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Mexico City Disaster: A Thirty-Year Perspective: What Have We Learned?

The 1984 Mexico City disaster was caused by a series of explosions at a PEMEX LPG storage and distribution terminal that killed over 500 people. Contributing factors included inadequate protective systems, mechanical integrity issues, poor emergency response, and a lack of safety planning and community awareness. In the 30 years since, PEMEX has experienced numerous other serious incidents, highlighting ongoing process safety issues.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
166 views21 pages

Mexico City Disaster: A Thirty-Year Perspective: What Have We Learned?

The 1984 Mexico City disaster was caused by a series of explosions at a PEMEX LPG storage and distribution terminal that killed over 500 people. Contributing factors included inadequate protective systems, mechanical integrity issues, poor emergency response, and a lack of safety planning and community awareness. In the 30 years since, PEMEX has experienced numerous other serious incidents, highlighting ongoing process safety issues.

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You are on page 1/ 21

Mexico City Disaster: A Thirty-Year Perspective

What have we learned?

Juliana Guarguati
Master’s Student in Safety Engineering
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center

March 10, 2016


Juliana Guarguati Ariza

 I was born and raised in


Bucaramanga, Colombia

 Bachelor’s degree in Industrial


Engineering at Pontificia
Universidad Javeriana,
Colombia

 HSE Engineer at
Ecopetrol in Colombia

 Master’s Student in Safety


Engineering at Texas A&M
University

2
Outline

Mexico City
incident

What have
we
learned?

Conclusions and
recommendations

3
Incident Overview [2,3]

November 19th, 1984.

San Juan, Mexico City.

A major fire and a series


Fig 1. Mexico City explosion [3]
of explosions in PEMEX
LPG Terminal.

Over 500 people were


killed, 7,000 injured and
200,000 people were
evacuated.
Fig 2. Terminal after the explosion [6]

4
Incident Background [1,2]

 Storage & Distribution facility for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).


 At the time of the disaster the storage was estimated to contain
11,000 – 12,000 m3 LPG.

 6 large spherical tanks Private gas


(2 largest - 2400m3) distributors within
 48 smaller tanks of various sizes 100-200 m from
the facility

40% of gas
supply of
Mexico City Terminal Before
PEMEX PEMEXHousing within
Terminal After130 m
from the storage tanks
Fig 4. PEMEX Terminal Before[10] Fig 5. PEMEX Terminal After[10]
Fig 3. Layout of the facility[8]

5
Sequence of Events [4,10]

Rupture of 8 in. Police alerted Series of Rescue work at


pipe. A vapor First explosion and civilian weaker its
cloud was (BLEVE)
traffic stopped explosions height
formed

8:00
5:30 5:40 5:45 5:46 6:00 7:01 7:30 11:00 23:00
18:00

Flames
Ignition of gas Second BLEVE Last explosion on Last
cloud. Violent seismograph extinguished
(One of the explosion
combustion. (BLEVE) on last large
most violent)
sphere

6
Incident Analysis

 Vapor cloud:
Estimated size: 200m x 150m
x 2m high [5].

100 m  Ignition source:


Ground flare at the bottling
plant [3].
200 m
 Explosions:
In total there were 9
explosions (The second and
300 m
seventh were the most
severe) [1].
 Effects of missiles:
The majority of damage
occurred within 300m away [1].
Fig 6. Damage to housing area and fall of missiles [1]

7
Previous PEMEX incidents [2]

• Fire and • Gas • Gas • Ammonia

Los Pajaritos, Veracruz


Acachapan, Tabasco

Colmenas, Tabasco
explosion pipeline pipeline gas
San Juan Ixhuatepec

near explosion explosion pipeline


storage leak
tanks
• 11 dead • Settlement • 4 dead
• Residents and 44 destroyed and 29
evacuated injured injured

March April June July


1984 1984 1984 1984

8
Contributing Factors Mexico City Incident [3,4,5,10]

Hazard  No formal hazard identification process was carried out.


identification  Lack of awareness of potential death toll if a BLEVE
occurred.

 Additional relief valve was needed for the pipeline as the flow
Management had been increased.
of change  Additional tankage had been installed with much closer spacing.

Plant
 Inadequate positioning of the tanks (Domino effect).
layout

 Victims were located within a 300m radius of the center of


Land use the terminal.
planning  Lack of effective planning and safety legislation.

9
Contributing Factors Mexico City Incident [3,4,5,10]

 The water spray system was inadequate and disabled.


Protective
 Lack of gas detector system.
systems
 Emergency isolation was initiated too late.

Mechanical  Inadequate maintenance and inspection program.


integrity  Pressure gauges were inaccurate and in bad shape.

 Lack of alarm systems and evacuation routes.


Emergency
 Lack of awareness of potential death toll if a BLEVE had
response
occurred.

Training  Lack of training of workers and the community regarding


hazard identification.

10
PEMEX thirty years later [16,17,18]
Fire and explosion
7 injured and environmental impact
Pajaritos Terminal explosion
2004 8 dead and 14 injured
2005
Leak at the Cadereyta refinery
2006 1 dead and 2 injured
2007 Gas facility explosion
Veracruz explosion 2010 30 dead
2 dead and 13 injured
2011 Madero refinery
Gas and oil leak 2012 4 dead and 8 injured
20 dead
2013
San Martin explosion
2014
30 dead and 52 injured
2015
Central building explosion
2016
33 dead and 125 injured
Platform fire 3 dead and
4 dead and 16 injured 7 injured

11 Fig 7. PEMEX Platform fire 2015 [21]


PEMEX thirty years later [16,17,18]

Number of incidents
Mechanical
231 239
Integrity: 64% 211 223
203
188
164 164
149

Land Use 36%


Planning: 44%
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Fig 7 . Adapted from Mexico newspaper “El Horizonte” [13]

Emergency
197 accidents 21 fatalities
Planning: 44% per year per year

12
Land use Planning San Juan [6]

27 facilities in the area


(6 million LPG liters)

In 2009 only 34% of the young


population knew about the
incident

In 1984 the president issued a


regulation in which gas
companies had to leave the area

Fig 8. Land use planning San Juan, Mexico City [6]

13
Catastrophic recent incidents [14,15]
West Fertilizer explosion - 2013 Tianjin explosion - 2015

15 fatalities and more than 173 fatalities and more


260 injured than 797 injured
Fig 9. West Fertilizer explosion 2013 [22] Fig 10. Tianjin explosion 2015 [23]

Poor hazard Inadequate


Land use
emergency
awareness planning
planning

14
Similar incidents in US [14]
Mechanical integrity Management of
Change

22 incidents 21 incidents
Fig 11. Mechanical integrity [26] Fig 12. Management of change [27]

Land use Planning Emergency Planning


Plant Layout Hazard Communication

12 incidents 26 incidents
Fig 13. Land use planning [25] Fig 14. Emergency response [24]
15
Conclusions and recommendations

 The chemical and petroleum industry should ensure that lessons learned
are communicated and implemented.

 Companies must report significance accidental releases in the framework


of the RMP. However, how much of this information is used for further
prevention?

 Companies should implement a corporate memory system to ensure


sharing knowledge within the company, especially with new employees,
and others companies.

 Agencies and government should ensure that regulations are well


established and the compliance is inspected by qualified experts.

 Governments have to ensure the implementation of process safety


courses in universities. As well as training in hazard awareness for
emergency responders and the community.

16
Conclusions and recommendations cont.

 Expert authorities in the field should encourage the use and


understanding of databases and academic resources in order to
ensure that companies are up to date regarding process safety
practices.

 Companies should ensure that incident investigations are


performed by qualified professionals and the identification of root
causes are not masked by intermediary causes.

 Companies should implement effective process safety metrics,


analyze them and take actions of any potential failure. These
metrics must take into account near misses.

 Companies should promote reporting of near misses by


employees with a culture of no blame or repercussions.

17
Acknowledgements

 Dr. Mannan
 Dr. Waldram
 Dr. Pasman
 All the members of the Steering Committee
 All the members of the MKOPSC

18
References
[1] C.M. Pietersen, Analysis of the LPG-disaster in Mexico city, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Volume 20,
December 1988, Pages 85-107, ISSN 0304-3894.
[2] Johnson, Kirsten. "State and community during the aftermath of Mexico City's November 19, 1984 Gas
Explosion." (1985).
[3] Atherton, John Gil, Frederic. (2008). Incidents That Define Process Safety. Center for Chemical Process
Safety/AIChE.
[4] Mannan, Sam. (2005). Lees' Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volumes 1-3 (3rd Edition).
[5] http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/casepemex84.htm [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[6] http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/graficos/especial/EU_sanjuanico/index.html [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nngeCe8Kni8 [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[8] López-Molina, Antioco, Richart Vázquez-Román, and Christian Díaz-Ovalle. "Aprendizajes del Accidente de San
Juan Ixhuatepec-México." Información tecnológica 23.6 (2012): 121-128. [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[9] G. Arturson, The tragedy of San Juanico—the most severe LPG disaster in history, Burns, Volume 13, Issue 2,
April 1987, Pages 87-102, ISSN 0305-4179.
[10] http://www.unizar.es/guiar/1/Accident/San_Juan.htm [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[11] http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs037/1102467289629/archive/1102479634308.html [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[12]http://web.mst.edu/~dludlow/classes/ChE%20285%20Sp12/The%20Mexico%20City%20Explosion%20of%2019
84%20Final.pptx [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[13] http://elhorizonte.mx/mexico/estados/598171/pemex-y-su-negro-historial-en-2015[Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[14] http://www.csb.gov [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[15] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33844084 [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]

19
References
[16] http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2013/01/31/cronologia-accidentes-pemex [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[17]http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2015/04/01/pemex-reporta-promedio-de-153-accidentes-con-21-muertes-por-
ano-7763.html [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[18]http://elhorizonte.mx/mexico/estados/598171/pemex-y-su-negro-historial-en-2015 [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[19]http://www.tcetoday.com/latest%20news/2016/february/three-killed-in-pemex-rig-
fire.aspx#.VsNXqMeprFI[Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[20] http://www.excelsior.com.mx/2013/02/01/882272 [Retrieved: 02/15/2016]
[21] http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-04-01/pemex-oil-platform-explodes-injuries-reported-hundreds-evacuate
[Retrieved: 02/20/2016]
[22] http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/04/live-updates-west-texas-fertilizer-plant-explosion-injures-more-
than-100/[Retrieved: 02/20/2016]
[23] http://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/Tianjin-Explosion-Highlights-Profits-over-People-20150823-
0011.html[Retrieved: 02/20/2016]
[24] http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/population/response/[Retrieved: 02/20/2016]
[25] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2311379/West-Texas-fertilizer-plant-explosion-Death-toll-rises-disaster-
near-Waco.html[Retrieved: 02/20/2016]
[26] http://www.csb.gov/-csb-releases-analysis-showing-cause-of-rupture-and-hydrogen-blast-in-2009-silver-eagle-
refinery-accident-in-woods-cross-utah-pipe-walls-thinned-due-to-corrosion-that-went-uninspected-for-years-/[Retrieved:
02/20/2016]
[27] http://www.grimsbytelegraph.co.uk/VIDEO-Body-following-yesterday-s-explosion/story-11532025-
detail/story.html[Retrieved: 02/20/2016]

20
Thank you

Juliana_guarguati@tamu.edu

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