KULAYAN V.
TAN
G.R. No. 187298; July 03, 2012
Ponente: J. Sereno
Doctrine:
While the President is still a civilian, ArticleII, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian
president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3,
when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial,
legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require
that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine
military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of
the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.
Facts:
In view of the kidnapping of members from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) incident on January 15, 2009 by a group whose leader is linked to the Abu
Sayaf Group, the Governor Tan of Sulu organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF),
a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were
redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul and later on issued Proclamation No. 1,
Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of
Sulu and accordingly, called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions
necessary to ensure public safety. Governor Tan justified his proclamation, citing the
kidnapping incident as a terrorist attack. The implementing rules of Proclamation No.
1 was eventually distributed.
Petitioners contends that Proclamation 1-09 is a violation of Sections 1 and 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling- out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Respondents, on the other hand, deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires,
as Governor Tan allegedly acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 46 of the LGC, which
empowers the Provincial Governor to carry emergency measures during calamities and
disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
supress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedetion.
Issue:
Whether local executives may exercise calling-out power pursuant to Section 465, in
relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code to suppress disorder within the
local government unit.
Held:
No. The Constitution grants upon the President, to whom executive power is solely
vested, the exercise of the calling-out power to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. The respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the
power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police and his own CEF. The calling-
out powers contemplated under the Constitution is "exclusive" to the President.
Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as
the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or
natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly
empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences.
But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a
disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to justify
their actions.
In all situations involving threats to security, such as lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses the sole
authority to exercise calling-out powers.
