CO NCEPT'

OF
SELF IN I NDIAN rHOUGHT
by
Fa ther T. R. Jac ob

A Thes i s subm itted t p the Fa culty of t he .

Gradua te Sch oo l, Ma rqu e tte University, in
Partial Fqlfillment of the Re-
qu ir em ent s for the De gree
of Master of Arts

Milwaukee , Wi sco ns in
May, 1975
 PREFACE

In the followin g pag es I have tried to trace the

evo lu tion of the concept of self in I n dian phi losophy. In

doin g so , I have attempted to show the differences between

the Indian concept of self and that of the Wes t. In the

concludin ~ part of this paper , I have tried to indicate how

u sefu l it coul d be to th e mod ern jest to know the signifi -

cance of Indian philosophy's stress the idea of the self.

A balance is needed between man's knowled g e of the external

world and his knowl edee of his inner world. An understand-

ing of the meaning and si~nificance of the Indian concept

of the self will h elp very much toward attaining this

balance.
 CONTEnTS

1. INTRODUC 'L'ION : 'r'lE UNIQUENESS OF' INDIAN

PHILOSOPHY ' S I Nl EREST IN THE NATURE
OF THE SELF
11 . SO URCES : THE VEDAS , THE BRAHMANAS , TH~
ARANYAKAS , THE UPANI~HADS , AND TH~
fWO GREAT INDIAN EPICS
111 . l'HE CONCEP'T OF' THE SELb' IN j'HE VEDAS
AND THE UPANI:SHADS
1 If • THE CONCEP'l' OF' '['HE SELF IN JAINISl'/j AND
BUDDH IS[vl
V. l' HE CONCEPT' OF THE SELF IN 'l'HE EPICS .
'11. THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF' I N THE SIX
SYSJ'EMS OF' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: .
1. Samk hy
2. Yoga
3. Pu~va Mimam sa \
4. Nyaya and Vaisesika
5. Vedanta
a . Samkara: Advaita or
Absolute Monism
b . Ramanuja : Qualified
Dualism
c . Madhava : Unqualified
Dualism

'111 . COMPARISON AND CON'l'RAS'[, BE'nv'EEN INDIAN

AND WESTERN CONCEPTS OF THE SELF'
V111 . WHATrrlE WEST CAN LEARN FROM I NDIA
 1. INTRODUCTION

Indian philosophy is one of the oldest in the world.

It be gan about two thousand years before Christ, and it has
had a continuity of about four thousand years. What distin-
guishes Indian thought from Western thought is its inwardness.
Generally speaking , it may be said that Western philosophy,
be g inning with the Greeks, has laid much more stress on exter-
nal phenomena than on the internal. On the other hand, the
"I" or the self has been the topic of Indian philosopby ri ght
from the be g inning . In Wester n pp ilosophy, the study of the
self as a separate entity is a comparatively modern phenomenon.
In no other philosophy is the concept of the self so central
as in Indian philosophy.
It should, therefore, be both interesting and instruc-
tive to investi gate the nature o~ the self as understood in
Indian philosophy. It will also be useful to note the simi-
larities and differences between the Indian concept of the self
and the idea of the self in the Western thought. This is es-
pecially so because of the great need in our time for a greater
under s tanding of man's inner world. Today, man, with his ad-
vanced technolo gy, has conquered the surface of the earth, and
he is all se t for his greater adventure into outer space. But
the sad truth is that man's knowled ge of himself has not kept
pace with the great growth in his knowled ge of the outer world.
This discrepancy is at the root of all his troubles today.
The great interest that has been taken in the nature of
the human self by modern psychology shows modern man's aware-
ness of the need to fill the gap between his knowledge of his
inner world and his knowled ge of the outer world. It is my
purpose, in this paper, to show that some of the insights of
modern Western psycholo g y on the nature of the human self are
truths which the thinkers of India had discovered in ancient
times . I shall also point out the relevance of ancient India's
knowled ge of the nature of the self to the problems that trouble
modern man.
 11. souaCES

The source books of Indian philosophy are, mainly, the

Vedas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas, the Upanishads, and the
two great Indian epics - the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.
Scholars ge nerally a gree that the be ginning of Vedic
literature goes back to 2000 B.C. or even 2500 B.C. The word
Veda (from the root "vid" meaning "to know" as in Latin "videre")
in the widest sense i s not the name of any particular book, but
the literature of a particular epoch ranging over a long period.
There are four Vedas. They are: the Rg Veda, the Yajur Veda,
the Sarna Veda, and the Atharva Veda.
The Rg Veda is mostly in the form of hymns addressed to
the dieties who are personifications of natural forces such as
the sun, the moon, the wind, the sky, the sea, etc. The Aryan
reli g ion was a form of nature worship which blended, in
course of time, with the reli gion of the pre-Aryan people of
India. The Yajur, Sarna, and Atharva Vedas came after the Rg
Veda, and they bear evidence of the interaction between the
Aryan and pre-Aryan reli g ions. Later the Brahmanas were com-
posed as guidelines to the ritual of Vedic sacrifice. Still
later the ritual and sacrifice became discredited as people
became more and more reflective. The Aranyakas contain the
thoughts produced during this reflective period. The Upanishads
which represent the hi ghest achievement of Vedic thought as
well as Vedic reli g ion, embody these thoughts in their maturest
form.
The hymns of the Rg Veda are filled with intense reli-
gious consciousness of the people who wrote them. These people
seem to be intoxicated with the idea of the holy within and
beyond natural phenomena. These hymns are filled with delight,
wonder, and excitement at the splendor of nature and the joy
and riddle of geing . The authors of these hymns have not yet
begun the inward looking search which came to be the main fea-
ture of the Upanishad s and which has been the chief character-
istic of Indian thou ght ever since.
The Upanishads are of vital importance to Indian philo-
sophy. They are philosophical interpretations of the Vedas.
Radhakrishnan says, "Though in some sense the Upanishads are
the continuation of the Vedic religion, they are in another
sense a strong philosophical protest a gainst the religion of
the Brahmanas. It is in the Upanishads that the tendency to
spiritual monism, which, in one form or another, characterizes
much of Indian philosophy, was first established whose intui-
tion rather that reason was first reco gnized as the true guide
of ultimate truth."l
The two great Indian epics are later developments of Vedic
thou ghts in the form of books, where semi-historic and legend-
ary personalities are g iven divine attributes and are presented
as models of philosophic outlook of the Vedas. Though there
are many epic writings , the most important are the Ramayana
and the Mahabhara ta. Of the m d amayana i s the stOry of the
god-he r o , Rama , while Mahabharata is the story of the war
between th e Pandava s a nd the Kaurava s .
The mos t important part of the Mahabha rata i s the
I

Bhagavad Gita which is full of ethical, mor a l, and philoso -

phical thou ghts Wilhelm von Humboldt ha s de s cribed the ~ ha g a-

vad Gi:ta a s " t he most beautiful , p erhaps the only philosophi -

I
cal song in any known tongue ." Z The context in which the Bha-
gavad Gita occurs in Mahabharata , may be de s cribed here. The
Pandavas are unjustly drawn into a war by their numerically
superior kinsmen , the Kaurava s . Lord Krishna , an incarnation
of Vishnu , joins the Pandavas and leads Arjuna as his charioteer .
Seeing his own kith and kin , his elders and teachers , in t he
enemy's camp , Arjuna loo s es hi s mora l streng th and lays down
his arms . Lord Krishna then exhorts Arjuna about his duty to
fi ght. This exhortation , which takes the form of a hi ghly
philoso phical and ethical disquisition , is what has come to be
known as t he Bhagavad Cita.
 o.

111. CONCEPT OF SELF I N THE VEDAS

AND THE UPANISHADS

As we have seen, the Rg Veda was composed by men who

were outward-looking . They had not become introspective. It
is only in the .Upanishads that we find an almost completely
inward-looking quest for truth. But we must note that the
shift from the outward-looking attitude of the Vedas to the
inward-looking attitude of the Upanishads was effected with-
out losing sight of the reality of the outer world. What is
remarkable here is the way in which the outer world of emp·ir-
ical phenomena and the inner world of psychic experience are
reconciled. This reconciliation produces an almost "scien-
tific" or rationalistic ground for the encounter between the
divin~ and the human within the mind of man. According to
Brhadavanyaka Upanishad, the "Atman" or God who resides within
man' s "being is the same "Atman" that is the li ght of the sun.
Thus man's inner nature and the reality of the external world
are correlated. As a learned interpreter puts it, "Man thus
becomes the meeting point of the gods of the universe or its
controlling forces. The hi ghest controlling force was the
Atman, the source of li ght, both internal and external. •• In
any case (the Upan ishad s ) accept the idea that God is the inner
most spirit within man. The philosophical thoughts of the
Upanishads once and for all becomes inward-looking in its
effect to find explanations."]
The cen t ral idea of the Upanishads is that the ultimate
truth is within man. The Brhadaranyaka Upanishad tells the
story of the Emperor Janaka who sought wisdom from the great
sage Yajnavalkya.
"Yajnavalkya," said the Emperor, "What is the li ght
by which man is served?"
"The li ght of the sun, 0, Emperor," said the sage,
"For it is by the li ght of the sun that man sits down,
g oes out, works, and comes back home. ".
"Quite so. But when the sun has set, 0, Yajnavalkya,
what then is the li ght by which man is served?"
"The moon then becomes his li ght; for it is then by the
li ght 'of the moon that he sits down, goes out, works,
and comes back home."
"That is so," said Janaka, "But when both the sun and
the moon are down, what then, 0, Yajnavalkya, is the
li ght by which man is served?"
"The fire becomes the light," replied Yajnavalkya,
"for it is then by fireli ght that he sits down, goes
out, works, and comes back home."
"0, Yajnavalkya, that is true; but when the sun and
the moon have set and the fire has gone out, what then
is the li ght by which man is served?"
"Sound then serves as light," said the sage, "for it
is with the voice as his light that he then sits down,
g oes out, works, and comes back home. 0, Emperor,
when it is so dark, that one cannot see one's own hand
before ones own face, if a sound is uttered, then one
can follow the sound."
"That indeed is true," said the Emperor, "but, 0,
Yajnavalkya, when the sun and the moon have set, and
the fire has gone out, and there is not a sound - what
is then the light by which man is served?-
The sag e was driven to the walL "A tman, the self,"
he declared, "becomes his light; for it is by the light
of the self that he sits down, goes out, works, and
comes back home."
The emperor was pleased; yet the discussion had to come
to this point: "That is true, 0, Yajnavalkya, but of
the many principles within man, which is the Self?"
Only when this question had b en asked did the sage at
last be g in to teach the king. 4
 u.

The Upanishads teach that it is only by delving deep

within himself that man can find the Supreme Reality. In this
sense the Indian concept of man is eminently humanistic. But
it is a humanism which believes that the s uperhuman is within
man. I t is also an empiricism which does not exclude the meta-
physical. The Upanishadic man is at home in the universe be-
cause he conceives of it "as the product of his own inner most
Spirit, the Atman, ••• and all the gods were its products and he
himself was created as the field of their activities and enjoy· -
ment.5
The Upanishads draw a distinction between man's empirical
self and his true Self or Atman. The empirical self is the
existential self, subject to sorrow and suffering and subject to
change. The true Self is the unchanging Atman that observes the
empirical phenomena but is unaffected and undying .
The Upanishads believe in the ultimate identity of the
empirical self with the Supreme Self. This identity ~ is elearly
illustrated in the Chando gya Upanishad through the lessons given
to Svetaketu by his father.
"Bring hither a fi g from there," (says his father).
"Here it is, Sir."
"Divide it."
"It is divided, sir."
" What do you see there?"
"These rather fine seeds, sir."
"O f these, please divide one."
·' It is divided, s ir."
"What do you see ther e?"
" Nothing at all, sir."
Then he said to him: "Verily, my dear, that finest
essence which you do not perceive . • . from that
finest es s ence this great sacred fi g tree thus arises.
Believe me e . . . that which is the finest essence
. . . this whole world has that as its self. That is
Atman. That art thou (tat tuam asi) Svetaketu."
 'j .

"Do you, sir, cause me to understand more."

"So be it, my dear," told he, "Place this salt in the
water. In the morning come to me."
Then he did so.
Then he said to him, "1' hat salt you placed in the water
last evening , please bring it hither.
Then he grasped for it but did not find it, as it was
completely dissolved.
"Please take a sip of it from this end," said he. "How
is it?"
"Salt."
"Take a sip from the middle," said he. "How is it?"
"Sal t. "
"Take a sip from that end," saod he. "How is it?"
"Salt. "
"Set it aside. Then come unto me." He did so, saying,
"It is always the same."
Then he said to him: "Verily . • • you do not Rerceive
Being here. Verily indeed, it is here. That which is
the finest essenc e - this whole world has that as its
self. That is Reality. That is Atman. That art thou,
Svetaketu.,,6
One of the best accounts of the structure of man is to
be found in the Taittiriya Upanishads. A distinction is drawn
between man ' s body and his atman. Man's body is not the real
self because "from the atman, which is the Brahman, aether
(akasa) is born; from it air; from air, fire; from fire, water;
from water, earth. From earth are born plants and from plants
food is derived; and from food man is born."? The Atman is the
Supreme Being; man is the finite creature. But deep within man
is the Atman which is man's true self.
What then is man's true self? The body is not the Atman
or Self, because the body is empirical. Is the Atman the vital
principle or "prana"? No, it cannot be because when a man is
asleep, his "I" does not respond if we call him, even though he
is not dead. In this case, it is his mind that is unconscious.
Is mind then the Atman? No, it is not because a lunatic's mind
operates, though he is far from being his true self. What he
 1U •

lacks is reason. Is reason, then, the Atman? No, it cannot be,

for when a man is asleep his reason is dormant ' and yet we do not
say that his self is absent. Is then the unconscious Atman? No,
it cannot be because the Atman by its very nature, must be cons-
cious. But the Atman though not to be identified or equated with
any or all of these - body, mind, reason, the unconscious - is
present in all of them. Thus we see that "the lower is the body
of the hi gher, and the hi gher is the atman of the lower. Matter
is not the atman of anything ; and the ultimate atman is not the
body of anything.,,8
What we must note here is that man is regarded as an inte-
gral unity of all these thing s and that the atman is what con-
stitutes that unity. Such a view excludes the polarities and
di~chotomies that abound in the Western attempts to understand
the nature of man. We do not find here the Carthesian division
between subject and object and between matter and spirit. There
is here a holistic approach which has become a significant part
of modern speculations on the nature of human personality. If
man's self (atman) is the microcosmos, the Brahman or the para-
matman is the macrocosomos. The holistic structure of the reality
within and outside man may be represented as thus:
s'rATES MICROCOSMOS MACROCOSMOS
Waking conciousness Visva Virat
Dream Taujasa Hiranyagrbha
Sleep Prajna Isvara
Pure state Atman Brhaman
Of this structure Professor Raju says, "In every state
the microcosmos is . • • connected with the macrocosmos.
"Hiranyagrbha" is the vital principle that binds all parts of
 /1 .

the universe and th e " 'l'a ij a s a s " are conne cted to gether through
it. 'I s vara" is the s elf conscious entity that, like mind,
controls the universe. The Brahma n is the self effluent Spirit
than comprehends the whole. In their dream state , all men are
bound to gether by the thread of the bio-psychic principle "Hi-
ranya f, arbha" . In the deep unconsciousness of their sleep , they
are the objects of "Isvara" , who is eternally and without inter-
mission conscious. . . In the fourth state , the microcosm and
the macrocosm are one . . • "9 This hierarchy of relationship
is also shown in a different way . Thus the mind ("manas") is
re ga rd ed as being "higher than the senses , reason ("buddhi")
higher than the mind, cosmic reason hi gher than reason, the un-
manifest e~vakta") is higher than cosmic reason and "Purusha"
(,'Atman" ) is hi gher than the unmanifest.,,10
Another famous illustration of the nature of man is to
be found in the metaphor of the chariot in the Katha Upanishad:
"The self (atman) is the owner of the chariot; the body (sarira)
is the chariot; intuitive discernment and awareness (buddhi) is
the charioteer; the thinking f unction (mana s ) is the bridle; the
~ense forces (indriya) a r e the horses; and the objects or spheres
of sense perception (visaya) are rang ing - groung (gocarna ) • •
The individual in whom the self , the sense forces , and the mind
are joined is called eater or enjoyer (bhoktav)."l1
An equally well - known illustlration is the metaphor of
the two birds on one tree: "rrwo birds of beaut i ful plumage ,
close friends and companions, reside in the intimate fellowship
on the self same tree . One of them eats the sweet fruits of
 12..

the tree; the other without eating watches.,,12 Here the tree
is the tree of life or of human personality and the two birds
are man ' s empirical self and his true self - the one eating the
fruit and the other looking on. The metaphor is interpreted
thus: The individual life - monad (purusa), being deluded,
laments, depressed by a feetin g of helplessness (anisaya): but
when he beholds on the same tree that other, the Lord in whom
the pious take deli ght (justam isam), and comprehends its great-
ness, then the grief is gone. 1 J This metaphor is an illustra-
tion of the unity of being and Being , of self and Self, of man
and God asserted by Chando gya Upanishad in the sentencel "Tat-
tvam asi" or "That art thou."
An important element in the Upanishadic concept of the
self is the eg o which is called "ahamkara". The e go is noil;:
static; it is dynamic. It includes the impersonal "I" and
"mine". It is the empirical self, not the true Self or Atman.
The activity of the e go is suspended in deep sleep. The ego is
active only in waking states. The psychic force of man resides
not in the e go , but in his true Self. Hence the Brhadaranyna
Upanishad tells man to look within for his true Self.
The d istinction between the ego ("ahamkara") and the
true Self (Atman) is of' great si gnificance. When the Upanishads
say that the highest goal of man is to realize his true se lf,
they are not proclaiming a doctrine of se lf-indul gence. To
realize the self one has to re gulate the ego. Also, there must
be ethical actions - action according to the law of "dharma"."
In Indian thought there is an extraordinary direct correlation
 - .-0 -

between human ethics and cosmic order.

The Upanishadic concept of human nature ' shaped the philo-
of .. .
sop h y:'\ educatlon ln anclent India. If the true Self within (At-
man) is identical with the Brahman, then it follows that all
human striving must aim at realizing that Self. For this reason
in ancient India, the purpose of education was self realization
through self knowled ge. This stress on self realization is
clearly anticipatory of the emphasis on self actualization in
modern educational psycholo gy. In ancient Indian thought, the
whole of life was re garded as a training for self realization.
There is, as we shall see, a difference between self realization,
as understood in Indian thought, and the self actualization
theory of present day humanistic psycholo gy.
 fif ,

1 V. TH E CO NCEY[' OF THE SE LF
I N JAINISM AND BUDDHISM

Both Jainism and Buddhism , as is well known , derived

much from Vedic thought . While rejec~in g the Upanishadic
not i on of a Supreme God (Brahman) , they still substantially
adopted the Hindu view of the world . In a way they are off-
shoots of Hinduism , and their chief difference from Hinduism ,
apart from thei r non- theism , is to be found in their greater
empha s i s on inwardness .
Jain metaphysics makes a distinction between spirit
( " j i va") and matter (" aj iva" ) . "Aj iva" is the various kinds
such as time , space , atoms , etc . ~lan is a "jiva" bound to
'ajiva" by the bonds of "karma" or action . '1'0 escape from

the bondag e , the jiva must purify i t s elf by rejecting " karma ".
Thus Jain ethics , in the extreme f orm , points toward inac tion .
T he Buddhist conception of man is more complex . Whi l e
the Upa nishad s re gard man as the ultimate reality , Buddh i sm
regards " nirvana " a s th8 supreme principle . dhi l e the Upani -
shads speak of matter as der i ving from spir i t and movin g toward
spi r it , Buddhi s m i gnores cate gories and conc entr ates on how to
re l iev e man f rom his misery . All the same Buddhists have evolved
a hi gh l y complex notion of the nature of man .
Buddhi s ts re gard man a s essent i ally "nirvana" according
to a l l schoo l s of Buddhism . But ex i stentially man is re garded
 - -' .
JS-.

as a " pud gala", a psycho-physical being made up of five aggre-

ga tes or " skandhas". 'r hese five skandhas are: "rupaskandha"
or the a ggre gate of matter, "vedaskandha" or the aggregate of
feelin gs and sensations, "samjnaskandha" or the aggregate of
ideas, "samskara s kandha" or a ggre gate of instincts and "vijna-
naskandha" or the a ggregate of consciousness. 14
Like the Upanishads, both Jainism and Buddhism stress
the realization of the supreme principle within man, although
they differ as to what constitutes the supreme principle. Both
Jainism and Buddhism have drawn criticism on grounds of their
excessive stress on self-control and their ignoring of the im-
portance of action. It has been said that they "overstressed
life above action; and their doctrine gave rise to the idea that
action is detrimental to salvation. ,,15 'rhis criticism, however,
is true only of Hinayana Buddhism. Mahayana Buddhism has a
strong ethical bias made manifest in the Boddhisattva ideal
which involves postponing one's salvation (nirvana) in order to
remain in the world of suffering so as to bring salvation to
others .
We have seen that the Vedic concept of man shaped Vedic
education. In like manner, the Jain and Buddhist views on the
nature of man shaped the educational theory and practice of
Jainism and Buddhism. Characteri s tically both Jain and Buddhist
education had an almost exclusive monastic orientation. But
their educational ideal - that of helping the individual to
realize the hi ghest within himself - is consistent with their
concept of man.
 /0 .

V. THE CONCEPT OF SELF IN THE EPICS

In the Ramayana and Mahabharata we have a more realistic

survey of man in action than in the Vedas and the Upanishads.
However, except in Bagavat Gita (which, as we have seen, is a
part of Mahabharata ), we do not have in epics anything like the
persistent wrestling with the problem of self that we find in
the Upanishads.
The concept of the self in the Bhagavat Gita is identi-
cal with that of the Upanishads. In the Bhagavat Gita, the pro-
blem of the self is powerfully dramatized. Arjuna's confronta-
tion with the non-self is here presented as a personal dilemna
with a heavy ethical import. He is torn between duty (dharma)
which enjoins fightin g the ri ghteous war, and the breakdown of
the will caused by his compa~sionate regard for those he is en-
joined to kill - among them his own relatives, teachers ( gurus),
and friends. Here there is a tremendous conflict of values.
The conflict is hei ghtened when Krishna tells Arjuna:
"play, but as one layeth
His worn-out robes away
And taking new ones, sayeth ,
"These will I wear todayl"
So putteth by the spirit
Li ~ htly its garb of flesh
And passeth to inheri~
A residence afresh."
If mans body and his temporal self are but the garb
which the spirit wears and puts away, then what is man? The
 ~ I •

'7·
question that Arjuna faces is: "Who am 17" 'l'he answer he re-
ceives from Krishna is that his true self is not the body or
the temporal self any mor e than the true selves of his enemies
are in their bodies or in their temporal selves. Arjuna's true
self is nothin~ other than the Atman residing within him. The
identity between this Atman and the Lord Krishna is revealed
to Arjuna in the cosmic vision of himself that Krishna grants
to Arjuna. Only then is Arjuna ready to understand and accept
Krishna's exhortation:
"Abandoning attachment to the fruits of action,
Constantly content, independent,
Even when he sets out upon action,
He yet does (in effect) nothing whatsoever.
No action is found (binding ) upon
Him who would deli g ht in the self alone,
Who would find contentment
And satisfaction only in the self.,,17
It must be noted that the "self" here means not the e go,
but the Atman - the undying and enduring self, the microcosmic-
counterpart within man of the macrocosmic Brahman.
 " !~ ,

V1. THE CONCEPr OF THE SELF IN THE SIX

SYST~NlS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The main systems of Indian philosophy are: Samkhya ,

Yo ga, Nyaya , Vaisesika, Purvamimasa , and Vedanta. These sys-
tems did not evolve one after another; they developed concur-
rently throug h mutual criticism and interaction. Except from
Samkhya , they accept the basic assumptions of the Vedas and
Upanishads, but there are individual differences among them.

- 1. Samkhya
Saml\hya phi.losophy holds a hig hly complex view of the
nature of man as a spiritual and psycho-physical entity. It
re gards the eg o as the center of both man and the universe.
"' As center is to the circumference," interprets Raju, "so man
is to the correlate of the external world. ,,18 -The ego emanates
from reason, which itself emanates from Prakrti or Primeval
Matter . According to Samkhya, the inner world of man ("antah-
karana") consist s of three parts: mind (mans), ego (ahamkara),
and reason (buddhi). Reason or buddhi whose funotion is t o
analYze and to determine, has two aspects - "the satvika" or
pure aspect and the "tamasika" or the letharg ic aspect. "Dharma"
(merit) ,"Jnana " (knowled p;e ), " Vairap;ya" (detachment), and "Ais-
varya" (Godliness) derive from the "Satvika" aspect, whereas
from the "tamasika" aspect derive qualities antithetical to
these.
 rr.
In one respect Samkhya differs si gnificantly from the
Upanishads. For the Upanishads, the vital principle is different
from the mind, but for Samkhya, the vital principle is the com-
mon function of the three forms of the inner instrument or "an-
tahkarana" • Each of the three has its own fun ction; but together
they perform the function of biolo g ical activity.,,19
The Samkhya analysis of the psyche conceives of man as
being at once "active" ("kartad and "receptive" ("bhoktar").
He is " active" through the five "organs of action" and "recep-
tive " through the five "organs of perception". The ego ("aham-
jara" ), as we have noted, is central to the psyche. But the ego
is the "prime motivating force of delusion" ("abhimana"). "A-
hamkara" is the misconception, conceit, supposition or belief
that refers all objects and acts of consciousness to an "I"
(" aham"). "Ahamkara" • . . comprises all psychic process, pro-
ducing the misleading notion "I am hearing ; I am seeing ; I am
rich and mi g hty • • • " It is the prime cause of the critical
"wrong perception" that dogs all phenomenal experience • . .'" 20
In this view of the ego, Samkhya comes very close to the Upani-
shads, but in contrast to the monism of the Upanishads. Samkhya
holds a dualistic view of reality. Sa~khya makes a categorical
distinction between "prakriti" (primeval matter) and "purusha"
(the collectivity of irradiant but inactive life-monads) •. Sam-
khya re gards the duality as axiomatic. "From this duality it
proceeds to develop an "analytical enumeration" ("parisamkhy-
ana") of the principles or cate gories" ("tattva"l "thatness")

of nature as there have been developed "in the unceasing develop-

ments and combinations of inert matter under the uninterrupted
in'fluence of the brilliance radiating from the life-monads
and producing consciousness.,,21
In Samkhya there is neither a personal God nor an imper-
sonal one, neither monotheism nor monism. It conceives of the
universe in terms of evolution. Hence Richard Garbe rightly
says that in Samkhya, "For the first time in the history of the
world, the complete independence of the human mind, its confi-
dence in its own powers were exhibited."22 What is particular-
ly striking in the philosophy of Samkhya is its concept of evo-
lution. I t re gards "prakrti" (primeval matter) as the basis
of objective existence, physical and psychical. "Prakriti" is
the source of the word of becoming . In it all determinate
potentiality i s contained. It is not a being , but a force, a
state of tens ion of three constituant s or " p;unas" - "sattva",
"ra.jas·', and "tamas". All these are products of "prakrti"
consisting of the three " gunas" in differe.nt proportions. '1'he
varied interaction of " gunas" accoun t s for the variety of the
world. When these three "Gunas" are held in equipose, there
is no action. When there is a disturbance of equilibrium, evo-
lution be Gins. The evolution of the unconscious "prakrti" can
take place only through the presence of the conscious "purusha".
The presence of "purusha" excites the activity of "prakrti" and
this upsettin,n; of the equilibrium of the " rr,unas" in "prakrti",
positively starts the evolutionary process. The development, .of
the process of evolution follows a law of succession. "Mahat"
(literally, "the great") is the first product of the evolution
of "prakrti". It is the basis of "buddhi" (intelli gence).
"Mahat " bring s out the cosmic aspects of "buddhi" which is not
the " purusha" itself, but the subtle substance of all mental
processes. Creation is the unfolding of differ ent affects from
the ori g inal "prakrti" and destruction is the dissolution of
them into the ori g inal "prakrti". 'rhe Samkhya notion of evo-
lution justifies Mon ier William's remark that, "the Hindus were
Darwinians many centuries before Darwin and evolutionists

many centuries before the doctrine of evolution was accepted

by the scientists of the present a ge."2J

2. Yo ga
Between Samkhya and Yo ga there is a close connection.
In fact they are re garded as two aspects of the same discipline.
Samkhya provides a theoretical exposition of human nature and
a theoretical way of "liberation" ("moksha"), while Yo ga deals
with the techniques of liberation.
According to Patanjali there are five mental states -
"pramana" (true co gnition), "viparyaya" (error), "'vikalpa"
(objectless ideation), "nidra" (co gnition in dreamless sleep),
and "smrti" (recollection). "Pramana" is of three kinds: per-
ception, inference, and verbal testimony. Internal perception
is the intuitive apprehension of truth, whereas external per-
ception occurs when the senses come into contact with external
objects.
Yo ga, as a spiritual discipline, may be defined as the
suppression of the five-fold mental activity described above.
The freedom and the inte grity of the self are curtailed by the
fluctuations of the mind which is subject to the influence of
~he sense data. The self, when subject to the ' chang ing condi-
tions of the mi~d, is in a state of "avidya" (i gnorance), and
under such i gnorance, it suffers from a total distortion of
values, mistaking the ephemeral for the eternal, the corrupt
for the pure, etc. To escape from such ignorance and its con-
sequences, the following antidotes are suggested. These are
known as "parikarmanas" which include "maitri" (friendship),
"karuna" (compassion), "upeksa" (tolerance). Also recommended
are "ahimsa" (non-injury), "satya" (truth), "asteya" (non-
stealing ), "brahmacharya" (sexual continence), and "aparihara"
(non-appropriation). These observances are expected to lead
to ., samadhi" or qui es cence of mind. "Samadhi" can be of two
kinds - "samprajnata" in which the self attains only a partial
liberation from the mind, and "asamprajnata" in· which the self
achieves complete freedom and re gains its orig inal nature as
pure spirit.
From what has been said above . it should be clear that
Yo ga is a form of metaphysics. The aim of the yo g i is to dis-
cover his trans cendental se lf. To f 'i'nd this hi gher self, the
yo g i not only follows the modes of spititual discipline men-
tioned above; he also adopts a system of physical exercises
that promote concentration and the attainment of "samadhi".
These bodily exe rci ses are called "asanas" or postures, and
they must be considered as aids to yo g ic attainment rather
than a s ends in themselves.
The psycholo gy of yo ga has won hi gher praise from some
 ,-- -' .

of the great est psycholo~ists of our times, including C. G.

Jung . However, any praise g iven to yoga psychology also belongs
to Samkhya since they are inter-related. As a well known Indo-
lo g ist says, "The supreme contribution by Samkhya and Yo ga to
Hindu ph ilosophy lies in their strictly psychological interpre-
tat ion of existence • .. Here the primitive mythical image
of the rise of a universe out of the cosmic waters and cosmic
e gg is re-interpreted and re-vivified in terms of stages of
human consciousness, as these can be observed in the subjective
experiences of yo ga . From the primal state of self-absorption
or involution, which amounts theo~tically to quiescerice and
resemble non-being , a state of intuitive inner awareness ("bud-
dhi") is involved; this is antecedent to the notion of "1"
( ,. ahamkara"), which is the followin g transformation; and through
intellect ("manas"), consciousness then proceeds to an experience
of (and t o action upon) the outer world through exterior senses.
The cosmo gen ic process thus is read in terms of psycholo gical
experience, as the unfolding of a perceived environment from
an innermo st , a ll- perceiving center. The naive myth becomes
immediately s i gnificantly structuralized; the world is under-
stood as unfoldin~ from a quiescent state of inward self-absorp-
tion; and the intros pe c t ion therewith becomes the key of the
riddle of the sphi~x." 2L~

J. ~" urvB' Mimamsa

r he aim of " Purva iVi imamsa" is to expound the nature of
"dharma" or duty. Such an aim cannot, of course be achieved
without examining the nature of man and the human self.
 " Mimamsa" re ~ ards the self as distinct from the body
and the senses, The body is considered as a means to an end;
it serves the soul which directs it. Co gnition is an attribute
of the s oul, not of the body. The energy of the soul causes
the movem~nt of the body.
'rhe "Mimamsa" philosophers expound the theory of the
plurality of selves in order to account for the multiplicity
of experiences. 'l 'he process of ; , co gnition involves "smrti"
(recollection) and "purvabhava" (previous recollection). Re-
membrance of a pas t co gnition is proof of the existence of a
present self which is t he s ub s trate ("asraya") of the past
perception and the present rec ollection. So Radhakr~hnan

says that according to Mimamsa, " the permanent self or per-

sonal identity is no t , the object of reco gnition, but the sub-
strate thereof. " 25 According to tw.o f'liimamsa thinkers, the
self is at once the cog nizer and the co gnized. They do not,
however, have a fully developed concept of self; they are
seen as, "struGgling towards a more adequate conception of
self which they are unable to reach on account of their prac-
tical intere sts . " 26

4. Nyaya and Vaisesika

For both Nyaya and Vai s esika, the vital principle
(,'prana") i s a n i mperc ept ibl e entity called "Jiva-yon i-yatna"
whi c h f unction s both i n s l eep and in wakefulness. Regarding
the inne r in strume nt ("anta hk a rana"), Nyaya and Vaisesika
take a simpler view than either Samkhya or Yo ga. For both
Nyaya and Vaisesika, the "antahakarana" is simply mind
(" manas" ) . ;r hese two systems do not concern themselves with
drawing a distinction between eg o and reason, and between one
aspect of reason and another. Like Samkhya, they reject
absolute moni s m of the Upanishad s ; but Vaisesika is definitely
pluralistic, while Nyaya takes a position between dualism and
monism.

5. Vedanta
"Vedanta" means the end of "Vedas" or the teaching
contained in the "Upanishads". 'l'he great interpretation of
the Upanishads is to be found . in the "Vedanta Sutra" of Bad-
rayana. According to "Vedanta Sutra", the "Purusha" and
"Prakriti" of Samkya are not separate entities, but different
forms of a single re a lity. Thus Badrayana asserts a monistic
world a gainst Samkya's dualism. According to him the Brah-
man (or "puru s ha") develops itself into the universe and yet
remains tran scende nt.

a) Sankara: Advaita or Absolute Monism

The mo st important advocate of Vedanta philosophy is
Sankara (6th century A.D.). Sankara's philosophy is known
as "Advaita Vedanta". He accepted the Upanishadic views of
man, on the whole, and he criticized "the 10,Ose and hasty spe-
culation s of Samkya thinkers, a s well as the empirical ten-
dencies of the Nyaya - Vaisesika. He broke away from (their)
common sense me t hod and s ubstituted for it a lo gical criticism
quite as stable and penetrating as that of the Buddhist
thinkers.,,27
 According to Samkara, the self cannot be known by
means of thoug ht. We know that the self is, but we do not
know what it is. The self is not to be identified with the
sense because, if senses constituted the self, then the sense
perceptions should be identical simultaneous. Also in dream-
less sleep, we have direct experience of the absence of know-
ledg e and disquiet. Samkarra holds that the "Atman" or the
true self can be realized only when it is freed from all that
surrounds it. Man as ",jivatma" is identical with the "para-
matma". This is the meaning of his doctrine: "Tat tuam asi"
(Thou art that) which he takes from the Upanishads. Of the
si r:;nificance of this doci:trine Radhakrishnan says, "The crux
of all philosophy is this, that the sense organs and the neu-
ral processes of the body, which is in space and time, seem
to produce consciousness. Surely, the non-conscious cannot
be the cause of the conscious. If anything , the conscious
must be the cause of the non-conscious • • • but the conscious-
ness which is the cause of the non-conscious, is the finite
consciousness but the ultimate one. ' . . of which the finite
is only a fra gment. The fundamental consciousness, which is
the basis of all reality, is not to be confused with the human
consciousness, which appears rather late in the cosmic evolu-
tion." 28
Samkara re gards "Atman" as at once universal and infi-
nite~ it is th e ultimate Reality. He attributes to the
"Atman" t ru t h, s el f -d e pe nd e nc e and omnipresence. It is also
possessed of absolute bliss or "ananda". 'l'he" Atman" cannot
be lo g ically apprehended. Radhakrishnan indicates how Samkara's
 c. ( •

;;7 ,

concept of self differs from that of some Western philo so-

s
phers: "It i s urg ed a gainst D~partes that he tried to ab-
stract the self totally from the not-self and established the
reality of the former independently of its own ri ght. We must
be clear that Samkara's self is not the individual knowing
sub,iect . The "A tman ' ·of Samkara is n either the indi vi-
dual self nor a collection of such .selves ... Samkara's
self is different from the transcendental ego of Kant, which
is purely a form which attaches to all objects of experience.
Though it is said to transcend empirical consciousness, it is
still individualized, since it becomes the practical will. ·
Kant's account of its difference from the empirical e go, which
is a product of conditions, applies to Samkara's "Atman".
OnlySamkara would say that the ever - present li ght of conscious-
ness is the same thing , perfect and not in the process of growth.
Fichte's absolute ego is not different from the empirical self,
since the activity by which it becomes actually what it is po-
tentially is determined by the non-e go . It is because Samkara
finds the essence of personality in its ~istinction from other
existences that he contends that the "Atman", which has no
other existences independent of it, not a person • • • we live
because we share the uni~ersal thought . Our experience is
possible because of the univer sa l Atman in us.,,29
Accordin ~ to Samkara , the individual's finite conscious-
ness is limited to a certain kind and order of experience.
'r h is i s because the finite consciousness is subject to "avidya"
or i gnoranc e . Thinkin g and reasoning belong to the level of
 G U.

the finite, while ultimate reality transcends thought. This

leads to Samkara's concept of inte gral experience which is
obtained through what he calls "anubhava" which is intuitional
consciousne s s. The difference between Samkara and other phi-
losophers on the question of "intuition" is explained by Had -
hakrishnan: "Kant spoke of an intellectual intuition to indi-
cate the mode of consciousness by which a knowledg e of things
in themselves mi ght be obtained in a non-logical way. Accord-
ing to Fichte, intellectual intuition enables us to get at
self-consciousness, which is the basis of all knowledge in his
philosophy. Schilling employs the s ame term to denote the
consciousness of the absolute, the identity between the subject
and the object. But according to Samkara , the object of in-
tuition is not the many thing s-in-themselves of Kant, or the
self of Fichte or the neutruum of Schill in . , but the "Atman"
or the universal consciousness. As for Plotinus, so for Sam-
kara, the absolute is not presented as an object, but in an
immediate contact which is above knowledge."JO What Radha-
krishan&lis trying to stress here is that, for Samkara, the
absolute is apprehended intuitively, that it is simultaneously
the hi ~hest principle within man and in the outer universe.
Samkara's philosophy has been compared with the thought
of others besides Kant. , D;c
'1
artes, Fichte, and Schilling .
Thu s he has been compared to the Briti s h philosopher F. H.
Bradley who se thought resembles Samkara's in many respects.
In his Appearance and Re ality, Bradley tries to show, as did
Samkara, that thought can never fully comprehend reality. Such
a view is held also by C. G. Jung . As L. T. Bischof points
out, "Jung felt that intuition is as important to man's mental
life as in any of the other three functions. Only by _ intuition
is man able to solve some of his problems."J1 Thus Samkara's
stress on the limitation of intellect or reason finds support
in the thought of one of the greatest modern psychologists.
Samkara's thought is also similar to that of Bergson,
although there are differences between the two. As Radhakrish-
nan says: "Sometimes Samkara's theory is compared to that of
M. Ber gson, which argues that there has been a growth of con-
sciousness in man. The u pward ascent from the amoeba has been
a long one. Many kinds of awareness or consciousnes s impli-
cit in those beings have been suppressed in the development
of man. We have paid an enormous price for being what we are.
While our lo g ical minds are useful for practical purposes, it
is unreasonable to suppose the whole of us is exhausted by what
we are now. Even in this world we come across men of genius
or insight, in whom the slumbering powers are stirred to life.
Samkara would not a gree with Be r g son's view that the intellect
breaks up the flow of life, that the unending dynamic process
is reduced by int e llect of a static or geometrical presentation.
Intellect does not dissect reality, but attempts to reconsti-
t ute i t . It is both analytic and synthetic in its functions .
. . . If Samkara re ga rds intellect as not the hi ghest mode of
man' s consciousness , it is because the completed world of in-
tellect still leaves him with a riddle. Samkara does not
condemn the intellect on the ground that it employs analysis
 3 6,

and abstraction. He accepts its concreteness and yet finds

it to be unsatisfactory.,,3 2 Despite these differences both
Samkara and B er ~ son a gree in reco gnizing the limitations of
intellect as a form of consciousness and as an organ of co g-
nition.
An interesting aspect of Samkara's philosophy is that
it is totally experim e ntal . It is not other-worldly despite
its emphasis on intuition. Like Kant , he attempted "to solve
the question of the conditions of knowled ge by the critical
rather that the empirical method . Samkara avoided the error
of Kant, who sought not so much the lo gical implications of
experience as a priOri condition of experience, and thus
asserted the reality of an ~ xtra-empirical world of things in
themselves. Samkara"s object was to discover the immanent
•
principle within experiences , and not a world beyond it.,,33
This immanent principle within experience is, for Samkara,
the omnipresent "Atman" of the Upanishads.
Samkara's philosophy , unlike Samkhya, is non-dualistic.
Samkara is the gr eatest spokesman of the absolute monism of
the Upanishads. For him, the individual soul is not a sepa-
rate entity, but the absolute itself, thou gh limited in some
way. Samkara likened the individual soul ("jivatma") to the
space in a jar and the Absolute Being ("Param atma ") to
univer s al space. Fre edom ~"mukti") consists in realizing the
oneness of the individual with the Absolute.
The empirical wor l d , according to Samkara , is a mere
reflection or shadow of the Absolute Being . This shadow
appears real to us because of our limited capacity to perceive
 ..J L •

reality. This limitation Samkara calls "maya" or illusion.

This is not to say that the empirical world is non-existent.
What is meant is that it is not the ultimate reality. The
failure to see that the phenomenal world is not the ultimate
reality is due to "avidya" (i gnorance), and this i gnorance is
born of the confusion of the transcendental subject ("Atman")
with empirical existence ("anatman"). In Samkara, the "Atman"
is the same as B rahman~ As a learned interpreter puts it,
"Brahman according to Samkara is the identity of pure intel-
ligence, pure being , pure blessedness. Brahman is the 8131 f
of us all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life we
are identifying the self with thousands of illusionary things
with all that we call "I" or "mine", but in dreamless sleep we
are absolutely without any touch of these phenomenal notions;
the nature of our true state as pure blessedness is partially
realized. The individual s elf a s it appears is but an appear-
ance only, while the real truth is the true self which is one
for all, as pure intellig ence, pure blessedness and pure being."34
'rhus the main idea in Samkara 's" advai t a" (monistic) philoso-
phy is that the ultimate and absolute truth is the Self which
is one, though appearing as many in different individuals.
The world as part of the different individuals has no reality,
has no other truth, to s how tha n this self . All other events,
mental or phys ical, a r e all passing ap peara nc e while the only
absolute and unchang eab le truth underlying them all is the
self .
Samkara wa s lo ~ ical l y drawn to this conclusion because
 jc. .

he could net ':;hin1;: ()f a " being " which if:; oth er than a Self- Exis -
tent_Being . It was Thomas Aquinas who solved ~his problem by
po i nting out two cate g ories of being in the realm of existence ,
the Self- Existent-Being and the contin ~ ent being (Ens a se and
ens ab alio) .

b) Ramanuja : Qualified Dualism

Ramanuja conc e rns himself with the relation of the
individual self to God unlik e Samkara ; he re gard s the indivi -
dual souls as havinz separate id entities . He also react s
a gainst the intellectualism of Samkara's ethics . While Sam-
kara is pan-theistic , Ramanuj a is theistic. But like Samkara
he believes that thought cannot comprehend the whole reality .
Like Samkara , he attributes to i ntuition ("saksatkara") the
capacity to grasp ultimate reality . A ~ain like Samkara , he
believe s that human knowled ge does no t embrace the whole of
reality . But there are major differences between the two as
shown by Radhakrishnan : "Samkara believes that the distinc -
tion between s ubject and object is a relative one , since the
real is the undiffer entiated one . Ramanuja disputes th i s view ,
and holds that the nature of consciousness testifies to the
existence of a permanent thi nk ing subject , as well as objects
distinct from the self~ . J5 In Ramanuja as well as in Samkara
the theory of knowled g e mer ~ es with the th e ory of being , but
this mer t~e r do es not mean that " knowing" is identical with the
whole of being . Knowled g e is self- luminou s , but is only a
function of the self .
Unlike Samkara who believes in an imper sonal God
 )).

( ' Atman') Ramanuja believes in a persona l God. Radhakrishnan

says , ' While Ramanuja is clear that there exists an absolute
self, he is equ ally clear that every finite reality is an
expression of the se lf. To make reciprocal interaction among
a p lurali ty of exist ents possible, the cons tituent elements
of the worl d - who l e must have a common bond of uni ty and
interd epe ndenc e , which must be a sp iri tual principle. Not only
lo g ic , but r e lig ious expe ri ence demands a conse rva tion of the
fini te and an adm i ss i on of the infini te as a personal being .
The sense of pe r sona l communion with God involves fellowship
wi th an "other " , d ivine personality . " 36
Individual man is an imperfec t pe rsonality, while God
i s the perfect personali ty . Fo r Ramanuja, the pluralistic
world of phenomena i s as real as God i s re a l, although the
phenomenal world depends on God for its existence .
Ra manuj a ' s emphas i s on a personal God becomes more clear
in the way he repudiates Samkara's inter pretation of the Upan-
shadic text '''r at tuam asi" as meaning that the individual soul
and the divine are one and the same. According to Ramanuja
the text refer s to the complex nature of the ultimate Reality
wi thout declaring a total identity, between it and the finite
r ea liti es . He also a grees that, "If there were not a difference
between the two, we c ould not say that the one is the other. " 37
Ra manuj a takes pa in s to assert t hat human persons are
separate , auton omou s entities, though they are modes of the
Supreme Be ine . For him, the J ivatmaor the individual per s on
i s not one with the Br a hman fro m whom he differs in essential
charac ter •
•
 Ramanuja goes into the problem of human freedom. On

the one hand, he reco gni7,es man's dependence on God for all
his activities but, on the other hand, he holds that the suf-
fering s of life are not due to God, but due to man's power to
choose between good and evil. He views God's absoluteness as
being limited by man 's erring will, but God, according to him,
has his ways of bring ing man back to ri ghteousness, when he
violates the law.
Thus Ramanuja's philosophy differs considerably from
that of Samkara, especially in re gard to the concept of the
self. As a gainst Samkara's absolute monism we have in Ramanuja
a qualified dualism which combines a monotheistic outlook with
the principle of immentism.

c) Madhava: Unqualified Dualism

In Madhava, another Vedantic thinker, we have a more
radical reaction a gainst .Samkara's absolute monism. In him
we find an unqualified dualism, which includes a five-fold
duality - between God and the individual; between God and the
material world; between soul and matter; between one soul and
another; and between one part of matter and another.
According to Madhava, there are three different entities
existin ~ from all eternity - God, soul, and world. The last
two are subordinate to Go d. Brahman ( God) is the only ind.8.pnn-
dent (svatantra) reality. While thus reco gnizing God as Supreme
Madhava reject s the "Advaita" theory that the world of indivi-
dual souls and of nature i s but an illusion or an emanation
from God . Fo r him, every human being is an organism different
 JJ '

· 3 ~·

from every other org ani s m and from God.

Like Ha manuja, Madhava rejects Samkara;s interpretation

of the text, "Tat tuam asi". But he ~ oes further than Ramanuja

in g ivin~ a dualistic interpretation. He not only denies that

thj~passag e declares an identity between God and the soul; he

even claims that the passag e means, "That thou art not" ("Sa

atma atat tuam asi " ). It is in so interpreting the Upanishadic

text that Madhava proclaims a du a lism that is more uncompromising

than Ramanuja's.
 d}:d-'

Vi1. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS BETWEEN

INDIAN AND WESTERN CONCEPTS
OF 'rHi: SELF

The six sys tem s of Indian philosophy we have discussed

above are, according t o Joseph Campbell, "l' he six aspects of a
single orthodox tradition. Thoug h apparently and even overtly
contradictory, they are understoood to be complimentary projec-
tions of one truth on various planes of consciousness, valid
intuitions from different points of view - like the expe riences
of seven blind men feeling the elephant in the popular Buddhist
fable. ' 38 What is basic to the orthod~xy that runs through the
six systems is a n over -ri ding concern with the nature of the
self. This concern with the self , as we have seen, is central
not only to the six systems, but to the Bhagavad Gita and the
Upanishads as well .
As noted at the be g innin g of this paper , this almost
exclusive concern with the nature of self is what distinguishes
Indian philosophy from other philosophies. Greek philosophy
despite He raclitus, Pytha ~ oras, Socrates , and Plato, was gene-
rally outward-looking , while Indian philosophy has been essen-
tially inward-looking , In Greek philosophy, the essence of
man is reason; in Indian philosophy , the essence of man is be-
yond reason; it is the "Atman", While Greek philosophy and
Western philosophy in general s how a stron g concern for'human
society, in Indian philosophy man's relation to God ("Atman")
 J( •

.3} .

is more important than his relation to man . For this reason,

Indian philosophy bids man ' s rise above social virtues in search
of the eternal and infinite. According to Raju , "Indian phi lo-
sophy presents a more complicated picture of the relation of
man to God t han do other philosophies . From the time of the
Upanishads this relati on is its main problem • In this
respect it is like Jewish thought. But Jewish thought is al-
most exclusively concerned with the ethical relationship bet-
ween God and man. In Indian thought, this ethical relation-
s hip is transcended and transmitted into that of blissful
communion. 39
'!

-
Indian philosophy has sometimes been criticized by
western critic s on the ground that it belittles individual
man by emphasizing the univer s al "At man". But these critics
" seem to for get that the grea test of Greek philosophers - So -
crates, Plato , Aristotle , - universalized man by lifting him
to the leve l of reason and made him one with cosmic reason,
and only then d id they a ccept the Protogorian principle that
man is the mea s ure of all things.,,40
I t has also been said that the Indian concept of man
is based on a philosophy of ne gativism and inaction. There
is an element of truth in thi s criticism, but such criticism
ignores the fact that there i s no le ss emphasis in Indian
philoso phy on "' lG:Jrmayo ,,;a " or way of action than there is on
'";jnanayo;;a" or the way of knowled ge and the "bhaktimarga" or
the way of devotion .
 Vlll . W}~ Tt HE WEST CA N LEAR N
FHmJj INDIA

The ~re a t es t merit of Indian t houGht lies , as we have

seen , in i ts un iqu e concept of the se lf . And it is in its
concern with th e se lf that nacient Indian thou ght anticipates
the increasing preoccupation with the nature of human self in
modern western philosophy and particularly in psycholo gy .
" VIe of the Occident" wrote Heinrich :6 immer , "are about I to
arrive at a crossroads' that was reached by the thinkers of
India s ome s even hundred years before Christ." 41 'f he develop -
ment of modern ps ycholo gy with its emphasis on studying the
nature of man ' s inner world is a modern equivalent to ancient
India s effort to understand the nature of the self . The
modern theorie s of personality formulated by Freud , Jung , Mur -
ray , Adler, Moreno , Herney , Allport , Murphy , etc ., are the
result of modern man ' s attempt to understand himself . They
are truly in accord with the Upani'shadic exhortation: "Atmanam
viddhi" (know thy s elf).
The imp ortance of the Upanishadic doc l rine has been
reco gnized by se veral modern thinker s . Heinrich Zimmer says ,
' The s upreme and characteristic achievement o f the brahman
mind . . • was its discovery of the self (" Atman") as an
independent , imperishable entity , underlying the conscious
personality and bodily frame • . . The effort of Indian phi -
losophy ha s been, for millenniums, to know the adamaritic self
and make the knowled ge effective in h&man life. And this
enduring concern is what has been re sponsible for the supreme
morninB calm that pervades the terrible hi sto ries of the
oriental "world - histories no less tremendous, no l ess horri-
fyin g than our own. Through the vicissitude s of physical change
a spiritual footing is maintained in the peaceful-blissful
g round of the .oAtman", ete rnal, timeless, and imperishable
. ,,42
B elng .

Ac cording to another scholar, "A systematic detailed

development of the philosophy of inwardness i s the greatest
contri bution that Indian philosophy has made to the world
thought, however one -sid ed it became in the pro cess.,,43 Yet
another scholar re gards the Indian emphas is on self knowledge
as of very g reat importance. He says , "A vol t e face was made
into the self with the words , "Tat tuam asi". (That, thou art)
rr hese words are amone; the greatest ever spoke n by man. ,,44
The Indian outlook could be an antidote to the aliena-
tion and identity crisis common to our "age . The Indian search
for reality proceeds from the outer world to the inner, unlike
the western search for reality which proceeds from the inner
to the outer "Jar.l d . The subj e c ti vi ty or inwardness of the
Indian approach provides a link between subject and object.
Indian thou r;ht s . as one writer puts it, "did not cut the um-
blical cord b et ween s ubject and object. Unlike the west , the
East did not perm it the object to evolve into a realm arising
inde pendently in front of the sub,j ect." 45
'r he Indian mind "attracts and penetrates the non-subj ect
in manifold ways so as to divest it of as much of its otherness
as poss ible. But it reaches its cle a r es t express ion when the
subject returns to and is alone with itself.,,46 In recent
Western thought there has been a mark ed emphasis on the need
of subje ctivity as a corre ctive to the separation of s ubject
from object. The holistic elements in modern Western thought
are clearly reminiscent of the Upanishadic metaphysics of
oneness, ~lthou gh modern holi sm g enerally lacks the mystic
content of Atvaita monism.
The modern search for holisttic view of life has been
seriously limi ted by a trend towards a ri ~ idly se lf- s llfficient
humanism. On the other hand, the "humani stic " monism of the
Advaita philosophy re gards the spi ri tual as natural.
In Indian thought, " Spirit i s considered to be a$ nat-
ural as matter , li fe or mind.IIL~7 In the Indian view of life,
therefore, there is an intensively reli g ious humanism without
being supernaturalistic. For this reason, it is more profound -
ly meaningful than the r a tionalistic humanism of the West .
As Raju remarks, "Relig ion if it is healthy, must be adequate ly
humanistic; and humanism if true, must be the embodiment of
spiri tual life. ,,48 'I'here are sign s today of a profound dis-
content with a ri g idly rationalistic humanism . These si gns
are evi de nt in the increas ing interest in para-psycholo gy , yo ga,
re-incarnatio n , e t c. They re pr ese nt attempts to ~ ive a
sp iritual dimension to modern humanism.
However , thi s search for spir itual dimension is hampered
by modern humanism~s fai lur e to reconcile its object ive approach
 .Iff·

to reality with a meaningful s Ubjectivism . Since the Indian

mind looks for reality wi thin itself , it gras p's the real as
an experimental phenomenon - intimately personal and sUbjective .
"This immediacy of the Real , " says William S . Haas , "enabl~s

the East to reach at an early moment supreme answers to basic

problesm. 'l' hese answers in the depth ancl fullness of their
significance have never been ser iously questioned . • . From
the Easts standpoint , it has re a ched the astounding clarity
and by dint of its own effort what the West i s eternally search-
in g und er ever-changing forms . The Westerner , caught in his
own net , would d ec lare that where the Eastern mind stopped
the Western start ed . ,,49 An Indian thinker , on the other hand,
claims that "the interest of Indian ph il osophy begins where the
West ends , '50 This statement appears to be nearer to truth,
since Indian philosophy offers a mor e satisfactory account
of the r e lation between God and the world , or rather, of God
in the world , than does the western thou ght. In this respect
Indian thoug ht may be said to start from where Weste rn ph ilO -
sophy leave s off,5 1
Tha t this i s so has been reco gnized by some Wes tern
thinkers as well. Gordo n Allport, for instance , "be lieved
it inexc usable provinciali sm for psycholo g ist s in our culture
to ne f l ect the wisdom of the East . He exam ined briefly the
four central desires of Hindu ps ycholo gy; plea s ure , s ucces s ,
duty and liberatio n from the pleasure - s ucce ss - duty periods
of exiistence . 52 Lik e Allport, ~urphy , Carl Ro g ers, Abraham
r,laslow and others place great stress on "be ing" . 53 The em-
p hasis on ' becoming " is in tune with the idea of "becoming"

in the Indian concept of personality. This idea is implicit

in the Indian notion of the "Atman" as absolute Be ing to be

distinguished from the finite being of the individual self.

The unity of the being with the Being implied by the Upani-

shadic doctrine of the "Tat tuam asi" remains unrealized as

long as the individual being is lost in the cloud of maya

re sultin~ from avidya or i g norance . In other words, the

individual self dwells in ,the realm of potentiality. Throug h

a process of becomin ~ he i s capable of attaining self-real-

ization with the atta inment of his unity with the Supreme Self.

Howe ver, as pointed out earlier, there is a difference

between the Indian concept of self-realization and the prin-

ciple of self-actuali zation upheld by modern humanist psycho-

lo gy.rhis difference stems fro~ the basic differences bet-

ween the Indi an concept of self and the concept of self in

modern psycholo ~y . As we have already noted, the distinction

between the empirical self (" ahamkara") arid the true self

("Atman") is a fundamental princ iple in Indian psycholo g y .

The Upanishads, Jainism, Buddhism and the six systems of Indian

philosophy in sist that self-actualization - "m oksha " or "nir-

vana" . ;; is attained by controllinp; "ahamkara" or the empirical

self . On the contrary modern humanist psyc h olo gy, cut off

from Christian r heolo ~y , ha s no s atisfactory substitute for

God or the " Atman" as the ultimate g oal of t he individual self.

Therefore , for modern humanism, self - realj~ation is no more

than the fullest r e al iz ation of the finite potential itie s of

the empirical e~o or what in Indian thou ght is called "aham-
kara " . In other word s , althou ~ h both Indian arid modern humanism
insist~ on self-realization as man ' s basic g oal , self-realiza-
tion means one thing in Indian thought and quite another in
modern humanist psycho lo ~ ists .

Generally speaking , modern theories of personality place

too much emphasis on cultural and biolo g ical factors and too
little on th e inward nature of man. This statement is true des-
pite the F,reat interest in the study of conscious and of the un-
conscious ~ene rated by Freuds psycholo ~ ical discoveries . The
Freudian approach to the study of the mind - conscious and uncon -
scious - is to isolate and analyze it objectively . Such an approach
has its undo ubted 'scientific" merits, but it lacks the inte gral
quality of the Indian approach which visualizes the nature of the
function of the mind s ubjectively or r at her experimentally
without drawing rig id boundaries between the conscious and the
unconscious. The delving of the Upanishads into the realms of
dreams and of the unconscious was accomplished as the final step
of a final journey from the known to the unknown in search of
ultimate realit y and inte grity. This is where the unified
approach of I nd ian "mystic" way is a corrective to the "divided
self" of the modern western man.
No thinker of our time has appreciated this truth bet -
ter than Carl Gus tav ) Jung . "Life in India", he says , "has
not yet withdrawn from the capsule of the head."S4 In an
essay , -, What India can teach us," he observes that there never
occurred in India anythinf, like the total dis so ciation that
 ·44,

happened in the West "between the conscious l)art of the mind

. L

and the unconsc iousness." 55 Jung re g ards the· unbroken link in

India between the conscious and the unconscious as the result

of a heal thy ' p rimi ti vi ty" which India, unlike a modern 'N est ,

has been able to maintain within the framework of her hi g hly

develop ed civilization. Jung po ints to the happy conjunct ion

of the 'primitive " and the "civilize d " as somethinr, for the

'Nest to emulate. He says , " Whateve r the ultima te fat e of the

white man may be , we can at l e ast behold one example of a

civilization which has broug ht every essential trace of pr imi-

tivity with it, embracing the whole man from top to bottom."S6

Jun ~ believes the holi st ic vision of India can be a foil

to the divisive approach of the West. "Indi an thinking," he

says, "is an increase of vision and not a predatory raid into

the yet unconquered realm of nature."S7 And finally as a

tribute to what India can teach the West , Jun~ has this to

say: " If you want to learn the g reate s t lesson India can

teach you , wrap yourself in the cloak of your moral superiority,

g o to the Black Pa ~ oda of Kanarak , sit down in the shadow of

the mi ~ hty ruin that is still covered with the most amazing

collection of obscenities, read Murray 's cunning old Handbook

for India, which tells you how to be properly shocked by the

lamentable state of affairs, and you sho uld ~o into temples

in the e venin ~ , because in the lampli g ht they l ook if ~osGib le

more (" and how beautifully!) wicked; and analyze carefully and

with the utmost honesty all ybJ r re actions , feeling s, and

thoughts. It will take you quite a while, but in the end, if

 , -' ~

you have done ~ ood work, you will have learned somet hing about
yourself, and about the white man in g eneral, which you have
probably never heard fro m anyone else. I think, if 'you can
afford it, ·a trip to India i s on the whole most edifying and,
from the psycholo g ical point of view mos t advisable, although
it may p; ive you considerable he.adaches." 58 Wha t Jung means
is that despite th e tremendous advance made by the West in
science, philosophy and psycho l ogy, it can sti ll t ake a lesson
or two from Indias timeless wisdom which is that of self-
knowled q; e .

I
r
 \

FOOTNOTES

1. S . Radhak rishnan, A Source Book in Indian Ph il osophY..t.

(Prince ton Press-,-New Je r sey , 195~--P-.-16.

2. Qu'o ted in Jawahar lal Nehru, Qi§.c CL )r v of Ind i a (The

John Day Company, New York, 194 , p . 99 . 6 I

3. S . Radhakrishnan and P. T . Raju , eds ., ;rhe Conc~ of

Man, ( Nebraska : Johnson Publishing Company, 1 9boJ.
p~'2 17. -

4. ~IQ~£a ~~Qy£ka _~p~Qi§.Q~g , 4.3. 1-7.

6. Q.Qando;r,Y1~L~p~!J.isb.ad i n T.b.~ Thir:.te ~!J. __EIinc iQ.l~_Up~!J. i shads ,

tr. Robert E . Hume (Oxford University, 1921T,
pp . 240- 241, 247- 24 8 .

7. 'rh~ Concept of Mall , p . 225 .

8. Ibid., p . 226 .

9. Ibid., p . 231.

10. Ibid., pp . 231- 232 .

11. K~lha_~~!J.ish~d, 4.1.

12. Mundaka Upanishad , 3 .1. 1- 2 .

1) . Ibid.

14. Ibid., p . 26 1.

15 . Ibid., p . 263 .

16. The B ha ~ avad Gita, (Edwin Arnold ' s Translation ),

11, 22 .

17. Ib i d ., 111, 17.

19. Ibid. , p.288 .
20. Heinrich Zimme r, Philos~hi~s_o~_lrr1i~ , ed ., J oseph
Campbell , (New York : Pantheon Books , Bol l ingen
Se ries XXV i, 1 951 ), p . 319.
21. Ibid ., p . 326 .
22 . Quoted in ,Tawaharlal Nehru , The_Discovery of India, p . 78.

23 · Quoted by C. P . Ramasawamy Iyer in Chapter 8 , (" Re li Gious

Hi nduism") of 'r he Gazette of India . Vo l. 1 ( Nasik ,
India: 'rhe Government of India Press . 1965), pp .ll~6 -147.
24 . Philosophies of Indi a , p . 331 .
25 . S. Radakrishnan , IDQian Philosol?hY . Vol . 2 , (New York :
1: he Ma cmillan Company , 195IT . p . L~10 .
26. Ibid ., p . 414.
27. Ibid ., p o. L~75.

28 . Ibid ., p . L~81 .

29 . Ibid., pp . 484-485 .
30 . Ibid ., pp. 512 - 51 3 .
31. Leoford J. Bischo f , Int~J'Dreting personalit~ Theori es ,
( New York : Harper and Row , 197C5J. p . 13 •
32 . Indian.J:.h-ilQsoI?hY , Vo l. 2 , p . 523 .
33 . Ibid ., p. 521.
34 . S . N. Dasgupta , A History of Indi an Ph il osophy , (The
University Press , Cambri d~e , 1951), p . 4 38 .
35 . Indian Philosol?Q.y , ViI. 2 , p . 679 .
36 . Ibid., p . 682 .
37 . Ibid., p . 688 .
38 . Appe ndix fI , Eh-J:losophies of Indi~, p . 605 .
39 . r h~QI!~~of_02!lJ._ p . 324 .
40. Ibid ., pp . 352 - 353 .
41. PhilosQl?hies of India, p . 1.
42. Ibid ., pp. 3- 4.
I-I-J. P. rr .
Ra;ju, Introduction to ':::om129:.ra ti ve PhilOSOyh Y,
(Lincoln University of Nebraska Press, 1962 , p. 200 .
44. w. S . Haas , The Destiny of Mind, (London: Faber and
Paber , 19b6) , p . 140.
45. Ibid., p . I1J.
Lj·6. Ibid., p. 119 .
4'7. Introduction to Comparative Phi lo sophy , p . 272 .
48. Ibid., p . 260 .
49. The Destiny of Mjnd , p. 1JI-IJ2.
50. Introduction to Comparative Religion , p . 199.
51. These remarks, it must be noted, are true only of
Wes tern Philosophy , not of Western Theolo gy. 1he
Indian tradition makes no distinction between phi -
losophy and theolo gy.
52. Introduction to Personality Theories , p . 289 .
5J . See ]e coming: Basic Co nsideration for a Philosophy of
Personality , (1955).
54 . C. G. Jung , Civilization in 1ransition, Vol. 10, of
The Coilected 00rks of C. G. Jun~ , (New York: Pantheon
Books, Bo iling en Series XX , 1964), p . 518 .
55. Ibid. , p . 537.
56. Ibid. , p . 528 .
57 . Ibid. , p. 529 .
58 . Ibid. , pp . 529-5JO.
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