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Module 6: Indirect Voluntary

Learning Outcomes

At the end of this module, the students should be able to:

1. Define the principle of Double Effect;

This module discusses the principle of double effect, the occasion of evil, the cooperation
of evil and additional modifiers of responsibility

INDIRECT VOLUNTARY

There is a difference between the way in which the act itself is voluntary and the way in
which its consequences are voluntary. Something is directly voluntary when it is the thing
willed, whether it be willed as an end or as means to an end. Something is indirectly
voluntary when it is the unintended but foreseen consequence of something else that is
directly voluntary; the agent does not will this consequence either as end or as means but
sees that he cannot get something else without getting it. The agent wills the cause of which
this is a necessary effect. Thus one who throws a bomb at a king to assassinate him,
knowing that he will kill the king's attend ants also, directly wills the throwing of the bomb
(as means), also directly wills the death of the king (as end), and indirectly wills the death
of the attendants (as consequence) though their death gives him no profit. A consequence,
however, that is neither intended nor foreseen is involuntary, such as the death of one who
unexpectedly rushes up to the king after the bomb has left the thrower's hand.

Note that what we are concerned with here are physical actions that we directly will to do
and that have physical consequences or effects that we do not directly will but foresee and
accept or permit because of the physical effect we want to achieve with our action. Now
there seems to be some significant difference between a per son's directly intending
something and that per son's foreseeing and accepting something else that will happen
along with the effect directly willed. In our example we have been dealing with several
physical evils that result from the assassin's physical action. Of these we must say that as a
killer he is more willing to have the king die than he is to have the attendants die and even
less willing to have innocent bystanders die. Note further that insofar as there is moral evil
in the situation, the moral evil lies in the assassin's will, for he intends (directly wills) to kill
the king, foresees and accepts the deaths of the attendants (indirectly wills these deaths),
and accepts, though he does not necessarily foresee, the deaths of possible innocent
bystanders (indirectly wills these deaths)
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Having examined the voluntariness of the assassin's action with regard to the deaths of the
king, the attendants, and the possible innocent bystanders, we are now in a position to
assess his responsibility for these various deaths. Note once again that the voluntariness of
one's action is the measure of the degree of responsibility that the person has for that
action. The distinction between the directly and the indirectly voluntary acts helps us to
articulate what is happening psychologically, namely, that the assassin by his act directly
intends the death of the king and is willing to accept the foreseen deaths of the attendants
and possibly those of innocent bystanders. All the other deaths apart from the king's are
indirectly willed and so are indirectly voluntary, and these deaths are willingly accepted
precisely because the death of the king is sufficiently important to the assassin to justify, in
his own mind, his acceptance. The assassin must be assigned complete responsibility for
the king's death, but how much responsibility does he have for all the other deaths? Even if
he is reluctant to accept the other deaths, must he accept complete responsibility for them?
He is completely responsible because he is perfectly willing to accept any other deaths as
long as he succeeds in killing the king. Those deaths may be an unfortunate side effect of
the killing of the king, but his foreseeing them was not sufficient to deter him from killing
the king and so he has complete responsibility for them.

Good or indifferent actions also may have evil physical consequences that can be foreseen.
How responsible are we for these physical evils? Must we always refuse to do a good act if
we foresee that it will or can have some physical evil as one of its effects? While we have
not yet established the existence or nature of moral good and evil, much less separated out
the particular factors from which these moral qualities arise, for our present purpose we
can take them on the common sense level on which we began our study: that humans judge
some actions to be good, others bad (evil), and still others indifferent. Our business here is
to determine how responsible one is for the physical consequences of one's actions,
whatever their moral quality, and our examples are mere common sense illustrations.

If we were obliged to avoid every action that will result in physical evil, life in this world
would soon become unlivable, impossible to bear Human beings are limited beings,
Physical evil at tends our life in this world. True, some of it merely happens to us as when
we are beset with violent disruptions of nature such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and
the like, but some are also caused by us. The human situation is such that it gives rise to
value conflicts and to particular situations in which we have to act to achieve some
important good but in so doing we bring about some sort of evil as well. Our situation is
also permeated with human limitations that are not mercy physical but psychological,
sociological, pedagogical, and aesthetic as well. In addition, most situations are very
complex. Nevertheless we must try to do the right thing in spite of the complexities. One
who accepts a job when jobs are scarce cuts someone else out of a livelihood; a doctor who
tends the sick during a plague exposes himself to catching the disease; a lawyer who must
present this bit of evidence to win her case may put an Innocent person under suspicion; or
a teacher who gives a competent examination knows that some will probably fail. The
world in which we live is a mixture of good and evil that affects each of us as we try to live
an upright moral life. We seem to be caught on the horns of a dilemma: either human life
cannot be lived as it actually is, or we are compelled to do evil and to do it voluntarily.
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There is a solution to the dilemma in the principle of the indirect voluntary, commonly
known as the principle of the double effect. This principle has a long history and helps
resolve some of the moral complexity of our lives. The first part of this principle is that no
evil must ever be willed simply for its own sake either as end (goal) or as means, for if the
evil were willed in either of these ways, it would be the direct object in tended by our
willing and would necessarily render our entire action evil, even if there were good,
morally correct consequences that flow from the act. Briefly stated, evil must never be
directly willed, for such an act is directly voluntary. The second part of the principle is that
evil may be willed indirectly, that is to say, as a foreseen but unwanted consequence, such
an act is indirectly voluntary and may be willed only if it can somehow be reduced to an
incidental and unavoidable by-product or side effect in the achievement of some good the
person is rightly seeking.

Though I am never allowed to will evil directly, I am not always bound to prevent the
existence of evil. Just as I may tolerate the existence of evils in the world at large, since I
could not cure them all without bringing other evils on myself or my neighbour, so may
sometimes tolerate evil con sequences from my own actions if to abstain from such actions
would bring a proportionate evil on myself or others. Sometimes I cannot will a good
without at the same time permitting the existence of an evil that in the very nature of
things is inseparably bound up with the god I will. But I must not do so indiscriminately.
Sometimes I am bound to prevent evil, and in these cases it would be wrong for me to
permit it. How can we determine these cases? The principle of double effect says that it is
morally allowable to perform an act that has an evil effect under the following conditions:

1. The act to be done must be good in itself or at least indifferent. This is evident, for if
the act is evil of itself, evil would be chosen directly, either as an end or as a means to an
end, and there could be no question of merely permitting or tolerating it.

2. The good intended must not be obtained by means of the evil effect. The evil must
be only an incidental by-product and not an actual factor in the accomplishment of the
good. If the act has two effects, one good and the other bad, the good effect must not be
accomplished by means of the bad, for then the evil would be directly voluntary as a means.
We may never do evil in order that good may come of it. A good end does not justify the use
of bad means. Hence the good effect must follow at least as immediately and directly from
the original act as the evil effect. It is sometimes said that the evil must not come before the
good, but this may be misunderstood. It is not a question of time but of causality: the good
must not come through or by means of the evil.

3. The evil effect must not be intended for itself but only permitted. The bad effect may
be of its own nature merely a by-product of the act per formed, but if the agent wants this
bad effect, he or she makes it directly voluntary by willing it.
4. There must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.
Though we are not always obliged to prevent evil, we are obliged to prevent a serious evil
by a small sacrifice of our own good. Hence some proportion between the good and evil is
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required. How to estimate the proportion may be difficult in practice. For the present we
can say that the good and the evil should be at least nearly equivalent. If the good is slight
and the evil great, the evil could be called incidental only in a technical sense, and the
obligation to avoid it would be overwhelming Also, if there is any other way of getting the
good effect without the bad effect, this other way must be taken, otherwise there is no
proportionate reason for permitting the evil.

Does the principle of the double effect do away with responsibility for the evil effect that is
merely permitted but not directly intended? Responsibility is measured by voluntariness.
The evil effect is, according to the principle of double effect, indirectly voluntary, that is to
say, not directly willed but foreseen as a consequence of something else that is directly
willed. I get the evil effect and cannot avoid getting it because I want the good that 1 rightly
intend. I am therefore completely responsible for the good as well as for the evil. The
principle of the double effect neither does away with responsibility nor was it intended to
do away with it. Its purpose is, in some conflict situations, to do away with moral blame for
permitting the existence of an evil that cannot be avoided if the good is to be obtained.

The act is not morally allowable unless all four conditions are fulfilled. If any one of them is
not satisfied, even though the other three are, the act is morally wrong. There is no
question here of telling people that in the conditions specified they can go ahead and do
wrong. Rather, it is a way of showing that the action in question is not wrong. The bad
effect spoken of is a physical evil of some kind. The double-effect principle ex presses the
conditions under which one is not morally blameworthy for permitting a physical evil to
happen.

An example will help to illustrate the application of the principle. A man passing by a
burning building dashes in to save a child trapped there, though he may be severely burned
and even lose his life. We recognize his deed as heroic, but its justification is found in the
principle of double effect:

1. The act itself apart from its consequences is merely an act of entering a building. It is
surely an indifferent act and morally allowable.

2. This act has two effects: one good (saving the child) and the other bad (being burned or
even death for the rescuer). However, he does not save the child by means of dying or being
burned but by means of reaching the child and carrying it or throwing it to safety. If he can
do so without harm to himself, so much the better. The good effect is accomplished in spite
of, rather than by means of the bad effect, which is thus made only an incidental
accompaniment in the rescue of the child.

3. If the rescuer were using this chance as an excuse for suicide, he would intend the evil for
itself rather than merely permit it.

4. There is a sufficient proportion: at a minimum, a life for a life. To enter a burning

A few more cases will show how one or another of these four conditions can be violated:

1. An employee of a bank embezzled money to pay for the care of his sick child, hoping to
pay it back later. Here the act itself of embezzlement (taking money belonging to another
and falsifying the accounts) is neither good nor in different but wrong, and it cannot be
justified by any good intentions or good effects that might follow. He must try to raise the
money in some other way, and for the purposes of this example we stipulate that it is
possible for him to do so. The first condition is violated, and the evil is directly voluntary.

2. A man living with an alcoholic rich uncle stocks the house with liquor, knowing that he
will inherit a fortune when the uncle has drunk himself to death. For purposes of this
example we stipulate that the uncle simply has no control over himself in the presence of
alcohol. The act of stocking the house with liquor is indifferent in itself. It has two effects,
bad for the uncle by occasioning his death, and good for the heir by bringing him his
inheritance sooner. But the money cannot be inherited except through the uncle's death.
The good effect (obtaining the money sooner) is accomplished by means of the bad effect
(the uncle's death), and thus the sec one condition is violated.

3. A political boss distributes money to poor people to get them to vote for an unworthy
candidate. Here the giving of money to the poor is a good act. The good effect (relieving
poverty) is not accomplished by means of the bad effect (electing an unworthy candidate)
but rather the other way round, the bad effect through the good, But here the third
condition is violated because the evil effect, the election of the unworthy candidate; is
directly intended as the end,

4. The owner of a private plane has his pilot fly him through exceedingly dangerous
weather to complete a business deal that will net him a small profit. To fly a plane is an
indifferent act; the danger has to do with the possible effect rather than with the act itself.
The good effect (completing the business deal) is not obtained by means of the bad effect
(possible loss of life). The bad effect is not intended for its own sake, for neither wants to
die. But the fourth condition can easily be violated here, for there does not seem to be a
sufficient proportion between the risk to their lives and the rather slight financial
advantage to be gained. There is always a risk in flying, of course, and financial advantage
can be great enough to justify it, but for the sake of an example we presuppose an excessive
risk.

Though the foregoing examples show how the principle of double effect can be violated,
many of the ordinary actions of life find their justified action in a correct application of the
principle. Thus people may take dangerous occupations to earn a livelihood, firemen and
policemen can risk their lives to save others, a surgeon can operate even though he may
cause pain, a man can vindicate his honor or rectify past wrongs even though other
people's reputations suffer from his disclosures, or the people may be subjected to great
sacrifices to defend their country. If a per. son were obliged to avoid every deed to which
evil could be incidental, we could do so little that we might as well stop living.
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS

Only the person who knowingly and willingly does an act can be responsible for it. In this
sense no one can be responsible for the acts of another person. But we are responsible each
for our own acts insofar as we knowingly and willingly intend to permit them to affect
another person as in incentives to good or evil. The ways in which we can help our
neighbor to god or ill are so numerous that it would be impossible to list them. It will be
useful here, since we have just discussed the double-effect principle, to consider two ways
in which we must try to avoid doing moral harm to other people, and how far this
avoidance is possible.

Occasion of Evil

The word scandal originally meant a stumbling block, and metaphorically something we
trip on and fall over in our moral career. Now the word has lost its force and means only
shocking conduct and juicy gossip. To regain the old meaning we shall call it occasion of
evil. It is any word or deed tending to lead, entice, or allure another person into
wrongdoing. It may be only given, or only taken, or both given and taken, so that the
question of responsibility may arise on either side or on both.

We give occasion of evil to another directly if we intend his or her evil act either as an end
or as a means. To intend it as an end would signify a truly diabolical hatred, for such an
intention looks to the moral destruction of the other per son. The usual motive for inducing
others to evil, however, is to use the other's evil doing as a means to one's own profit, as do
those who make their living by selling addictive drugs. The direct voluntariness of this
direct giving of occasion of evil makes for complete responsibility for the evil on the part of
the giver. The taker's responsibility is also complete if the evil is done knowingly and
willingly; his or her responsibility may be diminished by any of the modifiers of
responsibility discussed above.

We give occasion of evil to another indirectly if we do not intend the other person's evil act
either as end or as means but foresee it as a consequence of something else we do. Care for
our neighbor's moral welfare obliges us to avoid even this as far as possible, but life would
be intolerably difficult if we had to avoid all actions in which others might find an occasion
to do evil. Here the principle of double effect applies: the act we do must not be wrong in
itself though we foresee it will be a temptation to another; the good effect we intend must
not be accomplished by means of the other's evil act; we must not want but only permit the
other's temptation; and there must be a proportionate reason for permitting it.

Occasion of evil is taken but not given when someone with peculiar subjective dispositions
is led to evil by another person's innocent words or deeds. It may be due to the taker's
malice, and then is wholly the taker's responsibility. Or it may be due to the taker's
weakness, to his ignorance, youth, inexperience, prejudices, violent emotions, or
unconquered habits. Love of other human beings requires us to avoid words and actions,
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otherwise harmless, that might be a source of moral danger to the innocent or the weak.
But sometimes such situations cannot be avoided, and it is here that the principle of double
effect comes into play.

Cooperation in Evil

Cooperation in another's evil deed may occur by joining that person in the actual
performance of the act or by supplying him or her with the mean's for performing it. If two
men plan a robbery, one may hold the gun while the other relieves the victim of his
valuables, or one may lend the other a gun to enable him to carry out the robbery alone. In
either case one not only helps another to do evil but also knowingly and willingly joins in
his evil intention. This is known as formal cooperation and all the cooperators share
completely in the responsibility for the act.

A lesser variety of cooperation occurs when without approving another's wrongdoing one
helps him perform his evil act by an action of one's own that is not of its nature evil. Thus
an employee is forced by robbers to open the safe, or the driver of a car is compelled by
gangsters to drive them to the scene of intended murder. This is known as material
cooperation. There is nothing wrong in what I do or in what I intend, but there is the bad
circumstance that my otherwise innocent act aids others in their wrong doing.
Consequently, if there is a proportionately grave reason for permitting this evil
circumstance, material cooperation can be justified by the principle of double effect. Since
the act I do is not wrong in itself, since I do not use the other's evil deed as a means to any
end of my own, and since I have no wrong intention and so no moral responsibility for the
other's evil act, the only remaining difficulty is that of the proportion. This proportion must
be estimated by the following:

1. The amount of evil my cooperation helps others to do

2. The amount of evil that will happen to me if I refuse to cooperate

3. The closeness of my cooperative act to the others evil act

The first two points are only common sense and are formally justified in a later chapter by
the principles bearing on a conflict of rights. My duty to my fellow man does not oblige me
to suffer an injury greater than or equal to that which I am trying to ward off from him, but
it does oblige me to suffer a small loss to prevent a great loss from happening to another,
and it may even oblige me to sacrifice my life to prevent a huge public calamity. The third
point, however, needs some further explanation.

Cooperation may be proximate or remote, de pending on how close it comes to the actual
evil deed of the principal agent. The more proximate the cooperation, the greater the
proportionate reason needed to allow material cooperation.
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If no one else could be substituted to help in the evil act, I have a greater obligation because
I can actually prevent the act from happening, and I should have a proportionately greater
reason. Also, greater reason is required to justify material cooperation by persons who
have an explicit duty to prevent that particular kind of evil from happening. This would
occur if a soldier were forced to cooperate with the enemy, a policeman with criminals, a
watchman with burglars, a customs officer with smugglers. The forms that cooperation can
take are too numerous to mention, for it is possible to cooperate with almost any act, at
least by encouragement and support. Hired workers, because they engage their services to
a company whose policy they do not determine, are particularly open to the danger of
material cooperation. One should not keep a job with a company that continually and
habitually does a morally objectionable business. If it does so only occasionally, employees
need not be disturbed so long as their material cooperation is kept remote but if they find
that proximate material cooperation is demanded of them fairly frequently, they should
have a grave reason for continuing in their job and should meanwhile make an earnest
effort to obtain other work.