RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.G.R. No. 93252, 93746, and 95245, August 5, 1991
By: Abacajan, Erika Jayne R.
PRINCIPLE: It cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President
over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion
the good of the public service so requires. However, removal and suspension of public officers
are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to
constitutional limitations.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is
held to insure his presence at the trial. Under the LGC, it cannot exceed sixty days, which is to
say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and
which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a
shorter span.
FACTS: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints,
ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges,
among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on
August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
In December of the same year, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second
preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was
able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition
against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile,
the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for
another sixty days, the third time in twenty months.
Subsequently, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary
from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of
Appeals’ two decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can
suspend and/or remove local officials
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer
allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension
and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first,
to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase as may be
provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments.
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of “as may be provided by law”) signifies nothing
more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress'
“control” over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake
of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline. The power of the legislature to remove local officials pursuant
to the Article 10 section 3 of the constitution may also be delegated to the president. Hence, the
Secretary of Local Government as an alter ego of the president may remove local officials as in
this case.
RULING: Yes. The Secretary, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local
officials since the constitution did not prohibit the president to exercise as such. Though his
power is limited only to general supervision, it doesn’t mean that the legislative cannot delegate
it’s power to remove.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the
petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of
any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to
August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative
cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann
Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED
