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Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Political Geography
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo

Constructing Turkish “exceptionalism”: Discourses of liminality

a b s t r a c t
Keywords: This article examines the discursive practices that enable the construction of Turkish “exceptionalism.” It
Turkey argues that in an attempt to play the mediator/peacemaker role as an emerging power, the Turkish elite
Exceptionalism
construct an “exceptionalist” identity that portrays Turkey in a liminal state. This liminality and thus the
Liminality
Hybridization
“exceptionalist” identity it creates, is rooted in the hybridization of Turkey’s geographical and historical
Foreign policy characteristics. The Turkish foreign policy elite make every effort to underscore Turkey’s geography as
Discourse a meeting place of different continents. Historically, there has also been an ongoing campaign to depict
Metaphors Turkey’s past as “multicultural” and multi-civilizational. These constructions of identity however, run
Eurasia counter to the Kemalist nation-building project, which is based on “purity” in contrast to “hybridity”
Neo-Ottomanism both in terms of historiography and practice.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

“It is impossible to separate Turkish foreign policy from Turkey’s actions and policies (Brummett, 2007: p. 302; Ricento, 2003: p. 613),
past. Napoleon once said that it is geography that dictated foreign that they are a “special case ‘outside’ the common patterns and laws
policy. I am going to add two more factors: history and the con- of history” (Tyrrell, 1991: p. 1031)? Pointing out or implying that
juncture. Indeed for a country like Turkey that has liquidated an a state and its features are “unique” and “exceptional” is one way of
empire, geography and history hold many advantages and disad- creating such a belief. In addition to highlighting a “unique” geog-
vantages as well as many opportunities and challenges and raphy and history, elites can also construct “exceptionalism” through
responsibilities” (Demirel, 2002b: pp. 683e684). a series of discursive practices. This paper analyzes and exposes the
complex web of discursive practices that shape the construction of
“What are the main factors that place Turkey on a different axis
Turkish “exceptionalism” in the post-Cold War period. The main
and create a unique cultural dynamism? For these factors, one
argument is that Turkish exceptionalism in the post-Cold War period
should look into Turkey’s two constant variables related to time and
is constructed via liminal representations of the country. That is,
space, into history and geography” (Davutog lu, 2004: pp. 80e81).
while its policymakers imagine Turkey as a mediator/peacemaker
“Turkey is a modern Eurasian country that bridges the East and the between East and West, Turkey is also referred to as a country
West and has successfully managed to synthesize the culture and transitioning from a middle-sized power to a greater power. Turkey’s
values of both equally. Our roots in Central Asia and interaction liminality, or the state of “being neither here nor there” or “being
with the Western world that dates back to centuries, grants us the betwixt and between the positions,” to borrow the term from
exceptional situation of fully belonging to both continents at the anthropologist Turner (1969: p. 95), is grounded in the hybrid
same time” (Gül, 2008). representations of its geography and history. The hybridization of
geography is constructed by various discursive practices that portray
How do states create a sense of national “exceptionalism?” That is,
Turkey as a meeting place of different regions and continents. Turkey,
how do they generate the belief, which sometimes help justify states’
in other words, is portrayed as belonging to two different continents
q During the writing of this paper, which was financially supported by The and containing the features of both. The hybridization of history
Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) (Project means that Turkey’s past, especially its multiethnic and multireli-
#109K240), the author was a Fulbright scholar at the Middle East and Middle gious Ottoman past is remembered and represented in a multicul-
Eastern American Center (MEMEAC) at the City University of New York, New York, tural way. In other words, Turkey’s history and geography and thus its
NY. The author thanks these institutions for their support. Unless indicated
liminal status are thereby presented as exceptional in world politics.
otherwise, translations from Turkish are by the author. The usual disclaimers apply.
* Tel.: þ90 (312) 290 19 49; fax: þ90 (312) 290 27 42. With this argument as its background, this paper has two goals.
E-mail address: yanikl@bilkent.edu.tr. The first goal is to illustrate the long tradition of constructing

0962-6298/$ e see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.01.003
 Author's personal copy

L.K. Yanık / Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89 81

exceptionalism among Turkish policymakers that extended at least Third, as a result, even the ancient Anatolian civilizations have only
through the post-Cold War period (the period under consideration been selectively remembered in history books since the establish-
in this paper). With the “neo-Ottomanism” debate en vogue yet ment of the Republic (Copeaux, 2002: pp. 399e401). Put differ-
again (“neo-Ottomanism” itself being a hybrid representation of ently, as Çolak (2006: p. 599) and Yılmaz and Yosmaog lu (2008:
history), the media have continually pointed to Ahmet Davutog lu p. 677) have also argued, hybrid or the “multicultural” and
and his book Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu “multi-civilizational” representations of Turkey’s past and geog-
(Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position) published in 2001 raphy that contain these elements, or the desire to remember these
as the source of this discourse. In that book Davutog lu argues that elements contradict the founding premises of the Kemalist state
Turkey’s two “strategic depths” are its history and geography and (which takes a purist stance in nation making) as well as the
that Turks should make the utmost use of these “depths” to turn current realities regarding the state of ethnic and religious
Turkey into a major power. Yet neither Davutog lu who is the pluralism in contemporary Turkey.
current Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, nor the “reformed The remainder of this paper unfolds in four sections. After this
Islamist” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development introduction, I discuss key concepts, namely exceptionalism, limi-
Party-JDP) to which he belongs is the sole architect of the discourse nality and hybridity. I then analyze the historical background that
that portrays Turkey’s liminality. When the neo-Ottomanism prepared the way for and perpetuated the emergence of the
debate resurfaced in the 2000s, some scholars pointed to a “conti- geographical and historical hybridization that grounds the claims of
nuity” between the policies of Turgut Özal’s Anavatan Partisi Turkish exceptionalism. In the third section, I discuss the repre-
(Motherland Party-MP) and Recep Tayyip Erdog an’s JDP and espe- sentational practices of geographical and historical hybridization
cially, Ahmet Davutog lu’s “strategic depth,” doctrine (Murnison and finally summarize the paper in the conclusion where I reiterate
2006: p. 947). Even so, Davutog lu, the JDP and former Prime my main findings and arguments.1
Minister Turgut Özal and are not the only actors who portrayed
Turkey liminally and banked on hybrid representations of geog- Defining exceptionalism, liminality and hybridity
raphy and history and thus, deliberately or not, created an excep-
tionalist identity for Turkey. If neo-Ottomanism is defined as Exceptionalism
a discourse that highlights Turkey’s Ottoman past and mixes it with
geographical uniqueness to justify an active foreign policy in The literature is replete with the analyses of different claims to
Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, it can easily be demonstrated exceptionalism. Some analyses are critical, some favorable, and other
that there were shades of unspoken neo-Ottomanism helping to deconstructive. There is special attention paid to American excep-
construct an exceptionalist Turkish identity even during the tionalism, but there are also discussions of other claims to excep-
periods in which there was no neo-Ottomanism debate. tionalism such as the Asian, Chinese, Canadian, and Israeli varieties,
The second goal of this paper is to draw attention to the just to cite a few. One can divide the exceptionalism literature in
incongruity, or paradox, that this understanding of Turkish excep- political science and international relations into two parts. Some of
tionalism, which is based on history and geography, creates. Critical these studies focus on the cultural, religious, historical, strategic or
geopolitics is based on the premise that more than geographies, societal underpinnings of a state or a nation that serves as the basis of
there are geographical representations, that when invented and the claims of difference (Lipset, 1996) and ultimately for the
interpreted, create tools of power in the service of statecraft construction of claims of superiority vis-à-vis other states and
(O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998: p. 15). For Dijkink (1996), in contrast, it nations (Hodgson, 2009; Merom, 1999). Other studies focus on
is not only geographical but historical representations too are the certain institutional or procedural factors that defy generalizations
tools of power. Dijkink argues that national identity and geopolit- related to various laws, theories or expectations, or to put it more
ical visions (i.e., the way in which a country’s policymakers imagine concisely, on “anomalies” in the political science or international
their country’s location remember their past and conduct their relations literature (Kazemipur 2006; Mahajan 2005; Studlar 2001).
foreign policy), are inseparable from the construction of a national In the Turkish setting however, works explicitly discussing or
identity. Dijkink finds a reciprocal relationship between foreign referring to Turkish exceptionalism are rare and mostly focus on
policymaking and the creation of national identity, neither of which political or economic processes at the domestic level. While
can exist without imaginations of location and past. With Turkish Brummett (2007), in analyzing cartoons appearing in 19th century
exceptionalism, one can talk about two different and contradictory Ottoman newspapers, deconstructs the emergence of Ottoman
sets of identities prevalent in present-day Turkey, one at the exceptionalism as a resource to overcome accusations of inferiority,
domestic level and the other at the international level. One of these Mardin (2005) talks about a TurkisheIslamic exceptionalism and
identities is the exceptionalist identity based on the hybridization points to “the specifics of Turkish history . that have worked
of geography and history that attempts to portray Turkey as an cumulatively to create a special setting for Islam, a setting where
emerging power as well as a mediator/peacemaker thus posi- secularism and Islam interpenetrate” (2005: p. 148). For Angrist
tioning it liminally at the international level. The realities at the (2004), it is the Turkish political system that is “exceptional,” as
domestic level are quite different. The official state identity set forth Turkey is the only country with competitive party politics in the
by the Kemalist founders of the Turkish Republic, is based on the post-Ottoman lands. Öniş and Güven (2010) recently have argued
“purity” principle (Ersanlı, 2002: p. 153). That is, Turkish nation that the fact that Turkey did not renew its agreement with
making was “purified” in several regards. First, the Ottoman and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should be considered
Islamic past e the past that the Turkish elites have been trying to “exceptional.” Michael (2008), in contrast, has linked the politici-
reclaim since the 1950s and more forcefully since the 1980s e was zation of every issue in Turkey to its “geographical and historical
initially removed from Turkey’s historiography (Ersanlı, 2002). exceptionalism.”
Second, Kemalist nation-building was based on excluding and However, the construction of an “exceptional” national self-
expelling non-Muslim elements from society both rhetorically and image through the foreign policy process based on Turkey’s
more importantly, at a practicals level (see for example, Aktar, geographical and historical features and the ways in which this
2009: pp. 29e62; Çag aptay, 2006: Chapter 6 and 7). It also stood construction has been accomplished seems to have been missed by
on the premise that all remaining Muslims were “Turks” or, espe- students of Turkey. This is not to say that Turkey’s geographical and
cially in the case of the Kurds were potential “Turks” (Yeg en, 2007). historical features have not been elaborated on by others. Turkey’s
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82 L.K. Yanık / Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89

geographic and historical distinctiveness as well as the impact of The terms “liminality” and “marginality” only recently have
these factors on Turkey’s polity and politics is an oft-repeated been applied to international relations. The timing of their emer-
theme in Turkish politics. While countless scholars over the gence is not a coincidence. Much of the recent literature has
decades have argued that Turkey’s geography determines the devoted attention to Europe’s identity formation and “othering”
country’s foreign and security policies (Dominian 1916: p. 286; practices and to the ability of the European “self” to shape the
Sander 2006: p. 79; Vali, 1971: p. 44; to cite a few), many others “other” (Diez, 2004, 2005; Neumann 1996, 1998). Yet this interac-
have underscored the importance of the “Ottoman legacy” in tion between self and other has not always been that clear because
Turkish politics, especially in foreign and security policymaking the difference between self and other occasionally has produced
(Heper 2000; Jung 2003; Karaosmanog lu 2000; Walker, 2009 to forms other than the “other,” i.e. liminality (Rumelili 2004:
cite a few). In the same vein, Turkey has been described as a country pp. 27e38).
with “ambivalent ties to Europe” (Müftüler Baç, 2004: p. 31), as Both liminality and marginality have been applied to countries
well as an “in-between” (Robins, 1996: pp. 65e66), and a “hybrid” that have unclear ties to various economic or political communities,
(Diez, 2005: p. 633) place, which is “impossible to categorize” or to countries that are in the process of becoming a part of such
(Müftüler Baç, 1998: p. 248). Though all these studies highlight communities. In this regard, Australia (Higgot and Nossal 1997;
Turkey’s historical and/or geographical “uniqueness,” they take Rumelili 2007: Chapter 6), Turkey (Rumelili 2003, 2004, 2007)
these features as given. And while it might be true that Turkey’s and Estonia (Malksoo, 2009) have been referred to as liminals in the
location is a bit out of the “ordinary,” to quote Tonra, “facts do not recent international relations literature. Rumelili (2003) has argued
speak for themselves, they are spoken for” (Tonra, 2006: p. 3). That that the European Union’s (EU) representation of Turkey as liminal
is, how elites imagine and discursively express those imaginings has intensified Turkey’s conflict with its neighbor Greece. Further
shapes the construction and objectification of reality. theorizing on the community-building practices of the EU, Rumelili
Recently, however, more elaborate analyses have emerged argued that Turkish elites actively countered the EU’s efforts to
pointing to the unsettled nature of historical and geographical portray Turkey as a liminal by presenting Turkey as a country in
features in the context of Turkish foreign policy discourse. While possession of a dual Eastern and Western, or European and Asian,
Aydın (2003) highlighted the “securitization of history and geog- identity, especially after Turkey was not included among the list of
raphy,” Tank (2006: p. 464) mentioned the “manipulation of history candidate countries at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 (2007:
and geography. for creating a unique image” and the JDP Chapter 4). For Rumelili, it was the EU that pushed Turkey into
government’s construction of a “go-between” identity via foreign a liminal position and it was Turkey that started “negotiating this
policy. Bilgin (2009) has also highlighted Turkey’s recent claim for liminality” (2007: pp. 82e97).
“interstitiality and cosmopolitanism” (Bilgin, 2009: p. 121). All Parker (2008) drawing on examples from countries as diverse as
these studies are immensely informative, but though they imply the Denmark and Russia and Turkey and Britain, do not use the terms
“constructedness” of the above-mentioned features, they do not liminal or liminality per se, yet call for a theory of “positive mar-
analyze the ways in which this construction takes place. This paper ginality” and argue that countries considered “marginals” or in the
illustrate how historical and geographical features of a country are “margins” are in reality neither, meaning that such countries have
used discursively to construct an exceptional identity that in turn the power and the ability to shape the foreign relations of and with
justifies and rationalize foreign policy actions. “center” countries (Parker, 2008). With this “theory of positive
marginality” in the background, Tassinari (2008) defined Turkey as
Liminality and hybridity a “peculiarly marginal” country, as it is not fully “marginal,” i.e., not
a full EU member, but part of the Customs Union, partly within the
The term liminality originated in the work of anthropologist EU’s power structure, and partly modern. Tassinari argued that
Arnold Van Gennep who explored rites of passage rituals in various Turkey was trying to mitigate this “marginality” by asking for
societies. In The Rites of Passage, Van Gennep (1908) used the term “intermediation rewards” (p. 215) or by declaring itself an “alter-
liminality to describe the transitory period between two stages of native center” (p. 219).
human life. Building on Van Gennep’s work, Victor Turner, another Though both Rumelili and Tassinari put a finger on Turkey’s out-
anthropologist, elaborated on the functions and attributes of limi- of-the-ordinary, even outcast status, they miss the point that
nality. According to Turner, society was a series of “structure of Turkey’s liminality, or its “in-between” status, is neither created by
positions” and “the period of margin or ‘liminality’ was an inter- the EU alone nor regarded by the Turks as a bad thing. Rather, to
structural situation” (Turner, 1967: p. 93). In his The Ritual Process: make the claim for being Tassinari’s “alternative center,” and to
Structure and Anti-Structure, Turner (1969) gave a clearer definition receive “the intermediation rewards,” Turkey’s elites specifically
of liminality, arguing that “liminal entities are neither here nor imagine Turkey in a liminal position, support their claim with
there, they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and hybrid representations of the spatial and temporal features of
arranged by law, custom, convention and ceremonial” (1969: p. 95). Turkey and spend the utmost effort to portray their country as such
According to Turner, liminality had its own pros and cons. and carry liminality as a badge of honor. These actions, in turn,
Liminals were “inferior, submissive and silent” (1969: pp. reinforce Turkey’s liminal status. After all, as Turner put it, limi-
100e103), and liminality led to “ambiguity, paradox and confusion” nality is a much-preferred status compared to marginality, and the
(1967: pp. 96e97). Yet liminality also provided the ritual subject “liminality of the strong is weakness, of the weak is strength”
with the opportunity of being “neither this nor that and yet.both” (Turner, 1969: p. 200).
(1967: p. 99) as well as the chance to be in a “stage of reflection” Liminality, while potentially destabilizing, can be full of oppor-
(1967: p. 105) allowing a “certain freedom to juggle with the factors tunities since the ritual subject exists in a state of being “neither
of existence” (1967: p. 106). In his later writings, Turner distin- this nor that and yet.both” (Turner, 1967: p. 99). The idea of “being
guished liminality from marginality, arguing that in contrast to both” is a major theme in post-colonial literature, where hybridity
liminals, which are transitioning from one stage to another, is considered a strategy of the colonized (i.e., the weak) to resist the
marginals “have no cultural assurance of a final stable resolution of colonizer (i.e., the strong) (Bhabha, 1996: pp. 53e60). Bhabha has
their ambiguity” (1974: p. 233). In other words, while being argued that the “in-between spaces provide the terrain for elabo-
a liminal was not something fully desirable in Turner’s conception, rating strategies of selfhooddsingular or communaldthat initiate
comparatively speaking it was better than being a marginal. new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration and
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L.K. Yanık / Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89 83

contestation” (Bhabha, 1994: pp. 1e2). Again, for Bhabha “this East and the West in general (Yanık, 2009b: pp. 10e12). On a more
interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the practical level, however, Turkey (or, to be more precise, Özal, who
possibility of cultural hybridity that entertains difference without by then had become the president of the country) pushed for
an assumed or imposed hierarchy” (Bhabha, 1994: p. 4). In other involvement in the Gulf War of 1990e1991, again trying to please
words, hybridity is a strategy of resistance that can only take place its Western allies as well to polish Turkey’s Western credentials
in a liminal space. Though neither Turkey nor its precursor (Hale, 1992: pp. 679e692).
Ottoman Empire was ever colonized, both entities historically have After the transition to civilian rule, Turkey normalized ties with
had an uneasy relationship with the “West” and displayed the the Council of Europe and the Association Agreement was reini-
reflexes of a post-colonial country (Keyman, 1995: p. 96). Liminal tiated in 1988. But these moves, for several reasons, were not
representations grounded in hybrid constructions of geography and enough to secure the niche that Turkey had occupied during the
history not only paves the way for “exceptionalism.” Such repre- post-World War II years. First of all, problems with Turkey’s human
sentations also turn exceptionalism into a strategy of resistance and rights record and democracy persisted, which meant Turkey’s
paradoxically, a claim of superiority against the “West” as part of regime was not on par with the European countries. The second
the quest to become part of the West. blow to Turkey’s Europeanness/Westerness came when the Euro-
pean Community (EC) rejected Turkey’s membership application in
The background 1989, telling Turkey it would not be part of that exclusive club in the
foreseeable future. Finally, Turkey’s strategy of maintaining its
Since the final century of the Ottoman Empire’s existence, European/Western credentials through membership in trans-
foreign policymaking in Turkey has turned into a deliberate effort atlantic security establishments fell apart when the Soviet “enemy”
to shape Turkish identity. The founders of the Republic thought that disappeared in 1991, leading to more questioning of Turkey’s role in
a Western-oriented foreign policy would be an important factor in the various security and non-security institutions of the “West,”
guaranteeing a “Western” component of a modern Turkish identity and thus of Turkey’s place within and its identity as part of the
(Bilgin, 2009). When, after the end of World War II, Turkey was “West” (Müftüler Baç 1998: p. 243). Yet these occasions, which
incorporated into the West through various institutions, especially brought Turkey’s Europeanness/Westerness was under scrutiny
within such collective security organizations as the North Atlantic also provided Turkish foreign policymakers with the opportunity to
Treaty Organization (NATO), the missing “Western” component of pursue “alternatives” to Europe. Özal’s activism, combined with
Turkish identity that the Turkish elites had long desired was that of Süleyman Demirel’s, reached a new level with the collapse
obtained (Aybet & Müftüler Baç 2000; Müftüler Baç, 2000a: p. 22; of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Turkic republics, as
Yılmaz & Bilgin, 2005e2006). Turkey now not only had to redefine its role with regard to Europe
In the 1980s, this cozy arrangement, which provided the and the West, but also had to justify rhetorically its activist policy
“Westerness” of Turkey throughout the Cold War years came to an toward these Turkic states.
end. Turkey’s 1980 military coup, which highlighted democratic
deficiencies in Turkey, led to the downgrading of Turkey’s ties with
Constructing hybrid representational practices
the Council of Europe and to the suspension of parts of the Asso-
ciation Agreement between Turkey and the European Economic
Metaphors and “multiculturalism”
Community (EEC), the predecessor of the EU (Dag ı, 1996: p. 134;
Müftüler Baç, 2000b: p. 165). Although the United States (US) was
Referring to Turkey’s “unique” history and geography is one way
quite supportive of the 1980 military coup and the military
of creating a claim to exceptionalism. But metaphors also come in
government that emerged in its aftermath (Ludington & Spain,
handy while constructing exceptionalism because as linguistic
1983: pp. 150e168), Turkey’s “Western” credentials were tar-
instruments they play a crucial role in shaping reality (or more
nished, with various European institutions distancing themselves
correctly, what people believe is real, as they generate “new
from Turkey.
meanings” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: pp. 156, 211)). Though today
Since it found itself not fully desired by Europe, Turkey focused
“bridge” has become the metaphor describing contemporary
attention on the Islamic countries in the greater Middle East area
Turkey, the Turkish political elite used “door,” “latch and key,”
(Dag ı, 1996: p. 136). Obviously, this was not the first time that
“crossroads,” and “gate” to describe not only Turkey’s hybrid loca-
Turkey “had turned to East,” so to speak. In the mid-1950s, and then
tion and past, but also the role or the function to which it aspired
again in the 1960s, Turkish politicians had placed the Middle East
internationally (Yanık 2009a: pp. 536e537). Be it a bridge, door,
on their maps at different times, in order to “diversify” Turkish
gate, crossroads or a latch-key, these metaphors denote or highlight
foreign policy (Benli Altunışık and Tür 2005: p. 108; Mango 1968).
Turkey’s middleman/broker function and imply that Turkey’s
Yet in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, the favoring of
territory sits in a zone of transition, where different continents and
Islamic and Middle Eastern countries grew to such an extent that in
pasts mix, match and overlap. With these metaphors Turkey was
1984, for the first time since the inception of the Organization of the
portrayed as a merchant who would profit from the riches of the
Islamic Conference (OIC), Turkey was represented at the OIC’s
Middle East, as a facilitator for the newly independent states in
annual meeting at the presidential level e by Kenan Evren the
Eurasia, and as a peacemaker in the Balkans and the Middle East.
military coup leader turned president (Aykan, 1993: p. 102). The
For example, before the “bridge” metaphor came to dominate the
junta government’s “eastward-looking” Turkish foreign policy was
discourse, Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister at the time,
perpetuated by Turgut Özal, who became the head of the first
argued that “in this part of the world, Turkey has an exceptional
civilian government after the coup (Sayarı, 1990: pp. 395e401).
importance of being a gate from East to West and from West to East
However, more importantly, it was against this Middle Eastern
(Demirel, 1992: p. 33). In 1992, Özal described Turkey in these
backdrop that Turkey tried to prove its use to the West to regain its
terms:
“Western” credentials. While to Europe and for European audiences
Turkey maintained the rhetoric that Turkey was a European Our country is located between developed Western countries and
country; it began to employ a liminality discourse with Middle Islamic countries that have rich oil resources. Our location has
Eastern countries, pointing to the fact that Turkey could play the advantages and certain difficulties. Like a bridge that connects
middleman between the Middle East and Europe, and the Middle two people, we must connect these two cultures differing in their
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84 L.K. Yanık / Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89

main orientations and at the same time we should not cause any imperialistic, policymakers strongly rejected the neo-Ottoman
conflict within us. In other words, we should synthesize West’s label along with claims of “expansionism” (Demirel 2002b: pp. 685;
science and technology and Middle East’s belief and value system Haber10, 2010). Turkish elites’ rejection of neo-Ottomanism as
and present it for the use of humanity. Turkey that can construct a term, however, did not mean that Turkish leaders discontinued
a bridge in this regard will do great service for regional and world references to Turkey’s liminal state and hybrid geography and
peace (Özal, 1992a: p. 25). history. The Özal years were a milestone in the way Turkish history
was hybridized to shape Turkish exceptionalism, as Turkish elites
What is interesting in Turkey’s case is that the bridge metaphor,
revised “multiethnic” and “multireligious” to mean “multicultural.”
which has become the dominant metaphor, is based on the visual
This claim to multiculturalism rested on a much-romanticized
representations of the two bridges that connect the two continents
version of the Ottoman millet system (which itself is a controversial
of Asia and Europe as well as the two sides of Istanbul. While visual
subject) (Braude, 1982) as well as on an equally controversial pax-
and discursive representations of a bridge connecting two conti-
Ottomana argument (Forbes, Toynbee, Mitrany, & Hogarth 1915: p.
nents provide the basis for geographical hybridization, the histor-
47; Todorova, 2000), which assumes that the Ottoman Empire
ical hybridization, in contrast, rests on representations of Istanbul
brought peace and stability to the lands that it conquered.
as “cosmopolitan” and “multicultural,” especially through refer-
However, through a “selective reading” (Yavuz, 1998: p. 24) of
ences to its Ottoman past.
Ottoman history, Özal and later various other politician preferred to
The claim to the Ottoman past is regarded as a matter of
equate the presence and the governance of various different ethnic
competition between different groups trying to shape Turkish
groups in the Ottoman Empire with the ideas of “pluralism” and
identity (Çolak, 2006; Fisher Onar, 2009; Walker, 2009; Yavuz,
“harmony” and thus with “multiculturalism,” the ability to
1998). Istanbul, in this context, plays an important role as Islamist
“govern” these groups as “good governance,” and “stability” and
parties and conservative groups in Turkey have used Istanbul as
“order” as “peace.” These selective readings were then translated
a tool to reframe their own Ottoman-Islamist version of history,
into a rhetoric implying that the qualifications of the Ottoman
challenging Turkey’s official history at the domestic level (Çınar,
Empire as a “peacemaker” bestowed contemporary Turkey with the
2001; Öncü, 2007). These groups imagine and try to portray
credentials to provide peace and stability domestically and
Istanbul under Ottoman hegemony as the epitome of “multicul-
regionally. Özal and Turkish politicians who followed him tried to
turalism” and “peaceful coexistence” and thus as an illustration of
construct the convoluted argument that since the Ottoman millet
Ottoman justice (Bora, 1999: p. 49; Öncü, 2007: p. 241). In other
system worked for the Ottoman Empire in the past, Turkey, as the
words, Istanbul with its presumed “multicultural” past, became
present-day heir of that Empire, also automatically inherited the
a microcosm of “pax-Ottomana” (Çetinsaya, 2003: p. 371) as well as
practice of Muslim groups of different ethnicities to live together.
a case of the hybridization of history.
This hybridized image of the past that contained a romanticized
picture of coexistence, had a dual use. First, it targeted Kurds, or
The “neo-Ottomanism” debate more precisely it targeted the Kurdish separatism in Turkey that
flared up in the early 1980s. Now that non-Muslims in Turkey were
This yearning for a hybrid past took place at the international reduced to almost insignificant numbers, Islam was neatly extrac-
level as well. The term “neo-Ottomanism” first became fashionable ted from this hybrid romanticized “multicultural” past to provide
in academic and non-academic discourse in the early 1990s and an overarching identity that served as an antidote to rising Kurdish
then again in the 2000s, especially after the advance of the JDP to separatism (Çetinsaya 2003: p. 379; Çolak, 2006: p. 598). Second,
power. In the first wave, Turgut Özal was credited as the architect of on an international scale because states adjacent to Turkey were
neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy, while Ahmet Davutog lu, once part of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish elites viewed them as
an academic turned minister of foreign affairs, was considered the part of the romanticized Ottoman coexistence experience. This line
architect of the second wave. Though the term became en vogue of thinking enabled Turkish foreign policymakers, as the heirs of
after the end of the Cold War, David Barchard in Turkey and the the Ottoman Empire, to claim to hold first hand experience in
West, (published in 1985) uses it to describe Turkey’s turn to Middle coexistence and consequently to claim for Turkey, first in the Bal-
East (Barchard 1985: p. 91). Graham Fuller of Rand Corporation, one kans and then in some of the Turkic republics of the former Soviet
of the early proponents of the idea in academia, defined neo- Union, the role of a regional leader capable of providing stability,
Ottomanism in 1992 as “a renewed interest in the former territories economic development and peace (Tulander 1995; Yavuz 1998: p.
and people of the Empire, which includes Muslims who were part 40). Because Turkic communities were part of the first wave of neo-
of that Empire,” that arose due to the disappearance of Cold War Ottomanism (and despite Turkish elites’ rejection of the term),
conditions and that helped Turks “to see themselves once again at some observers argued that not only was Turkey reviving the
the center of a world reemerging around them on all sides rather Ottoman Empire (Constantinides, 1996; Waever, 1996), it also,
than at the tail-end of a European world” (Fuller, 1992: p. 13). While because its foreign policy extended geographically beyond the
other Rand Corporation publications (see for example Fuller, Lesser, former Ottoman lands into the Turkic speaking countries of the
Henze, & Brown, 1993) stressed this idea on the international former Soviet Union, was reviving the pan-Turkist ideals of the final
academic/think tank scene, in Turkey Cengiz Çandar, a journalist years of the Ottoman Empire (Landau, 1995: p. 221).
and adviser to Turgut Özal is usually credited with coining the term In its 1992 summer issue, the journal Türkiye Günlüg ü (The Diary
neo-Ottomanism and acting as an early proponent of a foreign of Turkey) published an interview with Turgut Özal, the president of
policy based on the concept (Çetinsaya, 2003: p. 378; Çolak, 2006: Turkey at the time, titled “Türkiye’nin Önünde Hacet Kapıları
p. 592). Not surprisingly, Çandar and Fuller eventually penned an Açıldı,” (a title which can be translated roughly as “Turkey’s Wishes
article together in 2001, titled “Grand Geopolitics for a New are Granted”), which is considered the official proclamation of neo-
Turkey,” full of references praising the Ottoman Empire and Ottomanism (Çolak, 2006: p. 592). In that interview Özal, without
underscoring how Turkey should make use of this imperial gran- pronouncing the word neo-Ottomanism, talks about the ways in
deur (Çandar & Fuller, 2001). which Turkey had inherited the governing practices of the Ottoman
Yet in both instances when the term neo-Ottomanism became Empire as well as an “exceptional” geography. The combination of
common currency in the media and academia, Turkish leaders the two Özal argued, could become the solution to regional insta-
themselves never used the term. Indeed, afraid of sounding too bility and resolve Turkey’s Kurdish “problem.” According to Özal,
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L.K. Yanık / Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89 85

We need to identify and properly analyze several points idea of Eurasia did not remain at the state level, as the disappear-
regarding the geopolitical region that extends from Central Asia ance of the Soviet threat and the emergence of “Eurasia” prepared
to the Balkans, which forms the target area of our leadership the ground for certain nationalist circles in Turkey. These nation-
role. To a large degree, this region contains Turkish communities alists following in the footsteps of their Russian counterparts,
[sic] and with this aspect, at the same time, it also harbors the offered Eurasianism as a foreign policy alternative, prescribing that
cultural belt that we call Turkish World [sic]. Yet, this region, Turkey minimize relations with the EU (which, after all these years,
again to a large extent, contains communities and states that are was still reluctant to accept Turkey as a member) and develop and
Muslim but not Turkish, which lived as Ottoman subjects. So, in intensify ties at different levels with countries to Turkey’s east
this region that extends from the Adriatic to Central Asia, we can (Akçalı and Perinçek 2009; Bilgin 2007: p. 753).
talk about several different nestled rings that have features in The “discovery” of Eurasia went hand-in-hand with the claim of
common but are located separate from each other. We should “Eurasianization,” which underscored Turkish nation’s “hybrid”
see these rings as areas with large intersection points (Özal character. The following quote from Bülent Ecevit exemplifies first,
1992b: p. 14). how the Turkish elite in the 2000s, were willing to highlight the
continuity between the Ottoman Empire and present-day Turkey,
In the same interview, Özal compared and contrasted the
and second, how positively Turkish elites remembered the multi-
multiethnic and multireligious Ottoman Empire with multiethnic
ethnic/multireligious character of the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the
Yugoslavia, claiming that separatism in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was
quote points out how inseparable are historical and geographical
a result of a “nonconsensual union” of different ethnic groups. By
hybridity. One can regard Eurasianism and the selective remem-
labeling Yugoslavia as a “nonconsensual union” and contrasting it
bering of the “multiethnic/multireligious” nature of the Ottoman
with the Ottoman Empire e as if the Ottoman Empire did not also
Empire as two sides of the same coin and as parts of the same
dissolve at the end of the World War I e Özal placed the Ottoman
hybridization process. While neo-Ottomanism represented the
Empire in a separate category:
historical hybridization phase of this process, the call for Eurasia or
When it comes to Turkey the situation is very different. Maybe it Eurasianization represented the geographical phase.
is the impact of religion, or the effect of Islam that made [us]
For 600 years Turks have been Europe’s most effective element.
mingle with each other and maintain a consensual union for
Some parts of Europe have been subject to Ottoman-Turkish
centuries. As a country and a society descending from an
hegemony for centuries. Those societies that lived under the
Empire, we were able to maintain a cultural and a political
Ottoman rule have maintained their religions, sects and languages
identity that transcends ethnic differences. Just like in the days
without any pressure being exerted on them. During the Repub-
of the Empire, I believe that Islam is the most important factor
lican era, on the other hand, the changes that were made in its
forming that identity (Özal, 1992b: p. 17).
political, social and cultural character have helped us in depth in
To summarize, references to the Ottoman Empire or claims to be terms of institutional integration with Europe. . Yet the Turkish
the heir of the Ottoman Empire helped the Turkish elite to achieve nation is not only European; at the same time, it is Central Asian,
two goals simultaneously. At the domestic level, the multiethnic Middle Eastern, Caucasian; it is from the Black Sea, from the
nature of the Ottoman Empire was mobilized to help “solve” Eastern Mediterranean. The mixed identity of the Turkish nation
Turkey’s Kurdish “problem”; internationally, the fact that Turkey’s is not a defect but an asset for Europe. This special mixed identity
present-day neighbors were once part of the Ottoman Empire of the Turkish nation has gained a special importance, especially
helped construct the argument that Turkey can establish order, when Europe and Asia are integrating during the process of Eur-
stability and peace in the surrounding region. Though neither Özal asianization. Turkey has become the key country that impacts the
nor his successors ever pronounced the word neo-Ottomanism, the whole world and civilization [sic] (Ecevit, 2000: p. 147).
idea of neo-Ottomanism was a hybridization of history, par excel-
lence, mixed with some low doses of geographical hybridization.
The process of “Eurasianization” also involved claims to being
a multi-civilizational country, claims that were frequently made by
From Eurasia to multi-civilizational Turkey Turkish politicians in the post-Cold War period. For example, Tur-
gut Özal, with Gündüz Aktan as his ghost writer, published Turkey
As the Soviet Union was dissolving, the emergence of the Turkic in Europe and Europe in Turkey, in which he argued, very much in
Republics in the post-Soviet space prompted the Turkish foreign line with the Turkish History Thesis, argued that the roots of
policy elite to “discover Eurasia” (Yanık 2009a: p. 537). The desire of Western countries go back to the ancient civilizations that once
Turkish foreign policymakers to associate Turkey with these lived in Anatolia. Therefore, Özal’s argument went, Turkey was
republics as part of an attempt to make Turkey into a regional entitled to be considered part of the West (Özal, 1991). Similarly,
power, led them to place Turkey in the “center” or “hub” of Eurasia. Tansu Çiller, first as prime minister and then as minister of foreign
This depiction sustained the discourse that located Turkey where affairs, claimed that Turkey was a country that “synthesized”
Europe and Asia mixed and met, and consequently highlighted different empires and civilizations. In a speech to the European
Turkey’s geographical hybridity yet again. Media Union, Çiller described Turkey as a country
Demirel described the post-Cold War situation in the region in
of tolerance and understanding as well as a refuge for those
the following fashion: “new Turkish states have emerged onto the
fleeing from persecution. This is where the continents meet and
world scene. That is, sibling countries’ flags are standing next to
it historically has been the meeting point for civilizations. Today
Turkey’s star and crescent flag. This is something only two years
Turkey looks like a mosaic. We are proud to be the heir to
old, something that belongs to Eurasia. Eurasia is a geographical
Roman, Greek, Ottoman and other cultures. All these past civi-
name, but in reality, it is an event that belongs to Turkish [sic]
lizations have enriched our cultural understanding. The bridge
community (Demirel, 2002a: p. 218). Meanwhile, as the Soviet
over Istanbul [sic] does not only connect Asia and Europe
Union collapsed and Turkey simultaneously sought admittance to
physically, but also literally (Çiller 1993: p. 362).
the EU, Turkish leaders did not see any problems in declaring
Turkey a “Eurasian power” along with Russia in one of the early _
Ismail Cem, too, became one of the most important proponents
agreements signed with the latter (Tellal, 2005: pp. 546e547). The of this civilizational discourse. As minister of culture and then
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86 L.K. Yanık / Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89

foreign affairs minister from 1995 until 2002, he called Turkey overwhelmingly Kurdish e stated that “we are a large nation with
a “geography of civilizations” (Cem, 2004: pp. 33e34) and a deep past, that has lived together for years, sharing a common
reclaimed the Ottoman heritage in a positive manner and culture, common sociological realities and a common history, and
denounced “Turkey” (but without getting too specific as to who in more importantly, a ‘common empire.’ This nation will carry these
Turkey) for forgetting the Ottoman Empire. In his 2004 book common feelings, this coexistence forward, [because] we are
Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya (Turkey, Europe, Eurasia), Cem argued that, a continuation of a big empire” (Gül 2010).
as minister of foreign affairs, he tried to overcome a “traditional” Overall the former representational practices continued, though
foreign policy that disregarded “geography” and especially the media preferred to emphasize Turkey’s role as a peacemaker
“history,” and which “overlooked centuries of accumulation of mostly in the Middle East (and to lesser extent in the Caucasus and
civilizational factors, relations and living experience” (Cem, 2004: elsewhere), based on Turkey’s “exceptional” geography and history.
pp. 11e13). Cem further criticized “traditional Turkish foreign This caused Turkish foreign policy to be labeled neo-Ottoman for
policy” for unnaturally imposing an “either East or West” or an’s quote below makes
the second time in less than 20 years. Erdog
“Europe or Asia” dichotomy on Turkey, rather than looking for ways the Turkish elite’s aspirations and imaginations very clear.
of forming a “synthesis” and a “reconciliation” between “East and
Our records of peaceful solution of the problems and of termi-
West,” and “Europe and Asia,” respectively (Cem, 2004: p. 30). By
nating conflict sources that threat international peace will be
claiming that Turkey was “European thus Western and at the same
useful in providing common goods such as establishment of
time Asian and thus Eastern” (Cem, 2004: p. 43) and by devoting
peace and stability in Balkans, Caucasses [sic] and large Middle
a section to “Ottoman tolerance” in this book, he defined his
East regions. Turkey has a great potential to make a bridge
approach to foreign policy:
between Europe and Middle East and Far East. Let me compre-
This approach aims to reconcile all civilizations that existed in hend [sic] the situation as a bridge between civilizations and
our geography and history with each other and also with cultures not as a bridge geographically. Turkey is an example
present-day Turkey. We can summarize Turkey’s Ottoman past, country, which can undertake the duty of a bridge either at the
which is symbolized by tolerance and the secular Turkish an 2005).
Middle East or at the Far East points (Erdog
Revolution as follows: in order to reflect a culture free from all
This shift, promulgated by the JDP as well as by the second wave
complexes on to our domestic and foreign policy, we need to
of neo-Ottomanism is attributed to Ahmet Davutog lu, who, after
reconcile all civilizations with each other, with the past, with
a career in academia, and stint as an ambassador-at-large, was
today and tomorrow, and internalized by us. The starting point
appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009. In his
of this approach is tolerance (Cem, 2004: p. 33).
book Strategic Depth (which has run through close to 40 printings),
Cem strove to reconcile East and West throughout the post-Cold Turkey is envisioned as a future great power that first must assume
War period. However, it was only after the 9/11 attacks that Cem a mediator/peacemaker’s role, using its “exceptional” geography
had the opportunity better to showcase Turkey’s “reconciler” role and history. “The current struggle,” as Davutog lu has neatly
as a “multi-civilizational country.” Turkey, as a candidate for EU summarized his position “is not a war of liberation, but is to turn
membership and a member of the OIC, hosted in February 2002 Turkey into one of the largest powers in the world” (Milliyet, 2009).
“The Meeting of Civilizations,” a forum for EU members and While Davutog lu’s “strategic depth” doctrine is fleshed out in his
candidate countries and OIC members. With the 9/11 attacks book of the same name, one can also see its underlying arguments
setting Christianity and Islam at loggerheads, Turkey had a chance in a series of interviews that Davutog lu gave after the 9/11 attacks.
to display its “exceptional” identity rooted in a mix of civilizations During these interviews, Davutog lu is very critical of Samuel
by hosting a “multi-civilizational” conference. Huntington and Francis Fukuyama’s theses that have shaped the
post-Cold War world order. While Davutog lu criticizes Huntington
“Neo-Ottomanism” redux for labeling Turkey as a “torn country,” which Davutog lu thinks is
something that should be perceived as positive not negative
In 2004, two years after the JDP’s rise to power, “The Meeting of (Davutog lu 2002: p. 193). Similarly, Fukuyama is criticized for being
Civilizations” was renamed the “Alliance of Civilizations.” After Western-centric and prematurely declaring “the end of history”
organizing several conferences, Prime Minister Erdog an declared (Davutog lu 2002: p. 8). At these interviews Davutog lu’s criticism
that the “Alliance of Civilizations,” now co-chaired by Spain and about the West and Western scholarship are taken to another level
sponsored by the United Nations (UN), was “a candidate for when he argues that the current state of crisis is a “crisis of not of
becoming the 21st century’s peace project” (Today’s Zaman, 2008). Islamic Civilization, but a crisis of Western Civilization” (Davutog lu
In reality, the “Alliance of Civilizations” ended up introducing 2002: p. 97) because “as Western Civilization globalized,” Davu-
a religious twist to Turkish exceptionalism because in this “alliance” toglu argues, “it started to curtail the historical areas of other
Turkey claimed to “bridge Islam and the West,” thus stepping civilizations” (Davutog lu 2002: p. 91). While the “Chinese and
forward as a representative of Islam (Yanık 2009a: p. 542). In other Indian civilizations could never become global,” the Ottoman
words, while the JDP maintained the civilizational discourse that Empire, according to Davutog lu, “was able to globalize in a limited
emerged in Turkey in the early 1990s, JDP’s understanding of civi- sense,” which created a different heritage and thus opportunities
lization was a more religious in tone, unlike its predecessor for present-day Turkey (Davutog lu, 2002: p. 196).
governments whose understanding of civilization was more In terms of “multiculturalism,” Davutog lu states that “cities like
cultural and historical, and less religiously defined. Paris, London and Berlin have just started to contain different
This discursive turn did not mean that other hybridization cultures in the past thirty years; a phenomenon which the Ottoman
practices such as seeing Turkey as “both European and Asian,” or in Empire has lived through, is only now being experienced by the
the “core of Europe and Asia” or emphasizing Turkey’s special or West” (Davutog lu 2002: p. 112). By comparing the Ottoman
unique geography and history through metaphors were dis- “expansion” into Europe, the Middle East and Africa to “globaliza-
continued. Nor was the idea discarded of reaching out to Kurds on tion,” Davutog lu tries to eliminate one of the most controversial
the grounds that both Kurds and Turks shared a common history. topics in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire: whether the
As recently as 2010, President Abdullah Gül, (a former minister Ottoman conquests meant colonialism and/or imperialism. Overall,
of foreign affairs), speaking in Diyarbakır e a city that is with Ottoman conquests being equated to “Ottoman globalization”
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L.K. Yanık / Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89 87

and the Ottoman Empire being declared as a unique source of only foreign policymaking, but also certain types of domestic
multiculturalism, Davutog lu indirectly refers to pax-Ottomana as decision making. In other words, Bilgin implicitly talks about
well as to an infallible Ottoman Empire. a geographical exceptionalism that infuses Turkish politics. This
While other members of the JDP insist on highlighting Turkey’s paper, on the other hand, expands on Bilgin’s findings in three
bridge role Davutog lu seems undecided. In Strategic Depth, he ways. First, it argues that geographical exceptionalism does not
divides “bridge countries” into two: “those whose bridge role is take place only by explicit references to jeopolitik. Analyzing the
built on a strong identity and self-confidence and those without discursive practices related to geography is another way to read and
any self-confidence that realize this bridge role in a pragmatic way.” reveal geographical exceptionalism. Second, this paper holds that it
Accordingly, while those “without any self-confidence” experience is almost impossible to separate geographical from historical
identity crises, those with “self-confidence,” such as the Ottoman imagination. It illustrates by analyzing the discursive practices that
Empire “under the Islamic paradigm”. [and]. “located in one of construct a hybridized geography and history for Turkey, that
the most heterogeneous regions of civilizational history accept this Turkish elites construct an exceptional identity for Turkey which
plurality as a source of richness” and thus create an exceptional then helps them constitute liminal representations of the country.
order (Davutog lu 2004: p. 92). In a 2008 interview, Davutog lu Third, the paper, follows in the footsteps of Bhabha (who argued
argues that Turkey “should be seen neither as a bridge country, that hybridity could only emerge in the state of liminality) in
which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed elaborating on the sources and conditions of liminality, this time in
as an ordinary country, that sits at the edge of the Muslim world or international relations.
the West,” but rather as a “central” country (Davutog lu 2008: p. 78), Can exceptionalism be a viable political strategy? Benli Altunışık
and so again he describes Turkey’s location and role with a meta- argues that, first Özal, and then Erdogan were criticized for bringing
phor. Overall, the hybridization or the exceptional identity that is the Ottoman Empire and Islam back into the Turkish identity and
being produced by Turkey’s JDP government is more Islam and polity. This shift meant the reversal of Kemalist nation making,
Ottoman Empire-heavy than previous versions, with continued which not only expelled the Ottoman Empire and Islam from
emphasis on the romanticized multicultural coexistence model. Yet Turkish history, but preferred to direct its attention to the West, as
what Davutog lu and the members of the JDP miss is that by criti- “Westernized” foreign policy was seen as part of the nation-
cizing “Western Civilization” and upholding an Islam-dominant building effort (Benli Altunışık, 2009: p. 178). More importantly, an
Ottoman Empire in their discourse, they too become as “essen- exceptional identity based on the hybridization of Turkey’s geog-
tialist” as their “Western” counterparts whom they criticize (Bilgin, raphy and history runs counter to the Kemalist nation-building
2009: p. 59e60). project on another count, because the Kemalist project was based
on the idea of “purity,” not hybridity (which signifies impurity). In
Conclusion this context, Turkish exceptionalism forms a layer of identity at the
international level that contradicts the identity at the domestic
This article examines the practices within Turkish foreign policy level. Given this basis for Turkey’s national identity as well as
discourse that have helped construct Turkish exceptionalism. Its current practices regarding diversity and plurality in present-day
main argument is that Turkish elites’ hybrid representations of Turkey, Turkish exceptionalism is destined to remain yet another
Turkey’s history and geography empower them not only to claim paradox of Turkish polity.
a peacemaker/mediator role for their country but also to portray
Turkey as a rising power with a liminal status and thus to present Endnote
Turkey as exceptional in the realm of international relations.
1
Turkish exceptionalism is constituted in several ways. First, A note on methodology: While analyzing the discursive formation of exception-
alism, I generally utilized the published speeches of Turkish foreign policymakers
various metaphors were used that highlighted Turkey’s location as and/or material from their published books. When published books and speeches
a meeting place of different continents. In the early 1990s, different were not available, I consulted media reports.
metaphors such as door, gate, latch and key, and crossroad were
utilized, and finally the “bridge” metaphor was embraced by the
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