EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-27782. July 31, 1970.]

OCTAVIO A. KALALO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO J. LUZ,

defendant-appellant.

Amelia K. del Rosario for plaintiff-appellee.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

DECISION

ZALDIVAR, J : p

Appeal from the decision, dated February 10, 1967, of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Branch V, Quezon City) in its Civil Case No. Q-6561.

On November 17, 1959, plaintiff-appellee Octavio A. Kalalo (hereinafter referred

to as appellee), a licensed civil engineer doing business under the firm name of
O. A. Kalalo and Associates, entered into an agreement (Exhibit A) 1 with
defendant-appellant Alfredo J. Luz (hereinafter referred to as appellant), a
licensed architect, doing business under firm name of A. J. Luz and Associates,
whereby the former was to render engineering design services to the latter for
fees, as stipulated in the agreement. The services included design computation
and sketches, contract drawing and technical specifications of all engineering
phases of the project designed by O. A. Kalalo and Associates, bill of quantities
and cost estimate, and consultation and advice during construction relative to the
work. The fees agreed upon were percentages of the architect's fee, to wit:
structural engineering, 12-1/2%; electrical engineering, 2-1/2 %. The agreement
was subsequently supplemented by a "clarification to letter-proposal" which
provided, among other things, that "the schedule of engineering fees in this
agreement does not cover the following: . . . D. Foundation soil exploration,
testing and evaluation; E. Projects that are principally engineering works such as
industrial plants, . . ." and "O. A. Kalalo and Associates reserve the right to
increase fees on projects which cost less than P100,000 . . ." 2 Pursuant to said
agreement, appellee rendered engineering services to appellant in the following
projects:

(a)Fil-American Life Insurance Building at Legaspi City;

(b)Fil-American Life Insurance Building at Iloilo City;

(c)General Milling Corporation Flour Mill at Opon, Cebu;

(d)Menzi Building at Ayala Blvd., Makati, Rizal;

(e)International Rice Research Institute, Research Center, Los Baños,

Laguna;

(f)Aurelia's Building at Mabini, Ermita, Manila;

(g)Far East Bank's Office at Fil-American Life Insurance Building at

Isaac Peral, Ermita, Manila;

(h)Arthur Young's residence at Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal;

(i)L & S Building at Dewey Blvd., Manila; and

(j)Stanvac Refinery Service Building at Limay, Bataan.

On December 11, 1961, appellee sent to appellant a statement of account

(Exhibit "1"), 3 to which was attached an itemized statement of defendant-
appellant's account (Exh. "1-A"), according to which the total engineering fee
asked by appellee for services rendered amounted to P116,565.00 from which
sum was to be deducted the previous payments made in the amount of
P57,000.00, thus leaving a balance due in the amount of P59,565.00.

On May 18, 1962 appellant sent appellee a resume of fees due to the latter. Said
fees, according to appellant, amounted to P10,861.08 instead of the amount
claimed by the appellee. On June 14, 1962 appellant sent appellee a cheek for
said amount, which appellee refused to accept as full payment of the balance of
the fees due him.
On August 10, 1962, appellee filed a complaint against, appellant, containing four
causes of action. In the first cause of action, appellee alleged that for services
rendered in connection with the different projects therein mentioned there was
due him fees in sums consisting of $28,000 (U.S.) and P100,204.46, excluding
interests, of which sums only P69,323.21 had been paid, thus leaving unpaid the
$28,000.00 and the balance of P30,881.25. In the second cause of action,
appellee claimed P17,000.00 as consequential and moral damages; in the third
cause of action he claimed P55,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation; and in the fourth cause of action he claimed P25,000.00 as
actual damages, and also for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

In his answer, appellant admitted that appellee rendered engineering services, as

alleged in the first cause of action, but averred that some of appellee's services
were not in accordance with the agreement and appellee's claims were not
justified by the services actually rendered, and that the aggregate amount
actually due to appellee was only P80,336.29, of which P69,475.21 had already
been paid, thus leaving a balance of only P10,861.08. Appellant denied liability
for any damage claimed by appellee to have suffered, as alleged in the second,
third and fourth causes of action. Appellant set up affirmative and special
defenses, alleging that appellee had no cause of action, that appellee was in
estoppel because of certain acts, representations, admissions and/or silence,
which led appellant to believe certain facts to exist and to act upon said facts,
that appellee's claim regarding the Menzi project was premature because
appellant had not yet been paid for said project, and that appellee's services
were not complete or were performed in violation of the agreement and/or
otherwise unsatisfactory. Appellant also set up a counterclaim for actual and
moral damages for such amount as the court may deem fair to assess, and for
attorney's fees of P10,000.00.

Inasmuch as the pleadings showed that the appellee's right to certain fees for
services rendered was not denied, the only question being the assessment of the
proper fees and the balance due to appellee after deducting the admitted
payments made by appellant, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties,
authorized the case to be heard before a Commissioner. The Commissioner
rendered a report which, in resume, states that the amount due to appellee was
$28,000.00 (U.S.) as his fee in the International Research Institute Project which
was twenty per cent (20%) of the $140,000.00 that was paid to appellant, and
P51,539.91 for the other projects, less the sum of P69,475.46 which was already
paid by the appellant, The Commissioner also recommended the payment to
appellee of the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

At the hearing on the Report of the Commissioner, the respective counsel of the
parties manifested to the court that they had no objection to the findings of fact of
the Commissioner contained in the Report, and they agreed that the said Report
posed only two legal issues, namely: (1) whether under the facts stated in the
Report, the doctrine of estoppel would apply; and (2) whether the
recommendation in the Report that the payment of the amount due to the plaintiff
in dollars was legally permissible, and if not, at what rate of exchange it should
be paid in pesos. After the parties had submitted their respective memorandum
on said issues, the trial court rendered its decision, dated February 10, 1967, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against

the defendant, by ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of
P51,539.91 and $28,000.00, the latter to be converted into the Philippine
currency on the basis of the current rate of exchange at the time of the
payment of this judgment, as certified to by the Central Bank of the
Philippines, from which shall be deducted the sum of P69,475.46, which the
defendant had paid the plaintiff, and the legal rate of interest thereon from the
filing of the complaint in this case until fully paid for; by ordering the defendant
to pay to plaintiff the further sum of P8,000.00 by way of attorney's fees which
the Court finds to be reasonable in the premises, with costs against the
defendant. The counterclaim of the defendant is ordered dismissed."

From the decision, this appeal was brought directly to this Court, raising only
questions of law.

During the pendency of this appeal, appellee filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of attachment under Section 1 (f) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court upon the
ground that appellant is presently residing in Canada as a permanent resident
thereof. On June 3, 1969, this Court resolved, upon appellee's posting a bond of
P10,000.00, to issue the writ of attachment, and ordered the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal to attach the estate, real and personal, of appellant Alfredo J. Luz within the
province, to the value of not less than P140,000.00.

The appellant made the following assignments of errors:

 I.The lower court erred in not declaring and holding that plaintiff-
appellee's letter dated December 11, 1961 (Exhibit "1") and the statement of
account (Exhibit "1-A") therein enclosed, had the effect, cumulatively or
alternatively, of placing plaintiff-appellee in estoppel from thereafter modifying
the representations made in said exhibits, or of making plaintiff-appellee
otherwise bound by said representations, or of being of decisive weight in
determining the true intent of the parties as to the nature and extent of the
engineering services rendered and/or the amount of fees due.

II.The lower court erred in declaring and holding that the balance owing
from defendant-appellant to plaintiff-appellee on the IRRI Project should be
paid on the basis of the rate of exchange of the U.S. dollar to the Philippine
peso at the time of payment of judgment.

III.The lower court erred in not declaring and holding that the
aggregate amount of the balance due from defendant-appellant to plaintiff-
appellee is only P15,792.05.

IV.The lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees in the sum of

P8,000.00, despite the commissioner's finding, which plaintiff-appellee has
accepted and has not questioned, that said fee be only P5,000.00; and

V.The lower court erred in not granting defendant-appellant relief on

his counter-claim."

1.In support of his first assignment of error appellant argues that in Exhibit 1-A,
which is a statement of accounts dated December 11, 1961, sent by appellee to
appellant, appellee specified the various projects for which he claimed
engineering fees, the precise amount due on each particular engineering service
rendered on each of the various projects, and the total of his claims; that such a
statement barred appellee from asserting any claim contrary to what was stated
therein, or from taking any position different from what he asserted therein with
respect to the nature of the engineering services rendered; and consequently the
trial court could not award fees in excess of what was stated in said statement of
accounts. Appellant argues that for estoppel to apply it is not necessary, contrary
to the ruling of the trial court, that the appellant should have actually relied on the
representation, but that it is sufficient that the representations were intended to
make the defendant act thereon; that assuming arguendo that Exhibit 1-A did not
put appellee in estoppel, the said Exhibit 1-A nevertheless constituted a formal
admission that would be binding on appellee under the law on evidence, and
would not only belie any inconsistent claim but also would discredit any evidence
adduce by appellee is support of any claim inconsistent with what appears
therein; that, moreover, Exhibit 1-A, being a statement of account, establishes
prima facie the accuracy and correctness of the items stated therein and its
correctness can no longer be impeached except for fraud or mistake; that Exhibit
1-A, furthermore, constitutes appellee's own interpretation of the contract
between him and appellant, and hence, is conclusive against him.

On the other hand, appellee admits that Exhibit 1-A itemized the services
rendered by him in the various construction projects of appellant and that the
total engineering fees charged therein was P116,565.00, but maintains that he
was not in estoppel: first, because when he prepared Exhibit 1-A he was laboring
under an innocent mistake, as found by the trial court; second, because appellant
was not ignorant of the services actually rendered by appellee and the fees due
to the latter under the original agreement, Exhibit A; and third, because appellant
did not rely on the data appearing in Exhibit 1-A, nor did he act by reason
thereof. Appellee further maintains that he cannot be bound by Exhibit l-A after it
was satisfactorily shown that there were services not included therein although
actually rendered by him to appellant, and that the fees were not correctly
charged because of appellee's ignorance of the legal implications of the terms of
the agreement, Exhibit "A."

We find merit in the stand of appellee.

The statement of accounts (Exh. 1-A) could not estop appellee, because
appellant did not rely thereon as found by the Commissioner, from whose Report
we read:

"While it is true that plaintiff vacillated in his claim, yet, defendant did
not in anyway rely or believe in the different claims asserted by the plaintiff
and instead insisted on a claim that plaintiff was only entitled to P10,861.08
as per a separate resume of fees he sent to the plaintiff on May 18, 1962
(See Exhibit 6)." 4

The foregoing finding of the Commissioner, not disputed by appellant, was

adopted by the trial court in its decision. Under article 1431 of the Civil Code, in
order that estoppel may apply the person, to whom representations have been
made and who claims the estoppel in his favor must have relied or acted on such
representations. Said article provides:

"Art. 1431.Through estoppel an admission or representation is

rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon."

An essential element of estoppel is that the person invoking it has been

influenced and has relied on the representations or conduct of the person sought
to be estopped, and this element is wanting in the instant case. In Cristobal vs.
Gomez, 5 this Court held that no estoppel based on a document can be invoked
by one who has not been mislead by the false statements contained therein. And
in Republic of the Philippines vs. Garcia, et al., 6 this Court ruled that there is no
estoppel when the statement or action invoked as its basis did not mislead the
adverse party. Estoppel has been characterized as harsh or odious, and not
favored in law. 7 When misapplied, estoppel becomes a most effective weapon to
accomplish an injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a man's mouth from speaking the
truth and debars the truth in a particular case. 8 Estoppel cannot be sustained by
mere argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its essential
elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 9 No party should be
precluded from making out his case according to its truth unless by force of some
positive principle of law, and, consequently, estoppel in pains must be applied
strictly and should not be enforced unless substantiated in every particular. 10

The essential elements of estoppel in pais may be considered In relation to the

party sought to be estopped, and in relation to the party invoking the estoppel in
his favor. As related to the party to be estopped, the essential elements are: (1)
conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at
least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and
inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2)
intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least
influence, the other party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real
facts. As related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1)
lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in
question; (2), reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party
to be estopped; (3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to
change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury,
detriment or prejudice. 11
The first essential element in relation to the party sought to be estopped does not
obtain in the instant case, for, as appears in the Report of the Commissioner,
appellee testified "that when he wrote Exhibit 1 and prepared Exhibit 1-A, he had
not yet consulted the services of his counsel and it was only upon advice of
counsel that the terms of the contract were interpreted to him resulting in his
subsequent letters to the defendant demanding payments of his fees pursuant to
the contract Exhibit A." 12 This finding of the Commissioner was adopted by the
trial court. 13 It is established, therefore, that Exhibit 1-A was written by appellee
through ignorance or mistake, Anent this matter, it has been held that if an act,
conduct or misrepresentation of the party sought to be estopped is due to
ignorance founded on innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. 14 Regarding the
essential elements of estoppel in relation to the party claiming the estoppel, the
first element does not obtain in the instant case, for it cannot be said that
appellant did not know, or at least did not have the means of knowing, the
services rendered, to him by appellee and the fees due thereon as provided in
Exhibit A. The second element is also wanting, for, as adverted to, appellant did
not rely on Exhibit 1-A but consistently denied the accounts stated therein.
Neither does the third element obtain, for appellant did not act on the basis of the
representations in Exhibit 1-A, and there was no change in his position, to his
own injury or prejudice.

Appellant, however, insists that if Exhibit 1-A did not put appellee in estoppel, it at
least constituted an admission binding upon the latter. In this connection, it
cannot be gainsaid that Exhibit 1-A is not a judicial admission. Statements which
are not estoppels nor judicial admissions have no quality of conclusiveness, and
an opponent whose admissions have been offered against him may offer any
evidence which serves as an explanation for his former assertion of what he now
denies as a fact. This may involve the showing of a mistake. 15 Accordingly, in
Oas vs. Roa, 16 it was held that when a party to a suit has made an admission of
any fact pertinent to the issue involved, the admission can be received against
him; but such an admission is not conclusive against him, and he is entitled to
present evidence to overcome the effect of the admission. Appellee did explain,
and the trial court concluded, that Exhibit 1-A was based on either has ignorance
or innocent mistake and he, therefore, is not bound by it.

Appellant further contends that Exhibit 1-A, being a statement of account,

establishes prima facie the accuracy and correctness of the items stated therein.
If prima facie, as contended by appellant, then it is not absolutely conclusive
upon the parties. An account stated may be impeached for fraud, mistake or
error. In American Decisions, Vol. 62, p. 95, cited as authority by appellant
himself we read thus:

"An account stated or settled is a mere admission that the account is

correct. It is not an estoppel. The account is still open to impeachment for
mistakes or errors. Its effect is to establish. prima, facie, the accuracy of the
items without other proof; and the party seeking to impeach it is bound to
show affirmatively the mistake or error alleged. The force of the admission
and the strength of the evidence necessary to overcome it will depend upon
the circumstances of the case."

In the instant case, it is Our view that the ignorance or mistake that attended
the writing of Exhibit 1-A by appellee was sufficient to overcome the prima
facie evidence of correctness and accuracy of said Exhibit 1-A.

Appellant also urges that Exhibit 1-A constitutes appellee's own interpretation of
the contract, and is, therefore, conclusive against him. Although the practical
construction of the contract by one party, evidenced by his words or acts, can be
used against him in behalf of the other party, 17 yet, if one of the parties
carelessly makes a wrong interpretation of the words of his contract, or performs
more than the contract requires (as reasonably interpreted independently of his
performance), as happened in the instant case, he should be entitled to a
restitutionary remedy, instead of being bound to continue to his erroneous
interpretation or his erroneous performance, and the other party should not be
permitted to profit by such mistake unless he can establish an estoppel by
proving a material change of position made in good faith. The rule as to practical
construction does not nullify the equitable rules with respect to performance by
mistake." 18 In the instant case, it has been shown that Exhibit 1-A was written
through mistake by appellee and that the latter is not estopped by it. Hence, even
if said Exhibit 1-A be considered as practical construction of the contract by
appellee, he cannot be bound by such erroneous interpretation. It has been held
that if by mistake the parties followed a practice in violation of the terms of the
agreement, the court should not perpetuate the error. 19

2.In support of the second assignment of error, that the lower court erred in
holding that the balance from appellant on the IRRI project should be paid on the
basis of the rate of exchange of the U.S. dollar to the Philippine peso at the time
of payment of the judgment, appellant contends: first, that the official rate at the
time appellant received his architect's fees for the IRRI project, and
correspondingly his obligation to appellee's fee on August 25, 1961, was P2.00 to
$1.00, and cites in support thereof Section 1612 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Section 48 of Republic Act 265 and Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No.
699; second, that the lower court's Conclusion that the rate of exchange to be
applied in the conversion of the $28,000.00 is the current rate of exchange at the
time the judgment shall be satisfied was based solely on a mere presumption of
the trial court that the defendant did not convert, there being no showing to that
effect, the dollars into Philippine currency at the official rate, when the legal
presumption should be that the dollars were converted at the official rate of $1.00
to P2.00 because on August 25, 1961, when the IRRI project became due and
payable, foreign exchange controls were in full force and effect, and partial
decontrol was effected only afterwards, during the Macapagal administration;
third, that the other ground advanced by the lower Court for its ruling, to wit, that
appellant committed a breach of his obligation to turn over to the appellee the
engineering fees received in U.S. dollars for the IRRI project, cannot be upheld,
because there was no such breach, as proven by the fact that appellee never
claimed in Exhibit 1-A that he should be paid in dollars; and there was no
provision in the basic contract (Exh. "A") that he should be paid in dollars; and,
finally, even if there were such provision, it would have no binding effect under
the provision of Republic Act 529; that, moreover, it cannot really be said that no
payment was made on that account., for appellant had already paid P57,000.00
to appellee, and under Article 125 of the Civil Code, said payment could he said
to have been applied to the fees due from the IRRI project, this project being the
biggest and this debt being the most onerous.

In refutation of appellant's argument in support of the second assignment of

error, appellee argues that notwithstanding Republic Act 529, appellant can be
compelled to pay the appellee in dollars in view of the fact that appellant received
his fees in dollars, and appellee's fee is 20% of appellant's fees; and that if said
amount is to be converted into Philippine Currency, the rate of exchange should
be that at the time of the execution of the judgment. 20

We have taken note of the fact that on August 25, 1961, the date when appellant
said his obligation to pay appellee's fees became due, there was two rates of
exchange, to wit: the preferred rate of P2.00 to $1.00, and the free market rate. It
was so provided in Circular No. 121 of the Central Bank of the Philippines, dated
March 2, 1961, amending an earlier Circular No. 117, and in force until January
21, 1962 when it was amended by Circular No. 133, thus:

"1.All foreign exchange receipts shall be surrendered to the Central

Bank of those authorized to deal in foreign exchange as follows:

Percentage of Total to be surrendered at

Preferred:Free Market
Rate:Rate

(a)Export Proceeds, U. S. Gov-

ernment Expenditures invisi-
bles other than those specifically
mentioned below2575

(b)Foreign Investments. Gold

Proceeds, Tourists and Inward
Remittances of Veterans and
Filipino Citizens; and Perso-
nal Expenses of Diplomatic
Personnel—100" 21

The amount of $140,000.00 received by appellant for the International Rice

Research Institute project is not within the scope of sub-paragraph (a) of
paragraph No. 1 of Circular No. 121. Appellant has not shown that 25% of said
amount had to be surrendered to the Central Bank at the preferred rate because
it was either export proceeds, or U.S. Government expenditures, or invisibles not
included in sub-paragraph (b). Hence, it cannot be said that the trial court erred
in presuming that appellant converted said amount at the free market rate. It is
hard to believe that a person possessing dollars would exchange his dollars at
the preferred rate of P2.00 to $1.00 when he is not obligated to do so, rather than
at the free market rate which is much higher. A person is presumed to take
ordinary care of his concerns, and that the ordinary course of business has been
followed. 22

Under the agreement, Exhibit A, appellee was entitled to 20% of $140,000.00, or

the amount of $28,000.00. Appellee, however, cannot oblige the appellant to pay
him in dollars, even if appellant himself had received his fee for the IRRI project
in dollars. This payment in dollars is prohibited by Republic Act 529 which was
enacted on June 16, 1950. Said act provides as follows:

"SECTION 1.Every provision contained in, or made with respect to,

any obligation which provision purports to give the obligee the right to require
payment in gold or in a particular kind of coin or currency other than
Philippine currency or in an amount of money of the Philippines measured
thereby, be as it is hereby declared against public policy, and null, void and of
no effect, and no such provision shall be contained in, or made with respect
to, any obligation hereafter incurred. Every obligation heretofore or hereafter
incurred, whether or not any such provision as to payment is contained
therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon payment in
any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public
and private debts; Provided, That, (a) if the obligation was incurred prior to
the enactment of this Act and required payment in a particular kind of coin or
currency other than Philippine currency, it shall be discharged in Philippine
currency measured at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time the
obligation was incurred, (b) except in case of a loan made in a foreign
currency stipulated to be payable in the same currency in which case the rate
of exchange prevailing at the time of the stipulated date of payment shall
prevail. All coin and currency, including Central Bank notes, heretofore or
hereafter issued and declared by the Government of the Philippines shall be
legal tender for all debts, public and private."

Under the above-quoted provision of Republic Act 529, if the obligation was
incurred prior to the enactment of the Act and require payment in a particular kind
of coin or currency other than the Philippine currency the same shall be
discharged in Philippine currency measured at the prevailing rate of exchange et
the time the obligation was incurred. As We have adverted to, Republic Act 529
was enacted on June 16, 1950. In the case now before Us the obligation of
appellant to pay appellee the 20% of $140,000.00, or the sum of $28,000.00,
accrued on August 25, 1961, or after the enactment of Republic Act 529. It
follows that the provision of Republic Act 529 which requires payment at the
prevailing rate of exchange when the obligation was incurred cannot be applied.
Republic Act 529 does not provide for the rate of exchange for the payment of
obligation incurred after the enactment of said Act. The logical conclusion,
therefore, is that the rate of exchange should be that prevailing at the time of
payment. This view finds support in the ruling of this Court in the case of Engel
vs. Velasco & Co. 23 where this Court held that even if the obligation assumed by
the defendant was to pay the plaintiff a sum of money expressed in American
currency, the indemnity to be allowed should be expressed in Philippine currency
at the rate of exchange at the time of judgment rather than at the rate of
exchange prevailing on the date of defendant's breach. This is also the ruling of
American courts, as follows:

"The value in domestic money of a payment made in foreign money is

fixed with respect to the rate of exchange at the time of payment." (70 CJS. p.
228)

"According to the weight of authority the amount of recovery depends

upon the current rate of exchange, and not the par value of the particular
money involved." (48 C.J. 605-606)

"The value in domestic money of a payment made in foreign money is

fixed in reference to the rate of exchange at the time of such payment." (48
C.J. 605)

It is Our considered view, therefore, that appellant should pay the appellee the
equivalent in pesos of the $28,000.00 at the free market rate of exchange at the
time of payment. And so the trial court did not err when it held that herein
appellant should pay appellee $28,000.00 "to be converted into the Philippine
currency on the basis of the current rate of exchange at the time of payment of
this judgment, as certified to by the Central Bank of the Philippines, . . ." 24

Appellant also contends that the P57,000.00 that he had paid to appellee should
have been applied to the fees due to the latter on the IRRI project because such
debt was the most onerous to appellant. This contention is untenable. The
Commissioner who was authorized by the trial court to receive evidence in this
case, however, reports that the appellee had not been paid for the account of the
$,28,000.00 which represents the fees of appellee equivalent to 20% of the
$140,000.00 that the appellant received as fee for the IRRI project. This is a
finding of fact by the Commissioner which was adopted by the trial court. The
parties in this case have agreed that they do not question the finding of fact of
the Commissioner. Thus, in the decision appealed from the lower court says:

"At the hearing on the Report of the Commissioner on February 15,

1966, the counsels for both parties manifested to the court that they have no
objection to the findings of facts of the Commissioner in his report; and
 agreed that the said report only poses two (2) legal issues, namely: (1)
whether under the facts stated in the Report, the doctrine of estoppel will
apply; and (2) whether the recommendation in the Report that the payment of
amount due to the plaintiff in dollars is permissible under the law, and, if not at
what rate of exchange should it be paid in pesos (Philippine currency) . . ." 25

In the Commissioner's report, it is specifically recommended that the appellant be

ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of "$28,000.00 or its equivalent as the fee of
the plaintiff under Exhibit A on the IRRI project." It is clear from this report of the
Commissioner that no payment for the account of this $28,000.00 had been
made. Indeed, It is not shown in the record that the peso equivalent of the
$28,000.00 had been fixed or agreed upon by the parties at the different times
when the appellant had made partial payments to the appellee.

3.In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in
not declaring that the aggregate amount due to him to appellee is only
P15,792.05. Appellant questions the propriety or correctness of most of the items
of fees that were found by the Commissioner to be due to appellee for services
rendered. We believe that it is too late for the appellant to question the propriety
or correctness of those items in the present appeal. The records shows after the
Commissioner had submitted his report the lower court, on February 15, 1966,
issued on the following order:

"When this case was called for hearing today on the report of the
Commissioner, the counsels of the parties manifested that they have no
objection to the findings of facts in the report, However, the report poses only
legal issues, namely: (1) whether under the facts stated in the report, the
doctrine of estoppel will apply; and (2) whether the recommendation in the
report that the alleged payment of the defendant be made in dollars is
permissible by law and, if not, in what rate it should be paid in pesos
(Philippine Currency). For the purpose of resolving these issues the parties
prayed that they be allowed to file their respective memoranda which will aid
the court in the determination of said issues." 26

In consonance with the afore-quoted order of the trial court, the appellant
submitted his memorandum which opens with the following statements:

"As previously manifested, this Memorandum shall be confined to:

 "(a)the finding in the Commissioner's Report that defendant's defense
of estoppel will not lie (pp. 17-18, Report); and

"(b)the recommendation in the Commissioner's Report that defendant

be ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of '$28,000.00 (U.S.) or its equivalent as
the fee of the plaintiff under Exhibit 'A' in the IRRI project.'

"More specifically this Memorandum proposes to demonstrate the

affirmative of three legal issues posed, namely:

"First:Whether or not plaintiff's letter dated December 11, 1961 (Exhibit

'1') and/or Statement of Account (Exhibit '1-A') therein enclosed has the effect
of placing plaintiff in estoppel from thereafter modifying the representations
made in said letter and Statement of Account or of making plaintiff otherwise
bound thereby; or of being decisive or great weight in determining the true
intent of the parties as to the amount of the engineering fees owing from
defendant to plaintiff;

"Second:Whether or not defendant can be compelled to pay whatever

balance is owing to plaintiff on the IRRI (International Rice and Research
Institute) project in United States dollars; and

"Third:Whether or not in case the ruling of this Honorable Court be that

defendant cannot be compelled to pay plaintiff in United States dollars, the
dollar-to-peso convertion rate for determining the peso equivalent of whatever
balance is owing to plaintiff in connection with the IRRI project should be the
2 to 1 official rate and not any other rate." 27

It is clear, therefore, that what was submitted by appellant to the lower court for
resolution did not include the question of correctness or propriety of the amounts
due to appellee in connection with the different projects for which the appellee
had rendered engineering services. Only legal questions, as above enumerated,
were submitted to the trial court for resolution. So much so, that the lower court in
another portion of its decision said, as follows:

"The objections to the Commissioner's Report embodied in defendant's

memorandum of objections, dated March 18, 1966, cannot likewise be
entertained by the Court because at the hearing of the Commissioner's
Report the parties had expressly manifested that they had no objection to the
findings of facts embodied therein."
We, therefore, hold that the third assignment of error of the appellant has no
merit.

4.In his fourth assignment of error, appellant questions the award by the lower
court of P8,000.00 for attorney's fees. Appellant argues that the Commissioner,
in his report, fixed the sum of P5,000.00 as "just and reasonable" attorney's fees,
to which amount appellee did not interpose any objection, and by not so
objecting he is bound by said finding; and that, moreover, the lower court gave
no reason in its decision for increasing the amount to P8,000.00.

Appellee contends that while the parties had not objected to the findings of the
Commissioner, the assessment of attorney's fees is always subject to the court's
appraisal, and in increasing the recommended fees from P5,000.00 to P8,000.00
the trial court must have taken into consideration certain circumstances which
warrant the award of P8,000.00 for attorney's fees.

We believe that the trial court committed no error in this connection. Section 12
of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, on which the fourth assignment of error is
presumably based, provides that when the parties stipulate that a commissioner's
findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law arising from the facts
mentioned in the report shall thereafter be considered. Consequently, an
agreement by the parties to abide by the findings of fact of the commissioner is
equivalent to an agreement of facts binding upon them which the court cannot
disregard. The question, therefore, is whether or not the estimate of the
reasonable fees stated in the report of the Commissioner is a finding of fact.

The report of the Commissioner on this matter reads as follows:

"As regards attorney's fees, under the provisions of Art. 2208, par (II),
the same may be awarded, and considering the number of hearings held in
this case, the nature of the case (taking into account the technical nature of
the case and the voluminous exhibits offered in evidence), as well as the way
the case was handled by counsel, it is believed, subject to the Court's
appraisal of the matter, that the sum of P5,000.00 is just and reasonable as
attorney's fees." 28

It is thus seen that the estimate made by the Commissioner was an expression of
belief, or an opinion. An opinion is different from a fact. The generally recognized
distinction between a statement of "fact" and an expression of "opinion" is that
whatever is susceptible of exact knowledge is a matter of fact, while that not
susceptible of exact knowledge is generally regarded as an expression of
opinion. 29 It has also been said that the word "fact," as employed in the legal
sense, includes "those conclusions reached by the trior from shifting testimony,
weighing evidence, and passing on the credit of the witnesses, and it does not
denote those inferences drawn by the trial court from the facts ascertained and
settled by it. 30 In the case at bar, the estimate made by the Commissioner of the
attorney's fees was an inference from the facts ascertained by him, and is,
therefore, not a finding of fact. The trial court was, consequently, not bound by
that estimate, in spite of the manifestation of the parties that they had no
objection to the findings of facts of the Commissioner in his report. Moreover,
under Section 11 of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, the court may adopt, modify,
or reject the report of the commissioner, in whole or in part, and hence, it was
within the trial court's authority to increase the recommended attorney's fees of
P5,000.00 to P8,000.00. It is a settled rule that the amount of attorney's fees is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 31

It is true, as appellant contends, that the trial court did not state in the decision
the reasons for increasing the attorney's fees. The trial court, however, had
adopted the report of the Commissioner, and in adopting the report the trial court
is deemed to have adopted the reasons given by the Commissioner in awarding
attorney's fees, as stated in the above quoted portion of the report. Based on the
reasons stated in the report, the trial court must have considered that the
reasonable attorney's fees should be P8,000.00. Considering that the judgment
against the appellant would amount to more than P100,000.00, We believe that
the award of P8,000.00 for attorney's fees is reasonable.

5.In his fifth assignment of error appellant urges that he is entitled to relief on his
counterclaim. In view of what We have stated in connection with the preceding
four assignments of error, We do not consider it necessary to dwell any further
on this assignment of error.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
defendant-appellant. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1.Annex A to complaint, pp. 18-21, Record on Appeal.

2.Record on Appeal, pp 21-26.

3.Record on Appeal, pp. 115-118.

4.Record on Appeal, p. 96.

5.50 Phil. 810, 821.

6.91 Phil. 46, 49.

7.Coronel, et al. vs. CIR, et al., 24 SCRA, 990, 996.

8.28 Am. Jur., 2d., pp. 601-602.

9.Rivers vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of New York, 6 N.Y., 2d. 3, 5.

10.28 Am. Jur. 2d. p. 642.

11.Art. 1437, Civil Code; 28 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 640-641; Reyes and Puno, an Outline of
Philippine Civil Law, Vol. IV, p. 277.

12.Record on Appeal, pp. 95-96.

13.Record on Appeal, p. 155.

14.Ramiro vs. Graño, 54 Phil. 744, 750; Coleman vs. Southern Pacific Co., 141 Cal
App 2d 121, 296 P2d 386.

15.Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed., Vol. IV, pp. 21-23.

16.7 Phil. 20, 22.

17.Corbin, On Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 145.

18.Corbin, On Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 147, and cases cited therein.

19.In re Chicago & E I. Ry. Co., 94 F2d 296; Boucher vs. Godfrey, 178 A 655, 119
Conn. 622.
20.Citing, 48 CJ, 605, 606-607 in support of his submission.

21.Arthur P. Bacomo, Central Bank Circulars and Memoranda, 1949-1968, p. 389.

22.Rule 131, Sec. 5, pars. (d) and (g), Rules of Court.

23.47 Phil. 115, 142.

24.This ruling modifies the decision in Arrieta vs. National Rice and Corn Corporation,
L-15645, January 31, 1964 (10 SCRA 79), where it was held that the obligation
based on dollar should be converted into the Philippine peso at the rate of
change prevailing at the time the obligation was incurred, or on July 1, 1952.
The provision of Rep. Act 529 was wrongly applied in this case, because the
obligation arose after the enactment of Rep. Act 529 (June 16, 1950). The rate
of exchange prevailing at the time the obligation was incurred would apply only
to obligations that were incurred prior to the enactment of Rep. Act 529, but not
to obligations incurred after the enactment of said Act.

25.Record on Appeal, p. 149.

26.Record on Appeal, p. 99.

27.Record on Appeal, pp. 113-115.

28.Record on Appeal, p. 97; italics supplied.

29.Pitney Bomes Inc. vs. Sirkle, et al., 248 S. W. 2d. 920.

30.Porter vs. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, et al., 173 Wis. 267, 181 N.W. 317,
318.

31.San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, L-21879, Sept. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 292.