Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle's Politics

The work which has come down to us under the title POLITIKA appears to be less an integrated
treatise than a loosely related collection of essays or lectures on various topics in political
philosophy, which may have been compiled by a later editor rather than by Aristotle. The
following topics are discussed in the eight books:

I Naturalness of the city-state and of the household

II Critique of ostensibly best constitutions

III General theory of constitutions

IV Inferior constitutions

V Preservation and destruction of constitutions

VI Further discussion of democracy and oligarchy

VII–VIII Unfinished outline of the best constitution

This ordering of the books reflects, very roughly, the program for the study of constitutions
which concludes the Nicomachean Ethics:

First, then, if any particular point has been treated well by those who have gone before us, we
must try to review it; then from the constitutions that have been collected we must try to see what
it is that preserves and destroys each of the constitutions, and for what reasons some city-states
are well governed and others the reverse. For when these things have been examined, we will
perhaps better understand what sort of constitution is best, and how each is structured, and which
laws and customs it uses. Let us then begin our discussion. [X.9.1181b15–23]

However, scholars have raised problems with the Politics as we have it. The first concerns the
intended order of its eight books. Some (including W. L. Newman) have questioned the
traditional ordering, arguing that the discussion of the best constitution (books VII–VIII) should
follow directly after book III. Indeed, book III concludes with a transition to a discussion of the
best constitution (although this may be due to a later editor). However, cross-references between
various passages of the Politics indicate that books IV–V–VI form a connected series, as do
books VII–VIII, but these series do not refer to each other. Nonetheless, both series refer back to
book III which in turn refers to book I. Moreover, book II refers back to book I and refers
forward to both series. With some oversimplification, then, the Politics is comparable to a tree
trunk supporting two separate branches: the root system is I, the trunk is II–III, and the branches
are IV–V–VI and VII–VIII. (The summary at the end of Nicomachean Ethics X.9 describes only
the visible part of the tree.)

The second problem concerns the order in which the books were actually written. If they were
composed at very different dates, they might represent discordant stages in the development of
Aristotle's political philosophy. For example, Werner Jaeger argued that books VII–VIII contain
a youthful utopianism, motivating Aristotle to emulate his teacher Plato in erecting “an ideal
state by logical construction.” In contrast, books IV–VI are based on “sober empirical study.”
Other scholars have seen a more pragmatic, even Machiavellian approach to politics in books
IV–VI. A difficulty for this interpretation is that in book IV Aristotle regards the business of
constructing ideal constitutions as perfectly compatible with that of addressing actual political
problems. Although much ink has been spilled since Jaeger attempted to discern different
chronological strata in the Politics, it has resulted in no clear scholarly consensus. Because there
is no explicit evidence of the dates at which the various books of the Politics were written,
argument has turned on alleged discrepancies between different passages.

This leads to the third problem, whether there are major inconsistencies of doctrine or method in
the Politics. For example, Aristotle's account of the best constitution assumes his theory of
justice, a moral standard which cannot be met by the actual political systems (democracies and
oligarchies) of his own day. He does discuss practical political reforms in books IV–VI but more
in terms of stability than justice. Some commentators view books IV–VI as a radical departure
from the political philosophy of the other books, while others find a great deal of coherence
among the books. Resolution of this problem requires careful study of the Politics as a whole.
Presuppositions of Aristotle's Politics

Aristotle's political philosophy is distinguished by its underlying philosophical doctrines. Of

these the following five principles are especially noteworthy:

(1) Principle of teleology Aristotle begins the Politics by invoking the concept of nature. In

the Physics Aristotle identifies the nature of a thing above all with its end or final cause
(Physiscs II.2.194a28–9, 8.199b15–18). The end of a thing is also its function (Eudemian
Ethics II.1.1219a8), which is its defining principle (Meteorology IV.12.390a10–11). On
Aristotle's view plants and animals are paradigm cases of natural existents, because they have a
nature in the sense of an internal causal principle which explains how it comes into being and
behaves (Phys. II.1.192b32–3). For example, an acorn has an inherent tendency to grow into an
oak tree, so that the tree exists by nature rather than by craft or by chance. The thesis that human
beings have a natural function has a fundamental place in the Eudemian
Ethics II.1, Nicomachean Ethics I.7, and Politics I.2. The Politics further argues that it is part of
the nature of human beings that they are political or adapted for life in the city-state. Thus
teleology is crucial for the political naturalism which is at the foundation of Aristotle's political
philosophy. (For discussion of teleology see the entry on Aristotle's biology.)

(2) Principle of perfection Aristotle understands good and evil in terms of his teleology. The
natural end of the organism (and the means to this end) is good for it, and what defeats or
impedes this end is bad. For example, he argues that animals sleep in order to preserve
themselves, because “nature operates for the sake of an end, and this is a good,” and sleeping is
necessary and beneficial for entities which cannot move continuously (De Somno 2.455b17–22).
For human beings the ultimate good or happiness (eudaimonia) consists in perfection, the full
attainment of their natural function, which Aristotle analyzes as the activity of the soul according
to reason (or not without reason), i.e., activity in accordance with the most perfect virtue or
excellence (EN I.7.1098a7–17). This also provides a norm for the politician: “What is most
choiceworthy for each individual is always the highest it is possible for him to attain” (Pol.
VII.14.1333a29–30; cf. EN X.7.1177b33–4). This ideal is to be realized in both the individual
and the city-state: “that way of life is best, both separately for each individual and in common for
city-states, which is equipped with virtue” (Pol. VII.1.1323b40–1324a1). However, Aristotle
recognizes that it is generally impossible to fully realize this ideal, in which case he invokes a
second-best principle of approximism: it is best to attain perfection, but, failing that, a thing is
better in proportion as it is nearer to the end (see De Caelo II.12.292b17–19).

Aristotle's perfectionism was opposed to the subjective relativism of Protagoras, according to

which good and evil is defined by whatever human beings happened to desire. Like Plato,
Aristotle maintained that the good was objective and independent of human wishes. However, he
rejected Plato's theory that the good was defined in terms of a transcendent form of the good,
holding instead that good and evil are in a way relative to the organism, that is, to its natural end.

(3) Principle of community Aristotle maintains that the city-state is the most complete

community, because it attains the limit of self-sufficiency, so that it can exist for the sake of the
good life (Pol. I.2.1252b27–30). Individuals outside of the city-state are not self-sufficient,
because they depend on the community not only for material necessities but also for education
and moral habituation. “Just as, when perfected, a human is the best of animals, so also when
separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all” (1253a31–3). On Aristotle's view, then,
human beings must be subject to the authority of the city-state in order to attain the good life.
The following principle concerns how authority should be exercised within a community.

(4) Principle of rulership Aristotle believes that the existence and well-being of any system
requires the presence of a ruling element: “Whenever a thing is established out of a number of
things and becomes a single common thing, there always appears in it a ruler and ruled …. This
[relation] is present in living things, but it derives from all of nature” (1254a28–32). Just as an
animal or plant can survive and flourish only if its soul rules over its body (Pol. I.5.1254a34–
6, De Anima I.5.410b10–15; compare Plato Phaedo 79e-80a), a human community can possess
the necessary order only if it has a ruling element which is in a position of authority, just as an
army can possess order only if it has a commander in control. Although Aristotle follows Plato in
accepting this principle, he rejects Plato's further claim that a single science of ruling is
appropriate for all (see Plato Statesman 258e-259c. For Aristotle different forms of rule are
required for different systems: e.g., political rule for citizens and despotic rule for slaves. The
imposition of an inappropriate form of rule results in disorder and injustice. This point becomes
clearer in the light of the following corollary of the principle of rulership.

(5) Principle of the rule of reason Aristotle agrees with Plato's dictum that, whenever a system
contains a rational element, it is appropriate for it to rule over the nonrational part, because the
rational element alone knows what is best for the whole (see Plato Republic IV.441e). Aristotle
elaborates on this principle: observing that different individuals can expemplify rationality in
different ways and to different degrees, he maintains that different modes of rule are appropriate
for different sorts of ruler and subject. For example, a child has a deliberative capacity, but it is
undeveloped and incomplete in comparison with an adult's, so that a child is a fit subject for
paternal rule by its father; but paternal rule would be inappropriate between two adults who both
have mature rational capacities (see Politics I.13 and III.6). In a political context the principle of
the rule of reason also implies that different constitutions are appropriate for different city-states
depending on the rational capacities of their citizens. This is an important consideration, for
example, in Aristotle's discussions of democracy and the rule of law (see Politics III.11 and 15–
16).

The aforementioned principles account for much of the distinctive flavor of Aristotle's political
philosophy, and they also indicate where many modern theorists have turned away from him.
Modern philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes have challenged the principles of teleology and
perfectionism, arguing against the former that human beings are mechanistic rather than
teleological systems, and against the latter that good and bad depend upon subjective preferences
of valuing agents rather than on objective states of affairs. Liberal theorists have criticized the
principle of community on the grounds that it cedes too much authority to the state. Even the
principles of rulership and of the rule of reason — which Aristotle, Plato, and many other
theorists regarded as self-evident — have come under fire by modern theorists like Adam Smith
and F. A. Hayek who argued that social and economic order may arise spontaneously as if by an
“invisible hand.” Modern neo-Aristotelian political theorists are committed to defending one or
more of these doctrines (or a modified version of them) against such criticisms.
Political Naturalism

Aristotle lays the foundations for his political theory in Politics book I by arguing that the city-
state and political rule are “natural.” The argument begins with a schematic, quasi-historical
account of the development of the city-state out of simpler communities. First, individual human
beings combined in pairs because they could not exist apart. The male and female joined in order
to reproduce, and the master and slave came together for self-preservation. The natural master
used his intellect to rule, and the natural slave employed his body to labor. Second, the
household arose naturally from these primitive communities in order to serve everyday needs.
Third, when several households combined for further needs a village emerged also according to
nature. Finally, “the complete community, formed from several villages, is a city-state, which at
once attains the limit of self-sufficiency, roughly speaking. It comes to be for the sake of life, and
exists for the sake of the good life” (I.2.1252b27–30).

Aristotle defends three claims about nature and the city-state: First, the city-state exists by
nature, because it comes to be out of the more primitive natural associations and it serves as their
end, because it alone attains self-sufficiency (1252b30-1253a1). Second, human beings are by
nature political animals, because nature, which does nothing in vain, has equipped them with
speech, which enables them to communicate moral concepts such as justice which are formative
of the household and city-state (1253a1-18). Third, the city-state is naturally prior to the
individuals, because individuals cannot perform their natural functions apart from the city-state,
since they are not self-sufficient (1253a18-29). These three claims are conjoined, however, with
a fourth: the city-state is a creation of human intelligence. “Therefore, everyone naturally has the
impulse for such a [political] community, but the person who first established [it] is the cause of
very great benefits.” This great benefactor is evidently the lawgiver (nomothetês), for the legal
system of the city-state makes human beings just and virtuous and lifts them from the savagery
and bestiality in which they would otherwise languish (1253a29–39).

Aristotle's political naturalism presents the difficulty that he does not explain how he is using the
term “nature” (phusis). In the Physics nature is understood as an internal principle of motion or
rest (see III.1.192b8–15). (For discussion of nature see Aristotle's Physics.) If the city-state were
natural in this sense, it would resemble a plant or an animal which grows naturally to maturity
out of a seed. However, this seemingly cannot be reconciled with the important role which
Aristotle also assigns to the lawgiver as the one who established the city-state. For on Aristotle's
theory a thing either exists by nature or by craft; it cannot do both. (This difficulty is posed by
David Keyt.) One way to escape this dilemma is to suppose that he speaks of the city-state as
“natural” in special sense of the term. For example, he might mean that it is “natural” in the
extended sense that it arises from human natural inclinations (to live in communities) for the
sake of human natural ends, but that it remains unfinished until a lawgiver provides it with a
constitution. (This solution was proposed by Ernest Barker and defended subsequently by Fred
Miller and Trevor Saunders.) Another way of solving the dilemma is to understand legislation as
an “internal movement” of the city-state rather than the activity of an external agent. (This
approach is defended recently by Adriel Trott.)