No.

________________________________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

RICHARD DUCOTE, ESQ., VICTORIA MCINTYRE, ESQ., & S.S.,

Petitioners,

v.

S.B.,
Respondent.
__________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
__________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________

RICHARD L. DUCOTE, ESQ.

Counsel of Record & In Proper Person
VICTORIA E. MCINTYRE, ESQ.
In Proper Person &
Counsel for Petitioners
318 E. Boston Street, Floor 2
Covington, Louisiana 70433
rducote@ducotelaw.com
(985) 898-2755
 QUESTION PRESENTED
Petitioners Richard Ducote and Victoria McIntyre are attorneys representing

Petitioner S.S., the mother of a now 14-year-old son, in a Pennsylvania child custody

case. After S.S. lost custody to the father, Respondent S.B., and the ruling was

affirmed on appeal, at S.B.’s urging the trial court issued a “gag order” against all

three Petitioners forbidding them to: “speak publicly or communicate about this case

including, but not limited to print and broadcast media, on-line or web-based

communications, or inviting the public to view existing on-line or web-based

publications”; and “direct or encourage third parties to speak publicly about this case

including, but not limited to, print and broadcast media, on-line or web-based

communications…” The order further enjoined S.S. from using her own name in any

public legislative testimony, and all Petitioners from saying anything publicly that

would in any manner “tend to identify” the child or the parents. Finally, Petitioners

were ordered to remove all public postings with “information about this case.”

However, no such “gag order” was imposed on S.B. and his attorney.

The question presented is:

Is such a “gag order” an unconstitutionally vague and overbroad prior restraint

and content-based restriction violating Petitioners’ First Amendment free speech

rights?
 ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Richard Ducote, Esq. and Victoria McIntyre, Esq. were not parties,

but counsel, in the Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas custody

case, and were appellants in the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania cases.

Petitioner S.S. was the defendant in the Court of Common Pleas child custody

case, and an appellant in the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania cases.

Respondent S.B. was the plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas child custody

case, and the appellee in the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania cases.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Silver v. Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 802 Fed.Appx. 55 (3d

Cir. 2020).

S.B. v. S.S., No. 74-WDA-2017, 2017 WL 4848400 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 20,

2017), appeal denied, 182 A.3d 430 (Pa. 2018).

 iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................ ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS.......................................................................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... v
OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................................................................... 2
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ............................................................ 9
I. The opinion below squarely conflicts with all other state high court
decisions considering such family court gag orders. ................................................. 9
II. Decisions by the high courts in Michigan and Illinois denying discretionary
appeals from intermediate appellate court rulings affirming such gag orders
underscore the importance of the Court’s definitive resolution of the First
Amendment issues presented here, because it can be reasonably predicted that
the majority of states without controlling jurisprudence will gravitate to
Pennsylvania’s erroneous ruling as the most recent and “enlightened” view of
First Amendment law. ............................................................................................. 12
III. The free speech rights of parents and their attorneys require definitive
protection, especially when they question governmental action. ........................... 14
IV. The violation of First Amendment rights in family court cases is a
recurring problem which will likely further burgeon without the Court’s
definitive resolution.................................................................................................. 17
V. On every relevant point of law, the decision below is wrong. .......................... 19
A. The gag order is a presumptively unconstitutional prior restraint
on speech................................................................................................................ 19
B. The gag order is a presumptively unconstitutional “content-based”
restraint on speech. ............................................................................................... 21
C. The gag order’s prior restraint and content-based restriction
on Petitioners’ speech cannot survive strict scrutiny analysis. .......................... 23
D. The gag order is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad............................ 25
VI. This case is the canary in the constitutional coal mine, and clamors
for the First Amendment firewall to be built here. ................................................. 28
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 30
 iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued
APPENDIX
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Opinion (Dec. 22, 2020) ………………………….. 1a
Majority Opinion ………………………………………………………………….… 1a
Dissenting Opinion ……………………………………………………………….. 35a
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Order Granting Allocatur (Sept. 11, 2019) ….. 57a
Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s Order Denying Reargument (March 4, 2019) .. 58a
Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s Affirming Opinion (Dec. 24, 2018) …………..… 59a
Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Gag Order (April 27, 2018) ……………………. 73a
Findings of Fact ………………………………………………………………….... 74a
Order of Court …………………………………………………………………...… 77a
Trial Court’s Interim Gag Order (April 19, 2018) ……………………………..…….. 80a
Transcript of F’s Testimony, S.B. v. S.S., No. 15-008183 (May 20, 2016) ……….. 81a
Rebecca Addison, Children’s Advocates Say Family Courts Unfairly Favor
Fathers, Even When They’re The Abusers, PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER, Feb. 28,
2018 …………………………………………………………………………………………113a

Adiel Kaplan, et al., Jacqueline Franchetti Says She Did What She Was
Supposed To Do. So Why Did Her Daughter Die?, NBC NEWS, May 13, 2021…...118a

Vicky Nguyen, et al., No Oversight for Programs Advertising They Reconnect

Children with ‘Alienated’ Parents, NBC BAY AREA, Nov. 5, 2018 ……………..…. 125a
L.L. Brasier, Judge Seeks To Reunite Dad, Kids Who Were Sentenced To Camp,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 10, 2015 ………………………………………………….. 132a
Pei-Sze Cheng, I-Team: NJ Brother, Sister Rip ‘Alienating’ Divorce Program
That Tore Them From Father for Years, NBC NEW YORK, Dec. 26, 2018 ………. 137a
Cara Tabachnick, They Were Taken From Their Mom To Rebond With
Their Dad. It Didn’t Go Well., THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE, May 11,
2017…………………………………………………………………………….…….…….. 140a

Former MLB Player David Segui Desperate to Regain Children From

‘Reunification Camp’, CELEB MAGAZINE, Jan. 25, 2021 ………………………….. 149a
 v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
A.S. v. Lincoln County R-III School District,
429 F.Supp. 3d 659 (E.D. Mo. 2019) ........................................................................ 22
Adams v. Tersillio, 666 N.Y.S.2d 203 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ..................................... 18
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) .................................................. 20, 21
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 612 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ........................ 18
Argen v. Katz, 821 Fed.Appx. 104 (3d Cir. 2020)........................................................ 18
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)........................................ 14, 23
Baskin v. Hale, 787 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) .................................................. 18
Bey v. Rasawehr, 161 N.E.3d 529 (Ohio 2020) ................................................. 9, 10, 26
Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637 (Haw. 1992) .............................................................. 20
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) ........................ 1
Care and Protection of Edith, 659 N.E.2d 1174 (Mass. 1996).................................... 10
Carroll v. President and Com’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) ................... 20
CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994) .................................................................... 20
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992) .......................................................... 21
Delgado v. Miller, No. 3D20-580,
2020 WL 7050217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2020),
aff’d sub nom J.M. v. A.J.D., No. 3D20-1118,
2021 WL 1660897 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2021) .................................................................... 18
Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) .......................................... 22
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)....................................................... 25
Ex Parte Wright, 166 So.3d 618 (Ala. 2014)................................................................ 26
FOCUS v. Allegheny Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 1996) ............... 18
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) ........................................................................ 22
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).................................................................. 14
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) .......................................... 25, 26
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County,
457 U.S. 596 (1982) ............................................................................................ 15, 25
Grigsby v. Coker, 904 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1995) .............................................................. 9
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) ......................................................................... 22
In Interest of FG, 421 P.3d 1267 (Haw. 2018)............................................................. 10
In Interest of Summerville, 547 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ................................ 13
In re Daily, No. 215744,
1999 WL 33429988 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1999) (per curiam) ........................... 12
In re Detroit Free Press, 620 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 2000) ................................................ 13
In re Detroit Free Press, No. 210022,
1999 WL 33409948 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1999) (per curiam) ........................... 13
In re Gorcyca, 902 N.W.2d 828 (Mich. 2017) .............................................................. 17
 vi

Cases--continued
In re J.S., 640 N.E.2d 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), ......................................................... 14
In re J.S., 647 N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. 1995) ........................................................................ 14
In re Macomb Daily, 620 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 2000) ..................................................... 13
In re Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2008) ......................................... 18
In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) ................................... 11
In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2018) .......................................... 21
In re N.B., 146 A.3d 146 (N.H. 2016) .................................................................... 11, 12
In re Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)......................... 18, 20, 26
In re R.J.M.B., 133 So.3d 335 (Miss. 2013)................................................................. 10
In re T.T., 779 N.W.2d 602 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) ................................................. 18, 20
Jabr v. Jabr, No. A07-2003,
2008 WL 1800138 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2008) ............................................ 18, 26
Johanson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev.
ex rel. County of Clark, 182 P.3d 94 (Nev. 2008) ......................................... 11, 20, 26
Karantinidis v. Karantinidis, 131 N.Y.S.3d 363 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) .................... 18
Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327 (Ill. 1986).......................................... 21, 26
Kinley v. Kinley, No. A06-865,
2007 WL 2702946 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2007) ........................................... 18, 26
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) ......................... 22
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) .......................... 14
Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California,
764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................... 21
Lieberman v. Lieberman, 88 N.Y.S.3d 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) ............................. 18
Lindke v. Lane, No. 19-11905,
2021 WL 807727 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2021) ............................................................ 18
Lowinger v. Lowinger, 695 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ................................ 18
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) .................................................................. 22
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) ....................................................................... 14
Minn. Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S.Ct. 1876 (2018) ........................................... 25
Nash v. Nash, 307 P.3d 40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013)........................................................ 20
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) ................................................. 20
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ....................................... 20
Nichols v. Sivilli, No. 2:14-3821,
2016 WL 3388296 (D.N.J. June 14, 2016) ............................................................... 18
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) .................................................................................................. 14
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) ....................................................... 21, 23
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) ................................... 15
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) ..................................... 22
S.B. v. S.S., 182 A.3d 430 (Pa. 2018) ............................................................................ 5
 vii

Cases--continued
S.B. v. S.S., No. 74-WDA-2017,
2017 WL 4848400 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2017). ............................................... 5, 17
S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) ......................................................... 9, 26
Shak v. Shak, 144 N.E. 3d 274 (Mass. 2020) .............................................................. 11
Silver v. Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
802 Fed.Appx. 55 (3d Cir. 2020) ................................................................................ 7
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) ........................................................................ 25
Stanfield v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families,
698 So.2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ................................................................. 18
State ex rel. L.M., 37 P.3d 1188 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) ............................................... 18
State v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805 (Kan. 2019)................................................................ 22
State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017)........................................................... 22
State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2018) .................................................................. 22
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) ............................................................. 14
Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests v. Joyce,
779 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................... 15
Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005) ......................................................................... 20
Twohig v. Blackmer, 918 P.2d 332 (N.M. 1996) ......................................................... 20
U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) ............................................................................. 8
U.S. v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993) ............................................................ 21
Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001) ........................................... 22
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) ......................................................................... 15
WXIA-TV v. State, 811 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. 2018) ............................................................ 20
Zimmerman v. Board of Trustees of Ball State University,
940 F.Supp. 2d 875 (S.D. Ind. 2013) ........................................................................ 22
Constitutional Provisions & Statutes
U.S. Const. amend. I ...................................................................................................... 2
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 .......................................................................................... 3
28 U.S.C. § 1257 ............................................................................................................. 2
Other Authorities
Rebecca Addison, Children’s advocates say family courts unfairly favor fathers,
even when they’re abusers, PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER (Feb. 28, 2018) ........................ 5
Am. Bar Ass’n., Mother Seeks Courtroom Reform for Sexually Abused Children
and Protective Parents, 32 CHILD L. PRAC. 94, June 2013 ...................................... 16
Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System:
Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 491 (1989) .................................................... 16
 viii

Other Authorities--continued
Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families:
Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for the Acts of Others,
2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13 (1995) ................................................................. 16
Carol S. Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation:
Getting it Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 Fam L. Q. 527 (2001) ...................... 16
Dale Margolin Cecka, Improper Delegation of Judicial Authority in Child
Custody Case: Finally Overturned, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 181 (2017) ....................... 16
Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (DV LEAP),
Pittsburgh Press Conference on Failure of Family Courts to Protect Kids,
Facebook (Feb. 7, 2018, at 11:10 AM), https://www.facebook.com/dvleap/videos/
1621260391289731/?fref=mentions&__xts__[0]=68.ARAZg05huZ_RuD-
lvtOqDHLps0KDS-66p75MNjbf7ZVe92pkzkM8k0wJCoUTeCEuo6hdFW
vygljLe6VDu3SMeZQjNdppNFwT-i9UKXbm17e6T7j3J_0abM_P0Vz8lUm
GBxxw_JEUbSIa&__tn__=K-R.................................................................................. 5
Richard Ducote, Guardians ad Litem in Private Custody Litigation:
The Case for Abolition, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 106 (2002)........................................ 16
Michael Gunter, et al., Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Child Custody Disputes,
19 MED. & L. 815 (2000) ........................................................................................... 16
Amy Halbrook, Kentucky’s Guardian ad Litem Litigation:
A Model for Seeking Role Clarity, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 81 (2017) ................... 16
Kimberly J. Joyce, Under the Microscope: The Admissibility of Parental
Alienation Syndrome, 32 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 53, 86 (2019) ...................... 17
Kelly Kanavy, Comment, The State and the “Psycho Ex-Wife”: Parents’ Rights,
Children’s Interest, and the First Amendment, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1081 (2013) .... 17
Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian ad Litem in Child
Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond
Recognition, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255 (1998) ....................................................... 16
Thomas D. Lyon & Stacia N. Stolzenberg, Children’s Memory for Conversations
About Sexual Abuse: Legal and Psychological Implications,
19 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 411 (2014) ............................................................... 16
Kee MacFarlane, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce Proceedings, in
SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG CHILDREN, 121-150
(Kee MacFarlane, et al, eds. 1986)........................................................................... 15
Mary Ann Mason, Ph.D., J.D., THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING
THE LEGAL BATTLE AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 171 (1999) ............................ 16
Joan S. Meier and Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light
on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation,
35 LAW & INEQ. 311 (2017) ....................................................................................... 15
 ix

Other Authorities--continued
Madelyn S. Milchman, Robert Geffner, & Joan S. Meier, Putting Science and
Reasoning Back into the “Parental Alienation” Discussion: Reply to Bernet,
Robb, Lorandos, and Garber, 58 FAM. CT. REV. 375 (2020) .................................... 16
John E.B. Myers, A MOTHER’S NIGHTMARE-INCEST: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
PARENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 107 (1997) ................................................................ 15
John E.B. Myers, Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation
Litigation: Recommendations for Improved Fact Finding and Child Protection, 28
J. FAM. L. 1 (1989) .................................................................................................... 16
John E.B. Myers, “Testilying” in Family Court,
46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 499 (2014) ............................................................................ 16
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and State Justice Institute,
NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A JUDGE’S GUIDE 19 (2006)..................................................................... 16
Dana E. Prescott, Forensic Experts and Family Courts: Science or Privilege-By-
License?, 28 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 521 (2016) ............................................... 16
Paula D. Salinger, True or False Accusations? Protecting Victims of Child Sexual
Abuse During Custody Disputes, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 693 (2001) ..................... 16
Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Provisions of Divorce, Child Custody, or Child
Support Orders as Infringing on Federal or State Constitutional Guarantees of
Free Speech, 2 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2015) .................................................................... 17
Kristine Simpson, Comment, Mississippi’s Guardian ad Litem Need Clarification
of Their Role and Responsibilities, 84 MISS. L. J. 1065 (2015) ............................... 16
Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations,
36 JUDGES’ J. 38 (Fall 1997) ..................................................................................... 16
Study Finds Pervasive U.S. Custody Bias in Favor of Abusive Fathers, 25 (10)
NATIONAL BULLETIN ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION NL 5 (Oct. 2019) ........ 15
Rebecca M. Thomas & James T. Richardson, Parental Alienation Syndrome:
30 Years and Still Junk Science, 54 JUDGES’ J. 22 (Summer 2015) ....................... 16
Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (2006).................................................................................... 19
Cheri L. Wood, The Parental Alienation Syndrome:
A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1367 (1994) ....................... 17
 In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________

RICHARD DUCOTE, ESQ., VICTORIA MCINTYRE, ESQ., & S.S.,

Petitioners,

v.

S.B.,
Respondent.
__________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
__________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011), the

Court reiterated the most basic principle of First Amendment free speech protections

to be that government lacks the power to restrict expression because of its message,

ideas, subject matter, or content, subject to a few limited exceptions for historically

unprotected speech, such as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words. Id. at 790-791.

The Court further explained that “new categories of unprotected speech may not be

added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be

tolerated.” Id. at 791. Furthermore,

No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from

harm, but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas
to which children may be exposed. “Speech that is neither obscene as to
youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be
suppressed solely to protect the young from idea or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable to them.”
Id. at 794-795 (citations omitted).
 2

This case challenges the most egregious example of a whole new category of

speech restrictions, not enacted by legislatures, but divined by family court judges:

sweeping child custody gag orders supposedly premised on ipse dixit “best interest of

the child” concerns. Although such gag orders have heretofore escaped the Court’s

review, the time has come for bold constitutional lines to be drawn, and for these First

Amendment abuses to be harnessed.

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (App. 1a-56a) is reported at

243 A.3d 90 (5-2 decision). The opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court (App. 59a-

73a) is reported at 201 A.3d 774. The opinion and orders of the Court of Common

Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (App. 74a-80a) are unreported.

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania entered its opinion in this case on

December 22, 2020. On March 19, 2020, this Court extended the filing deadline for a

petition for a writ of certiorari due on or after that date to 150 days from the date of

the lower court judgment. Petitioners invoke this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant

part that “Congress shall make no law *** abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press ***.”
 3

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in

relevant part that “[n]o State shall *** deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law ***.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The issues in this Petition originate in a child custody case in the Court of

Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.

I. The Child Custody Trial

S. S., the child’s mother, and S.B., the child’s father, are the divorcing adoptive

parents of a now 14-year-old son F, who shares neither parent’s surname. During

their custody trial, on May 20, 2016, then 9-year-old F testified under oath (App. 81a-

113a) before Judge Kim Berkeley Clark to S.B.’s anally raping and fondling him, in

response to the judge’s questioning:

Q. So how long has it been since you’ve seen your grandparents?

A. A while.
Q. Do you miss them?
A. No.
Q. Why don’t you miss them?
A. Because they don’t believe me, and I don’t like people who don’t
believe me.
Q. Why do you think they don’t believe you?
A. Because once when I called my grandma, she asked me first thing
if I was reading off a script, and I said no. Then I told her that you
shouldn’t believe what my father is telling you. It’s all lies.
App. 91a.
***
Q. Tell me about where you slept in the house and where [father]
slept.
A. I slept in my bed, and he slept in my bed. But he really had his
own room, but he would always sleep in mine.
 4

Q. Every night?
A. Like almost like—more than every other night.
Q. More than every other night. So what happened when your dad
would sleep in the bed with you?
A. Sometimes he would do things.
Q. Can you tell me some of the things that he did.
A. It’s really uncomfortable.
Q. I know it is, but it’s important for me to hear from you. You know,
this has been going on for a while. I did get to read what you said
to Judge Satler, and then I saw your interview with Dr. Rua.
Everybody else keeps telling me things that you said, but I
haven’t heard from you. You’re really the most important person
in all of this, [F].
A. Well, sometimes he would lay on top of me. He would like pull
my pajamas down. He had these like shorty shorts that he would
go running in. They didn’t need underwear. Well, the first thing
is that I was—I acted asleep, but I was really awake when it all
happened. He would stick his penis in my butt crack. Into what I
call my poop hole. He would do that many times. When under my
body he would be squeezing my penis. Sometimes I get really
angry with myself because I always say that I could have stopped
him.
Q. Do you understand though, [F], you are a child? Do you
understand that? Do you understand that none of this is your
fault? Do you believe that?
A. Sometimes.

App. 103a-104a.
***
Q. Does your mother ever say anything to you about [father] at this
time?
A. No. What she tells me to do is to tell the truth.
App. 106a.

Despite this testimony, the judge granted S.B. sole legal and physical custody

of the child, ordered S.B. and F’s participation in the Family Bridges “reunification

program,” and enjoined S.S. from having any contact whatsoever with her son.
 5

Attorneys Richard Ducote and Victoria McIntyre enrolled as S.S.’s counsel post-trial.

S.S. unsuccessfully appealed the custody judgment, which was affirmed by the

Pennsylvania Superior Court on October 17, 2017. S.B. v. S.S., No. 74-WDA-2017,

2017 WL 4848400. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied S.S.’s discretionary

appeal on February 22, 2018. 182 A.3d 430. The trial court record has never been

sealed.

II. Press Conference and PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER Article

Petitioners, together with other professionals, parents, and a now grown child

sharing common concerns and experiences, participated in a February 7, 2018,

Pittsburgh press conference discussing child abuse victims and the courts’ failure to

protect them. 1 Mr. Ducote mentioned only S.S. by name, as a mother who lost custody

of her un-named son, despite his testimony, to his un-named father.

Independent of the conference, on February 28, 2018, the PITTSBURGH CITY

PAPER published Parental Inequity: Children’s Advocates Say Family Courts Unfairly

Favor Fathers, Even When They’re the Abusers (App. 114a). The article, which

included comments from a Pennsylvania legislator and a George Washington

University law school professor, highlighted proposed legal reforms to address

1The conference video is independently maintained online by the George Washington University Law
School Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project on their Facebook page. Domestic
Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (DV LEAP), Pittsburgh Press Conference on Failure
of Family Courts to Protect Kids, Facebook (Feb. 7, 2018, at 11:10 AM),
https://www.facebook.com/dvleap/videos/1621260391289731/?fref=mentions&__xts__[0]=68.ARAZg05
huZ_RuD-lvtOqDHLps0KDS-66p75MNjbf7ZVe92pkzkM8k0wJCoUTeCEuo6hdFWvygljLe6VDu3SM
eZQjNdppNFwT-i9UKXbm17e6T7j3J_0abM_P0Vz8lUmGBxxw_JEUbSIa&__tn__=K-R.
 6

custody cases with abuse allegations. F’s graphic testimony was anonymously quoted

to illustrate the alarming nature of this problem. App. 114a.

III. The Gag Order

In response to the conference and article, on March 22, 2018, S.B.’s counsel

sought a gag order on Petitioners, plus $200,000 in sanctions, and $10,000 for each

future violation of the proposed order. No evidence whatsoever concerning the child

was presented at the hearing which resulted in the gag order. It is important to note

that Petitioners have never publicly stated F’s name or otherwise publicly identified

him. On April 19, 2018, over S.S.’s strenuous constitutional objections, Judge Clark

first signed an interim gag order preventing all parties and their counsel from

publicly speaking or communicating about the case. App. 80a. However, on April 27,

2018, Judge Clark entered a final gag order prohibiting only S.S., Mr. Ducote, and

Ms. McIntyre—and not S.B., his counsel, or S.S.’s former trial counsel who presented

the child’s testimony—from speaking about this case in any manner:

It is hereby ORDERED that [S.S.]; Richard Ducote, Esquire; and

Victoria McIntyre, Esquire shall NOT speak publicly or communicate
about this case including, but not limited to, print and broadcast media,
on-line or web-based communications, or inviting the public to view
existing on-line or web-based publications. The following is also
ORDERED.
1. [S.S.]; Richard Ducote, Esquire; and Victoria McIntyre shall NOT
direct or encourage third parties to speak publicly or communicate
about this case including, but not limited to, print and broadcast
media, on-line or web-based communications, or inviting the public
to view existing on-line or web-based publications.

2. [S.S.]; Richard Ducote, Esquire; and Victoria McIntyre may provide

public testimony in the State House and/or Senate and in the
United States Congress and Senate about parent alienation, sexual
abuse of children in general or as it relates to this case. However,
 7

in providing such testimony, they shall NOT disclose any

information that would identify or tend to identify the Child. [S.S.]
shall NOT publically [sic] state her name, the name of the Child, or
[S.B.'s] name. Attorney Ducote and Attorney McIntyre shall NOT
publically [sic] refer to [S.S.], the Child, or [S.B.] by name or in any
manner that would tend to identify the aforementioned parties.

3. [S.S.] and Counsel shall remove information about this case, which
has been publically [sic] posted by [S.S.] or Counsel, including but
not limited to, the press release, the press conference on the
YouTube site, the Drop Box and its contents, and other online
information accessible to the public, within twenty-four (24)
hours. [S.S.] and Counsel shall download or place the
aforementioned information onto a thumb drive, which shall be
filed with this court.
App. 78a-79a (emphasis in original).

IV. Federal Court Litigation and State Court Appeals

Petitioners first unsuccessfully challenged the order in federal court. See Silver

v. Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 802 Fed.Appx. 55 (3d Cir. 2020).

Petitioners also appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the gag

order on December 24, 2018. App. 59a. Referencing attorneys’ “special responsibility”

with a cryptic nod to Rule 8.4(c) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct

relative to “dishonesty,” in a direct threat illustrating the battlelines drawn here,2

the Superior Court “reminds” Mr. Ducote and Ms. McIntyre “of their ethical

obligations under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct,” and alerts them

to “the possibility of disciplinary action.” App. 72a. Ironically, while denying any

2 Judge Clark, even before entering the gag order, said she found it “tempting to impose monetary
sanctions on Mother and her attorney…”, and then admitted that she could find no legal authority to
support the gag order she was issuing. App. 77a, ¶¶ 16, 19.
 8

“chilling effect” triggered by the gag order, in the same opinion (App. 70a), the

appellate judges openly threaten to freeze out two attorneys from the practice of law

for no discernable “wrongdoing” other than refusing to quietly go home. 3 Reargument

was denied on March 4, 2019. App. 58a. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted

allocatur (App. 57a) on September 11, 2019, recasting the issue for consideration as:

In a child custody case, did the Pennsylvania Superior Court err in

affirming the gag order in violation of Appellants’ rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, §7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when the order precluded
the parent and attorneys from speaking publicly about the case in a
manner that would identify the child involved? 4
On December 22, 2020, in a 5-2 decision, the court below affirmed the gag

order, deeming it “content neutral” under U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), and

thus constitutional. App. 1a-34a. The opinion wholly ignored the prior restraint issue

and rejected the vagueness claim. Justices Wecht and Donahue filed a compelling

dissent harshly criticizing the majority’s disregard of clear First Amendment law.

App. 35a-56a.

Petitioners unsuccessfully raised all First Amendment issues asserted here in

the trial court through opposition pleadings and oral argument at the April 19, 2018,

hearing. App. 74-78a. The Pennsylvania Superior Court considered and rejected

3 The court suggests without citation that lawyers may need to exercise “some degree of restraint in
revealing details of a case to the general public.” App. 72a (emphasis added). Petitioners Ducote and
McIntyre embrace their defense of the First Amendment in the highest traditions of their profession
and dispute the court’s position that disagreement with and criticism of this troubling child custody
ruling represents some form of “dishonesty.”
4 The recast question misinterprets the gag order to only bar speaking publicly about the case in a

manner “that would identify the child involved.” App. 57a.

 9

Petitioners’ same First Amendment challenges. App. 66a-72a. Finally, the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania likewise rejected these constitutional arguments, as set forth

below. App. 34a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The opinion below squarely conflicts with all other state high court
decisions considering such family court gag orders.
The decision below stands alone among state courts of last resort. Seven (7)

other state supreme courts have reviewed these restraints, and then declared this

type of gag order in family courts creates unconstitutional restrictions on parties’

First Amendment free speech rights. 5

1. The Supreme Court of Ohio in Bey v. Rasawehr, 161 N.E.3d 529, 533

(Ohio 2020), vacated a gag order in a civil-stalking protective order case filed against

a son by his mother and widowed sister-in-law, which enjoined the son from posting

about his relatives on any social media service, website discussion board, or similar

outlet or service and ordered him to remove all such postings from the internet. He

was also forbidden to post about the deaths of the relatives’ husbands in any manner

that expresses, implies, or suggests that they are culpable in those deaths. Id.

Contrary to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis, the Ohio high court

determined the use of the word “about” created a content-based restriction requiring

strict scrutiny and that concerns about “mental distress” and controversial

5Also, the Supreme Court of Texas vacated a child custody gag order solely on state constitutional free
speech grounds in Grigsby v. Coker, 904 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1995), as did the Supreme Court of Alaska
in S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
 10

accusations about family members alleged could not justify “virtually unlimited

restraint on the content” of the parties’ speech. Id. at 538-46.

2. The Supreme Court of Mississippi vacated a gag order issued against a

mother in a Youth Court protective custody case involving her newborn son in In re

R.J.M.B., 133 So.3d 335, 339-346 (Miss. 2013). The gag order provided that “no one

in the hearing this date shall disclose information concerning this case to the Media.”

Id. at 339. The court rejected the same reasoning found in the case at bar.

3. The Supreme Court of Hawai’i in In Interest of FG, 421 P.3d 1267 (Haw.

2018), vacated an order prohibiting parents in a family court case from disclosing

their children’s names and other information about their involvement in the foster

care system, wherein one toddler died. The court found that the record could not

support such harsh restrictions on parents’ First Amendment interests. Id. at 1276.

4. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Care and Protection of

Edith, 659 N.E.2d 1174, 1175-76 (Mass. 1996), vacated an order in a child protection

court that the father not “discuss any aspect of the ongoing proceedings with any

member of the media … if it is reasonable to believe that the information

communicated will lead to the identity of the subject children.” The court invalidated

the “unlawful prior restraint on the right of the children’s father to comment on the

judicial proceedings and on the conduct of the department,” noting that “[t]he

department has not identified a compelling State interest that needs protection” and

“[a] general rule that bars any parent from directly or indirectly revealing the names

of children subject to a care and protection proceeding will not do.” Id. at 1177
 11

(citations omitted). More recently, the same court in Shak v. Shak, 144 N.E. 3d 274,

278-280 (Mass. 2020), vacated a “non-disparagement” order issued to divorced

parents as an unconstitutional prior restraint on the father’s freedom of expression.

The court found that no compelling state interest was shown, and that the order

prohibiting social media postings about the case was not the least restrictive remedy.

The court also held that any alleged harm to the child which may stem from the

banned communications was speculative. Id.

5. The Supreme Court of Washington in In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d

161, 163-66 (Wash. 2004) (en banc), vacated an order enjoining a wife from

“knowingly and willfully making invalid and unsubstantiated allegations or

complaints to third parties which are designed for the purpose of annoying,

harassing, vexing, or otherwise harming [her ex-husband] and for no lawful purpose”

as an unconstitutional prior restraint of First Amendment rights.

6. The Supreme Court of Nevada in Johanson v. Eighth Judicial Dist.

Court of State of Nev. ex rel. County of Clark, 182 P.3d 94, 96-100 (Nev. 2008), vacated

as unconstitutional a gag order, apparently implemented to avoid embarrassing the

ex-husband in his judicial re-election campaign, which prevented the parties and

their counsel from disclosing any documents or discussing any portion of the case in

a child support proceeding.

7. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in In re N.B., 146 A.3d 146, 152

(N.H. 2016), reversed an unconstitutional prior restraint of an adoptive

grandmother’s speech in an atypical context. There, the grandmother intended to file

 12

a tort suit on behalf of her two grandchildren against the state child welfare agency

and the child advocates, whose negligence allegedly allowed the children to be

sexually abused. Id. at 147. The juvenile court ordered all potential future filings in

the tort case be sealed and that all allegations of abuse remain confidential. Id. at

148. The New Hampshire high court found the order unconstitutional,

notwithstanding the children’s privacy interests, which could be maintained by

pseudonyms. Id. at 152.

II. Decisions by the high courts in Michigan and Illinois denying

discretionary appeals from intermediate appellate court rulings
affirming such gag orders underscore the importance of the Court’s
definitive resolution of the First Amendment issues presented here,
because it can be reasonably predicted that the majority of states
without controlling jurisprudence will gravitate to Pennsylvania’s
erroneous ruling as the most recent and “enlightened” view of First
Amendment law.
1. In In re Daily, No. 215744, 1999 WL 33429988, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov.

23, 1999) (per curiam), a sweeping gag order was issued in a divorce and child custody

case, based on the “best interest of the child,” enjoining the parties, their counsel, the

employees of the parties or their counsel, the parties’ family members, and the

guardian ad litem from: having contact with the media; commenting “upon the

subject matter of the case”; and allowing the child to be photographed. In the local

newspaper’s appeal, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the gag order 2-1 as

“reasonable restrictions on the persons involved.” Id. at *3. Dissenting Judge

Markman in an extensive First Amendment analysis criticized the lack of any

evidence concerning the child’s best interest and the speculative basis for the order.

Id. at *3-9. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied leave to appeal because it was
 13

“not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.” In re

Macomb Daily, 620 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 2000) (4-2 decision). Justice Young concurred,

but stated, “However, I think that issues regarding the propriety and scope of gag

orders merit further consideration by this Court. Therefore, I support having the

Court open an administrative file to address these issues.” Id. Justice Taylor

dissented, agreeing that there was a “colorable argument” that the gag order

“implicated First Amendment rights” and “appears overly broad in terms of the

people restricted…, [and] the scope of the restrictions.” Id. He suggested a remand

for the trial court to precisely articulate the interests protected and to weigh the

effects on First Amendment rights. Id.

In a companion case, In re Detroit Free Press, No. 210022, 1999 WL 33409948

(Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1999) (per curiam), involving another custody dispute, the

same gag order as in Macomb was also affirmed, with essentially the same compelling

dissent by Judge Markman. The Supreme Court of Michigan also denied leave to

appeal here, because it was “not persuaded that the question presented should be

reviewed by this Court.” 620 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 2000) (4-2 decision).

2. In In Interest of Summerville, 547 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), a

custody case with sexual abuse allegations, a gag order preventing all parties and

attorneys from communicating or discussing matters relating to the case with the

media, and later from revealing the name and whereabouts of the child and the status

of her placement, in order to prevent potential future harm and embarrassment to

the child, was vacated as unconstitutional because the proscribed conduct posed no
 14

serious threat to the integrity of the judicial process. Later, however, in In re J.S.,

640 N.E.2d 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), another sexual abuse allegation custody case, a

gag order forbidding parties and their attorneys from discussing facts of the case with

the media was affirmed as constitutional. Notably, the appellate court stated, “We

fail to see the necessity of discussing details of this case with the news media.” Id. at

1383 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court of Illinois denied review. 647 N.E.2d

1010 (Ill. 1995). That an appellate court would condition the exercise of free speech

rights on the judges’ belief that the speech was necessary, with tacit approval from

the state’s high court, is cause for very grave concern indeed.

III. The free speech rights of parents and their attorneys require
definitive protection, especially when they question governmental
action.
The First Amendment generally forbids the government, including the judicial

branch, “from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech

Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002). These freedoms are essential to our democracy,

which depends upon an informed citizenry to hold government officials accountable,

and to seek redress and change by lawful means. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64

(1964); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). “[S]peech concerning public

affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison,

379 U.S. at 74-75; see also Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School

District, 391 U.S. 563, 567-574 (1968). A primary purpose of the First Amendment is

to “protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Landmark Communications,

Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,

218 (1966)); see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S.
 15

596, 604 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)

(plurality opinion) (the “expressly guaranteed freedoms” of the First Amendment

“share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters

relating to the functioning of government”). This purpose “includes the need: … to

protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, [including] … any

just criticism upon [government officials’] conduct in the exercise of the authority

which the people have conferred upon them.” Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392

(1962) (citation omitted).

The gag order at issue unconstitutionally prevents Petitioners from personally

and professionally commenting on important legal and public policy issues directly

relevant to S.S’s custody ruling. 6 Absent the ability to reference S.S.’s own court

experiences, Petitioners’ calls for legal reform lack vital context. S.S.’s loss of her son,

despite his graphic testimony, invokes topics generating years of legal and media

comment, such as a priori judicial skepticism of abuse evidence in custody cases, 7 the

6 Of note, the 8th Circuit has held that speech concerning sexual abuse of children, accountability for
perpetrators, and healings for victims is protected content-based speech subject to strict scrutiny.
Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests v. Joyce, 779 F.3d 785, 789-791 (8th Cir. 2015).
7
See, e.g., Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light on Family
Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation, 35 LAW & INEQ. 311 (2017); Study Finds
Pervasive U.S. Custody Bias in Favor of Abusive Fathers, 25 (10) NATIONAL BULLETIN ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PREVENTION NL 5 (Oct. 2019); Kee MacFarlane, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce
Proceedings, in SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG CHILDREN, 121-150, 149 (Kee MacFarlane, et al, eds. 1986)
(“[particularly mothers] may automatically be regarded as paranoid, hysterical, or perverted in their
thinking for simply suspecting their ex-husbands of … child sexual abuse… For divorcing mothers,
the assumptions … serve as an insurmountable barrier to getting help. This bias may be so strong
that their reports … of what their children have told them can actually jeopardize their own positions
as future custodians…”); John E.B. Myers, A MOTHER’S NIGHTMARE-INCEST: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
PARENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 107 (1997) (“There are cases—many, I fear—where a father sexually
abuses his child but the child’s mother and her lawyer can’t prove it in court…she is branded a false
 16

use of so-called guardians ad litem in custody cases, 8 sending children reporting

parental abuse to dubious “reunification camps” to convince them to recant their

allegations, 9 and the tragic rejection of children’s abuse reports based on the

debunked “parental alienation” defense. 10 “Parental alienation” drove F’s fate, as the

accuser and an hysterical mother. The judge awards custody to the father! … This disaster—loss of
the child you are desperately trying to protect—could happen to you.”); Mary E. Becker, Double Binds
Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for the
Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13 (1995); Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child
Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 491 (1989); Rita Smith &
Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in
Custody Determinations, 36 JUDGES’ J. 38 (Fall 1997); Michael Gunter, et al., Allegations of Sexual
Abuse in Child Custody Disputes, 19 MED. & L. 815 (2000); John E.B. Myers, “Testilying” in Family
Court, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 499 (2014); Am. Bar Ass’n., Mother Seeks Courtroom Reform for Sexually
Abused Children and Protective Parents, 32 CHILD L. PRAC. 94, June 2013; Paula D. Salinger, True or
False Accusations? Protecting Victims of Child Sexual Abuse During Custody Disputes, 32 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 693 (2001); Thomas D. Lyon & Stacia N. Stolzenberg, Children’s Memory for Conversations
About Sexual Abuse: Legal and Psychological Implications, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 411 (2014);
John E.B. Myers, Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Litigation:
Recommendations for Improved Fact Finding and Child Protection, 28 J. FAM. L. 1 (1989).
8
See, e.g., Richard Ducote, Guardians ad Litem in Private Custody Litigation: The Case for Abolition,
3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 106 (2002); Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian ad Litem
in Child Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 255 (1998); Amy Halbrook, Kentucky’s Guardian ad Litem Litigation: A Model for
Seeking Role Clarity, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 81 (2017); Kristine Simpson, Comment, Mississippi’s
Guardian ad Litem Need Clarification of Their Role and Responsibilities, 84 MISS. L. J. 1065 (2015);
Dale Margolin Cecka, Improper Delegation of Judicial Authority in Child Custody Case: Finally
Overturned, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 181 (2017).
9
See, e.g., App. 128a-155a.
10
See, e.g., Rebecca M. Thomas & James T. Richardson, Parental Alienation Syndrome: 30 Years and
Still Junk Science, 54 JUDGES’ J. 22 (Summer 2015); National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges and State Justice Institute, NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A JUDGE’S GUIDE 19 (2006) (“Richard Gardner’s theory…of ‘parental alienation
syndrome’ or PAS has been discredited by the scientific community. Testimony that a party to a
custody case suffers from the syndrome should therefore be rule inadmissible…’”); Madelyn S.
Milchman, Robert Geffner, & Joan S. Meier, Putting Science and Reasoning Back into the “Parental
Alienation” Discussion: Reply to Bernet, Robb, Lorandos, and Garber, 58 FAM. CT. REV. 375 (2020);
Dana E. Prescott, Forensic Experts and Family Courts: Science or Privilege-By-License?, 28 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 521 (2016); Mary Ann Mason, Ph.D., J.D., THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN
ARE LOSING THE LEGAL BATTLE AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 171 (1999) (“With the PAS model the
voices of children are heard, but they are being used against them. The more fear the child expresses
about the other parent the more likely the child will be taken away from his or her mother and placed
with that parent.”); Carol S. Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation: Getting it
Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 Fam L. Q. 527 (2001); Kimberly J. Joyce, Under the Microscope: The
 17

Superior Court claimed in affirming custody to the father, “The core of this custody

case is not allegations of sexual abuse; it is isolation and alienation.” S.B., 2017 WL

4848400, at *6 (emphasis added). The national media has recently reported critically

on Family Bridges and parental alienation claims (App. 128a-155a), including a May

12-13, 2021, NBC Nightly News exposé addressing fatal results in misguided child

custody rulings (App. 118a). A Michigan judge was publicly censured for her

outrageous treatment of three children in one of these punitive custody

modification/reunification program cases. In re Gorcyca, 902 N.W.2d 828 (Mich.

2017).

IV. The violation of First Amendment rights in family court cases is a

recurring problem which will likely further burgeon without the
Court’s definitive resolution.
1. Judges nationwide have issued similar gag orders in family court cases

for decades. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Provisions of Divorce, Child

Custody, or Child Support Orders as Infringing on Federal or State Constitutional

Guarantees of Free Speech, 2 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2015); Kelly Kanavy, Comment, The

State and the “Psycho Ex-Wife”: Parents’ Rights, Children’s Interest, and the First

Amendment, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1081 (2013). Although the number of un-appealed gag

orders is not documented, state intermediate appellate courts have routinely reversed

Admissibility of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 32 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 53, 86 (2019) (“PAS is
an unreliable theory, and it imposes a remedy that could be devastating to children and families.”);
Cheri L. Wood, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1367 (1994).
 18

them when challenged. See, e.g., Baskin v. Hale, 787 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017);

Jabr v. Jabr, No. A07-2003, 2008 WL 1800138 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2008); In re

Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2008); Kinley v. Kinley, No. A06-865,

2007 WL 2702946 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2007); In re Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d

863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); In re T.T., 779 N.W.2d 602 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009); Delgado v.

Miller, No. 3D20-580, 2020 WL 7050217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2020), aff’d sub

nom J.M. v. A.J.D., No. 3D20-1118, 2021 WL 1660897 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2021); Stanfield

v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families, 698 So.2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997);

State ex rel. L.M., 37 P.3d 1188 (Utah Ct. App. 2001); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 612

N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 88 N.Y.S.3d 234 (N.Y.

App. Div. 2018); Lowinger v. Lowinger, 695 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). See

also Karantinidis v. Karantinidis, 131 N.Y.S.3d 363 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) and Adams

v. Tersillio, 666 N.Y.S.2d 203 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (unconstitutional gag orders

narrowed on appeal).

Another Pennsylvania child custody gag order was attacked in FOCUS v.

Allegheny Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 1996). More recent federal

court challenges to family court gag orders were brought in Nichols v. Sivilli, No.

2:14-3821, 2016 WL 3388296 (D.N.J. June 14, 2016); Argen v. Katz, 821 Fed.Appx.

104 (3d Cir. 2020); and Lindke v. Lane, No. 19-11905, 2021 WL 807727 (E.D. Mich.

Mar. 3, 2021).

2. The new frontier for family court First Amendment intrusions are gag

orders controlling what parents can say to their own children. In J.A.C. v. M.J.C., No.
 19

1652-WDA-2018, 2019 WL 2028727 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 8, 2019), the Pennsylvania

Superior Court affirmed an order that a mother not tell her own daughter that the

father was sexually inappropriate with her half-sister, because that truthful

information “might harm” the child in some way or cause her to shun her father. The

Pennsylvania appellate court apparently believes that “experts” should decide when

to ax a parent’s First Amendment rights. See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech

and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (2006) (discussing

problems with and competing approaches to such gag orders).

3. The decision below will trigger a tsunami of similar cases. As Justice

Wecht wisely observed in his dissent:

Today’s Majority licenses trial courts to enter vague and overbroad gag
orders in any contentious custody case when a judge feels that a parent’s
speech could be deemed to cause emotional harm. Protection of children
from harm is a worthy goal. It can be advanced with a scalpel, rather
than a broadsword. It can never be advanced at the expense of our
Constitutions and the fundamental rights that they guarantee. The
order before us cannot survive strict scrutiny.
App. 55a.
V. On every relevant point of law, the decision below is wrong.
As the gag order prevents Petitioners from speaking publicly or

communicating about S.S.’s case (which trial court record remains unsealed below) in

any manner, it is an overly broad, presumptively unconstitutional prior restraint and

content-based speech restriction which cannot survive strict scrutiny.

A. The gag order is a presumptively unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.

This Court has described prior restraints as “administrative and judicial

orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that
 20

such communications are to occur.” Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550

(1993) (citation omitted). A prior restraint may only be imposed when it furthers “the

essential needs of the public order,” but not when those needs can be achieved

through less restrictive means. Carroll v. President and Com’rs of Princess Anne, 393

U.S. 175, 183-84 (1968); see also Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738 (2005). Even

when a prior restraint may theoretically be constitutionally permissible, it must be

precisely and specifically tailored to meet the exigencies of the particular case without

censoring protected speech. 11 Accordingly, prior restraints must survive the most

exacting scrutiny and are “presumptively unconstitutional.” Nebraska Press Assn. v.

Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); see CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994);

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, J.,

concurring).

Gag orders preventing participants from making extrajudicial statements

about their own case are unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. See United

States v. Scarfo, 264 F.3d 80, 92 (3d Cir. 2001), Johanson, 182 P.3d at 98; WXIA-TV

v. State, 811 S.E.2d 378, 383-84 (Ga. 2018); Twohig v. Blackmer, 918 P.2d 332, 335-

36 (N.M. 1996); Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637, 640-41 (Haw. 1992); Kemner v.

11 For example, general concern for the best interests of the child will not necessarily allow a court to

broadly restrain a parent from making disparaging comments about the other to third parties. See,
e.g., Nash v. Nash, 307 P.3d 40, 49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013); K.D., 929 N.E.2d at 871-72 (reversing as
overbroad an order barring mother from talking to “any media source or others” about allegations in
custody case); T.T., 779 N.W.2d at 621 (vacating order barring parents from disclosing medical
information about their child for lack of evidence “to satisfy the State’s heavy burden to justify this
prior restraint on free speech”).
 21

Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327, 1338 (Ill. 1986); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4,

9 (Tex. 1992). See also Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550; In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907

F.3d 788, 796-97 (4th Cir. 2018); U.S. v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1993);

Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California, 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir.

1985). Petitioners’ gag order is accordingly subject to strict scrutiny, and not

intermediate scrutiny as used below. As the dissent acknowledges, “today’s Majority

avoids this issue [of prior restraint] entirely.” App. 43a.

B. The gag order is a presumptively unconstitutional “content-based” restraint

on speech.
Content-based speech restrictions attack the idea or message a speaker

conveys, such as when the restriction “defin[e]s regulated speech by particular subject

matter.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). Gag orders warrant the

most exacting review because they fester at the intersection of two free speech dead-

ends: prior restraints and content-based restrictions. See Nat’l Inst. of Family and

Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018). The court below erroneously

finds the gag order to be a “content-neutral” restriction on speech because it claims

the order “is not concerned with the content of Mother and her attorney’s speech, but

instead with the target of the speech, namely, Child, a juvenile whose identity and

privacy the court seeks to protect.” App. 10a (emphasis added). There simply is no

reasonable analysis to avoid the obvious fact that the gag order proscribes the

content, i.e., the subject and message of Petitioners’ speech. Because only S.S. and

her counsel, who disagree with the trial court’s custody decision, are muzzled, while
 22

S.B. and his counsel, who celebrate the custody ruling, are unbridled, clearly Judge

Clark dislikes Petitioners’ message and favors S.B.’s.

The high court’s awkward attempt to avoid the content-based label by creating

the novel idea that the supposed “target” of Petitioners’ future speech, the child F,

controls the classification of the gag order, is not only unsupported by any legal

authority, but misunderstands what the “target” of speech refers to, i.e., the intended

unwilling or captive audience of prohibited speech. 12 F is certainly aware,

independently of anything Petitioners say, of his sworn detailed testimony to his

father’s conduct in the custody trial, of the judge’s decision to sever his relationship

with his mother, and of his experiences at the controversial California Family Bridges

“reunification camp”–all of which occurred prior to any of the events triggering the

gag order. As the dissent notes:

12See,e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Veneklase v.
City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001). In a First Amendment context, in addition to the captive
unwilling audience, the “target” of speech refers to a particular person to which patently harmful
speech is directed, such as terroristic threats or child pornography. See, e.g., State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d
1 (Conn. 2018) (terroristic threats); State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017) (child pornography);
Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (harassment protection order); State v.
Boettger, 450 P.3d 805 (Kan. 2019) (true threats directed at particular individuals); A.S. v. Lincoln
County R-III School District, 429 F.Supp. 3d 659 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (bullying speech targeting one
student and substantially disruptive could be disciplined by school officials); Zimmerman v. Board of
Trustees of Ball State University, 940 F.Supp. 2d 875 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (one target student harassed);
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (one student targeted for
harassment and ridicule). None of these elements apply in this case, and F is not a “target” of the
speech.
 23

The restriction … was based upon the content of speech. It was based
upon a particular subject matter. It was based upon the message. It was
directed at the ideas expressed. The first sentence of the gag order
categorically bans [Petitioners] from speaking about the custody case;
the preclusion extends only to that topic and that message. This is the
very essence of a content-based restriction.
App. 46a (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
C. The gag order’s prior restraint and content-based restriction on Petitioners’
speech cannot survive strict scrutiny analysis.
Under Reed, to survive strict scrutiny, the restriction must further a

compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, and it must also

be the “least restrictive means” of furthering that interest. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666.

The gag order at issue is the most egregious of its kind, unsupported by facts or legal

precedent. At no point has any evidence been presented justifying the prior restraint,

and it cannot meet the incredibly high burden constitutionally mandated by this

Court.

Although it dodges the strict scrutiny mandate, the court below still sees the

gag order as narrowly tailored. Its justification for this conclusion is puzzling. The

court claims that, “when read in context,” Petitioners can speak freely “as long as

[they] do so in a manner that protects Child’s identity” and that because the gag order

only applies to Petitioners, this is “further evidence that the gag order was narrowly

crafted.” App. 29a-30a. It cites as additional evidence that the order was “narrowly

crafted” the trial court’s “precise action” of applying the order only to Petitioners, and

not sealing the custody record or imposing any restraints on the press. App. 30a. In

other words, the court below mistakenly views it acceptable under the First

Amendment to impose unprecedented Draconian content-based prior restraints on

 24

speech, so long as the victims of such orders are few in number. Obviously, “narrow

tailoring” applies to the substance of the gag order and not to the census of the

throttled.

The court illogically, but assuredly claims—without any evidence

whatsoever—that the order “leav[es] open ample alternatives for communication of

the information [Petitioners] wanted to express, restricting only the manner by which

that speech could be conveyed.” App. 30a (emphasis added). With all due respect, such

paternalistic guarantees of the court below cannot support a finding that the order is

narrowly tailored. The dissent succinctly sums up the majority’s errors:

The Majority believes that this order provides ample opportunity for
[Petitioners] to express their views. I disagree. In its first sentence, the
order categorically prevents [Petitioners] from speaking or
communicating about the case publicly. There are only two limited and
very specific exceptions for [Petitioners] to express their views, and
Mother is precluded in all circumstances from doing so in her own name,
ostensibly because this might tend to identify Child. This sweeping gag
order all but precludes Mother from speaking about this case to anyone
other than Counsel. Moreover, the order is not limited in time … the
restriction is essentially endless and it is anything but narrowly
tailored.
App. 49a.
While protecting children’s “privacy,” the parameters of which are ad hoc, and

avoiding their embarrassment is certainly laudable, it is reasonable to ask: What

group of children are to be protected by family court gag orders? Sexual abuse

victims? Well, the courts below do not believe F’s testimony that it happened.

Children who were not abused, but think they were? Children who were abused, but

deny it? Children who are not “alienated,” but are afraid of a parent for other reasons?

Depressed children? Happy children? Children with emotional, physical, substance

 25

abuse, educational, or peer-relationship problems? Shy kids? Disappointed kids? Kids

who just defy convention? Adolescents who by nature are embarrassed by any parent?

Maybe, every child involved in a custody case? Or, just maybe every child, period? A

slippery slope, indeed. But, as this Court has held, First Amendment freedoms do not

evaporate simply because the state has in interest in protecting minors—even sex

crime victims—from embarrassment. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.

D. The gag order is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

Where First Amendment interests are at stake, only a precise order “evincing

a legislative [or judicial] judgment that certain specific conduct be limited or

proscribed” is permissible. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963).

“Vague” restrictions on speech offend the First Amendment; restraints on speech

must include “some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what

must stay out.” Minn. Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S.Ct. 1876, 1888 (2018). A gag

order is unconstitutionally vague if it does not give clear guidance regarding the types

of speech for which an individual may be punished. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.

566, 572-73 (1974).

The overbreadth doctrine applies if an order is so broad that it encompasses

and “prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.” Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,

501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991). Courts across the country have held that gag orders

preventing parties and their attorneys from disclosing information about their case
 26

are constitutionally overbroad. 13 There is no question that the gag order here requires

Petitioners to “guess at its contours.” Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048. The limits of the gag

order at issue are endless. The dissent explains the overwhelming sweep of this order:

Without a doubt, Mother and Counsel engage in otherwise

protected activity when they speak about this case pending in our courts.
As they say, this is America. The trial court could only prohibit as much
speech as necessary to protect a compelling state interest, and no more.
Instead, the trial court entered a sweeping order that prohibited Mother
and Counsel from speaking publicly about this case except in starkly
limited form and in two narrow contexts. Even in those two contexts,
Mother could not identify herself. That is, she could not speak her own
name. That latter restriction is breathtaking. If that is not an overly
broad restriction, nothing is.
Turning to vagueness, the Majority brushes this argument aside,
sculpting and applying this creative and paternalistic gloss: “a person of
ordinary intelligence would read the gag order to forbid [Petitioners]
from taking this peculiar custody case to the media in a way that would
harm the psychological and emotional well-being of Child.” If only the
order was so limited.
App. 51a (emphasis added).

The gag order’s vague prohibitions against speaking publicly or

communicating in any manner that would “tend to” identify any of the parties, and

“directing or encouraging” third parties to speak publicly or communicate “about this

case,” are too indefinite to inform Petitioners of exactly what speech is prohibited,

thereby chilling them from constitutional speech for fear of contempt sanctions. The

court below dismisses these concerns as “pedantic,” while in the same breath

13 See, e.g., Johanson, 182 P.3d at 99; Bey, 161 N.E.3d at 543; Kemner, 492 N.E.2d at 1338; Ex Parte

Wright, 166 So.3d 618, 632 (Ala. 2014); Jabr, No. A07-2003, 2008 WL 1800138, at *1, *5; Kinley, No.
A06-865, 2007 WL 2702946, at *5; K.D., 929 N.E.2d at 874; S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 880.
 27

misstates the true limitations of the order: “First, we decline to engage in a pedantic

dissection of the word ‘tend’ as used in the language of the gag order precluding

[Petitioners] from speaking publicly about the custody case in a manner that would

‘tend’ to identify Child.” App. 32a.

This misinterpretation of the wide net cast by the order underscores its

ambiguity. Notably, the gag order does not only preclude Petitioners from speaking

publicly in a way that would “tend to” identify F, but it prohibits Petitioners from

speaking publicly or communicating about this case—period. It also specifically

orders Petitioners, in providing public testimony, to “NOT disclose any information

that would identify or tend to identify the Child” and further orders Petitioners to

“NOT publically [sic] refer to the Defendant, the Child, or the Plaintiff by name or in

any manner that would tend to identify the aforementioned parties.” App. 79a.

While the order technically “allows” S.S. and her attorneys to “disclos[e] entry

of this order” it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which this could be accomplished

without “communicating” about the case, and thus per se violating the order. In

addition to the ways in which the order muzzles Petitioners from lending their voices

to the important discourse surrounding controversial family court decisions, the

egregious legal error and constitutional wrong here is exponentially exacerbated by

the vague and sweepingly broad terms “including, but not limited to, print and

broadcast media, on-line or web-based communications.” App. 78a.

The gag order’s prohibition on “direct[ing] or encourag[ing] third parties to

speak publicly or communicate about this case” and speaking “in any manner that
 28

would tend to identify the aforementioned parties” is a formidable trap. App. 78a.

Notably, Petitioners’ merely sharing publicly that this petition was filed, and

circulating copies seeking amicus support, may violate the gag order as a “discussion

about the case.” How can Petitioners prophesy what might “encourage” an

independent third party to speak about this case? Likewise, who knows what

serendipitous dot-connecting would “tend to” identify Petitioners, S.B., or the child?

Petitioners’ only true safe harbor from the contempt snare is a cocoon of silence.

Consider the range of talk “about this case” which could land Petitioners in hot water.

Are S.S. and her attorneys prevented from even mentioning that they are involved in

this custody case? Does the filing of this petition ipso facto violate the order? Can S.S.

even tell new friends that she has a son, or reminisce about him with old ones? How

can S.S. explain to her cohorts, family, professional peers, spiritual congregants, and

community contacts why this youngster, the light and joy of her daily life, suddenly

and completely evaporated from her universe?

VI. This case is the canary in the constitutional coal mine, and clamors
for the First Amendment firewall to be built here.
From every perspective, this case is fraught with constitutional flaws. Yet, if it

stands, judges nationwide emboldened by its holdings will likely propagate its First

Amendment transgressions into most of the many thousands of child custody cases

litigated daily. Embracing the potent control gifted them, judges will enthusiastically

push the envelope. The distressing ramifications of the ruling below are legion. To

spare children from embarrassment, “privacy invasion,” and other ill-defined

“harms,” judges under the precedent below could bar any parents from complaining
 29

at board meetings about grading policies in their son’s school, cheering too wildly at

their child’s basketball game, meeting with their family’s clergy for guidance on a

daughter’s contraception request, publicly advocating for increased funding for their

teen’s substance abuse treatment, or joining support groups and speaking out for

families with autistic or physically challenged children. Mothers could be banned

from campaigning for more humane conditions in detention centers or psychiatric

facilities where their children reside. Fathers could be muzzled from publicly decrying

institutional indifference to the exploitation of their sons and daughters in scout

troops, gymnastic teams, locker rooms, theatrical auditions, or the sanctuary. Any of

these developments would be disastrous; recent history has clearly taught us that

when children are at risk silence is leaden, not golden.

That some judges in this nation—especially below in America’s oldest

appellate court—believe that the First Amendment countenances demands that a

mother abandon her own name and identity in service of the spectral governmental

interest embraced here is bewildering. In this legal quicksand, judges can arguably

reach into intact families to control what moms and dads are saying to their kids,

should some teacher or social worker take issue with the message. Finally, lawyers

who dare question the legality of it all are “reminded” to stay in line or face

Kafkaesque “disciplinary” consequences.

 30

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD L. DUCOTE, ESQ.

Counsel of Record & In Proper Person
VICTORIA E. MCINTYRE, ESQ.
In Proper Person &
Counsel for Petitioners
318 E. Boston Street, Floor 2
Covington, Louisiana 70433
rducote@ducotelaw.com
(985) 898-2755

May 19, 2021