which is the
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the "Iglesia ni Cristo," as a National Historical Landrnark. The plaintiff perforce needs the land as such
national historical landmark which is a public purpose.
At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The
motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 03 August 1989, 4 an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and
assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited
with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the
provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. 5 Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August
1989 order of the trial court.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners' motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its
denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 1990,7 another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic the
motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order. 8
 Page 28 of 98

Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the appellate court
dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in any
case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration of
the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992 resolution of the appellate court.
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates.
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of
sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate,
rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. 9 It is a right to take or
reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. 10 The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." 11 This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against
whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 12 to wit:
(a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform. 13 Petitioners suggest that
we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public uses, 14 i.e., the —
. . . taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including schoolhouses,
parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads.
This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President's power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private
lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the
Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain
should not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. 15
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public
exigency. 16 Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, "public
use" is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of
public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many
members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont.
457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use
concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally
interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.
Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common,
and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and
inconvenience. A "public use" for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new
appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an
increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. 17
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use
should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been
discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,18 quoting from Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See
DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is no for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of
eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891;
United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.
It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 that:
. . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public use" to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the
individual increase and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for "whatever is beneficially
employed for the community is a public use.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement.
Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is
not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution
in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for
resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
 Page 29 of 98

government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use. 20
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 21 has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument
and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as
"public welfare." 22
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might
follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to
the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. 23
Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be reminded
that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard; 24 contrary to petitioners' argument, the records of this case are replete with pleadings 25 that
could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value of the property.
Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial court's order which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of
Manila. 26 Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners which
(the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Page 30 of 98

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS.
— The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is
not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote
safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and
regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road
or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said
law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion
of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is
conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
 Page 31 of 98

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the
respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from
Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from
the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid,
with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed
to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as
a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets
is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by
Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of
fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or
by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules
and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a
reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and
his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines"
and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and
the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
 Page 32 of 98

depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing
the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law
is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever
a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was
this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon
which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public
Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation,"
not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548
constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act
No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169),
"the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of
population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46
Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within
such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part
of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
 Page 33 of 98

G.R. No. 167324               July 17, 2007

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS, INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH
DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE SOCIETY
OF SANITARY ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG
MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P.
GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUÑATA, EDGARDO J. DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND REMEGIO S.
MERCADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision, 1 promulgated by the Court of Appeals on 26
November 2004, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health
(DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which was issued by then President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999.
Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated 29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action.
HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and analyses with
inputs from several consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided
for five general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public health programs; (3) promote
the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand
the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP). 2
Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and
the corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The said provision under the HSRA reads:
Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government hospitals must be allowed to collect socialized user fees so they can reduce the dependence
on direct subsidies from the government. Their critical capacities like diagnostic equipment, laboratory facilities and medical staff capability must be
upgraded to effectively exercise fiscal autonomy. Such investment must be cognizant of complimentary capacity provided by public-private networks.
Moreover such capacities will allow government hospitals to supplement priority public health programs. Appropriate institutional arrangement must be
introduced such as allowing them autonomy towards converting them into government corporations without compromising their social responsibilities. As a
result, government hospitals are expected to be more competitive and responsive to health needs.
Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH, dated 5 January 2001, entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the
Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January
2001;"3 and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled "Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in
Government Health Facilities,"4 dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and
medical services.5
Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for being in violation of the following constitutional provisions: 6
ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the law.
ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of democracy.
 Page 34 of 98

ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for
all.
ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual
and social well-being x x x.
ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.
ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:
xxxx
(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.
xxxx
ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions,
and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health," which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive
order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical
assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. The provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the deployment of
DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals read:
Sec. 4. Preparation of a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan. In view of the functional and operational redirection in the DOH, and to effect efficiency and
effectiveness in its activities, the Department shall prepare a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) which shall be the basis of the intended changes.
The RSP shall contain the following:
a) the specific shift in policy directions, functions, programs and activities/strategies;
b) the structural and organizational shift, stating the specific functions and activities by organizational unit and the relationship of each units;
c) the staffing shift, highlighting and itemizing the existing filled and unfilled positions; and
d) the resource allocation shift, specifying the effects of the streamline set-up on the agency budgetary allocation and indicating where possible,
savings have been generated.
The RSP shall [be] submitted to the Department of Budget and Management for approval before the corresponding shifts shall be affected (sic) by the DOH
Secretary.
Sec. 5. Redeployment of Personnel. The redeployment of officials and other personnel on the basis of the approved RSP shall not result in diminution in
rank and compensation of existing personnel. It shall take into account all pertinent Civil Service laws and rules.
Section 6. Funding. The financial resources needed to implement the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan shall be taken from funds available in the DOH,
provided that the total requirements for the implementation of the revised staffing pattern shall not exceed available funds for Personnel Services.
Section 7. Separation Benefits. Personnel who opt to be separated from the service as a consequence of the implementation of this Executive Order shall
be entitled to the benefits under existing laws. In the case of those who are not covered by existing laws, they shall be entitled to separation benefits
equivalent to one month basic salary for every year of service or proportionate share thereof in addition to the terminal fee benefits to which he/she is
entitled under existing laws.
Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to
the local government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related functions and responsibilities. 7
Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the
exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been issued in excess of the President’s authority. 8
Moreover, petitioners averred that the implementation of the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in accordance with law. The RSP was
allegedly implemented even before the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approved it. They also maintained that the Office of the President
should have issued an administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so. 9
Furthermore, petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo
U. Bacuñata and Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their
jobs, and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH
employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.10
Petitioners also pointed out several errors in the implementation of the RSP. Certain employees allegedly suffered diminution of compensation, 11 while
others were supposedly assigned to positions for which they were neither qualified nor suited. 12 In addition, new employees were purportedly hired by the
DOH and appointed to positions for which they were not qualified, despite the fact that the objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on
costs.13 It was also averred that DOH employees were deployed or transferred even during the three-month period before the national and local elections in
 Page 35 of 98

May 2001,14 in violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers." 15 Petitioners, however, failed to
identify the DOH employees referred to above, much less include them as parties to the petition.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or authority to
sign the certification of non-forum shopping and the verification; 2) Petitioners failed to show any particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct
or personal injury sustained or were in the immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme Court on 15 August 1999, was filed
out of time, or beyond 60 days from the time the reorganization methods were implemented in 2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus will not lie
where the President, in issuing the assailed Executive Order, was not acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
In resolving the substantial issues of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15,
18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or
indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions
of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners’ assertion that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a
justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political
department.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to issue Executive Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. It also declared that the DOH did not implement Executive Order No. 102 in bad faith or with grave abuse of discretion, as alleged
by the petitioners, as the DOH issued Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000, which created the different committees tasked with the
implementation of the RSP, only after both the DBM and Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) approved the RSP on 8 July 2000 and
17 July 2000, respectively.1avvphi1
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision rendered on 26 November 2004, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 7 March 2005.
Hence, the present petition, where the following issues are raised:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT ANY QUESTION ON THE WISDOM AND
EFFICACY OF THE HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ARE NOT JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT THAT
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102 IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE FILIPINO IS LIKEWISE NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SAID ORDER; AND
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN UPHOLDING TECHNICALITIES OVER AND ABOVE THE
ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE RAISED IN THE PETITION BELOW. 16
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the
Constitution.17 They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15
and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies
allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded.
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are
not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. 18 However, some provisions have
already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
In Tanada v. Angara,19 the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such
broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 20 this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and
Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 21 the Court referred to Section 1 of
Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which
merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause
of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. 22
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15
and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara. 23
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are
embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the
HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of
this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the protection of working
women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino
family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non
self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation 24 and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,25 they are mere statements
 Page 36 of 98

of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie
with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.
The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission 26 :
x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of
the ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and
exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent
legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners’ bare allegations that it violates the general principles expressed in the non self-executing
provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic
considerations of due process and the limitations of judicial power. 27
Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was issued by the President in excess of his authority. They maintain that
the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order
No. 102.28 This line of argument is without basis.
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government
entities under the Executive Department.29 This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." Section
31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose,
he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments or Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or agencies.
In Domingo v. Zamora,30 this Court explained the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, it must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it. 31 The agencies
under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.—The agencies under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the
chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the
President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific
department. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the term "agency of the government" as follows:
Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-
owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional
distribution of the work of the President.32 Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of
the Office of the President. Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting the President the continued authority to
reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH.
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general appropriations laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48
and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645, the "General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993," already contained a provision stating that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities Within the Executive Branch.—The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby
directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out, or
abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out, or abolition of activities shall be effected pursuant to
Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. (Emphasis provided.)
Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or
changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and be funded form appropriations by
this Act.
Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, "The General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999" (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to
the President the power to make any changes in any of the key positions and organizational units in the executive department thus:
Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or
organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided
by this Act.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in
issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the
provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
 Page 37 of 98

Petitioners also pointed out several flaws in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102, particularly the RSP. However, these contentions are without
merit and are insufficient to invalidate the executive order.
The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM approved it. The facts show otherwise. It was only after the DBM approved the Notice of
Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action on 8 July 2000, 33 and after the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) issued on 17 July
2000 Memorandum Circular No. 62,34 approving the RSP, that then DOH Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez issued on 28 July 2000 Department Circular No.
275-C, Series of 2000,35 creating the different committees to implement the RSP.
Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.
Such objection cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of the DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts of
the President. The members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the President since they are merely his alter egos. 36 Thus, their acts,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved by the President, presumptively acts of the President. 37 Significantly,
the acts of the DOH Secretary were clearly authorized by the President, who, thru the PCEG, issued the aforementioned Memorandum Circular No. 62,
sanctioning the implementation of the RSP.
Petitioners Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U.
Bacuñata, and Edgardo Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs,
and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH
employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.
In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or departments as valid, for so long as they are pursued in good faith—that is, for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. 38 On the other hand, if the reorganization is done for the purpose of defeating security of
tenure or for ill-motivated political purposes, any abolition of position would be invalid. None of these circumstances are applicable since none of the
petitioners were removed from public service, nor did they identify any action taken by the DOH that would unquestionably result in their dismissal. The
reorganization that was pursued in the present case was made in good faith. The RSP was clearly designed to improve the efficiency of the department and
to implement the provisions of the Local Government Code on the devolution of health services to local governments. While this Court recognizes the
inconvenience suffered by public servants in their deployment to distant areas, the executive department’s finding of a need to make health services
available to these areas and to make delivery of health services more efficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary, a
determination which is well within its authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners’ contentions to be insufficient to invalidate Executive Order No. 102.
Without identifying the DOH employees concerned, much less including them as parties to the petition, petitioners went on identifying several errors in the
implementation of Executive Order No. 102. First, they alleged that unidentified DOH employees suffered from a diminution of compensation by virtue of the
provision on Salaries and Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000, issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:
2. Any employee who was matched to a position with lower salary grade (SG) shall not suffer a reduction in salary except where his/her current salary is
higher than the maximum step of the SG of the new position, in which case he/she shall be paid the salary corresponding to the maximum step of the SG of
the new position. RATA shall no longer be received, if employee was matched to a Non-Division Chief Position.
Incidentally, the petition shows that none of the petitioners, who are working in the DOH, were entitled to receive RATA at the time the petition was filed.
Nor was it alleged that they suffered any diminution of compensation. Secondly, it was claimed that certain unnamed DOH employees were matched with
unidentified positions for which they were supposedly neither qualified nor suited. New employees, again unnamed and not included as parties, were hired
by the DOH and appointed to unidentified positions for which they were purportedly not qualified, despite the fact that the objective of the ongoing
streamlining was to cut back on costs. Lastly, unspecified DOH employees were deployed or transferred during the three-month period before the national
and local elections in May 2001, in violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers."
Petitioners’ allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for the Court to pass upon. The persons involved are not identified, details of
their appointments and transfers – such as position, salary grade, and the date they were appointed - are not given; and the circumstances which attended
the alleged violations are not specified.
Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal
errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312,
Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order
No. 94, series of 2000;39 and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would,
nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or misabused, and
may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. 40
In a number of cases,41 the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein the "transcendental importance" of the constitutional question
justified the granting of relief. In spite of these rulings, the Court, in Domingo v. Carague, 42 dismissed the petition when petitioners therein failed to show any
present substantial interest. It demonstrated how even in the cases in which the Court declared that the matter of the case was of transcendental
importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantial interest. Present substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity of the
law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 43 It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,
contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest. 44
In the same way, the Court, in Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec, 45 ruled that a citizen is allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. This case likewise
stressed that the rule on constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked where a party’s substantive claim is without
merit. Thus, a party’s standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof. After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners’
substantive claims, this Court finds that the petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to their claims.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26
November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No costs.
 Page 38 of 98

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47841 March 21, 1978

FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and CHIEF OF POLICE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
 
FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus on February 23, 1978, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the
ground that the pre examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of
Mariveles, Bataan, 1 failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause. 2 He likewise alleged
that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. 3 It was
in the amount of Pl6,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable
to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that
there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he asserted that while it was
fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P
8,000.00.
Petitioner's counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the matter on March 15, 1978. In the course of intensive questioning by the members of
this Court, especially Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor entitled to the protection and
benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. 4 a youthful offender being defined therein as "one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense." 5 As such, he could be provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of a court. 6 According
accordingly, after the hearing, the Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the
Court Resolved pursuant to section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old minor, to [order] the release of the petitioner on the
recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in
such capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law." 7 This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State
recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." 8
Thus was the petition resolved, without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the
existence of probable cause was constitutionally deficient. Nonetheless, it must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench that they should always be
on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to the economic or social standing of the alleged offended party, as was intimated in this petition, the rights
of an accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded. There is much more importance attached to the immunities of an individual during a period of
martial law, which in itself is a creature of the Constitution as a mode of coping with grave emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state that there
should be fealty to the constitutional ban against excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this excerpt from De la Camara v. Enage: 9
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution
commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more
forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that that United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, 'the sole permissible
function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978 as set forth above.
 Page 39 of 98

G.R. No. 88582             March 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because
of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal canal of said
Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl.
Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10)
Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee
Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon
Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3)
Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are summarized in its decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie
Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen
from among a bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to
take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom,
accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out and
placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of these objects the accused played
with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted
inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution purchased by the
accused in Bangkok when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did
the accused. He then started masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated
each other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told
to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and accused started
fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against
the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to
look because he was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00.
He then left them in the hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something in her
vagina. But they could not do anything anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did they report the matter to the police.
Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already removed from her body and Rosario said
"Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina
and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion wherein Jessie was
summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks.
 Page 40 of 98

Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he already went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his
studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario
at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was
unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo City General
Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one who gave the personal circumstances of
Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while
Rosario was already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of Rosario Baluyot when he
brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was
Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar
Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14,
1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother,
Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother.
His brother Melchor was also living with their mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's
testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely assume that of all the more
than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at his brother's house, he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot
including her age. In his testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can safely be concluded
that he knows her very well. It is against normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the
real name of the girl he claims to know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was attending to her since she is a street child, having
stowed away from the custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of
Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with no
relatives attending to her and after finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short interview with Rosario, regarding
her name and age only because she clamped up about her residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the medicine
she needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from
Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their
program assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-
enteritis, but which came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987,
after she was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had
vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an
OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said object was
deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis.
The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May
17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was
Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This
was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr.
Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so
with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have septicemia,
poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been caused through infection by the foreign object which has been
lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a sexual
vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it
to the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to
Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said
patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced
her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the cause of death was cardio-
respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked
the nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped financially
Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and
asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were
able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St.
Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested in filing a case
against the person who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file
the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her house and told her that the accused
was willing to settle the case, but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she knows that the accused
is liable to pay damages anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs.
 Page 41 of 98

Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no longer bear the situation, sent her nephew,
Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the
records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there,
she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty.
Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money
with the understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and she was asked to change the age of
her granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and
was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of
Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo
Police Department to make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object inside
Rosario's vagina was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation headed by criminal investigator
Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay Drive,
they rounded up about 43 street children and from some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at
the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They
found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to the said hotel.
Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee
Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof were
distributed to the local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the
composite drawing were photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the physical description
by Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so-called American may be European or
Australian national, the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and
Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was
on September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was
negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male
caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then
reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, so the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner
and to strike a conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought
him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no beard while the one previously described by
Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several
minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect,
arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were
accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape
with Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained his
personal belongings, and from there they brought him to the Western Police Department. At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a
permissive search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form
of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the
suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter, Salonga and his team already left the
headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed
against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant
was Maria Burgos Turla because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and
their father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only
appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was already in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned
about the death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with Homicide because the suspect was described as an
American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time
of the commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26, 1973 as per baptismal certificate,
wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque
Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year
1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein. Likewise, the defense's stand is that the
accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and
that the death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital,
who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution has established the GUILT of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's fees to the private
prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
 Page 42 of 98

The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON
OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE
(12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial
conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act ( See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who died after the rape because of a foreign object,
believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the
time the alleged incident happened on October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation,
deprivation of reason or unconscious state do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the
absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's grandmother and father who testified that she was born on
December 22, 1975. These oral declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth
certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a
matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p.
54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because her brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita
(Rosario's mother) was the only one who failed to attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain
that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she
was admitted at the Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's
clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12
years old. The trial court accepted this as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared that he was
born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than
12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by other independent evidence such as the clinical record,
death certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any probative or
evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must as a general rule be shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able
to testify as they both did testify in court. Their declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The other witnesses
who testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own
personal knowledge of what happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the
Court accepted the testimony of the mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age because the
child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no
reasonable assurance of its correctness. (People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
 Page 43 of 98

With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never established, which indicates that the day was rather
insignificant to be remembered. The father's declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had direct
knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year old at the time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis shown to establish their competence for the purpose.
The clinical records were based on Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came to know
her only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the
trial court was merely based on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate
to establish the exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As against the oral
declarations made by interested witnesses establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy
of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque
Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber
Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was
baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita R.
Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals  (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while
baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments
on the dates therein specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa
v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero  (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal
certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person
baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law.
(At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which
is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and
recorded in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by
the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's
father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the one presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever
presented to prove a date different from that brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized on December
25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have been born on December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was
born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario
was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal
Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos  (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
x x x           x x x          x x x
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her
mother's testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document as to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof
that she was born on December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12
years old at the time of the alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual
elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual
advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie
Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in court
clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to
submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the
appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not
enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken
from Rosario as the same object which the appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.
 Page 44 of 98

In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler,
na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga
kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na
nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang
bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti ? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny having possessed at that time. He was certain that
the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N.
p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when he answered on
additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one
shown to him by the prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because he did not
actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court
admitted such statement as part of the res gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test of
admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old, the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for
that matter into the vagina of a young girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show that the
statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the event was so startling Res gestae  does not apply. (Section 42,
Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario
to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically admitted to you that she was already able to remove the
object allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when you asked her and when
she told you that she was already able to remove that object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same
night, she again complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering
defamatory words against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6,
1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the
appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the
alleged incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of
Medicine and a graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of
Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia
Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until
1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on
Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center,
UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the
author of the textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too
authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery
operated. Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into
her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as such be considered a foreign object. As a foreign
object, the tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One
of the reactions that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a
way to avoid its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and changes in the area where the foreign body is located.
 Page 45 of 98

In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now,
considering the fact that this foreign body as shown to me is already not complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react.
If there is mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power from within and that power must be a dry cell
battery. [The] composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any substance that will cause current flow. All of
these substances are irritants including areas of the container and as such, the primary reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues,
thereby inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection in a way
that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area,
and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an infection would set in, how many days after the insertion
of this object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well,
liberation of this irritant chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal usually developed within, a period of two (2)
weeks  . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated
on, on May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take that long before
any adverse infection could set in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this lipstick of women usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that
the patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the
vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against
him cannot be based on probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the body. An examination of the object gave the following
results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric,
Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic ( see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog because no actual physical dimensions and/or
mechanical characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in
much earlier. Considering also that the object was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with
a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no reason why his opinions qualified by training and
experience should not be controlling and binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA
469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of
Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The patient was brought to the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the
wheel chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door to the examining table. On examination, the patient is
conscious, she was fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time and examination deals more on the
 Page 46 of 98

abdomen which shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum tenderness over the hypogastric
area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I placed my index finger and middle finger inside the vagina of the
patient and was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the
vaginal canal, there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on the posterior part of the
vaginal canal.
x x x           x x x          x x x
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to remove the said foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried
to do so also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and
were you able to talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and placed the foreign object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the time I examined her .
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a
normal conversation with the doctors and would be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to
the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because there were several instances testified to by different
witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this
group she visits indigent children in the hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go
to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia.
In one of her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot
seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2
or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but
writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer questions asked of her although she was complaining of
stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity
caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and
into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court  (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to
wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural  and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused . And
since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at
all. The defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking,
he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution
and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (At. p. 592)
 Page 47 of 98

The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution
but there is no direct and convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death seven (7)
months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the following requisites should
concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of
Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime
(People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals,
153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the appellant
for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children
encounter as they sell their bodies in order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they experience life in
its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that
even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of
galvanizing the nation to care for its street children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be
brought to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we
cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not
more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been
satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took
place. If the evidence for the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of
reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary
considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert
the vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that
she was able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of
pain in her stomach. She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious
infection only after seven months inside a young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the
incident happened in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however shows that the appellant was not here in the
Philippines that December. As per the Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived in the Philippines on
October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have
happened only in October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven (7) months
with the kind of serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang
naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she
was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that she
could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina between
October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to
establish appellant's guilty connection with the requisite moral certainty. ( See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may
have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere
possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into account. This rule applies even to hardened
criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The
strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. ( See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v.
Ng  (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the
accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof "to the
satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to
support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the
 Page 48 of 98

contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the
conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an
acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM
Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate
pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked him and Rosario from among the children and invited
them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show
that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal
Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have sexual intercourse with a child of either sex.
Children of various ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually
committed by a homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public
morals and violative of the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article II,
Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our
country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and
domestic tranquility of the people. The state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The
appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III,
Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC,
supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by
the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in
the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment
or correction of the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities
are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the
civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just
and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is
not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law.
It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house. 1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate
profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous
death as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not
ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose
end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but
civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy ( see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the
appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the
Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus,
considering the circumstances of the case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps,
their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended
 Page 49 of 98

for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine
articles, media exposes, college dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will
continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the
Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's
concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable
doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel
him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the country.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern
and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped
everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the
nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850,5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected
from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria,
other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist
Order8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist
from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was
resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the
Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991,
order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry
of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote
the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. 9
 Page 50 of 98

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from
enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was
presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by
the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the
foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to
dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing
or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of
this case and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying
its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the
same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within
ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it,
ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from
exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and
(2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to
quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if
the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with
dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of
determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so
lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of
Appeals.14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the
General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative
were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the
dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from
notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such
efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and
decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order
of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease
and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future
dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this
case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding
restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the
temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of
the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease
and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered
by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the
surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to
question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local
Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the
 Page 51 of 98

basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the
LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has
territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in
Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the
necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the
Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which
was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e),
(f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and
regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of
pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal
system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the
same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government
agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature
and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter
and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin
authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation
and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business
establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No.
192, series of 1987,18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931.
Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the
National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution . Under such a broad grant and power and authority,
the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated,
among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region,
public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of
the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-
complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite
project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d),
of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an
Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case
was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of
the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a
"cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
 Page 52 of 98

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite
found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an
unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4,
par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City
Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that
there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect
that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. 25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers.26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be
reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie  evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable
standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The  ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte  cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping
the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made
to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute
and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of
the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the
Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental
human right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper
exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by
the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided
under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation
of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region,
whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might
possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe
objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from
the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the
Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special knowledge and
expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
 Page 53 of 98

G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,
vs.
THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, LUZON PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS
SHELL CORPORATION, respondents.
Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Luzon Petrochemical Corporation.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the
site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG).
This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. the Board of Investments", September 7, 1989, where
this Court issued a decision, ordering the BOI as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments is ordered: (1) to publish the amended application for
registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on the original and
amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation,
excluding, however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information, and (3) to set for
hearing the petitioner's opposition to the amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence in his
possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas province. The hearing
shall not exceed a period of ten (10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served by personal service to the
petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in advance. The hearings may be held from day to day for a period of ten (10) days
without postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary injunction is denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-451)
However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that we rule on the import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign
investor's claim of right of final choice of plant site, in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, this Court
on October 24, 1989, made the observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not provide that the Limay site should be the only petrochemical zone in the
country, nor prohibit the establishment of a petrochemical plant elsewhere in the country, that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in Batangas does
not violate P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803.
Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial inducements and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may
change it simply because it has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his
failure to appear at the hearing that was set by the BOI after receipt of the decision, so he may be deemed to have waived the fruit of the judgment. On this
ground, the motion for partial reconsideration was denied.
A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking that we resolve the basic issue of whether or not the foreign investor has
the right of final choice of plant site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and executory; and
that the petitioner had not therefor waived the right to a hearing before the BOI.
In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated:
Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under the 1987 Constitution nor in the Omnibus Investments Code
is there such a 'right of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's choice is subject to processing and approval or disapproval by the
BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus Investments Code). By submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for approval, the
investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government, through the BOI, to approve or disapprove the same after
determining whether its proposed project will be feasible, desirable and beneficial to our country. By asking that his opposition to the
LPC's amended application be heard by the BOI, the petitioner likewise acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the last word
or the "final choice" on the matter.
 Page 54 of 98

Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by the BOI may not be 'final', for supervening circumstances
and changes in the conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the project will not
fail. After all, our country will benefit only when a project succeeds, not when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539)
Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.
A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and this ponente voted to grant the motion for reconsideration stating that the
hearing set by the BOI was premature as the decision of the Court was not yet final and executory; that as contended by the petitioner the Court must first
rule on whether or not the investor has the right of final choice of plant site for if the ruling is in the affirmative, the hearing would be a useless exercise; that
in the October 19, 1989 resolution, the Court while upholding validity of the transfer of the plant site did not rule on the issue of who has the final choice;
that they agree with the observation of the majority that "the investor has no final choice either under the 1987 Constitution or in the Omnibus Investments
Code and that it is the BOI who decides for the government" and that the plea of the petitioner should be granted to give him the chance to show the
justness of his claim and to enable the BOI to give a second hard look at the matter.
Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of January 17, 1990 in G.R. No. 88637 that the investor has no right of final
choice under the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code.
Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain located in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical
Industrial Zone under the administration, management, and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new
domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was
the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with PNOC.
BPC was issued a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI.
BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like: (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire
proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings
on investments. As additional incentive, the House of Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on
naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3. Rollo, pp. 441-442)
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose
Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job
site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas
of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino expressed her preference that the plant be established in Bataan in a
conference with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC filed on April 11, 1989 its request for approval of the
amendments. Its application is as follows: "(l) increasing the investment amount from US $220 million to US $320 million; (2) increasing the production
capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. (Annex B to Petition; Rollo, p. 25)
Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner addressed to Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the proposed
amendment with its attachments which was denied by the BOI on May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC's petrochemical
project. (Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No. 88637; supra.)
BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means of the Senate asserted that:
The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of the petrochemical complex, as this would provide a
better distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area. ... In advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for the
petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made it clear, and I would like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view that the
BOI or the government for that matter could only recomend as to where the project should be located. The BOI recognizes and respect
the principle that the final chouce is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the
project. (Petition, P. 13; Annex D to the petition)
This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the present petition.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its
feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the BPC, now
Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the
site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national
interest notwithstanding.
We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and determine the paramount issue. We grant the petition.
First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the
name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There is
no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before any covetous
interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that
 Page 55 of 98

the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these were taken into
account when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover, the evidence proves the contrary.
Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of the national output of naphtha which can be used as
feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need to
import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes.
Scarce dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of the transferred petrochemical plant.
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem  tax by the approval of Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino
but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both
Congress and the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from
naphtha to LPG.
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution.
In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the national economy in consonance with the principles and objectives of
economic nationalism" is the set goal of government.
Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital for the project from local sources by way of loan which led to the so-
called "petroscam scandal", the capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the project and its feedstock shall
be limited to naphtha which is certainly more economical, more readily available than LPG, and does not have to be imported.
Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the great benefit and advantage of the government which shall
have a participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a
near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain
murky to say the least.
And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through
industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
xxx xxx xxx
Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural
resources, the State's full control over the development and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and
priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or
even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry
is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends the industry by controlling the
upstream or cracker facility.
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors, among them:
(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an eligible relending credit or relending facility worth US
$50 million and a debt to swap arrangement for US $30 million or a total accommodation of US $80 million which at current exchange
rates is around P2080 million.
(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign sources but from loans, initially a Pl Billion syndicated loan,
to be given by both government banks and a consortium of Philippine private banks or in common parlance, a case of 'guiniguisa sa
sariling manteca.'
(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer status.'
(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian Development Bank portfolio because of the
petrochemical firm's massive loan request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee).
but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of
unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to
Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all
other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the
independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one
subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do
with our heritage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of Investments approving the amendment of the certificate of
registration of the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989, (Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE
as NULL and VOID. The original certificate of registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with Bataan as the plant site and naphtha as the
feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained.
 Page 56 of 98

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.]

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and
JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as
taxpayers: CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG
KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-
governmental organizations, Petitioners, v. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO
AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO,
BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective
capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as
National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of
Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast majority of countries, has
revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and
economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world
of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries
in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient
domestic producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world economy
has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity." chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Brief Historical Background

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions —
inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations — were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB)
which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in
world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT — the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body
administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.

After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally
gave birth to that administering body — the World Trade Organization — with the signing of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the
WTO Agreement by its members. 1 1a 1b 1c

Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two
letters to the Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . .,
 Page 57 of 98

(the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . . ., and (the attraction of) more investments into the country." Although the Chief
Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines — and this is of special interest to the legal profession — will benefit from the WTO
system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2)
Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative
bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.

The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition
before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods."cralaw virtua1aw library

Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it
proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of
the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement,
for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public
officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).

By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."cralaw virtua1aw library

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of the Philippines, 3 stating among
others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library

On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the Philippines 4 likewise dated August 11, 1994,
which stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in
the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5

On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby
concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 6 The text of the WTO
Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various
agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral
Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ANNEX I

Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Agriculture
 Page 58 of 98

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary

Measures

Agreement on Textiles and Clothing

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures

Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General

on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection

Agreement on Rules of Origin

Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures

Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures

Agreement on Safeguards

Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes

Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

Property Rights

ANNEX 2

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the

Settlement of Disputes

ANNEX 3

Trade Policy Review Mechanism"

On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the
aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1),
two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the
same and every Article and Clause thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also
(1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,
8 the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least
developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to
trade and on dispute settlement.
 Page 59 of 98

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to
existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence
and new financial service." cdti

On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents’ comment and petitioners’ reply thereto, the Court resolved
on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the
Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as
"Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.

During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate;
and

(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement,
which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon
as possible."cralaw virtua1aw library

After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996,
the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty."
Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues

In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.

B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from impugning
the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity or of the concurrence.

C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and
12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the
legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines’;

E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power.

F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only
in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act,
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners into the following" : 10

"1. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of
Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.

4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
 Page 60 of 98

By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether
the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Tañada and Anna
Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when
they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) The "political question" issue — being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and
decide this case — was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;

(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of
their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents’ favor, will not cause the petition’s dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two
senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and

(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four
issues raised by the Solicitor General.

During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to
have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international
commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on
the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11

To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL
QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?

(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12,
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
CONGRESS?

(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING
RULES ON EVIDENCE?

(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department’s duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17
"the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature."cralaw virtua1aw library

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
 Page 61 of 98

Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no
hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.

We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate
in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on
the propriety of the government’s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers.
Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.

Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity
provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions
and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

x       x       x

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
x       x       x

Article XII

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

x       x       x

Sec. 10 . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
x       x       x

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make
them competitive."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in their memorandum: 19

"a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 2

National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.

1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. No Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III
or Article XI of GATT 1994.
 Page 62 of 98

2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article
XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p. 22121, Emphasis supplied).

The Annex referred to reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ANNEX

Illustrative List

1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are
mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which
require:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in
terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or

(b) that an enterprise’s purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local products that it
exports.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994
include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which restrict:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports;

(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to
the enterprise; or

(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume
or value of its local production." (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p.
22125, Emphasis supplied).

The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are
based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by
the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1 (a) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p. 177, Emphasis supplied).

"b) In the area of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the
protection of intellectual property . . . (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p. 25432 (Emphasis supplied)

"(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

National Treatment

1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.

2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical
treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.

3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of completion in favour of services
or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in
 Page 63 of 98

Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 Emphasis supplied)."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is petitioners’ position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render
meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty
imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in
national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general
policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant
provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the
WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization.chanrobles law library

We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is
called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do
not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the same light, we held in Basco v. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement them,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On petitioners’ allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice)
of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles
and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

‘In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available
remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the
language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)."cralaw virtua1aw library

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due
process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his
concurring opinion in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 26 explained these reasons as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order
of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
 Page 64 of 98

determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.’ (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as ‘the right to a balanced and healthy ecology’ and ‘the right to health’ are combined with remedial standards as
broad ranging as ‘a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,’ the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into
the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown
to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy

On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should
be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make
full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . .
x       x       x

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity."cralaw virtua1aw library

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;

2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and

3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.

With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods" ; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of
the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity" ; 30 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of
"Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, Et Al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable."
However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this
paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to
allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
 Page 65 of 98

WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise
the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN
Security Council.chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary

"WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the majority
of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote.
Amendments would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will require assent of all members.
Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals." 33

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization.
This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development." These basic principles are found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Parties to this Agreement,

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development,

Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them,
secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development,

Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction
of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,

Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,

Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system, . . ." ( Emphasis supplied.)

Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries
a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general,
preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread
out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while
developing countries — including the Philippines — are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.

In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as
compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.

In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and
export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of
that prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.

Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing
measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these
measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos
will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account;
thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to
steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking
jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its
constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
 Page 66 of 98

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community." As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most
basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to
the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and
public utilities." 36

The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact
they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the
fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a
sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered
under a policy of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that
Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to
make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the
question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large.

Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?

Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos’ general welfare because it will — as promised by its promoters — expand the country’s exports and
generate more employment?

Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public?

The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral
exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the
Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the
United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have
contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its
control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?

It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to
cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the
same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38
explains:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise.
It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly ‘in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,’
where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess
Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it
seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far
from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation." cdtech

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that" (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically
 Page 67 of 98

the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the
sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general
welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of investments and
money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . . ." 40

More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the Congress. 41 And while the Constitution
allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such
authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such limitations and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code.

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by
the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws. 44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in
good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."
45

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their
state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in
pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have
been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of
territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of
claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore
cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in
the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The
age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here." 47

UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter," (a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes
in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the
peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United
Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter.
Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to
appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter,
the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own
territory. Another example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter,
such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under
Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article 103," (i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall prevail," thus
unquestionably denying the Philippines — as a member — the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to
honor.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts — both bilateral and multilateral — that involve limitations on
Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income
received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to
its citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.

(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.
 Page 68 of 98

(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.

(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.

(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes
aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.

(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar
duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.

(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and
Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.

(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining
transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.

(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59
days.

(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its
agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and
related charges.

(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.

(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice
has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of international obligation."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power.
The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.

"International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political
sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we
accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that
structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries
exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries
typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of
potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller country’s market." 48

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that
the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and
amity with all nations." casia

Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. 50

To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 34

Process Patents: Burden of Proof

1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject
matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to
obtain an identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any
identical product when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained
 Page 69 of 98

by the patented process:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;

(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable
efforts to determine the process actually used.

2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.

3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into
account."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words "in the absence of proof to the contrary") presumption that a
product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said
patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product
was made with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the
identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article
34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by
the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the
patented process.

The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended,
otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 60. Infringement. — Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or
utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented
design or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying." ( Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented
process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through
reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.

By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue — derogation of legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue
also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial. 52

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act

Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act,
namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and insufficient and thus
constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act,
which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the
second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the
Senate.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"A final act, sometimes called protocol de clôture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending
the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several
years. The text of the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the
Philippines undertook:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
 Page 70 of 98

"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."cralaw virtua1aw library

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the
Senate in the WTO Agreement.

The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article
XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint
action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." 56

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27
Members which "have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing
financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to
payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business." 57

On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts, 58 as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article II

Scope of the WTO

1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.

2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral Agreements") are integral parts
of this Agreement, binding on all Members.

3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this
Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either
obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them.

4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT
1947").

It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading
the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, 59 the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60

"THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the
observation made by Senator Tañada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the
final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino
raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was
acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the
submission could be clarified.

And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new. . . is he making a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first
submission?

MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving
this letter.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Can this Committee hear from Senator Tañada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?

Senator Tañada, please.

 Page 71 of 98

SEN. TAÑADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the
Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding
and Commitments in Financial Services.

I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.

SEN. TAÑADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tañada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.

SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now
complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to
ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the
participants.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective
competent authorities with a view of seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures.’

In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional
procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the
Constitution and the Final Act itself .

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.

SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of
yesterday’s session and I don’t see any need for repeating the same.

Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?

SEN. LINA, Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I
believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make."cralaw virtua1aw library

Epilogue

In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court’s constitutionally imposed duty "to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. 63

In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus
entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in
good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its
favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate’s processes, this Court
cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate’s exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by
Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. 64

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles —
 Page 72 of 98

while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is
balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the
policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law
of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or
personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is
more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to
the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate
did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is
a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of
membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance 65 where "the East will become the dominant
region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this
coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO.
Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly
enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a
vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let
the people, through their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

SO ORDERED.
 Page 73 of 98

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO,
CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and
PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh
labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle.
This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of
Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air,
beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like
Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than
a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot
of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the
specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice
and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words
for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and
 Page 74 of 98

subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The
State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on
August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated
on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon
C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own
deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This
law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of
the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case will
require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland
worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified
farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article
XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4)
and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the
President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay  5  and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation
contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due
process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored
judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived
of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases of  Chavez v. Zobel,  7 Gonzales v.
Estrella,  8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council.  9 The determination of just
compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not
foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has
as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event
their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just compensation
by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely
assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same
infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was
insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of
rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have
been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc.
is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not
the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact
emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection.
 Page 75 of 98

They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS
(P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the
receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be
considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed
to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full,
but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines
"shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market
value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This
compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically,
or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the
PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no
tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the
same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been
violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least
20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et
al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of
uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion
pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not
been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the
powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government
assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay
the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also
justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's
contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to
its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently
treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private
agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the corresponding appropriation.
There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian
Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional
amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the
arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation,
placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents,
who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied
without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued.
These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or
just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.
 Page 76 of 98

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the
doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that
may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as
guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the provisions of
E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the
land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the program along with other
landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian
Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII
of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was
deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the
President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as
they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such
time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other
agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive
adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already
been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide
Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December
29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985
(Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking
this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President
of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot
be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of
agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because
they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional
reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested
with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for
what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of
powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the
acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that
before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not
be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of
the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And as established by judge
made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision
of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and
intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 13 And
 Page 77 of 98

even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by
President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection
that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not
hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as
God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that
cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's
pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures
involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in  Gonzales v.
Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over
legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987,
and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to
be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared
invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same
token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she
possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically
provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like
the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the
CARP Law. 18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the
Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal
purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation
of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular
reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the
exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely
vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as
required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in
fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no
case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner,
subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep
the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only
short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
 Page 78 of 98

The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law
because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474
could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos,
whose word was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held
in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and
effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November
29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a
discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification.
Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion
to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it
is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is
purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action
only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular
question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly
gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of
the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative
authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks
systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the
property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose,
such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the
interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was
a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal
company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and
waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which
he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to
protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the
prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or
make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the
restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as
an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for
the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally
speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be available
for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful
externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as
suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need
have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the distance between
the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful
complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which
broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police
power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in
the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
 Page 79 of 98

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,  29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks
Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal,
which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however,
was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so over their
respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand
Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by
Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but
unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story building
that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling
Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the
transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with
the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and
dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally
agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other
claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be
made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with
particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that
all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners
but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only
where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the
lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and,
no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not
enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will
not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III
of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys
the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment
of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into
play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the
people is the supreme law.
 Page 80 of 98

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has
evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of
agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that
only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the
decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the
exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the political question. As
explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views
may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the
distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees
no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be
so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the American bank and the
international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the
purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation
proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian
reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The
purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the
necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or
collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by
this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police
power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its
beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a
private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the
compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the
amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of
judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the
government to buy his land-
... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner,
the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the
case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for
 Page 81 of 98

property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever
was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for
the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared
either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly
fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the
decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its
discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the
determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains
the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it
is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail
over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have
been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally
objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to
submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final
and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to
review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon
by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent
provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-
five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable
at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent
(30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance
to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified
investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year:
Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in
part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the
following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the
Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institutions in
the same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
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(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares of

stock owned by the government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the
loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium- scale
industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these bonds
for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the
financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated
properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite
jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which
should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated
has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that
is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just
compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person
desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation
for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus —
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but
money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at
the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there
must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of
compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a
reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations,
bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has
just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain.
This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific
and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the
population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover
only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice
of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a
richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than
the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the
laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is
already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government.
It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have
to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations
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of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the
farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the
payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value.
We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in force at the time
they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be
given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine
tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should
be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-
subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was
reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the
members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the
expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of
the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue,
but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The
Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant
masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing
the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our
view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash
payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be
needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value
equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot
be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even
sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be
like the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the
said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does
not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor
for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section
17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and
paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local
Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until
payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just
compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held
that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not
to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the
fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the
payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the
property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just
compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,  56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of
expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably
taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... .  (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had
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become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had
to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full
payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner
by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance
payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even
now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees
or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has
already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial
action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D.
No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than
those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of
these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-
examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit
of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is
not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we
venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle
as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom
of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own
feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of
the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it
the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild
in it the music and the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections
raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A.
No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Page 85 of 98

G.R. No. 91649             May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because —
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local
taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.
(p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the
people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of
Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of
the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise
under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it
proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to
fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy —
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore
authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled,
administered and supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.)
and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control
programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other
essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and
(3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of
gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989
alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income
share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in
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cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present
administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine
(9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and
public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running
counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1
(Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the
exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v.
Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-
honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its
constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter,
has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the
offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the —
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are
involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46
SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242
[1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod
sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners
and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many
other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate
it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it
is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of
governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell &
Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized
by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in
one corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for
the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of
the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and
corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
 Page 87 of 98

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D.
1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise
holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax
or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings
derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and
shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any
municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v.
Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power
or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983
ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress"
(Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative
powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments
(Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate
gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit
or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling
shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or
collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with
an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869)
it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and
the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section,
including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other
matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary
notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way
(taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political
subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them . (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or
enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the
1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to
such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains
an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the
exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local
autonomy.
 Page 88 of 98

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission,
pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra
sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure
of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns
wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State
to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local
corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are
inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah
You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling,
while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of
the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate
(Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were
the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact
that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as
amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been
applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way;
the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than
the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free
enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the
government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. 1âwphi1 Under our system
of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all
state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public
interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of
principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were
rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the
available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature
through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec,
82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v.
Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation
considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and
educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board , 162 SCRA 521 —
 Page 89 of 98

Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and
constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the
Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the
assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the
main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court
and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the
President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This
excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on
life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not
necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause . For
the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO
BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:
 
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing
supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the
opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs.
Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on the matter.
,
(Sgd.)
RICARDO C.
VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
 Page 90 of 98

Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte

108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Compañero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte,
Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the opposition members of Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may
be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I regret very much that at this
time we cannot respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,
petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa,
including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due
course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek
relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of
action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their
constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means
of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question
of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan
v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees,
involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus hes to compel
respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to
access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R.
No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987,150 SCRA 530, the
Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed
for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas
and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of
government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the
authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec.
 Page 91 of 98

1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied,
except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate.
For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures
that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to
keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for
free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely
an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes
hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure  * and honesty in the public service.  ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters
of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission , supra,  at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern". As observed in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern"
like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want
to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [ Ibid. at p. 541]
In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the
various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citezens. In Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [ Supra at p. 539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were
able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs. Imelda
Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the
latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its
funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,
one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial
solvency of the funds administered by the System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is
not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter
of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not
be among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the
indiscriminate dissemination of information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what
the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents
evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this
Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:
... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. UItimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute. state, In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words,
 Page 92 of 98

of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modem society has developed. All the forces of
technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into
it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to
privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the
Court in Morfe  is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS.
Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982
(1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party
and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature
[Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)),
and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest
they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [ Cf. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos.
82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the
Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official  records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official  acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of
access to official  records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the
constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions
and Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the government,
whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the
coverage and scope of the right to information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions
entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of fun public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" — referring to the transactions of the State
— and when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the various agencies, departments, ministries
and instrumentalities of the government....
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with
the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v.
 Page 93 of 98

Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to
be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act
must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to
allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify,
subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991

MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD, respondents.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for petitioner.
Francisco Ma. Chanco for respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the constitution.
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of
the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of
MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their
decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. It is
the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto
must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions
regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking
examination of the board's records.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said
meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same
inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips.
However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and
personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.
Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment.
Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22, 1989. In that meeting, respondent Morato told the board that
he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved for screening by the
Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by
virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially
those which are controversial."
Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD
1986 (Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board).
After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato
any authority to unilaterally reverse the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89 on the ground
that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42).
The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to ignore it.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following:
A. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. 10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
 Page 94 of 98

B. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS.
C. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF 1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND BY
INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD FAITH, IN EXCESS OF THEIR
JURISDICTION, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film
(already) reviewed especially those which are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly confidential,
private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of
the committee that reviewed the film.
Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright for having failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he is required
to comply with all administrative remedies available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). The rationale behind this salutory
principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available
administrative remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity to act and to correct the
errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is rectified, judicial intervention would then be unnecessary.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions, such as:
1) when no administrative review is provided by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v. Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256
[1989], citing Aguilar v. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v.
Philippine Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty
of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans' Backpay Commission [1969]; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitrary and
oppressive (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where there
is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108
Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of
qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).
The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is
inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the administrative
processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive
Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of the Office of the President ( Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies must therefore fail.
Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We now proceed to resolve the issues raised by petitioner. In this regard, We find
respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the
individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,  as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means
of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the
duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature ( Id. at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256
[1989]).
Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their
individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an
exclusive property of the member concerned.
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or
belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board and the
individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986)
creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It
being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no invasion
of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare
otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official
functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is
guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the
discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of
the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said
right would be rendered nugatory. As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]):
 Page 95 of 98

Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the
law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not
their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be
wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a
remedy. (emphasis supplied)
It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta , supra, upheld the right to information based on the statutory right then
provided in Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right, now constitutionalized,
should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law mandates.
The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain
exceptions as regards the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this
Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the
deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve
disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records (See Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, supra).
We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by respondents that respondent Morato is empowered by PD 1986 to unilaterally downgrade
or upgrade a film reviewed especially those which are controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree provides:
Sec 4. Decision. — The decision of the BOARD either approving or disapproving for exhibition in the Philippines a motion picture, television
program, still and other pictorial advertisement submitted to it for examination and preview must be rendered within a period of ten (10) days
which shall be counted from the date of receipt by the BOARD of an application for the purpose . . .
For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee composed of at least three BOARD members to undertake
the work of review. Any disapproval or deletion must be approved by a majority of the sub-committee members so designated. After receipt of the
written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for reconsideration in writing may be made, upon which the Chairman of the Board shall
designate a sub-committee of five BOARD members to undertake a second review session, whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be
rendered through a majority of the sub-committee members so designated and present at the second review session. This second review session
shall be presided over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision of the BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered within
five (5) days from the date of receipt of the motion for reconsideration.
Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program or publicity material for exhibition in the Philippines must be in
writing, and shall state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval. No film or motion picture intended for exhibition at the moviehouses or
theaters or on television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program
considered in its entirety.
The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture or television
program in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines, who may himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either by
an ad hoe committee he may create or by the Appeals Committee herein created.
An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines is hereby created composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be
appointed by the President of the Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation to the President. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the Appeals Committee.
The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter shall be final.
Implementing Rules and Regulations
Sec 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three. — a) A proper application having been filed, the Chairman of the Board shall, as the exigencies of
the service may permit, designate a Sub-Committee of at least three Board Members who shall meet, with notice to the applicant, within ten days
from receipt of the completed application. The Sub-Committee shall then preview the motion picture subject of the application.
b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his representative shall withdraw to await the results of the deliberation of the Sub-Committee.
After reaching a decision, the Sub-Committee shall summon the applicant or his representative and inform him of its decision giving him an
opportunity either to request reconsideration or to offer certain cuts or deletions in exchange for a better classification. The decision shall be in
writing, stating, in case of disapproval of the film or denial of the classification rating desired or both, the reason or reasons for such disapproval
or denial and the classification considered by the Sub-Committee member dissenting from the majority opinion may express his dissent in writing.
c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be submitted to the Chairman of the Board for transmission to the
applicant.
Sec 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five. — Within five days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the Sub-Committee referred to in the
preceding section, the applicant may file a motion for reconsideration in writing of that decision. On receipt of the motion, the Chairman of the
Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five Board Members which shall consider the motion and, within five days of receipt of such motion,
conduct a second preview of the film. The review shall, to the extent applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the preceding section.
Sec 13. Reclassification. — An applicant desiring a change in the classification rating given his film by either the Sub-Committee of Three? or
Committee of Five mentioned in the immediately preceeding two sections may re-edit such film and apply anew with the Board for its review and
reclassification.
Sec 14. Appeal. — The decision of the Committee of Five Board Members in the second review shall be final, with the exception of a decision
disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines who may himself decide
the appeal or refer it to the Appeals Committee in the Office of the President for adjudication.
On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of the same decree as follows:
Sec. 5. Executive Officer. — The Chairman of the BOARD shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the BOARD. He shall exercise the following
functions, powers and duties:
 Page 96 of 98

(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by the BOARD;
(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;
(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD, and recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the
necessary administrative and subordinate personnel; and
(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the BOARD.
It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato, as Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any
authority to reverse or overrule by himself alone a decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or television programs.
The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General Patronage" or "For Adults Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself and not
with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board calls for the
implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having been
reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no choice but to exercise the same as mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not
transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari — a delegated power cannot
be delegated. And since the act of classification involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary power with more reason the Board cannot, by way of the
assailed resolution, delegate said power for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject of delegation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to
the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337,
355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644,
658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202,
204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-
299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473,
486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839,
878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-
544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852,
854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing
to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
 Page 97 of 98

that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done
to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is
that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel
the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of
this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which
surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no
other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly,
the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of
other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability;
[3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability
and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the
people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the
law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled:
"Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas
de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
 Page 98 of 98

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide
for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some
members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity
apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court
had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that
it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of
its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had
accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official
Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in
some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.