PEOPLE vs DE VERA 6) Thereafter, the trial court convicted De Vera and his co-accused

G.R. No. 128966 AUGUST 18, 1999 Garcia of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the
Plaintiff-appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Accused: EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y the victim. In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial
GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER CASTRO court found that the killing was attended by treachery, evident
Appellant: EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was
enough to qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted
Course Topic: Accomplices generic aggravating circumstances;
7) The trial court explained that the evidence established evident
FACTS:
1) Edwin de Vera y Garcia, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth premeditation, for Florendo’s group acted with deliberate
forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of
Florendo and Elmer Castro, was charged with Murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in connection with the killing of the criminal design. Treachery was also proven, because the attack
was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the
one Frederick Capulong;
execution of the criminal design without risk to the group;
2) De Vera and Garcia pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The
8) There was also abuse of superior strength, because the
other two accused, Florendo and Castro, were at large. Trial in due
course proceeded only against De Vera and Garcia; attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and
weapons. Furthermore, the trial court found that it was indeed
3) During trial, the prosecution presented as witness one Florendo who actually shot the victim;
Bernardino Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II,
9) However, it convicted De Vera as a principal because the
Quezon City;
scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly and
4) Bernardino Cacao testified that a bout 1:30 in the afternoon of substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four
June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the witness saw a car accused. Aggrieved, de Vera appealed his conviction before the
passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with four Supreme Court.
(4) other passengers. He recognized and identified two of the
passengers as Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar ISSUES:
in the subdivision. He saw the victim dragged out of the car by
Florendo and brought to a grassy place. Florendo was holding a gun. 1) WON appellant De Vera should be convicted as principal or
accomplice.
Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and fired the gun at
the victim, hitting him between the eyes, After the shooting,
RULING:
Florendo and his companions fled in different directions;
5) Aside from Cacaos testimony, the prosecution also presented The court partially granted the appeal. Appellant De Vera is
De Veras’ extrajudicial statement which established that he knew convicted as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of
that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three co- murder. He is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years
accused were carrying weapons and that he acted as and 1 day of  prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1
a lookout to watch for passersby; day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they
The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however,
that could inculpate De Vera. Aside from the fact that he was inside know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided
the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it
amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do
conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a
indicating a common design to commit murder. Such suppositions crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed;
they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its
The Revised penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime;
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not
of a felony and decide to commit it." To prove conspiracy, the essential to the perpetration of the offense.
prosecution must establish the following three requisites: "(1) that
two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement
concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of
the felony [was] decided upon." Except in the case of the
mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the accused
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court
has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous
agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced
from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted
action and community of interest.

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as

"those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." The
Court has held that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal
design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally
therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be
committed just the same." To hold a person liable as an accomplice,
two elements must be present: (1) the "community" of criminal
design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the
performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.